Reply Brief — Onwy Uzoigwe, Petitioner v. Charter Communications, LLC

No.: 25-643

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

Onwy Uzoigwe,

Petitioner

Vv.

Charter Communications LLC.,

Respondent

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF

Onwy Uzoigwe

4212 Flowerton Rd.

Baltimore, MD 21229

Phone: (347) 572-8280

Email: pauclewemenall oon

Pro se Petitioner

RECEIVED

FEB -3 2026

OFFICE OF T

SUPREME count Hes

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION sccsssssssssciscsssaniesssonsseesansessesessvaccasens 1

LEGAL STANDARD ...0.. ee ccesssssossseesscsecsaceacensenes 2

I. THE RESPONDENT'S BRIEF DOES NOT

ALIGN WITH RULE 83. .....ccsccssessessesssesscsseestenes 2

Il. THE POINTS RAISED BY THE

RESPONDENT AGREE WITH PETITIONER’S

POSITION ........cssssscesssssesessssssssssesesesscssessecserseeeseees 3

A. The Respondent Contradicts Itself. ........0....0... 3

B. The Respondent implicitly agrees, and

therefore, concedes, that this Case should not have

been Removed to Federal Court...........ccccccccseeeeeeees 4

C. The Respondent’s argument regarding Morse

v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984)

is insufficient and flawed. .............ccccessssesecceseeeensees 5

i. The Subsequent Service was Completed and

conforms to NY CPLR § 311-a, NY CPLR §

308(3), and NY Limit Liab Co § 3038(b). ......000. 7

ii. The Second Circuit incorrectly characterized

the Subsequent Service as “another unsuccessful

attempt at mailed service.” .........ccccccccccessessseeees 11

D. The Petition does not Assert Arguments

Beyond the Scope of the Questions Presented. ... 13

K. The Respondent is an In-State Defendant, and

there are no Federal Claims in this Case............ 14

F. The Respondent’s “Question Presented” does

not restate, clarify, or fairly reframe the questions

presente d. sesessssesiseser ccuvssaseamoseerieucascsnus seaman 16

G. Petitioner’s Unemployment Appeal decision

had undisputed issue preclusion effect, not claim...

Preclusion effECt. ..........cccccccceseesssseeseesseseereeesseerenees 17

H. The Second Circuit applied an incorrect

analysis to the contract’s considerations and the

verbal “six -step process” statement. ..............000 19

CONCLUSION .......ccccsssscscsssssscscescsecsscseesscssnssassneeas 19

il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996)..... 14

Handelsman v. Bedford Village Associates Lid.

Partn., 213 F.3d 48, 50n. 2 (2d Cir. 2000) ...... 14, 15

Henderson v. U.S., 517 U.S. 654, 672 (1996) .......0... 10

Lacovacci v. Brevet Holdings, LLC, No. 1:18-CV-

08048-MKV, 2023 WL 2631966, at *9 (S.D.N-Y.

Mar. 24, 2028) .........ccccccccccsseeeeceeeeseesseeecceeseceetererenes 19

Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709,

T14 (1986)... ceccecececsssenseeesserseescssaeeeeesessssseeess 11

Isett v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 947 F.3d 122, 129-380 (2d

Cir. 2020) .... eee waoeoas sbbbasTeueeeMNESE NESE EEdives 11

Lebron v. Natl. R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374

(1995)................-.9sgegityasaslaag oesewepusssumeuszieuessncsemaunNecss 13

Lobosco vu. N.Y. Tel. Co./ NYNEX, 96 N.Y.2d 312

(2001)... ceeecseeeceeeeeessseseeeeeeeteeeeeeeeeseececerseeceeeeesensees 19

Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 548 (2d Cir.

ZO IN@) a. .+2+. ogie +> +B» SSSI RS Sean eSRRRN i enRNAINNRNES 12

Old Republic Ins. Co. V. P. Fin. Services of Am., Inc.,

301 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir, 2002) .....cccecessceesssseeeeseees 8

O'Neill v. New York Univ., 97 A.D.3d 199, 944

N.Y.S.2d 508 (2012) oo... eescecesesetseeseeesseeseeneeees 19

iil

RDW Capital v. Monesi, No. 21-2066, 2022 WL

9575728, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 17, 2022)... 8

Royal Canin U.S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S.

