Petition for Writ of Certiorari — James Maharg, Petitioner v. Connecticut

No. 25In the

Supreme Court of the United States

JAMES MAHARG,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of Connecticut

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Eric Del Pozo

Counsel of Record

Joette K atz

Shipman & Goodwin LLP

One Constitution Plaza

Hartford, CT 06103

(860) 251-5332

edelpozo@goodwin.com

Counsel for the Petitioner

384549

A

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

The erroneous admission over objection of a defendant’s

coerced confession at a criminal trial will require a retrial

unless the reviewing court is “‘able to declare a belief that

[the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295 (1991) (quoting

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Here, in

a bench trial, the court denied the defendant’s motion to

suppress testimony about his alleged murder confession—

given in a hospital emergency room, two hours after he

had collapsed in a seizure in the police barracks, thus

ending a thirteen-hour overnight interrogation that

the trial court separately held to be unconstitutionally

coercive. In convicting the defendant of murder, the trial

court expressly credited the testimony about the hospital

confession, but to that finding dropped a footnote stating

that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt even in the confession’s absence. The trial court

then found the defendant guilty of murder based on all

the evidence presented. The Connecticut Supreme Court

relied on the footnoted disclaimer in concluding that

any constitutional error in admitting the confession into

evidence would have been harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt. The question presented is:

Whether, in a criminal bench trial for murder, a

trial judge who admits over objection a defendant’s

coerced confession to that offense may later insulate the

constitutional error from meaningful appellate review

by issuing a posttrial “finding” that the evidence would

have established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial

conducted without the confession.

ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

State v. Maharg, No. DBD-CR-19-0159438 (Conn.

Super. Ct., Danbury Jud. Dist.) (posttrial judgment of

conviction entered on May 10, 2023)

State v. Maharg, No. SC 20855 (Conn.) (judgment

affirmed on July 8, 2025)

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

RELATED PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

TABLE OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

OPINIONS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS . . . 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

A. Legal Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

B. Factual Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

C. Procedural History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION . . . . 13

I.

The Connecticut Supreme Court’s Decision

Contradicts Several of This Court’s

Precedents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

iv

Table of Contents

Page

II. This Case Presents an Optimal Vehicle for

Examining the Important Question of the

Harmless-Error Standard for Bench Trials . . 19

III. T he C on ne c t ic ut S upr eme C ou r t ’s

H a r m le s sne s s D et e r m i n at ion Wa s

Demonstrably Wrong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

v

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE SUPREME

C OU RT OF C ON N EC T ICU T, FI LED

JULY 8, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a

APPENDIX B — MEMORANDUM OF THE

SUPERIOR COURT, JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF DANBURY, FILED DECEMBER 2, 2022 . . . 32a

APPENDIX C — MEMORANDUM OF THE

SUPERIOR COURT, JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF DANBURY, FILED OCTOBER 31, 2022 . . . . 54a

vi

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Anderson v. Smith,

751 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Arizona v. Fulminante,

499 U.S. 279 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 14-18, 21, 26

Bollenbach v. United States,

326 U.S. 607 (1946) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Chapman v. California,

386 U.S. 18 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3, 5, 13-18, 20, 26, 28

Crane v. Kentucky,

476 U.S. 683 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 22, 23

Delaware v. Van Arsdall,

475 U.S. 673 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 13, 15

Fahy v. Connecticut,

375 U.S. 85 (1963) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 15

Halbert v. Michigan,

545 U.S. 605 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Harrington v. California,

395 U.S. 250 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Harris v. Rivera,

454 U.S. 339 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

vii

Cited Authorities

Page

Jackson v. Denno,

378 U.S. 368 (1964) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Kansas v. Ventris,

556 U.S. 586 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Lockhart v. Fretwell,

506 U.S. 364 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Lockhart v. Nelson,

488 U.S. 33 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Lyons v. Oklahoma,

322 U.S. 596 (1944) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Michaels v. Davis,

144 S. Ct. 914 (2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Mincey v. Arizona,

437 U.S. 385 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Neder v. United States,

527 U.S. 1 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5, 16, 24, 28

Oregon v. Elstad,

470 U.S. 298 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

viii

Cited Authorities

Page

Payne v. Arkansas,

356 U.S. 560 (1958) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 14, 26

Singer v. United States,

380 U.S. 24 (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

State v. Alexander,

343 Conn. 495 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

State v. Golding,

213 Conn. 233 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

State v. Iverson,

352 Conn. 422 (2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

State v. Rasmussen,

225 Conn. 55 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

State v. Tomlin,

266 Conn. 608 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Sullivan v. Louisiana,

508 U.S. 275 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 16, 17

United States v. Hasting,

461 U.S. 499 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 15

United States v. Lee,

618 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

ix

Cited Authorities

Page

United States v. Palin,

874 F.3d 418 (4th Cir. 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

United States v. Poole,

640 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

United States v. Preston,

751 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Williams v. Illinois,

567 U.S. 50 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Yates v. Evatt,

500 U.S. 391 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 17, 24, 26, 29

Constitutional Provisions & Statutes

U.S. Const. amend. V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2, 8

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2, 8

28 U.S.C. § 1257 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-199 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 27

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-155 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 27

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-82 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

x

Cited Authorities

Page

Other Authorities

Alan Hirsch, Confessions and Harmless Error:

A New Argument for the Old Approach,

12 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 1 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Daniel Epps,

Harmless Errors and Substantial Rights,

131 Harv. L. Rev. 2117 (2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Wayne R. LaFave et al.,

Origins of harmless error review,

7 Crim. Proc. § 27.6(a) (4th online ed.) . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,

Harmless Error,

30 J. Legal Stud. 161 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

James Maharg respectfully petitions for a writ of

certiorari to review the judgment of the Connecticut

Supreme Court.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court (Pet.

App. 1a-31a) is reported at 337 A.3d 718 (Conn. 2025). The

relevant opinions of the Connecticut Superior Court (Pet.

App. 32a-53a, 54a-82a) are unreported.

JURISDICTION

The Connecticut Supreme Court entered judgment

on July 8, 2025. Pet. App. 1a. On September 9, 2025, this

Court entered an order extending the deadline for filing

a petition for certiorari until November 20, 2025. This

Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal

case to be a witness against himself . . . .” U.S. Const.

amend. V.

“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S.

Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Legal Background

Under the U.S. Constitution, no person “shall be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against

himself,” U.S. Const. amend. V, “nor shall any State

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law,” id. amend. XIV, § 1. Use of a defendant’s

involuntary, or coerced, confession at his criminal trial

infringes each of these guarantees. See, e.g., Kansas v.

Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 590 (2009) (Fifth Amendment);

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978) (due process).

The well-known exclusionary rule effectuates these

prohibitions by requiring trial courts, on timely request,

to exclude unconstitutionally obtained confessions from

the evidence offered against criminal defendants at

trial. See generally Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 687

(1986). “Involuntary confessions, of course, may be given

either simultaneously with or subsequently to unlawful

pressures, force or threats.” Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322

U.S. 596, 602 (1944). Thus, when a defendant allegedly has

twice confessed, and the court rules the first confession

involuntary, the government must demonstrate that

the second confession embodied an independent choice,

untainted by lingering impropriety. See, e.g., Oregon v.

Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309-14 (1985); Lyons, 322 U.S. at 602.

Sometimes, trial courts get suppression questions

wrong—implicating the harmless-error rule. A retrial

is avoidable only if the reviewing court can “declare a

belief that [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. To meet that standard,

3

“the beneficiary of a constitutional error”—i.e., the

gover nment —must demonstrate that “ the er ror

complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”

Id. The core question is “‘whether there is a reasonable

possibility that the evidence complained of might have

contributed to the conviction.’” Id. (quoting Fahy v.

Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)).

The modern concept of harmless error arose in

reaction to the unduly rigid Exchequer Rule, which

English courts adopted in the 1800s, and which presumed

prejudice from even insignificant trial errors in admitting

evidence or instructing juries. See Wayne R. LaFave

et al., Origins of harmless error review, 7 Crim. Proc.

§ 27.6(a) (4th online ed.). “As a result, retrials became so

commonplace that English litigation ‘seemed to survive

until the parties expired.’” Id. (quoting Steven H. Goldberg,

Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. Crim.

L. & Criminology 421, 422 (1980)). As this Court has thus

observed, “when courts fashion rules whose violations

mandate automatic reversals, they ‘retreat from their

responsibilities, becoming instead impregnable citadels of

technicality.’” United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509

(1983) (cleaned up) (quoting Roger Traynor, The Riddle

of Harmless Error 14 (1970)).

By the 1900s, all fifty States had harmless-error

statutes or rules with varying particulars, and Congress

had enacted a version for the federal courts. See Chapman,

386 U.S. at 22 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2111). Nevertheless,

per se reversal endured for certain trial errors deemed

corrosive to the factfinding process. In that category

was admitting a coerced confession, which “vitiate[d] the

judgment”—“even though there may have been sufficient

4

evidence, apart from the coerced confession, to support

a judgment of conviction.” Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S.

560, 568 (1958).

Since then, the Court has added coerced confessions

to the list of trial errors subject to harmless-error review.

See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306-12. That development

did not, however, adopt the previously rejected and

“much more lenient rule which would allow affirmance

of a conviction if the evidence other than the involuntary

confession was sufficient to sustain the verdict.” Id. at 309.

Rather, “[w]hen reviewing the erroneous admission of an

involuntary confession, the appellate court . . . reviews

the remainder of the evidence against the defendant to

determine whether the admission of the confession was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 310. In doing

so, the reviewing court must “exercise extreme caution

before determining that the admission of the confession

at trial was harmless.” Id. at 296.

Broadly speaking, the Court has summarized the

harmless-error inquiry as follows: “Is it clear beyond a

reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found

the defendant guilty absent the error?” Neder v. United

States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999). The question facing an

appellate court “is not whether, in a trial that occurred

without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have

been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually

rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the

error.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993).

Pertinent factors include the evidence’s importance to

the prosecution’s theory, whether it was cumulative, the

extent of corroborating or contradictory evidence, “and,

of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.”

5

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). For

example, the existence of overwhelming and uncontested

evidence on the point in question may render an error

harmless. See, e.g., Neder, 527 U.S. at 17; Harrington v.

California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969).

This Court’s harmless-error decisions have generated

scholarly debate about the nature of the governing

standard, largely focusing on jury trials. See Daniel Epps,

Harmless Errors and Substantial Rights, 131 Harv.

L. Rev. 2117, 2155-58 (2018). That debate is especially

academic here because this case turns on how to assess

the prejudicial impact of a suppression error in a bench

trial. And not just any suppression error, but the wrongful

admission of an involuntary confession to murder. The

Court has scarcely addressed the standards of review

for bench trials, let alone articulated how Chapman

treats constitutional errors in this context. In the void,

the Connecticut Supreme Court has espoused an overly

deferential and malleable standard that swings the

pendulum from the discredited practice of automatic

reversal to a functional recipe for insurmountable error.

B. Factual Background

In March 2019, a distraught Maharg called 911

overnight, to report having encountered his husband

dead in their house. Maharg told the 911 operator that

the couple had been drinking heavily, that the husband

had hit his head on a counter, causing a wound, and that

Maharg had tried to clean the blood before the couple

retired to bed.

A responding trooper brought Maharg to the State

Police barracks, where a team of detectives interrogated

6

him—otherwise alone and without counsel—for almost

thirteen hours, from the mid-morning until around 5:30

p.m. Near the start, Maharg “was shaking so violently

that he was unable to sign his name” on the Miranda

form. Pet. App. 75a; see id. at 23a (reproduced scrawled

“signature”). Throughout, Maharg incessantly pleaded to

stop the interview and to go home, to no avail. A few times,

he vomited. Despite the detectives’ bringing up a hatchet,

and misrepresenting that testing had found human blood

on it, Maharg continually denied knowledge or recollection

of how the decedent’s injuries had come about.

Things took a turn for the worse after Maharg

explicitly asked, without success, “to go to the hospital”

to detoxify from the alcohol. State Ex. 27 (Interrogation

Tr.) at 542. He declared, “I need help,” to which a detective

responded, “I know you do.” Id. at 549. The detectives

carried on with the questioning, during which Maharg

briefly entertained the hatchet supposition before stating

that he was just accepting what the detectives had said,

id. at 606, and later clarifying that “it couldn’t have been

the hatchet,” id. at 622. Subsequently, Maharg rambled:

“I don’t know. I mean, I wouldn’t know. There’s—I killed

my husband. I don’t know.” Id. at 623. The detectives

pressed him to identify a putative weapon, for which he

did not “have the answer.” Id. at 624.

Similar inquiries persisted until Maharg fell to the

floor, turned blue, had a seizure, and had to be taken

by ambulance to Waterbury Hospital. In the hospital

emergency room, approximately two hours post-arrival,

Maharg allegedly exclaimed: “My life is ruined. I

murdered Tom. How do I tell people I killed my husband?”

Pet. App. 37a, 64a. Stationed seven to ten feet away, a state

trooper wrote these supposed statements in a log book.

7

As Maharg headed to the hospital, a scene investigator

with the State Office of the Chief Medical Examiner

(OCME) ar r ived at Maharg ’s house. The OCME

investigator’s written report—forming part of the

autopsy file—recounted information that the investigator

had obtained “from police personnel as well as personal

observation.” Def. Ex. G (Report of Investigation) at 1.

This report began by stating that “[t]he husband confessed

to murdering the decedent by using an ax to his head,”

before adding that “[t]he ax the suspect claimed to use

was in a wooden bucket in a shed with other tools.” Id.

The next morning, an OCME Associate Medical Examiner

performed an autopsy and concluded that the decedent

had been killed via chop wounds to the head. State Ex.

11 (Report of Autopsy). An axe and hatchet found on

Maharg’s property later tested negative for blood.

C. Procedural History

1. Maharg waived a jury and proceeded to a trial

before a panel of three Superior Court judges.1 For

efficiency’s sake, the parties agreed to conduct the

suppression hearing in the middle of the trial.

Before that hearing occurred, the State’s medical

examiner testified regarding her conclusion that the

1. In Connecticut, “[i]f the accused is charged with a crime

punishable by death, life imprisonment without the possibility of

release or life imprisonment and elects to be tried by the court,

the court shall be composed of three judges to be designated by

the Chief Court Administrator, or the Chief Court Administrator’s

designee, who shall name one such judge to preside over the trial.

Such judges, or a majority of them, shall have power to decide

all questions of law and fact arising upon the trial and render

judgment accordingly.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-82(b).

8

decedent had suffered chop injuries, caused by “machetes,

axes or hatchets.” Trial Tr. (10/12/23) at 49. On crossexamination, defense counsel delved into the scene

investigator’s report, in an effort to establish that the

dubious confession recited in the report had compromised

the autopsy finding. When asked whether the scene

investigator had mentioned certain statements and a

weapon, the medical examiner recalled that “there were

comments in the report.” Id. at 95. When asked how she

would have classified the death without any information

from law enforcement, this forensic witness responded that

she “would have been very concerned by the appearance

of the injuries,” but “would not have been able to explain

[the] many impacts.” Trial Tr. (10/13/23) at 43. She further

confirmed that the decedent’s head wounds were surfacelevel, with hallmarks of blunt force, but without any indicia

of internal or structural injury, signifying that minimal

force had been applied. Trial Tr. (10/12/23) 54, 127-128,

153-156. Agreeing with and interpreting those underlying

findings, the defense’s forensic expert witness disagreed

that the decedent had “sustained serious, so called, chop

wounds,” concluding that the injuries must have arisen

in another, unidentified way. Trial Tr. (10/31/23) at 27-28.

Following the midtrial suppression hearing, as

reflected in a written opinion, the panel suppressed

Maharg’s statements during the barracks interrogation

as having been “extracted” involuntarily, in violation of

his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Pet. App.

79a-80a. In doing so, the court discussed at length the

detectives’ interrogation of Maharg, inclusive of the

“repeated requests to terminate the interview and critical

medical deterioration of the defendant throughout the

thirteen-hour prolonged interview.” Id. at 81a. As the court

9

found, only after he had explicitly (and unsuccessfully)

relayed his “‘need to go to the hospital’” did Maharg “for

the first time” begin to offer even arguably incriminating

statements. Id. at 79a. Even so, the panel assessed

Maharg’s “spontaneous statements” in a trooper’s

presence in the hospital emergency room—i.e., the alleged

murder confession—to have been “freely and voluntarily

made.” Id. at 80a-81a. Despite observing that Maharg had

made these statements “approximately two hours after

he arrived at the hospital,” where he had remained “in

custody from the time his interrogation started,” the court

concluded that “the defendant spontaneously stated that

he murdered his husband . . . [i]n the absence of coercive

police activity.” 2 Id. at 81a.

