Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jeremy Edward Johnson, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefDec 29, 2025
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No. ___________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
________________________________________________________
JEREMY JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
On Petition for A Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Opiel Law
Christopher Opiel, Esq.
Counsel of Record for Petitioner
88 North Franklin Street
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania 18701
(570) 762-9992 (Office)
(570) 417-1436 (Cell)
(570) 825-6675 (Fax)
Email: cropiel@opiellaw.com
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
1. DID THE THIRD CIRCUIT ERR BY ASSUMING EVEN IF THERE WAS
A MIRANDA VIOLATION, THE VIOLATION WAS HARMLESS?
a. Did the Third Circuit err by not determining that there was a Miranda
violation?
b. Did the Third Circuit err by determining that even assuming there was a
Miranda violation, the violation was harmless?
ii
LIST OF PARTIES
All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.
RELATED CASES
1. United States v. Susan Nickas, 3:21-cr-00143 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 2022).
2. United States v. Susan Nickas, 23-1316 (3d Cir. Sept. 30, 2025) (reh’g
denied).
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page(s)
QUESTION PRESENTED………………………………………………………...ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES………………………………………………………vi
OPINION BELOW…………………………………………………………………2
JURISDICTION…………………………………………………………………....2
RELEVANT CASE LAW HOLDING……………………………………………..2
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS…………………………………………………...2
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION………………………………….10
1. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ERRED IN DETERMINING
THAT EVEN ASSUMING THERE WAS A MIRANDA VIOLATION,
THE VIOLATION WAS HARMLESS…………………………….…..….10
a. A Miranda Violation Occurred After the 25-Minute and 20-Second
Mark of Mr. Johnson’s Interrogation………………………………..10
b. The Miranda Violation Was Not a “Harmless Error” that Violated Mr.
Johnson’s Fifth Amendment Rights……………...………………….14
CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………...20
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE……………………………………………………21
CERTIFICATIONS……………………………………………………………….23
APPENDIX A
Third Circuit Opinion (09/30/2025)……………………………………..Appx A - 1
Third Circuit Judgment (09/30/2025)…………………………………..Appx A - 17
Middle District of Pennsylvania Judgment (01/04/2023)…………...…Appx A – 19
iv
Order Denying Motion to Suppress (07/20/2022)………………...……Appx A - 27
Memoranum Opinion Denying Motion to Suppress (07/20/2022)…….Appx A - 28
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page(s)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994)………………………...…2, 10, 11, 13
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990)………………………………………...14
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990)………………………………….10-11
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983)………………………………….11, 14
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 478 (1981)…………………………………….13-15
Rhode Island v., 446 U.S. 291 (1980)………………………………………2, 11-12
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975)………………………………………….11
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)…………………………....2, 14-16, 20
Fahy v. State of Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963)………………………………...15
STATUTES
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)………………………………………………………………...2
vi
No. ___________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
________________________________________________________
JEREMY JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Petitioner, Jeremy Johnson, by and through his undersigned attorney,
respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment entered in this
case by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
1
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
appears in the Appendix. Appx A – 1.
JURISDICTION
On September 30, 2025, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit entered
its judgment affirming the judgment of the District Court. Appx A – 17. The
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
RELEVANT CASE LAW HOLDING
The pertinent case law holdings include Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452
(1994); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980); and Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Detectives with the Monroe County District Attorney’s Office, along with
the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”), were investigating the death of Joshua
Kiernan, who allegedly died from a fentanyl/heroin overdose on December 11,
2020. United States v. Johnson, 3:21-cr-00143 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 2022), ECF No.
128 at 2.
On February 24, 2021, Mr. Johnson was taken into custody by law
enforcement pursuant to an active probation warrant, and Mr. Johnson was
interrogated by Monroe County Detective Craig Vanluvender and PSP Trooper
2
Nicholas De La Iglesias regarding the death of Joshua Kiernan. This interrogation
was audio- and video-recorded. See United States v. Johnson, 3:21-cr-00143
(M.D. Pa. July 20, 2022), ECF No. 128 at 3.
