Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Mark Hanneman, Minneapolis Police Officer, et al., Petitioners v. Karen Wells, as Co-Trustee for the Next of Kin of Amir Rahkare Locke, et al.

Supreme Court briefDec 1, 2025

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No. 25In the

Supreme Court of the United States

MARK HANNEMAN, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

AS A MINNEAPOLIS POLICE OFFICER,

AND THE CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS,

Petitioners,

KAREN WELLS AND ANDRE LOCKE AS

CO-TRUSTEES FOR THE NEXT OF KIN OF

AMIR RAHKARE LOCKE,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of A ppeals for the Eighth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Kristyn A nderson

Minneapolis City Attorney

Kristin R. Sarff

Counsel of Record

Tracey Fussy

Sara Lathrop

Assistant City Attorneys

Minneapolis City Attorney’s Office

350 South Fifth Street

Minneapolis, MN 55415

(612) 673-3919

kristin.sarff@minneapolismn.gov

Counsel for Petitioners

Officer Mark Hanneman and

City of Minneapolis

385479

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

QUESTION PRESENTED

Officer Mark Hanneman was assigned to serve a noknock warrant to investigate the robbery and murder of a

man killed by a body-armor-piercing bullet. The suspects

were known to have committed other violent crimes and

were recently pictured with a cache of guns. During the

warrant entry, Officer Hanneman encountered Amir

Locke who, despite being ordered to show his hands

several times, concealed himself under a blanket and

grabbed a gun. Body worn camera video shows that Locke

raised and pointed his gun towards Officer Hanneman.

Less than one second before Officer Hanneman fired his

weapon, the Eighth Circuit described the video as showing

“the barrel of a gun appearing from under Locke’s blanket

with the barrel angled close to horizontal” as Officer

Hanneman was nearby. The district court held that Officer

Hanneman “faced a ‘split-second’ decision” and it was not

feasible to issue a warning before firing.

But the district court denied Officer Hanneman

qualified immunity from a Fourth Amendment claim

because Respondents alleged Locke kept his gun pointed

down, not in the direction of officers, and was shot “as he

began” to comply with the last officer order to show his

hands. The Eighth Circuit, citing this alleged fact dispute,

dismissed the qualified immunity appeal for lack of

jurisdiction. Neither court addressed Petitioners’ repeated

legal argument that, even if accepted as true, Respondents’

allegations do not render Officer Hanneman’s force to be

unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances or

unlawful under clearly established law.

The questions presented are:

1. When the Respondents’ own factual allegations,

the facts assumed by the courts, and the undisputedly

authentic video footage, show the officer was entitled to

qualified immunity, can an appellate court dismiss a

qualified immunity appeal for lack of jurisdiction?

2. Is an officer entitled to qualified immunity for

using deadly force during a dangerous incident when

faced with an armed individual that, according to the

Eighth Circuit, held the gun “close to horizontal”?

3. Is an officer entitled to qualified immunity for

their use of deadly force when it is alleged an armed

individual was just beginning to comply with officers’

orders less than a fraction of a second before the deadly

force is used?

iii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioners are Officer Mark Hanneman and the

City of Minneapolis, defendants and appellants below.

Respondents are Karen Wells and Andre Locke,

plaintiffs and appellees below.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

•

Karen Wells, et al., v. Mark Hanneman, et al., No.

23-cv-273, U.S. District Court for the District of

Minnesota. Order entered July 8, 2024.

•

Karen Wells, et al., v. Mark Hanneman, et al., No.

24-2612, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

Judgment entered July 18, 2025. Order denying

rehearing entered Sept. 2, 2025.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ................................................ i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ............................... iii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS........................................... iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................................ v

TABLE OF APPENDICES................................................. vii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ........................... viii

OPINIONS BELOW ........................................................... 1

JURISDICTION ................................................................. 1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED........... 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................................... 2

I. Factual Background ................................................... 2

II. District Court Proceedings ........................................ 6

III. Court of Appeals Proceedings ................................ 15

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ......... 22

I. The Eighth Circuit Contravened This Court’s

Direction To Resolve Qualified Immunity

Questions At The Earliest Possible Stage

In Litigation .................................................................... 22

A. The Eighth Circuit Incorrectly Declined

To Consider Whether Officer Hanneman

Is Entitled To Qualified Immunity Even If

Locke’s Gun Was Pointed Down .......................... 23

B. The Eighth Circuit Did Not Decide Whether

Locke’s Alleged Belated Attempt To Comply

Was Material To Officer Hanneman’s Qualified

Immunity Defense ................................................. 26

C. The Eighth Circuit Did Not Decide Whether

Officer Hanneman Was Entitled to Qualified

Immunity Based On Its Own Interpretation

Of The Video ........................................................... 29

II. It Is Beneficial For This Court To Issue

Substantive Decisions On Constitutional Issues

That Are Recurring And Critically Important ...... 33

CONCLUSION .................................................................. 38

vii

TABLE OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX A — ORDER OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

EIGHTH CIRCUIT, FILED JULY 18, 2025......... 1a

APPENDIX B — OPINION AND ORDER OF

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,

DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA, FILED

JULY 8, 2024 ............................................................... 8a

APPENDIX C — ORDER OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT, FILED

SEPTEMBER 2, 2025.............................................. 30a

viii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Anderson v. Creighton,

483 U.S. 635 (1987) .......................................................... 23

Anderson v. Russell,

247 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 2001) .......................................... 34

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

563 U.S. 731 (2011) .......................................................... 33

Barnes v. Felix,

605 U.S. 73 (2025) ............................................................ 37

Behrens v. Pelletier,

516 U.S. 299 (1996) ......................................................... 24

Ching as Tr. for Jordan v. City of Minneapolis,

73 F.4th 617 (8th Cir. 2023) ....... 13, 16, 19, 20, 22, 27, 28,

City and Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan,

575 U.S. 600 (2015) .................................................... 22, 23

City of Escondido v. Emmons,

586 U.S. 38 (2019) ............................................................ 23

Cole v. Hutchins,

959 F.3d 1127 (8th Cir. 2020) ..................................... 31, 32

Cooper v. City of Columbus, Ohio,

2023 WL 1434055 (6th Cir. 2023) ................................... 35

Craighead v. Lee,

399 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2005) ............................................... 28

D.C. v. Wesby,

583 U.S. 48 (2018) ................................................ 22, 31, 33

Elder v. Holloway,

510 U.S. 510 (1994) ......................................................... 15

Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386 (1989) ................................................ 8, 29, 36

Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800 (1982) ......................................................... 23

Hunter v. Bryant,

502 U.S. 224 (1991) .................................................. 23, 26, 28

Jacobs v. Alam,

915 F.3d 1028 (6th Cir. 2019) ............................................. 35

Johnson v. Jones,

515 U.S. 304 (1995) ............................................................... 24

Kisela v. Hughes,

584 U.S. 100 (2018) .............................................. 23, 31, 36

Liggins v. Cohen,

971 F.3d 798 (8th Cir. 2020) ............. 10, 16, 18, 19, 20, 25

Loch v. City of Litchfield,

689 F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 2012) ................................................. 9

Maser v. City of Coralville, Iowa,

139 F.4th 1004 (8th Cir. 2025) ............................... 22, 27, 30

Mitchell v. Forsyth,

472 U.S. 511 (1985) ........................................................ 23, 34

Morgan-Tyra v. City of St. Louis,

89 F.4th 1082 (8th Cir. 2024) ................................ 16, 18, 25

Mullenix v. Luna,

577 U.S. 7 (2015) .............................................................. 33

Mullins v. Cyranek,

805 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 2015) ............................................. 36

Nixon v. Fitzgerald,

472 U.S. 731 (1982) ............................................................... 34

Partlow v. Stadler,

774 F3d 497 (8th Cir. 2014) ................................................ 12

Partridge v. City of Benton, Arkansas,

70 F.4th 489 (8th Cir. 2023) .............................28, 31, 32, 33

Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223 (2009) ........................................ 23, 26, 29, 38

Plumhoff v. Rickard,

572 U.S. 765 (2014) ............................................24, 25, 28, 38

Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001) .................................. 8, 23, 26, 29

Scott v. Harris,

550 U.S. 372 (2007) ...................8, 15, 23, 24, 26, 29, 34, 35

Sinclair v. City of Des Moines,

268 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2001) ............................................ 9

Tennessee v. Garner,

471 U.S. 1 (1985) .......................................................... 9, 35

Watson v. Boyd,

2 F.4th 1106 (8th Cir. 2021) ........................................... 15

White v. Pauly,

580 U.S. 73 (2017) ...................................................... 22, 23

Wilson v. City of Bastrop,

26 F.4th 709 (5th Cir. 2022) ................................................ 34

Constitutional Provision

United States Constitution,

Amendment IV ...............i, 1, 7, 8, 17 24, 25, 28, 34, 37, 38

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ............................................................... 1

42 U.S.C. § 1983 .................................................................... 8

OPINIONS BELOW

The district court opinion denying petitioner’s

motion for judgment on the pleadings is not reported but

is reproduced in the appendix (“App.”) at App. 8a-29a.

The Eighth Circuit’s order dismissing the appeal is

reported at 144 F.4th 1015 (8th Cir. 2025) and is

reproduced at App. 1a-7a. The Eighth Circuit’s order

denying rehearing is not reported but is reproduced at

App. 30a-31a.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Eighth Circuit was entered on

July 18, 2025. The Eighth Circuit denied the timely

petition for rehearing on September 2, 2025. This Court

has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

states:

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon

probable cause, supported by Oath and

affirmation, and particularly describing the place

to be searched, and the persons or things to be

seized.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Factual Background

In January 2022, Otis Elder was robbed and killed

in St. Paul by a .223 caliber round. (R. Doc. 48 at 3, 7.)

That bullet type is notable because it can pierce police

body armor. (Id. at 9.) After discovering that the murder

suspects fled to an apartment building in Minneapolis, St.

Paul police requested assistance from the Minneapolis

Police Department and St. Paul police secured a no-knock

warrant to find the murder weapon. (Id. at 9-13.)

On February 2, 2022, St. Paul police briefed the

Minneapolis SWAT Team before they executed the

warrant. (R. 45-1, at 4.) The SWAT team, including

Officer Mark Hanneman, was informed that the warrant

related to a homicide investigation involving a bodyarmor-piercing .223 caliber gun, which had not been

recovered, the homicide suspects were associated with

multiple armed robberies and carjackings and recently

made social media posts depicting themselves with

multiple firearms, and the primary homicide suspect

spent a significant amount of time in the apartment they

would be searching. (Id. at 4-5.)

The warrant entry was recorded on body worn

camera video. Before officers began to enter the

apartment, Sergeant John Sysaath loudly announced,

“Police! Search Warrant!” (R. Doc. 47 (Sysaath BWC) at

06:48:04-06:48:06.) 1 After entering, Sergeant Sysaath

repeated, “Police! Search warrant!” (Id. at 06:48:0606:48:09.) Sergeant Troy Carlson followed, yelling,

Each body worn camera (“BWC”) video is identified with the last

name of the officer equipped with the BWC and a time stamp.

“Police! Search warrant!” (R. Doc. 47 (Carlson BWC) at

06:47:26-06:47:27.)

Sergeant Carlson’s flashlight illuminated Amir

Locke as Locke raised his head to peer over the back of a

couch and look at the entering officers:

(Carlson BWC at 06:47:28.)

Sergeant Carlson yelled, “Let me see your hands!

Hands! Hands! Hands!” (Carlson BWC at 06:47:2806:47:30.) Locke did not show his hands but, instead,

pulled a blanket over his head:

(Carlson BWC at 06:47:29.)

Locke actively moved under the blanket. (Carlson

BWC at 06:47:29-06:47:31.) He even moved into a sitting

position, continuing to conceal himself under the blanket:

(Carlson BWC at 06:47:31.)

Sergeant Carlson then approached and kicked the

couch that Locke was on and yelled, “Hands!” (Carlson

BWC at 06:47:31-06:47:32.) Sergeant Sysaath ordered,

“Get on the ground!” (R. Doc. 47 (Pearson BWC) at

06:48:08-06:48:10.) Locke instead leaned over an ottoman

next to the couch with his hands still concealed. (Pearson

BWC at 06:48:09-06:48:10.)