At the close of the State’s case, the defense moved for

a judgment of acquittal based on evidentiary insufficiency.

Among other things, defense counsel maintained that

although “something happened” in the house, the

State had failed to show that the defendant intended to

cause his spouse’s death. Trial Tr. (10/20/23) at 76-78.

The prosecutor rejoined that Maharg had cleaned up

blood before dialing 911, then later, at the hospital, had

stated “that I murdered Tom.” Id. at 82. The State thus

insisted “that this defendant intended, based on his own

statements,” to commit a murder. Id. at 83. The court

denied the motion for acquittal. Id. at 85.

On summation, the prosecutor quoted Maharg’s

alleged hospital confession verbatim, Trial Tr. (11/02/23)

2. The trial court also noted that, in the emergency room,

Maharg “had eaten a turkey sandwich,” which he promptly

“vomited.” Pet. App. 64a.

10

at 30, then adjured the court to “look at the statements,”

id. at 61.

The panel convicted Maharg of murder, in violation

of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54a. 3 In its written opinion,

the panel credited the State’s autopsy finding, as well as

the evidence of Maharg’s emergency-room statements,

in concluding that Maharg had intentionally attacked

his husband with a sharp-edged weapon. Pet. App. 49a,

51a n.5. A footnote within the opinion’s findings of fact

asserted as follows: “The panel did not suppress the

spontaneous statements the defendant made within

[the state trooper’s] earshot because they were neither

made in response to police interrogation nor the result

of coercive police conduct. Nonetheless, the panel

unanimously concluded that the evidence established the

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, even in the

absence of these statements.”4 Id. at 37a n2. The panel

then found Maharg guilty of murder “[b]ased upon the

evidence presented”—without qualification. Id. at 49a,

52a. This nearly seventy-year-old defendant received an

aggregate effective prison sentence of thirty-five years.

See Sentencing Tr. (05/10/23) at 23.

3. The panel likewise entered a guilty verdict for tampering

with evidence, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-155, based

on the findings that Maharg had cleaned blood from the decedent

and house and repositioned the decedent’s body. Maharg did not

challenge that conviction, the prison term for which has elapsed.

4. The court’s posttrial opinion noted that the stationhouse

interrogation had been suppressed and that, “[a]ccordingly, the

panel did not consider the content of the interview in reaching its

decision.” Pet. App. 37a n.1.

11

2. On direct appeal to the Connecticut Supreme

Cour t, 5 Maharg raised two claims of prejudicial

constitutional error. First, he argued that the unlawful

barracks interrogation had tainted the State’s autopsy

finding of a chop-wound homicide.6 Second, he asserted

that the putative emergency-room confession was legally

inseparable from the barracks ordeal and was therefore

improperly admitted into evidence. In responding to the

second issue, the State relied exclusively on the trial

panel’s footnoted disclaimer, quoted above, to argue that

the Supreme Court could bypass the constitutional claim’s

merits because error, if any, in the hospital statements’

admission would have been harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt.

In affirming the conviction, the Connecticut Supreme

Court held that the trial record did not permit a

conclusion, as a matter of law, that the State’s forensic

evidence had resulted from unconstitutional conduct.

Pet. App. 12a-15a. As for the hospital confession, that

court accepted the State’s invitation: it declined to decide

whether the admission of Maharg’s emergency-room

statements had violated the Constitution, reasoning

that any such error would have been harmless. Id. at

5. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-199(b)(3) (authorizing direct

appeals to Connecticut Supreme Court of certain convictions,

including for Class A felonies).

6. Acknowledging that trial counsel had not formally

preserved this legal argument, Maharg sought relief under State v.

Golding, 213 Conn. 233 (1989), which permits review of otherwise

unpreserved constitutional claims if the appellate record suffices

to demonstrate the violation as a matter of law.

12

18a-21a. More specifically, the Connecticut Supreme Court

“agree[d] with the state” that the outcome turned on the

trial court’s sentiment “that, even if it did not consider

the hospital confession, the other evidence established

the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at

18a. The Connecticut Supreme Court emphasized that

“the trial court’s observation is strong evidence of the

impact the hospital confession had,” id. at 19a n.15, in

itself confirming “that the defendant’s hospital confession

did not materially impact the court or the result of the

trial,” id. at 20a. The court’s discussion on appeal did not

refer to any eyewitness testimony, surveillance video, or

putative murder weapon in evidence—for there was none.

Three Connecticut Justices issued a concurring

opinion, which began by calling this “a textbook case that

demonstrates, in both dramatic and dangerous fashion,

what can go wrong when the police improperly conduct an

interview of a suspect.” Id. at 22a. This opinion recounted

“the shockingly disturbing circumstances under which

the state police conducted the defendant’s interrogation,”

all “while he was in a seriously compromised medical

state.” Id. The concurring opinion noted that, during

the interrogation, “the defendant acceded to the officers’

suggested narrative that he had used a hatchet to

murder the victim—which was never supported by any

physical evidence.” Id. at 24a. Despite “not consider[ing]

this a paradigmatic case that our system worked,” the

concurring Justices voted to affirm Maharg’s conviction—

including the ruling that admission of the emergency-room

statements, if error, would have been harmless. Id. at 31a.

13

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

On appeal from this bench trial gone awry, the

Connecticut Supreme Court adopted an approach to

harmless-error review that contradicts this Court’s

established precedents, is impracticable to apply, breeds

significant unfairness, and yields unjustifiable results.

Review of this important question is warranted to restore

coherence to appellate review of federal constitutional

errors.

I.

The Connecticut Supreme Court’s Decision

Contradicts Several of This Court’s Precedents.

The petition should be granted because the Connecticut

Supreme Court’s harmless-error determination conflicts

with relevant decisions of this Court. To begin, a state

court’s formulation or application of the harmlessness

standard for constitutional errors “is every bit as much of

a federal question as what particular federal constitutional

provisions themselves mean, what they guarantee, and

whether they have been denied.” Chapman, 386 U.S.

at 21. Here, that federal question warrants this Court’s

attention. An appellate court evaluating an improperly

admitted confession’s effect on a guilty verdict is supposed

to assess, for example, the evidence’s importance to the

prosecution’s theory, whether it was cumulative, the extent

of corroborating or contradictory evidence, and the overall

strength of the prosecution’s case. See Van Arsdall, 475

U.S. at 684. In forsaking that analysis in this case, the

state court ran afoul of this Court’s teachings in at least

three overlapping ways.

First, the state court’s determination conflicts with

the federal harmless-error test for a coerced confession

14

prescribed by Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279.

Wrongfully admitted coerced confessions are subject to

Chapman’s harmless-error analysis. See id. at 309. To

perform that inquiry “[w]hen reviewing the erroneous

admission of an involuntary confession, the appellate court,

as it does with the admission of other forms of improperly

admitted evidence, simply reviews the remainder of the

evidence against the defendant to determine whether

the admission of the confession was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Id. at 310. Moreover, this Court has

expressly rejected the “much more lenient rule which

would allow affirmance of a conviction if the evidence other

than the involuntary confession was sufficient to sustain

the verdict.” Id. at 309 (citing Payne, 356 U.S. at 567-68).

“Such a test would, of course—unlike the harmless-error

test—make the admission of an involuntary confession

virtually risk-free for the State.” Id.

The Connecticut Supreme Court’s absolution-byfootnote rule impermissibly substitutes what amounts

to sufficiency review for the requisite true harmlessness

analysis. That court assumed that the hospital confession

should have been suppressed as involuntary, triggering

harmless-error review under Chapman and Fulminante.

See Pet. App. 18a-21a. But rather than perform the

necessary analysis, the appellate court simply “agree[d]

with the state” that any constitutional error would be

harmless because “the trial court explained that, even

if it did not consider the hospital confession, the other

evidence established the defendant’s guilt.” 7 Id. at 18a.

7. As a refresher, after reiterating that the alleged hospital

confession had not been suppressed—and apparently standing by

that decision—“the panel unanimously concluded that the evidence

15

Whereas the trial court’s footnote indeed alluded to

unspecified guilt-establishing “evidence” against the

defendant, the Connecticut Supreme Court failed to

fulfill its responsibility because it never independently

canvassed the record to assess the putative error’s

prejudicial effect. See Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 405

(1991) (“As a threshold matter, the State Supreme Court

did not undertake any explicit analysis to support its view

of the scope of the record to be considered in applying

Chapman.”), disapproved on other grounds by Estelle

v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991); see also Van Arsdall, 475

U.S. at 681 (harmless-error analysis looks to “the whole

record”); Hasting, 461 U.S. at 509 n.7 (same).

Without that undertaking, the Connecticut Supreme

Court could only have reverted to assessing whether the

other evidence surpassed basic sufficiency review. The

result is a putative harmless-error standard much more

lenient than the one the law mandates for erroneously

admitted involuntary confessions. See Fulminante, 499

U.S. at 309; see also Fahy, 375 U.S. at 86 (“We are not

concerned here with whether there was sufficient evidence

on which the petitioner could have been convicted without

the evidence complained of.”). Alternatively, and even

more rudderless, the reviewing court might implicitly

have weighed the remaining proof to reach a conclusion

about the defendant’s probable guilt. Unsurprisingly, this

Court has long eschewed that approach to ascertaining

harmless error—to which appellate tribunals are

institutionally unsuited. See Bollenbach v. United States,

326 U.S. 607, 615 (1946) (“From presuming too often all

established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, even

in the absence of these statements.” Pet. App. 37a n2.

16

errors to be ‘prejudicial,’ the judicial pendulum need not

swing to presuming all errors to be ‘harmless’ if only the

appellate court is left without doubt that one who claims

its corrective process is, after all, guilty.”); see also Neder,

527 U.S. at 19 (reaffirming that appellate court properly

conducting harmless-error review does not “become

in effect a second jury” (quotation marks omitted)).

Either way, the state court’s determination strays from

Fulminante’s straightforward dictates.

Second, the state court’s decision ignores this

Court’s explanation of the harmlessness inquiry in

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275. There, the Court

held that an improper jury instruction on reasonable

doubt represented a structural error mandating a retrial

without a further analysis of prejudice. In reaching that

conclusion, the Court clarified “the proper role of an

appellate court engaged in the Chapman inquiry.” Id. at

280. That role is not “to hypothesize a guilty verdict that

was never in fact rendered.” Id. at 279. Nor is the proper

inquiry “whether, in a trial that occurred without the

error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered,

but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this

trial was surely unattributable to the error.” Id.

Ignoring those commands, the Connecticut Supreme

Court construed what it deemed the dispositive footnote to

mean that the trial court “would have found the defendant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in the absence of the

hospital confession.” Pet. App. 21a. But there was no trial

conducted in the absence of that alleged confession—which

the State introduced, which the trial court admitted

over objection, and which featured prominently in the

proceedings. Whether an item of admitted evidence was

17

surely immaterial to the verdict differs from whether

the factfinder could have reached a similar result had the

evidence never been admitted. And here, the trial court

premised the guilty verdict actually rendered “on the

evidence presented”—without limitation. Id. at 49a, 52a.

Although this case involved a bench trial, and does

not involve a claim of structural error, Sullivan’s principle

governs. If a trial court postulates an alternative verdict

based on a subset of evidence, an appellate court cannot

rely on that maneuver to excuse a suppression error, for

“[t]here is no object, so to speak, upon which harmlesserror scrutiny can operate.” Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280.

A conclusion that the contested evidence might not have

been strictly necessary to the verdict “does not satisfy

all of Chapman’s concerns.” Yates, 500 U.S. at 407. In

this way, a reviewing court’s omission of harmless-error

review under Chapman is tantamount to its inability to

apply harmless-error review under Sullivan.

Third, the state court’s determination effectively

excuses the government from meeting its burden to

demonstrate harmlessness. Under Chapman’s framework,

“constitutional error, in illegally admitting highly

prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone other

than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it

was harmless.” 386 U.S. at 24. This standard “requir[es]

the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not

contribute to the verdict obtained.” Id.

In Fulminante, the Court reiterated that a wrongfully

admitted coerced confession should “be quantitatively

assessed in the context of other evidence presented in

18

order to determine whether its admission was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt.” 499 U.S. at 308. Here, the

State would not have relished that obligation, after

repeatedly keying on the defendant’s statements to argue

that the evidence supported a murder conviction. See,

e.g., supra at 9-10. On appeal, the State thus entirely

outsourced the harmlessness inquiry to the trial

court’s conclusory pronouncement that other evidence

established guilt. The State’s brief failed to cite a single

other strand of evidence, or facet of the trial, to fortify

such a harmless-error showing. The seminal footnote

served improperly to shift the burden to the defendant

to demonstrate prejudice, contrary to Chapman’s core

premise. Compounding the issue, carrying this burden

would appear to demand a showing that the trial court’s

own psychological self-assessment was wrong.

A more customary approach would not have entailed

nearly these contortions. When the State chose to

introduce testimony about the defendant’s alleged

second confession, the trial court (acting as judge) had

to admit or exclude the confession. Once admitted, the

trial court (acting as factfinder) could have credited this

evidence or not. On appeal, the Supreme Court (acting as

reviewer) needed to determine whether the suppression

decision was error and, if so, whether the error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For its part, the

State (acting as advocate) could have—and, if possible,

should have—presented independent arguments on these

points. Instead, the State treated the trial court as having

impliedly recognized, and immunized, its own error in

admitting proof of a confession that the State continued

to assert had been lawfully obtained. These departures

from ordinary procedure justify granting the petition.

19

II. This Case Presents an Optimal Vehicle for

Examining the Impor tant Question of the

Harmless-Error Standard for Bench Trials.

In addition, review is warranted because the proper

harmless-error standard for bench trials presents an

important question of federal law that the Court should

examine. If followed, the Connecticut Supreme Court’s

approach threatens to upend harmless-error review in

the subset of criminal cases tried to a court instead of a

jury. This case presents an ideal vehicle for evaluating

this important question, which is properly preserved and

cleanly presented.

Although prior appellate courts have purported to

permit trial judges’ commentary in bench trials to inform

review of alleged errors, in several such cases the trial

courts’ commentary was not itself dispositive, unlike here.

For example, the Fourth Circuit has written that “in

determining if an error is harmless, a reviewing court

may consider the entire record, including the trial court’s

discussion of its error during post-trial proceedings.”

United States v. Palin, 874 F.3d 418, 422 (4th Cir. 2017).

For that proposition, the circuit cited a prior case in which

a district judge presiding over a bench trial had referred

offhand to codefendants’ guilty pleas, but clarified that they

had no effect on the defendant’s conviction for tax fraud,

which “rested solely on the government’s ‘overwhelming’

evidence.” United States v. Poole, 640 F.3d 114, 120 (4th

Cir. 2011). And there, the reviewing court explicitly

“agree[d] with the district court’s characterization of the

evidence in th[e] case as ‘overwhelming.’” Id.

20

The Seventh Circuit has ostensibly credited a

district judge’s “emphatic” on-the-record insistence

“that his holding [of guilt] stood regardless” of whether

“incriminating statements were suppressed.” United

States v. Lee, 618 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2010). Yet in

that case, the circuit also expressly concluded that no

constitutional violation had occurred, id., and that there

was otherwise “powerful evidence” of the defendant’s

“guilt on all counts,” id. at 674.

Prior to this case, the Connecticut Supreme Court

cited Lee in holding that a judge’s remarks after a bench

trial merely “reinforce[d]” an independent appellate

“conclusion that the improper admission of the defendant’s

video-recorded statement had no impact” on his felonymurder conviction. State v. Alexander, 343 Conn. 495,

510 (2022). There, the defendant’s statement—not a

confession—had placed him near the scene of a shooting,

but so too did surveillance footage and three eyewitnesses’

accounts. See id. at 509.

These decisions have helped to pave the way for the

trial court’s single-sentence evisceration of Chapman

here. 8 This brand of appellate laxity towards error in

bench trials has reached its endpoint. Meanwhile, bench

trials will continue to happen, and Chapman’s harmlesserror doctrine is “probably the most cited rule in modern

criminal appeals.” William M. Landes & Richard A.

