Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Alphonso Lataurean James, Petitioner v. United States

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FILED

JUL 3 0 2025

^LreEmeFc^urtLusK

ALPHONSO LATAUREAN JAMES

PETITIONER

(Your Name)

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

"et al."

RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ALPHONSO LATAUREAN JAMES

(Your Name)

P.O. BOX

5000

YAZOO CITY FCI FACILITY

(Address)

YAZOO CITY,

MS.

39194-5000

(City, State, Zip Code)

N/A

(Phone Number)

Received

AUG 1 2 2025

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

The questions presented for review are: (1) Is whether

Application Note 14(b) unreasonably interprets the text of

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), such that no deference to the commentary

is justified. (2) Based on the Supreme Court's course of

correction in how the constitutionality of firearms regul­

ations is reviewed under the Second Amendment, 922(g)(1)

is unconstitutional as applied to Mr. James. There is no

relevantly similar analogue in the historical tradition

for the 922(g)(l)'s permanent disbarment of all felons. As

a result, Mr. James 922(g)(1) conviction violates the 2nd

Amendment, and this Court should exercise its discretion

and find that Mr. James, suffered plain error under "Rahimi

Case", when the district court found facts necessary to

establish the 922(g)(1) conviction.

(i)

V

LIST OF PARTIES

[ ] All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

[X| All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of

all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this

petition is as follows:

Casas, Jesus M.

Bailey, Lynn P.

Cummings, Jonas

Dudek, The Honorable Kyle C.

Eth, Simon R.

Hall, A. Fitzgerald

Handberg, Roger B.

Kahn, Conrad Benjamin

Lappan, James

Mizell, The Honorable Nicholas P.

Nebesky, Suzanne C.

Polster Chappell, The Honorable Sheri

Rhodes, David P.

United States Attorney General, Pam Bondi

No publicly traded company or corporation has an interest

in the outcome of this petition for writ of certiorari.

RELATED CASES

USCA11 Case:23-11972-EE

United States v. Alphonso Lataurean James

and

Case: 2:22-CR-OO116-SPC-KCD

Case From the United States District Court

Middle District of Florida, Fort Myers Division

(ii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS BELOW........................................................................................................ 1

JURISDICTION........................................................... ,......................................................... 2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED.................................. 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.............................................................................................. 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT............................................................................5

CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................... 6

ATTACHMENT

........................................ 1-16

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE..................................... 7

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

USCA11 Case:23-11972-EE Document:19 Date Filed: 11/

09/23 Page: 1 Of 41 pages Attached to this Petition.

APPENDIX B

USCA11 Case:23-11972 Document:31 Date Filed: 01/05/

2024 Page: 1 of 35 pages Attached to this Petition.

APPENDIX C

USCA11 Case:23-11972-EE Document: 36 Date File: 03/

27/24 Page: 1 Of 34 pages Attached to this Petition.

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX E

APPENDIX F

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

PAGE NUMBER

CASES

New York State Rifle & Pisrol Assn. Inc., v. Bruen,

597 U.S. 1, 9-10; 17 (2022) ...... ..............................................................

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)

•

McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)

•

Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 50, n. 10 (1961)..

United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 492 (2024)

United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 23-24 (1st Cir. 2011)

Range v. Atty. Gen. U.S., 124 F.4th 218, 229 (3rd Cir. 2024)....

State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. 418, 421-422 (1843)......

United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 469-70 (5th Cir. 2024)....

Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2023)

..............

United States v. Moore, 111 F.4th 266 (3rd. Cir. 2024)

United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. 634, 648, 139 S. Ct. 2369,

204 L. Ed. 2d 897 (2019)

STATUTES AND RULES

.

18 U.S.C. 922 (g)(1) as a person who had previously "been

convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment

for a term exceeding one year."

Second Amendment of the United States Constitutional states

that "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not

be infringed." U.S. Const, amend. II. text "guarantees the

individual right to possess and carry weapons."

18 U.S.C. 922(g).....................

18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8).

18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8)(A)(C)

............................

18 U.S.C. 3231,

............................

18 U.S.C. 3742(a)(1)............

28 U.S.C. 1291

OTHER

See Appendix A, Table of Authorities, page iv, and v for Statutes

and United States Sentencing Guidelines Provisions.

