Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Frank A. Walls, Petitioner v. Florida, et al.

No. _________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_____________

FRANK ATHEN WALLS,

Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

____________________________________________________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Florida Supreme Court

_____________________________________________________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

THIS IS A CAPITAL CASE

WITH AN EXECUTION SCHEDULED FOR

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 18, 2025, AT 6:00 P.M.

_____________________________________________________

JULISSA R. FONTÁN*

FLORIDA BAR NUMBER 0032744

LAW OFFICE OF THE CAPITAL COLLATERAL

REGIONAL COUNSEL - MIDDLE REGION

12973 N. TELECOM PARKWAY

TEMPLE TERRACE, FL 33637

TELEPHONE: (813) 558-1600

COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER

*COUNSEL OF RECORD

MEGAN M. MONTAGNO

FLORIDA BAR NUMBER 118819

LAW OFFICE OF THE CAPITAL COLLATERAL

REGIONAL COUNSEL - MIDDLE REGION

COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER

CAPITAL CASE

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Has Florida’s partial retroactive treatment of Hall v. Florida denied intellectually disabled

people the protections of Atkins and should procedural bars exist for categorical bars to the

death penalty?

2. Does a state constitutional provision that prohibits any consideration of evolving standards

of decency violate this Court’s jurisprudence?

ii

LIST OF PARTIES

All parties appear on the caption to the case on the cover page. Mr. Walls was the Appellant

below. The State of Florida was the Appellee below.

iii

RELATED CASES

TRIAL AND SENTENCING

Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Okaloosa, Florida

Docket Number: 87-CF-856

Case Caption: State of Florida v. Frank Athen Walls

Date of Entry of Judgment: Convicted, July 20, 1988; Sentence of Death, August 24, 1988.

Unreported.

DIRECT APPEAL

Florida Supreme Court

Docket Number: SC1960-73261

Case Caption: Frank Athen Walls v. State of Florida

Date of Entry of Judgment: Order entered, April 11, 1991; Rehearing Denied, June 13,

1991; Mandate issued, July 30, 1991.

Walls v. State, 580 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1991).

TRIAL AND SENTENCING

Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Okaloosa, Florida

Docket Number: 87-CF-856

Case Caption: State of Florida v. Frank Athen Walls

Date of Entry of Judgment: Convicted, June 18, 1992; Sentence of Death, July 29, 1992.

Unreported.

DIRECT APPEAL

Florida Supreme Court

Docket Number: SC1960-80364

Case Caption: Frank Athen Walls v. State of Florida

Date of Entry of Judgment: Order entered, July 7, 1994; Rehearing Denied, August 31,

1994; Mandate issued, September 30, 1994.

Walls v. State, 641 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1994).

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

United States Supreme Court

Docket Number: 94-7005

Case Caption: Frank Athen Walls v. Florida

Date of Entry of Judgment: January 23, 1995.

Walls v. Florida, 115 S.Ct. 943 (1995).

POSTCONVICTION MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE

Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Okaloosa County, Florida

iv

Docket Number: 87-CF-856

Case Caption: State of Florida v. Frank Athen Walls

Date of Entry of Judgment: November 20, 1997; Rehearing Denied December 3, 1997.

Unreported

APPEAL FROM DENIAL OF POSTCONVICTION MOTION TO VACATE JUDGEMENT AND

SENTENCE AND CONSOLIDATED STATE HABEAS PETITION

Florida Supreme Court

Docket Number: SC2003-0633 & SC03–1955

Case Caption: Frank Athen Walls v. State of Florida

Date of Entry of Judgment: Feb. 9, 2006; Rehearing Denied April 7, 2006; Mandate

Issued, April 24, 2006.

Walls v. State, 926 So.2d 1156 (Fla. 2006).

SUCCESSIVE MOTION TO VACATE DEATH

Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Okaloosa County, Florida

Docket Number: 87-CF-856

Case Caption: State of Florida v. Frank Walls

Date of Entry of Judgment: July 18, 2007

Unreported

APPEAL FROM SUMMARY DENIAL OF SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION MOTION

Florida Supreme Court

Docket Number: SC07-2007

Case Caption: Frank A. Walls v. State of Florida

Date of Entry of Judgment: October 31, 2008

Walls v. State, 3 So.3d 1248 (Fla. 2008).

Unpublished

FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PETITION

United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division

Docket Number: 3:06cv237/MCR

Case Caption: Frank A. Walls v. Walter A. McNeil, Secretary, Fl. Dept. of Corrections

Date of Entry of Judgment: September 30, 2009

Walls v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 2009 WL 3187066 (U.S. F.L.M.D. 2009).

APPEAL FROM DENIAL OF PETITION OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Docket Number: 09-15706-P

Case Caption: Frank A. Walls v. Walter A. McNeil, Secretary, Fl. Dept. of Corrections

Date of Entry of Judgment: September 28, 2011.

v

Walls v. Buss, 658 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2011).

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

United States Supreme Court

Docket Number: 11–8965

Case Caption: Frank A. Walls v. Kenneth S. Tucker, Secretary, Florida Department of

Corrections.

Date of Entry of Judgment: April 30, 2012.

Walls v. Kenneth S. Tucker, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 132 S.Ct. 2121

(2012).

SUCCESSIVE MOTION TO VACATE DEATH

Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Okaloosa County, Florida

Docket Number: 87-CF-856

Case Caption: State of Florida v. Frank Walls

Date of Entry of Judgment: July 10, 2015

Unreported

APPEAL FROM SUMMARY DENIAL OF SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION MOTION

Florida Supreme Court

Docket Number: SC15–1449

Case Caption: Frank A. Walls v. State of Florida

Date of Entry of Judgment: Oct. 20, 2016; Rehearing denied: January 9, 2017; Mandate

Issued, January 25, 2017.

Walls v. State, 213 So.3d 340 (Fla. 2016).

SUCCESSIVE MOTION TO VACATE DEATH

Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Okaloosa County, Florida

Docket Number: 87-CF-856

Case Caption: State of Florida v. Frank Walls

Date of Entry of Judgment: February 20, 2017; Rehearing Denied April 4, 2017.

Unreported

APPEAL FROM SUMMARY DENIAL OF SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION MOTION

Florida Supreme Court

Docket Number: SC22-72

Case Caption: Frank A. Walls v. State of Florida

Date of Entry of Judgment: February 16, 2023; Rehearing denied: March 29, 2023;

Mandate Issued, April 14, 2023.

Walls v. State, 361 So.3d 231 (Fla. 2023).

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

vi

United States Supreme Court

Docket Number: 22-7866

Case Caption: Walls v. Florida

Date of Entry of Judgment: October 2, 2023

Walls v. Florida, 144 S.Ct. 174 (2023).