22, 44 (2025) .cececceccsessessecsecsesssecssessessessessessevesessseeses 16

Simonds v. Grobman, 277 A.D.2d 369, 716 N.Y.S.2d

692, 693 (2000)... eceessteccsssrseccsesesseeeeccesseeeeesnes 8

Skyline Agency, Inc. v. Ambrose Coppotelli, Inc., 117

A.D.2d 135, 502 N.Y.S.2d 479, 483-84 (1986)........ 8

Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L. P., 595

U.S. 178, 191-92 (2022), Justices Thomas, Alito,

And Gorsuch AiSSenting .......cccccccccccccscccceceeeeesseverere 13

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1832 sccccsssesavesncncccscemzaamameareanasericcncnes 15

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) ww... eee 10

RULES

FRCP Rule 12(b)(6)............cccccessesceeeeseeeeeeeeserenceeees 1,17

FRCP Rule 41.00.00... ccccccccecesesvees RGUSINSESCSODNaNSGESUIRI oo 0000s e 6

NY CPLR 312-€..ccccccccssssssssssessesseesvesesseesesseaveases 6, 7, 11

NYLL § 628 ...... ssssssegisccensapapgessiecsnesssersnspenonponsees++++++ 18

Supreme Court Rule 14............00...cccccccccecceeseeeeeeeee 2

Supreme Court Rule 24.0.0... ceeeeeeeeeeeeeenes 2,16

iv

Supreme Court Rule 38 ................ccccccccccceccecceeeeeeees

INTRODUCTION

An objective review of the record demonstrates

that Respondent, Charter Communications LLC,

received full due process and suffered no prejudice

from any alleged defect in service: it had notice,

appeared, removed the action, and fully litigated the

matter. Rather than defend in the state forum where

the case was commenced—and where only state-law

claims were asserted—Respondent, a forum-state

defendant, invoked federal jurisdiction and then used

removal to foreclose merits adjudication altogether.

The issues on appeal therefore extend beyond statelaw service questions and arise from departures from

ordinary federal practice, including the retention of

jurisdiction over a purely state-law case removed from

the defendant's home forum, the resolution of

disputed factual inferences at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage,

and the making of first-instance factual

determinations on appeal. Respondent’s insistence

that the case presents “only state-law issues” is a post

hoc reframing designed to shield those procedural

departures from review and is contradicted by its

own decision to remove the action to federal

court.

LEGAL STANDARD

“A brief in opposition should be stated briefly

and in plain terms...the brief in opposition shall

comply with the requirements of Rule 24

governing a respondent's brief.” U.S. Sup. Ct. R.

15. “A brief on the merits for a petitioner or an

appellant...shall contain...[t]he questions presented

for review under Rule 14.1(a)...The phrasing of the

questions presented need not be identical with that in

the petition for a writ of certiorari or the jurisdictional

statement, but the brief may not raise additional

questions or change the substance of the

questions already presented in_ those

documents.” U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 24.

I. THE RESPONDENT’S BRIEF DOES NOT

ALIGN WITH RULE 33.

“Every booklet-format document shall be

produced on paper that is opaque, unglazed, and not

less than 60 pounds in weight[.]” U.S. Sup. Ct. R.

33. The pages in the Opp. Br. do not align with Rule

33.1(c). The booklet was produced on paper that is

2

less than 60 pounds in weight. Petitioner followed

the Rule 33 standard and would be prejudiced if the

Court rewards the Respondent’s noncompliance.

Il. THE POINTS RAISED BY THE

RESPONDENT AGREE WITH

PETITIONER’S POSITION.

The Respondent and Petitioner agree that one

of the compelling reasons for granting a petition is “a

lower court’s departure so far from the accepted and

usual course of proceedings such as to call for an

exercise of this Courts supervisory power.”

Respondent’s Opposition Brief “Opp. Br.”) at 9. The

following reasons are consistent with that contention.

