Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Rick Negrette, Petitioner v. Phu V. Pham, et al.

i\ .•-

*

IK®

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

RICK R. NEGRETE -Pro Se Petitioner

FILED

OCT 1 h 2025

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT. U.S.

PHU V. PHAM ET AL—Respondent(S)

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari of the

United States Court ofAppeals

for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

RICK R. NEGRETE

39520 Murrieta Hot Springs Road

Suite 219-83

Murrieta, CA 92563

951-532-5211

I

*

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The following issues are to be respectfully presented before this right honorable court:

In addition to those listed below, two main issues arise before this right honorable court,

•

The lower court had the absolute right under the law and that of U.S.C, § 110 to lower

any fines, fees levied on the pro se petitioner as the law states “may issue,”

•

Any fines and fees levied on the pro se petitioner should be weighed against the ability

of said petitioner’s ability to pay said fines, fees,

•

ANY and all matters pertaining to the failure of the petitioner to sign off on a bankruptcy

form could had easily be cured via an amended complaint; saved the taxpayers the tens of

thousands of dollars avoiding all this needless time and expense.

•

In addition;

1. The lack of any prior incidences, history of alleged said conduct, that this was the

first (and only) time that the appellant had been before this, or any bankruptcy

court regarding this matter, having no other prior history or alleged involvement

with the alleged subject matter.

2. That the court refused to case law cited by the appellant that substantiates setting

a lower fine amount, the inability of the defendant to pay the fines, fees requested

by the trustee.

3. That the appellant shut down the alleged Google ad shortly after this matter was

brought before him,

i

4. That the appellant was fully willing to do what it took to remedy this matter in the

most favorable way possible.

5. That the appellant, being on full California public assistance, averaging a weekly

earnings of $300.00 a week, would be unable to pay the $12,000.00 proposed by

the Trustee’s office or pay any portion of..

6. That it would financially ruin the appellant, subject him to financial ruin, leave

him with no choice but to file for Bankruptcy knowing that the $12,000.00 fine is

not subject to discharge.

ii

LIST OF PARTIES

All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of all parties to the

proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this petition is as follows:

•

Phu V. Pham; 3446 Bryce Canyon Way Perris, CA 92570

•

Everett L. Green; Office of the United States Trustee

3801 University Avenue Suite 720

Riverside, CA 92501

•

Leslie A. Skorheim’ Office of the United States Trustee Southern Division

411 West 4th Street Suite 7160

Santa Ana, CA 92701

•

Nancy S. Goldenberg United States Trustee Office

411 West Fourth Street Suite 7160

Santa Ana, CA 92701

•

Peter C. Anderson U.S. Trustee

3801 University Avenue Suite 720

Riverside, CA 92501

iii

RELATED CASES

•

6:22-bk-14570-RB Phu Van Pham

Case type: bk Chapter: 7 Asset: No Vol: v Judge: Magdalena Reyes

Bordeaux

• 5:23-cv-01732-RGKIn Re PhuV. Pham

I

R. Gary Klausner, presiding

Date filed: 08/25/2023I

L.............. ............................................

Date terminated: 01/05/2024

Date of last filing: 08/12/2025

• Court of Appeals Docket #: 24-1053

Nature of Suit: 3422 Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158

Negrette v. Pham, et al.

Appeal From: Riverside, Central California

iv

X

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED...................................................................................... i

LIST OF PARTIES................................................................................................... iii

RELATED CASES................................................................................................... iv

I.

PETITION FOR WRITOFCERTIORARI............. ’.............................. 1

II.

OPINIONS BELOW........................................................................... 1

III.

JURISDICTION................................................................................. 1

IV.

STATUATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED......................................... 2

V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE............................................................. 2

VI.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT........................................... 3

A. Statement of the Issues......................................................................... 2

B. Standards for Review For Lower Court................................................. 4

VII.

Summary of Argument.......................................................................... 6

VIII.

Argument.............................................................

7

A. Defendant Has no History with the Trustee’s Office, Being in Front

of the Bankruptcy Court for Allegations of Violation of 11 U.S.C. §110.............. 7.