Officer Hanneman came around the couch and

approached Locke as Locke remained concealed under

the blanket. (Pearson BWC at 06:48:09.)

Officer

Hanneman ordered, “Show me your hands.” (R. Doc. 47

(Hanneman BWC) at 06:48:11-06:48:13.) Locke instead

grabbed a gun and moved it forward from under the

blanket, revealing the gun being raised and pointed in the

direction of Officer Hanneman:

(Pearson BWC at 06:48:09-06:48:10.)

Officer Hanneman fired his weapon at Locke. (Id.

at 06:48:10.) Less than one second elapsed between when

Locke’s gun was raised and pointed in the direction of

Officer Hanneman and when Officer Hanneman fired.

(Pearson BWC at 06:48:10)(showing Locke’s gun

appearing from under the blanket and capturing the

sound of Officer Hanneman shooting within the same

second.) Locke was still armed when he was shot. (Id.)

Officer Hanneman yelled, “He’s got a gun.” (Id. at

06:48:12.) Officer Hanneman also proclaimed, “he pointed

it at us.” (Id. at 06:48:28-31.)

II.

District Court Proceedings

The Amended Complaint asserts that Officer

Hanneman’s use of force constituted an unlawful seizure

under the Fourth Amendment, among other claims. (R.

Doc. 40.) It pleads:

•

“[S]till draped in the blanket . . . [Locke] began to

stand and grabbed the handgun[.]” (Id. at ¶112.)

•

Locke “held the handgun[.]” (Id. at ¶113.)

•

Locke “kept the handgun pointed down, and never

raised the handgun . . . in the direction of any

officer[.]” (Id. at ¶114.)

•

“Before [Locke] could fully comply with [Officer]

Hanneman’s command to ‘Show me your hands,’

Hanneman fired[.]” (Id. at ¶120)(emphasis added.)

•

Officer Hanneman “yelled, ‘He’s got a gun.’” (Id. at

¶126.)

•

Locke “was shot as he began to comply with the

officers’ commands[.]” (Id. at ¶131)(emphasis

added.)

•

“Alternatively, [Locke] was shot before he was given

the opportunity to comply with the officers’

commands,

including

Officer

Hanneman’s

commands.” (Id. at ¶132.)

•

Locke was shot “only eight seconds after” the SWAT

team “entered the threshold” of the apartment. (Id.

at ¶121.)

The Amended Complaint invokes the jurisdiction of 42

U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at ¶6.)

The Answer pled that Officer Hanneman is

entitled to qualified immunity, and incorporated the above

BWC video. (R. Docs. 45 at 28 ¶2; R. Docs. 47-48.)

Petitioners moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing

that Officer Hanneman was entitled to relief under both

qualified immunity prongs, as his use of force was

objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and

did not violate any clearly established law. (R. Docs. 63,

65.)

Petitioners’ memorandum reminded the district

court that Supreme Court precedent requires an officer’s

use of force to be assessed with due regard for the totality

of the circumstances confronting the officer (R. Doc. 65 at

10)(citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989))

and with deference for the fact that officers are often

forced to make split-second decisions under

circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly

evolving. (Id. at 11)(citing Saucier v. Katz, 553 U.S. 194,

205 (2001).) Additionally, Petitioners noted that the

Supreme Court requires the facts to be viewed “in the

light depicted by the videotape.” (Id. at 5-6, n.2)(citing

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-381 (2007).)

Although the Amended Complaint alleged that

Locke kept his gun pointed down and never raised it in

the direction of any officer, Petitioners directed the

district court to video depicting Locke’s gun being (1)

raised and (2) pointed in the direction of Officer

Hanneman. (Id. at 7)(citing Pearson BWC at 06:48:10); R.

Doc. 81 at 7:12-19, 9:3-7.)

Petitioners argued that Locke, having raised and

pointed the gun, presented an immediate threat of death

or serious harm, justifying the use of deadly force under

Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent. (R. Doc. 65

at 11 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) and

Loch v. City of Litchfield, 689 F.3d 961, 965 (8th Cir.

2012)); 13 (quoting Sinclair v. City of Des Moines, 268

F.3d 594, 596 (8th Cir. 2001)(“[N]o constitutional or

statutory right would prohibit a police officer from using

deadly force when faced with an apparently loaded

weapon.”))

Alternatively, assuming the allegations in the

Amended Complaint to be true, Petitioners’

memorandum argued:

[E]ven if the barrel of Locke’s gun was pointed

down, [Officer Hanneman’s] use of force was

objectively reasonable.

When an officer

reasonably believes that there is an imminent

threat of serious harm, the officer may be justified

in using deadly force even before the person

actually points a weapon at him.

(Id. at 18.) Petitioners cited to and analyzed Liggins v.

Cohen, 971 F.3d 798 (8th Cir. 2020), an Eighth Circuit

decision holding that it was reasonable for an officer to

shoot a fleeing teenage suspect who held a gun by the

barrel and pointed down. (Id.) The Eighth Circuit

reasoned, “With only a second or two to react,” the officer

had “reasonable grounds to believe” the individual “could

raise the gun and shoot. It would take only an instant to

do so if the person were ready to fire.” (Id. at 19)(quoting

Liggins, 971 F.3d at 801.) Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit

established, “In dangerous situations where an officer has

reasonable grounds to believe that there is an imminent

threat of serious harm, the officer may be justified in

using a firearm before a subject actually points a weapon

at the officer or others.” Liggins, 971 F.3d at 801.

Petitioners reiterated this alternative argument in

their reply memorandum:

Under the totality of the circumstances, Locke did

not merely possess a gun, he made menacing and

threatening actions. . . . This is so even if the barrel

of Locke’s gun was pointed down. When an officer

reasonably believes that there is an imminent

threat of serious harm, the officer may be justified

in using deadly force even before the person

actually points a weapon at him.

(R. Doc. 70 at 11)(emphasis added.)

Petitioners raised the alternative argument again

at the district court’s motion hearing. (R. Doc. 81 at 9:311:1 (explaining Eighth Circuit precedent does not

require Locke to have been “pointing and aiming the gun

at the officer” for deadly force to be reasonable), 19:14-18

(considering the totality of the circumstances and splitsecond decision to be made, the force was reasonable

“even if [Locke] had angled [the gun] down”).)

Petitioners’ memorandum argued that, regardless

of the exact position of Locke’s gun, a reasonable officer

could have viewed Locke as presenting an imminent

threat of death or serious harm under the totality of the

circumstances. Specifically, from only a few feet away and

without any ability to seek cover, Officer Hanneman faced

an armed individual, who he reasonably could have

believed was a murder suspect equipped with armorpiercing ammunition, who attempted to conceal himself

and his gun while actively moving under a blanket, failed

to comply with orders from multiple officers to show his

hands, and did not drop the gun. (R. Doc. 65 at 12-13, 17,

21, 25.) Officer Hanneman was forced to make a splitsecond decision under the tense, uncertain, and rapidly

evolving circumstances of the no-knock warrant entry.

(Id. at 13, 16-17.)

Finally, with respect to the clearly established law,

Petitioners argued that there was no case law as of

February 2, 2022, that would have put Officer Hanneman

on notice that his use of force would be deemed

unconstitutional under these specific circumstances. (Id.

at 19-22.) To the contrary, Petitioners identified ample

Eighth Circuit case law granting relief to officers facing

armed individuals in dangerous circumstances. (E.g. id. at

13-14, 17-19 (citing Partlow v. Stadler, 774 F3d 497, 502

(8th Cir. 2014)(use of deadly force against armed suicidal

man was reasonable even though man claimed his

movements reflected an attempt to comply with officers’

orders).)

Respondents did not contest that the BWC video

showed Locke failing to comply with Sergeant Carlson’s

initial order, “Let me see your hands! Hands! Hands!

Hands!” or second order, “Hands!” Nor did they contest,

or offer an alternative explanation for, the specific BWC

video depicted above (Pearson BWC at 06:48:10) showing

that Locke raised and pointed the gun in Officer

Hanneman’s direction. Rather, conceding that Locke

“grabbed” and “held” a handgun, Respondents

maintained that Officer Hanneman’s force was

unreasonable because Locke “began to comply” with the

last order, from Officer Hanneman, to “show me your

hands” but was shot “before [Locke] could fully comply[.]”

(R. Doc. 68 at 3-4.) In other words, Respondents argued

that Locke’s incomplete compliance occurred at the same

time as Officer Hanneman’s use of force. In support of

this contention, Respondents cited to BWC video

recorded within a fraction of a second of Officer

Hanneman’s use of force purporting to show Locke had

begun to lower his gun. (Id. at 29, 31-32.)

Petitioners responded that Locke’s alleged

attempt to comply was not material to Officer

Hanneman’s qualified immunity defense. This is so

because Locke’s alleged compliance transpired during a

fraction of a second between when Locke maneuvered his

gun out from under the blanket (Pearson BWC at

06:48:10) and when Locke was shot. (R. Doc. 70 at 8)(“no

matter what Locke was doing during that milli-second, it

was not enough time for [Officer Hanneman] to deduce

that Locke was no longer a threat.”) Under controlling

Eighth Circuit precedent, a single second is not a

sufficient amount of time for an officer to reassess if a

deadly threat has passed.

Petitioners cited to and analyzed Ching as Tr. for

Jordan v. City of Minneapolis, 73 F.4th 617 (8th Cir.

2023), an Eighth Circuit decision granting qualified

immunity to an officer who continued to shoot a suspect

one second after the suspect fell to the floor and dropped

their weapon. (R. Doc. 70 at 8.) The Eighth Circuit held it

was objectively reasonable for an officer to shoot one

second later because “a jury could not find [the officer]

had sufficient time to reassess the threat [the individual]

presented before he stopped firing.” (Id.)(quoting Ching,

73. F.4th at 621.) It also held the officer did not violate

any clearly established right by shooting one second after

the individual became disarmed because it was not aware

of any Eighth Circuit case holding the “alleged excessive

force occurred only one second after the threat was

arguably dissipated.” Ching, 73 F.4th at 621. Petitioners

reiterated the import of Ching at the district court’s

motion hearing. (R. Doc. 81 at 9:3-17)(explaining that,

under Ching, one second was not enough time for Officer

Hanneman to recognize that a threat may no longer be a

threat), 14:21-15:4, 18:12-19:18.)

Consequently,

Petitioners argued that even if the court accepted

Respondents’ contention that Locke attempted to comply

at the last moment, Officer Hanneman’s use of force was

still objectively reasonable or, at minimum, did not violate

clearly established law.

However, the district court denied Officer

Hanneman qualified immunity. (App. 8a.) The district

court order begins by acknowledging that the “basic facts

surrounding [Locke’s] death are not disputed.” (Id.)

Indeed, the district court determined that:

•

Officer Hanneman was executing a search warrant

relating to a murder investigation involving armorpiercing bullets. (App. 8a, 12a.)

•

Locke “was holding a handgun.” (App. 9a.)

•

“Officer Hanneman began firing after he saw the

handgun in [Locke’s] hand.” (Id.)

•

“Defendants are correct that . . . Officer Hanneman

faced a ‘split-second decision.’” (App. 20a.)

•

Plaintiffs “argue that Officer Hanneman’s failure to

command that [Locke] drop the handgun establishes

that the use of deadly force was not reasonable. Not

so. ‘When the hesitation involved in giving a warning

could readily cause such a warning to be the officer’s

last, then a warning is not feasible.’” (App. 21a.)

Still, the district court denied Officer Hanneman

qualified immunity. The district court believed the BWC

videos provided “dim, unclear images of the incident’s

critical moments.” (App. 15a.) It did not offer any

description of what was depicted in the BWC video from

Officer Pearson, as depicted above, and accepted the

allegation that Locke kept his gun pointed down. Yet it

accepted Respondents’ proffer that BWC video, recorded

less than a second later, may be construed as showing

Locke attempting to comply by putting the gun down.

(Id.) The district court held that it was clearly established

at the time of the incident that it was unlawful to use

deadly force on an armed individual who was moving his

gun in compliance with officers’ commands. (App. 19a.)