See Appendix B, Table of Authorities, page ii, and iii for other

Cases, Statutes, and Sentencing Guidelines on page iii, an iv.

(iv)

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

[X] For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix

the petition and is at Appendix

as well

[ reported at fn<^ex to Appendices

. or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

A

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix

to

the petition and is unavailable to the Petitioner at this time.

[reported at The Clerk of the District Court

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at

Appendix

to the petition and is

[ ] reported at_

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the

appears at Appendix

:__________________________court

to the petition and is

[ ] reported at

'_______________________ ; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

1.

to

JURISDICTION

[ ] For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case

was April 30th, of 2025

[ x] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of

Appeals on the following date:

, and a copy of the

order denying rehearing appears at Appendix

[ X] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including October 28, 2025(date) on August 28 ,2025 (date)

in Application No.

A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was------------------A copy of that decision appears at Appendix

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:

:, and a copy of the order denying rehearing

appears at Appendix

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including(date) on ;— -:-------- (date) in

Application No.

A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

2.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The district court erred by overlooking Application Note 14(E).

According to Note 14(E), "[i]n determining whether subsection (b)(6)

(B)...applies, the court must consider the relationship between the

instant offense and the other offense, consistent with relevant con­

duct principles." U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt. n. 14(E) (citing § lB1.3(a)

(l)-(4)). Note 14(E) negates any rule in which a gun is automatically

deemed to be possessed "in connection with" another felony just be­

cause it is in "close proximity" to drugs.

As the Third Circuit did in Perez, the district court should

have interpreted Note 14(B) in light of Note(E) to require that even

if guns and drugs are in "close proximity," there must be some said

relationship between them. Perez, 5 F.4th at 398-99. Because the said

district court did not do that, it erred by applying subsection (b)

(6)(B).

In light of Bruen, Rahimi, Moore, and founding era analogues

for disarmament, § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Mr.

James. Although Mr. James's prior convictions, none of those said

convictions establishes a risk that Mr. James is or will be dangerous

in the future to justify permanent disarmament. In the absence of

an articulable and clear threat of dangerousness, the Second Amend­

ment does not permit the government to Temporarily disarm an indivi­

dual-much less permanently an individual. As such, the blanket and

permanent nature of § 922(g)(1) is at odds with this country's said

historical traditions and, as a result, in violation of the Second

Amendment's "unqualified command." Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. Therefore,

this Court should vacate Mr. James's conviction as a violation of the

Second Amendment as applied to this case.

3.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This Court has summarily vacated several/said sen­

tencings in the wake of Rahimi f that are similarly situated, albeit outside

of harmless error review: the record cannot be said to establish a harm­

less

error, see 'Bruen, 597 U\S, at 1-7, Heller, 554 U.S. at ,634.

supra.

Accordingly, this Court should exercise its discretion and find that Mr.

James, suffered plain error under Rahimi • when the district court found

•tj-

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facts necessary to establish the ‘a said 922(g) .convictionII. Given the historical understanding of the Second Amendment,

§ 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to the circumstances

of Mr. James

conviction.

Alphonso L. James pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm

in violation of § 922(g)(1) as a person who had previously “been convicted

in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding

one year.” In fight of the historical understandings of the Second Amend­

ment, however, § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Mr. James.

Therefore, this Court should reverse and render Mr. James' s § 922(g)(1)

conviction as unconstitutional as applied to him.

The Second Amendment of the United States Constitutional states

that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be

4.

infringed.” U.$, ,Const, amend. II. In New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn.

Inc., v. Brizen.,. the Supreme Court—relying on its previous decisions in

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), andMcDonald v. Chi­

cago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)—heldthat together the Second and Fourteenth

Amendments “protect an individual’s right to keep and bear arms for self­

defense.” iflew York Statg Rifle

Pistol Assn. Inc.,;g. Brueji, 597 UXS. 1,

,p-IQ;-.17 (2022), Under Bruen, “the,Consfrtutiqn'prestimptively protects”

.aUilndiyiduaTs right to keep.x and bear^armsz Id.-at; 17, As a result,

§ 922(g)(1) is?unconstituticnal as applied to Mr, James

,because it in­

fringes upon his Second and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

InHeZZer.theSupremeCourtheldthatthe Second Amendment’s text

“guarantee® the fridiyidual right to possess and carry sveaponsZ’ Heller,

554 U.S. at 592 (cleanedup).Follpwing IleUer, lower courts adopted a

“frvq-step framework far analyzing? Second Amendment challenges that

Combines history> with means?end scrutiny.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at .17

(cleaned up). Bruen, however, rejected the second step—applying means. endecrutjny-TTof this approach; Id.sA, 517.