Posner, Harmless Error, 30 J. Legal Stud. 161, 161 (2001).

A course correction is needed.

8. Although intrastate legal developments are not ordinarily

this Court’s focus, the glide path from Alexander to the decision

here highlights the risks of empowering trial courts via offhand

statements to insulate their own errors in bench trials from

appellate review.

21

In particular, the Connecticut Supreme Court’s

approach stacks the deck against criminal defendants

in bench trials. An improperly admitted involuntary

confession still counts towards evidentiary sufficiency,

which looks to “all of the evidence [the trial court] has

admitted”—whether erroneously or not. Lockhart v.

Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 41-42 (1988); see Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Thus, even in bench trials,

sufficiency review may rely on an “erroneously admitted

confession.” United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008, 1029

(9th Cir. 2014). Under the Connecticut Supreme Court’s

rule, however, a trial court’s superfluous commentary

in rendering the verdict can insulate the same coerced

confession from meaningful review for suppression error.

This no-win situation for the defendant “make[s] the

admission of an involuntary confession virtually risk-free

for the State.” Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309.

The challenged ruling also artificially dilutes the

harmlessness standard for confessions. “A confession

is like no other evidence.” Id. at 296. Given its often

“dramatic” and “devastating” effect, id. at 312, courts

must “exercise extreme caution before determining that

the admission of the confession at trial was harmless,” id.

at 296; accord Michaels v. Davis, 144 S. Ct. 914, 915 (2024)

(Jackson, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[T]his

Court has long held that courts must ‘exercise extreme

caution’ when determining whether the admission at trial

of an illegally obtained confession constitutes a harmless

error.” (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296)). Crediting

a trial court’s retrospective sentiment that a defendant’s

murder confession does not matter is not an exercise of

extreme judicial caution.

22

While the trial court here opined that “the evidence

established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt, even in the absence of these statements” (Pet.

App. 37a n2), there is reason to doubt that the proof

could be so neatly segregated. Although involving judges,

this situation implicates similar concerns to those the

Court has cited for disallowing jurors from deciding a

confession’s voluntariness. Either situation presents an

intolerable risk of cross-contaminating the other proof,

even if the factfinder “found the confession involuntary

and disregarded it.” Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 388

(1964). As the Court has queried: “If there are lingering

doubts about the sufficiency of the other evidence, does

the jury unconsciously lay them to rest by resort to the

confession? Will uncertainty about the sufficiency of the

other evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt

actually result in acquittal when the jury knows the

defendant has given a truthful confession?” Id.

These concerns are not unique to lay jurors. For one

thing, case studies have supported a view that judges

may not be entirely impervious to the probative impact

of “improperly admitted confessions, which are often

unreliable and yet inherently over-valued.” Alan Hirsch,

Confessions and Harmless Error: A New Argument for

the Old Approach, 12 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 1, 22 (2007).

For another thing, the tribunal that avowedly ignored

Maharg’s alleged hospital confession is the very same

tribunal that ruled the confession to be voluntary and

admissible.

In general, this Court has “assumed that evidence

about the manner in which a confession was secured will

often be germane to its probative weight.” Crane, 476

23

U.S. at 688. Here, the trial court as gatekeeper found

that Maharg’s allegedly “spontaneous statements” in the

emergency room “were freely and voluntarily made.” Pet.

App. 80a; see id. at 81a (“In the absence of coercive police

activity, such unprovoked statements cannot be found

to be involuntary.”). The same trial court as factfinder

would naturally have viewed such a “voluntary” murder

confession as reliable and true. After all, “If the defendant

is innocent, why did he previously admit his guilt?” Crane,

476 U.S. at 689. An appellate court should not take on

faith a trial court’s assessment of a confession’s impact

when that same trial court has assigned the confession

inflated weight to begin with, especially when the error

provides the trial court with a subconscious reason to find

the defendant guilty.

Granting the petition would fully respect the notion

that “[i]n bench trials, judges routinely hear inadmissible

evidence that they are presumed to ignore.” Harris v.

Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346 (1981) (per curiam) (emphasis

added). Learned trial judges presumptively appreciate the

reasons for the rules barring consideration of “inadmissible

information and will not rely on that information for any

improper purpose.” Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 69

(2012) (plurality op.), abrogated on other grounds by Smith

v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024).

But again, the trial court in this case held the contested

confession to be voluntary and admissible. Thus, in this

regard, “[t]he fact that this was a bench trial is irrelevant.

True, a judge conducting a bench trial can hear evidence

that he ultimately determines to be inadmissible without

prejudice to his verdict. Here, however, the statement

was accepted into evidence, and it was considered to be

24

relevant and probative, so that the judge had no reason to

ignore or discount it as evidence.” Anderson v. Smith, 751

F.2d 96, 106 (2d Cir. 1984). Indeed, harmless-error review

operates on the competing assumption that the factfinder

has “considered all the evidence bearing on the issue in

question before it made the findings on which the verdict

rested.” Yates, 500 U.S. at 405; cf. Neder, 527 U.S. at 16-17

(presuming that jury considered overwhelming evidence

of offense element that jury charge omitted). The Court

should take the opportunity to evaluate the extent to which

a trial court’s observations in a bench trial can override

that assumption—particularly regarding evidence that

the trial court has expressly admitted and credited.

For the administration of justice, the stakes are high.

Only when a trial judge perceives a suppression issue as

a close call would the judge gratuitously hedge by adding

that a verdict could stand without the contested evidence.

Yet under the Connecticut Supreme Court’s rule, such an

observation would neutralize the prospect of appellate

reversal: despite the evidence’s inherent impact, any

error becomes harmless because the trial judge said so.

Worse still, the appellate court could avoid deciding the

issue’s merits to conserve judicial resources, depriving

future parties and courts of controlling guidance on the

constitutional question.9

Raising the stakes further, in this case, the second

confession flowed from what the concurring opinion

aptly described as a “shockingly disturbing” overnight

9. But see Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 370 n.2 (1993)

(“Harmless-error analysis is triggered only after the reviewing

court discovers that an error has been committed.”).

25

interrogation, lasting “for approximately thirteen hours,

while the defendant was clearly in the dangerous throes

of alcohol withdrawal.” Pet. App. 22a. As that opinion

recounted: “It was only after the defendant began

experiencing a seizure and became ‘cyanotic’ that the

ordeal finally came to an end and an ambulance was called.

By placing the defendant in serious medical jeopardy, the

officers’ treatment of the defendant can only be described

as recklessly indifferent.” Id. at 25a. Even the majority’s

opinion labeled the interrogation “disturbing.” Id. at 8a

n.8.

Despite all this, the State Supreme Court took a

shortcut to harmless error that obviated any need to

address whether the alleged hospital confession should

have been suppressed as involuntary. Such a double

bypass in no way furthers a State’s “legitimate interest

in reducing the workload of its judiciary.” Halbert v.

Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 623 (2005). Nor will it realistically

deter law-enforcement officers from testing limits in

the zeal to solve crimes, when trial courts will remain

free to admit, consider, and then immunize any evidence

extracted. Although conditions may be placed on a

defendant’s waiving the fundamental right to a jury trial,

Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965), impliedly

forfeiting suppression or appellate rights should not be

among them. For these reasons as well, the Court should

grant review to restore regularity to harmless-error

review in bench trials.

III. The Connecticut Supreme Court’s Harmlessness

Determination Was Demonstrably Wrong.

This case is also worthy of review because the

Connecticut Supreme Court’s harmlessness determination

26

is patently incorrect. That is so with or without the trial

court’s footnoted disclaimer—which had no proper place

in a judicial finding of guilt, let alone in a conclusion of

harmless error.

In arguing to the Connecticut Supreme Court that the

suppression error would have been harmless, the State

pointed exclusively to the footnote, to which the appellate

court deferred. Pet. App. 18a-21a. Both were misguided.

After admitting and crediting a state trooper’s testimony

that Maharg had exclaimed, “I murdered Tom,” the trial

court convicted Maharg of having done just that, basing

this verdict “upon the evidence presented.” Id. at 49a, 52a.

Nestled in the decision’s findings of fact, the trial

court also “concluded that the evidence established the

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, even in

the absence of” the confession. Id. at 37a n.2. But that

observation did not say (nor could it say) that the trial

court ignored the alleged murder confession in rendering

judgment—which the trial court did say when addressing

the stationhouse statements that had been suppressed.

See id. at 37a n.1. The footnote itself fails to exclude the

“reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of

might have contributed to the conviction.” Chapman, 386

U.S. at 24 (quotation marks omitted). At most, “‘no one can

say what credit and weight’” the factfinder assigned the

confession. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308 (quoting Payne,

356 U.S. at 568).

The unspecified other “evidence” to which the

footnote referred did not eclipse the putative murder

confession to such a degree as to render it “unimportant

in relation to everything else.” Yates, 500 U.S. at 403. Not

27

in a prosecution for murder, during which the prosecutor

herself confessed that “we may never know exactly what

happened on” the night in question. Trial Tr. (11/02/23)

at 60.

Unlike other species of homicide, the commission of

murder requires “intent to cause the death of another

person.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54a(a). Establishing intent

was an uphill climb in a case with no eyewitness testimony,

surveillance video, or alleged weapon (an axe and hatchet

found on the property both tested negative for blood).

So much so that the State—over a defense objection—

successfully implored the trial court also to consider the

lesser included offense of first-degree manslaughter,

with a lesser mens rea. See id. § 53a-55; see also Trial

Tr. (11/02/23) at 12-14.

Under the well-established standard, in granting

that request, the trial court necessarily determined that

the evidence was “sufficiently in dispute to permit [it]

consistently to find the defendant not guilty of murder

but guilty of manslaughter.” State v. Iverson, 352 Conn.

422, 429 (2025); see also State v. Tomlin, 266 Conn. 608,

634 (2003); State v. Rasmussen, 225 Conn. 55, 67-68

(1993). In general, a charge of manslaughter as a lesser

included offense will be unavailable where the State has

“unquestionably presented overwhelming evidence that

the defendant had intended to kill the victim,” including via

“the nature and extent of the victim’s injuries.” Iverson,

352 Conn. at 430. In this case, the State thus maintained,

and the trial court accepted, that even with the alleged

murder confession, the proof “suggest[ed] at least a

possibility that the defendant acted with a lesser intent

than that of the specific intent to kill.” Tomlin, 266 Conn.

28

at 632 (quotation marks omitted). There had to have been

at least a reasonable possibility that admitting Maharg’s

alleged murder confession contributed to Maharg’s

murder conviction. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; cf. Neder,

527 U.S. at 18-19 (holding that error respecting element

of crime will be prejudicial under Chapman if reasonable

factfinder could have resolved element in either direction).

It is no wonder that, on appeal, the State focused

on the trial court’s footnote, rather than assert that the

confession objectively made no difference to guilt. At trial,

the prosecutor insisted that Maharg’s statements “about

how he murdered” his spouse were “incredibly probative”

of his “intent to kill his husband.” Trial Tr. (10/14/23) at

91; see id. (“This is a murder case, Your Honor.”). The

prosecutor then insisted that “this defendant intended,

based on his own statements,” to kill his spouse. Trial

Tr. (10/20/23) at 83. Grasping at straws, the prosecutor

alternatively urged the trial court to convict Maharg of

murder for allegedly failing to render aid to his injured

spouse—but the court would not let the “obligation to act

for a spousal partner basically take the place of and/or

negate the issue of specific intent.” Trial Tr. (11/02/23) at

15. The prosecutor further told the court that “[o]f course”

the forensic experts should have considered the murder

confession when interpreting the decedent’s injuries. Trial

Tr. (10/31/23) at 71.

On that point, as the concurring State Justices

observed, the idea that Maharg had murdered his husband

with a sharp-edged weapon—which the State’s autopsy

finding purported to confirm, and which was central to

the trial court’s finding of guilt—“was never supported

by any physical evidence.” Pet. App. 24a. See supra at 8

29

(describing witnesses’ basic agreement as to injuries’

surface-level nature and blunt-force characteristics). This

Court should grant review given the state court’s obvious

error in holding the second confession’s admission to be

harmless. See Yates, 500 U.S. at 407-11 (concluding that

use of prohibited presumption on intent was prejudicial

error in state murder trial in which proof of defendant’s

alleged intent was unclear).

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Eric Del Pozo

Counsel of Record

Joette K atz

Shipman & Goodwin LLP

One Constitution Plaza

Hartford, CT 06103

(860) 251-5332

edelpozo@goodwin.com

Counsel for the Petitioner

APPENDIX

i

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE SUPREME

C OU RT OF C ON N EC T ICU T, FI LED

JULY 8, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a

APPENDIX B — MEMORANDUM OF THE

SUPERIOR COURT, JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF DANBURY, FILED DECEMBER 2, 2022 . . . 32a

APPENDIX C — MEMORANDUM OF THE

SUPERIOR COURT, JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF DANBURY, FILED OCTOBER 31, 2022 . . . . 54a

1a

Appendix

A

APPENDIX A

— OPINION

OF THE

SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT,

FILED JULY 8, 2025

SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT

SC 20855

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

v.

JAMES MAHARG

Filed July 8, 2025

OPINION

MULLINS, C. J. Following a bench trial before a

three judge panel, the defendant, James Maharg, was

found guilty of murdering his husband, Thomas Conley,

in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a(a). In connection

with the murder, the trial court also found him guilty

of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence in

violation of General Statutes § 53a-155. On appeal, the

defendant raises two claims, challenging only his murder

conviction. The defendant does not challenge his conviction

of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence.

First, the defendant claims on appeal that he was

deprived of his federal and state constitutional rights

to due process and against self-incrimination because,

notwithstanding the fact that the trial court properly

suppressed statements he had made during an almost

thirteen hour police interrogation, including his confession

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Appendix A

that he murdered Conley with a hatchet,1 the prosecutor

and the court extensively relied on those statements

in bringing about his conviction of murder. He further

asserts that the three experts who testified at trial relied

on an investigative report by the Office of the Chief

Medical Examiner (OCME report) that referred to the

suppressed confession to develop their expert reports and

findings, rendering the defendant’s trial fundamentally

unfair.

Second, the defendant claims that the trial court

erred in admitting statements he had made while in the

emergency room, in which he confessed to the murder. He

argues that, because those statements were made shortly

after, and were a product of, his earlier, involuntary

confession, the taint from that earlier confession carried

over and rendered his hospital confession equally

involuntary and violative of due process. We reject both

claims. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

The trial court found, or reasonably could have found,

the following facts. On March 20, 2019, at approximately

2 a.m., the defendant frantically called 911, and, after he

was connected to a dispatcher, he yelled: “My husband is

1. The police discovered both a hatchet and an axe during a

sweep of the defendant’s property. Although the defendant, during

the police interrogation, confessed to murdering Conley with the

“hatchet” and clarified that he probably would not have used “the

axe because [it was] difficult to get to,” some of the subsequent

investigatory reports and expert testimony indicated that the

instrument in question was an axe.

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Appendix A

dead! My husband is dead!” The defendant relayed the

following story to the dispatcher. He explained that he

and Conley had been drinking a great deal throughout the

day 2 and that, at some point during the evening, Conley

fell and hit his head on the kitchen cabinet and started

to bleed heavily. The defendant said that he tended to

Conley’s gash by stopping the bleeding with a roll of paper

towels and that he brought Conley upstairs to bed. 3 The

defendant told the dispatcher that he had just awoken and

had found Conley at the bottom of the stairs. When the

dispatcher asked the defendant if Conley was “beyond

help,” the defendant responded, “yes . . . he’s cold as a

rock.” While rapidly panting, the defendant, unprompted,

began talking about the couple’s financial problems and

frequent drinking.

Approximately twenty minutes later, a paramedic,

Justin Walsh, arrived at the defendant’s residence. After

the defendant secured his dogs to let Walsh in, he entered

the house and noticed Conley’s naked body lying in an

unnatural position, at the bottom of the stairs. Walsh

examined Conley and determined that he was deceased.

During the examination, Walsh noticed large and small

wounds that were filled with clotted blood on the top of

Conley’s head. Based on the clotting, Walsh believed

2. The defendant’s blood alcohol concentration was not tested.

Conley’s postmortem blood alcohol concentration was recorded

at 0.393 in the toxicology report. An associate medical examiner

testified that this amount would be considered an elevated level

for a chronic alcohol user.

