Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Steven Matthew Wolf, Petitioner v. Florida

No. ________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

__________________

STEVEN MATTHEW WOLF,

Petitioner,

v.

THE STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

_________________________________

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of Florida

_________________________________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

_________________________________

CARLOS J. MARTINEZ

Public Defender

Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida

SHANNON HEMMENDINGER

Assistant Public Defender

Counsel of Record

l320 N.W. l4th Street

Miami, Florida 33125

(305) 545-1963

AppellateDefender@pdmiami.com

Counsel for Petitioner

CAPITAL CASE

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether Mr. Wolf was deprived of a jury of his peers as

guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments where the trial

court removed a juror who preferred life over death but could follow the

law and consider whether death was an appropriate penalty?

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question Presented .................................................................................... i

Table of Contents ...................................................................................... ii

Table of Authorities ..................................................................................iii

Opinions Below .......................................................................................... 1

Jurisdiction ................................................................................................ 2

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ................................... 2

Statement of the Case ............................................................................... 3

Reasons for Granting the Petition .......................................................... 12

I. The trial court erred in striking Juror 225 based on her

reservations about the death penalty. ........................................... 12

Conclusion ............................................................................................... 14

INDEX TO APPENDICES

Appendix A: Decision of the Florida Supreme Court dated July 10, 2025.

................................................................................................................... 1

Appendix B: Order of the Florida Supreme Court Denying Rehearing

dated August 20, 2025 ............................................................................. 52

Appendix C: Sentencing Order of the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit dated

June 29, 2023........................................................................................... 54

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Wolf v. State,

416 So. 3d 1117 ................................................................................ 1, 11

Adams v. Texas,

448 U.S. 38 (1980) ................................................................................ 13

Gray v. Mississipi,

481 U.S. 648 (1987) .............................................................................. 12

Wainwright v. Witt,

469 U.S. 412 (1985) ........................................................................ 10, 12

Witherspoon v. Illinois,

391 U.S. 510 (1968) .................................................................... 9, 10, 12

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) .................................................................................... 2

U.S. CONST. amend. VI ........................................................................ iii, 2

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ..................................................................... iii, 3

iii

No. ________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

__________________

STEVEN MATTHEW WOLF,

Petitioner,

v.

THE STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

_________________________________

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of Florida

_________________________________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

_________________________________

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida affirming the

petitioner’s conviction and sentence is reported at 416 So. 3d 1117 and

is attached as Appendix A. The Supreme Court of Florida’s order

denying rehearing, attached as Appendix B, is unpublished. The circuit

court’s order sentencing the petitioner to death, attached as Appendix

C, is unpublished.

1

JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the petitioner’s judgment

and sentence on July 10, 2025. The Supreme Court of Florida entered

its order denying petitioner’s timely motion for rehearing on August 20,

2025. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §

1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

INVOLVED

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an

impartial jury of the state and district wherein

the crime shall have been committed, which

district shall have been previously ascertained by

law, and to be informed of the nature and cause

of the accusation; to be confronted with the

witnesses against him; to have compulsory

process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and

to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

All persons born or naturalized in the United

States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are

citizens of the United States and of the state

wherein they reside. No state shall make or

enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges

or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor

shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law; nor deny

to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.

2

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Petitioner, Steven Matthew Wolf, is a prisoner under

sentence of death. The State of Florida charged Mr. Wolf with the

murder and sexual battery of Michelle Osborne.

On the first day of jury selection, the trial court opened voir dire

on death-penalty issues with an extemporaneous discussion of the

process in capital cases. Describing what it means to be a qualified

juror, he explained:

And so you must, if you are going to be on the

jury, be open to make a recommendation for

death if you believe it’s been proven and you

believe it’s appropriate. Similarly, you must also

be willing to recommend a life sentence if you

believe that’s what’s appropriate under the

circumstances. You have to be open to both,

always remembering that, ultimately, the jurors

don’t sentence. It’s the judge who does that.