In Brueri, the Supreme . Court held that' the only relevant question

when reviewing the constitutionality of a firearms regulation is whether

Attachment 2 to page 4.

the “firearin regulation is cbnsistent with this Nation's historical tradi­

tion.”<Brizen,597U.S. at 17. Bruen rejected the idea that policy interests

play-a role in determining the constitutionality of a firearm regulation.

Id. The Second Anfendinent created an “unqualified command.” Id. ait 24.

Therefore; mteans-end-scrutinyis inappropriate for challenges to because

i -“the very enuineratidii di the rigfil takes‘ out of the haiids ofgovernment—even the Third Branch'ofJGrdvernment—thb powdr to decide* on a

case-by-Case

basis

right

whether the*

worth insisting

is really

upon.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 23 (quoting' Heller,'^54: U:S. ;at 634)(cleaned

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v + To ’establish'that a firearnis regulation is cdhstitUtiohal/ the 'gdvernment must‘Show that the reguiation cbncerns conduct outside’ Jthecscbpe

: of the Second Amendment-by proving fhat “afirearrn regulation ^ ConJ sistent with this Nation's hfet6rical tradition’’ hi. at/177 24 tqttdfihg^i^b-

- nigsbefg v. State Bar ^fCal^36QIJiSi 86,T50,di. 10 (1961)). If the govern­

ment fails to do so, the regulatidn-infringes-upon “the Second‘Amend­

ment’s unqualified command?”'id. at'17/Societal probremsdhat are not

consistent with the histoficai tradition cannot be Used to undermine the

“unqualified deference” afforded to the Second Amendment. Id. at 26-27.

Attachment 3 to page

-

Bruen explained its test as:

.

.....

The test that we set forth in Heller and apply today requires courts

to assess whether modern firearms regulations are consistent with

the Second Amendment’s text and historical understanding. Tn

some cases, that inquiry will be fairly straightforward. For in­

stance, v^hen. a challenged regulation addresses a general; societal

problem that has persisted since the 18th century, the lack of a dis­

tinctly similar historical regulation,addressing that problem is rel­

evant evidence that the challenged regulation is inconsistent with

the Second Amendment. Likewise, if earlier generations addressed

the societal problem, but did so through materially different means,

that also, couldbeevidence that a modern regulation is unconstitu­

tional. And if some jurisdictions actually attempted to enact analogous rregqlatipns during .this timeframe, but those proposals were

rejected on constitutional grounds, that rejection surely would pro­

vide some probative evidence of unconstitutionality.

-

Bruen,

597rr U.S.

at 26.

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, Applying this test, “constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope

they were understood to have when the people adopted .them.” Id. at 34

(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35) (cleaned up). Therefore, the further

removed from 1791—-when the Second Amendment was adopted—a reg­

ulation appears in the historical record, the less force and authority it

. carries. Id. at 35-36; see also Id. at 37 (explaining that although the Four-

teenth Amendment enforces the Second Amendment upon the States, the

protections guaranteed through the Bill of Rights are tied to the under­

standing of those rights at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted). For

Attachment 4 to page 4.

this reason, when “later history contradicts whht the text says, the text

controls.” Id; at 36.

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In United States v. Rahimi,5 the Shpremb Court explained that Bruen

requires that modern laws have a “releVantly similarly" analogue found

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in -regulatory traditions. UnitedStatesv. Rahinti, 602 U.S. 680, 492

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(2024). This requires determining5 whether a modern law is “analogous

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enough to pass constitutionalmustOr”hy “applying faithfully the balance

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struck by the founding generati6n.*Id. (cleaneduC) (quoting Bruen, 597

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Under Rahimi, the government is not required to identify “a ‘dead

fihg<3f’ or a ‘historical■ti^^TdlXquo^g’jBnien', 597 WS? at 30); Rahmi

explained that “if laws at the founding regulated firearm use to address

particular problems” that can serve ‘‘as a strong indicator that contem-

pofary laws imposing similar fesfrictions forhimilar reasons fall within

a permissible category bf re^latibns.^iaf^uf “even when a law regulates

arm-bearing for a permissible reason; [j it may not be compatible with

the right if it does so to an extent beyond what was done at the founding ”

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Attachment. 5

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to page 4.