3. The defendant did not immediately call 911.

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that the wounds were not fresh. Despite the visible head

wounds, there was no noticeable blood on Conley’s body

or on the surrounding floor. Walsh noted that Conley’s

body was stiffened by rigor mortis and was cold, which

indicated that Conley had been dead for several hours.

The defendant told Walsh the same version of events that

he had told to the dispatcher.4

Shortly thereafter, Troopers Isaiah Gonzalez and

Laurence Gregg arrived on the scene. When Gregg

arrived on the scene, he audio-recorded his interaction

with the defendant, who can be heard admitting that

there was no one else in the house but him, Conley, and

their dogs. At approximately 4 a.m., Gonzalez transported

the defendant to the State Police Troop A barracks

in Southbury. Initially, Gonzalez and Detective Jared

Barbero interviewed the defendant for approximately

one hour at the police station. Then, Detective Ed Vayan

joined Barbero, and, together, they interviewed the

defendant for an additional twelve hours. The interview

was video-recorded. On multiple occasions during the

lengthy interview, the defendant asked Barbero and

Vayan to terminate the interview, a request that was not

heeded by the detectives. The defendant also appeared to

be visibly shaking, and Barbero noted that he could “see

the withdrawal all over [the defendant].”

4. The defendant explained to Walsh that Conley had fallen,

injuring himself earlier in the night. He told Walsh that he had

helped get Conley upstairs to bed before they had both passed out.

Then, sometime later, he woke up to hearing Conley fall down the

stairs. When he went downstairs and found Conley at the base of

the stairs, that is when he called 911.

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Appendix A

After being advised of his Miranda rights, 5 the

defendant signed his name on the waiver form. Barbero

and Vayan commented on the defendant’s unusual level

of shaking that made it difficult for him to even scrawl

his name on the form. Toward the end of the interview,

the defendant verbally confessed to killing Conley with a

hatchet.6 During the nearly thirteen hour interrogation,

the defendant vomited numerous times. Finally, after

the defendant had an apparent seizure, at approximately

5 p.m., he was transported to Waterbury Hospital for

alcohol withdrawal treatment. Trooper Matthew Geddes

accompanied him.

Once at the hospital, Geddes remained in the hallway

outside of the defendant’s room, approximately seven to

ten feet away from the defendant. About two hours after

arriving, the defendant woke up and, unprompted, asked,

“where is my husband?” Geddes logged the comment,

as required by police policy, but did not acknowledge

or respond to the defendant. Thirty minutes later, the

defendant declared: “[M]y life is ruined. I murdered

[Conley]. How do I tell people I killed my husband?” Once

again, Geddes logged the comment and did not respond.

The next day, while still in the hospital, the defendant

requested to speak with Barbero. In the recorded

interview, the defendant admitted to pushing Conley into

5. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct.

1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

6. As we noted in this opinion, the defendant filed a motion

to suppress, which the trial court granted only with respect to

this confession.

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Appendix A

a kitchen cabinet but denied bludgeoning him. Shortly

thereafter, the police arrested the defendant and charged

him with murder and tampering with or fabricating

physical evidence.

Meanwhile, investigation of the crime scene revealed

a different story from the one narrated by the defendant.

At the scene, Detective Jamie Pearston recovered a

bloodstained robe in the living room that Conley likely

wore at some point during that evening. Additionally,

Detective Jeremy Combes photographed three elliptically

shaped bloodstains that were deposited in a downward

direction in the kitchen. There was also a large bloodstain

on the kitchen floor, which, the investigators determined,

was where the first bloodshed event occurred.

Furthermore, despite the defendant’s saying that

he stopped Conley’s bleeding before bringing him up to

bed, there was a significant amount of blood upstairs.

There were saturation stains on the bed and the pillows

in both bedrooms. “[S]patter stains,” as well as “small,

circular stains,” caused by “blood drops that are released

from an object in motion,” were also found near the north

bathroom doorway. The investigators determined that the

numerous bloodstains upstairs indicated that there was a

second event that resulted in bloodshed, contrary to the

defendant’s story. However, the investigators could not

pinpoint the exact location in the upstairs portion of the

house where the second bloodshed event had occurred.

Before trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress

the recorded verbal confessions that he had made during

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Appendix A

the thirteen hour station house interview (station house

confession) and the statements overheard by Geddes

at the hospital (hospital confession).7 He claimed that

the police had violated his constitutional rights under

both the federal and state constitutions. The trial court

held a hearing on this motion during the trial to avoid

the duplicative questioning and cross-examination of

the relevant witnesses. The trial court ultimately made

two oral rulings on the defendant’s motion to suppress,

granting it in part and denying it in part. Before the

defense presented its case, the trial court issued a written

opinion, which articulated in greater detail the grounds

for its oral rulings on the motion to suppress and the facts

that it relied on in reaching its conclusions.

Specifically, the trial court suppressed the statements

the defendant had made during the station house

confession. The court concluded that the statements

were not voluntarily made. In support of its decision, the

court relied on the failure of the detectives, Barbero and

Vayan, to honor the defendant’s repeated requests to

terminate the interview and to ensure that he understood

the Miranda warnings. The court also determined that

Barbero and Vayan disregarded the defendant’s urgent

need for medical care, even though the defendant showed

obvious signs of physical distress. 8 The court, however,

7. The defendant did not seek to suppress the statement he

gave to Barbero at the hospital.

8. The trial court found that “Barbero and Vayan talked

about the defendant’s need to sober up and observed the defendant

shaking to the point that he could neither hold a cup of coffee steady

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Appendix A

denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the hospital

confession on the ground that that confession was

admissible because it was spontaneous and freely made.

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found

the defendant guilty of murder and tampering with or

fabricating physical evidence.9 In its written memorandum

of decision, the court found “that the defendant used a

nor legibly sign his own name [on] the Miranda form.” The court

noted that, during the interview, Barbero commented that he could

“see the withdrawal all over [the defendant].” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Ultimately, the court determined that “Barbero

and Vayan disregarded the defendant’s obvious and increasingly

urgent need for medical care.” At trial, Barbero testified that state

police policy requires bringing a suspect exhibiting signs of alcohol

withdrawal to a nearby medical facility. Given the disturbing facts

of this interrogation, we are dismayed at the failure of the police

officers to follow that policy and to obtain medical care for the

defendant in a more expedient manner.

9. The conviction of tampering with or fabricating physical

evidence was based on the fact that the trial court found beyond

a reasonable doubt that the defendant had “tampered with the

crime scene [by] attempting to remove blood from the kitchen

floor, [from] the upper landing of the stairs, and from [Conley’s]

head and body,” and that the defendant had moved Conley’s body

to the bottom of the stairs, “as evidenced by the facts that (1)

there was no blood under [Conley’s] body, showing that he did not

die in that location, (2) [Conley’s] leg was stiff and raised off the

ground, showing that the defendant [had] moved his body to that

location after [Conley] was already in a state of rigor [mortis], and

(3) [Conley] had lividity on the posterior of his body, indicating

that he was on his back after death, rather than on his stomach,

as he was found when the police arrived.”

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Appendix A

weighted and sharp object to repeatedly bludgeon [Conley]

over the head, a vital area of the body.” Furthermore, the

court reasoned that the fact that the defendant had the

ability to call for help but failed to summon treatment for

a grievous wound “is consistent with an antecedent intent

to cause death.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The

court also found that the defendant had attempted to stage

the scene to make it appear as if Conley had fallen down

the stairs. The court concluded that “[t]he cumulative

force of the defendant’s actions and inactions supports

the inference that the defendant had the requisite intent

to kill [Conley]. This includes, but is not limited to, the

evidence that the defendant (1) used a sharp-edged weapon

to inflict [Conley’s] injuries, which caused substantial

blood loss, (2) failed to seek medical help while [Conley]

bled out, (3) dragged [Conley’s] body, and (4) lied to the

911 dispatcher, the paramedic, and the responding police

officers regarding the cause of [Conley’s] injuries.”

Lastly, the trial court noted that, even though it

did not suppress the hospital confession, the evidence

established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt even without that confession. The court sentenced

the defendant to a total effective sentence of thirty-five

years of imprisonment, followed by ten years of special

parole. This appeal followed.

I

The defendant asserts that, even though the trial

court properly suppressed his station house confession,

the state “extensively relied on its tainted fruits in

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Appendix A

bringing about [the defendant’s] conviction [of] murder.”

The defendant claims that this deprived him of a fair

trial, as guaranteed by the due process clauses of both

the federal and state constitutions, and of his federal and

state constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

Specifically, the defendant points to the testimony of three

witnesses as being improperly tainted by the suppressed

station house confession, namely, Jacqueline Nunez, an

associate medical examiner; Trooper Mark Davison, an

expert in bloodstain pattern analysis; and the defendant’s

own expert, Mark Taff, a forensic pathologist.

At trial, although the defendant filed a motion to

suppress the station house confession, he made no claim

that the confession affected other parts of the trial or the

previously mentioned expert witnesses. The defendant’s

failure to raise this claim renders it unpreserved.10 Given

10. The defendant contends that, after being found guilty but

before sentencing, he personally raised the claim that, even though

the trial court properly suppressed the station house confession,

that confession nevertheless affected his right to a fair trial

because the prosecutor and the trial court extensively relied on it

to bring about his murder conviction. We note that the defendant

was still represented by counsel at that time, and his counsel did

not raise this claim to the trial court. In fact, the court, through

the panel’s presiding judge, explained to the defendant that he

“need[ed] to address that with [his] attorney and [that] there [were]

appropriate ways for [him] to address that exact issue . . . .” The

presiding judge was “certain that [defense counsel would] advise

[him] as to how to do that.” Indeed, the judge further explained to

the defendant that his counsel could pursue the claim in a motion

for a new trial. Thereafter, defense counsel moved for a new trial

but did not pursue the claim that the defendant now raises on

appeal. As a result, this claim was not preserved.

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the constitutional nature of the claim, however, we will

employ our familiar Golding analysis to address his

unpreserved claim. See State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233,

239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989); see also In re Yasiel R., 317

Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015) (modifying third

prong of Golding).11 In doing so, we conclude that the

defendant’s claim fails under Golding’s first prong because

the record is not adequate for review.

In the present case, the defendant asserts that the

testimony of Nunez, Davison, and Taff was tainted by

the suppressed station house confession. Particularly, the

defendant claims that each of these witnesses developed

his or her opinion based in part on the OCME report,

which referred to the suppressed confession. To sustain

the validity of his claim, the defendant would need to

demonstrate that these witnesses knew of and had

reviewed the OCME report in reaching their conclusions

about which they testified and that the references to

the station house confession contained in the OCME

report affected each expert’s conclusion. We reject the

defendant’s Golding claim because the record is not

adequate for this purpose. We address this issue with

respect to each expert in turn.

11. A defendant may prevail on an unpreserved claim under

Golding when “(1) the record is adequate to review the alleged

claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging

the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional

violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial;

and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to

demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation

beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Golding,

supra, 213 Conn. 239–40; see In re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn. 781.

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A

At trial, Nunez testified that she performed an

autopsy on Conley on March 21, 2019. Nunez also testified

that, as a result of the autopsy, she concluded that the

cause of Conley’s death was “chop wounds of the head,”

the mechanism of his death was exsanguination (loss of

blood), and the manner of his death was homicide. She also

testified about Conley’s death certificate, which she signed

on March 21, 2019. Under the first prong of Golding, in

order for this court to consider the defendant’s claim,

the record must contain sufficient facts for this court to

determine whether Nunez had read the OCME report

before completing the autopsy and whether that report

had influenced the results of the autopsy report or the

death certificate. The record is devoid of such evidence.

Nunez testified that, prior to conducting the autopsy

on Conley, she had received “some of the preliminary

investigative information.” She also testified that she

could recall only that “there was a concern because of

statements that had been made [by the defendant] at the

scene and . . . [that the scene] was treated as suspicious

from the beginning.” Nunez further testified that she

did not remember whether she had been informed that

the police had found an axe during their sweep of the

property. Notably, Nunez testified that she was not sure

whether she had reviewed the OCME report prior to

conducting the autopsy on Conley, but she implied that it

was unlikely because the OCME report was certified one

week after she had conducted the autopsy. Therefore, the

record is inadequate for us to determine whether Nunez

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Appendix A

possessed a copy of the OCME report when she conducted

the autopsy, let alone to consider whether that report

influenced the findings contained in the autopsy report

or the death certificate.

The defendant asserts that there was evidence that

Nunez necessarily had reviewed the OCME report prior

to conducting the autopsy because she testified that she

had received “preliminary information” from the medical

investigator and because General Statutes § 19a-406 (b)12

requires the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner “to

perform autopsies in connection with the investigation”

of certain deaths. We disagree. There is no requirement

in § 19a-406 that the person conducting the autopsy

review the OCME report prior to conducting the autopsy.

Rather, § 19a-406 (a) prescribes the types of deaths that

the chief medical examiner must investigate, identifies

the individuals who may perform or request an autopsy,

and requires that “[t]he findings of the investigation at

the scene of death” and the autopsy “be filed in the Office

of the Chief Medical Examiner.” More definitively, Nunez

testified that she did not know if she was in possession of a

copy of the OCME report when she performed the autopsy

on Conley and completed his death certificate. Therefore,

even if this court were to consider the requirements of

§ 19a-406, they do not provide the necessary factual record

to review the defendant’s claim.

12. Although § 19a-406 was amended during a special session

in July, 2020; see Public Acts, Spec. Sess., July, 2020, No. 20-1,

§ 36; that amendment has no bearing on the merits of this appeal.

In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of

the statute.

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Simply put, the defendant did not establish a factual

basis for this court to determine whether Nunez reviewed

the OCME report before conducting the autopsy and

whether her findings and testimony were influenced by

the references to the station house confession contained

in the OCME report. “If the facts revealed by the record

are insufficient, unclear or ambiguous as to whether a

constitutional violation has occurred, [this court] will

not attempt to supplement or reconstruct the record, or

to make factual determinations, in order to decide the

defendant’s claim.” State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 240.

Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence is not sufficient

to review the defendant’s claim regarding Nunez.

B

Similarly, the record is inadequate to review the

defendant’s claim regarding Davison. Davison testified

first about the general methodology for performing

bloodstain pattern analysis and the limitations of that

analysis. He explained that he had reviewed crime scene

photographs and reports, and that he had inspected

some of the other items of evidence in reaching his

conclusions. Ultimately, Davison testified about utilizing

the photographs to determine where bloodstains were

found throughout the house and described the various

bloodstain definitions and what they may indicate. He

did not testify about the cause of Conley’s death, who

caused Conley’s death, who moved Conley, who altered

the bloodstains, or what instrument caused the stains.

On direct examination, Davison testified that he had

a copy of the OCME report in his possession when he

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prepared his own report, but he was not asked whether the

OCME report impacted his findings. Davison explained

that he reached his conclusions based on an analysis of

“the scene . . . .” Defense counsel also did not question him

as to whether the OCME report influenced his report.

Rather, defense counsel’s cross-examination focused on

the possibility that the transfer stains had been caused

by the dogs, insofar as they may have walked through or

licked up the blood.

Moreover, Davison, in his findings, did not refer to

the OCME report in general or to the references to the

station house confession contained therein, and there is

nothing in the record to demonstrate what impact, if any,

the suppressed statements had on his findings.13 Indeed,

given the scientific nature of Davison’s testimony and the

fact that he did not reach a conclusion about the cause or

manner of Conley’s death, there is no record to credit the

defendant’s speculative claim that Davison’s testimony

was improperly tainted by the station house confession.

C

The defendant also claims that Taff’s testimony

was tainted by the station house confession because the

prosecutor referred to it in her cross-examination of

Taff and in her closing argument. In response, the state

13. To the extent the defendant points to the fact that Davison

testified that he had a copy of “Barbero’s interrogation report,” the

record is also inadequate to review that claim. This is because it is

unclear from the record what was contained in Barbero’s report,

as the report was not entered into evidence at trial.

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asserts that the prosecutor did not taint Taff’s testimony

by referencing the station house confession and that, to the

contrary, Taff spontaneously mentioned the OCME report

during his testimony because it was defense counsel, not

the prosecutor, who had provided the OCME report to

Taff, the defense’s own expert witness, whom defense

counsel called to challenge Nunez’ conclusions.