Asked for her thoughts on this, Juror 225 indicated she opposed

the death penalty, but that did not mean she could not impose it, and

she was open to both:

[Juror 225]: I don’t believe in the death penalty.

Never say never. I’m open, given this is the first

time in this type of a trial for me. But my main

reason is because there’s been so many that have

3

not gone well, not necessarily in this state, but in

other states. And I think there’s just a real

problem institutionally with it.

The judge followed up on this:

THE COURT: Well, I certainly understand your

position. So you might have some difficulty? Even

if the State were to prove or establish the

aggravating factors and you felt that they

outweighed the mitigators and the law supported

a recommendation of death, you would hesitate to

make such a recommendation because of your

feelings and concerns?

[Juror 225]: I would listen to both sides, but I

would be extremely careful about recommending

death.

THE COURT: Well – and I expect everybody

would be careful. But if you mean reluctant, even

if it was appropriate, that’s different than careful.

[Juror 225]: Correct.

THE COURT: So you would have some concerns?

Am I paraphrasing it correctly?

[Juror 225]: Yes.

THE COURT: I appreciate that fact, and I thank

you for sharing them with us.

The prosecution suggested Juror 225 should be excused for cause

based on her comment, “never say never.” The prosecution requested an

4

individual sequestered examination of the juror because “I think the

difference with her is that she’s on the fence.”

The prosecutor began that examination by asking her if she had

said she did not believe in the death penalty.

[STATE]: … Did you make that statement?

[JUROR 225]: Never say never. I would listen to

both sides, but I have some real concerns with it,

because I listen to a lot of podcasts, and there

have been a lot of issues where people were put to

death and they shouldn’t have been, or they get

botched. I don’t know about the State of Florida

because I’ve only lived here for a few years.

[STATE]: How do you personally feel about the

death penalty?

[JUROR 225]: I don’t really like it. I’m not –

obviously, I’m not a proponent of it, but I’ve never

been in a situation like this.

[STATE]: And I think the judge alluded to that

it’s somewhat unfair in that you had no idea

when you were coming down here today that you

were dealing with this situation. So it doesn’t give

you a lot of opportunity to reflect on a lot of the

questions that you’re being asked.

The concern that I have is whether your interest

in this area, having listened to podcasts or other

people’s opinions or reports of these, as you said,

botched executions having taken place, whether

that would cause you to be reluctant to impose

the death penalty if you otherwise felt it was

5

appropriate, based on the evidence and the

instructions that the judge gave you.

[JUROR 225]: I would listen to the evidence. And

I can’t tell you for sure, but I’m not the type of

person that would say “an eye for an eye,” or “a

tooth for a tooth.”

[STATE]: Okay. Only you can answer these

questions for us. And we are so dependent on

your honesty and straightforwardness in

answering our questions. My perception of what

you’re saying is that you have reservations about

your ability to vote for it, even though you might

otherwise feel it’s appropriate because of what

the –

[JUROR 225]: If, ultimately, he was executed,

that execution might be botched or might be

inappropriate for some reason. That, and I’ve

heard that it’s actually – how do we say this – a

life sentence, I think, is a little bit easier on the

community and the taxpayer, just because of all

the appeals that go on.

[STATE]: You

implications?

mean

kind

of

financial

[JUROR 225]: Well, both, yeah. I’m in finance so

–

[STATE]: I guess the ultimate question is, all of

the considerations that you have as it pertains to

the death penalty or related to the death penalty,

would they impair your ability to recommend the

death penalty if you otherwise felt it was

appropriate?

6

[JUROR 225]: I’m not going say a definite “yes”

because I think I would want to listen to both

sides, but I just think it would be better not to

have a death penalty.

Defense counsel asked Juror 225 to consider cases where a

defendant is guilty of first-degree murder: “Not cases where there was

an intentional murder, not an accident or mistake, and the defendant

was not insane, or intellectually disabled.” Juror 225 answered, “I still

think a life sentence is an option.” Asked what evidence she would need

to hear, Juror 225 replied:

[JUROR 225]: I don’t know what I’m going to

hear, but, I mean, I think there have been some

cases where I thought, “Okay. Makes sense.” But

I still don’t like it.