B. The Bankruptcy Court Judge refused to consider statements, case law

provided, contained within defendant’s response, verbal testimony..................... 8

C. Defendant is on Public Assistance,........................................................ 9

D. THE COURT DOES HAVE DISCRETION TO LOWER,

WAIVE FEES AND FINES BASED UPON THE ABILITY OF

THE DEFENDANT TO PAY.......................................................................... 11

v

E. The Fine Ordered by the Bankruptcy Court of $ 12,000.00 Would

Financially Ruin the Appellant, Subject Him to Financial Ruin, Leave

Him With no Choice but to File for Bankruptcy.................................................... 13

IX.

CONCLUSION......................................................................................... 16

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A; MEMORANDUM AFFIRMING LOWER COURTS DECISION

APPENXIB; ORDER DENYING THE REQUEST TO STAY THE MANDATE

APPENDIX C; MANDATE ENTERED ON AUGUST 12™ 2025

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

(Adams v. Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 113, 284 Cal.Rptr. 318, 813 P.2d 134).............. 9

Bajakaiian, 524 U.S, at335-36, 118 S.Ct, at2037.....................................................8,11

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).............................................. 4

Briones-Coroy, 481 B.R. at 716—17.......................

7,12

City and Cntv. ofSan Francisco v. Sainez, 77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1322 (2000).................... 11

Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972)....................................................................................... .4

Diehl v. Franklin, D.N.J.1993, 826 F.Supp. 874 .............................

9

C

A

Dodd Insurances Services, Inc, v. Royal Insurance Co, Of America, 935 F.2d 1152,1160 (10th

Cir. 1991)

Erickson y. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,94 (2007)

.............................. 4

Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147,1151 (4th Cir, 1978).......................................................... 4

Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980)

4

In re Bodrick _2016)

6 10

In re Hazlett 2019 WL 1567751, 5, Bkrtcy.D.Utah

6

In re Hernandez, .(Oct. 31, 2011) ........................................................................................ 6

In re Johnson 2016 WL 11271937, 4, Bkrtcy.S.D.Ill

7

In re Monson (Nov.2014)

6

In re Sanchez” 2011

In re S.B. (2009)..................................................................................................................... 5

Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (App. 5 Dist. 2001)

5

Liberty Nat’l Enters, v. Ambanc La Mesa L.P (9th Cir. 1997)

5

Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, § 308(a), as amended, 16 U.S.C.A. §

1858(a)

McDow v. Mayton, 319 B.R, 601, 607-08 (E.D.Va.2007)

10

People v. Duenas, January 8th, 2019.............................. . .....................................................9

Pimentel v. City of Los Angeles(2015)

10

R.J. Reynolds, 37 Cal. 4th at 728

]j

Rojero, 399 B.R. at 921,

12

Sanchez, 446 B.R. at 540

6

United States v. Antonio Bugatti [67156-1121]

12

vii

United States v. Gear (2016)................................................................................................12

United States v. Levesque, 546 F.3d 78, 83-84 (1st Cir. 2008)........................................... 11

United States v. Me Connery, 728 F.2d 1195, 1200-02 (9th Cir. 1984)............................... 5

United States v. Stewart(2016)..........................................................................................12

United States v. Topilina (2015).......................................................................................... 12

White v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 499, 502 (10th Cir. 1992).................................... 6

STATUTES

5,7,13,15

11U.S.C. §110

11 U.S.C§ 110(l)(l)............................................................................................................ 7,11

§ 110(b)-(h), § 110(l)(l)..................................................................................................... 7,12

§ 110(D(2)(D)....................................................................................................................... 12

16U.S.C.A, § 1858(a).......................................................................................................... 9

18 U.SC. 83612(f)(3)(A)..............................................

12

18U.S.C. 83612(g)............................................................................................................. 12

United States Constitution and the California Constitution.4 ( **277 U.S. Const. 14th Amend.;

Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.)........................................................................................................ 9

RULES

§ 904.108 Factors considered in assessing civil penalties, addresses assessing fines and fees

based upon the ability of the defendant to pay................................................................... 2,8

Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, § 308(a), as amended, 16 U.S.C.A. §

1858(a)................................................................................................................................... 6

viii

£

I. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Rick R. Negrette petitions the Court for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

II. OPINIONS BELOW

The Ninth Circuit’s unpublished opinion affirming the lower court’s decision against the

petitioner, attached as Appendix 1. The district court’s order denying Petitioner’s motion is

unreported, and attached as Appendix 2.

