Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Sam Boyd, Petitioner v. United States

No.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

SAM BOYD,

Petitioner,

VS.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Conor K. Duffy

1321 Mount Rushmore Rd.

Rapid City, SD 57701

Telephone: 605-939-7936

conorduffylaw@gmail.com

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

QUESTION PRESENTED

When a trial court grants an “ends of justice” continuance pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), is it required to make specific factual findings beyond

simply re-stating the language of the statute?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION

CHSSHSHHHHHETSEHSHEHHHHHHHHHHHHHSHOTHSHOTHHHHHHHOHTHH OES HOHTOS HSH SHESHOHH OHO OOOO HOHOEC EOC OOTOSE SEH OER OS OOOE

QUESTION PRESENTED

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 00... ceecceecccsssscessseeeseeeesecessecessecessssesssscesssessaees

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196 (2010)... cecescessssesseseescsscsscescssssececeeees 4

Zedner v. U.S., 547 U.S. 489, 507 (2006) ....ececcccccescescssesseseesccssescsssescscsseseeees 2, 3,

5, 6

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

United States v. Boyd, 138 F.4™ 1079 (8 Cir. 2025)....c.ccccccesscssssssssececseseeseeees 1,5

United States Code

18 U.S.C § 3161 vecccccccsesssessesssesssessesssessssssesssessessssssessssssssesessesetessessussesseuseeeeesee i, 1,2,

3,4, 5

2B U.S.C § 1254 ceccccccccsecsssssessessessusssessessusssessesssssssssesivssusesssissitesteseseveeseereeeee |

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INDEX TO APPENDIX

APPENDIX A: — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Judge Order

(denying en banc petition for rehearing filed by Appellant Sam Boyd), 5:22-cr-

50020-KES-1, filed 07/09/2025.

iV

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Sam Boyd, by and through Conor Duffy, Court Appointed Counsel,

respectfully petitions this court for a Writ of Certiorari to review the judgment of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The United States Court of Appeals denied Mr. Boyd’s direct appeal. The

opinion was filed on May 30", 2025. See United States v. Boyd, 138 F.4th 1079,

1082 (8th Cir. 2025).

JURISDICTION

Mr. Boyd’s petition for rehearing to the United States Court of Appeals for

the Eighth Circuit was denied. The Order Denying Petition for en banc rehearing

was filed on July 9, 2025. Mr. Boyd invokes this Court’s jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1254, having timely filed this Petition for Writ of Certiorari within ninety

days of the United States Court of Appeals judgment.

QUESTION PRESENTED

When a trial court grants an “ends of justice” continuance pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), is it required to make specific factual findings beyond

simply re-stating the language of the statute?

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of Boyd’s motion to dismiss

for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. The trial court in this case issued an ends-ofjustice continuance on November 7", 2022. The only record of this continuance

was a text order in Pacer which read: “Based on the ends of justice and 18 U.S.C. §

3161(h)(7), the deadlines and trial date are canceled pending resolution of (R. Doc.

105) Motion to Suppress and (R. Doc. 104) Motion to Dismiss.” R. Doc. 106.

If this continuance order was valid, it would mean that Boyd’s trial began

after 54 days had elapsed from his Speedy Trial clock. If this continuance order

was invalid, as Boyd asserts, then his trial began after 93 days had elapsed, which

is beyond the 70 days allowed under the Speedy Trial Act and the case should have

been dismissed.

REASON FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This continuance was invalid because the trial court did not make findings as

required by statute and Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 498 (2006). The trial

court’s ends-of-justice findings under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) were inadequate, and

therefore invalid.

The ends of justice “findings” in this case consisted of a single text entry in

Pacer. It read: “Based on the ends of justice and 18 USC § 3161(h)(7), the

deadlines and trial date are canceled pending resolution of 105 Motion to Suppress

and R. Doc. 104 Motion to Dismiss.” (R. Doc. 106).

No other findings were made, either orally or written. The Eighth Circuit’s

decision that this text order constitutes adequate 18 U.S.C. § 3 161(h)(7) findings

conflicts with Zedner, which states:

“The Act requires that when a district court grants an ends-of-justice

continuance, it must “se[t] forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in

writing, its reasons” for finding that the ends of justice are served and they

outweigh other interests. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A).” Zedner v. United States, 547

U.S. 489, 506-07, 126 S. Ct. 1976, 1989, 164 L. Ed. 2d 749 (2006). The reason the

order offers that the ends of justice were served by granting the continuance was

that the trial court needed to resolve the motions before it. This is not a valid

reason under subsection h(7). Continuances for the court to decide motions are

dealt with under subsection h(1)(H) of the Speedy Trial Act.

The findings justifying the ends-of-justice continuance in this case were

therefore inadequate and the trial court’s order conflicts with the Zedner decision.

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489. Zedner is clear that a trial court must give

reasons for an end-of-justice continuance, not simply parrot a small portion of the

statutory language:

“Delay resulting from an ends-of-justice continuance is excluded from this

time period, but “/n/Jo such period of delay ... shall be excludable under this

subsection unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in

writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of

such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a

speedy trial.” Jd. 508, emphasis mine.