DEFENDANT’S SUCCESSIVE MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND

SENTENCE OF DEATH AFTER DEATH WARRANT SIGNED AND DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

STAY OF EXECUTION CONSOLIDATED.

Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Okaloosa County, Florida

Docket Number: 87-CF-856

Case Caption: State of Florida v. Frank A. Walls.

Date of Entry of Judgment: December 5, 2025.

Unreported

APPEAL FROM SUMMARY DENIAL OF SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION MOTION TO VACATE

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND SENTENCE OF DEATH AFTER DEATH WARRANT SIGNED,

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION AND DEFENDANT’S WRIT FOR HABEAS

CORPUS CONSOLIDATED

Florida Supreme Court

Docket Number: SC25-1915 & SC25-1917

Case Caption: Frank A. Walls v. State of Florida

Date of Entry of Judgment: December 11, 2025

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONTENTS

Page(s)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED........................................................................................................... ii

LIST OF PARTIES ........................................................................................................................ iii

RELATED CASES ........................................................................................................................ iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................. viii

INDEX OF APPENDICES ........................................................................................................... ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................x

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.................................................................................1

CITATION TO OPINION BELOW ................................................................................................1

JURISDICTION ..............................................................................................................................1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED .........................................................................2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE........................................................................................................3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .....................................................................................6

1. Intellectual Disability Should Not Be Subject to Procedural Bars ......................................6

2. Florida’s constitution conformity clause violates the Eighth Amendment because it

prohibits Florida courts from participating in the process of determining society’s evolving

standards of decency as mandated by this Court’s jurisprudence......................................15

A. Florida’s Eighth Amendment Conformity Clause .................................................17

B. Reviewing Florida’s implementation of the conformity clause is a proper and

necessary exercise of this Court’s authority ..........................................................19

C. This case is a proper vehicle for consideration of the question presented because

there is no independent or adequate state law impediment....................................22

D. The constitutional harm is not confined to Florida, but without this Court’s

intervention, Florida will not rectify the problems created by its outlier status ....24

CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................30

viii

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A – Opinion of the Florida Supreme Court

APPENDIX B – Order of the Florida Circuit Court, Okaloosa County

APPENDIX C - Florida Supreme Court decision related to intellectual disability litigation.

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999) ................................................................... 24

Allen v. State, 322 So. 3d 589, 602 (Fla. 2021) ........................................................... 19

Ark Encounter, LLC v. Parkinson, 152 F.Supp.3d 880, 927 (E.D. Ky 2016) ............. 24

Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So.2d 7, 17 (Fla. 2000) ....................................................... 18

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) .............................................................. 3, 6, 23

Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785, 795 (Fla. 2023) ...................................................... 19

Bowles v. State, 276 So. 3d 791, 796 (Fla. 2019)......................................................... 19

Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 409 (2006) ...................................................... 25

Brown v. State, 62 N.E.3d 1232, 1236-37 (Ind. 2016) ................................................ 24

Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 579 (1981) ........................................................... 29

Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2007) ................................................................... 5

Clark v. State, 418 So. 3d 1226, 1230 (Miss. 2025) .................................................... 10

Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001) .......................................................................... 21

Cooper v. State of Cal., 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) ........................................................... 25

Covington v. State, 348 So. 3d 456, 479-480 (Fla. 2022) ............................................ 19

Cunningham v. Florida, 144 S. Ct. 1287, 1288 (2024) ............................................... 17

Democratic Executive Comm. of Florida v. Lee, 915 F.3d 1312, 1331 (11th Cir. 2019)

................................................................................................................................... 20

Florida v. Rigterink, 559 U.S. 965 (2010) ................................................................... 25

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) ........................................................ 7

Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 499 n.4 (2016 ........................................................ 23

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972)............................................................. 16

GE Commercial Finance Business Property Corp. v. Heard, 621 F.Supp.2d 1305,

1309 (M.D. Ga. 2009) ................................................................................................ 24

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) ....................................................................... 19

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59-61 (2010)............................................................ 15

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 76 (2010) ................................................................. 28

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) ................................................................ 21

Hall v. Florida, 134 S.Ct. 1986 (2014) ................................................................ 5, 8, 10

Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 708 (2014) ............................. ii, 3, 5, 6, 8, 14, 16, 20, 27

Hart v. State, 246 So. 3d 417, 420-21 .......................................................................... 19

Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) ......................................................... 22

Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92, 94 (2016) ..................................................................... 28

x

Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584–85 (1988)................................................... 6

Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) .................................................. 7, 9, 21, 28

Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1269 (3d Cir.

1992) .......................................................................................................................... 25

Lard v. State, 595 S.W.3d 355, 357 (Ark. 2020) ................................................... 10, 11

Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544, 545 (Fla. 2020) .................................................... 19

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) ...................................................... 23

Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940) .......................................... 20

National Tea Co., 309 U.S. at 557 ............................................................................... 22

New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) ......................................... 29

Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) ................................................................... 25

Phillips v. State, 299 So.3d 1013 (Fla. 2020) ................................................................ 3

Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 228 (1987)..................................................... 20

Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989) .......................................................................... 22

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 584 (1964) ................................................................ 19

Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) ......................................................................... 22

Rigterink v. State, 2 So. 3d 221, 241 (Fla. 2009) ........................................................ 25

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) .......................................................................... 22

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 559-60, 565-66 (2005).............................. 7, 8, 23, 27

Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992) ........................................................................ 9

State ex re. Clayton v. Griffith, 457 S.W.3d 735, 757 (Mo. 2015) ................................. 7

State v. Baldon, 829 N.W.2d 785, 791 & n.1 (Iowa 2013) .......................................... 24

State v. Griffin, 339 Conn. 631, 690 (Conn. 2021) ...................................................... 24

State v. Purcell, 331 Conn. 318, 341 (Conn. 2019) ..................................................... 24

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)................................................................. 15, 16

Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488-89 (1980) .................................................................. 9

Walls v. Florida, 513 U.S. 1130..................................................................................... 4

Walls v. State, 213 So. 3d 340, 348 (Fla. 2016) ............................................... 3, 5, 8, 10

Walls v. State, 3 So. 3d 1248 (Table) (Fla. 2008) .......................................................... 5

Walls v. State, 580 So. 2d 131, 134 (Fla. 1991) ............................................................. 4

Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1994) ..................................................................... 4

Walls v. State, SC25-1915 & SC25-1917....................................................................... 1

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) ............................................... 16, 21

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288 (1976) ......................................... 21, 29

Zack v. State, 371 So. 3d 335 (Fla. 2023) .................................................................... 19

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884–885, 887 n.24 (1983) .......................................... 6

xi

Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 921.1425 Fla. Stat. (2025) ........................................................................ 28

Fla. Stat. § 921.1426 (2025) ......................................................................................... 28

Fla. Stat. § 921.1427 Fla. Stat. (2025) ........................................................................ 28

Other Authorities

Death Penalty Information Center, Florida Prosecutors Seek First Death Sentence

Under New Child Sex Abuse Law, Death Penalty Info (March 14, 2025).............. 29

Constitutional Provisions

28 U.S.C. § 1257 ........................................................................................................................................ 1

FLA. CONST. Art. I, § 17 ............................................................................................................. 22, 23, 27

U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI ........................................................................................................................... 1

U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII ............... viii, 1, 3, 10, 11, 13, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 29, 32, 34, 35, 36, 38

U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV .................................................................................................................. 3, 28

xii

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner, Frank A. Walls, respectfully requests that this Court issue a writ

of certiorari to review the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court and address the

important questions of federal constitutional law presented. This case presents a

fundamental question concerning the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, the Due

Process Clause requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the Eighth

Amendment need for a reliable capital sentencing determination.