III. JURISDICTION

The Ninth Circuit entered judgment on July 17th 2025. See Appendix 1. This petition is

timely filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 13.1. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1254(1).

1

IV. STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

§ 904.108 Factors considered in assessing civil penalties, addresses assessing fines and fees

based upon the ability of the defendant to pay. It states;

Factors to be taken into account in assessing a civil penalty, depending upon the statute in

•

question, may include the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the alleged violation; the

respondent's degree of culpability, any history of prior violations, and ability to pay; and such

other matters as justice may require.

/

in consideration of a respondent's ability to pay, increase or decrease a civil penalty from

an amount that would otherwise be warranted by the other relevant factors. A civil penalty may

be increased if a respondent's ability to pay is such that a higher civil penalty is necessary to

deter future violations, or for commercial violators, to make a civil penalty more than a cost of

doing business. A civil penalty may be decreased if the respondent establishes that he or she is

unable to pay an otherwise appropriate civil penalty amount.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner Ricky Rene Negrette, hereinafter (Petitioner) respectfully submits this Petition

for a Writ of Certiorari with the upmost honor and respect. Having the highest esteem for THE

highest court in the land, and knowing that it is an honor to have this right honorable court

affording myself the opportunity for certiorari, It is indeed hoped and this court will fully address

the issues presented within this petition and that this honorable court will somewhat take some

2

2.

That the court refused to case law cited by the appellant that substantiates setting a lower

fine amount, the inability of the defendant to pay the fines, fees requested by the trustee.

3.

That the appellant shut down the alleged Google ad shortly after this matter was brought

before him,

4.

That the appellant was fully willing to do what it took to remedy this matter in the most

favorable way possible.

5.

That the appellant, being on full California public assistance, having been terminated

from his position with North County Ford, would be unable to pay the $12,000.00 proposed by

the Trustee’s office or pay any portion of..

6.

That it would financially ruin the appellant, subject him to financial ruin, leave him with

no choice but to file for Bankruptcy knowing that the $12,000.00 fine is not subject to discharge.

B.

Standards of Review

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made

of the pro se notice of appeal. This court is required to liberally construe pro se pleadings.

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,94 (2007). Such pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent

standard than those drafted by attorneys, id.; Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.

1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro

se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S.

5, 9 (1980); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiffs

allegations are assumed to be true. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)).

4

When this Court reviews a decision of the bankruptcy court, it reviews the factual

findings for clear error and the legal conclusion de novo. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013; Liberty Nat’l

Enters, v. Ambanc La Mesa L.P. (In re Ambanc La Mesa L.P.), 115 F.3d 650,653 (9th Cir. 1997;

United States v. Me Connery, 728 F.2d 1195,1200-02 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc).

Where findings of fact are challenged on a civil appeal, the appellate court is bound by

the elementary, but often overlooked principle of law, that the power of an appellate court begins

and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or

uncontradicted, to support the findings below; the court must therefore view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference

and resolving all conflicts in its favor. Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (App. 5 Dist. 2001) 108

Cal.Rptr.2d 34, 89 Cal.App.4th 959, review denied. 3458; 3460; 3936,Review of findings is

normally obtained by appeal from the ensuing judgment or order. In re S.B. (2009) 94

Cal.Rptr.3d 24, 46 Cal.4th 529,207 P.3d 525. 3401

On July 25th, 2023, this court held a hearing per the trustee’s motion for disgorgement of

fees pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 110, (Doc. No. 54). Appellant Rick R. Negrette submitted a brief in

support of denial of trustee’s motion, served trustee with said motion, and argued against trustees

motion for fines, fees, denial of trustees motion. Appellant Negrette also argued that he is on

Medical and Calffesh, (was at the time) making an average of $300.00 a week, that he was and

would be unable to pay the full, requested amount of $12,000.00, and that this court had

discretion to lower fines and fees based upon the inability to pay.