The interrogation was approximately 1 hour and 48 minutes long. United
States v. Johnson, 3:21-cr-00143 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 2022), ECF No. 128 at 6. Mr.
Johnson was initially read his Miranda Warnings and agreed to speak with law
enforcement. United States v. Johnson, 3:21-cr-00143 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 2022),
ECF No. 128 at 3.
Approximately 25 minutes and 20 seconds into the recorded interrogation,
Mr. Johnson unequivocally stated, “I want a lawyer.” United States v. Johnson,
3:21-cr-00143 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 2022), ECF No. 128 at 6.
Shortly after the 25-minute mark during the recorded interrogation, the
following transpired:1
CV – He’s showed you respect; he’s treated you like a man and all
he’s looking for is the truth. That’s what you got to give him.
JJ – So how do you know what’s the truth and what’s not, you know
what I mean? I could be telling you my truth and then …
CV – Well there’s not your truth, and her truth and his truth, there’s
one truth.
1
“CV” refers to Monroe County Detective Craig Vanluvender. “JJ” refers to Jeremy Edward Johnson. “ND” refers
to PSP Trooper Nicholas De La Iglesias. United States v. Johnson, 3:21-cr-00143 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 2022), ECF
No. 118 at 8-13.
3
JJ – Right, that’s up to somebody’s discretion, of somebody, you
know what I mean, like if you’re telling me I’m telling the truth or
not. If you already have the truth then what are we sitting here for?
ND – No, can you listen to me for a second?
JJ – See what I’m saying?
ND – The truth itself is not subjective. Everybody can have their
opinions their perspective on what they saw and how they feel about it
but the truth itself, that is not subjective.
JJ – Right.
ND – Ok. So, I’m just asking that whatever you tell me please tell me
the truth because it will only benefit you to tell me the truth, it
honestly will. If I am lied to by you then I can take any lie to me that
you’ve completely lied to me about everything and so I can disregard
everything you tell me and I don’t want to do that. I’d like to get the
honest truth from you sir. Ok? You lost a friend, right? I mean, no
matter who… (inaudible)
JJ – I want a lawyer.
ND – Sure.
JJ – Because I’m don’t like the way this is going. Cause I already feel
like people are pointing the finger to me right now and I don’t think
that’s fair. I didn’t ….
ND – That’s fine.
JJ – You know what I mean like, I knew this was going to come up. I
knew it, she tried to convince me that I was the one who sold him
drugs and I didn’t. I didn’t sell him drugs. It makes me so fucking
sick, it really does. It makes me so sick.
ND – You said you’d like a lawyer, that’s fine you have a
constitutional right for that.
JJ – Fucking tramp, fucking tramp of a wife (inaudible).
4
CV – We’ve got, we’ve got we’ve got messages, we’ve got phone
messages, text, we got ….
JJ – Then what are we sitting here for, I want a lawyer.
CV – That’s why we’re done sitting, we’re done sitting here.
ND – What we’re going to do …
JJ – You guys, you know what I mean, (inaudible) you know what I
mean.
CV – We want to get your side.
ND – Listen, so you made the choice to have a lawyer and that’s fine
so let’s stop the interview now ok and what we’ll do is get you cuffed
up and resecured out there. I want you to just take this with you when
you leave and you might want to talk to your lawyer later ok? I just
want you to take this information with you ok, so drug delivery
resulting in death is what we’re looking at and there’s a possibility
that we’re going to look at that route with you. Ok and if we’re
looking at the route with you.
JJ – (inaudible) …
ND – Can you hear me please.
CV – Just listen to him.
JJ – I just feel like you guys are coming at me so aggressively, like I
didn’t I didn’t.
ND – Jeremy ….
CV – Nobody’s aggressive.