A. The Respondent Contradicts Itself.

The Respondent asserts that “[t]he Petition

substantially departs from the record and the

arguments presented at the lower courts. Although

Petitioner identifies two questions presented, he also

asks this Court to revisit the merits of the case.” Opp.

Br. at 8. The Respondent cannot simultaneously

assert that the Petition “substantially departs from

the record” and then assert that it improperly asks

this Court to “revisit the record.” Either the Petition

relies on the record below and challenges the legal

conclusions drawn from it, or it introduces matters

outside the record. It cannot be both. This

contradiction is only a glimpse of the frivolous and

unethical argument exhibited by the Respondent

throughout this entire matter.

B. The Respondent implicitly agrees, and

therefore, concedes, that this Case should

not have been Removed to Federal Court.

The Respondent, a New York resident, removed

this case from the State Court to the Federal Court

when there were no federal claims and service was

proven to be completed prior to the removal. They are

now minimizing federal authority in their Opp. Br.

and place heavy reliance on New York authority:

“TThe Petition] challenges the correctness of the lower

court’s fact-specific application of settled New York

law, which falls far short of the compelling reasons

necessary for this Court’s review.” Id. at 9; “First, the

lower court decisions turn on state law, not federal

law, which renders certiorari improper.” Jd. at 10; The

Respondent’s contention that “[Petitioner’s] argument

is premised on, and derivative of, Petitioner’s state

4

law service theory” Jd. at 12; “Petitioner’s

disagreement with the Second Circuit’s application of

settled New York law...is not a_ conflict or

disagreement between circuit courts and does not

support certiorari.” Jd. at 12-13; “Every question

raised in the Petition turns on state law: New

York’s service-of-process rules, New York’s at-will

employment doctrine, and New York’s statutory

treatment of administrative determinations. These

are improper issues upon which to grant certiorari.”

Opp. Br. at 13; “The merits of each of Petitioner’s

arguments is also contrary to well-settled New York

law” Id. at 19. The Respondent, a New York resident,

concedes that this case only raised state issues,

making their own removal from the State improper.

C. The Respondent’s argument regarding

Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35

(2d Cir. 1984) is insufficient and flawed.

The Respondent asserts that “Petitioner’s

reliance on Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35

(2d Cir. 1984) is misplaced as discussed in Section

III.A. (pp. 23-24), as Petitioner never cited this case

at the lower courts, this case does not interpret the

5

New York statute under which Petitioner claimed he

completed service, and the Second Circuit’s holding

does not conflict with the holding from Morse.” Opp.

Br. at 13n. 2.

Petitioner’s first service attempt on Respondent

was via NY CPLR 312-a. Petitioner then effectuated

personal service via private process server on

Respondent which was completed prior to removal.

The Respondent removed this case to the Federal

Court. “CPLR 312-a authorizes service of process by

first-class mail, provided certain — statutorily

prescribed forms are enclosed with the process. CPLR

312-a took effect on January 1, 1990. It is modeled

largely on a former version of Rule 4 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Practice

Commentaries, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 312-a.

There is limited authority in New York to

determine how to handle these _ particular

circumstances. However, the 312-a commentary

confirms that it should be construed in pari materia

with the former Rule 4 acknowledgment of service.

Morse v. Elmira concerns the former Rule 4.

Petitioner is not invoking Morse as a direct

construction of CPLR § 312-a or § 311-a, but as

6

binding Second Circuit precedent governing how

federal courts have handled service defects

regarding the acknowledgment of service, and

what completes that defective services. Morse v.

Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984)

confirms that even with the Respondent’s late return

of the acknowledgment form, the subsequent service

would complete the first half of the 312-a service, with

the completion date being the date the Respondent

received the 312-a mailing; August 28th, 2023.

i. The Subsequent Service was

Completed and conforms to NY

CPLR § 31l-a, NY CPLR § 308(3). and

NY Limit Liab Co § 303(b).

It is well known that in a removed case,

whether the forum defendant rule was triggered

depends on whether or not service was completed

prior to removal according to state law. Therefore,

completed service depends on state law and authority.

The Respondent asserts “Petitioner previously

conceded that he only attempted service by mail—not

personal service—and that Respondent never signed

or returned the acknowledgment form required to

complete service under New York CPLR § 312-a. (See,

e.g., Pet. App. 224—30.)”