CITATION TO OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Florida Supreme Court Walls v. State, SC25-1915 & SC251917 is reproduced at Appendix A. The trial court’s order denying Walls’ successive

motion for post-conviction relief is reproduced at Appendix B.

JURISDICTION

The opinion of the Florida Supreme Court was entered on December 11, 2025.

(Appendix A). This petition is timely filed. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1257

1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII.

The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor

cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the

jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State

wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall

abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor

shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014), this Court found the Florida Supreme

Court’s application of its Intellectual Disability statute unconstitutional under Atkins

v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). In Walls v. State, 213 So. 3d 340 (2016) (per curiam),

the Florida Supreme Court agreed that its prior statutory interpretation had

unconstitutionally restricted Atkins claims to a smaller subgroup of individuals than

recognized by the medical community and determined Hall to be retroactive. As a

result, capital defendants who were denied under the unconstitutional pre-Hall

framework were entitled to receive a new, “holistic” review of their Atkins claims.

However, the Florida Supreme Court sua sponte reversed its decision in Walls and

determined that Hall announced a new non-watershed rule for Eighth Amendment

purposes and thus was not retroactive. See Phillips v. State, 299 So.3d 1013 (Fla.

2020).

Procedural History:

In 1987, 19-year-old Frank Walls, who is intellectually disabled, was arrested

and charged with two counts of first degree-murder. Before his 21st birthday, a jury

convicted him as charged and recommended a penalty of life imprisonment for one of

the murders, and recommended the death penalty, by a vote of 7-5, on the second

murder. The trial judge condemned him to death and made all of the necessary

factual findings in order to support the death sentence.

3

On direct appeal, Mr. Walls’s convictions and death sentence were vacated

because, in the months following his arrest, a female jail guard, acting as an agent

for the state, manipulated the intellectually disabled teen into providing

incriminating information that was used against him. The Florida Supreme Court

reversed his conviction and sentence finding that:

[G]ross deception is precisely what led to the statements made

by Walls while in custody. Here we find the surreptitious, admittedly

illegal gathering of information later transmitted to those conducting

psychiatric evaluations of the accused. In this case, a state agent

befriended Walls, fraudulently encouraged him to speak freely ‘in

confidence’ to her, failed to warn him that the information she obtained

later would be used against him in court, and discouraged him from

telling his attorney of her activities. Later, these illegally obtained

statements formed a substantial part of the basis for expert statements

on which the trial court directly relied in finding Walls competent to

stand trial.

Walls v. State, 580 So. 2d 131, 134 (Fla. 1991).

Mr. Walls was convicted again after a retrial, and the jury unanimously

recommended a sentence of death.1 There was no special verdict form or any

indication of what aggravators or mitigators the jury found, if any. Mr. Walls’s

convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d

381 (Fla. 1994) (cert denied) (Walls v. Florida, 513 U.S. 1130)(1995).

1 Double Jeopardy precluded the State from seeking death again on one murder charge since Walls’s

original jury returned a life recommendation on that count. After Walls was again convicted of two

counts of first degree murder, the judge automatically imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for one

count of first degree murder.

4

Mr. Walls filed state and federal post-conviction challenges which were denied.

While his federal habeas proceedings were pending, Mr. Walls filed a motion to bar

his execution due to intellectual disability.

The circuit court denied relief and the

Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial. Walls v. State, 3 So. 3d 1248 (Table) (Fla.

2008). The sole basis for the decision was that “[t]here is no evidence that Walls has

ever had an IQ of 70 or below.” Id. (citing Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2007).

After this Court rejected Florida’s rigid 70 IQ cutoff score in Hall v. Florida,

134 S.Ct. 1986 (2014), Mr. Walls filed a successive post-conviction motion alleging

that he was entitled to a new evidentiary hearing under the Hall guidelines. The

Florida Supreme Court agreed, finding that Hall applied retroactively and that Mr.

Walls was entitled to a new evidentiary hearing to establish that his intellectual

disability bars his execution. Walls v. State, 213 So. 3d 340 (Fla. 2016). His claims

were ultimately denied and the Florida Supreme Court, based on its decision to only

partially give retroactive effect to Hall, denied Mr. Walls a full and complete review

of his intellectual disability claims. See Appendix C.

Mr. Walls, an intellectually disabled, death-sentenced prisoner—with two

qualifying IQ scores, 72 and 74, obtained 15 years apart and adaptive deficits in

thirteen medically-recognized categories2—has never had the merits of his

intellectual disability claim decided by the Florida Supreme Court post-Hall. See Hall

2 These categories include fine-motor skills, social interaction, language comprehension, language

expression, eating and meal preparation, toileting, dressing, personal self-care, domestic skills, time

and punctuality, money and value, work skills, and home/community orientation. PCR-2. 155.

5

v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014). Because of Mr. Walls’s intellectual disability, he is of

a class of individuals constitutionally prohibited from execution under the Eighth

Amendment. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Mr. Walls has diligently

raised an Atkins claim at every available juncture. Yet an amalgamation of wronglydecided state court precedent and convoluted procedural hurdles have thus far

prevented a merits-determination on whether Mr. Walls is categorially prohibited

from being executed.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This case presents questions of great importance for this Court regarding the

analysis of a State court’s duty to give retroactive effect to a federal constitutional

holding. This area of the law remains complicated and unclear to many lower courts

and practitioners. Further, this Court has repeatedly held that a death sentence

“cannot be predicated on mere ‘caprice’ or on ‘factors that are constitutionally

impermissible.’” Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584–85 (1988) (quoting Zant v.

Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884–885, 887 n.24 (1983)). The Florida Supreme Court’s sua

sponte reversal of Walls in Phillips undermines the integrity of the judicial system

and results in arbitrary eligibility determinations.