The district court did not issue a ruling on either of

Petitioners’ legal arguments that, under Eighth Circuit

precedent, (1) a reasonable officer could have viewed

Locke as presenting an imminent threat under the

dangerous circumstances even if Locke’s gun was pointed

down, or (2) that Locke’s alleged attempt to comply at the

last moment was immaterial because Officer Hanneman

did not have a sufficient amount of time to assess whether

the threat posed by the still-armed Locke had passed.

III.

Court of Appeals Proceedings

Respondents moved to dismiss Petitioners’ appeal,

claiming the Eighth Circuit lacked jurisdiction based on

purported fact disputes. But, as Petitioners responded,

appellate courts have jurisdiction to consider whether the

factual allegations made by Respondents or accepted by

the district court are blatantly contradicted by video

evidence. (Doc. ID 5431362 at 1, 15-16)(analyzing Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007).) And Petitioners noted

that appellate courts always have jurisdiction to

determine whether an alleged fact dispute is material in

light of the substantive law. (Id. at 2, 22-23)(citing Watson

v. Boyd, 2 F.4th 1106, 1109 (8th Cir. 2021).) Additionally,

Petitioners reminded the court that once the predicate

facts are known, the determination of whether an officer’s

use of force is reasonable or contrary to clearly

established law is a question of law for the court to decide.

(Id. at 20)(citing Watson, 2 F.4th at 1110-11 and Elder v.

Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994).)

Moreover, Petitioners argued that the motion to

dismiss the appeal must fail because Officer Hanneman is

entitled to qualified immunity even if the appellate court

accepted Respondents’ factual allegations.

With respect to the positioning of Locke’s gun,

Petitioners argued, “alternatively, it is clearly established

that a gun can be wielded in a menacing fashion, justifying

deadly force, even if the gun is pointed down, as Appellees

claim.” (Id. at 26)(citing and analyzing Morgan-Tyra v.

City of St. Louis, 89 F.4th 1082, 1085-88 (8th Cir.

2024)(deadly force was not clearly unreasonable even if

plaintiff was pointing the gun in a downward direction).)

“[E]ven if” Locke “lowered the gun, a reasonable officer

could have reasonably believed Locke remained an

immediate threat. ‘It would take only an instant [to raise

a gun and shoot] if the person were ready to fire.’” (Id. at

27)(quoting Liggins, 97 F.3d at 801.)

With respect to Locke’s alleged compliance,

Petitioners argued, in part, that they “need not contest (or

even disprove) the district court’s factual determination

[that Locke was attempting to comply when he was shot]

for Officer Hanneman to be entitled to qualified

immunity. The asserted factual conclusion is immaterial

in light of clearly established law that governs officers’

capacity to reassess threats in split-second timing[.]” (Id.

at 22, 23)(analyzing Ching, 73 F.4th 617.)

The Eighth Circuit issued an order stating that

Respondents’ motion to dismiss the appeal would be

considered by the merits panel. (Doc. ID 5436147.)

On the merits briefing, Petitioners detailed the

totality of the circumstances facing Officer Hanneman

during the fast-paced warrant entry for the murder

investigation and highlighted the BWC video, as depicted

above. (Pet. Br. at 3-11.) Petitioners maintained that the

district court failed to apply the Supreme Court’s edict to

view the facts in the light depicted by the video. (Id. at 1819.) The district court described the BWC video as being

dim and unclear, but the video undeniably showed Locke

raising and pointing his gun “spotlighted by a flashlight.”

(Id. at 18, 26.)

Moreover, Petitioners maintained that the district

court’s qualified immunity analysis was incomplete

because it failed to consider the materiality of

Respondents’ factual allegations under the appellate

court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Petitioners

reiterated that, under the totality of the circumstances,

Officer Hanneman could have justifiably used deadly

force even if Locke had kept the gun pointed down or

attempted to comply with Officer Hanneman’s order as he

was shot, as alleged by Respondents.

With respect to the position of Locke’s gun,

Petitioners argued that Officer Hanneman’s force was

reasonable even if Locke’s gun was pointed down:

Contrary to the district court’s holding, an

allegation that the gun was pointed downward

cannot displace precedential case law holding that

a gun in that position can still represent a lifethreatening, imminent threat to an officer . . . .

Liggins compels reversal of the district court order

. . . . After all, a gun need not be pointed directly at

an officer to be considered menacing or lifethreatening to an officer. The Court must consider

Locke’s conduct in the context of a tense,

uncertain, and rapidly evolving situation. And, it

must consider the totality of the circumstances.

(Id. at 38-39, 34-36)(analyzing Liggins, 971 F.3d 798.)

Petitioners also argued that Officer Hanneman’s

force was permissible under clearly established law, even

if Locke’s gun was pointed down. “Additionally, on the

date of this incident, the clearly established law confirmed

that, even if a gun was positioned pointing down, an officer

may still view a subject as wielding a gun in a menacing

manner that justifies an officer’s use of deadly force.” (Id.

at 49, 50 (analyzing Morgan-Tyra, 89 F.4 1082 (8th Cir.

2024); see also id at p. i (explaining circuit precedent holds

that “a gun can be wielded in a menacing manner, even if

it is pointed downward”).)

In the reply brief, Petitioners continued to advance

the argument that a gun can be wielded in a menacing

manner even if it is not pointed directly at an officer. (E.g.

Pet. Reply Br. at 5, n.1)(detailing Locke’s menacing

actions independent of pointing the gun at officers and

reminding that an “officer may be justified in using deadly

force even before the person actually points a weapon at

him”.) “There is no rule requiring that a subject …

take direct aim at an officer to justify deadly force.”

(Id. at 4)(bolding in original.)

With respect to Locke’s alleged attempt to comply,

Petitioners argued that controlling Eighth Circuit case

law rejected the notion that deadly force becomes

unlawful if an armed individual ceased to be a threat a

mere moment before deadly force is used, making

Respondents’ allegation of compliance immaterial as a

matter of law:

[Ching, 73 F.4th 617 (8th Cir. 2023) and Liggins,

971 F.3d 798 (8th Cir. 2020)] both advise that

Officer Hanneman’s use of force was objectively

reasonable, and both confirm that Officer

Hanneman could not have violated a clearly

established law based on the threat posed by Locke

and the timing of the incident. With these cases,

[Petitioners] argue that Officer Hanneman is

entitled to qualified immunity ‘regardless’ of

whether the Court must accept the allegation that

Locke attempted to comply with officer orders[.]

(Pet. Br. at 49)(emphasis added.) Indeed, Petitioners

reminded that, in Ching, “the Eighth Circuit held that

‘one second’ is not ‘sufficient time [for an officer] to

reassess the threat’ posed by a subject that had been

armed.” (Id. at 29, 27-37)(analyzing and applying Ching.)

And, here, BWC video confirms that less than one second

elapsed between when Locke’s gun appeared from

underneath the blanket and when Officer Hanneman

fired. (Id. at 31, 11 )(citing R. Doc. 47 (Pearson BWC) at

06:48:10.) “As such, even if the Court were to agree that

Locke demonstrated an attempt to comply with officer

commands during the split-second . . . it would not defeat

the reasonableness of Officer Hanneman’s force.” (Id. at

32.)

Petitioners raised the same argument again in

their reply brief. (Pet. Reply Br. at 22 (“Locke’s alleged

compliance was not material”), 23 (noting Respondents

did not offer any contrary authority or response to

“Ching’s central holding: that one second of time is

insufficient for an officer to reassess whether an armed

and menacing subject ceased to be a threat and, therefore,

deadly force used within that one-second is objectively

reasonable as a matter of law”).)

The Minnesota Police and Peace Officers

Association (“MPPOA”) filed an Amicus Brief. It too

advised the Eighth Circuit that the district court

incorrectly denied qualified immunity based on the

mistaken belief that Locke’s gun needed to be pointed

directly at an officer to justify the use of deadly force.

(MPPOA Br. at 2-3, 10-11.) The MPPOA reminded the

Eighth Circuit of its own precedent, holding “[i]n

dangerous situations where an officer has reasonable

grounds to believe that there is an imminent threat of

serious harm, the officer may be justified in using a

firearm before a subject actually points a weapon at the

officer or others.” (Id. at 11)(quoting Liggins, 971 F.3d at

801.) Like the Petitioners (Pet. Br. at 36-39), the MPPOA

took issue with the district court’s attempt to distinguish

Liggins exclusively on the procedural ground that it was

decided on summary judgment. (MPPOA Br. at 3.) That

rationale “operates to deny Officer Hanneman the benefit

of qualified immunity as immunity from suit rather than a

mere defense to liability.” (Id.)

The Eighth Circuit panel issued an order

concluding that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the

appeal. (App. 1a.) The order only addresses what it

describes as Petitioners’ “principal argument” that BWC

video blatantly contradicts the district court’s factual

assumption that Locke did not raise his gun in the

direction of officers. (App. 5a.) The panel acknowledged

that Petitioners identified BWC video claiming that it

depicted Locke both raising his gun as well as pointing it

in the direction of Officer Hanneman. (App. 5a-6a.)

Unlike the district court, however, the panel provided a

description of the events depicted in the video. According

to the panel, the BWC video “shows the barrel of a gun

appearing from under Locke’s blanket, with the barrel

angled close to horizontal” with Officer Hanneman

“located to the right of Locke, near the corner of the

couch.” (App. 6a.) The panel decided the BWC did not

“definitively” show if the “close to horizontal” barrel was

pointed in the direction of officers. (Id.)

Nevertheless, the panel concluded that the facts

assumed by the district court were not blatantly

contradicted by video, and it lacked jurisdiction to

“address [Officer] Hanneman’s remaining arguments on

appeal.” (Id.) Specifically, the panel did not address

Petitioners’ argument that Locke’s alleged attempt to

comply at the last moment was immaterial to the qualified

immunity defense. (Id.) Additionally, the panel explicitly

“decline[d] to consider” whether Officer Hanneman was

entitled to qualified immunity “even if the videos do not

establish that Locke pointed the gun in the direction of

the officers[.]” (App. 7a.) It did so by incorrectly

concluding that “defendants did not raise this argument

in the district court or on appeal.” (Id.)

Petitioners sought rehearing en banc. The petition

for rehearing cited to parts of the district court and

appellate record where Petitioners clearly raised their

alternative argument that Officer Hanneman’s use of

deadly force was reasonable even if Locke’s gun was

pointed down or not directly pointed at Officer

Hanneman. (Doc. ID 5543924 at 16-17.) The petition also

reiterated that Eighth Circuit precedent recognizes that

an officer may lawfully use deadly force in a dangerous

situation even if the armed individual attempted to comply

with officers’ orders at the last moment. (Id. at 20)(citing

Ching, 73 F.4th at 621; Maser v. City of Coralville, Iowa,

139 F.4th 1004 (8th Cir. 2025)(holding one second did not

represent “adequate time or opportunity [for an officer]

to assess whether the threat had passed”).) The petition

for rehearing was denied. (App. 31a.)

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The Eighth Circuit Contravened This Court’s

Direction To Resolve Qualified Immunity

Questions At The Earliest Possible Stage In

Litigation.

This Petition presents a question of exceptional

importance.

Qualified immunity is a matter of

“importance” to “society as a whole.” City and Cnty. of

San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 611 n.3 (2015);

see also White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017). The

immunity shields officers from suit “unless (1) they

violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2)

the unlawfulness of their conduct was ‘clearly established

at the time.’” D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62-63 (2018).

“Because qualified immunity is ‘an immunity from suit

rather than a mere defense to liability . . . it is effectively

lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.’”

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Even

discovery should not be allowed to proceed until the

threshold question of immunity is resolved. Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Mitchell v. Forsyth,

472 U.S. 511, 536 (1985). Accordingly, this Court has

“repeatedly stressed the importance of resolving

immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in

litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227

(1991)(collecting cases); Saucier v. Katz, 533 US 194, 201

(2001); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 376 n.2 (2007);

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.

When lower courts improperly allow suits to

proceed, it “can entail substantial social costs, including

the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and

harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the

discharge of their duties.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483

U.S. 635, 638 (1987). Mindful of these risks, this “Court

often corrects lower courts when they wrongly subject

individual officers to liability” by denying qualified

immunity. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 575 U.S. at

611 n.3 (collecting case reversals); see also Kisela v.

Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 105 (2018); City of Escondido v.