There is no indication from the trial court’s text entry that it considered any

of the required statutory factors from subsection (h)(7)(B).

The order granting the continuance was merely a conclusory statement and

contains no reasons. The law doesn’t say that a court shall set forth a conclusory

assertion that the best interests of justice would be served by a continuance. The

law says that a court must set forth its reasons for such an assertion. Failure to do

so violates the explicit requirements of 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7).

The Speedy Trial Act gives a trial judge great latitude in choosing his

reasons for granting an (h)(7) continuance. But the trial court must choose some

reason, and either write or speak it into the record, and this is not optional. An

(h)(7) continuance is lawful “only where the district court makes findings

justifying the exclusion.” Bloate v. U.S., 559 U.S. 196, 211 (2010). Here, the trial

court left no record of any reason for its determination that the ends of justice

would be served by granting the (h)(7) continuance.

This Court has held that a trial court’s “passing reference to the case's

complexity” was an insufficient finding to justify an (h)(7) continuance. Zedner v.

U.S., 547 U.S. 489, 507 (2006). The record here lacks even that.

In this case, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that, “The text

order is short. But when we consider the record within which the continuance was

granted, we understand the reasons for the continuance.” United States v. Boyd,

138 F.4th 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 2025).

This statement is in direct conflict with the reasoning in Zedner, and the

explicit language of the Speedy Trial Act, which requires a trial court to state the

reasons for its findings on the record. It is not permissible for a trial court to

silently rely on the entirety of the record to justify an ends-of-justice continuance,

or for a Court of Appeals to glean such a justification by its examination of the

record as a whole, after the fact. If the Eighth Circuit’s decision stands, and a trial

court’s reasons for granting ends-of-justice continuances are allowed to be inferred

from a review of the greater trial record, Zedner and 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)

become dead letters.

The Eighth Circuit’s decision conflicts particularly with this passage from

Zedner: “A straightforward reading of these provisions leads to the conclusion that

if a judge fails to make the requisite findings regarding the need for an ends-of-

justice continuance, the delay resulting from the continuance must be counted, and

if as a result the trial does not begin on time, the indictment or information must be

dismissed.” Zedner v. U.S., 547 U.S. 489, 508.

CONCLUSION

For these foregoing reasons, Mr. Boyd respectfully requests that this Court

issue a writ of Certiorari to review the Order of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Eighth Circuit.

Dated this 22" day of September 2025.

/s/ Conor_K. Duffy

Conor K. Duffy

Attorney for Petitioner

1321 Mount Rushmore Rd.

Rapid City, SD 57701

(605) 939-7936

conorduffylaw@gmail.com

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No: 24-1314

United States of America

Appellee

V.

Sam Boyd

Appellant

Appeal from U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota - Western

(5:22-cr-50020-KES-1)

ORDER

The petition for rehearing en banc is denied. The petition for rehearing by the panel is

also denied.

July 09, 2025

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

/s/ Susan E. Bindler

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Gnited States Court of Appeals

Sor the Cighth Circuit

No. 24-1314

United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

V.

Sam Boyd

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from United States District Court

for the District of South Dakota - Western

Submitted: December 20, 2024

Filed: May 30, 2025

Before LOKEN, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

KOBES, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Sam Boyd of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance,

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846, and of being a prohibited person in

possession of a firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).

Boyd moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his Speedy Trial Act rights were

violated, see 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seg., and separately moved to sever the gun counts

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from the conspiracy count, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a), 14(a). Because the motions

were properly denied, we affirm.

First, the Speedy Trial Act. On November 7, 2022, Boyd filed motions to

dismiss or in the alternative to suppress evidence (the November Motions) based on

allegations that the confidential informant’s misconduct was “so outrageous it

violated [Boyd]’s Due Process right [sic] contained within the 5th and 14th

Amendments.” R. Doc. 104 (citing United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983);

United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973)); R. Doc. 105. The same day, the

district court! issued a text order continuance, setting a hearing date and stating that

“[b]ased on the ends of justice and 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7), the deadlines and trial

date are canceled pending resolution of [R. Doc.] 105 Motion to Suppress and [R.

Doc.] 104 Motion to Dismiss.” R. Doc. 106. The hearing was delayed by disputes

over the witness list and difficulties in procuring testimony. On Boyd’s motion, the

court ordered post-hearing briefing based on new information from the live

testimony.

On February 9, 2023, as part of the post-hearing briefing, Boyd filed a

document stylized as a memorandum “in support of’ the November motion to

dismiss along with a motion to compel discovery (together the February Filings).

The magistrate judge recommended that Boyd’s November Motions and February

Filings be denied on June 2. All reasonably expected filings were submitted by June

16. The district court finally adopted the report and recommendation on August 24.

After the district court denied Boyd’s motion to dismiss the indictment for violation

'The Honorable Jeffrey L. Viken, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota, now retired, issued the continuance. The Honorable Karen E.

Schreier, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota, denied the

motion to dismiss for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. The Honorable Daneta

Wollmann, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of South Dakota, denied

the motion to sever. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The Honorable James M.