First, this is false, and no argument is required

by Petitioner where Respondent failed to file an

affidavit rebutting service. “[A] process server's

affidavit of service establishes a prima facie case of the

account of the method of service, and thus, in the

absence of contrary facts, we presume that Pacific was

properly served with the complaint.” Old Republic

Ins. Co. V. P. Fin. Services of Am., Inc., 301 F.3d 54,

57 (2d Cir. 2002). “A defendant's sworn denial of

receipt of service, however, rebuts the presumption of

proper service established by the process server's

affidavit and necessitates an evidentiary hearing.” Id

at 57, citing Skyline Agency, Inc. v. Ambrose

Coppotelli, Inc., 117 A.D.2d 135, 502 N.Y.S.2d 479,

483-84 (1986). “But no hearing is required where the

defendant fails to swear to ‘specific facts to rebut the

statements in the process server's affidavits.” Old

Republic Ins. Co. V. P. Fin. Services of Am., Inc. at 58,

citing Simonds v. Grobman, 277 A.D.2d 369, 716

N.Y.S.2d 692, 693 (2000); see also RDW Capital uv.

Monesi, No. 21-2066, 2022 WL 9575728, at *1 (2d Cir.

Oct. 17, 2022) citing Old Republic Ins. Co. V. P. Fin.

Services of Am., Inc. (°A defendant's sworn denial of

receipt of service ... rebuts the presumption of proper

8

service established by the process server's affidavit

and necessitates an evidentiary hearing’ only if the

defendant ‘swear[s] to specific facts to rebut the

statements in the process server's affidavits.”). This

further confirms the Second Circuit’s departure “from

the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings”

triggering the need for this Court’s review of the

issues in this case.

Second, the Respondent states that “the record

confirms that Petitioner did not personally serve

Charter, that Yves Vagary did not personally serve

Charter, and that both individuals only mailed a copy

of the summons complaint to Charter’s registered

agent.” Opp. Br. at 20-21. This is also false. The

Respondent, however, concedes that the

subsequent service reached their registered

agent, meaning that they, in fact, were served.

Their characterization of that service is a disputed

fact that is irrelevant here where they failed to file an

affidavit rebutting service.! Furthermore, “the core

function of service is to supply notice of the pendency

1 The evidence confirms that the personal service attempt was

“delivered” on September 12th, 2023 to Respondent’s agent on

file with the state to receive service of process, and does not fit

the definition of “mailed” in NY. See App Pg. 281-291.

)

of a legal action, in a manner and at a time that

affords the defendant a fair opportunity to answer the

complaint and present defenses and objections.”

Henderson v. U.S., 517 U.S. 654, 672 (1996).

Petitioner has successfully completed this core

function on Respondent. The Second Circuit's

departure from this well settled principle requires

review from this Court.

The Respondent also misconstrues’ the

“personally served” definition. “Personal service” is a

statutory term of art and is not limited to hand-tohand delivery. It is “[a] beneficial or useful act

performed on behalf of another by an individual

personally. In this sense, a personal service is an

economic service involving either the intellectual or

manual personal effort of an individual.” PERSONAL

SERVICE, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

This confirms that the subsequent service, by

Mr. Vagary on behalf of Petitioner, completed the first

service where the Respondent failed to timely return

the acknowledgement documents. See Morse uv.

Elmira, supra. While the acknowledgment documents

would have given the Respondent 20 days to respond,

their failure to timely return the acknowledgment

10

documents, and the receipt and completion of the

subsequent service would find them served on the date

they received the 312-a service—August 28th, 2023.

Alternatively, even if Morse if not applied, the

Respondent was still served prior to removal on

September 12th, 2023, meaning that, either way, the

forum defendant rule was triggered and the Federal

Courts lacked jurisdiction of this case.

ii. The Second Circuit incorrectly

characterized the Subsequent

Service _as “another unsuccessful

attempt at mailed service.”

There are two main issues with the Second

Circuit characterizing Petitioner’s subsequent service

as “another unsuccessful attempt at mailed service.”

See Appendix (“App. Pg.”) 9n. 1.