Emmons, 586 U.S. 38 (2019). Such reversals are

necessary to “reiterate the longstanding principle[s]”

associated with qualified immunity. White, 580 U.S. at 79.

A. The Eighth Circuit Incorrectly Declined To

Consider Whether Officer Hanneman Is Entitled

To Qualified Immunity Even If Locke’s Gun Was

Pointed Down.

The Eighth Circuit order defies this Court’s

directive to resolve the threshold question of qualified

immunity at the earliest possible stage in litigation.

Indeed, the panel did not address the merits of Officer

Hanneman’s qualified immunity defense at all. It

incorrectly dismissed the appeal based on jurisdictional

grounds purportedly arising from a fact dispute over the

position of Locke’s gun, and purportedly dim or unclear

moments in the BWC video. But this Court readily

recognizes that an appellate court has jurisdiction to

consider the merits of a qualified immunity defense if,

upon accepting a plaintiff’s factual assertions, officers

“contend that their conduct did not violate the Fourth

Amendment and, in any event, did not violate clearly

established law.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 773

(2014)(accepting factual allegations does not involve an

impermissible determination of evidence sufficiency

under Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995)); see also

Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996)(explaining

Johnson permits appellate review of the facts assumed by

the court to determine if they meet the objective

reasonableness test.)

Certainly, Petitioners argued that the facts should

be viewed “in the light depicted by the videotape.” Scott,

550 U.S. at 381. And, that BWC video showed Locke

raising his gun and pointing it in the direction of Officer

Hanneman. But Petitioners also repeatedly argued, in

the alternative, that Officer Hanneman’s use of force was

objectively reasonable and did not violate clearly establish

law even if Locke’s gun was pointed down rather than

aimed in the direction of an officer, as Respondents

alleged.

However, the Eighth Circuit panel expressly

“decline[d] to consider” whether Officer Hanneman was

entitled to qualified immunity even if Locke’s gun was

pointed down. The panel refused to consider the legal

issue based on the mistaken belief that Petitioners “did

not raise the argument in the district court or on appeal.”

That, of course, is plainly and inexplicably wrong.

As noted above, Petitioners raised the alternative

argument in every written submission to the district court

and appellate court. (R. Doc. 65 at 18-19; R. Doc. 70 at 11;

R. Doc. 81 at 9:3-11:1, 19:14-18; Doc. ID 5431362 at 26-27;

Pet. Br. at 34-36, 38-39, 49-50; Pet. Reply Br. at 4, 5 n.1;

Doc. ID 5543934 at 16-17.) In one brief, the argument was

presented in bolded font. Petitioners supported their

argument by citing and analyzing controlling Eighth

Circuit precedent declaring that officers in dangerous

situations may reasonably view a person wielding a

pointed-down gun as an imminent threat justifying the

use of deadly force. See Liggins v. Cohen, 971 F.3d 798,

801 (explaining an “officer may be justified in using a

firearm before a subject actually points a weapon at the

officer or others” and holding deadly force reasonable

where teen held the barrel of a gun down); Morgan-Tyra

v. City of St. Louis, 89 F.4th 1082, 1085-1088 (deadly force

was not clearly unreasonable even if plaintiff was pointing

the gun in a downward direction).) The record plainly

shows that Petitioners raised and preserved this legal

issue for appellate review.

By declining to even consider whether the

Respondents’ allegations about the position of Locke’s

gun were material, the Eighth Circuit allowed the Fourth

Amendment claim to proceed against Officer Hanneman

without the appellate review of his qualified immunity

defense to which he was entitled. In doing so, the Eighth

Circuit abrogated its “core responsibility” to resolve the

legal issue of qualified immunity. Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at

773. Allowing the legal issue to go unanswered cannot be

countenanced with this Court’s instruction to decide

qualified immunity at the earliest possible stage in

litigation. Hunter, 502 U.S. at 227; Saucier, 533 US at 201;

Scott, 550 U.S. at 376 n.2; Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.

The Eighth Circuit order leaves the district court

ruling intact. That order sends the untenable message to

officers in dangerous situations that they must wait until

an armed individual has their gun directly aimed at an

officer – or another innocent victim – before officers can

protect themselves or others with deadly force.

B. The Eighth Circuit Did Not Decide Whether

Locke’s Alleged Belated Attempt To Comply Was

Material To Officer Hanneman’s Qualified

Immunity Defense.

The Eighth Circuit order is wholly silent on the

legal issue of whether Locke’s alleged belated attempt to

comply with officers’ orders is material to Officer

Hanneman’s qualified immunity defense. Recall, the

Amended Complaint alleges that Locke was shot “as he

began to comply” with officers’ orders to show his hands,

including Officer Hanneman’s order. As such, it was pled

that Officer Hanneman’s use of force occurred at the same

time that Locke allegedly attempted to comply with

Officer Hanneman’s last order for Locke to show his

hands.

During motion practice before the district court,

Respondents argued that video from Officer Pearson’s

BWC, with time stamp 06:48:10, showed Locke

attempting to lower his gun in compliance with officers’

orders. The district court accepted that construction as

plausible. Those images were recorded – and, hence, the

construed compliance occurred – in the fraction of a

second between when Locke’s gun appeared from

underneath Locke’s blanket, as Officer Hanneman was

mere feet away, and when Officer Hanneman fired.

(Pearson BWC at 06:48:10)(showing Locke’s gun

appearing from under the blanket and capturing the

sound of Officer Hanneman shooting within the same

second.)

But Petitioners repeatedly argued that even if the

Court accepted Respondents’ arguments about Locke’s

compliance, it was not material to Officer Hanneman’s

qualified immunity defense. (R. Doc. 70 at 8; R. Doc. 81 at

9:3-17, 14:21-15:4, 18:12-19:18; Doc. ID 5431362 at 22-23;

Pet. Br. at 27-37, 49; Pet. Reply Br. at 22-23; Doc. ID

5543924 at 20.) As a matter of law, the fraction of a second

between Locke’s alleged compliance and Officer

Hanneman’s use of force was not a sufficient amount of

time for Officer Hanneman to reassess whether the stillarmed Locke had ceased to be a threat. Petitioners

supported their argument by citing and analyzing

controlling Eighth Circuit precedent declaring that one

second of time is not sufficient for an officer to determine

whether an imminent threat had passed, even if the

individual had become fully disarmed when deadly force

was used. See Ching, 73 F.4th 617 (8th Cir. 2023)(using

deadly force a second after individual dropped their

weapon was reasonable and permissible under clearly

established law); see also Maser v. City of Coralville,

Iowa, 139 F.4th 1004 (8th Cir. 2025)(holding one second

did not represent “adequate time or opportunity [for an

officer] to assess whether the threat had passed”.)

The district court did not address Petitioners’ legal

argument regarding the timing of Locke’s alleged

compliance, or the import of the Eighth Circuit’s holding

in Ching. This, despite the fact that the district court

concluded “Officer Hanneman faced a ‘split-second

decision’” and that it was not feasible to give Locke a

warning because “the hesitation involved in giving a

warning could readily cause such a warning to be the

officer’s last[.]” (App. 20a, 21a.) Rather, the district court

simply declared it was clearly established that “an officer

violates the Fourth Amendment when he uses deadly

force on an armed individual who is moving his gun in

compliance with officers’ orders.” (App. 19a.) But neither

of the cases cited by the district court turned on, let alone

addressed, an officer’s capacity to reassess an imminent

threat based on the last-moment timing of an armed

individual’s attempted compliance. (Id.)(citing Partridge

v. City of Benton, Arkansas, 70 F.4th 489, 493 (8th Cir.

2023)(divided panel found that a doctor’s opinion created

a fact dispute about whether armed individual was

anatomically likely to have pointed his gun at officers);

Craighead v. Lee, 399 F.3d 954, 961 (8th Cir.

2005)(denying qualified immunity for officer who fired at

two wrestling men, knowing he would strike a victim,

while one man “held the gun over his head, pointed

upward.”)

Likewise, the Eighth Circuit order does not

consider the Petitioners’ legal argument that, given the

last-moment timing of Locke’s purported compliance,

Officer Hanneman is still entitled to qualified immunity.

Indeed, the panel did not acknowledge the uncontested

timing of Locke’s alleged compliance in relation to Officer

Hanneman’s use of force. Nor did it acknowledge the

Eighth Circuit’s own precedent in Ching, recognizing that

officers are unable to reassess in a split-second whether

an imminent threat had dissipated. As such, the panel

again abrogated its “core responsibility” to resolve the

legal issue of qualified immunity. Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at

773. And, in the process, it also side-stepped this Court’s

instruction to decide qualified immunity “at the earliest

possible stage in litigation.” Hunter, 502 U.S. at 227;

Saucier, 533 US at 201; Scott, 550 U.S. at 376 n.2;

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.

In doing so, the Eighth Circuit left the district

court decision undisturbed. That decision subjects

officers to suit if they are unable to reassess the threat

posed by a still-armed individual, and change course, in

less than a fraction of a single-second. Such a holding is

completely untethered from this Court’s directive that the

“calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for

the fact that police officers are often forced to make splitsecond judgments – in circumstances that are tense,

uncertain, and rapidly evolving – about the amount of

force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-397 (1989).

C. The Eighth Circuit Did Not Decide Whether

Officer Hanneman Was Entitled to Qualified

Immunity Based On Its Own Interpretation Of The

Video.

Unlike the district court, the Eighth Circuit

offered its own interpretation of the BWC video recorded

less than one second before Officer Hanneman fired. It

concluded that the BWC “shows the barrel of a gun

appearing from under Locke’s blanket, with the barrel

angled close to horizontal” with Officer Hanneman

“located to the right of Locke, near the corner of the

couch.” (App. 6a.) That description contradicts the

Respondents’ allegation that Locke “kept the handgun

pointed down, and never raised the handgun.” After all,

the barrel of a gun cannot be angled close to horizontal

and also be kept pointed down, never having been raised.

This Court instructs that the facts must be viewed

“in the light depicted by the videotape.” Scott, 550 U.S. at

381. But the Eighth Circuit panel did not analyze whether

Officer Hanneman was entitled to qualified immunity

based on its view of the video showing Locke’s gun had

been angled close to horizontal as Officer Hanneman

approached nearby. Locke’s wielding of the gun, as

construed by the panel, would certainly be viewed as

threatening to a reasonable officer in Officer Hanneman’s

position. See Maser, 139 F.4th 1004, 1010 (8th Cir.

2025)(“it is immaterial whether Maser actually pointed

the rifle at a particular officer because a reasonable officer

would perceive how Maser moved the rifle [pointing it

outward from his body] as threatening”).

Indeed, consider the panel’s view of the video in

context with the other facts pled by Respondents,

assumed by the district court, and video-depicted:

• Officer Hanneman was executing a no-knock search

warrant relating to a murder investigation involving

armor-piercing bullets. (District Court.)

• Locke concealed himself and moved under a blanket

after officers ordered him to show his hands. (Video.)

• Locke grabbed and held a gun. (Am. Compl., District

Court.)

• The gun appeared from under Locke’s blanket with

the barrel angled close to horizontal as Officer

Hanneman approached near the couch. (Eighth

Circuit.)

• Officer Hanneman began firing after he saw the

handgun in Locke’s hand. (District Court.)

• Locke “was shot as he began to comply” with

officers’ commands. (Am. Compl.)

• Less than one second elapsed between when Locke’s

gun is seen coming from under the blanket and

angled close to horizontal, and when Officer

Hanneman fired. (Video.)

• Officer Hanneman faced a split-second decision.

(District Court.)

• There was not sufficient time for Officer Hanneman

to warn Locke. (District Court.)

These facts reveal that Officer Hanneman, and the other

officers, could reasonably believe they were in grave danger.

And, that Officer Hanneman did not have sufficient time to

reassess whether Locke ceased to be a threat.

The Eighth Circuit does not explain how Officer

Hanneman’s use of force was unreasonable under these

circumstances, or identify any case law that would have

provided “fair notice” to Officer Hanneman that his use of

force was clearly unlawful under these particular

circumstances. Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104. The two cases

relied on by the district court certainly do not satisfy that

test. (App. 19a)(citing Cole v. Hutchins, 959 F.3d 1127 (8th

Cir. 2020) and Partridge v. City of Benton, 70 F.4th 489

(8th Cir. 2023).)