ND – Jeremy I’m being very, very cordial and very nice with you but
I want you to take this with you and I’m not asking you any more
questions, just take this information with you. Ok so we have the
ability with drug delivery resulting in death to prosecute one of two
ways. We can prosecute that within the state system ok or we can
prosecute that federally ok. That can go as a federal charge. If it goes
5
as a federal charge with what you have of a prior criminal history sir
with the PWID you’re potentially looking at a life sentence out of it
and I’m not looking to do that to you. I would really like that buck not
to stop with you and move up to getting Sue and getting the drugs the
way, they came. So you want a lawyer, unless you decide you want to
waive those rights later that’s fine but that’s what I’m looking for. I
want to get Sue. I don’t want the buck to stop with you. I want to go
up the chain. I want to stop these drugs from coming in here and
hurting people.
CV – You’re a small fish.
ND – And I want you to take that with you when you leave. I want
you to take.
JJ – Well then well just tell me that in the beginning. Like, why were
you doing this whole song and dance? You know what I mean, like
CV – We were going to see if you were going to give it to us.
JJ – Like I’m the … I’m a (inaudible) guy like … but this whole you
know … you guys are trying to steer me a certain way like just be
honest with it … I’m a grown adult, you know what I’m saying like…
CV – He’s looking at you for drug delivery resulting in death. You
might go away for the rest of your life, there’s the truth.
JJ – Yeah but you got to prove that. I mean like I didn’t deliver him
the drugs and I’m pretty sure you guys know that.
CV – No, I don’t.
JJ – You do. You do.
CV – But circumstantially, we can prove that you did.
JJ – So how?
ND – Well you already asked for an attorney.
CV – We’re done. We’re done.
6
ND – Are you waiving that right? Do you now what to have a
conversation because you’re waiving your right to an attorney or did
you want your attorney, I don’t care either way, it’s your right, your
choice.
CV – You said you want an attorney. We’re done. He’s just talking
he’s not asking you questions. He’s just giving you a little information
as we’re parting ways. The only thing I’d add to what he said is
people make mistakes in life it’s what they do afterwards.
ND – What do you want. Just be honest with me. What do you want?
Let’s cut through this whole song and dance though. Just be honest
with it. I’m an adult. Alright? I’m not a child. You don’t have to
spoon feed me shit. Just tell me what’s going on. You know what I
mean? Like this whole we can talk through it and figure it out … like
I’m a grown ass man. Let’s be honest, why are we doing this … what
do you want?
ND – Are you waiving your right to an attorney and can we ask
questions or not?
JJ – Sure whatever just.
ND – It’s not whatever.
CV – Right, you ask for an attorney, you have to say now that I don’t
want an attorney I understand that I can ask for one again later on and
it has to be rule of course.
ND – At this point do you want an attorney?
JJ – Yes, no let’s continue.
ND – Ok.
JJ – Let’s figure this out (inaudible).
ND – Here’s what we’re looking for ok. I know that you and Kaleigh
met up the day before Josh died. I know that. Ok.
JJ – I don’t think, I don’t, I’m pretty sure I didn’t.
7
ND – Your Facebook messages are indicative of it and Kaleigh’s
statements are indicative of it.
JJ – Yeah but her statements don’t mean anything. She’s not, she’s a
drug addict.
ND – Ok.
JJ – You know what I mean? Like her statements don’t mean
anything. And my Facebook messages aren’t, that’s just … just check
out …
ND – Well …
JJ – This is a two-way conversation, are we having a two-way
conversation?
ND – Sure (inaudible)
JJ – That doesn’t check out because I don’t talk to people through
Messenger, especially Kaleigh. I didn’t talk to her up until that point.
You know what I mean. I didn’t ever talk to Kaleigh so whatever
messages you’re talking about you have I don’t believe that.
Law enforcement does not cease the interrogation after Mr. Johnson
unequivocally stated “I want a lawyer” at the 25-minute and 20-second mark, and
law enforcement continued to interrogate Mr. Johnson for an additional 1 hour and
22 minutes.
On June 17, 2022, Mr. Johnson filed a Motion to Suppress Statement of
Defendant, Jeremy Edward Johnson. United States v. Johnson, 3:21-cr-00143
(M.D. Pa. July 20, 2022), ECF No. 94 at 1. On July 1, 2022, Mr. Johnson filed a
Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress Statements of Defendant, Jeremy Edward
Johnson. United States v. Johnson, 3:21-cr-00143 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 2022), ECF
8
No. 104 at 1. Mr. Johnson argued that everything he stated to law enforcement
after the 25-minute and 20-second mark, when he stated “I want a lawyer”, should
be suppressed from use at trial. Id. at 3-4.