First, the characterization of this subsequent

service amounts to improper fact finding. See Icicle

Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714

(1986)(Where the district court failed to find facts, the

district court should not simply have made factual

findings on its own.). The Second Circuit departed

from that reasoning where they previously held fast to

it. See Isett v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 947 F.3d 122, 129—

80 (2d Cir. 2020)”) (“Specifically, the question of how

11

an employee spends her “working time is a question of

fact” and the question of whether an employee's

primary duty excluded her “from the overtime benefits

of the FLSA is a question of law.); see also Myers v.

Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 548 (2d Cir. 2010); Icicle

Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714

(1986). In this matter, whether the service was

mailing is a question of fact, while whether or not the

Defendant received service is a question of law. The

question of law has been affirmatively answered,

evidenced by the unchallenged affidavit of service on

file. See App. Pg. 224-228.

Second, there was no traverse hearing and no

indication that Mr. Yves Vagary was unavailable to

testify to that service. All statements characterizing

the method of the subsequent service regardless of it

coming from Petitioner, Respondent, or the Second

Circuit Court, is hearsay. The undisputed facts are

that there is an affidavit on file of a subsequent service

being completed, and that there was never a rebuttal

affidavit filed by the Respondent.

12

D. The Petition does not Assert Arguments

Beyond the Scope of the Questions

Presented.

The Respondent incorrectly asserts that “[t]he

Petition is likewise improper because it asks this

Court to consider issues outside those Petitioner

articulated in the Questions Presented.” Opp. Br. at

18.

The Courts Rules state that, “fo]nly the

questions set out in the petition, or fairly included

therein, will be considered by the Court.” U.S. Sup.

Ct. R. 14. “An argument is ‘fairly included’ only if it

raises a ‘prior question.” Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M

Hennes & Mauritz, L. P., 595 U.S. 178, 191-92 (2022),

Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch dissenting.

“Fairly included” means that those issues were

previously raised in the lower courts. The Supreme

Court has gone as far as considering argument not

explicitly raised until brief on merits “where both

lower courts considered argument and it was fairly

embraced both within questions presented and

argument set forth in petition.” Lebron v. Natl. R.R.

Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995). There is no

prejudice to the Respondent, and the Respondent

13

presented rebuttal reasons under Petitioner’s Reasons

for Granting the Writ.

E. The Respondent is an In-State Defendant,

and there are no Federal Claims in this

Case.

This Court has long held that “[w]hen a plaintiff

files in state court a civil action over which the federal

district courts would have original jurisdiction based

on diversity of citizenship, the defendant or

defendants may remove the action to federal

court...provided that no defendant ‘is a citizen of the

399

State in which such action is brought,”. Caterpillar

Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996); see also

Handelsman v. Bedford Village Associates Ltd. Partn.,

213 F.3d 48, 50n. 2 (2d Cir. 2000)(“Because Kronman

was a citizen of New York, he was not entitled to

remove to federal court.”).

The Respondent made clear in their Notice of

Removal that “Charter is and has been a citizen

of the States of Connecticut, Delaware, Missouri, and

New York.” App. Pg. 190. Petitioner’s Motion to

Remand, filed only nine days after the Respondent

filed their Notice of Removal, stated that “[r]emoval to

14

the United States District Court was not

necessary...[where]...all the actions giving rise to this

claim happened in the County of Queens.” App. Pg.

247. Yet the District Court chose not to remand the

case back to the State Court.

In the Second Circuit, Petitioner stated, in his

Appellant’s Brief that “[ijf Charter Communications

LLC., as a citizen of New York, is a proper party to the

action, its presence destroys diversity citizenship, and

thereby deprives the district court of subject matter

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.” D.E. 31.1 at 21.

The Second Circuit stated that “[t]here is no dispute

that Charter, a New York resident, filed its notice of

removal from New York State court before returning

the required acknowledgment of service to Uzoigwe.”

See App. Pg. 7. The Second Circuit, however, declined

remand. This constitutes a complete departure

from their holding in Handelsman v. Bedford Village

Associates; a compelling enough reason for this

court to grant the Petition.