1.

Intellectual Disability Should Not Be Subject to Procedural Bars.

“The Eighth Amendment prohibits certain punishments as a categorical

matter.” Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 708 (2014). Categorical bans exist to protect

both the individual as well as the interests of society. See e.g. Ford v. Wainwright,

6

477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (finding Eighth Amendment based categorical exemption

not only protects the death-exempt individual but also protects “the dignity of society

itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance[.]”. The United States

Supreme Court has never suggested that the Eighth Amendment prohibition on

executing an intellectually disabled person is subject to any sort of waiver or

procedural bar or default. Just as it would be illegal to execute a person who was

convicted of committing a murder as a fifteen-year-old and who failed to raise an

Eighth Amendment challenge at the appropriate time, see Roper, 543 U.S. at 568-69,

or to execute a person who was convicted of rape but not murder and failed to raise a

challenge at the appropriate time, see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), so

too it would be illegal to execute an intellectually disabled person who failed to raise

his claim at the appropriate procedural time. See, e.g., State ex re. Clayton v. Griffith,

457 S.W.3d 735, 757 (Mo. 2015) (Stith, J., dissenting) (“[I]f [petitioner] is

intellectually disabled, then the Eighth Amendment makes him ineligible for

execution … [I]f a 14-year-old had failed to raise his age at trial or in post-trial

proceedings then [] would [it] be permissible to execute him for a crime he committed

while he was a minor? Of course not. His age would make him ineligible for execution.

So too, here, if [petitioner] is intellectually disabled, then he is ineligible for

execution.”). Notwithstanding any waiver or provision of Florida law, the Eighth

Amendment requires that persons “facing that most severe sanction … have a fair

opportunity to show that the Constitution prohibits their execution.” Hall, 134 S. Ct.

7

at 2001; see also Walls v. State, 213 So. 3d 340, 348 (Fla. 2016) (Pariente, J.,

concurring) (“More than fundamental fairness and a clear manifest injustice, the risk

of executing a person who is not constitutionally able to be executed trumps any other

considerations that this Court looks to when determining if a subsequent decision of

the United States Supreme Court should be applied.”).

The categorical bans that are recognized under the Eighth Amendment

recognize the Amendment’s “protection of dignity” that reflects “the Nation we have

been, the Nation we are, and the Nation we aspire to.” Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701,

708 (2014). “A claim that a punishment is excessive”, such as the execution of an

intellectually disabled individual, “is judged not by the standards that prevailed in

1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over the ‘Bloody Assizes’ or when the Bill of Rights

was adopted, but by those that currently prevail.” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,

311 (2002). A State rule that “will frequently and predictably cause a factfinder to

determine that an individual who in fact is intellectually disabled is not” manifestly

does not meet the command of the Eighth Amendment.

No state-law waiver provision can stand in the way of this important

constitutional function. Death-sentenced individuals “must have a fair opportunity

to show that the Constitution prohibits their execution.” Hall, 572 U.S. at 724. Just

as it would unquestionably be unconstitutional for the State to invoke timeliness or

res judicate as justification to execute individuals subject to other categorical

exemptions or exclusions, see e.g., Roper v. Simmons,543 U.S. 551 (2005) (juveniles);

8

Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (individuals without murder conviction),

so too would it be unconstitutional to execute Mr. Walls on the grounds that he failed

to raise his claim at the “appropriate” procedural time or was “right too soon” by

attempting to litigate before the consensus was reached. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505

U.S. 333 (1992) (courts may hear otherwise defaulted claims where petitioner can

show “by clear and convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error,” he would

not be eligible for the death penalty).

“Once a State has granted prisoners a liberty interest, this Court [has] held

that due process protections are necessary ‘to insure that the state-created right is

not arbitrarily abrogated.’” Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488-89 (1980). Determining

who benefits from a substantive right must not offend the Due Process Clause. In

this matter, this court had originally granted Mr. Walls a hearing on his intellectual

disability claim.

Due to the Florida courts erroneous interpretation of federal law, and its

insistence on placing a time bar on intellectual disability claims, the State of Florida

will execute an intellectually disabled defendant, in violation of the United States

Constitution. This Court should reconsider any previous precedent that would violate

Mr. Walls’ rights to due process and would create an unacceptable risk under the

Eighth Amendment of executing an individual that falls within one of the

acknowledged categorical bars to the death penalty.

9

Notwithstanding any waiver or provision or Florida law, the Eighth

Amendment required that persons “facing the most severe sanction…have a fair

opportunity to show that the Constitution prohibits their execution.” Hall, 134 S. Ct.

at 2001; see also Walls v. State, 213 So. 3d 340, 348 (Fla. 2016) (Pariente, J.,

concurring) (“”More than fundamental fairness and a clear manifest injustice, the

risk of executing a person who is not constitutionally able to be executed trumps any

other considerations that this Court looks to when determining if a subsequent

decision of the United States Supreme Court should be applied.”). Although the

Florida Supreme Court failed to address the trial court’s assessment of the merits of

Mr. Walls’ disability in 2023, there is a final opportunity for Mr. Walls’ claim to be

heard and fully appealed now. Multiple state courts have considered an Atkins claim

under warrant, including at least one state supreme court that has held that an

intellectual disability claim only ripens when a warrant is signed. See Lard v. State,

595 S.W.3d 355, 357 (Ark. 2020) (explaining that the issue of “whether Lard can be

executed due to an intellectual disability” ripens only once an execution date has been

set).

Lard’s holding inherently recognizes that any colorable Atkins claim must be

considered before an execution is carried out because the execution of an

intellectually disabled is constitutionally prohibited. Id. While not under warrant, the

Mississippi Supreme Court similarly rejected the State’s argument that an Atkins

claim could not be raised on procedural grounds in Clark v. State, reasoning that “the

10

Constitution ‘restrict[s]…the State’s power to take the life of any intellectual disabled

individual” because “[a]pplying the waiver bar to such a claim carries with it the risk

that an intellectually disabled individual will be executed[.]” 418 So. 3d 1226, 1230

(Miss. 2025) (internal citations omitted). Despite Lard’s holding and the United

States Supreme Court never suggesting claims raising intellectually disability be

subject to any type of bar, procedural or otherwise, the State, in response to Mr. Walls’

successive motion, argue that Mr. Walls is barred from raising intellectual disability.

Similarly, and as contemplated by Lard, because Mr. Walls is intellectually disabled

and thus categorically excluded from the class of individuals a State may

constitutionally execute, the merits of his claim must be heard at this junction. As

the State conceded below, Mr. Walls has not received his full appellate review on this

issue.