They “lack factually ‘similar

circumstances’” from those facing Officer Hanneman. See

Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64.

Cole arose out of a dispute between two relatives.

After arguing in his uncle’s front yard, Roy Richards

retrieved a long gun from his vehicle, while his uncle

walked up to the front porch. 959 F.3d at 1130. Officer

Hutchins saw Richards approach the porch, holding the

gun vertically, such that it was pointed either toward the

ground or sky, but never toward the uncle. Id. Unaware

of the officers’ presence, Richards walked up the porch

steps, while the uncle entered his home and shut the front

door. Id. at 1131. Richards then backed down the steps,

away from the porch and toward his vehicle. Id. Roughly

five seconds after the uncle went into his home and shut

the door, Officer Hutchins fired at Richards without

warning as Richards walked away from the uncle’s home.

Id. The Eighth Circuit decided a jury could find that

deadly force was not justified because Richards was not

wielding the weapon in a threatening manner, the

immediate threat to the uncle had passed as Richards

visibly retreated and separated from his uncle for five

seconds, and the officer “chose to stand silent” before

shooting. Id. at 1131, 1133.

Partridge involved a call to assist a suicidal teen

who had gone into the woods holding a gun. From about

45 feet away, one of the officers called to the teen to show

his hands. 70 F.4th at 490. The teen turned, revealing a

gun which he then brought to his own temple. Id. The

officer commanded the teen to drop his gun. Id. When the

teen moved the gun, he was shot. Id. The teen’s parents

claimed that their son was lowering the gun away from the

officers when he was shot. Id. at 491. A divided panel of

the Eighth Circuit concluded that the parents identified a

material fact dispute about whether their son pointed his

gun at the officers by presenting expert medical

testimony that pointing the gun at the officers would have

required a “very awkward, highly atypical, unnatural

twisting of the wrist.” Id. In contrast, the defendant

officer testified that either the teen pointed his gun or

“just the movement” of the teen’s arm prompted him to

fire. Id. at 492. Consequently, there was a fact dispute

about whether the son, who intended to inflict self-harm,

presented a threat to the officers. Id.

Given the materially different circumstances,

neither case could have provided fair notice to Officer

Hanneman that his use of force would be deemed

unreasonable nor could they have placed the

constitutional issue “beyond debate.” Wesby, 583 U.S. at

63 (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011).)

Indeed, neither case involved the fast-paced, dangerous

circumstances involved in this case. Neither involved an

individual who armed himself in response to the officers’

presence, possibly with police-body-armor-piercing

ammunition.

Neither involved an individual who

attempted to conceal their gun while ignoring officers’

initial orders to show their hands. Neither involved an

individual who, as the appellate court found, raised their

gun close to horizontal, while an officer was just feet away

without the ability to take cover. And, neither involved a

legal finding by the district court that the officer faced a

split-second decision and that it was not feasible to issue

a warning. Nor did either case resolve the legal argument

that the officer had insufficient time to assess whether the

armed individual ceased to be a threat. This Court should

remind the district court and appellate court that case law

must approximate the specific circumstances to justify

denying qualified immunity to an officer. Mullenix v.

Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015).

II.

It Is Beneficial For This Court To Issue

Substantive Decisions On Constitutional Issues

That Are Recurring And Critically Important.

Although the Eighth Circuit declined to issue a

substantive decision on Officer Hanneman’s qualified

immunity defense, this Petition warrants the Court’s

attention. The “purely legal question on which [Officer

Hanneman’s] claim of immunity turns is ‘appropriate for

[this Court’s] immediate resolution’ notwithstanding that

it was not addressed by the Court of Appeals.” Mitchell v.

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985)(quoting Nixon v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 743 n.23 (1982)(“There can be no

serious doubt concerning our power to review a court of

appeals’ decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction – a

power we have exercised routinely.”)) This Petition

presents a good vehicle for the Court to address

important constitutional questions regularly raised in the

context of Fourth Amendment deadly force claims against

officers.

First, this Petition questions whether an armed

individual must directly aim their gun at an officer or

another to be considered an imminent threat, and justify

the use of deadly force. At Respondents’ urging, the

district court gave dispositive weight to the allegation that

Locke kept his gun pointed down and never raised it in

the direction of an officer. The Eighth Circuit elected to

leave that decision unchallenged although it explicitly saw

something different in the video evidence. But there is no

“magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions

whenever an officer’s actions constitute ‘deadly force.’”

Scott, 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007).

Indeed, the position adopted by the district court

and accepted by the appellate court has been repeatedly

rejected by other circuit courts. See e.g. Anderson v.

Russell, 247 F.3d 125, 131 (4th Cir. 2001)(“This Circuit

has consistently held that an officer does not have to wait

until a gun is pointed at the officer before the officer is

entitled to take action.”); Wilson v. City of Bastrop, 26

F.4th 709, 715 (5th Cir. 2022)(“[W]e reject Plaintiffs'

argument that Johnson posed no threat because he never

actually aimed his gun at an officer.”); Cooper v. City of

Columbus, Ohio, 2023 WL 1434055, at *6 (6th Cir.

2023)(“[A]iming a weapon is not a minimum requirement”

for the use of deadly force)(quoting Jacobs v. Alam, 915

F.3d 1028, 1040 (6th Cir. 2019)(“[A]n officer need not face

the business end of a gun to use deadly force.”).) Equally

important, the ruling is inconsistent with this Court’s

precedent advising that if an officer has probable cause to

believe that an armed individual “poses a threat of serious

physical harm, either to the officer or others, it is not

constitutionally unreasonable to … us[e] deadly force.”

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).

Moreover, upon review, this Court is not bound by

the panel’s interpretation of the video or Respondents’

allegations that are blatantly contradicted by the BWC

video. This Court reviews the “facts in the light depicted

by the videotape.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 381. The video shows

Locke’s gun raised and pointed in Officer Hanneman’s

direction:

Second, the Petition questions whether an armed

individual’s attempt to comply at the last moment renders

an officer’s otherwise reasonable use of deadly force to be

unlawful. Here too, the district court gave dispositive

weight to Respondents’ allegation that Locke attempted

to comply either simultaneously with, or less than a

fraction of a second before, Officer Hanneman used force.

As such, it neglected to consider whether Officer

Hanneman had sufficient time to reassess if the threat

posed by Locke had passed. In doing so, the district court

as well as the appellate panel conflict with the case law

from another circuit. E.g., Mullins v. Cyranek, 805 F.3d

760, 767-68 (6th Cir. 2015)(holding officer’s use of deadly

force against teen who had released his weapon was

reasonable because “only a few seconds passed between

when [the teen] brandished his firearm and when the

[officer] shot” and “we do not think it is prudent to deny

police officers qualified immunity in situations where they

are faced with a threat of severe physical injury or death

and must make split-second decisions[.]”) This Court

should reject the lower courts’ position as this Court

routinely demands deference for the split-second decision

making of officers in dangerous situations. E.g., Kisela,

584 U.S. at 105 (explaining officer had “mere seconds to

assess the potential danger”); Graham, 490 U.S. at 396397 (holding the “calculus of reasonableness must embody

allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced

to make split-second judgments”.)

Finally, the Petition questions whether Officer

Hanneman is entitled to qualified immunity under the

totality of the circumstances. It is evident that the district

court and appellate panel divorced their assessment of

Officer Hanneman’s use of force from the totality of the

circumstances he faced. They focused almost exclusively

on the last second of time, in which Locke’s gun became

visible and he allegedly partially complied. But the

totality of the circumstances cannot be distilled to such

isolated moments. Rather, this Court recently reminded

that courts assessing Fourth Amendment claims must

“consider all the relevant circumstances, including facts

and events leading up to the climactic moment.” Barnes v.

Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 76 (2025). Indeed, “earlier facts and

circumstances may bear on how a reasonable officer

would have understood and responded to later ones.” Id.

at 80.

Here, Officer Hanneman faced a quintessentially

dangerous, tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving

situation. He was executing a no-knock warrant for a

murder investigation involving police-body-armorpiercing bullets. Locke armed himself by grabbing a gun

in response to the officers’ presence. Locke tried to

conceal himself and his gun while ignoring the first two

rounds of officer orders to show his hands. Those facts

reveal a frightening encounter and menacing action by

Locke. Additionally, when Locke’s gun came into view, it

had been raised close to horizontal (under the appellate

panel’s interpretation) or raised and pointed in the

direction of Officer Hanneman (by the video depiction) as

Officer Hanneman was mere feet away and without cover.

Any alleged attempt to comply by Locke occurred less

than a fraction of a second before Officer Hanneman fired

– a timeframe in which the district court concedes Officer

Hanneman faced a split-second decision which made the

issuance of a warning infeasible.

All of these

circumstances, in totality, render Officer Hanneman’s use

of force objectively reasonable and permissible under

clearly established law. There is certainly no case law

from this Court advising otherwise.

The Eighth Circuit panel stayed silent on all of

these important constitutional questions. This Court

should not do the same. Examining whether an officer’s

conduct violates the Fourth Amendment, with the above

considerations in mind, “will be ‘beneficial’ in

‘develop[ing] constitutional precedent’[.]” Plumhoff, 572

U.S. at 774 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,

236 (2009).) Petitioners sincerely hope that this Court will

issue a substantive decision, either on summary reversal

or by granting plenary review, for the sake of all officers

who find themselves confronted by armed individuals in

dangerous circumstances.

CONCLUSION

The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted,

KRISTYN ANDERSON

Minneapolis City Attorney

KRISTIN R. SARFF, Counsel of Record

TRACEY FUSSY

SARA LATHROP

Assistant City Attorneys

Minneapolis City Attorney’s Office

350 South Fifth Street

Minneapolis, MN 55415

(612) 673-3919

kristin.sarff@minneapolismn.gov

Counsel for Petitioners

Officer Mark Hanneman and City of Minneapolis

December 1, 2025

APPENDIX

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — ORDER OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

EIGHTH CIRCUIT, FILED JULY 18, 2025 . . . . . 1a

A PPENDIX B — OPINION AND ORDER

OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT, DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA ,

FILED JULY 8, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8a

A PPEN DI X C — OR DER OF T H E

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT, FILED

SEPTEMBER 2, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30a

Appendix

A UNITED STATES

APPENDIX A — ORDER

OF THE

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT,

FILED JULY 18, 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-2612

KAREN WELLS, AS CO-TRUSTEES

FOR THE NEXT OF KIN OF AMIR RAHKARE

LOCKE, DECEASED; ANDRE LOCKE, AS

CO-TRUSTEES FOR THE NEXT OF KIN OF

AMIR RAHKARE LOCKE, DECEASED,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

MARK HANNEMAN, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL

CAPACITY AS A MINNEAPOLIS POLICE

OFFICER; CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS,

Defendants-Appellants.

MINNESOTA POLICE AND

PEACE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION,

Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s).

Appeal from United States District Court

for the District of Minnesota

Submitted: March 18, 2025

Filed: July 18, 2025

Appendix A

Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, ERICKSON and

GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

COLLOTON, Chief Judge.

This is an interlocutory appeal from an order of the

district court denying a police officer’s motion for judgment

on the pleadings based on qualified immunity. We conclude

that this court lacks jurisdiction, and therefore dismiss

the appeal.

The case arises from a police shooting during execution

of a no-knock search warrant on an early morning in

February 2022. A SWAT team from Minneapolis entered

an apartment in search of a murder suspect. When officers

entered, they found Amir Locke, the suspect’s cousin,

asleep on a living room couch. Given the posture of the

case, we recite the facts as set forth in the pleadings.

Locke was lying on a couch that was “straight ahead

after entering the door to the apartment.” About six

seconds after the SWAT team entered the apartment,

Sergeant Carlson kicked the couch as another officer

yelled, “Get on the ground.” Locke, draped in a blanket,

fell off the couch and onto the ground. As he began to

stand, Locke grabbed for a handgun that was placed

near the couch. Officer Hanneman approached Locke and

yelled, “Show me your hands.”

Locke began to comply by lowering the handgun’s

barrel to the ground and raising his left hand to the side

Appendix A

of his head. Before Locke could fully comply, Officer

Hanneman fired three shots that hit Locke. Hanneman

then announced, “He’s got a gun.” During the encounter,

Locke allegedly kept his finger off the trigger, pointed

the handgun toward the ground, and “never raised the

handgun in a threatening manner in the direction of any

officer or other person.” The shooting occurred eight

seconds after the SWAT team entered the apartment.