This court found in favor of the trustee’s motion and ordered appellant Negrette to pay a

total of $12,000.00. Appellant Negrette then proceeded to verbally request a stay, only to have

this court ignore his request and move on to the next case.

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Appellant Negrette testified that he had never been in front of this court before at all,

regarding this or any other related subject matter, accusation, implication of a “bankruptcy

petitioner.” Appellant also testified that this was a one-time occurrence based upon the death of

Mr. Pham’s wife, that he had never before sold himself as a “BPP” nor had he sold himself as a

Bankruptcy professional, This was a first time, one time, occurrence that did not warrant penalty

and fines totaling $12,000.00. Appellant Negrette cited valid, non-flagged, cases that fined those

found in violations thousands less citing judges in those respective cases, stating that courts DID

have discretion to award less than the maximum fine. Sanchez, 446 B.R. at 540; see also In re

Hernandez, No. 10^11290 SBB, 2011 WL 5239238, at *12 (Bankr.D.Colo. Oct. 31,2011) The

factors courts have examined to determine the appropriate amount of a fine include the nature of

the violations and whether the bankruptcy petition preparer had previously been before the court

to answer for violations of § 110. Sanchez, 446 B.R. at 540; as cited in, In re Monson, United

States Bankruptcy Court, D. Utah. November 24, 2014522 B.R. 340.

In issuing sanctions, applicable law requires the Court to exercise its discretion to impose

measured and tempered sanctions. Typically, sanctions are not intended to be compensatory.

Rather the Court is required to impose the “ ‘minimum that will serve to adequately deter the

undesirable behavior.’ ” White v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 499, 502 (10th

Cir.l992)(Emphasis in original), quoting. White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 669, 685

(10th Cir, 1990). One of the other factors that the Court must consider is the ability of the

sanctioned party to pay the sanctions imposed. Dodd Insurances Services, Inc. v. Royal

Insurance Co. Of America, 935 F.2d 1152,1160 (10th Cir. 1991). However, the burden of proving

such an inability lies with the sanctioned party. Id; see In re Hazlett 2019 WL 1567751, 5,

6

Bkrtcy.D.Utah; In re Johnson 2016 WL 11271937,4, Bkrtcy.S.D.Ill. In the courts determination

of sanctions (In re Brodrick 04/14/2016,) “Burton could be fined up to $500 for each of her

dozens of violations of § 110(b)-(h), § 110(l)(l), and the total fine pursuant to § 110(l)(l) would

be tripled because Burton prepared documents without disclosing her involvement, §

110(l)(2)(D).8 Nevertheless, the court will decline to impose sanctions to the full extent allowed

by § 110.9 See Briones-Coroy, 481 B.R. at 716—17 (considering reasonableness, deterrence,

ability to pay, and other factors and concluding that fining a BPP for every individual violation

was not a wise exercise of discretion).”

ARGUMENT

A. Appellant Has no History with the Trustee’s Office, Being in Front of the Bankruptcy

Court for Allegations of Violation of 11 U.S.C. §110.

As so addressed and contain within appellant’s initial response to trustees’ motion for

disgorgement motion, appellant has no prior history of anything related to said violation(s),

being notified by the trustees office for alleged said violation(s) of, been before the honorable

court regarding violation(s) of. As addressed, this is the first and indeed last time appellant will

have to address allegations of violations of the above titled statute.

