Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Willie Frank Gordon, Petitioner v. United States

No. 25-___

Supreme Court of the United States

───────

WILLIE FRANK GORDON, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

───────

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

───────

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

───────

BENJAMIN JAMES STEVENSON

Appointed Counsel of Record

Stevenson Legal, PLLC

919 Panferio Drive

Pensacola Beach, FL 32561

T. 702.306.6708

bjs@stevenson-legal.com

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Sheriff’s deputies suspected a driver had drugs, stopped him, and wanted to

search his car to find them. Only when their attempt to establish probable cause for

the search failed did they decide to impound the car. Does the Fourth Amendment

forbid an impound (and resulting inventory search) primarily motivated by an

investigative purpose?

2. Although a sheriff’s policy did not authorize deputies to impound a car from

private property, the deputies did so purportedly to protect it from vandalism and

theft. Does the Fourth Amendment forbid the impound and the resulting inventory

search?

(I)

II

PARTIES INVOLVED

The caption contains the names of all the parties.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court (N.D. Fla.):

United States v. Gordon, No. 3:22-cr-43 (Sept. 18, 2024)

United States Court of Appeals (11th Cir.):

United States v. Gordon, No. 24-13035 (July 29, 2025)

III

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinions Below .............................................................................................................. 1

Jurisdiction .................................................................................................................... 1

Constitutional Provisions Involved ............................................................................... 2

Statement ....................................................................................................................... 2

Facts .......................................................................................................................... 2

Proceedings below .................................................................................................... 3

Reasons for Granting the Petition ................................................................................ 5

1. The court of appeals’ decision is wrong. ............................................................. 5

1.1. A search conducted for investigative purposes precludes an inventory

search exception. ......................................................................................... 5

1.2. Theft and vandalism justify searching a car once in police custody but do

not justify initially seizing it. ..................................................................... 8

2. The decision below warrants this Court’s review. ........................................... 10

Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 11

Appendix A — Court of appeals opinion .................................................................... a 1

Appendix B — District court order .......................................................................... a 10

Appendix C — Circuit court order denying panel rehearing .................................. a 20

Appendix D — Sheriff’s Impound Policy.................................................................. a 21

IV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) ....................................................................... 5

Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) ................................. 10

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) ................................................ 7

City of Los Angeles, Calif. v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409 (2015) .......................................... 7

Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) .......................................................... 5, 6, 9

Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013) .................................................................... 7

New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) ................................................................. 6

United States v. Duguay, 93 F.3d 346 (7th Cir. 1996) ..................................... 10, 11

United States v. Kanatzar, 370 F.3d 810 (8th Cir. 2004) ....................................... 11

United States v. McKinnon, 681 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2012) ..................................... 11

United States v. Ramos, 88 F.4th 862 (10th Cir. 2023) ........................................... 7

United States v. Roberson, 897 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir. 1990) ................................. 4, 7

United States v. Rogers, 97 F.4th 1038 (6th Cir. 2024) ......................................... 11

United States v. Staller, 616 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1980) ......................................... 10

United States v. Venezia, 995 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2021) ..................................... 11

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) ....................................................... 2, 6

Supreme Court of the United States

───────

No. 25-___

WILLIE FRANK GORDON, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

───────

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

───────

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

───────

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App. A, infra, 1a et seq.) was not reported but

is available at 2025 WL 2112464. Neither its opinion denying panel rehearing

(App. C, infra, 20a et seq.) nor the district court’s order (App. B, infra, 10a et seq.) was

reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on July 29, 2025 (App. A.,

infra, 1a). A petition for rehearing was denied on August 26, 2025. (App. C.,

infra, 20a). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1), this Court has jurisdiction.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place

to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

STATEMENT

Facts

The Escambia County, Florida, Sheriff’s deputies stopped Willie Gordon’s car to

search him. He was a target of the gun crimes unit. The deputies suspected he had

drugs he was trying to sell. See App. B, infra, 10a, n.1. They had surveilled

Mr. Gordon at his hotel residence. Later, across town, the deputies, in four cruisers,

caught up with Mr. Gordon. They had run his driver’s license and retrieved his

profile. They were after Mr. Gordon, not the car’s unknown registered owner. To

effect the search, Deputy Owens pulled Mr. Gordon over ostensibly for a seatbelt

violation. Because the motivation for a traffic stop is immaterial, pulling Mr. Gordon

over was lawful. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Yet that does not

mean the deputies were not looking for drugs. They were.