Locke died within fifteen minutes of the shooting.

Karen Wells and Andre Locke, co-trustees of Locke’s

next of kin, brought this action against Officer Hanneman

and the City of Minneapolis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

Minnesota’s wrongful death statute. The plaintiffs alleged

that Hanneman violated Locke’s Fourth Amendment right

to be free from unreasonable seizures. They also alleged

that the City failed adequately to train its officers and

failed “to correct a number of persistent and widespread

unconstitutional practices and customs” that led to Locke’s

death. Finally, they alleged that Officer Hanneman and

the City violated Minnesota’s wrongful death statute by

engaging in wrongful acts and omissions that caused

Locke’s death.

Hanneman and the City answered the complaint

and submitted body camera footage from the officers.

Hanneman moved for judgment on the pleadings on the

ground that he was entitled to qualified immunity. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Hanneman argued that the amended

complaint and body camera footage establish that he

“had probable cause to believe that Locke posed a threat

of death or serious physical harm to himself or other

Appendix A

officers.” The officer cited body camera footage for the

proposition that “Locke raised the gun and pointed the

gun in Hanneman’s direction and near the direction of

other police officers in the apartment.”

The district court denied the motion. The court

concluded that the body camera footage did not contradict

the factual allegations in the complaint. Specifically,

the court observed that “the body-worn-camera videos

provide dim, unclear images of the incident’s critical

moments.” After a “careful review of the videos,” the

court determined that Locke’s actions were “obscured by

darkness or the officers themselves.”

Based on the uncontradicted allegations in the

complaint, the court assumed that Locke lowered the

barrel and muzzle of his firearm toward the ground,

began raising his left hand toward his head, attempted

to comply with officers’ commands, and never raised

the gun in a threatening manner in the direction of any

officer. On those assumed facts, the court concluded that

the complaint plausibly stated a claim that Hanneman’s

use of deadly force violated Locke’s clearly established

rights. The court also denied the defendants’ motion to

dismiss the remaining claims.

Hanneman and the City noticed an appeal, and

the plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal for lack

of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs argue that the appeal

challenges the facts assumed by the district court and

does not raise a purely legal issue over which this court

has jurisdiction.

Appendix A

II.

In an appeal from the denial of qualified immunity,

we have jurisdiction “to decide the purely legal issue of

whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff are a violation

of clearly established law.” Raines v. Counseling Assocs.,

Inc., 883 F.3d 1071, 1074 (8th Cir. 2018). In making that

determination, the court is “constrained by the version of

the facts that the district court assumed or likely assumed

in reaching its decision.” Thompson v. Murray, 800 F.3d

979, 983 (8th Cir. 2015). We ordinarily lack jurisdiction

to decide “which facts a party may, or may not, be able to

prove at trial.” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S.

Ct. 2151, 132 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1995). “There is one exception

to such a jurisdictional limitation on our review: we may

reject the district court’s factual findings to the extent that

they are ‘blatantly contradicted by the record.’” Wallace

v. City of Alexander, 843 F.3d 763, 767 (8th Cir. 2016)

(quoting Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1116 (8th Cir.

2014)); see Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S. Ct.

1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007).

The defendants’ principal argument on appeal is that

the body camera footage blatantly contradicts the district

court’s assumed fact that Locke did not raise the gun in

the direction of the officers. The defendants claim that the

footage clearly depicts Locke raising and pointing the gun

in the direction of Officer Hanneman or other officers.

After reviewing the body camera footage, we conclude

that the videos do not blatantly contradict the assumed fact

Appendix A

that Locke did not raise the gun in the direction of officers.

We agree with the district court that Locke’s actions “are

obscured by darkness or the officers themselves,” and

that “the body-worn-camera videos provide dim, unclear

images of the incident’s critical moments.”

The defendants assert that a still-image taken from

Officer Carlson’s body camera footage shows Locke

pointing the gun at officers. The image shows the barrel

of a gun appearing from under Locke’s blanket, with the

barrel angled close to horizontal. Officer Hanneman is

located to the right of Locke, near the corner of the couch.

But the image does not show definitively what direction

the barrel is pointing or whether officers are located in

the direction of the barrel.

Because the district court’s assumed facts are not

blatantly contradicted by the record, this court does

not have jurisdiction to address Hanneman’s remaining

arguments on appeal. Each of the arguments would

require the court to reject the plaintiffs’ alleged facts

and agree with Hanneman that Locke raised his gun in

the direction of officers. Because we lack jurisdiction to

address whether the evidence is sufficient to support the

allegations in the complaint, the appeal must be dismissed.

See Evans v. Krook, 106 F.4th 790, 792 (8th Cir. 2024) (per

curiam).

The Minnesota Police and Peace Officers Association,

as amicus curiae, argues that even if the videos do not

Appendix A

establish that Locke pointed the gun in the direction

of the officers, Officer Hanneman was still entitled to

qualified immunity. But the defendants did not raise this

argument in the district court or on appeal. We therefore

decline to consider it. See FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health

Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 226 n.4, 133 S. Ct. 1003, 185 L.

Ed. 2d 43 (2013); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050,

1053 n.1 (8th Cir. 2013). Because we lack jurisdiction to

consider Hanneman’s claim for qualified immunity, we

also do not consider the City’s interlocutory appeal on

the claims alleging municipal liability or the defendants’

interlocutory appeal concerning the state-law claim. See

Shockency v. Ramsey County, 493 F.3d 941, 952 (8th Cir.

2007).

The appeal is dismissed.

Appendix

B ORDER OF THE

APPENDIX B — OPNION

AND

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT

OF MINNESOTA, FILED JULY 8, 2024

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

File No. 23-cv-273 (ECT/DLM)

KAREN WELLS AND ANDRE LOCKE, AS

CO-TRUSTEES FOR THE NEXT OF KIN

OF AMIR RAHKARE LOCKE, DECEASED,

Plaintiffs,

MARK HANNEMAN, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL

CAPACITY AS A MINNEAPOLIS POLICE

OFFICER, AND CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS,

Defendants.

Filed July 8, 2024

OPINION AND ORDER

In the early morning of February 2, 2022, Amir Locke

was shot and killed by Defendant Mark Hanneman, a

Minneapolis Police Department officer. The basic facts

surrounding Amir’s death are not disputed. Officer

Hanneman was part of a Minneapolis Police Department

SWAT team. The SWAT team was searching for a murder

suspect. As part of its search, the team executed a no-

Appendix B

knock search warrant on an apartment. Amir was asleep

on a couch in the apartment. The officers’ entry into the

apartment roused Amir, who was holding a handgun.

Officer Hanneman began firing after he saw the handgun

in Amir’s hand.

Plaintiffs Karen Wells and Andre Locke are cotrustees for Amir’s next of kin. Karen and Andre brought

this case to recover damages arising from Amir’s death.

Through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they claim that Officer

Hanneman violated Amir’s Fourth Amendment rights and

that the City of Minneapolis implemented unconstitutional

policies and practices that caused Amir’s death. Karen

and Andre also assert a wrongful-death claim under

Minnesota law.

Defendants seek judgment on the pleadings pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). The primary

issue is whether Officer Hanneman possesses qualified

immunity from suit. In Defendants’ view, video recorded

by the SWAT team officers’ body-worn cameras establishes

conclusively that Officer Hanneman did not violate Amir’s

clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. This is so,

Defendants argue, because police officers have a right to

shoot an armed person who poses a threat, and the bodyworn camera videos show that Amir possessed a handgun

and did not comply with officers’ demands to show them

his hands.

The motion will be denied. Plaintiffs allege facts

plausibly showing that Officer Hanneman’s use of force

violated Amir’s clearly established Fourth Amendment

10a

Appendix B

rights. As presented at this stage, the body-worn-camera

videos show Amir was armed, but they do not conclusively

establish that Amir’s actions justified the use of deadly

force. The City’s only argument for its separate dismissal

depends on Officer Hanneman’s dismissal. Regardless,

Plaintiffs allege plausible claims against the City. And

Plaintiffs’ wrongful-death claim survives because the

official-immunity rules by which this claim is judged under

Minnesota law are comparable to the qualified-immunity

inquiry under federal law.

Begin with the standards governing a Rule 12(c)

motion’s adjudication. A motion for judgment on the

pleadings is assessed under the same standards as a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Ashley Cnty. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d

659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009). Under the familiar Rule 12(b)(6)

standards, a court must accept a complaint’s factual

allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in

the plaintiff’s favor. Gorog v. Best Buy Co., 760 F.3d 787,

792 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Although the factual

allegations need not be detailed, they must be sufficient

to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955,

167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (citation omitted). A pleading’s

allegations must “state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Id. at 570. Considering “matters outside

the pleadings” generally transforms a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion—and, by extension, a Rule 12(c) motion—into

one for summary judgment, but not when the documents

are “necessarily embraced” by the pleadings. Zean v.

11a

Appendix B

Fairview Health Servs., 858 F.3d 520, 526 (8th Cir. 2017)

(citation omitted).

As noted, Defendants’ motion relies on videos recorded

by SWAT team officers’ body-worn cameras, and the

parties dispute whether these videos may be considered

at this stage. Defendants argue the videos contradict the

operative Amended Complaint’s allegations and instead

establish Defendants’ version of the dispositive facts.

Plaintiffs argue the videos cannot be considered at this

stage of the proceedings if they contradict the Amended

Complaint’s factual allegations. Alternatively, Plaintiffs

argue the videos are at times difficult to discern and have

inconsistent time stamps, making the incident’s precise

facts and timeline unclear.

Our Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has provided

clear guidance governing the consideration of videos

recorded by police officers’ body-worn cameras in the

Rule 12(c) context: “Videos of an incident are necessarily

embraced by the pleadings” and therefore may be

considered in adjudicating a motion for judgment on the

pleadings. Ching v. City of Minneapolis, 73 F.4th 617,

621 (8th Cir. 2023). A complaint’s allegations should not

be accepted “if they are blatantly contradicted by video

evidence.” Waters v. Madson, 921 F.3d 725, 734 (8th Cir.

2019) (cleaned up). On the other hand, “[i]nconclusive

video evidence must be construed in the plaintiff’s favor.”

Abdullah v. Lepinski, No. 23-cv-121 (ECT/DTS), 2023

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149737, 2023 WL 5515895, at *2 (D.

Minn. Aug. 25, 2023); see Evans v. Krook, 106 F.4th 790,

No. 23-2753, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 16240, 2024 WL

12a

Appendix B

3283787, at *2 (8th Cir. July 3, 2024); see also Raines v.

Counseling Assocs., Inc., 883 F.3d 1071, 1075 (8th Cir.

2018); Maser v. City of Coralville, No. 23-cv-028, 2023

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222969, 2023 WL 8526724, at *2 (S.D.

Iowa Nov. 2, 2023) (“The Court . . . will rely on the video

to override a party’s denial of a fact only when the video

footage is definitive; if the footage is unclear, the factual

dispute will be resolved in [the plaintiff’s] favor as the

non-moving party.”).

The SWAT team officers’ body-worn camera videos

are therefore appropriately considered in adjudicating

Defendants’ motion. The dispositive question is whether

the videos negate any plausible allegations or inferences

that Defendants violated Amir’s clearly established

Fourth Amendment rights. The Amended Complaint’s

factual allegations and the videos’ content—or what the

parties contend the videos show—will be discussed in

tandem.

Turn to the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint

and as shown by the body-worn-camera videos. In late

January 2022, a homicide was committed in St. Paul

involving the use of armor-piercing bullets. Based on

surveillance videos from the area near the homicide, the

St. Paul Police Department focused on a person named

Mehki Speed as the prime suspect. Am. Compl. [ECF

No. 40] ¶ 72. Mehki lived in apartment 1402 of the Bolero

Flats apartment building on South Marquette Avenue in

Minneapolis. Id. ¶¶ 71, 73. Mehki’s brother, Marlon, lived

13a

Appendix B

in the same building, in apartment 701. Id. ¶¶ 78–79. Amir

was Mehki and Marlon’s cousin. Id. ¶ 80.