Furthermore, the Respondent fails to point to

any federal claims that would have made their

removal proper. This Court recently reaffirmed the

well-known standard—that the lack of federal claims

15

“deprived the District Court of federal-question

jurisdiction. And once that was gone, the court's

supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims

dissolved too.” Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc. v.

Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 44 (2025). The Second

Circuit has previously agreed with this. See Fracasse

v. People's United Bank, 747 F.8d 141 (2d Cir.

2014)(“The Court of Appeals held that employees'

state law claims did not arise out of federal law, as

would give rise to federal subject matter

jurisdiction.”). On that ground alone, remand was

warranted.

F. The Respondent’s “Question Presented”

does not restate, clarify, or fairly reframe

the questions presented.

As stated above, the Opp. Br. is flawed from its

onset where the Question Presented sidesteps the

Court’s Rules. Rule 15 states that “the brief in

opposition shall comply with the requirements of Rule

24 governing a respondent's brief.” Respondent’s

“Question Presented” does not restate or fairly

reframe the questions in the Petition, as permitted by

Supreme Court Rule 24, but instead substitutes a

16

new inquiry—whether certiorari should be denied—

thereby changing the substance of the issues before

the Court. The Petition asks whether the court of

appeals departed from accepted judicial procedure in

resolving factual matters on review of a Rule 12(b)(6)

dismissal. Respondent’s formulation presumes the

absence of any such issue and embeds an argument

for denial into the “question” itself, which Rule 24 does

not authorize.

G. Petitioner’s Unemployment Appeal decision

had undisputed issue preclusion effect, not

claim preclusion effect.

The Second Circuit explicitly stated that

“[Petitioner’s]} argument that earlier administrative

proceedings regarding his’ entitlement to

unemployment benefits has res judicata effect fails

because those proceedings did not address whether

Charter breached any contract when it terminated

[Petitioner].” See App Pg. 11n. 2. The Second Circuit

implicitly agrees that the administrative decision has

collateral estoppel effect, and that only one element,

which is in dispute in this case—whether the

17

Respondent breached any contract—prevented claim

preclusion.

The Respondent argues that Petitioner’s

inclusion of the Administrative Preclusion argument

is “outside the Questions Presented” and “also

meritless.” Opp. Br. at 23. Yet the Respondent

provided argument, albeit, insufficient.

To be brief, NYLL § 623(1) explains that

reviewed unemployment facts found, which have not

been further appealed, have issue preclusion. § 623(2)

explains that there is no claim preclusion from the

hearing decision. Petitioner cited the statute in his

Complaint. See App. Pg. 139 (Complaint citing NYLL

§ 623; App. Pg. 211 (original Complaint in Notice of

Removal). The statute as a whole means that either

party is allowed to commence a civil action. However,

the relevant facts found in the unemployment appeals

hearing will be precluded from further litigation.

Therefore, the Unemployment Preclusion argument

has merit.

18

H. The Second Circuit applied an incorrect

analysis to the contract’s considerations and

the verbal “six -step process” statement.

The Second Circuit’s reliance on Lobosco v. N.Y.

Tel. Co./NYNEX, 96 N.Y.2d 312 (2001), was

misplaced. “Lobosco cautions courts against ‘lightly’

converting routinely issued employee manuals,

handbooks, and policy statements ... into binding

employment agreements.” Jacovacci v. Brevet

Holdings, LLC, No. 1:18-CV-08048-MKV, 2023 WL

2631966, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2023)(cleaned up)

“[S]ince Lobosco, the First Department has looked at

the totality of the circumstances and not a narrow

analysis of breach of employment contract claims. See

O'Neill v. New York Univ., 97 A.D.3d 199, 944

N.Y.S.2d 503 (2012).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a

Writ of Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Onwy Uzoigwe

Onwy Uzoigwe

19

4212 Flowerton Rd.

Baltimore, MD 21229

Phone: (347) 572-8280

Email: 0.uzoigwe@gmail.com

Pro se Petitioner

20

Onwy Uzoigwe

4212 Flowerton Rd.

Baltimore, MD 21229

Phone: (347) 572-8280

Email: o.uzoigwe@gmail.com

Pro se Petitioner