The Florida Supreme Court’s treatment of Mr. Walls’s intellectual disability

claim showcases why it is imperative for this Court to clarify that the Constitution’s

shield against the unacceptable risk of executing an intellectually disabled person

extends across every stage of a defendant’s case. In 2017, the Florida Supreme Court

issued a final mandate granting Mr. Walls an evidentiary hearing and assurance that

his

intellectual

disability

claim

would

finally

be

adjudicated

under

the

constitutionally compliant standards set out by Hall. Yet, in a sudden violation of Mr.

Walls’s due process rights, the Florida Supreme Court unexpectedly and unjustifiably

overruled its holding on Hall-retroactivity while Mr. Walls’s case was still on

11

remand—for reasons having nothing to do with his case or any intervening precedent

from this Court. The effect of the Florida Supreme Court’s additional incursion on

Mr. Walls’s constitutional rights was to reimpose on Mr. Walls, and many others, the

same unconstitutional IQ-score cutoff Hall struck down. This imposition perpetuates

the very “unacceptable risk” this Court had castigated in Hall. This Court’s

intervention is urgently needed to stop Florida’s continued defiance of Hall.

Mr. Walls has demonstrated clear and convincing evidence that he has

significantly subaverage general intellectual function. Mr. Walls has two scores on

individualized, standardized intelligence testing instruments – the Weschler Adult

Test Revised (“WAIS-R”) and the Weschler Adult Intelligence Test – Third Edition

(“WAIS-III”) – that fall in the accepted range of intellectual disability. T350-351. The

Full Scale IQ (“FSIQ”) scores that Mr. Walls obtained on these tests – 72 and 74,

respectively – meet the legal definition of significantly subaverage general

intellectual functioning. Id.

There is evidence that these impairments were present from birth, but after

Mr. Walls contracted meningitis in his youth, his conceptual skills diminished even

further. T639. Dr. Daniel Martell testified at Mr. Walls’ evidentiary hearing that the

records he reviewed showed that Mr. Walls may have been hypoxic, meaning that he

was deprived of oxygen, shortly after birth, experienced high fevers that required

hospitalization at the age of 2, and again at the age of 3 or 4. Mr. Walls was referred

for “possible mental deficient or possible minimal brain damage” at age 5. T641-42.

12

R4617. Mr. Walls’ US Air Force Clinic Spangdahlem records indicate that Mr. Walls

was “delayed in learning to walk at one and a half years, that he only began to say

words at two and a half years, and that he was late to speak in complete sentences.”

T641-642. These are some of Mr. Walls’ earliest deficits noted. Mr. Walls’ father also

reported that Mr. Walls was “slow to talk, hesitant, slow to answer, and could not

form words.” Then, he “spoke more than he understood.” T642; R5738.

When Mr. Walls was 8 years old and in the 3rd grade, he was sent for an

evaluation as part of an Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”), which included a

Wide Range Achievement Test (“WRAT”). T644. At this time, Mr. Walls was

functioning at a full grade level lower in reading, spelling, and math. Mr. Walls was

scoring at a second grade level in all of these areas. Id. The reading portion of this

WRAT was only testing his ability to pronounce words. Id.

After Mr. Walls suffered from his first bout of meningitis in 1979, he was tested

at age 12. At this time, Mr. Walls was in the sixth grade and was tested using the

WRAT. Dr. Martell testified that the records show that Mr. Walls’ “spelling was at

the third-grade level, his arithmetic was at the fourth-grade level, and his reading

was at the fifth-grade level, so was still at least a full school year behind in each area.”

T645 (emphasis added).

After Mr. Walls’ second bout of meningitis in 1980, his teacher, Bruce Ravan,

who taught the emotionally handicapped class at Max Bruner Junior High, noted

“[h]e also struggled with multistep activities and had to be reminded of the next step

13

and stay on task. Frank had to be constantly reminded of daily activities of the class

despite how structured it was.” T647. Mr. Ravan also noted “Frank was not caught

up to the other students. He had a fifth grade brain when he was in seventh grade.”

T747. R5755. Finally, Ms. Schwenke reported in her 2019 affidavit that while he was

her student in the eighth grade, “Frank was well below his peers in the domains of

academics, judgement, problem solving, self-care, like hygiene and grooming.” T652;

R5764-68. These deficits continued well into his teens and adulthood.

The State, in response, arguing that Mr. Walls’ claim of intellectual disability

is meritless, misconstrues United States Supreme Court’s ruling and plainly ignores

evidence to Mr. Walls’ intellectual disability in their efforts to execute Mr. Walls. The

State points out three IQ scores that Mr. Walls received as a minor – 88, 102, and 101

– pointing out an average of 93, stating this reflects “normal intelligence.” State’s

Ans. 3rd Succ. PC Motion at 11. The State’s argument, solely relying on IQ scores, is

a misinterpretation of the Supreme Court’s holding in Hall. “Florida’s rule disregards

established medical practice in two interrelated ways. It takes an IQ score as final

and conclusive evidence of a defendant’s intellectual functioning, when experts in the

field would consider other evidence. It also relied on a purportedly scientific

measurement of the defendant’s abilities, his IQ score, while refusing to recognize

that the score is, on its own terms, imprecise.” Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 712

3 This issue of “whether and how courts may consider the cumulative effect of multiple IQ scores in

assessing an Atkins claims” is currently pending before this Court and is currently set for oral

argument on December 10, 2025. Hamm v. Smith, Docket No. 24-872.

14

(2014). In other words, the State resting wholly on IQ scores and ignoring evidence of

Mr. Walls’ issues with adaptive function, does not accord with Supreme Court

precedent, which is to give the issue a holistic review.

The record is rich with evidence of Mr. Walls’ intellectual disability. Not only

does Mr. Walls have qualifying IQ scores, but there is also evidence of his subaverage

functioning and issues with adaptive functioning. This Court should not ignore this

evidence. Mr. Walls’ Eighth Amendment Atkins claim cannot be impeded by state

procedural barriers because it concerns categorical exemptions guaranteed by the

United States Constitution. The Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits states

from executing intellectually disabled persons. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 5961 (2010). An individual who is categorically ineligible for execution because of his

intellectual disability must have his Atkins claim heard before an execution warrant

is carried out.

2.

Florida’s state constitution conformity clause violates the Eighth

Amendment because it prohibits Florida courts from participating

in the process of determining society’s evolving standards of

decency as mandated by this Court’s jurisprudence.

Almost 50 years ago, this Court declined to “give precise content to the

Eighth Amendment.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). Instead, it explained

that the Eighth Amendment, unique from others, “draw[s] its meaning” through

active state participation as it pertains to evolving standards of decency. Id. Its basic

concept is “nothing less than the dignity of man[,]” standing to assure that a state’s

“power to punish…be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.” Id. at 100.