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Together Bruen and Rahimi- require, that the United States locate a

sufficiently analogous historical regulation that justifies a modern regu­

lation’s infringement upon a person’s Second Amendment rights. Histor­

ical analogues enacted contemporaneously with or shortly after the rati­

fication of the Second Amendment provide a stronger basis for modern

regulations., Bruen, 597 U.S. at 35r36. But>$he modern analogue’s-scpp^

can’t exceed that of its historical analogue.

Applying these ^rincqsles....to , Mr. |.James's

i

case reveals^ that

, § 922(g)(1)) is unconsfitutipnal-as applied! to Mr. James. ;

r

First, Mr. James . i^ pne of the.people covered by the Second; Amendment. The SecqndA^

which, controls, protects; “theright

of the people”—not the merely right of the tbose who have never broken

the law. See Rahimi, 602 l^S-yat ,691 (‘“In TZeZ/er. our; inquiry into the

scope of the right beganwith\constitutionaltextandhistc>ry.’Briie7z,597

U.S. at 22.”) As Heller acknowledged, ^m-all six othey provisions of the

Constitution that, mention, the people, the term unambiguously refers to

all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset. Heller,

554 U.S. at 580 (cleaned up). As a result, the Second Amendment applies

Attachment 6 to page 4.

“individually and belongs to all Americahs”—incldding Mr. Janies,

at 581.

Id.

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Second, § 922(g)(1) lacks the required basis in the historical tradition

i ■ required underBruezi5 and Rahinti to permanently disarm Mr. James

• Afor a piior c^nvidtidn. In? 2011? ihd Firfetj Circuit recognized the fdihtive

recency of this type of disarmanient.' United States U. Booker, 644 F.3d

12, 23-24 (1st Cir. 2011).4 Beginning iriJ196i; federal law baited anyone

convicted of a crime punishableMby h-'year bi more ihpfisohffomowning

a firearm. An Act to StrengthendheFedefalFirearms Adt, Publ. L. No.

87-872, - 75-Stat. 757 (1961)? TW’<krKest' verhibh of the laiyIn 19§8 applied only toMkjlenifdrffies^Piib. Ll No? 75^785; 1(6); 2(f),52Statfl250,

i 1250—51 (1988)^ Ultimately, v§' 922(g)(1) is’ firmly rooted in the twentieth

centUry and likely heath little resemblance to lawS in effect at the time

the Second Amendment was ratified” ?Bboher, 644 F.3dr at 24. Given

§ 922(g)(l)’s 20th century ofigins—-fhr removed from the time of the

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founding—the statute cannot survive Bruen1 absent anJ established

4 At issue in Booker was the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).

Booker, 644 F.3d at 22. Booker, however, predated Bruen’s course correc­

tion of Second Amendment analysis.

Attachment 7 to page 4.

historical analogue from the time ofthe founding. §ee Range p; Atty. Gen.

U.S., 124 F.4th 218, 229 (3rd Cir. 2024); (en banc) (Even if the 1938 Act

were “longstanding” enough to warrant Heller's assurance—a. dubious

proposition, given -the Rahimi Court's locus on Founding-era sources.”

(quoting Rahimi,^2 U.S. at 983-95)).

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. InRahimi, the Supreme Courtheld that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) is.con­

stitutional. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 693. That provision prohibits individuals

restraming order from possessing

who are subject to.ar

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firearms. § '922(g)(8)(A)^(G). 2?ah^7?i sumjri.arized its holding and rar

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1 When a restraining order .contains a finding that an individual

poses a^credible threat to the ph^sicalsafety of an intim ate partner,

that individual majy---<.onsistent vdth, ths Second Amendment—be

banned from possessing firearms while the >rder is in effeot. Since

the founding, our Nation's □.rearm laws have included provisions

preventing individuals who threaten physical harm to others from

; misusing firearms. As applied to. the facts of this case, Section

922(g)(8) fits comfortably within this tradition.

Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 690. Critical to this analysis was the temporary na­

ture of the disarmament—“while the order is in effect”—and the articu­

lated dangerousness—“individuals who threaten harm to others.” Id.

Attachment 8

to page 4.

RahimiloMnd two sufficiently analdgotis historicalfegulationstosupporc § 922(g)(8): (1) surety laws and (2) going armed laws; Rahirrti, 602

•U.S. at 694-98. Surety laws required the imposing ofa bond to iri lieu of

= being jailed when“thefe is probable grbiihd to suspect-[aperson] offuture

misbehavior.” Id. at 695-97. Thb *bohd sefved “to stipulate with and to

give full assurhnce^that such bffbhce shall not happen.” Id; “(cde&ried up).

Some ?suretylhW§’targeted1 firehrm^^ ■’>•3

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In 1795, for example, Massachu&etts-eiiacted a1 IhW authorizing jus­

tices of the peace to “arrest” all who “go armed offensively [and] re^quire of the offender tofikfdsuroti&s'forbdh keeping ffie^peace.^ 1-795

Mass. Acts ch. 2, in Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts, 1794—

1795, ch. 26, pp. 66—67 (1896). Later, Massachusetts amended its

surety laws to be even more specific, authorizing the imposition of

> bonds from individuals “[who WOnt] ‘armed' with a dirk, dagger,

sword, pistol; or■other offensive and dangerous weapon.”Mass Rev.

Stat., chir134/§ 16psee i5iiZj (niarginal note) (referencing the earlier

^statutejv At least hiSndthdrjuWdictiofis didddie<samebSee Brden,

597 U.S., at 56^andm. 23,?142 S/Gw 2111.

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Id. at; 696.;ar,hese.;laws, however, involved:temporary disarmament and

were not absolute. Id.

By their nature, surety bonds were temporary measures. As Rahimi

noted: “Bonds could not be required for more than six months at a time,

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and an individual could obtain an exception if he needed his arms for self­

defense or some other legitimate reason.” Id. at 697 (citing Mass. Rev.

Attachment 9 to page 4.

Stat., ch. .134, § 16). Once the period pf the bond period lapsed, the temporary disarmament ended.

.. -

Going armed arms dealt with risks of violence. Rahimi explained that

“the going armed laws, prohibited riding or going armed, with, dangerous

or. unusual weapons, to terrify the good people of the land.” Id. (cleaned

up). “’Such conduct disrupted the public order and led almost necessarily

to actual violence.” State y. Huntly, 25 N.G. 418, 421—422 (1843) (per cu-

riam). Therefore, the taw pumshed these acts with ‘forfeiture of the-arms

and imprisonment.’ 4 Blackstone 149?” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 697 (cleaned

• •

up).

,

,v.

Together these laws, proyided a sufficient historical analogue Jfor a

modern law that requires disbarment “once a court has found that the

defendant represents a cre.dib?le thxeqt to the physical safety of another,”

but only on a temporary basi^. Id.

699 (cleaned up). Notably, the surety

and going armed laws provided a more restrictive penalty than

§ 922(g)(8)’s “lesser restriction of temporary disarmament ” Rahimi, 602

U.S. at 699. Based on these historical analogues, the Supreme Court had

“no trouble concluding that .Section 922(g)(8) survives Rahimi’s facial

challenge [because] our tradition of firearm regulation allows the

Attachment 10 to page 4.

Government to disarm individuals who present a credible threat to the

safety of others.” Id. (cleaned up).

Rahimis analysis on disarinamentunder § 9122(g)(8), however, is not

exactly analogous1 to as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1). Section 922(g)(1)

} deprives Americaris of the right to own a firearm permanently. Under

its terms; the statute forever prohibits a convicted ielon from owiiirig a

firearm with no consideration of the underlying conduct or any sort of

ongoing assessment ofa defendarit’sddngerouSness to the enminiinify

This permanent disarmament differs remarkably from the temporary

disarmament at issue in Rahimi.