As stated and addressed to the honorable court via his response motion and testimony,

appellant solely accepted the petitioner’s request for assistance after the passing. The petitioner

asked THREE-FOUR times for assistance with his pending bankruptcy petition only to have

appellant refuse each and every time, stating that he was not a bankruptcy preparer and that he

should find someone who is certified to do so. After agreeing to offer some, limited typing

7

assistance, appellant did offer to submit the petitioner’s BK petition as a curtesy since the

petitioner had been involved making arrangements for his late wife’s funeral. All this was done

SOLELY due to the passing of the petitioner’s wife, never via personal enlistment by appellant,

selling himself as a BPP, never directing the petitioner to any website, business card. And as

stated, the BK petitioner’s original contact to the appellant was to assist with obtaining crash

footage of petitioner’s Tesla; THAT WAS IT. This came via a verbal referral from an UBER

driver, not via a business card or a website.

B.

The Bankruptcy Court Judge refused to consider statements, case law provided,

contained within defendant’s response, verbal testimony.

§ 904.108 Factors considered in assessing civil penalties, addresses assessing fines and fees

based upon the ability of the defendant to pay. It states;

•

Factors to be taken into account in assessing a civil penalty, depending upon the statute in

question, may include the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the alleged violation; the

respondent's degree of culpability, any history of prior violations, and ability to pay; and such

other matters as justice may require.

•

in consideration of a respondent's ability to pay, increase or decrease a civil penalty from

an amount that would otherwise be warranted by the other relevant factors. A civil penalty may

be increased if a respondent's ability to pay is such that a higher civil penalty is necessary to

deter future violations, or for commercial violators, to make a civil penalty more than a cost of

doing business. A civil penalty may be decreased if the respondent establishes that he or she is

unable to pay an otherwise appropriate civil penalty amount.

•

Financial Ability to pay Fine:

8

“A $10,000 penalty imposed on fisherman for violation of Magnuson Fishery Conservation and

Management Act was arbitrary and capricious to the extent that administrative law judge (ALJ),

in determining penalty, failed to rule on fisherman's financial ability to pay penalty.” Magnuson

Fishery Conservation and Management Act, § 308(a), as amended, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1858(a).

Diehl v. Franklin, D.N.J.1993, 826 F.Supp. 874.

People v. Duenas, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7,

California, January 8th, 2019. Duenas goes though great length to discuss and address fines and

fees on those unable to pay, “indigent.” It addresses the issues that defendants face when unable

to pay fines. Fees, “potentially devastating consequences suffered only by indigent persons,” It

goes on to state, “if imposed without a determination that the defendant is able to pay, are thus

fundamentally unfair; imposing these assessments upon indigent defendants without a

determination that they have the present ability to pay violates due process under both the United

States Constitution and the California Constitution.4 ( **277 U.S. Const. 14th Amend.; Cal.

Const., art. I, § 7.)” “The principle that a punitive award must be considered in light of the

defendant's financial condition is ancient.” (Adams v. Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 113, 284

Cal.Rptr. 318,813 P.2d 1348.) The Magna Carta prohibited civil sanctions that were

disproportionate to the offense or that would deprive the wrongdoer of his means of livelihood.

(Ibid}.”

C.

Appellant is on Public Assistance, Having Been Terminated From North County Ford.

Appellant Negrette testified that due to his economic status, earning an average of

$300.00 a week as an Uber Driver and being on full public assistance, he would be unable to pay

anything remote to the $12,000.00 that this court was inclined to order. This was also FULLY

addressed in the defendant’s response brief.

9

1

In “In re Bodrick,” through discussing civil penalties associated with the violation(s) of

section 110 of the Bankruptcy Code, stated, “The total amount of sanctions allowed under § 110

for egregious violations can add up to a significant amount of money. See McDow v. Mayton,

379 B.R. 601,607-08 (E.D.Va.2007) (concluding that a BPP was liable for a maximum sanction

of $45,875 (but only sanctioning the BPP in the total amount of $3375).” In re Bodrick, United

States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. North Carolina, Charlotte Division, Aptil 14th, 2016.