The St. Paul Police Department secured warrants to

search both apartments 1402 and 701, telling the issuing

judge that Mehki was “associated with” apartment 701,

had requested a key fob for that apartment in the past,

and that Minneapolis Fire Department medics had

transported Mekhi from apartment 701 two weeks earlier.

Id. ¶ 76; see also Answer Ex. 11 [ECF No. 17] at 7. The

St. Paul Police Department asked the Minneapolis Police

Department to execute the warrants. Am. Compl. ¶ 83.

The Minneapolis Police Department agreed to do so only

if the warrants were re-issued as “no-knock” warrants

rather than “knock and announce” warrants.1 Id. ¶ 84.

St. Paul Police then applied for and received no-knock

warrants for the apartments. Id. ¶ 86.

Minneapolis SWAT Team 1280 executed the warrants

in the early morning of February 2, 2022. Id. ¶¶ 90,

1. The Fourth A mendment generally requires that a

government official executing a search warrant knock and

announce the official’s presence before entering a residence. See

Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934–36, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 131 L.

Ed. 2d 976 (1995) (holding that knock-and-announce requirement

is part of Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness inquiry, with

exceptions such as when the “circumstances present[] a threat

of physical violence”). “In order to justify a ‘no-knock’ entry,

the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and

announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances,

would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective

investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction

of evidence.” Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394, 117 S. Ct.

1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997).

14a

Appendix B

98. Amir was sleeping under a blanket on a couch in

apartment 701. Id. ¶¶ 92, 94. The couch faced away from

the apartment’s entrance and sat in a living room that was

“straight ahead after entering the door to the apartment.”

Id. Defendant Mark Hanneman is a Minneapolis Police

Officer who served on SWAT Team 1280; he was the third

member of the team to enter apartment 701 on February 2,

after Sergeant John Sysaath and Sergeant Troy Carlson.

Id. ¶¶ 99, 107; see also ECF No. 16 Ex. 3 (Hanneman

BWC)2 at 6:48:05.

“Approx imately si x seconds after Team 12 80

crossed the threshold into Apartment 701, Sgt. Carlson

encountered Amir on the couch.” Am. Compl. ¶ 109; ECF

No. 16 Ex. 2 (Carlson BWC) at 6:47:30. Sergeant Carlson

kicked the couch, and Amir fell to the floor. Am. Compl.

¶¶ 110–11; ECF No. 16 Ex. 5 (Pearson BWC) at 6:48:08.

Amir, still draped in the blanket, “began to stand and

grabbed [his] handgun . . . .” Id. ¶ 112. Officer Hanneman

came around the couch at approximately the same time,

telling Amir to “[s]how me your hands.” Id. ¶ 116; ECF

No. 16 Ex. 3 at 6:48:09–13. Officer Hanneman then fired

three shots at Amir, approximately eight seconds after

the SWAT team entered the apartment and two seconds

after Sergeant Carlson kicked the couch. Am. Compl.

¶¶ 120–21; ECF No. 16 Ex. 5 at 6:48:11; ECF No. 16 Ex.

1 (Sysaath BWC) at 6:48:13.

The Amended Complaint alleges that Amir did not

have his finger on the handgun’s trigger at any time, kept

2. Exhibit 16 consists of the body-worn camera (or “BWC”)

videos from nine officers involved in the incident.

15a

Appendix B

the gun pointed down, and “never raised the handgun in

a threatening manner in the direction of any officer or

other person.” Am. Compl. ¶ 114. The Amended Complaint

also alleges that, when Officer Hanneman told Amir to

“show me your hands,” Amir lowered the gun’s barrel

and muzzle further toward the ground and raised his left

hand to the side of his head. Id. ¶¶ 118–19. Before Amir

“could fully comply with [Officer] Hanneman’s command,”

the Amended Complaint alleges, Officer Hanneman fired

his weapon. Id. ¶ 120.

According to Defendants, the body-worn-camera

videos reveal a different account of these events.

Defendants say the videos show that Amir looked up

as police entered the apartment, went back under the

blanket, moved around under the blanket, and held the

gun by its grip. Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. [ECF No. 65] at 6–7;

ECF No. 16 Ex. 5 at 6:48:10. These actions, in Defendants’

view, contradict the Amended Complaint’s allegations that

Amir was complying with Officer Hanneman’s commands.

This description of the body-worn camera videos

is not persuasive at this Rule 12(c) stage. In the form

they have been presented with this motion, the bodyworn-camera videos provide dim, unclear images of the

incident’s critical moments. Plaintiffs proffer screenshots

from the videos that reasonably may be construed to

support the finding that Amir was attempting to put the

gun down and was raising his other hand immediately

before Officer Hanneman fired. See Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n

[ECF No. 68] at 29–32. A careful review of the videos

shows that Amir’s actions are obscured by darkness or

16a

Appendix B

the officers themselves, making it difficult to determine

how A mir responded to the officers’ commands. 3

Accepting Defendants’ characterization of the video

evidence would therefore not be faithful to Rule 12(c)’s

requirement that allegations and materials embraced by

the complaint—including body-worn-camera video—be

construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. In view

of the Amended Complaint’s allegations and the bodyworn-camera video, it remains plausible that Amir was

attempting to comply with officers’ directions to drop the

handgun and surrender before he was shot.

III

Defendants seek judgment on the pleadings as to

Officer Hanneman based on qualified immunity. In

determining whether Officer Hanneman has qualified

immunity, two questions are answered: “(1) whether

the facts shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of

a constitutional . . . right, and (2) whether that right was

clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged

misconduct.” Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491,

496 (8th Cir. 2009); see also Watson v. Boyd, 2 F.4th 1106,

1109 (8th Cir. 2021). Courts may consider the questions in

either order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129

3. To be clear, I reviewed and re-reviewed each of the

body-worn-camera videos, frequently pausing some videos in an

attempt to discern specific events. The videos cannot reasonably be

construed to establish any fact that might contradict the Amended

Complaint’s core allegations. Perhaps the videos are capable of

enhancements. Regardless, that kind of evidence has not been

provided with this motion.

17a

Appendix B

S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009). A § 1983 plaintiff can

defeat a claim of qualified immunity only if the answer to

both questions is yes. Id. “Qualified immunity ‘protects

all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.’” Sok Kong Tr. for Map Kong v. City of

Burnsville, 960 F.3d 985, 991 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting

Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 200 L.

Ed. 2d 449 (2018)). If the material facts are not genuinely

disputed, then the constitutionality of an officer’s conduct

is a question of law. Thompson v. Reuting, 968 F.2d 756,

759 (8th Cir. 1992); see also Pollreis v. Marzolf, 66 F.4th

726, 732 n.2 (8th Cir. 2023); Bell v. Irwin, 321 F.3d 637,

640 (7th Cir. 2003). “[Q]ualified immunity questions should

be resolved at the earliest possible stage of a litigation.”

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6, 107 S. Ct.

3034, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987).

Plaintiffs allege that Officer Hanneman violated

Amir’s clearly established Fourth Amendment right to

be free from unreasonable seizures. See Tennessee v.

Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985)

(“[A]pprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure

subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth

Amendment.”). 4 Several general principles guide the

4. The Amended Complaint also invokes the Fourteenth

Amendment. See Am. Compl. at 36. The Fourteenth Amendment

does not apply. Its substantive-due-process protections apply to

an excessive-force claim when there has been no seizure. Cnty. of

Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843–44, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 140

L. Ed. 2d 1043 (1998). Here, because Amir was shot and killed,

there was a “seizure.” See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395,

109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989) (“[A]ll claims that law

18a

Appendix B

qualified-immunity analysis in this context. Determining

whether a police officer’s use of force violates this right

“requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances

of each particular case, including the severity of the

crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate

threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether

he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade

arrest by flight.” Sok Kong Tr. for Map Kong, 960 F.3d

at 991 (quoting Kisela, 584 U.S. at 103). “Reasonableness

‘must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable

officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision

of hindsight,’” and must “embody allowance for the fact

that police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,

and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is

necessary in a particular situation.” Id. (quoting Kisela,

584 U.S. at 103).

More specific considerations govern the qualifiedimmunity analysis in the use-of-deadly-force context.

“‘[A]bsent probable cause’ for an officer to believe the

suspect poses ‘an immediate threat of death or serious

bodily injury’ to others, ‘use of deadly force is not

objectively reasonable.’” Cole v. Hutchins, 959 F.3d

1127, 1132 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Billingsley v. City of

Omaha, 277 F.3d 990, 993 (8th Cir. 2002)). “Generally, an

individual’s mere possession of a firearm is not enough for

enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in

the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a

free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and

its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a ‘substantive

due process’ approach.”).

19a

Appendix B

an officer to have probable cause to believe that individual

poses an immediate threat of death or serious bodily

injury; the suspect must also point the firearm at another

individual or take similar ‘menacing action.’” Id. Well

before February 2, 2022, it was clearly established that

an officer violates the Fourth Amendment when he uses

deadly force on an armed individual who is moving his gun

in compliance with officers’ commands. Partridge v. City

of Benton, 70 F.4th 489, 492 (8th Cir. 2023); see Craighead

v. Lee, 399 F.3d 954, 961 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that the

use of deadly force against an individual holding a gun

over his head, pointed upward, is unreasonable).

Applying these rules here shows that Officer

Hanneman is not entitled to qualified immunity at the Rule

12(c) stage. According to the Amended Complaint, Amir

possessed a handgun, but “never raised the handgun in a

threatening manner in the direction of any officer or other

person.” Am. Compl. ¶ 114. And, the Amended Complaint

alleges, after Officer Hanneman ordered Amir to show

his hands, Amir lowered the firearm’s barrel and muzzle

further toward the ground and began raising his left hand.

Id. ¶¶ 118–19. These allegations plausibly show that Amir

did not point the firearm at officers or use the weapon in

a menacing way and that Amir was attempting to comply

with officers’ commands. As explained above, in the form

they have been presented on this motion, the body-worncamera videos do not contradict these allegations. Under

Cole and Partridge, among other Eighth Circuit cases,

the Amended Complaint’s uncontradicted allegations

plausibly show the violation of a clearly established right.

20a

Appendix B

Defendants rely on Liggins v. Cohen, 971 F.3d 798 (8th

Cir. 2020), for their argument that Officer Hanneman’s

conduct was objectively reasonable. Defs.’ Mem. in Supp.

at 18–19. In Liggins, an officer shot an armed individual.

Liggins, 971 F.3d at 800. The individual was running

toward the officer, holding a gun by its barrel and pointed

down. Id. The district court denied summary judgment

to the officer on qualified immunity grounds, finding

disputed questions of fact as to whether the officer acted

reasonably. Id. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that

undisputed facts established that the officer’s actions

were objectively reasonable: a person carrying a gun was

running in the direction of the police officer, the gun was

moving as he ran, and the officers were investigating a

report of a stolen firearm. Id. at 801. Because the officer

had only one or two seconds to react, he had “reasonable

grounds to believe that the fleeing subject who was

running . . . could raise the gun and shoot.” Id. Liggins

teaches that “i[n] dangerous situations where an officer has

reasonable grounds to believe that there is an imminent

threat of serious harm, the officer may be justified in using

a firearm before a subject actually points a weapon at the

officer or others.” Id.

Defendants argue that the entry of summary judgment

in Liggins shows that judgment on the pleadings should

be entered here, but this argument is not persuasive.

Defendants are correct that, like the officer in Liggins,

Officer Hanneman faced a “split-second decision.” Id. And

it is true, as Defendants note, that the Supreme Court

has found an officer’s conduct reasonable when the officer

“had mere seconds to assess the potential danger.” Kisela,

21a

Appendix B

584 U.S. at 105. Liggins is nonetheless distinguishable

for its procedural posture. Here, as noted, the Amended

Complaint allows the plausible inference that Officer

Hanneman either saw or should have seen that Amir

was not using the handgun in a threatening manner and

was attempting to comply with officers’ commands. Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 114, 118–19. Discovery may ultimately reveal

that “[i]t was not practical in that moment for [Officer

Hanneman] to discern whether [Amir] was carrying the

gun in an unusual manner . . . .” Liggins, 971 F.3d at 801.