On July 12, 2022, the Government filed the Government’s Brief in
Opposition to Defendant Johnson’s Motion to Suppress Statements. United States
v. Johnson, 3:21-cr-00143 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 2022), ECF No. 118 at 1.
On July 20, 2022, the District Court denied Mr. Johnson’s motion to
suppress all statements after the 25:20 minute mark without the need for an
evidentiary hearing. Appx A – 27.
On July 25, 2022, an eight (8) day joint jury trial commenced against Mr.
Johnson and Ms. Nickas. The Government introduced evidence and testimony
throughout the trial regarding Mr. Johnson’s statements that he made to law
enforcement on February 24, 2021, beyond the 25:20-minute mark of his
interrogation. The Government brought up these statements in the Government’s
opening statement, during the direct examination of PSP Trooper Nicholas De La
Iglesias, and during the Government’s closing argument.
On August 2, 2022, Mr. Johnson and Ms. Nickas were convicted by the jury
of both counts of the Indictment.
9
On January 4, 2023, Mr. Johnson was sentenced to three hundred (300)
months of incarceration. United States v. Johnson, 3:21-cr-00143 (M.D. Pa. July
20, 2022), ECF No. 212 at 3.
Mr. Johnson filed a timely appeal with the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit docketed as No. 22-2512.
On September 30, 2025, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit filed its Opinion and Judgment whereby it affirmed the District Court’s
judgment entered on January 4, 2023. Appx A – 1.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I.
CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ERRED IN
DETERMINING THAT EVEN ASSUMING THERE WAS A
MIRANDA VIOLATION, THE VIOLATION WAS HARMLESS.
a. A Miranda Violation Occurred After the 25-Minute and 20-Second Mark
of Mr. Johnson’s Interrogation.
This Court has held that “when counsel is requested, interrogation must
cease, and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present,
whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney.” Minnick v.
Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990). “[A] suspect who has invoked his right to
counsel cannot be questioned regarding any offense unless an attorney is actually
present.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994) (citing Minnick v.
10
Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990)).
“[I]f a suspect requests counsel at any time during the interview, he is not
subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or the suspect
himself reinitiates conversation.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458
(1994). “[H]e must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly
that a reasonable police officer in the circumstance would understand the statement
to be a request for an attorney.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
“[T]he admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided
to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off
questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored.’” Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104
(1975).
“[E]ven if a conversation taking place after the accused has ‘expressed his
desire to deal with the police only through counsel,’ is initiated by the accused,
where reinterrogation follows, the burden remains upon the prosecution to show
that subsequent events indicated a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to have
counsel present during the interrogation.” Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039,
1044 (1983). Furthermore, after a defendant has invoked his Fifth Amendment
rights, police cannot ask questions or make statements “they should have known
were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 291, 303 (1980).
11
Here, Mr. Johnson unambiguously invoked his right to counsel when he
stated, “I want a lawyer” shortly after the 25:00-minute mark during the recorded
interrogation. At this point, all questioning was required to cease immediately.
Instead of “scrupulously honor[ing]” Mr. Johnson’s request for counsel, Trooper
De La Iglesias and Detective Vanluvender continued the conversation, playing off
Mr. Johnson’s emotion. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 303 (1980).
Trooper De La Iglesias and Detective Vanluvender continued the
conversation with Mr. Johnson, playing off his emotion by referencing the
investigation and telling him, “I want you to just take this with you when you
leave” and he may be charged with “drug delivery resulting in death”.
Furthermore, Trooper De La Iglesias asked Mr. Johnson to “hear” him while
Detective Vanluvender urged him to “just listen to him [Trooper De La Iglesias].”
Id.