The deputies’ investigative purpose became material after they stopped

Mr. Gordon and began devising a justification to search the car. At that point, as this

Court acknowledges in Whren, 517 U.S. at 811, the motivation for an inventory search

is “significant.” The deputies continued to exhibit their intent to search the car for

investigative purposes. They requested a K-9 unit and peered into the car for

3

contraband in plain view to develop probable cause for an investigatory search. They

were unsuccessful.

After arresting Mr. Gordon for driving without a license, the deputies explored

arrangements for the car. The car’s owner was in jail and could not retrieve it. The

car was in a shopping mall’s parking lot, where they stopped him. The sheriff’s

impound policy did not authorize impounding the car from this private property.

Policy § 581.1(1), App. D, infra, 21a. Yet without an impound, they had no reason to

search the car.

By 6:03 p.m., the deputies had concluded that no authorized person was available

to retrieve the car. Yet they did not call for a wrecker or begin an inventory search.

Instead, the deputies resumed their efforts to develop probable cause to search the

car. They searched the driver’s compartment of the car without success. Only when

they concluded they had no probable cause to justify a full search of the car—and they

were left with no other options to accomplish their investigative goal from the start—

did they resort to an inventory search at 6:12 p.m.

The deputies justified impounding the car and subsequently searching it because

it was in a high-crime area. They seized the car on private property purportedly to

protect it from vandalism and theft. During the search following the car’s seizure,

they discovered methamphetamine and a firearm.

Proceedings below

A grand jury indicted Mr. Gordon for possession with intent to distribute

methamphetamine and for gun offenses. Mr. Gordon moved to suppress the evidence

4

discovered in his car during the warrantless search in violation of the Fourth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The district denied the motion. App. B, infra,

10a et seq. Mr. Gordon proceeded to trial and was convicted. The district court had

jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.

Mr. Gordon appealed. The circuit court of appeals upheld the search under the

inventory search exception. It reasoned that the deputies had the authority to

impound the car for safekeeping. Infra, 6a. The sheriff’s impound policy authorizes

impounding a car on public property when its owner is unavailable to retrieve it.

Infra, 7a. The policy directs deputies to prepare paperwork when a car is “towed for

safekeeping.” Id. Furthermore, the circuit court ruled that the deputies’ expectation

of finding drugs “did not ‘vitiate’ their inventory search” because the impound was

“otherwise valid.” Infra, 9a (quoting United States v. Roberson, 897 F.2d 1092, 1096

(11th Cir. 1990)).

Mr. Gordon sought rehearing. He argued that the sheriff’s policy did not authorize

impoundment from “private property, including shopping centers.” See Policy

§ 581.4(1)(a), App. D, infra, 24a. Instructions to prepare paperwork after

impoundment did not constitute authorization for the impound. See Policy, § 581.6

infra, 25a. More fundamentally, the deputies did not simply expect to find drugs,

their primary motivation for stopping Mr. Gordon, impounding his car, and searching

it was to fulfill the investigative purpose they had from the outset.

The circuit court rejected Mr. Gordon’s request for panel rehearing. App. C, infra,

20a et seq.

5

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The Eleventh Circuit erred by holding that the sheriff’s deputies may impound

and search a car when the impound would safeguard the car from vandalism and

theft, regardless of evidence of their true investigative purpose. This renders

meaningless this Court’s repeated rulings that the police’s goal matters for an

inventory search exception and that the police may not circumvent the probable cause

requirement when hunting for incriminating evidence. Furthermore, the decision

below wrongly ruled that the police may seize a car to protect it when that reason

only justifies the search after the car is already in police custody. The decision below

conflicts with this Court’s decisions and a decision from another court of appeals.

This Court should grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and reverse.

1.

The court of appeals’ decision is wrong.