Moody, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas, sitting

by designation, overruled Boyd’s objection to Magistrate Judge Wollmann’s denial

and presided over trial and sentencing.

J.

of his Speedy Trial Act rights and motion to sever the firearm counts from the drug

conspiracy count, the case went to trial where the jury heard evidence that Boyd

possessed multiple firearms, with ammunition, and used them during the drug

conspiracy.

The Speedy Trial Act “requires that trial begin within 70 days after a

defendant is charged or makes an initial appearance.” United States v. Lucas, 499

F.3d 769, 782 (8th Cir. 2007) (en banc). But certain periods of delay “shall be

excluded” from the speedy trial calculation. § 3161(h). So the speedy trial clock

runs only if none of § 3161(h)’s eight enumerated exclusions apply. See Bloate v.

United States, 559 U.S. 196, 206-07 (2010). “In the context of Speedy Trial Act

rulings, we review a district court’s legal conclusions de novo, its factual findings

for clear error, and its ultimate determination for an abuse of discretion.” Lucas, 499

F.3d at 782.

Everyone agrees that 54 days accrued to Boyd’s speedy trial clock, but Boyd

insists that an additional 39 days accrued between June 17, when the report and

recommendation for the February Motions was “under advisement,” and August 24,

when the court decided the motions. § 3161(h)(1)(H); see also Henderson v. United

States, 476 U.S. 321, 329 (1986) (stating a motion is under advisement after “the

court receives all the papers it reasonably expects”); Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(a)(1)(A).

He argues that § 3161(h)(1)(H) is limited to 30 days and that no other exclusion

could apply. Under Boyd’s theory, after the 30 excludable days expired, 39 days

ran.

The question then is whether the district court validly issued its ends of justice

continuance on November 7 because if it did, the 39 days are excludable. See

§ 3161(h) (flush language). For an ends of justice continuance to be proper under

that text order, the district court “must ‘set forth, in the record of the case, either

orally or in writing, its reasons’ for finding that the ends of justice are served and

they outweigh other interests.” United States v. Johnson, 990 F.3d 661, 667 (8th

Cir. 2021) (cleaned up) (quoting Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 506 (2006)

-3-

(quoting § 3161(h)(7)(A))). The findings don’t need to be made when the district

court issues the continuance but must be “on the record by the time a district court

tules on a defendant’s motion to dismiss under § 3162(a)(2).” Zedner, 547 U.S. at

507. There is a non-exhaustive list of factors it must consider when granting an ends

of justice continuance. § 3161(h)(7)(B).

Boyd argues that the district court’s on-record findings were not enough to

support its sua sponte continuance. While he concedes that the district court is not

required to make “extensive elaboration[s],” United States v. Bonilla-Filomeno, 579

F.3d 852, 857 (8th Cir. 2009), he emphasizes the statute requires on the record

findings, § 3161(h)(7)(A). And he argues that neither the one sentence text order

nor the order denying his motion to dismiss the indictment explains the court’s

reasoning. See § 3161(h)(7)(B) (listing required considerations).

The text order is short. But when we consider the record within which the

continuance was granted, we understand the reasons for the continuance. See United

States v. Fogg, 922 F.3d 389, 392 (8th Cir. 2019) (upholding a short ends of justice

continuance after examining the record in which it was issued); United States v.

Villarreal, 707 F.3d 942, 954-55 (8th Cir. 2013) (same). The November Motions

were factually complex, and the text order tells us that the district court granted the

continuance so that those motions could be resolved. See § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii)

(requiring the court to consider complexity). The record also reveals that witness

issues caused the hearing on the motions to be delayed, and when it was finally held,

Boyd asked for more briefing, which led to the February Filings. When considered

in this context, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred when it found that

the ends of justice would be served by a continuance. And we hold the district court

did not abuse its discretion by granting the continuance and denying the motion to

dismiss.”

*Because the ends of justice continuance was tied to the resolution of the

November Motions and the district court acted with reasonable diligence in

addressing the combined motions, we do not address the “open-ended continuance”

arguments.

_4-

Boyd next argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to sever

the drug charge from the firearm charges. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a), 14(a). We can

reverse the denial of a motion to sever only if “the defendant shows an abuse of

discretion resulting in severe prejudice.” United States v. Geddes, 844 F.3d 983,

988 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). But “[a] defendant cannot show prejudice

when evidence of the joined offense would be properly admissible in a separate trial

for the other crime.” Jd. (citation omitted). The guns and ammunition were found

within Boyd’s constructive possession, within the drug conspiracy’s time frame, at

or near where Boyd had methamphetamine, so they would be admissible under

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) as evidence of “a plan to possess and distribute

drugs” given the charges are temporally connected. United States v. Boyd, 180 F.3d

967, 982 (8th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); see also id. at 982-83; Fed. R. Evid.

404(b). Similarly, evidence of the drugs in a separate gun case would be admissible

under the same rule to prove knowing possession. See Boyd, 180 F.3d at 982-83;

see also United States v. Jones, 880 F.2d 55, 61-62 (8th Cir. 1989). Because the

guns and drugs would be admissible in separate gun and drug trials, there was no

prejudice.

Affirmed.