At this stage, “[t]aking the facts in the complaint as true

and drawing all reasonable inferences in [Plaintiffs’] favor,

[the officer] shot a non-resisting, non-fleeing [individual]

as he moved his gun in compliance with [officer’s]

commands . . . .” Partridge, 929 F.3d at 567.

Plaintiffs raise three alternative contentions that

deserve comment. (1) The Amended Complaint includes

several allegations regarding Amir’s state of mind. See,

e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 112 (alleging that Amir “grabbed the

handgun to assess the threat that jarred him awake”).

The qualified immunity “analysis must consider only

what a reasonable officer on the scene would have

perceived.” Liggins, 971 F.3d at 801; see Morgan-Tyra

v. City of St. Louis, 89 F.4th 1082, 1090 (8th Cir. 2024)

(Kelly, J., dissenting). (2) Plaintiffs argue that Officer

Hanneman’s failure to command that Amir drop the

handgun establishes that the use of deadly force was

not reasonable. Not so. “When the hesitation involved

in giving a warning could readily cause such a warning

to be the officer’s last, then a warning is not feasible.”

Liggins, 971 F.3d at 801 (quoting Hicks v. Scott, 958 F.3d

22a

Appendix B

421, 437 (6th Cir. 2020)). (3) Plaintiffs argue that the

underlying search warrant was invalid because it was not

supported by probable cause. This lack of probable cause,

Plaintiffs contend, establishes the unreasonableness of

Officer Hanneman’s conduct. Again, this is not correct.

The Fourth Amendment analysis considers only the

circumstances at the time of the seizure—here, the use

of deadly force—not the events leading up to it. Cole, 993

F.2d at 1333 (“[W]e scrutinize only the seizure itself,

not the events leading to the seizure, for reasonableness

under the Fourth Amendment.”). “[T]he . . . standard

of reasonableness at the moment applies” to claims of

excessive force. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (emphasis

added).

Plaintiffs raise two § 1983 claims against the City

of Minneapolis. In Count Two, they claim the City

maintained unconstitutional practices and customs that

violated its citizens’ equal protection rights and their right

to be free from the unreasonable use of force. Am. Compl.

¶¶ 194–200. In Count Three, they claim the City failed

to adequately train its officers to avoid violating citizens’

rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Id. ¶¶ 201–07.

A municipality is a “person” to whom the prohibitions

of § 1983 apply. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 690, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). But a

municipality is not liable “unless action pursuant to official

municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional

23a

Appendix B

tort.” Id. at 691. “[A] municipality cannot be held liable

solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words,

a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a

respondeat superior theory.” Id. While a municipality

may be liable only for its own illegal acts, Pembaur v.

Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 89 L. Ed.

2d 452 (1986), if the “execution of a government’s policy

or custom . . . inflicts the injury [] the government as an

entity [may be held] responsible under § 1983. Monell, 436

U.S. at 694. As the Supreme Court explained, municipal

liability under § 1983 lies when “official policy [is] the

moving force of the constitutional violation.” Id. “Official

municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s

lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and

practices so persistent and widespread as to practically

have the force of law.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51,

61, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 179 L. Ed. 2d 417 (2011).

In addition to liability for unconstitutional policies,

practices, and customs, a municipality may be liable for

failing to properly train its public servants, including

police officers. Inadequate training “may serve as the

basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train

amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons

with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L. Ed. 2d

412 (1989). A municipality “may be deemed deliberately

indifferent if the policymakers choose to retain” a training

program when they “are on actual or constructive notice

that a particular omission in [that] training program

causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional

rights.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61–62.

24a

Appendix B

The City’s only argument against Count Two is that

Officer Hanneman’s qualified immunity precludes the

claim. The determination that Officer Hanneman is not

entitled to qualified immunity defeats this contention.

Regardless, whether Officer Hanneman has qualified

immunity for Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim is not

dispositive of the claim that City practices and customs

violate the Equal Protection Clause.

“[A] mun icipa l ity may be held l iable for it s

unconstitutional policy or custom even when no official

has been found personally liable for his conduct under the

policy or custom.” Webb v. City of Maplewood, 889 F.3d

483, 486 (8th Cir. 2018). In Webb, the plaintiffs challenged

a city policy of issuing arrest warrants for failure to pay

traffic fines, alleging the policy violated their equalprotection and due-process rights. Webb, 889 F.3d at

484–85. While each plaintiff had been subjected to this

practice, they did not sue the individual police officers

who arrested them; they sued the city that promulgated

the allegedly unconstitutional policy. Webb v. City of

Maplewood, No. 16-cv-1703, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85645,

2017 WL 2418011, at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 5, 2017), aff’d, 889

F.3d 483 (8th Cir. 2018). The city argued it was immune

because “all of the individuals the complaint identifies as

participating in the contested practices are personally

immune from suit.” Webb, 889 F.3d at 486. The Eighth

Circuit rejected this contention: “even if . . . [City] officials

all enjoy personal immunity from suit, it hardly follows

that they did not engage in any unlawful acts or that the

City is thereby immune as well.” Id.

25a

Appendix B

The Eighth Circuit has explained that “situations

may arise where the combined actions of multiple

officials or employees may give rise to a constitutional

violation, supporting municipal liability, but where no one

individual’s actions are sufficient to establish personal

liability for the violation.” Speer v. City of Wynne, 276 F.3d

980, 986 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing, inter alia, Garcia v. Salt

Lake Cnty., 768 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1985)).

Monell does not require that a jury find

an individual defendant liable before it can

find a local governmental body liable. The

language of § 1983 “plainly imposes liability

on a government that, under color of some

official policy, ‘causes’ an employee to violate

another’s constitutional rights.” Monell, 436

U.S. at 692. Although the acts or omissions of

no one employee may violate an individual’s

constitutional rights, the combined acts or

omissions of several employees acting under a

governmental policy or custom may violate an

individual’s constitutional rights.

Garcia, 768 F.2d at 310.

The theory underlying Count Two is consistent

with these cases. Plaintiffs allege the City had a policy

or custom of executing no-knock warrants and of using

excessive force against people of color, and that these

policies violate the Equal Protection Clause. Am. Compl.

¶ 196. Plaintiffs describe statistics showing that, in 2021

and 2022, eighty percent of no-knock warrants executed

26a

Appendix B

by Minneapolis police targeted Black subjects. Id. ¶ 154.

The Amended Complaint alleges that no warrants of this

type were executed against a non-Hispanic white subject.

Id. Plaintiffs allege that the police officers may have been

acting reasonably according to official policy, but that

the policy in question—executing no-knock warrants

exclusively on people of color—was unconstitutional. The

bottom line, then, is that the City’s exclusive reliance on

Officer Hanneman’s entitlement to qualified immunity as

the ground to challenge Count Two is not persuasive. The

officer is not entitled to qualified immunity, and even if he

were, that fact alone would not undermine the plausibility

of Count Two’s policy or custom claim.

As with Count Two, Defendants seek dismissal

of Plaintiffs’ failure-to-train claim in Count Three

solely on the basis that Officer Hanneman is entitled to

qualified immunity. “It is the law in this circuit . . . that

a municipality may not be held liable on a failure to train

theory unless an underlying Constitutional violation is

located.” Schulz v. Long, 44 F.3d 643, 650 (8th Cir. 1995).

Because Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Officer

Hanneman is not entitled to qualified immunity, however,

the failure-to-train cannot be dismissed on this basis.

Regardless, Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient.

The elements of a § 1983 failure-to-train claim are: (1)

that training was inadequate; (2) that the failure to

train “reflects a deliberate and conscious choice” by

the municipal entity; and (3) the deficiencies in training

27a

Appendix B

actually caused the injury at issue. Ambrose v. Young, 474

F.3d 1070, 1079 (8th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

The Amended Complaint alleges that Minneapolis

Police Department training regarding the use of force

and the use of no-knock warrants was inadequate, that

policymakers knew it was inadequate and knew that

the inadequate training allowed Minneapolis police

officers to violate citizens’ rights, and that the failure

to adequately train Minneapolis police officers resulted

in Amir’s death. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 202–03. Were these

Plaintiffs’ only allegations in support of the failureto-train claim, Defendants would likely be entitled to

judgment on this claim. See B.A.B., Jr. v. Bd. of Educ.,

698 F.3d 1037, 1040 (8th Cir. 2012) (affirming failure-totrain claim’s dismissal because the plaintiff did not allege

facts plausibly showing the claim’s elements). Unlike the

plaintiffs in B.A.B., however, Plaintiffs here outline the

City’s knowledge of the Minneapolis Police Department’s

use of no-knock warrants, including four specific instances

where police officers’ use of no-knock warrants resulted

in injuries and consequent civil lawsuits against the

City. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 41–44. Plaintiffs also plead that the

City had notice that Officer Hanneman specifically had

violated other individuals’ rights during the execution of

search warrants, but that the City did not offer Officer

Hanneman, or any other officer, additional training in the

constitutional execution of search warrants. Id. ¶¶ 50–55.

And Plaintiffs allege that independent investigators,

including the United States Department of Justice, found

Minneapolis Police Department training regarding the

use of force to be constitutionally insufficient. E.g., id.

¶ 166.

28a

Appendix B

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Minnesotalaw wrongful death claim, arguing they are entitled

to official immunity. “[U]nder Minnesota law a public

official is entitled to official immunity from state law

claims when that official is charged by law with duties

that require the exercise of judgment or discretion.

Generally, police officers are classified as discretionary

officers entitled to that immunity.” Johnson v. Morris,

453 N.W.2d 31, 41–42 (Minn. 1990) (en banc) (citations

omitted). Discretionary conduct on the part of a police

officer is entitled to official immunity unless “the official

committed a willful or malicious wrong.” Elwood v. Rice

Cnty., 423 N.W.2d 671, 679 (Minn. 1988) (en banc). The

official-immunity determination “contemplates less of a

subjective inquiry into malice, which was traditionally

favored at common law, and more of an objective inquiry

into the legal reasonableness of an official’s actions.”

Hassan v. City of Minneapolis, 489 F.3d 914, 920 (8th Cir.

2007) (quoting State ex rel. Beaulieu v. City of Mounds

View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Minn. 1994) (en banc)). Malice

in this context is usually a question for the jury, although

“Minnesota courts rule in favor of a defendant when ‘no

reasonable jury could find the [officers] acted with bad

faith or malicious intent.’” Smith v. City of Minneapolis,

754 F.3d 541, 549 (8th Cir. 2014) (alteration in original)

(quoting Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 679); but cf. Stresemann

v. Jesson, No. A13-1967, 2015 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS

1082, 2015 WL 7693339, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 30,

2015) (“The law concerning a motion to dismiss for failure

to state a claim is not hospitable to the doctrine of official

immunity.”).

29a

Appendix B

The same reasoning that led to the denial of qualified

immunity leads here to the denial of official immunity. See

Craighead, 399 F.3d at 963. Plaintiffs allege facts plausibly

showing that Officer Hanneman’s use of deadly force

violated Amir’s clearly established Fourth Amendment

rights. In other words, Officer Hanneman’s use of deadly

force was not legally reasonable. That is enough to defeat

official immunity on this record.

ORDER

Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files,

records, and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT

Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF

No. 63] is DENIED.

Dated: July 8, 2024

/s/ Eric C. Tostrud

Eric C. Tostrud

United States District Court

30a

Appendix

C UNITED STATES

APPENDIX C — ORDER

OF THE

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT,

FILED SEPTEMBER 2, 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No: 24-2612

KAREN WELLS, AS CO-TRUSTEES FOR THE

NEXT OF KIN OF AMIR RAHKARE LOCKE,

DECEASED AND ANDRE LOCKE, AS

CO-TRUSTEES FOR THE NEXT OF KIN

OF AMIR RAHKARE LOCKE, DECEASED,

Appellees,

MARK HANNEMAN, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL

CAPACITY AS A MINNEAPOLIS POLICE

OFFICER AND CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS,

Appellants,

MINNESOTA POLICE AND

PEACE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION,

Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s).

Appeal from U.S. District Court

for the District of Minnesota

(0:23-cv-00273-ECT)

31a

Appendix C

ORDER

The petition for rehearing en banc is denied. The

petition for panel rehearing is also denied.

September 02, 2025

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

/s/ Susan E. Bindler

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