Trooper De La Iglesias, by telling Mr. Johnson,
Ok so we have the ability with drug delivery resulting in
death to prosecute one of two ways. We can prosecute that
within the state system ok or we can prosecute that
federally ok. That can go as a federal charge. If it goes as
a federal charge with what you have of a prior criminal
history sir with the PWID you’re potentially looking at a
life sentence out of it and I’m not looking to do that to you.
did exactly what the Supreme Court in Innis prohibits. Undoubtedly, any officer
should know that telling a defendant that they face a potential life sentence if they
12
don’t tell their side of the story is likely to elicit an incriminating response.
Furthermore, Detective Vanluvender stated, “[Y]ou said you want an
attorney. We’re done. He’s just talking he’s not asking you questions. He’s just
giving you a little information as we’re parting ways. The only thing I’d add to
what he said is people make mistakes in life it’s what they do afterwards . . .”
Regardless of whether Detective Vanluvender was asking a question or making a
statement, this comment is one that he should have known was likely to elicit an
incriminating response after Mr. Johnson unambiguously invoked his right to
counsel.
Davis made it clear that once a defendant unambiguously invokes his right
to counsel, police must cease all questioning until an attorney is present. Here, Mr.
Johnson unambiguously invoked his rights when he stated, “I want a lawyer.”
Therefore, any further questioning or comments that a reasonable police officer
should have known were likely to elicit an incriminating response had to cease.
Detective Vanluvender and Trooper De La Iglesias continued to engage with Mr.
Johnson as shown above, thereby violating Mr. Johnson’s right to have counsel
present.
Furthermore, when Detective Vanluvender and Trooper De La Iglesias
continued to make comments to Mr. Johnson after he invoked his right to counsel,
the continued engagement violated the purpose of the rule set forth in Edwards.
13
“Edwards thus established another prophylactic rule designed to prevent police
from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.”
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990) (citing Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462
U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983) (plurality opinion)). As shown in the interrogation
transcript, Detective Vanluvender and Trooper De La Iglesias repeatedly
acknowledged and badgered Mr. Johnson about whether he wanted an attorney
after he unambiguously asserted that he did want an attorney numerous times.
Eventually, Mr. Johnson, after being consistently badgered by Detective
Vanluvender and Trooper De La Iglesias, hesitantly agreed to waive his rights.
Since Mr. Johnson unambiguously invoked his right to counsel when he
stated, “I want a lawyer” shortly after the 25:00-minute mark during the recorded
interrogation, and Detective Vanluvender and Trooper De La Iglesias continued
communicating in a way that a reasonable officer should have known Mr. Johnson
would likely make an incriminating response, Mr. Johnson’s Fifth Amendment
rights were violated. Therefore, there was a Miranda violation committed against
Mr. Johnson.
b. The Miranda Violation Was Not a “Harmless Error” that Violated Mr.
Johnson’s Fifth Amendment Rights.
This Court has held the question to be asked when determining if a
constitutional error was harmless is “‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that
the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’” Chapman
14
v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) (quoting Fahy v. State of Connecticut, 365
U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)). “[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held
harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). “There is
little, if any, difference between our statement in Fahy v. State of Connecticut …
and requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Id.
“We are not concerned here with whether there was sufficient evidence on
which the petitioner could have been convicted without the evidence complained
of.” Fahy v. State of Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86 (1963).
[T]he Court has strongly indicated that additional
safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for
counsel; and we now hold that when an accused has
invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial
interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be
established by showing only that he responded to further
police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been
advised of his rights.
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 478, 484 (1981).
In the instant case, the Third Circuit held, “we will reverse the judgment of
conviction unless the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the
statements were harmless—i.e., that the statements did not contribute to the
conviction.” Appx A – 6. “Here, the government has met its burden of proving
harmlessness.” Id. “In light of the record as a whole, we are convinced that any
15
additional inculpatory evidence from Johnson’s post-25-minute-mark statements
did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.” Id.
Mr. Johnson respectfully contends that the Third Circuit erred in
determining that the Miranda violation was harmless because the inculpatory
evidence from Johnson’s post-25-minute-mark statements might have contributed
to his conviction. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967). Since
Johnson’s post-25-minute-mark statements might have contributed to his
conviction, the Third Circuit erred by determining that the Government had met its
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements did not contribute
to his conviction. Id.