While discussing fines, fees, sanctions, the court stated, “ If the court were so inclined, it

might be able to sanction Burton in a record-setting amount. For example, Burton could be fined

up to $500 for each of her dozens of violations of § 110(b)-(h), § 110(l)(l), and the total fine

pursuant to § 110(l)(l) would be tripled because Burton prepared documents without disclosing

her involvement, § 110(l)(2)(D).8 Nevertheless, the court will decline to impose sanctions to the

full extent allowed by § 110.9 See Briones-Coroy, 481 B.R. at 716—17 (considering

reasonableness, deterrence, ability to pay, and other factors and concluding that fining a BPP for

every individual violation was not a wise exercise of discretion).”

In the McDov v. Mayton decision, weighting the judgement of fines and fees, stated and

chose, to lower the total amount of fines levied stating, “The U.S. Trustee seeks to impose the

maximum potential fine of $43,500 on the Defendant. However, because the Defendant is likely

unable to pay such a fine.” The defendant was fined a total of $3,375.00 in fines and fees.

In Pimentel v. City of Los Angeles, United States District Court, C.D. California.

September 29, 2015, court argued:

“Furthermore, while defendant may be correct that ability to pay is not a factor that plaintiffs

must prove to prevail on their excessive fines claim, it is relevant to the proportionality analysis.

10

See, e.g., Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 335-36,118 S.Ct. at 2037 (discussing precedent requiring that

fines should be “proportioned to the offense and that they should not deprive a wrongdoer of his

livelihood”); United States v. Levesque, 546 F.3d 78, 83-84 (1st Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court

has made it clear that the notion that a forfeiture should not be so great as to deprive a wrongdoer

of his or her livelihood is deeply rooted in the history of the Eighth Amendment.”); cf.

Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 340, n. 15,118 S.Ct. at 2039, n. 15 (not addressing ability to pay because

“Respondent does not argue that his wealth or income are relevant... or that full forfeiture would

deprive him of his livelihood^]” and because “the District Court made no factual findings in this

respect.”). This is especially true under California law, as the California Supreme Court has

stated that it considers “the defendant's ability to pay” a factor in analyzing proportionality under

Bajakajian. See R.J. Reynolds, 37 Cal.4th at 728 (citing with approval City and Cnty. of San

Francisco v. Sainez, 77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1322 (2000) (review denied May 10, 2000), which

found that “we agree, that in the case of fines ... the defendant's ability to pay is a factor under

the Excessive Fines Clause.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That the court may

consider plaintiffs' ability to pay further strengthens the court's conclusion that dismissal at this

stage would be inappropriate;”

D. THE COURT DOES HAVE DISCRETION TO LOWER, WAIVE FEES AND FINES

BASED UPON THE ABILITY OF THE DEFENDANT TO PAY.

As appellant Negrette testified and indeed cited in his testimony, this court does have

discretion to lover, even waive all fines and fees based on the ability to pay. Appellant’s

statements can easily be verified by the trustee’s office. This is not something appellant is proud

of, celebrates. This is sadly the reality of appellant Negrette’s livelihood. The ordered amount of

11

$12,000.00 would devastate the financial status of the defendant, leaving him destitute,

bankruptcy, homeless, broke, out on the streets.

In “In re Sanchez” February 11 2011,, discussing the imposition of fines and fees, the

court stated, “Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 110(1 )(1), the Court may impose a fine of up to $500.00

for each violation. The Court has discretion under this se'ction to determine the amount of the

fine per violation. Rojero, 399 B.R. at 921.

In, United States v. Stewart United States District Court, C.D. California. April 20,2016,

court ruled as follows:

“Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f)(3)(A), interest on the restitution ordered is waived because the

defendant does not have the ability to pay interest. Payments may be subject to penalties for

default and delinquency pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).

All fines are waived as it is found that the defendant does not have the ability to pay a fine in

addition to restitution.”

In, United States v. Antonio Bugatti [67156-1121] United States District Court, C.D.

California .January 23, 201

“Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f)(3)(A), interest on the restitution ordered is waived because the

defendant does not have the ability to pay interest. Payments may be subject to penalties for

default and delinquency pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g). All fines are waived as it is found that

the defendant does not have the ability to pay a fine in addition to restitution; United States v.