15

In accordance, Eighth Amendment principles as articulated in this Court’s

jurisprudence presuppose that states will actively work to bring society closer to “the

Nation we aspire to be[,]” Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 708 (2014), by reflecting and

advancing “the evolving standards of decency to mark the progress of a maturing

society.” Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. State participation in facilitating evolving standards

of decency ensures that the Eighth Amendment “is not fastened to the obsolete but

may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). Particularly in the capital context

due to “its total irrevocability[,]” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972)

(Stewart, J., concurring)), state courts with jurisdiction over and proximity to the

legal conflicts arising from everyday life have a duty to meaningfully consider Eighth

Amendment challenges.

But Florida has abdicated this critical role, claiming article I, section 17 of the

Florida State Constitution (the “conformity clause”) prohibits it from conducting any

Eighth Amendment analysis that could lead to protection not explicitly required by

this Court’s prior holdings. Legislation from the past year—that is in direct conflict

with this Court’s Eighth Amendment holdings—proves that Florida routinely flouts

the conformity clause in order to enact harsher and more expansive punishments.

However, the state courts still rely upon it as justification to refuse to consider

meritorious Eighth Amendment claims.

16

Florida’s selective and one-sided use of the conformity clause violates the

Eighth Amendment by effectively foreclosing evolving standards of decency in Florida

and bypassing critical safeguards for constitutional administration of the death

penalty. It rejects core federalist principles of state autonomy and individualism;

stands to hinder this Court’s own function by obstructing analysis of state practice;

forces this Court to act as a court of first instance for Eighth Amendment issues

arising out of Florida; and underscores Florida’s shameful legacy of flouting scientific

and sociolegal advancements in the realm of criminal punishment. Unless this Court

intervenes, “Florida [will continue to do] what the Constitution forbids[,]”

Cunningham v. Florida, 144 S. Ct. 1287, 1288 (2024) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from

denial of certiorari), and vulnerable individuals like Mr. Walls will die based on a

systemic constitutional flaw in Florida’s death penalty scheme, with no meaningful

consideration of any argument that they are exempt from execution.

A.

Florida’s Eighth Amendment Conformity Clause

Art. I, § 17 of the Florida State Constitution states:

The prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, and the

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, shall be construed

in conformity with decisions of the United States Supreme Court which

interpret the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment

provided in the Eighth Amendment to the United States

Constitution….This Section shall apply retroactively.

Legislative and judicial history illuminates its regressive purpose. Originally

proposed in 1998, the amendment was overturned in 2000 after the Florida Supreme

Court held the ballot misleading to voters by “imply[ing] that the amendment will

17

promote the rights of Florida citizens[.]” Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So.2d 7, 17 (Fla.

2000). The court in Armstrong noted that because (a) Florida’s system of

constitutional government was “grounded on a principle of ‘robust individualism’ and

[its] state constitutional rights thus provide greater freedom from government

intrusion into the lives of citizens than do their federal counterparts”, id.; and (b) the

amendment would “nullify a longstanding constitutional principle that applies to all

criminal punishments, not just the death penalty”, id. at 18; a citizen “could well have

voted in favor of the proposed amendment thinking that he or she was protecting

state constitutional rights when in fact the citizen was doing the exact opposite—i.e.,

he or she was voting to nullify those rights.” Id.

The ballot summary preceding the amendment’s 2002 adoption was clearer:

The amendment would prevent state courts, including the Florida Supreme

Court, from treating the state constitutional prohibition against cruel or

unusual punishment as being more expansive than the federal constitutional

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment or United States Supreme

Court interpretations thereof. The amendment effectively nullifies rights

currently allowed…which may afford greater protections for those subject to

punishment for crimes than will be provided by the amendment.

Fla. HJR 951 (2001) at 2-3 (ballot summary regarding proposed amendment to FLA.

CONST. art. I, § 17) (emphasis added).

Since the Eighth Amendment conformity clause—the only one of its kind in

any state constitution—became part of the Florida constitution, the Florida courts

have increasingly cited and relied upon it to opt out of critical Eighth Amendment

analyses, including judicial determinations related to evolving standards of decency.

18

See, e.g., Bowles v. State, 276 So. 3d 791, 796 (Fla. 2019) (Florida Supreme Court

relying on the conformity clause to refuse any consideration of whether national

death penalty trends warranted exemption from execution under the Eighth

Amendment); Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785, 795 (Fla. 2023) (relying on conformity

clause to refuse merits consideration of categorical exemption argument due to

defendant’s intellectual disability and age at the time of the offense); Lawrence v.

State, 308 So. 3d 544, 545 (Fla. 2020) (relying on the conformity clause to eliminate

proportionality review); Hart v. State, 246 So. 3d 417, 420-21 (Fla. 4th DCA 201

(relying on the conformity clause in a non-capital context to refuse to consider

whether a juvenile sentence violated Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010));

Covington v. State, 348 So. 3d 456, 479-480 (Fla. 2022) (relying in part on conformity

clause to refuse consideration of whether alleged insanity rendered defendant’s death

sentence cruel and unusual); Zack v. State, 371 So. 3d 335 (Fla. 2023) (relying on

conformity clause to justify denying nonunanimous jury challenge); Allen v. State,

322 So. 3d 589, 602 (Fla. 2021) (seemingly implying that the conformity clause may

justify limiting a mitigation presentation in certain cases involving waiver).

B.

Reviewing Florida’s implementation of the conformity clause is

a proper and necessary exercise of this Court’s authority

Where a state constitution conflicts with the federal constitution—including

this Court’s interpretive jurisprudence—the state must yield. See Reynolds v. Sims,

377 U.S. 533, 584 (1964) (“When there is an unavoidable conflict between the Federal

and a State Constitution, the Supremacy Clause of course controls.”); Puerto Rico v.

19

Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 228 (1987) (rejecting idea that states and federal government

are coequal sovereigns because “[i]t has long been a settled principle that federal

courts may enjoin unconstitutional action by state officials.”); Democratic Executive

Comm. of Florida v. Lee, 915 F.3d 1312, 1331 (11th Cir. 2019) (“while federalism

certainly respects states’ rights, it also demands the supremacy of federal law”).

And, although it is “fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered

by [this Court] in interpreting their state constitutions,” Minnesota v. National Tea

Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940), it is equally important that those state adjudications

do not stand as barriers to a determination by this Court of the validity

under the federal constitution of state action….For no other course

assures that important federal issues, such as have been argued here,

will reach this Court for adjudication; that state courts will not be the

final arbiters of important issues under the federal constitution; and

that we will not encroach on the constitutional jurisdiction of the states.

Id.

Here, there is no question that the issue at bar is of this Court’s purview.