Warrantless seizures and searches are “per se unreasonable,” “subject only to a

few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Arizona v. Gant, 556

U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quotation omitted)). A vehicle impound and inventory search is

one exception. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987). Yet for two reasons, the

Eleventh Circuit erred in applying it here.

1.1. A search conducted for investigative purposes precludes an

inventory search exception.

The police may constitutionally impound and search a car in the absence of

probable cause when performing a community caretaking function. Bertine, 479 U.S.

at 371 (“The standard of probable cause is peculiarly related to criminal

investigations” but “unhelpful when analysis centers [on] caretaking functions.”

6

(cleaned up)). The police may seize cars from public roads to facilitate traffic flow and

public safety. S. Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368–69 (1976). And once cars are

in custody, the police may safeguard them and their contents from vandalism and

theft. Id. at 369. Searching and inventorying seized cars arise from the police officers’

custodial responsibilities.

At the same time, the “exemption from the need for probable cause (and warrant)”

does not extend to impounds and searches conducted for investigative purposes.

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811–12 (1996). The police’s primary purpose

determines whether the exception applies. The impound decision and the resulting

inventory search must be based on “something other than suspicion of evidence of

criminal activity.” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375. The impound cannot be “a ruse” “to

discover incriminating evidence.” Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990). Thus, when

community caretaking is a pretext to conceal an investigative search, probable cause

or some other exception is required.

When applying the inventory search exception, this Court has consistently

“thought [] significant,” Whren, 517 U.S. at 811, the lack of “bad faith,” Bertine, 479

U.S. at 375, a lack of a “showing” of intent to pretextually “investigate suspected

criminal activity,” New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716–717, n.27 (1987), and the

absence of a suggestion that the search was “a pretext concealing an investigatory

police motive,” Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376. Bad faith and pretext matter even when

inventory searches are otherwise valid. Although a standardized policy may permit

the impound, a pretextual reason makes the search unconstitutional. See United

7

States v. Ramos, 88 F.4th 862, 867–68 (10th Cir. 2023). That’s because the warrant

exception that allows the impoundment and search for a community-caretaking

purpose cannot justify a search for a criminal investigation purpose.

The court of appeals departed from this principle. When confronted with evidence

that the sheriff’s deputies impounded and searched the car for an investigative

purpose, App. A, infra 8a, the court nevertheless concluded that this purpose was

immaterial, App. A, infra, 9a. It ruled that “any expectation the officers had of finding

evidence in the vehicle did not ‘vitiate’ their inventory search because it was

otherwise valid.” Id. (quoting United States v. Roberson, 897 F.2d 1092, 1096 (11th

Cir. 1990)). Of course, simply because the police anticipate finding contraband does

not make a good-faith impound decision for community caretaking unconstitutional.

Yet a pretextual purpose is more than mere expectation.

To distinguish circumstances in which law enforcement may seize and search

without probable cause, this Court inquires whether “the primary purpose was to

detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,

531 U.S. 32, 38 (2000). See also City of Los Angeles, Calif. v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 420

(2015) (ruling that the “primary purpose” of searches justified without probable cause

must be “distinguishable from the general interest in crime control”) (quoting

Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44); Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 467–68 (2013) (Scalia, J,

dissenting) (arguing that only when the primary purpose of a search is for something

other than criminal investigation should the Court disregard probable cause, because

the “closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches”

8

“has never included searches designed to serve “the normal need for law

enforcement”) (quotations omitted).

Here, the Eleventh Circuit rejected as immaterial the evidence that the sheriff’s

deputies targeted Mr. Gordon, stopped his car to search for drugs, and continued their

attempt to develop probable cause to justify their investigative search well after it

was clear no acceptable person could retrieve the car. (The court of appeals only

addressed the inventory procedure, which was never at issue.) In its view, the

deputies’ motivations were immaterial because the impoundment was otherwise

valid. This eviscerates this Court’s crucial limitation on inventory searches that

suspend the requirement for probable cause only when the impoundment’s purpose

is not a pretext for an investigative search.

The purpose of an impound and search is constitutionally material. The court of

appeals erred by ignoring it.

1.2. Theft and vandalism justify searching a car once in police

custody but do not justify initially seizing it.