[DEFENSE]: Now, do you understand, in the

State of Florida, you just have to consider the

death penalty. Can you consider the death

penalty as an appropriate penalty?

[JUROR 225]: Yes.

[DEFENSE]: It’s never required. The death

penalty is never required, as Judge Jones

alluded. It’s an individual moral decision whether

or not to give death. And you’re okay with that?

[JUROR 225]: Yes.

[DEFENSE]: And you get to decide if you were on

the jury what’s mitigating. Can you do that?

7

[JUROR 225]: Mm-hmm.

[DEFENSE]: And mitigation.

[STATE]: Was that a yes? I’m sorry.

[JUROR 225]: Yes. I’m sorry.

Later, the defense directly asked if Juror 225 could consider the

death penalty:

[DEFENSE]: And, again, just so we’re clear, you

could consider the death penalty, and there have

been cases where you’re like – I don’t want to put

words in your mouth.

[JUROR 225]: Right, because cases that you hear

about on TV or, you know, podcasts so –

The judge followed up about Juror 225’s podcast-listening:

THE COURT: … You mentioned you listen to

podcasts, ma’am. Is this podcasts that involve

murder cases, or criminal justice, or the death

penalty?

[JUROR 225]: Everything. It’s across the board,

music, art and entertainment, sometimes book

reviews.

THE COURT: But it did come up in the context of

counsel’s question.

[JUROR 225]: Just recently, I heard a podcast

with WLRN, exposé on some cases in Mississippi.

THE COURT: So murder or death penalty cases?

[JUROR 225]: Death penalty cases, yeah.

8

The State moved to excuse Juror 225 for cause, “based on the

statements she’s made, which I think established a reluctance on her

part to consider it equally with a recommendation of life as well.”

Defense counsel objected, quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,

522 (1968), and pointed out that Juror 225 had said there were some

cases where it would be appropriate. The judge granted the State’s

cause challenge:

I appreciate your argument, but she was just

really in distress, in my view. And you – yes, she

said she could consider it after she talked about

botched executions, after she talked about her

general opposition to it, after she told us her

reluctance to do it. I guess she didn’t mouth the

phrase, “I can consider it,” but I don’t believe that

that is a meaningful willingness to genuinely

consider both options. I think she had an absolute

prejudice against the death penalty, which is fine,

but I don’t think it withstands a cause challenge.

The jury found Mr. Wolf guilty and rendered a unanimous

recommendation in favor of the death penalty. The circuit court

sentenced Mr. Wolf to death, and Mr. Wolf appealed.

Among other errors, Mr. Wolf argued that the trial court violated

Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985), and Witherspoon in

striking Juror 225. The Florida Supreme Court rejected this argument:

9

Prospective Juror 225 gave equivocal or even

evasive answers when asked whether she could

recommend the death penalty if she felt it was

appropriate. She answered affirmatively when

asked whether she would be reluctant to

recommend the death penalty even if she found it

to be otherwise appropriate. When asked whether

her exposure to podcasts, opinions, or reports

discussing “botched” executions would cause her

to be reluctant to impose the death penalty if she

otherwise felt it was appropriate, she responded

that she was unsure but indicated a hesitation to

recommend death. She specifically expressed

concern that Wolf's “execution might be botched

or might be inappropriate for some reason.” When

asked whether her concerns about “botched”

executions and the financial implications of the

death penalty on the taxpayers would impair her

ability to recommend the death penalty if she

otherwise felt it was appropriate, she refused to

give a definite answer and reiterated that it

would be better not to have a death penalty.

Incongruently, when asked whether she could

“consider the death penalty as an appropriate

penalty,” she answered, “Yes.”