Here, the Government introduced evidence and testimony throughout the
trial regarding Mr. Johnson’s statements that he made to law enforcement on
February 24, 2021, beyond the 25:20-minute mark of his interrogation.
Specifically, the Government stated to the jury in its opening statement at
trial, “[y]ou are going to hear about statements from both defendants, and you’ll
learn how they lied to law enforcement.” Transcript of Jury Trial Monday, July
25, 2022, United States v. Johnson, 3:21-cr-00143 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 2022), ECF
No. 179 at 134.
Additionally, Trooper De La Iglesias testified at trial that once he showed
Mr. Johnson a physical copy of the Facebook communications between Mr.
16
Johnson and Kaleigh from December 10th (the day prior to Josh’s death) that “there
was a visible change in him” and “[h]e began sweating quite profusely [and] used
several tissues to wipe his brow.” Transcript of Jury Trial Tuesday, August 2,
2022, United States v. Johnson, 3:21-cr-000143 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 2022), ECF No.
184 at 47. Mr. Johnson was shown the Facebook communications and began
sweating at the 40:20-minute mark of the interrogation, which is after the 25minute mark.
Trooper De La Iglesias testified at trial to specific statements that Johnson
made to law enforcement after the 25-minute mark of the interrogation. Trooper
De La Iglesias testified:
[h]e said that he knows Josh and Josh uses all the drugs he
has right then and there, he doesn’t save any. I asked him
about how much drugs does Josh consume normally
speaking. He said, three to four bags at a time and it could
be anywhere from two to three bundles in a day… [and]
[h]e was hanging out with him every day.
Id. at 49. Mr. Johnson provided law enforcement with this information starting at
the 31:71-minute mark and the 34:10-minute mark in the interrogation, which are
both after the 25-minute mark.
Trooper De La Iglesias testified that Mr. Johnson “initially said that he
talked to [Josh] that morning” being the day Josh passed away, “[t]hen [Mr.
Johnson] changed it to he tried to call him that morning.” Id. at 49. Mr. Johnson
provided law enforcement with this information starting at the 37:20-minute mark
17
in the interrogation, which is after the 25-minute mark.
The stamps on the drug bags were a critical factor throughout the trial, and
Trooper De La Iglesias testified that when asked about the stamps on the drug
bags, Mr. Johnson responded, “personally it doesn’t matter”. Transcript of Jury
Trial Tuesday, August 2, 2022, United States v. Johnson, 3:21-cr-000143 (M.D.
Pa. July 20, 2022), ECF No, 184 at 50. Mr. Johnson provided law enforcement
with this information starting at the 31:30-minute mark in the interrogation, which
is after the 25-minute mark.
Trooper De La Iglesias testified that Mr. Johnson told law enforcement that:
Mr. Johnson did not meet up with Kaleigh Watson on December 10th, the day
before Josh died; Kaleigh did not give Mr. Johnson money the day before Josh
died; and Mr. Johnson “kept saying I don’t hang out with Kaleigh”. Id. at 50. Mr.
Johnson provided law enforcement with this information starting at the 49:07minute mark in the interrogation, which is after the 25-minute mark.
Trooper De La Iglesias testified that Mr. Johnson told law enforcement that
he would cooperate with law enforcement “only if [he/Mr. Johnson] go[es] home”.
Id. at 53. Mr. Johnson provided law enforcement with this information starting at
the 1:23:05-minute mark in the interrogation, which is after the 25-minute mark.
Trooper De La Iglesias testified that when law enforcement asked Mr.
Johnson if he would cooperate against sources of drugs in New Jersey that Mr.
18
Johnson responded, “I don’t play ball, it’s against my code.” Id. at 52. Mr.
Johnson provided this statement to law enforcement at the 1:29:38-minute mark of
the interrogation, which is after the 25-minute mark.
Finally, during the closing argument, the Government stated to the jury,
“[y]ou also have the lies of Jemery Johnson … which I will rely on your
recollection as to what Jeremy Johnson told Trooper De La Iglesia during that
interview …” Transcript of Jury Trial Wednesday, August 3, 2022, United States
v. Johnson, 3:21-cr-000143 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 2022), ECF No. 186 at 83.