Gear United States District Court, C.D. California. November 7,2016; United States v. Topilina

United States District Court, C.D. California .December 30,2015.”

12

So, as it appears via the above citations, THIS court does indeed have discretion to limit,

resolve all fines and fees ordered by this court, against appellant Negrette, yet for reasons

unknown, this court chose not to. As anyone in the legal business knows, Judges do have

discretion to rule accordingly to the merits of, whether a first-time offender if you will, the

ability to pay said fines, fees, with the ability of the court to fully consider the ability of the

defendant to pay.

As it so appears and is evidence through the above cited cases, courts do indeed have the

full invested option of discretion in ruling, ordering, issuing fines, fees, sanctions, despite the

opinion of the ordering court that “its hands are tied,” does not have the ability to order lower

amounts than so cited in 11U.S.C. 110.

E. The Fine Ordered by the Bankruptcy Court of $12,000.00 Would Financially Ruin the

Appellant, Subject Him to Financial Ruin, Leave Him With no Choice but to File for

Bankruptcy.

Appellant has been relying on credit cards and selling his personal belongings to do his

best to get by, while he seeks gainful employment. As so testified via appellant’s response brief,

oral testimony on the 25th of July 2023, His sole base of income is earned via driving for Uber

Eats. Although paid on a weekly basis, appellant averages about $300.00 to $350.00 a week. The

amount greatly varies based upon the availability of deliveries, times of day, days of the week. If

appellant is not on a run, delivery, he does not get paid for sitting around and waiting for a

delivery request. Although appellant submits resumes on a weekly basis, he has only had two

formal interviews, which sadly has not resulted in a job offer. Frankly it is completely

13

embarrassing to have to address the severe lack of sustainable income, the inability to pay his

bills in full, being behind on utilities, having to make arrangements just to keep the lights, on,

water running, gas lit so that he can cook. This is not how anyone should have to live; however,

it is the only thing appellant has going for himself while he constantly continues to seek gainful

employment.

As of the date of this opening brief, appellant has a credit card balance totaling just short

of $35,000.. Having been involved in F&I, appellant knows firsthand how important a solid

FICO score is, knows that late payments, high balance limits weights on one’s credit score, and

has done everything he can to make sure the minimums are paid so that he dies not take a huge

FICO hit; although appellant’s FICO is no longer 780, now due to the high balances, has

dropped to a 630. A solid FICO is everything, it is considered when renting, applying for a job,..

. In addition to, defendant was also informed that the home he is renting is going to be put on the

market, which will result in an eviction, relocation to another residence, which will result in an

expense defendant cannot afford; moving costs, higher monthly rent, higher security deposit,

If appellant was able to accept the $3,900 settlement offer from the Trustee’s office prior

to the hearing, he would had done so. Appellant even tried to secure a few lines of credit only to

be denied sue the high balances, percentage of credit usage on his cards. Appellant is trying his

best to get back into the job market, earn more than $300.00 a week not knowing if he will be

able to evade being out on the street, financial ruin,...

What is troubling about all this is that there are NUMEROUS related cases where BPP’s

took FULL ADVANTAGE of their clients, numerous violations of relates statutes, laws

governing BPP’s, yet they were never held to such a standard via full enforcement of fines and

fees. Judges, justices, knew that a fine of a million dollars for GROSS violations of statutes, as

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would be issued upon said violations, would be beyond the ability of the BPP to pay. 11 U.S.C.

section 110 states “may be fined, “ not shall be fined, allowing judges, justices, DISCRETION,

to rule based upon the ability to pay, Yet here we are.

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CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF

So, it is with the sincere and humble submission of this opening brief, it is so requested

that this court take full consideration of the appellant’s first-time offense, his poverty level

income, his debt, economic hardships, and lower if not fully deny the order of the lower court to

pay in full the $12,000.00

FOR THE REASONS SO ADDRESSED, The petition for a writ of Certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted this 14th day ofLQetnbei_202-5

ick R. Negree, Pro Se Petitioner

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