Our review of the record confirms that the prosecutor

did not question Taff about the defendant’s station house

confession. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked

Taff if he knew about the defendant’s hospital confession,

which had not been suppressed. The prosecutor asked,

“[a]re you aware that [the] defendant admitted to the

police that ‘my life is ruined, I murdered [Conley], how

do I tell people I killed my husband?’” The language of

the prosecutor’s question was a verbatim recitation of the

defendant’s unsuppressed hospital confession, in which the

defendant said: “[M]y life is ruined. I murdered [Conley].

How do I tell people I killed my husband?” To the extent

that there is any ambiguity about whether the defendant

thought that the prosecutor’s use of the phrase “admitted

to the police” referred to the suppressed station house

confession, the record is inadequate on this point.

It was Taff who referenced the OCME report, by

stating that he “remember[ed] [the defendant] making

some incriminating statements about . . . using an axe . . .

in the [OCME] report . . . .” Taff then testified that he took

the OCME report into consideration when conducting his

analysis, but he failed to explain how the report affected

his conclusions. The prosecutor followed up by asking

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Taff, “and yet . . . you’re still here, and you’re indicating

that it’s accident by suicide?” Taff responded: “I said

that this could be an accident because it could be selfinjurious, self-inflicted types of injuries. I did not call this

a clear-cut suicide.” At no point, however, did either the

prosecutor or Taff expressly refer to the station house

confession. More important, Taff never suggested that

the suppressed statement influenced his opinion. Under

these circumstances, the record is inadequate to review

the defendant’s unpreserved claim that the station house

confession tainted Taff’s testimony.

The defendant also claims that the prosecutor,

during her closing argument, improperly referenced

Taff’s allegedly tainted testimony. We reject this claim

because the prosecutor, during her closing argument,

did not refer to the station house confession but, instead,

merely argued that Taff had not reviewed the “statements

from the defendant,” which we take as a reference to the

unsuppressed hospital confession or to the unchallenged

statement that the defendant had given to Barbero while

at the hospital. Thus, the record is devoid of evidence

to establish the factual predicate for the defendant’s

claim—that the prosecutor referred to the station house

confession—and the claim is, therefore, unreviewable.

To summarize, we conclude that the defendant’s claims

regarding the suppressed station house confession fail the

first prong of Golding and are unreviewable.14

14. To the extent the defendant raises a general claim that

his constitutional rights were violated because the trial court

failed to step in to prevent the use of the station house confession,

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II

The defendant claims that the admission into evidence

of the hospital confession violated his right to due process

because the statements were a product of the thirteen hour

station house interrogation and confession. In response,

the state contends that, even if we assume that evidence

of the hospital confession was improperly admitted, the

state has established beyond a reasonable doubt that any

impropriety was harmless. Specifically, the state asserts

that any error was harmless because, in its memorandum

of decision, the trial court explained that, even if it did

not consider the hospital confession, the other evidence

established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.15 We agree with the state.

even though the statements the defendant had made during the

confession had “spread like wildfire into nearly all other material

aspects of this case,” even beyond the three witnesses he has

identified, we conclude that the claim is inadequately briefed. Other

than the testimony of the three witnesses that we have addressed

in this opinion, the defendant does not point to any specific aspect

of the trial that was impacted by his station house confession.

Accordingly, we decline to review this general claim.

15. In his reply brief, the defendant asserts that this court

cannot rely on the trial court’s observation regarding the defendant’s

hospital confession to conclude that its admission into evidence

was harmless because, as this court recently noted in State v.

Alexander, 343 Conn. 495, 507 n.10, 275 A.3d 199 (2022), the question

of harmlessness is “reserved to ‘an appellate court applying the

correct standard of review,’“ and this court may not speculate as to

the degree of influence an objectionable finding had on a final result.

We reiterate, as we did in State v. Alexander, supra, 343

Conn. 510, that the trial court’s comment regarding the impact of

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“In conducting a harmless error analysis, the

dispositive issue is ‘the impact of the [allegedly improperly

admitted] evidence on the trier of fact and the result of the

trial.’” State v. Alexander, 343 Conn. 495, 507, 275 A.3d

199 (2022), quoting State v. Armadore, 338 Conn. 407, 437,

258 A.3d 601 (2021). We have concluded that, when the

case is “tried to a court, not a jury . . . our harmless error

analysis is facilitated substantially by the express findings

contained in the memorandum of decision by which the

[trial court] returned [its] ultimate finding of guilt.” State

v. Alexander, supra, 506; see, e.g., Ghiroli v. Ghiroli, 184

Conn. 406, 408, 439 A.2d 1024 (1981) (recognizing that

trial court’s explanation that contested evidence “‘was

not considered by [the court]’” refuted plaintiff’s claim of

error); see also, e.g., State v. Velazquez, 197 Conn. App.

754, 762–63, 231 A.3d 1269 (2020) (“[D]uring the trial, the

[trial] court stated that it did not ‘[find] the testimony that

the car smelled of marijuana . . . to be that material [to]

the case’ . . . [and that] it was not drawing the conclusion

that the defendant had been smoking marijuana . . . .

[Therefore, the Appellate Court] conclude[d] that any

error was harmless.”).

the defendant’s hospital confession is not the same as a finding of

harmlessness by this court. However, the trial court’s observation

is strong evidence of the impact the hospital confession had on it,

as the fact finder, and we can use that evidence in reaching our

conclusion that the state has established beyond a reasonable doubt

that any impropriety was harmless. See id. (“[t]he [trial court’s]

‘insistent remarks’ that the defendant’s ‘statements had no effect

on [its] decision[s]’ reinforce[d] [this court’s] confidence in [its] own

conclusion that the [improperly admitted evidence] had no impact

on the guilty findings at issue”).

20a

Appendix A

Upon reviewing the trial court’s findings in the

present case in the context of the entire record, we

conclude that the defendant’s hospital confession did not

materially impact the court or the result of the trial.

The trial court did not rely on the hospital confession in

reaching its conclusions. Indeed, in its memorandum of

decision, the court explained that it “did not suppress

the spontaneous statements the defendant made within

Geddes’ earshot because they were neither made in

response to police interrogation nor the result of coercive

police conduct. Nonetheless, the [court] unanimously

concluded that the evidence established the defendant’s

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, even in the absence of

these statements.”

The trial court found that the defendant’s story

was not credible, and it based its finding on the forensic

evidence presented at trial. On the basis of this evidence,

the court determined that the bloodstain evidence showed

that “the assault on [Conley] was not [caused by] a single

blow. . . . Notwithstanding [Conley’s] unmistakable need

for immediate medical intervention, the defendant failed

to call for help, despite the evidence that the defendant had

the ability to make a call . . . .” The court also found that

none of the defendant’s explanations “to the 911 operator,

[to] the paramedic, and to the responding [police] officers

. . . [is] supported by the evidence [because] . . . [b]oth .

. . Taff and . . . Nunez agree[d] that [Conley’s] injuries

were not the result of a fall.” (Footnote omitted.) Lastly,

the court considered Taff’s “alternative scenarios,” but it

did not credit his theory that Conley’s wounds were selfinflicted due to the “location, number, and severity of the

. . . wounds . . . .”

21a

Appendix A

Accordingly, after conducting our own independent,

scrupulous review of the record, we conclude that, even

if the trial court improperly admitted the defendant’s

hospital confession, any alleged error was harmless

because the court would have found the defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt in the absence of the hospital

confession. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 800 F.2d 129,

136 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[t]he trial court specifically stated it

would disregard the disputed evidence from its evaluation

of [the] defendant’s guilt, and despite any court’s ‘many

human [frailties],’ we must take that statement as true”).

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

22a

Appendix A

McDONALD, J., with whom D’AURIA and ECKER,

Js., join, concurring. This is a textbook case that

demonstrates, in both dramatic and dangerous fashion,

what can go wrong when the police improperly conduct an

interview of a suspect. Although I agree with the majority

that the judgment of conviction should be affirmed and

join its opinion, I write separately to highlight the deeply

troubling—perhaps even reckless—manner in which

state police officers conducted the interrogation of the

defendant, James Maharg, while he was in a seriously

compromised medical state as a result of long-term

alcohol abuse.1 The actions of these officers seriously

endangered the defendant’s physical health, violated

both the defendant’s constitutional rights and state police

policy, and needlessly jeopardized the integrity of the

investigation and the ensuing prosecution of this case, all

of which undermined the ends of justice.

I begin by emphasizing the shockingly disturbing

circumstances under which the state police conducted

the defendant’s interrogation, for approximately thirteen

hours, while the defendant was clearly in the dangerous

throes of alcohol withdrawal. Trooper Isaiah Gonzalez

responded to the defendant’s house around 2:20 a.m.,

following the defendant’s 911 call reporting that the

defendant found the victim, the defendant’s husband,

Thomas Conley, lying on the floor “dead” after having

hit his head on a kitchen cabinet earlier that evening. As

the trial court noted, at that time, “the defendant made

1. The defendant was convicted of murder in violation of

General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) and tampering with or fabricating

physical evidence in violation of General Statutes § 53a-155.

On appeal, the defendant does not challenge his conviction of

tampering with or fabricating physical evidence.

23a

Appendix A

several spontaneous statements in [Gonzalez’] presence,

including that he and the [victim] ha[d] been drinking

a lot since they lost their business and that they had

been drinking earlier that evening.” At the scene, police

officers observed “alcohol bottles” on the kitchen counter,

noting that “[s]ome [of the bottles] were empty, [and]

some were not.” At approximately 4 a.m., the defendant

was transported to State Police Troop A barracks in

Southbury. As the trial court found, during the first hour

of the interrogation at the police station, Gonzalez and

Detective Jared Barbero discussed, among other things,

“the fact that the defendant had consumed a significant

amount of alcohol the prior evening.”

Barbero and another detective, Ed Vayan, proceeded

to interrogate the defendant for another approximately

twelve hours, despite the defendant’s repeated requests

to terminate the interview. To compound the disturbing

nature of the interrogation, the police officers continued

the interrogation even though the defendant was visibly

shaking, and they acknowledged that the defendant was

exhibiting signs of alcohol withdrawal. The defendant’s

shaking was so intense that he was unable to sign his name

on the Miranda notice form to purportedly “certif[y]” that

he had been “advised” of his constitutional rights. Instead,

at Vayan’s direction, the defendant was told to “just make

[his] mark” on the form. As witnessed by Barbero and

Vayan, this is the “mark” of the defendant:

24a

Appendix A

It is hard to imagine that, given the defendant’s

condition, he was able to meaningfully understand the

constitutional rights the police purportedly advised him

of, much less that he understood how to meaningfully

exercise them. For hours during the intensely suggestive

interrogation, in addition to violently shaking, the

defendant vomited numerous times and repeatedly denied

having killed the victim. Ultimately, the defendant acceded

to the officers’ suggested narrative that he had used a

hatchet to murder the victim—which was never supported

by any physical evidence—and thus confessed to killing

the victim. It was not until approximately thirteen hours

into the interrogation, after the defendant had a seizure,

that the defendant was transported to a hospital for

alcohol withdrawal treatment. Under these extraordinary

circumstances, I am hard-pressed to understand why the

state did not readily acknowledge, at oral argument before

this court, that the police interrogation in this case was

inexcusable and violated the defendant’s constitutional

rights, as the three judge trial court determined when it

granted the defendant’s motion to suppress with respect

to the entire thirteen hour interview.

To be clear, the state police seriously endangered the

defendant’s health by ignoring his obvious signs of physical

distress and urgent need for medical treatment. As the

trial court found, “[f]rom the outset of the interview, both

Barbero and Vayan understood that the defendant had

been drinking very heavily at the time of the incident.

Barbero and Vayan talked about the defendant’s need to

sober up and observed the defendant shaking to the point

that he could neither hold a cup of coffee steady nor legibly

25a

Appendix A

sign his own name [on] the Miranda form.” A few hours

into the interview, the defendant pleaded with Barbero

and Vayan that he “need[ed] a drink so bad.” In response,

Barbero stated, “[y]eah, I can see the withdrawal all

over you.” The defendant made additional pleas of, “[o]h

my God, I need a drink so bad,” and “I can’t stand it,

I can’t stand this shaking.” The trial court found that,

instead of seeking immediate medical assistance, “[t]he

detectives responded by putting the defendant in a cell.”

The defendant was then brought back into the interview

room, at which point he told the police officers, “I need

to go to the hospital to get off this, and I need detox.”

The defendant subsequently stated, “I need help.” Vayan

responded, “I know you do,” and, notwithstanding that

acknowledgment, he and Barbero proceeded to continue

questioning the defendant. It was only after the defendant

began experiencing a seizure and became “cyanotic” 2

that the ordeal finally came to an end and an ambulance

was called. By placing the defendant in serious medical

jeopardy, the officers’ treatment of the defendant can only

be described as recklessly indifferent. 3

2. When paramedics arrived, Barbero told them that

the defendant was in “[a]lcohol withdrawal” and that he went

“cyanotic,” which, as the trial court explained, indicated “that his

skin had turned a bluish color.” See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate

Dictionary (11th Ed. 2014) p. 310 (defining “cyanosis” as “a bluish

or purplish discoloration (as of skin) due to deficient oxygenation

of the blood”).

3. “[A]cute alcohol withdrawal . . . can cause significant

illness and death. Some patients experience seizures, which may

increase in severity with subsequent [alcohol withdrawal] episodes.

Another potential [alcohol withdrawal] complication is delirium

26a

Appendix A

Even putting aside the indifferent nature of law

enforcement’s treatment of the defendant, the officers’

actions needlessly jeopardized the integrity of the

investigation and subsequent prosecution of the defendant.

Moreover, Barbero testified that state police policy

required that state police officers bring a suspect

exhibiting signs of alcohol withdrawal to a medical

facility Barbero and Vayan clearly did not abide by that

policy, and, when asked at oral argument whether those

officers were ever disciplined for that violation, the state

responded, “I do not know.” In a case such as this, the

state would be well served to come to oral argument before

this court equipped with information and persuasive

arguments for why this court need not take action to

ensure law enforcement’s compliance with state law and

its own internal policies. Discipline is one such piece of

information. Without knowing such information, the state

does nothing meaningful to quell concerns when the state

police so brazenly ignore their own policies and, more

importantly, the law. My own independent review of the

record does not reveal that Barbero and Vayan were ever

disciplined in any manner for their actions.

These observations about the police officers’ actions

in this case are far from irrelevant. Courts must often

consider whether there are policies or other incentives or

tremens, characterized by hallucinations, mental confusion, and

disorientation.” L. Trevisan et al., “Complications of Alcohol

Withdrawal: Pathophysiological Insights,” 22 Alcohol Health &

Rsch. World 61, 61 (1998), available at https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.

gov/articles/PMC6761825/pdf/arh-22-1-61.pdf (last visited July

7, 2025).

27a

Appendix A

disincentives in place to ensure that state officials conform

their conduct to law. As we have recently noted, courts

regularly struggle to acquire reliable information about

whether existing constitutional or prophylactic rules are

working (or new ones are desirable) to deter misconduct

that violates not only the rights of those who become

suspects, targets or criminal defendants, but the rights

of all of us who are members of a free society. Indeed, this

is not the only case in this court year in which we have

had to grapple with this challenge. For example, in State

v. Haynes, 352 Conn. 236, A.3d (2025), we were asked to

devise a new prophylactic rule under the state constitution

for instances in which the state wants to use an illegally

obtained statement to impeach the trial testimony of a

defendant in a criminal case. See id., 250–51 and n.10.

Although we declined, over a spirited dissent; see id., 264

(Ecker, J., concurring and dissenting); to overrule a prior

case from this court addressing this question; see State

v. Reid, 193 Conn. 646, 480 A.2d 463 (1984); we observed

that “[t]he legitimacy of prophylactic constitutional

rules derives from their necessity. . . . There is general

agreement that courts should use their authority to devise

prophylactic rules cautiously and to tailor them to be as

narrow as possible to accomplish their purpose. . . . Courts

create prophylactic rules when they determine that the

risk of a constitutional violation is sufficiently great [such]

that simple case-by-case enforcement of the core right

is insufficient to secure that right. . . . This court has

demonstrated that it will devise and implement additional

prophylactic rules, beyond those that federal law compels,

when we are persuaded that they are necessary to protect

the constitutional rights within our state.” (Citations

28a

Appendix A

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Haynes, supra, 250–51 n.10.