The
jury’s reliance on the statements Mr. Johnson made to law enforcement after the
25-minute mark of the interrogation certainly contributed to the verdict obtained.
Here, the Government is the beneficiary of the inculpatory evidence from
Mr. Johnson’s post-25-minute mark statements because the statements were used
at trial as evidence to help convince the jury that Mr. Johnson was guilty.
Therefore, the burden rests on the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the Miranda violation did not contribute to the verdict.
The Government has failed to meet its burden. The standard does not
require there to be enough other evidence to support the guilty verdict absent the
inculpatory evidence; instead, the reviewing court must determine whether the
inculpatory evidence might have played a role in influencing the jury’s decision. If
there is a reasonable possibility that it did, the error cannot be harmless beyond a
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reasonable doubt.
Here, the Government used the inculpatory evidence stated above to help
outline its case to the jury. The Government repeatedly referenced the
interrogation after the 25:20-minute mark to support its narrative of guilt from its
opening statement to closing argument. The jury actually heard these statements
and the line of questioning that included the inculpatory evidence. Since the
Government relied, at least in part, on it to support its case, there is at least a
reasonable possibility that it influenced the jury’s verdict.
Once the inculpatory evidence was heard by the jury, it is unrealistic to
assume that the jurors would ignore it so that it “did not contribute” to the
conviction. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
Therefore, the inculpatory evidence admitted at trial might and likely did
contribute to Mr. Johnson’s guilty verdict. Thus, the error of admitting this
evidence cannot be deemed harmless. Since the error cannot be deemed harmless,
Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that his conviction and/or sentencing be
reversed.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing argument and authorities, this court
should grant the petition for writ of certiorari.
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No. ___________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
________________________________________________________
JEREMY JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Christopher R. Opiel, hereby certify that on December 28, 2025, I served
copies of the Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and the Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari in the above-captioned cases were mailed, first class postage
prepaid, to the following:
Solicitor General of the United States
Room 5616
Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20530-0001
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Patricia S. Dodszuweit, Clerk
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
601 Market Street
Room 21400
Philadelphia, PA 19106-1790
Office of the United States Attorney
235 N. Washington Avenue
Scranton, PA 18503
Jeremy Edward Johnson
Register No. 47254-509
FCI Ray Brook
Federal Correctional Institution
P.O. BOX 900
Ray Brook, NY 12977
I certify that all parties required to be served have been served.
Respectfully submitted,
Date: December 28, 2025
/s/ Christopher Opiel
Christopher Opiel, Esq.
CJA Appointed Counsel
Attorney ID# PA318776
Opiel Law
88 North Franklin Street
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania 18701
(570) 762-9992 (Office)
(570) 417-1436 (Cell)
(570) 825-6675 (Fax)
Email: cropiel@opiellaw.com
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CERTIFICATIONS
I, Christopher R. Opiel, Esq., hereby certify that:
1. I am an attorney appointed under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964.
2. The text of the documents electronically filed with the Court is identical to
the text of the paper copies mailed to the Court.
3. A virus check was performed on the electronic documents with AVG
software, and the documents are virus-free.
4. This filing contains 5,387 words.
5. On December 28, 2025, one copy of the foregoing Petition for Writ of
Certiorari was placed in the United States mail, first-class, postage prepaid,
addressed to: U.S. Attorney’s Office, William J. Nealon Federal Building,
Suite 311, 235 N. Washington Avenue, Scranton, PA 18503.
6. On December 28, 2025, ten copies of the same were placed in the United
States mail, first class, postage pre-paid, addressed to: Supreme Court of the
United States, Office of Clerk, 1 First Street NE, Washington, D.C. 20543.
Date: December 28, 2025
/s/ Christopher Opiel
Christopher Opiel, Esq.
CJA Appointed Counsel
Attorney ID# PA318776
Opiel Law
88 North Franklin Street
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania 18701
(570) 762-9992 (Office)
(570) 417-1436 (Cell)
23
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.