\

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'^rialySis ftfrhed oh the tdnipbfafy fiature of

the disarmament. The' analogue to sut^ty bonds was sufficient because

“like the surety bonds of limited dufhtio'n, Section 922(g) (8)’s restriction

was tempOrary as' applied to Rahimi.’, Bd/iimf, 602 U.S. at 699. As the

Supreme Court noted, § 922(g)(8)’s disbarment lasts drily “as long as the

defendant is subject to a restraining order.” Id. (cleaned up); see Range,

124iF.4th at ^Q ^RaKimi did bleSs disarming (at least temporarily)

physically dangerous people.” (emphasis added).

Attachment 11 to page 4.

x

Morepver^ theThird Circuit hasrecently rejectedtbeidea thatthe fact

that the foundingera frequently relied on capital punishment—the defi­

nition of a permanent punishment—for felonies creates an analogue for

permanent disarmament. Ran^e,_124 F.4th at 231.;

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Yet the Founding-era practice of punishing some, nonviolent crimes

with death does not suggest that the particular (and distinct) punishment -t issue here—de facto lifetime disarmament for alv felo­

nies and felony-equivalent misdemeanors—is rooted in our Nation’s

history and, tradition. Though our dissenting /^colleagues read

Rahimi as blessing disarmament as a lesser punishment generally,

the;, Qo.urt did not. do- that. Instead, < if authorized temporary dis-^

armament as a sufficient analogue to historic temporary imprison ment only to respond .to .the , use of guns to threaten the physical

safety of others.” Compare Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 1902, with United

Statesv.Diaz, 116 F.4th ;458, 469-70 (5th Cir. 2024) (similarly

broad reasoning).

Nor does § 922(g)(l)’s permanent disarmament allow for any recon­

sideration of whether an individual remains a credible threat to the

safety of others: See Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 702 (“An individual found by a

court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another may be

temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.”). While

a judicial finding of potential dangerousness may justify temporary dis­

armamentunder § 922(g)(8), there is no similar support for § 922(g)(l)’s

Attachment 12 to page 4.

: permanent disarmament—particularlywhere the underlying felony in­

volvednon-violent conduct? Rahimis rationale for allowing temporary

disbarment based on “a clear threat of physical violence of another” col­

lapses when applied to individuals barred from firearm possession based

on non-Violent conduct.

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While Mr.James* f has multiple prior convictions; those CCnViCtibns—

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standing alone^—do hotestablfebPthdV Mt:James •

going or future dangerousness. Mr. James

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presents a risk of on­

has been disarmed for the

sole fact that he’s been convicted'of a fblbny^fdghidlesS of whether he’s

dahgerous or not. The SecbndAmendment hoes not allow 922(g) to Oper­

ate in this way.

The Supreme Court has acknowledged rehabilitation as genuine goal

of imprisonment. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (“A sentence

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can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence,

retribution, or rehabilitation. See 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive

Criminal Law § 1.5, pp. 30-36 (1986) (explaining theories of punishJ.’

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ment)”). If rehabilitation holds any value to society, then permanent dis­

barment without any consideration or acknowledgement of a person’s po-

tential rehabilitation is at odds with that goal. As Rahimi demonstrated,

Attachment 13 to page 4.

founding era laws involvedtemporary idisarmament---mot permanent disbarment-xand that temporary restriction wassbased on articula ted con­

cerns pf violepce. Rahimi;,QQ2 U.S. at 698t99.

io In

United States v. Moore;: the Third Circuit recently addressed

§ 922(g)(1) in a mannerinstructive: for Mr. James's case. UnitedStates

v. Moore, 111 F.4th 266 (3rd;:Cir.'2024); There, the Thii-d Circuit %eld

that:§: 922(g)(1) was Constitutional as-applied to Moore because Moore

possessed a firearm’while!On-superVised release from a prior conviction.

Id- at 273. The Third Circuit held'that'MoOfe isprotected by the Second

Amendment because he is “an adult citizen’

meaning “the Government

♦

.bearsithe burden of justifying” § 922(g)(1). Moore, 111 F.4th at 268-69.