Our consideration of whether to adopt a new or

modified prophylactic rule under state law is not the only

instance in which we will often look to whether there

are other incentives or disincentives in place to ensure

that state officials will conform their conduct to law. To

cite one example, when we are faced with the question of

whether to extend absolute immunity to state actors for

actions taken in the course of their duties, one relevant

consideration is whether there are sufficient checks in

place that discourage state officials from violating the

law. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 522–23,

105 S. Ct. 2806, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1985) (“[M]ost of the

officials who are entitled to absolute immunity from

liability for damages are subject to other checks that help

to prevent abuses of authority from going unredressed.

Legislators are accountable to their constituents . . . and

the judicial process is largely self-correcting: procedural

rules, appeals, and the possibility of collateral challenges

obviate the need for damages actions to prevent unjust

results.” (Citation omitted.)); Khan v. Yale University, 347

Conn. 1, 28–29, 295 A.3d 855 (2023) (“[b]ecause absolute

immunity removes the threat of private defamation actions

in order to incentivize witnesses to participate candidly

and willingly in the proceeding, it is crucial that there be

some strong deterrent, such as the threat of a perjury

prosecution, against abuse of the privilege by the giving

of untruthful testimony”).

In sum, there are various circumstances in which

courts look for policies or other rules that may ensure

29a

Appendix A

a public official’s compliance with state law, short of

this court stepping in to ensure such compliance. It is

incumbent on the state to assure this court that there

are mechanisms in place to ensure compliance with state

law and to protect an individual’s constitutional rights. In

this case, we have no assurances that existing measures

are sufficient to deter the type of reckless indifference

exhibited by the police officers. Such assurances could

have included, for example, the fact that the officers

were disciplined as a result of their violation of state

police policy or that their reckless indifference may have

jeopardized their qualified immunity. The state cannot

simply rely on the absence of any relevant evidence or

an agreed on measure of determining the prevalence of

similar violations to avoid the development of a new rule.

Here, there is no question that the police officers were

aware that the defendant had been drinking heavily at

the time of the incident and was in the throes of alcohol

withdrawal during the interrogation. Indeed, the trial

court found as much. For example, and in addition to the

evidence already discussed, when asked at the probable

cause hearing whether the defendant appeared to have

been drinking, Gonzalez stated that “[the defendant] did

have . . . [a] smell or . . . odor emanating from him that

smelled like it could [be an] . . . alcohol-like substance,

yes.” At trial, Gonzalez acknowledged that he remembered

testifying at the probable cause hearing that the defendant

had smelled like alcohol. Vayan testified at the probable

cause hearing that, during the police interrogation,

the defendant told him that “there was a lot of alcohol

30a

Appendix A

consumption involved” on the night of the murder. Vayan

also testified that the defendant was intoxicated “earlier”

in the interrogation and that he could smell alcohol on the

defendant during the interrogation. Barbero testified at

trial that the defendant had “tremors” and “[s]hakes”

during the interview but that the police did not “test his

breath or . . . blood” to determine if he was intoxicated.4

It is eminently reasonable for the public to expect

law enforcement to treat suspects within its custody in

a professional and humane manner, without needlessly

endangering their health and well-being. At a bare

minimum, law enforcement must follow its own policies

when it comes to caring for suspects within its custody.

In the present case, the police officers did neither, and we

have no assurances that their blatant breach of protocols

was an isolated incident. I am deeply concerned that the

officers acted with reckless indifference to the defendant’s

health and that the state did not find these actions troubling

enough to even inquire of the state police regarding any

disciplinary action taken or additional training that these

officers may have received as a result of their actions.

As a consequence, we have not been offered any of the

necessary assurances this court needs to determine

whether the acts of these officers were isolated in nature,

rather than a part of a more widespread, systemic problem

that might require this court to take action.

4. Although the defendant’s blood alcohol concentration was

not tested, the victim’s postmortem blood alcohol concentration

was 0.393 according to a toxicology report.

31a

Appendix A

Nevertheless, because the trial court properly

suppressed any statements made by the defendant

during the approximately thirteen hour station house

interrogation, we can expect that this ruling should serve

to deter future misconduct. Accordingly, I agree with

the majority that the judgment of conviction should be

affirmed.

I would, however, hope and expect that it would not

take the trial court’s exclusion of the statements that the

defendant made during the interrogation to incentivize law

enforcement to follow clear law and policy. Put differently,

I do not consider this a paradigmatic case that our system

worked. One of the purposes of the exclusionary rule is to

deter police misconduct, but not only in cases that end up

being litigated. If we were to suspect that the exclusion

of evidence in a case that went to trial did not sufficiently

deter misconduct, we might conclude that a particular

aspect of our system is not working, requiring, in an

appropriate case, that we devise a more robust rule.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.

32a

B

APPENDIX B —Appendix

MEMORANDUM

OF THE

SUPERIOR COURT, JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

DANBURY, FILED DECEMBER 2, 2022

SUPERIOR COURT

JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF DANBURY

DOCKET NO. DBD-CR190159438-S

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

v.

JAMES MAHARG

Filed December 2, 2022

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The state filed a two-count information charging

James Maharg with the crimes of Murder, in violation of

Section 53a-54a of the Connecticut General Statutes, and

Tampering with Evidence, in violation of Section 53a-155

of the Connecticut General Statutes. The charges arose

from events that occurred on March 19, 2019.

The panel heard testimony and the arguments of

counsel over the course of approximately eight days.

During the trial, numerous exhibits were received

into evidence. The panel has considered all the evidence

presented in this case from both the state and the

defendant. In reaching its conclusions, the court has: (1)

considered the evidence received during trial, including

33a

Appendix B

evaluating the credibility of the witnesses; (2) assessed

the weight, if any, to be given specific evidence and measured

the probative force of conflicting evidence; (3) reviewed all

exhibits, relevant statutes, and case law; and (4) drawn

such inferences from the evidence or facts established by

the evidence that it deems reasonable and logical. The

court’s credibility determinations were based upon the

conduct, demeanor, and attitude of the witnesses. See

Lapointe v. Commissioner of Corrections, 316 Conn. 225,

268-71, 112 A.3d 1 (2015). Additionally, any other evidence

on the record not specifically mentioned in this decision

that would support a contrary conclusion, whether such

evidence was contested or uncontested by the parties,

was considered and rejected by the court. See State v.

Edmonds, 323 Conn. 34 (2016).

FINDINGS OF FACT

I.

The Crime Scene

Based on the evidence presented and the reasonable

and logical inferences drawn therefrom, the panel

unanimously finds the following facts: on March 20,

2019, at approximately 2:00 a.m., the defendant called

911 from the landline in his home stating “My husband

is dead. My husband is dead.” During the 911 call (Ex. 2),

the defendant told the dispatcher that he and his husband

(hereinafter “victim”) had been drinking heavily and

that the victim fell and hit his head on a kitchen cabinet.

The defendant described the victim’s injury as a “big

gash,” and said that he “knew it was bad because he was

bleeding heavily.” The defendant claimed that he was

34a

Appendix B

able to stop the bleeding, and that they had gone to bed

around 9 p.m.

The defendant told the dispatcher that he had just

awoken and gone downstairs, where he found the victim

on the floor. The defendant said that he did not know how

the victim got downstairs. When asked if he thought the

victim was “beyond help,” the defendant responded, “Yes.

He’s cold.” The defendant also told the dispatcher that he

and the victim had been having financial issues prior to

this incident and that the victim was “cold as a rock.”

The call was then transferred to the Connecticut State

Police Dispatch Center. During the second portion of the

911 call (Ex. 5), the defendant reiterated that he and the

victim had been drinking and that the victim fell and hit

his head on a kitchen cabinet. The defendant stated that

he put paper towels on the “big gash” on the victim’s head

and that the victim asked for a wet cloth. The defendant

told the dispatcher that he was covered in blood and

that there was blood everywhere in the house. He asked

the dispatcher, “Can you make him okay? He’s cold.” The

defendant also asked “What am I going to do? What are

you going to do with me? Are you going to take me?” and

commented, “He’s dead. Stupid drinking.”

At 2:02 a.m., the police and an ambulance were

dispatched to 99 Church Street in Sherman, Connecticut,

which was the defendant’s and victim’s residence.

Paramedic Justin Walsh testified that he was the first to

arrive on scene at approximately 2:18 a.m. Upon entering

the house, Walsh saw that the victim was naked and lying

35a

Appendix B

prone at the base of the stairs. Walsh testified that the

victim did not have any vital signs, was in full rigor mortis,

and was cold to the touch. Walsh explained that while

rigor mortis sets in within a few hours of death, it takes

approximately four hours for a body to turn cold. Walsh

concluded, based upon his training and experience, that

the victim had died several hours earlier.

Walsh saw that the victim had one large and two

smaller head wounds that were filled with clotted

blood. (Ex. 3-30). Walsh testified that the biggest head

wound was much larger and deeper than he had ever

seen from a simple fall. Walsh explained that although

head wounds bleed profusely, there was no blood on the

victim’s head or body and no blood on the floor under

where the victim lay. Walsh observed that the victim had

lividity on the back of his body, indicating that he had

died on his back rather than face down, as he was found.

(Ex. 3-23). Walsh also saw that the victim’s left leg was

stiff and raised off the floor, leading Walsh to conclude

that the victim was moved after rigor mortis set in. Walsh

explained that if the victim had died in the location where

he was found his leg would be flat on the floor. (Ex. 3-22).

The defendant told Walsh that he and the victim had

been drinking and that the victim fell and hit his head on

a cabinet. The defendant initially told Walsh that he did

not know how the victim got downstairs, but then said

that he heard the victim fall down the stairs. Finally, the

defendant told Walsh that he and the victim used to have

millions of dollars but that they lost everything. Now,

the defendant explained, he and the victim spent much

of their time drinking and fighting with one another.

36a

Appendix B

Connecticut State Police (“CSP”) Trooper Isaiah

Gonzalez testified that he arrived at the defendant’s

residence at approximately 2:20 a.m. Gonzalez identified

several photographs taken in the early morning hours of

March 20, 2019, including two that depicted the defendant

wearing a blue denim shirt that was covered in large blood

stains. (Ex. 3-5 and 3-6). Gonzalez testified that the blood

stains, which were primarily located on the defendant’s

left sleeve and collar area, appeared to be dry.

CSP Trooper Laurence Gregg testified that on March

20, 2019, at approximately 2:00 a.m., he was dispatched

to a medical call on Church Street. When Gregg arrived,

he asked the defendant some questions about what had

occurred. Much of the conversation between Gregg and

the defendant was recorded by an audio recorder in

Gregg’s pocket. (Ex. 9). The defendant told Gregg that

the victim fell and hit his head on a cabinet, that he (the

defendant) used paper towels to clean the blood off the

kitchen floor, and that it was the victim’s blood on his

shirt. The defendant also stated the victim angrily asked

the defendant to give him a wet cloth, after which the

defendant helped the victim upstairs to bed. The defendant

told Gregg that there was no one in the house other than

the defendant, the victim, and their dogs.

At approximately 4:00 a.m., Trooper Gonzalez drove

the defendant to Troop A in Southbury. When they

arrived, CSP Detectives Jared Barbero and Ed Vayan

interviewed the defendant over a period of 13-hours.1 At

1. After a hearing, the panel found that the defendant’s

interview at the police barracks was conducted in violation of the

37a

Appendix B

approximately 5:00 p.m., the defendant was transported to

Waterbury Hospital to be treated for alcohol withdrawal.

CSP Trooper Matthew Geddes accompanied the defendant

in the ambulance.

Geddes testified that approximately two hours after

they arrived at the hospital, he was standing in the hall

seven to ten feet away from the defendant when he

heard the defendant say, “Where is my husband?” Geddes

testified that the defendant spoke clearly in a normal,

conversational tone and seemed sober when he made

the statement. Geddes documented the defendant’s

comment but did not respond. Thirty minutes later,

Geddes heard the defendant say, “My life is ruined. I

murdered Tom. How do I tell people I killed my husband?”

Again, Geddes documented the defendant’s statements

but did not respond. 2 Geddes explained that prior to

making these comments, the defendant had received

medical treatment and eaten a turkey sandwich.

5th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution. The

panel granted a motion to suppress, and the state was precluded

from using the statements made during the interview for any

purpose, including for cross-examination should the defendant

decide to testify. Accordingly, the panel did not consider the

content of the interview in reaching its decision.

2. The panel did not suppress the spontaneous statements the

defendant made within Geddes’ earshot because they were neither

made in response to police interrogation nor the result of coercive

police conduct. Nonetheless, the panel unanimously concluded that

the evidence established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt, even in the absence of these statements.

38a

Appendix B

II. Crime Scene Investigation

Several members of the Western District Major

Crimes, Crime Scene Unit (“WDMC”) testified about

processing the crime scene. The testimony established

that they arrived on scene at approximately noon. WDMC

took photographs and a video of the scene. They also

collected swabs of blood from various locations throughout

the house for DNA testing.

Of note, WDMC observed and/or recovered the following

items: in the living room, they recovered two blankets, a

robe, and paper products, all of which contained blood. In

the kitchen, there was blood on several areas of the floor,

most of which was smeared from having been wiped

up. There was blood on the dog’s water dish and on the

lower portion of a door that leads from the kitchen to the

exterior of the house. There were several paper towels,

a five-inch serrated knife, and an eight-and-a-half-inch

chefs knife in the sink, and a washcloth and paper towels

in the garbage can under the sink, all of which were

saturated with blood. There was also a blood smear on

the wall between the kitchen and the stairwell.

As previously described, the victim was lying prone

just outside the kitchen at the bottom of the stairway

that led to the bedrooms. The victim was naked; there

was very little blood on his body. While there was clotted

blood within the lacerations on the victim’s head, there

was no blood around the injuries or under the victim’s

body. There was one small bloodstain on the bottom stair

next to where the defendant lay.

39a

Appendix B

Upstairs, WDMC observed a swipe of blood on

the handrail, a small bloodstain above the handrail,

and a bloodstain on the top stair. They also observed

a significant amount of blood in the master bedroom,

including saturation stains on the bed, the comforter,

and the pillows. There was also blood on the trim outside

of the bathroom and on the edge of the bathroom sink. In

the guest room, WDMC observed saturation stains on

the bed, the pillow, and a washcloth next to the pillow,

and blood on the bathroom sink.

WDMC recovered two cell phones from the residence.

The defendant’s cell phone was recovered from the master

bedroom; the victim’s phone was recovered from the living

room. An analysis of the defendant’s telephone records

showed that the defendant made two phone calls on

March 20, 2019, at 12:57 a.m. – one to Kohl’s and one

to a friend that went unanswered. These calls were made

one hour before the defendant called the police from his

landline.

III. Blood Spatter Expert

CSP Captain Mark Davison testified as an expert

on bloodstain pattern analysis. From his examination of

the evidence and testimony, it can reasonably be inferred:

1.

The altered, wiped, and perimeter blood stains in the

kitchen and at the top of the stairwell demonstrated

that someone attempted to clean up the blood in these

areas.

40a

Appendix B

2.

The absence of blood on the floor surrounding the

victim indicated that the victim neither sustained his

injuries nor bled in this area.

3.

The livor mortis on the victim’s buttocks and other

posterior areas was not consistent with the position

in which the victim was found indicating that the

victim was moved post-mortem.

4.

The available data and scene context suggested

that there was an initial bloodshed event followed

by additional bloodshed event(s) with intervening

movement between locations.

5.

In the kitchen, there was one elliptically shaped

bloodstain on the dog’s water dish and two on the

lower portion of the kitchen door. The directionality

of the stains indicated that they were deposited

in a downward direction. These bloodstains are

consistent with spatter, meaning that they resulted

from airborne blood droplets that were created

when external force was applied to liquid blood.

6.

The 4-and-1/2-foot by 1-and-1/2-foot perimeter stain

on the floor in the kitchen indicated that a large pool of

blood was removed from this area. The comparatively

large area of bloodstaining was suggestive of the

origin of a bloodshed event.

7.

In the second-floor master bedroom, there were

small, elliptical bloodstains on the lower right

side of the exterior wall to the bathroom that were

41a

Appendix B

consistent with spatter stains. The directionality

of the stains indicated that they were deposited in

a downward direction. There were small circular

blood stains on the floor adjacent to that wall. Those

bloodstains were consistent with a cast-off pattern,

meaning that they resulted from blood drops

released from an object due to its motion.