Florida has—through its implementation of the conformity clause and abdication of

any judgment apart from this Court’s verbatim holdings—explicitly interwoven its

determinations regarding cruel and unusual punishment with this Court’s Eighth

Amendment jurisprudence. Paradoxically, by virtue of this inflexible binding process,

Florida has wholly repudiated a critical aspect of Eighth Amendment determinations:

consideration of ever-evolving societal, legal, and scientific standards. See, e.g., Hall,

572 U.S. at 708 (“The Eighth Amendment’s protection of dignity…[affirms] that the

Nation’s constant, unyielding purpose must be to transmit the Constitution so that

20

its precepts and guarantees retain their meaning and force”); Kennedy v. Louisiana,

554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (“Evolving standards of decency must embrace and express

respect for the dignity of the person, and the punishment of criminals must conform

to that rule”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (“the [Eighth] Amendment

has been interpreted in a flexible and dynamic manner”); Woodson v. North Carolina,

428 U.S. 280, 288 (1976) (“Central to the application of the [Eighth] Amendment is a

determination of contemporary standards regarding the infliction of punishment”);

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (“Time works changes, brings into

existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore [a constitutional principle], to be

vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.”).

Thus, Florida does not merely treat this Court’s holdings as both the “floor”

and “ceiling” of protections against cruel and unusual punishment: it also falls below

the “floor” established by this Court’s jurisprudence by failing to adhere to this

Court’s minimum prescribed standards for evaluating the applicability of Eighth

Amendment protections. In other words, Florida’s purported “conformity” with the

Eighth Amendment actually violates it. Art. I, § 17 of the Florida State Constitution

must therefore yield to the U.S. Constitution and this Court’s jurisprudence.

This Court’s precedent illustrates its well-established authority to intervene

when faced with a state constitutional provision that conflicts with federal

constitutional rights. See, e.g., Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001) (granting

certiorari despite no split of authority due to importance and affirming that portions

21

of Missouri Constitution were unconstitutional); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000)

(Hawaii’s state constitutional provision violated the Fifteenth Amendment); Romer

v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Colorado constitutional amendment adopted by

statewide voter referendum violated the Fourteenth Amendment (amendment to

Arkansas constitution invalid as conflicting with Article I of the federal constitution);

Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (provision of Oregon state constitution

violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989) (holding

provision of Missouri state constitution violated federal constitution, and state court’s

judgment upholding it reflected a significant misreading of this Court’s precedent).

This Court should exercise that authority here. Florida’s unchecked use of the

conformity clause to ostensibly—but falsely—bind itself to this Court’s mandates will

result in Florida acting as a flawed “final arbiter[] of important issues under the

federal constitution[.]” National Tea Co., 309 U.S. at 557. This Court’s intervention

is necessary to prevent such an upending of federal authority, and to prevent Mr.

Walls from an unconstitutional execution.

C.

This case is a proper vehicle for consideration of the question

presented because there is no independent or adequate state

law impediment

In utilizing the conformity clause to deny Mr. Walls’s Eighth Amendment

claim below, the Florida Supreme Court’s merits determinations were inextricably

bound with federal issues and this Court’s jurisprudence; thus, no independent or

adequate state law bars this Court’s review. In reference to Mr. Walls’s argument

22

that he should be exempt from execution via the Eighth Amendment due to a new

scientific consensus related to juvenile brain development, the Florida Supreme

Court’s merits determination rested on its interpretation of federal law: “[W]e lack

authority, due to the conformity clause of article I, section 17 of the Florida

Constitution, to extend Roper or Atkins.”

App. A at 18 (citations omitted).

To the extent the state courts found a procedural impediment to Mr. Walls’s

entitlement to relief on these claims, those findings are incorrect. But more

importantly, the lower court did not actually rely on any procedural or time bar

because it engaged in detailed merits rulings which are wholly inextricable from the

federal question. In finding it had no authority to extend Eighth Amendment

protections due to this Court’s precedent, the Florida Supreme Court necessarily

found that federal law required denial of Mr. Walls’s claims. See Foster v. Chatman,

578 U.S. 488, 499 n.4 (2016 (“[W]hether a state law determination is characterized

as entirely dependent on, resting primarily on, or influenced by a question of federal

law, the result is the same: the state law determination is not independent of federal

law and thus poses no bar to our jurisdiction.”) (cleaned up); see also Michigan v.

Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) (even when adequacy and independence of

possible state law grounds are not clear from the opinion, “this Court will accept as

the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did

because it believed that federal law required it to do so.”).

23

D. The constitutional harm is not confined to Florida, but without

this Court’s intervention, Florida will not rectify the problems

created by its outlier status

Florida’s use of the conformity clause to abdicate all responsibility for

considering and perpetuating evolving standards of decency undermines bedrock

principles of federalism and state autonomy dating as far back as the Founding. See,

Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999)Error! Bookmark not defined. (referring

back to “the founding generation” in declaring that federalism requires states to be

treated as “joint participants in the governance of the Nation.”).

It is virtually unquestioned among states and lower circuits that precepts of

federalism empower states to provide higher “ceilings” of individual rights than the

“floor” provided by the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Griffin, 339 Conn. 631,

690 (Conn. 2021) (discussing the “settled proposition that ‘the federal constitution

sets the floor, not the ceiling, on individual rights’”) (quoting State v. Purcell, 331

Conn. 318, 341 (Conn. 2019)); Brown v. State, 62 N.E.3d 1232, 1236-37 (Ind. 2016)

(referencing the federal constitution as “the floor, not the ceiling, of individual

rights”); Ark Encounter, LLC v. Parkinson, 152 F.Supp.3d 880, 927 (E.D. Ky 2016)

(“The federal Constitution may only be a floor and not a ceiling, but it is a floor

nonetheless.”); State v. Baldon, 829 N.W.2d 785, 791 & n.1 (Iowa 2013) (United States

Supreme Court’s jurisprudence “makes for an admirable floor, but it is certainly not

a ceiling.”); GE Commercial Finance Business Property Corp. v. Heard, 621 F.Supp.2d

1305, 1309 (M.D. Ga. 2009) (“it is abundantly clear that states ‘are free to extend

24

more sweeping constitutional guarantees to their citizens than does federal law as

federal constitutional law constitutes the floor, not the ceiling, of constitutional

protection.’”) (citing Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown, 958 F.2d

1242, 1269 (3d Cir. 1992)).

Even Florida, in non-Eighth Amendment contexts, takes this view:

[T]he federal Constitution sets the floor, not the ceiling, and this Court

retains the ability to interpret the right against self-incrimination

afforded by the Florida Constitution more broadly than that afforded by

its federal counterpart. See, e.g., In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1191 (Fla.

1989) (“State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their

protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme

Court’s interpretation of federal law….[W]ithout [independent state

law] the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.” (quoting

William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of

Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 491 (1977))).