In granting the cause challenge, the trial court

found that it was not “a close call.” The court

noted that Prospective Juror 225 “was just really

in distress” when being questioned about the

death penalty. Although she said she could

consider the death penalty, the court did not

believe that she had “a meaningful willingness to

genuinely consider both options” and instead had

an “absolute prejudice against the death penalty.”

In their totality, Prospective Juror 225's

responses established a reasonable doubt as to

10

whether her views on the death penalty would

substantially impair her ability to perform her

duties as a juror. While the prospective juror

ultimately stated that she could “consider” the

death penalty, she consistently expressed

reservations about her ability to recommend it—

based on what she had heard about it from

podcasts or other people's opinions or reports—

even if it were otherwise justified. And we will

not disturb the trial court's credibility finding

regarding her lack of a meaningful willingness to

genuinely consider both a life sentence and a

death sentence. The “distress” observed by the

trial court cannot be gleaned from the record,

which demonstrates the importance of this

Court's deference to the trial court, which is able

to see and hear the way the prospective juror

answered

the

questions.

Under

these

circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial

court abused its discretion or committed manifest

error in excusing Prospective Juror 225 for cause.

Wolf v. State, 416 So. 3d 1117, 1128 (Fla. 2025).

11

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I.

The trial court erred in striking Juror 225 based

on her reservations about the death penalty.

A court may not exclude a juror simply because she favors life over

death. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968). The only

question for the trial judge is whether the juror can “conscientiously

apply the law and find the facts,” or whether her views would “prevent

or substantially impair the performance of [her] duties.” Wainwright v.

Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423-24 (1985). The exclusion of Juror 225 denied

Steven Wolf his right to trial by an impartial jury of his peers, in

violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Florida

Supreme Court was required to reverse for a new sentencing trial. See

Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987).

Juror 225’s statements did not rise to this level. To be sure, she

opposed the death penalty, but this is not the standard. She did not

“believe in the death penalty,” but she was “open, given this is the first

time in this type of trial.” Significantly, she did not express a moral or

religious objection. She was concerned about how the death penalty was

administered. “But my main reason is because there’s been so many

that have not gone well …” She had heard about botched executions.

12

She thought that the death penalty was poor policy – “a life sentence, I

think, is a little bit easier on the community and the taxpayer, just

because of all the appeals that go on.” She would not say that these

concerns would impair her ability to recommend the death penalty, she

could consider both sides, but it would be better if the death penalty

was not law. “I’m not going to say a definite ‘yes’ because I think I

would want to listen to both sides, but I just think it would be better not

to have a death penalty.”

There were cases where Juror 225 thought the death penalty

“Makes sense,” but she still didn’t like it. And she agreed that she could

“consider the death penalty as an appropriate penalty.”

The trial court and the Florida Supreme Court appear to have

operated under the understanding that a juror was disqualified if her

views of the death penalty might influence her decision-making at all.

But this is not so. In Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 46-47 (1980), this

Court rejected the argument that a juror could be excluded where her

“views might influence the manner in which [she] performs [her] role

without exceeding” the guided discretion provided by law.

13

The Florida courts’ reliance on the fact Juror 225 was “distressed”

just

demonstrates

the

error:

“[N]either

nervousness,

emotional

involvement, nor inability to deny or confirm any effect whatsoever is

equivalent to an unwillingness or an inability on the part of the jurors

to follow the court's instructions and obey their oaths, regardless of

their feelings about the death penalty.”

Juror 225 stated that she could follow the law in deciding the

appropriate penalty. She may not have been able to deny or confirm

whether her views would have “any effect whatsoever.” The Court

should grant certiorari to decide whether this is enough under

Wainright, or whether Adams remains good law on this point.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition should be granted.

CARLOS J. MARTINEZ

Public Defender

Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida

BY: ______________________________

SHANNON HEMMENDINGER*

Assistant Public Defender

Fla. Bar No.: 97947

United States Supreme Court

Bar No.: 298309

AppellateDefender@pdmiami.com

November 18, 2025

*Counsel of Record

14