8.

The presence of bloodstains on both the first floor and

the second floor indicated that the victim moved or

was moved between floors.

9.

The absence of visible bloodstaining on most of the

victim’s body and on the majority of the stairs indicated

that his injuries were covered during movement, his

skin was shielded from blood by clothing, and/or he

was cleaned.

10. The bloodstains on the bathrobe recovered from the

living room suggested that the victim was wearing

the robe at some point during a bloodshed event.

IV. Medical Examiner

Dr. Jacqueline Nunez is a board certified forensic

and anatomical pathologist who has been employed by

the State of Connecticut Office of the Chief Medical

Examiner as an Associate Medical Examiner since 2018.

She was previously employed by the New York City Office

of the Chief Medical Examiner as a forensic pathology

fellow. Dr. Nunez performed the autopsy on the victim

on March 21, 2019, at approximately 9:30 a.m. Prior

to that date, she had performed over 1,000 autopsies.

42a

Appendix B

Dr. Nunez testified at length regarding the victim’s

pre- and post-mortem injuries, the victim’s toxicology

report, and the manner and cause of death. Dr. Nunez

was also cross-examined at length regarding the

victim’s prior medical history. The focus of the crossexamination was what, if any, effect it would have

had on her determination regarding the manner and

cause of death had she reviewed the history before issuing

the death certificate.

With respect to pre-mortem injuries, Dr. Nunez

found that the victim had chop wounds to the top of his

head and blunt impact injuries to the head, neck, torso,

and extremities. The largest of the chop wounds was

positioned horizontally across the victim’s parietal scalp

and measured approximately 4 and 3/8 inches long by 1/2

of an inch wide by 1/4 of an inch deep. Dr. Nunez explained

that the scalp was avulsed at the site of the injury, meaning

that the scalp had pulled away from the skull.

Also on the parietal scalp was a second horizontal

wound that measured 1 and 1/4 inches long by 1/4 of an inch

wide by 3/ 8 of an inch deep. Located to the anterior of the

largest of the two wounds were a 1/2 of an inch by 1/8 of

an inch curvilinear laceration and a superficial 1/4 of an

inch by 1/16 of an inch vertical laceration. While the skull

was not fractured, there was subscapular hemorrhaging

of the frontal and parietal scalp.

Dr. Nunez determined that the head injuries were

consistent with chop wounds. Dr. Nunez explained that

the center of the largest wound showed signs of blunt

43a

Appendix B

force trauma while the edges of the injury were smooth

and straight. Dr. Nunez determined that the injury was

consistent with having been caused by an object that had a

sharp edge and weight such as a hatchet or ax. Dr. Nunez

did not believe that the wounds were consistent with

falling into a cabinet or a table due to their horizontal

orientation, the number of injuries, the proximity of the

injuries to one another, and their location on the top of

the victim’s head. Dr. Nunez explained that because the

head is round, a person who falls would not suffer multiple

injuries so near to one another as the victim did in this

case. Rather, Dr. Nunez concluded that the injuries

were a result of repeated impact applied to the same

area. Dr. Nunez explained that the head wounds were

so significant that the bleeding would not have stopped

without sutures.

Dr. Nunez noted that the victim had multiple

pre-mortem contusions and abrasions all over his body

including on his head, tongue, abdomen, left elbow, left

wrist, left knee, left calf, right forearm, right shin, and

right toe.

With respect to post-mortem injuries, Dr. Nunez

documented several orange­brown abrasions to the

victim’s forehead, nose, cheek, neck, shoulder, chest,

knee, and thigh. Dr. Nunez explained that these types

of injuries can occur from something rubbing against

the victim’s skin after his death. The victim’s lumbar

spine was fractured in the pelvic region. The lack of

soft tissue hemorrhaging meant the break occurred

post­ mortem.

44a

Appendix B

Dr. Nunez testified that the victim had a fatty liver

consistent with excessive alcohol usage. At the time of

death, the victim’s blood alcohol level was a .393 (or .466 in

the vitreous fluid of the eye), which Dr. Nunez explained

was not necessarily high for someone who chronically

abuses alcohol. The victim’s blood also showed a reading

of 8.9 milligrams per deciliter of methanol which is an

alcohol often found in solvents; it is also found in small

amounts in commercially produced alcoholic beverages.

(Ex. 11). However, Dr. Nunez testified that the amount of

methanol in the victim’s system would have had to have

been at least double to be significant.

Dr. Nunez also testified that the victim had livor

mortis on various areas of his body, including on his

buttocks, the back of his head, the back of his shoulder, his

genitalia, and his right frontal scalp. Dr. Nunez explained

that liver mortis occurs approximately four to six hours

after death and, if the body is moved during that time, the

livor mortis can move, as well. The fact that the victim’s

body displayed livor mortis both on the front and back

of his body indicated that he was moved after he was

deceased.

Finally, Dr. Nunez testified that the victim’s internal

organs all appeared pale and that the livor mortis, although

dispersed throughout both sides of the victim’s body,

was scant. Dr. Nunez explained that these findings are

consistent with a loss of blood.

Dr. Nunez conclusively ruled out suicide explaining

that the chop wounds on the top of the victim’s head were

inconsistent with having been self-inflicted. She also

45a

Appendix B

ruled out an accidental death due to the appearance,

proximity, number, and location of the wounds. Moreover,

while the liver damage may have made it more difficult

for the victim’s blood to clot, Dr. Nunez concluded that

neither alcohol, alcoholism nor any of the victim’s other

pre-existing medical concerns were the cause of his

death. Instead, Dr. Nunez determined that the victim’s

manner of death was homicide, the cause of death was

chop wounds to the head, and the mechanism of death

was exsanguination. Dr. Nunez explained that the

victim could have died within minutes of the injuries,

but that it also may have taken several hours for him

to bleed to death.

V. Defendant’s Statement

On March 21, 2019, Detective Barbero went to

Waterbury hospital to speak with the defendant; this was

done at the defendant’s request. When Barbero entered

the room, he set up video and audio recording equipment.

During the conversation, the defendant stated that

while they were arguing the victim fell toward him. The

defendant said that he pushed the victim away causing

him to fall into the kitchen cabinet. The defendant

then told Barbero that the victim was unstable and

hypothesized that the victim might have fallen outside

and hit his head on a rock. The defendant suggested that

Barbero should test the rock and a hatchet to determine

if there were blood on them.

46a

Appendix B

VI. The Defense

The defendant called Dr. Mark Taff as his only witness.

Dr. Taff has been board certified in anatomical and forensic

pathology since 1988 and licensed to practice medicine in

New York State since 1981. He has held multiple public

positions including Chief Medical Examiner for Rockland

County, New York, from October of 2008 through October

of 2012. Dr. Taff also has multiple academic affiliations

including positions at Mr. Sinai School of Medicine and

Lehman College, City University of New York. Dr. Taff is

now a consultant and has testified over 600 times in

the courts of Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey

in both civil and criminal cases. Prior to completing

his initial report, Dr. Taff reviewed Dr. Nunez’s autopsy

report, the victim’s toxicology report, and approximately

1,200 pages of the victim’s medical records.

Dr. Taff described the six-stage framework that he

testified should govern all death investigations. These

include: (1) assembling historical information on the

decedent; (2) reviewing crime scene documentation;

(3) performing the autopsy; (4) obtaining laboratory

analysis of samples taken during the autopsy; (5) preparing

the autopsy report; and (6) preparing a death certificate

with the cause and manner of death. Dr. Taff criticized

all but one (stage 2) of Dr. Nunez’s work.

Dr. Taff produced two reports for the defense, both

of which became full exhibits. His first report was dated

October 3, 2022 (Ex. V). Dr. Taff’s first report concluded:

“The immediate cause of [the victim’s] death was due to

47a

Appendix B

acute cardiorespiratory failure (cardiac dysrhythmia)

due to acute and chronic alcoholism associated with liver

encephalopathy, delirium tremens and pancytopenia and

hypertensive cardiovascular disease.

“Blunt force impact-related scalp lacerations and

hemorrhage, rheumatoid arthritis, depression and recent

methanol usage and history of prescribed use of a rolling

walker to ambulate and prevent falls, tobacco, marijuana

and cocaine usage and financial problems were significant

associated conditions contributing to [the victim’s] death.”

(Ex. V, p.8).

Dr. Taff’s second report was dated October 27,

2022 (Ex. W) and was prepared after he had been

provided with what he described as “over 300 pages

of Dr. Nunez’s testimony.” 3 Dr. Taff testified that his

review of Dr. Nunez’s testimony “enlightened” him. In Dr.

Taff’s second report he explained, “It is now my opinion

that the immediate cause of [the victim’s] death was

exsanguination due to multiple superficial scalp lacerations

on top of head due to blunt force impact trauma. In the

3. On October 31, 2022, the state filed its “Notice Regarding

Potential Sequestration Violation” in which it took the position

that providing Dr. Taff w ith Dr. Nunez’s trial testimony

constituted a violation by the defense of the court’s October 11,

2022, sequestration order. The State did not seek preclusion of

Dr. Taff’s testimony but leave of court to cross-examine him

on the circumstances of his receipt of said testimony as well as

any revisions or modifications of his initial opinion made after

reviewing Dr. Nunez’ testimony. The court granted such relief

without objection from the defense.

48a

Appendix B

greater scheme of things, it really does not matter

if [the victim] sustained the scalp wounds from being

struck in the head with either a blunt instrument or

chopping weapon. The end result of the impacts to the

head were bleeding scalp lacerations leading to death

by exsanguination.” (Ex. W, p.2)

Dr. Taff’s second report also noted that the victim’s

injuries “would not have caused instantaneous loss of

consciousness. [The victim] would have been able to move

about the scene which was confirmed by the transfer of

blood from one area of his home to another.” (Ex. W, p. 2).

Despite his agreement with the victim’s cause of

death, Dr. Taff disagreed with Dr. Nunez’s conclusive

determination that the victim’s manner of death was

a homicide. He opined, “It is further my opinion that

the manner of death should have been classified as

undetermined (homicide due to scalp wounds inflicted

by another(s) or accident due to scalp wounds inflicted

by self).” (Ex. W, p.3). Dr. Taff explored the possibility

of self ­h arm as the decedent’s manner of death but

acknowledged in his testimony that he “gave more

credence to the scalp wounds after reading her (Dr.

Nunez’s) testimony” and further acknowledged under

cross-examination that the evidence in this case was

“consistent with homicide.”

Finally, the defense asked Dr. Taff if the victim’s head

wounds could have been caused accidentally as a result of

the victim “fumbling around and striking himself?” Dr.

Taff responded: “It’s possible. Maybe one or two of these

49a

Appendix B

wounds. I can’t tell you . . . I would, I would find it kind

of unusual that someone is going to stand up and bang

his head on a low ceiling multiple times. Is it possible?

Anything is possible. To get these wounds on the top, he

would have to dive head-first like into a pool to get that. But

if you dive head-first, why would you have four wounds. You

should only have one scalp wound unless he jumped into

a pool four times which I think is kind of stretching it.”

ANALYSIS

Based upon the evidence presented, the panel

finds that the defendant used a weighted and sharp

object to repeatedly bludgeon the victim over the head,

a vital area of the body. The assault on the victim was

not a discrete incident. This was established by the

blood staining, blood spatter, and evidence of multiple

bloodshed events that occurred in different locations of

the house. Moreover, the assault on the victim was not

a single blow. The defendant inflicted multiple severe

and ultimately fatal injuries to the victim who suffered

a significant and obvious loss of blood from his wounds.

This was readily established by the saturated blood stains

in both the master and guest bedrooms, the large pools

of blood (that the defendant attempted to conceal) on

the kitchen floor, the blood in the living room, and the

blood on the victim’s robe.

Notwithstanding the victim’s unmistakable need for

immediate medical intervention, the defendant failed

to call for help despite the evidence that the defendant

had the ability to make a call from either his home or

50a

Appendix B

his cellular telephone, both of which were operational.4

Instead, the defendant inflicted the victim’s injuries

and then allowed the victim to bleed to death. The

precise time of death cannot be ascertained. However,

it is a reasonable inference from the evidence – blood

throughout the house and the fact that the victim died

from exsanguination – that the victim died a prolonged

death.

The defendant next attempted to conceal and fabricate

evidence. He tampered with the crime scene, attempting

to remove blood from the kitchen floor, the upper landing

of the stairs, and from the victim’s head and body. The

defendant moved the victim’s body to the bottom of the

stairs after the victim was already deceased as evidenced

by the facts that: (1) there was no blood under the

victim’s body showing that he did not die in that location;

(2) the victim’s leg was stiff and raised off the ground

showing that the defendant moved his body to that location

after the victim was already in a state of rigor; and (3) the

victim had lividity on the posterior of his body indicating

that he was on his back after death, rather than on his

stomach as he was found when police arrived.

4. “From the defendant’s cell phone records, the jury

reasonably could have found both that it was possible to obtain a

cell phone signal strong enough to allow the defendant to place a

call for emergency help . . . and that the defendant did not place

such a call. . . . We have often noted that ‘it can be inferred that,

if the defendant has caused a grievous wound that could cause the

victim’s death if not treated promptly, the failure to summon that

treatment is consistent with an antecedent intent to cause death.”’

State v. Otto 305 Conn. 51, 71-72 (2012) quoting State v. Sivri, 231

Conn. 115, 129, 646 A.2d 169 (1994).

51a

Appendix B

In addition, based upon the evidence presented,

the panel can infer that the defendant attempted to

stage the scene to make it appear as if the victim fell

down the stairs, which is what the defendant told the

paramedic, i.e., that he heard the victim fall down the

stairs. Notably, the victim did not have any pre-mortem

injuries to support this assertion and, absent one blood

drop on the top stair and one blood drop on the bottom

stair, there was no blood on the remaining stairs as would

have been the case if the victim fell downstairs while

alive. Significantly, the victim did have extensive postmortem injuries. Dr. Nunez noted several orange-brown

abrasions to the victim’s forehead, nose, cheek, neck,

shoulder, chest, knee, and thigh. Dr. Nunez explained

that these types of injuries can occur from something

rubbing against the victim’s skin after his death. In

addition, the victim’s lumbar spine was fractured in

the pelvic region. The lack of soft tissue hemorrhaging

meant the break occurred post-mortem. This evidence

further supports the finding that the victim was moved

after death.

The defendant provided implausible explanations to

the 911 operator, the paramedic, and to the responding

officers regarding how the victim allegedly sustained his

injuries, i.e., that the victim fell and hit his head either on

a cabinet or on a rock. 5 The panel finds that none of these

5. The cumulative force of the defendant’s actions and

inactions support the inference that the defendant had the

requisite intent to kill the victim. This includes, but is not limited

to, the evidence that the defendant: (1) used a sharp-edged weapon

to inflict the victim’s injuries which caused substantial blood

52a

Appendix B

explanations are supported by the evidence. Both Dr. Taff

and Dr. Nunez agree that the victim’s injuries were not

the result of a fall.

Finally, the panel considered Dr. Taff’s testimony

regarding alternative scenarios that may have led to the

victim’s death, including his opinion that the victim may

have harmed himself. Given the location, number, and

severity of the victim’s wounds, the panel does not credit

Dr. Taff’s hypothesis that self-inflicted wounds could have

been the cause of the victim’s death. Even the defendant

did not claim during his conversations with the 911

operators, the paramedic, or the police that the victim

harmed himself. The panel has also considered all of Dr.

Taff’s observations, opinions, and criticisms regarding

Dr. Nunez’s approach to the death investigation and the

conclusions she drew therefrom. This included Dr. Taff’s

view that Dr. Nunez should have considered and placed

more weight on the victim’s medical history and Dr. Taff’s

disagreement with Dr. Nunez’s determination that the

victim suffered a chop wound. This panel finds Dr. Taff’s

criticisms and conclusions unpersuasive.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the evidence presented, the panel finds

that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each

loss, (2) failed to seek medical help while the victim bled out, (3)

dragged the victim’s body, and (4) lied to the 911 dispatcher, the

paramedic, and the responding police officers regarding the cause

of the victim’s injuries. See State v. Francis, 195 Conn. App. 113,

130 (2019).