Rigterink v. State, 2 So. 3d 221, 241 (Fla. 2009) (cert. granted, judgment vacated on

other grounds sub nom., Florida v. Rigterink, 559 U.S. 965 (2010)).

And, this Court has long supported the use of state action to provide greater

protection than the federal constitution. See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719

(1975) (“a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose [greater protections] than

those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards”)

(emphasis in original); Cooper v. State of Cal., 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (States maintain

the “power to impose [greater protections] than required by the Federal

Constitution”); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 409 (2006) (Stevens, J.,

25

concurring) (“Federal interests are not offended when a single State elects to provide

greater protection for its citizens than the Federal Constitution requires.”).

Citing many of these cases, Justice Brennan reflected in 1977:

[U]nder our federal system….state courts cannot rest when they have

afforded the full protections of the federal Constitution. State

constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections

often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s

interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which has brought

federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent

protective force of state law—for without it, the full realization of our

liberties cannot be guaranteed.

William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,

90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 491 (1977). He added that U.S. Supreme Court decisions

are not, and should not be, dispositive of questions regarding rights

guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state law….Adopting the

premise that state courts can be trusted to safeguard individual rights,

the Supreme Court has gone on to limit the protective role of the federal

judiciary…our liberties cannot survive if the states betray the trust the

Court has put in them.

Id. at 502-03; see also id. (stating a “confident[] conjecture that James Madison,

Father of the Bill of Rights,” would have agreed).

As Florida itself championed the importance of independent state judgment

and the maintenance of state autonomy to more robustly champion individual rights

than the federal constitution, Florida’s use of the conformity clause in the Eighth

Amendment context is all the more egregious. Florida is not simply declining to

extend particular protections, and justifying that decision with the fact that they are

not required under the federal constitution. Florida is weaponizing this Court’s

26

judicial restraint and respect for state sovereignty by proffering them as justification

to wholly ignore legitimate Eighth Amendment claims.

Further, Florida’s practice obstructs important aspects of this Court’s judicial

function. When this Court is faced with determinations regarding whether societal

standards of decency have evolved to the point of warranting additional Eighth

Amendment protections, it looks to the actions of individual states, including judicial

practice. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315-16 (2002) Roper v. Simmons,

543 U.S. 551, 559-60, 565-66 (2005) (tallying, as part of evolving standards analysis,

the number of states that have embraced or abandoned a particular death penalty

practice). Thus, although the federal constitution does not require a state court to

offer more protection in a particular case than this Court’s jurisprudence has

established, a state cannot prohibit itself wholesale from considering evolving

standards of decency. By declaring itself unauthorized to engage in this independent

action, Florida has abdicated its “critical role in advancing protections and providing

[this] Court with information that contributes to an understanding” of how Eighth

Amendment protections should be applied. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 719 (2014).

Finally, Florida’s use of the conformity clause is particularly troubling in light

of its history of unconstitutionality and outlier status related to death penalty and

punishment in general. The State’s flawed punishment system has necessitated this

Court’s intervention on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701,

704 (2014) (this Court holding as unconstitutional Florida’s “rigid rule” withholding

27

Eighth Amendment protection from individuals who had valid claims for categorical

exemption from execution); Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92, 94 (2016) (this Court

holding Florida’s death sentencing scheme unconstitutional); Graham v. Florida, 560

U.S. 48, 76 (2010) (this Court discussing the “flaws in Florida’s [punishment] system”

in finding that Florida’s imposition of life without parole was an unconstitutional

sentence for juveniles who committed nonhomicide crimes). Put simply, Florida’s

standards of decency have long since lagged behind other states.

This is no more apparent than in Florida’s own abandonment of the conformity

clause in order to enact harsher and more expansive punishments than this Court

allows. This year, Florida authorized the use of the death penalty for sexual battery

of a child under 12, despite this Court’s ruling in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407

(2008), that the Eighth Amendment forbids imposition of the death penalty in cases

of child rape with no homicide. Compare Fla. Stat. § 921.1425 Fla. Stat. (2025)

(authorizing death penalty for sexual battery upon a person less than 12 years of age);

see also Fla. Stat. § 921.1427 Fla. Stat. (2025) (authorizing imposition of death

penalty for human trafficking of vulnerable persons for sexual exploitation, despite

no death occurring). Florida also passed a law requiring mandatory imposition of the

death penalty on a defendant who is “an unauthorized alien and who is convicted of

or adjudicated guilty of a capital felony” without any consideration of individualized

sentencing factors. Fla. Stat. § 921.1426 (2025). Yet, there is no question that this

Court has forbidden mandatory death penalty statutes. See Woodson v. North

28

Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976). In fact, Florida’s legislators and current

governor have acknowledged that these violate this Court’s constitutional holdings.

See Death Penalty Information Center, Florida Prosecutors Seek First Death Sentence

Under New Child Sex Abuse Law, Death Penalty Info (March 14, 2025),

https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/florida-prosecutors-seek-first-death-sentence-undernew-child-sex-abuse-law.4

Florida’s misguided—and now routinely abandoned—self-limitation forestalls

“one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may,

if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic

experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S.

560, 579 (1981) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)

(Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Thus, with no state-recognized avenue to effect Eighth

Amendment progress in the Florida state courts, this Court—if it does not intervene

here—will be forced into the undesirable and untenable position of being a court of

first instance for any Eighth Amendment issue arising out of Florida that is not

factually and legally identical to this Court’s prior holdings. More urgently, if this

Court does not interfere, Florida will continue executions under an Eighth

Amendment framework frozen in time, in violation of today’s evolving standards of

decency and this Court’s case law.

4 During the January 28, 2005, Senate Special Session B discussion of mandatory death penalty for

“unauthorized aliens,” then-Senator Randy Fine explicitly stated: “In fact in this legislature, we have

chosen to pass things that we knew were unconstitutional at the time that we passed them because

we believed that the Supreme Court would change their mind[.]”

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the petition for a writ of

certiorari.

/S/ JULISSA R. FONTÁN

Julissa R. Fontán

Florida Bar. No. 0032744

Assistant Capital Collateral Counsel

Capital Collateral Counsel - Middle Region

12973 N. Telecom Parkway

Temple Terrace, FL 33637

813-558-1600

Fontan@ccmr.state.fl.us

Counsel of Record

/S/ MEGAN MONTAGNO

Megan Montagno

Florida Bar. No. 118819

Assistant Capital Collateral Counsel

Capital Collateral Counsel - Middle Region

12973 N. Telecom Parkway

Temple Terrace, FL 33637

813-558-1600

Montagno@ccmr.state.fl.us

Counsel for Petitioner

December 15, 2025

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