'Looking to historical regulations, the Third Circuit located the histor­

ical analogues required by Brueri ‘£ii&R&hiniito justify § 922(g)(l)’s-eon? stitutionality as applied’to MOore; Afoore< ll l F.4th at 269-70. The Court

explained that:

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The bottom line is this: during the founding era, forfeiture laws

temporarily disarmed citizens who had committed a wide range of

:< crimes. Convicts could be required to forfeit their weapons and; were

prevented from reacquiring arms until they had finished serving

their sentences. This historical practice of disarming a convict dur­

ing his sentence—or as part of the process of qualifying for par­

don—is like temporarily disarming a convict on supervised release.

Attachment 14 to page 4.

After all, ‘-the-defendant receives a term of supervised release

thanks to his initial offense, and it constitutes a part of the final

- sentence for his crime?’ United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. 634,

648, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 204 L.Ed.2d 897 (2019) (plurality opinion); see

also United States v. Island, 916 F.3d.'249-, 252(3dCir. 2019) (“The

supervised release term constitutes part of the original sentence.”)

■ > (cleanedup); Consistent with our Nation's history and' tradition of

firearms regulation, we hold that convicts may be disarmed while*

r serving their sentences on supervised release. ■

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Zt/.at 271 (cleaned up) (internal footnote omitted).

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, Mopre is applicable tp^Mr.James'scsicaisedn two major aspects: First.,

the Third Circiut’s;recognitipn^of thexfacfcthat^ despite his; felonatatus,

Moore remained within the protections pf the Second Amendment—not

: ojttside .its;prptections:r/d. , af <2Q9u Second, theJThird Circuit’s: focus on

temporary disarmament during/ the duiatipiL of Moore’s; sentence—dn. . eluding supervised release. Id, \ at -271:72- The disarmament upheld in

Moore was temporary,-not<perman.eiit.'

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In light oIBruen, Rahimi, and founding era analogues for disarma­

ment, § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Mr. James . Although

Mr. James' s prior convictions, none of those convictions, establishes a risk

that Mr- James -•-is?OB wilkbe dangeropsinthe future to justify permanent

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disarmament. In the absence of an articulable and “clear threat” of dan-

gerpusness, the Second Amendment does not permit the government to

Attachment 15 to page 4.

temporarily disarm an individual—much less permanently disarm an in­

dividual.

As such, the blanket and permanent nature of § 922(g)(1) is at odds

with this country’s historical traditions and, as a result, in violation of

the Second Amendment’s “unqualified command.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17.

Therefore, this Court should vacate Mr. James' s conviction as a viola­

tion of the Second Amendment as applied to this case.

Attachment 16

to page 4.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

First reason for granting the petition is: (1) Despite Mr.

James's felon status, he remained within the protections of the

Second Amendment-- not outside its protections. And second said

reason is that the disarmament was only temporary, not permanent.

In light of Bruen, Rahimi, Moore, and founding era analogues

for disarmament, § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to

Mr. James. Although Mr. James's prior convictions, none of these

convictions establishes a risk that Mr. James is or will be dan­

gerous in the future to justify permanent disarmament. In the

absence of an articulable and clear threat of dangerousness, the

Second Amendment does not permit the government to temporarily

disarm an individual--much less permanently disarm an individual.

As such, the blanket and permanent nature of § 922(g)(1) is

at odds with this country's historical traditions and, as a result

in violation of the Second Amendment's "unqualified command", see

Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. Therefore, this Court should vacate Mr.

James's conviction as a violation of the Second Amendment as

applied to this case.

5.

Based on the foregoing Mr. Alphonso Lataurean James humbly asks

this Honorable Court to vacate his conviction or sentence and remand

for new proceedings. Respectfully submitted.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certidrarT should be granted.

J.'sr.

■ RespectfuUy^uhhhttbdjii:.;^ tJ

Alp^n^so^^^James #36156-510

Prose Litigant

Date: 7

Per

'--br.

Houston v. Lack (1988) Rule

Address: Yazoo.City FCI Facility

P.O. BOX 5000

Yazoo City, MS. 39194-5000

?

... 1

Respectfully submitted,

Alphonso L. James #36156-510

Pro se Litigant

■:

i y--.

Date: October 27th, of

,2025, Per Houston v. Lack (1988) Rule

Address: Yazoo City FCI Facility

P.O. BOX 5000

Yazoo City, MS. 39194-5000

6. ’