53a

Appendix B

of the elements of Murder, in violation of Section 53a-54a

of the Connecticut General Statutes, and Tampering with

Evidence, in violation of Section 53a-155 of the Connecticut

General Statutes.

Dated this 2nd day of December 2022.

/s/ Robin Pavia

Pavia, J.

/s/ Tracy Dayton

Dayton, J.

/s/ M Medina Jr

Medina, J.

54a

C

APPENDIX C —Appendix

MEMORANDUM

OF THE

SUPERIOR COURT, JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

DANBURY, FILED OCTOBER 31, 2022

SUPERIOR COURT

JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF DANBURY

AT DANBURY

DOCKET NO. DBD-CR-19-0159438-S

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

v.

JAMES C. MAHARG

Filed October 31, 2022

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The defendant, James Maharg, stands charged with

Murder, in violation of Connecticut General Statute

§ 53a-54a, and Tampering with Evidence, in violation of

Connecticut General Statute § 53a-155 in connection with

an incident that is alleged to have occurred on March 19,

2019.

On August 12, 2022, the defendant filed a “Motion to

Suppress Statements.” In his motion, the defendant argues

that his statements made on March 20, 2019, to the police at

the Troop A Barracks, and later during his hospitalization

at Waterbury Hospital were obtained in violation of the

Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United

55a

Appendix C

States Constitution and Article I, Sections Seven, Eight,

and Nine, of the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.1

In reaching its conclusions, the court has: (1)

considered the evidence received at the hearing and,

where relevant, during trial, including evaluating the

credibility of the witnesses; 2 (2) assessed the weight,

if any, to be given specific evidence and measured the

probative force of conflicting evidence; (3) reviewed all

exhibits, relevant statutes, and case law; and (4) drawn

such inferences from the evidence or facts established

by the evidence that it deems reasonable and logical. The

court’s credibility determination was based upon the

conduct, demeanor, and attitude of the witnesses. See

Lapointe v. Commissioner of Corrections, 316 Conn. 225,

268-71, 112 A.3d 1 (2015). Additionally, any other evidence

on the record not specifically mentioned in this decision

that would support a contrary conclusion, whether such

evidence was contested or uncontested by the parties,

was considered and rejected by the court. See State v.

Edmonds, 323 Conn. 34 (2016).

For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to

Suppress is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

1. The defendant did not move to suppress his statements

pursuant to the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The

panel believes that the omission was likely a scrivener’s error and

included Fifth Amendment considerations in its analysis, as well.

2. The parties agreed that the motion to suppress would

be heard mid-trial and that some of the testimony and exhibits

admitted during the State’s case-in-chief, e.g., the testimony of

Connecticut State Police Trooper Isaiah Gonzalez, would also be

relevant, and considered in relation, to the motion to suppress.

56a

Appendix C

FINDINGS OF FACT

I.

The Defendant’s Residence

Based on the evidence presented and the reasonable

and logical inferences drawn therefrom, the panel finds

the following facts: on March 20, 2019, at approximately

2:00 a.m., the defendant called 911 from the landline in

his home stating “My husband is dead. My husband is

dead.” During the 911 call (Ex. 2), the defendant told the

dispatcher that he and his husband had been drinking

heavily and that his husband fell and hit his head on a

kitchen cabinet. The defendant said that his husband

bled a lot, but that he (the defendant) had been able to

stop the bleeding, after which they had gone to bed. The

defendant told the dispatcher that he had just awoken

and gone downstairs, where he found his husband on the

floor in the foyer. When asked if he thought his husband

was “beyond help,” the defendant responded, “Yes. He’s

cold.” The defendant also told the dispatcher that he and

his husband had been having financial issues prior to this

incident and that his husband was “cold as a rock.”

At 2:02 a.m., an ambulance and the police were

dispatched to the defendant’s home at 99 Church Street,

Sherman, Connecticut. Paramedic Justin Walsh testified

that he was the first to arrive on scene at approximately

2:18 a.m. When Walsh arrived, he could hear the defendant

yelling and dogs barking. Upon entering the house,

Walsh saw that the defendant’s husband (hereinafter “the

decedent”) was naked and lying prone at the base of the

stairs. Walsh testified that the decedent did not have any

57a

Appendix C

vital signs, was in full rigor mortis, and was cold to the

touch. Walsh explained that while rigor mortis sets in

within a few hours of death, it takes approximately four

hours for a body to tum cold. Walsh therefore concluded,

based upon his training and experience, that the decedent

had died several hours earlier.

Walsh saw that the decedent had one large and two

smaller head wounds that were filled with clotted blood.

(Ex. 3-30). Walsh explained that although head wounds

bleed profusely, there was no blood on the decedent’s head

or body and no blood on the floor under where he lay. Walsh

observed that the decedent had lividity on the back of his

body, indicating that he had died on his back rather than

face down, as he was found. (Ex. 3-23). Walsh also saw that

the decedent’s left leg was stiff and raised off the floor,

leading Walsh to conclude that the decedent was moved

after rigor mortis set in because his leg would otherwise

be flat on the floor. (Ex. 3-22). Walsh testified that, as he

examined the decedent, the defendant was intermittently

pacing, yelling, and screaming. At one point, the defendant

tried to pull Walsh away from the decedent.

Connecticut State Police (“CSP”) Trooper Isaiah

Gonzalez testified that he arrived at the defendant’s

residence at approximately 2:20 a.m. Gonzalez explained

that the defendant made several spontaneous statements

in his presence, including that he and the decedent have

been drinking a lot since they lost their business and that

they had been drinking earlier that evening.

58a

Appendix C

CSP Trooper Laurence Gregg also testified that

on March 20, 2019, at approximately 2:00 a.m., he

was dispatched to a medical call on Church Road in

Sherman. When Gregg arrived, he asked the defendant

some questions about what had occurred. The defendant

repeated his version of how the decedent’s injuries had

occurred. The defendant also told Gregg that there was no

one in the house other than the defendant, the decedent,

and their dogs.

During their conversation, the defendant repeatedly

asked Gregg for a glass of water. Gregg testified that he

could not get the defendant water because the kitchen

appeared to be a crime scene. Gregg also testified that his

Sergeant ordered that he should not let the defendant go

anywhere or wash up. Gregg understood his Sergeant’s

order to mean that the defendant should not be allowed

into the crime scene, but that the defendant was not under

arrest and was free to leave.

At approximately 4:00 a.m., Sergeant Broski ordered

Trooper Gonzalez to take the defendant to Troop A in

Southbury. Gonzalez testified that the defendant was

not under arrest and that he voluntarily agreed to

accompany Gonzalez. However, while driving to Troop

A, the defendant said that he wanted to go back to his

husband. When Gonzalez told him that he could not take

him back to the house, the defendant asked to get out of

the car saying that he would walk back. Gonzalez told the

defendant he could not let him out on the side of the road

because it was dangerous and because the defendant was

intoxicated.

59a

Appendix C

II. The Interrogation3

On March 20, 2019, at approximately 4:40 a.m., a

police officer escorted the defendant into an interview

room. An audio and video recorder were activated before

the defendant entered the room. From the recording, it

appears to be a windowless cinderblock room with one

door. There was a table and three chairs in the room.

The defendant was placed in a chair with his back to the

recording equipment. Because only one of the two cameras

in the room was operational, when the defendant was

seated only the back of his head was visible.4

Initially, there were two officers in the room with the

defendant: Trooper Gonzalez and CSP Detective Jared

Barbero. During the first hour, Gonzalez and Barbero

engaged the defendant in conversation about his dogs,

the areas in which he and the decedent had resided, the

display business that he and the decedent owned, the

3. The parties jointly requested that the court review,

prior to trial, the approximately 13-hour audio and videotaped

interrogation and read the accompanying transcript. On October

13, 2022, the recording and transcript of the interrogation were

admitted as State’s Exhibits 26 and 27, respectively. The Miranda

waiver form was admitted as State’s Exhibit 28. These three exhibits

were admitted solely for the purpose of the suppression hearing,

despite being marked consecutively to the State’s trial exhibits.

4. The defendant moved to suppress his statement claiming

that it was not recorded as required by CGS § 54-1o. The panel

considered and rejected this argument. Although only one

camera in the interview room was operating at the time of his

interrogation, the entirety of the interview was captured by

both audio and video recording equipment.

60a

Appendix C

defendant’s relationship with the decedent, and the fact

that the defendant had consumed a significant amount of

alcohol the prior evening. The defendant repeatedly asked

what they were doing, why they were engaging in “chitchat,” stated that he neither wanted to nor felt capable

of discussing the incident and asked when they would

be done. T. 2, 7, 22, 24, 27, 33, 38, 43-4, 57-8. 5 Barbero

commented that the defendant was “shaking heavily.” T.

46. The defendant was visibly agitated and stated that he

was “going to get sick.” T. 55.

At approximately 5:40 a.m., CSP Detective Ed Vayan6

entered the interview room. A few minutes later, Barbero

told the defendant that they had to “read this paperwork.”

T. 61, The defendant responded, “I can’t read.” Barbero

replied, “No. I know. I’m just going to read it to you.”

Vayan added, “The quicker we get this done, the quicker

we can get you out of here.” The defendant was thereafter

read his Miranda rights. Although he was asked once

whether he understood these rights, the defendant was not

given an opportunity to answer this inquiry as questioning

immediately began regarding the decedent’s death. The

defendant explained that the decedent fell in the kitchen,

hit his head on a cabinet, and started to bleed profusely.

The defendant said that he initially did not call 911 because

he thought he successfully stopped the bleeding. The

defendant said that he helped the decedent upstairs to

bed after which they both went to sleep. Several hours

5. References to the interview transcript will be marked

as “T.” followed by the transcript page number.

6. Vayan was a detective at the time of this incident. He

is now a Sergeant.

61a

Appendix C

later, the defendant awoke to find that the decedent was

neither in their bedroom nor in the guest bedroom. He

walked downstairs and found the decedent on the floor.

The defendant tried to pull the decedent up and discovered

that he was cold which prompted the defendant to call 911.

Barbero and Vayan interrogated the defendant for

another twelve hours. For the great majority of the

interview, the defendant repeated the same version of the

events; namely, that the decedent fell and hit his head on

the kitchen cabinet, the defendant stopped the bleeding,

they went upstairs to bed, and the defendant later found

the decedent at the bottom of the stairs.

While the detectives’ voices remained conversational

throughout almost the entirety of the interview,7 as

the discussion progressed they began confronting the

defendant about evidence that contradicted his statement.

For instance, when the defendant stated that neither he

nor the decedent left the house during the evening, the

detectives confronted him with the fact that there was

blood discovered in the detached garage. T. 592. When the

defendant stated that the decedent’s injuries were not the

result of a weapon-strike, the detectives confronted the

defendant with the fact that a hatchet was found in the

garage that appeared to contain traces of blood.8 T. 591-92.

7. There are, in fact, several times throughout the

interview when the defendant thanked the detectives for being

so nice to him and commented that they had a very difficult job.

8. One of the grounds upon which the defendant moved to

suppress his statement was that the detectives falsely claimed to

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Eventually, the defendant told the detectives that

he pushed the decedent causing him to hit his head on

the cabinet. T. 558-57. He also stated that he carried

the decedent downstairs from the bedroom and that the

decedent was alive when he did so. T. 570-73. While the

defendant said that he “must have hit” the decedent, he

could not specifically remember doing so. T. 589. After it

was repeatedly suggested to him that he used the hatchet

to cause the decedent’s injuries, the defendant stated, “I

must have used the – the hatchet.” T. 595-97. When the

detectives continued to push the defendant to provide

additional specifics, he responded “I’m just agreeing with

what you said.” T. 606.

Dur ing this por tion of the inter rogation, an

approximately 18-minute period, the defendant repeatedly

asked to use the bathroom but was not permitted to do

so.9 The detectives indicated that they first wanted the

have evidence that they did not have, namely, evidence of blood on

a hatchet. It is unclear from the evidence presented whether there

was, in fact, blood found on the hatchet. The witnesses seem to

contradict one another on this point. However, to the extent

that there was blood, it was neither the defendant’s nor the

decedent’s blood and the detectives did not claim anything to

the contrary. However, even if they had so claimed, that would

not in and of itself render his confession involuntary because law

enforcement is permitted to use false evidence ploys during an

interrogation. See State v. Griffin, 339 Conn. 631, 667–68, 262

A.3d 44, 68–69 (2021), cert. denied, 211 L. Ed. 2d 575, 142

S. Ct. 873 (2022). Accordingly, the panel rejects the defendant’s

argument in this regard.

9. The defendant moved to suppress his statement on the

ground that he was denied the use of the bathroom during

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defendant to finish telling them how the decedent incurred

his injuries. Vayan eventually took the defendant to the

bathroom and testified that during this time the defendant

turned to Vayan and stated, “When did you know I killed

my husband?” T. 629. Vayan was not wearing any recording

equipment at this time, but reasonably explained that he

would have turned it off in the bathroom in any event to

protect the defendant’s privacy. When they returned to

the interview room, Vayan attempted to memorialize the

defendant’s question by asking, “James, why – why did

you ask me did I know that you killed him? You were just

curious?” The defendant replied, “Yeah.” The defendant

then added, “It’s terrible. It’s hard to imagine I killed

my husband . . . I’ve told you everything, so I wouldn’t

hold back. It’s something that I don’t remember.” T. 631.

Shortly thereafter, the defendant experienced what was

described on the video as a seizure. An ambulance was

called, and he was transported to Waterbury Hospital. T.

644-54. Trooper Matthew Geddes, a uniformed patrolman,

rode in the back of the ambulance with the defendant.

Geddes did not speak to the defendant either in the

ambulance or later at the hospital.

III. Waterbury Hospital

The defendant arrived at the Waterbury Hospital

Emergency Room at approximately 5:09 p.m. and

this period. The detectives took the defendant to the

bathroom approximately 11 times over the course of the 13hour interview. There was only one 18-minute period during

which they did not take him immediately upon his request.

Under these circumstances, the panel rejects the defendant’s

argument that he was denied the use of the bathroom.

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immediately received medical treatment. Trooper Geddes

remained in the hallway approximately seven to ten feet

from the defendant the entire time. Geddes stated that the

defendant was not restrained in any manner and was not

under arrest. Geddes testified that if the defendant had

decided to leave the hospital at any point that he would

have let him go and then call his (Geddes’) supervisor.

At approximately 7:05 p.m., two hours after they

arrived at the hospital, the defendant called out,

“Where is my husband?” Geddes did not respond but

contemporaneously documented the statement. At

approximately 7:35 p.m., the defendant stated aloud,

“My life is ruined. I murdered Tom. How do I tell people

I killed my husband?” The defendant also commented

that he would not last one day in jail. Once again, Geddes

did not respond but made a contemporaneous note of the

statement. Geddes testified that the defendant appeared

sober and was speaking clearly when he made these

statements. In addition, the defendant had received

fluids and had eaten a turkey sandwich approximately

15 minutes prior to making the statements. Nonetheless,

the defendant vomited at 7:40 p.m., prompting Geddes to

summon medical personnel.

On March 21, 2019, the defendant, who was still at

Waterbury Hospital, requested to speak with Detective

Barbero. When Barbero arrived, the defendant told him

that the victim had an unstable gait and suggested that the

victim may have fallen and hit his head on a rock. When

Barbero questioned why the defendant was; in substance,

changing what he previously told them about the incident,

the defendant admitted that he pushed the victim into

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the cabinet, but said he did not know if he hit him with a

hatchet or a rock, or if the victim simply tripped and hit

his head.

The defendant seeks suppression of all statements

made at the police department, including those made in

the interview room as well as later in the bathroom. He

additionally moves to suppress the statements overheard

by Geddes while being treated at the hospital later in

the night. Although the defendant’s motion to suppress

references statements made at the police department and

later at Waterbury Hospital, the defendant makes no claim

regarding the subsequent statements made to Barbero

on May 21, 2019, when Barbero went to the Waterbury

Hospital to speak with the defendant at the defendant’s

request. This statement was admitted into evidence absent

objection (Ex. 32).

LEGAL DISCUSSION

The defendant asserts that he was in custody from

the moment he left his home and that a reasonable person

in his position would not feel free to leave. The defendant

further asserts that the police ignored his repeated

requests to terminate the interview, interviewed him

for an unreasonably prolonged period, lied to him about

evidence they claimed to have, failed to properly re

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.