The court of appeals found that the sheriff’s policy and other “circumstances”

authorized the deputies to impound Mr. Gordon’s car. App. A, infra, 8a. The policy

plainly does not apply. The court of appeals erred in concluding that vandalism and

theft could justify not only searching the car after it is seized but also seizing it in the

first place.

Everyone agrees that the sheriff’s deputies stopped Mr. Gordon’s car on private

property. It was in a “shopping center parking lot.” App. A, infra, 2a. Incongruently,

9

the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the sheriff’s policy authorized the deputies to

impound the car from public property. App. A, infra, 7a (citing the Policy, § 581.1(1),

App. D, infra, 21a). Plainly, if the deputies had to comply with the sheriff’s “standard

criteria” for impound, Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375, and Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376, they

could not rely on the directive to tow the car from public property because the car was

on private property. So the Eleventh Circuit searched beyond the policy for impound

authorization.

The constitutionality of a seizure ultimately turns on its reasonableness. Fairly, a

departmental policy may not supply the exclusive authority. This Court teaches that

the police may seize cars from public roads to facilitate traffic flow and public safety.

Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368–69. And once cars are in custody, the police may

safeguard them and their contents from vandalism and theft. Id. at 369. Searching

and inventorying seized cars fall within their custodial responsibility.

Nevertheless, the justification for the seizure differs from the justification for the

search. Public safety and conveyance justify the impound. Protecting a car and its

contents from damage justifies the search. The “police [are] potentially responsible

for the property taken into their custody,” and knowing what they possess allows

them to protect the car, themselves, and others. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 373; see also

Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369–71. Yet because the police have no general obligation to

protect private property before they assume custody, protecting a car from vandalism

and theft in their custody cannot justify taking custody of the car.

10

The court of appeals departed from this principle. It reasoned that the sheriff’s

deputies were justified in seizing the car because once it was in their custody, they

could protect it. Under this circular reasoning, for example, they may impound and

search any car parked in a high-crime area. After all, those cars may be better

protected in police custody, so the police may seize them to protect them and protect

them because they seized them. This is a solution in search of a problem.

Custodial responsibilities do not justify custody. Instead, the seizure of a car

permitted the deputies to search it. Without a reason to impound a car, no inventory

was necessary, and no inventory search exception could apply.

The court of appeals erred by ruling that the sheriff’s deputies were authorized to

impound the car to protect it from vandalism and theft. That only became their

responsibility after they seized the car.

2.

The decision below warrants this Court’s review.

The decision below also warrants review because it conflicts with United States v.

Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 352 (7th Cir. 1996). The Eleventh Circuit ruled that the sheriff’s

deputies’ decision to impound the car was justified because “leaving the car in the

parking lot in a high-crime area would create an ‘appreciable risk’ of damage to the

vehicle.” App. A, infra, 8a (quoting United States v. Staller, 616 F.2d 1284, 1290 (5th

Cir. 1980) 1). That is, the deputies could seize the car because once they seized it, they

1 All decisions rendered by the Fifth Circuit before the close of business on September 30, 1981,

are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th

Cir. 1981) (en banc).

11

could fulfill their custodial responsibilities to protect it. Other circuit courts align

with the Eleventh Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. McKinnon, 681 F.3d 203, 208

(5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Kanatzar, 370 F.3d 810, 813 (8th Cir. 2004); United

States v. Venezia, 995 F.3d 1170, 1180 (10th Cir. 2021). Yet the Seventh Circuit

reached a different conclusion.

The Seventh Circuit found that the justifications for impound and the subsequent

search were “distinct.” Duguay, 93 F.3d at 352. Although protecting the car from

vandalism and theft may support searching it once in custody, it does “not establish

the a priori legitimacy of the seizure.” Id. The “police do not owe a duty to the general

public to remove vulnerable automobiles from high-crime neighborhoods.” Id. That

duty only arises once they seize a car. Thus, protecting the car cannot justify seizing

it in the first place. In dissent, judges from other courts of appeals agreed with

Duguay. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 97 F.4th 1038, 1048 (6th Cir. 2024)

(Stranch, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Duguay).

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

NOVEMBER 18, 2025

BENJAMIN JAMES STEVENSON

Appointed Counsel of Record