Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Peter Bormuth, Petitioner v. Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy, aka EGLE
Supreme Court briefOct 15, 2025
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IN THE
Supreme Court, U.S,
FILED
Supreme Court of the United States
1
CCs 1: 2".'
4
PETER BORMUTH,
Petitioner,
v.
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT LAKES,
AND ENERGY (EGLE), AND CONSUMERS ENERGY
Respondent & Intervenor.
♦ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
4-
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
♦
PETER CARL BORMUTH
DRUID
810 CENTRE ST. APT #7
TRAVERSE CITY, MICHIGAN 49686
(517) 782-0298
earthprayer@outlook .com
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Two questions are presented:
1. Does the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause require state administrative
tribunals to follow their own clearly established precedent?
2. Do religious beliefs provide grounds for special interest or special damages for
standing purposes?
LIST OF PARTIES
1. Peter Bormuth, Druid, Appellant and Petitioner
2. Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy, Appellee and
Respondent
3. Consumers Energy, Appellee and Intervenor
11
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED...................................................................................... i
LIST OF PARTIES.....................................................................................................ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................ Hi
TABLE OF APPENDICES........................................................................................ iv
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES.......................................................................... v
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI................................................................1
OPINION BELOW..................................................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.......................................................................... 1
CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED........................ 1
INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................... 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................................................................... 5
A. Facts giving rise to the case................................................................ 5
B. Jackson Circuit Court Proceedings.................................................... 7
C. Michigan Court of Appeals Proceedings............................................ 7
D. Michigan Supreme Court Proceedings............................................... 7
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION.......................................... .............. 8
I.
REVIEW IS WARRANTED TO DETERMINE WHETHER DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS ARE VIOLATED WHEN ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES FLOUT CLEARLY ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT..... 8
A. The ALJ violated Petitioner's right to due process.......................... 8
B. The Circuit Court violated Petitioner’s right to due process........... 13
II.
REVIEW IS WARRANTED TO PROTECT THE DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES............. ’................. 14
A. Petitioner’s religious beliefs and status............................................. 14
B. The ALJ & the Circuit Court deny religious standing................... 17
C. Michigan case law................................................................................ 18
D. Federal case law ................................................................................... 20
CONCLUSION........................................................................................................... 23
IV
TABLE TO APPENDICES
Page
Appendix A — Michigan 4th Circuit Court Order, Filed March 29, 2024......... la
Appendix B - Order Of The EPRC, Filed May 26, 2023 ..................................... lb
Appendix C - Order Of MOAHR, Filed March 16, 2023 ....................................1c
Appendix D - Michigan Court Of Appeals Order, Filed December 19, 2024 ....Id
Appendix E - Michigan Supreme Court Order, Filed July 25, 2025 .................. le
Michigan Supreme Court Order, Filed May 22, 2025 .................. 2e
Appendix F - Order Of The EPRC, Filed December 15, 2021 ............................. If
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page
American Legion v. American Humanist Association, 588 U.S.
(2019)........ 21
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2011) ...20
Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. v. Becerra, No. 23-10326 (5th Cir. 2025)........................ 22
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682 (2014).......................................................... 20
Carson v. Makin, 596 US 767 (2022)........................................................................... 21
303 Creative v. Elenis, 600 US 570 (2023)................................................................. 22
De Beaussaert v Shelby Twp, 122 Mich. App. 128, 333 N.W.2d 22 (1982)........... 11
Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 591 U.S. 464 (2020)......................21
Federated Ins. Co. v. Oakland Cnty. Road Com’n, 475 Mich 286 (Mich 2006) ...3,13
Groff v. DeJoy, 600 US 447 (2023)............................................................................... 22
Hile v. State of Michigan, No. 22-1986 (6th Cir. 2023)........................................... 22
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, 551 U.S. 587 (2007).......................20
Hernandez v Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 490 US 680 (1989)............................ 16
Hosanna Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, 132 U.S. 694 (2012). .20
In re Adams Estate, 257 Mich. App. 230, 667 N.W.2d 904 (2003)........................ 12
In re Brock, 442 Mich. 101, 499 N.W.2d 752 (1993)................................................ 12
In re Critchell's Estate, 361 Mich. 432, 105 N.W.2d 417 (Mich 1960)................ 3
In re Petition ofA.G. for Investigative Subpoenas, 274 Mich App 696 (2007) .11
Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 597 U.S. 507 (2022)................................ 21
Lansing Sch. Ed. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Ed, 487 Mich 349 (Mich 2010) ....passim
Lassiter v. Durham Co. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981).................12
V.
Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs, 464 Mich 726, 629 NW2d 900 (Mich 2001) .3
Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555 (1992)
3
Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.S.
22
(2025)
Manuel v. Gill, 481 Mich. 637, 753 NW 2d 48 (Mich 2008)
3
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm, 584 U.S. 617 (2018) ..21
Micu v. City of Warren, 147 Mich. App. 573, 382 N.W.2d 823 (1985)
11
MOAHR Docket No. 20-026200, Petition of WCCD (December 15, 2021)
9,10,11
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961)
12
Nat'l Wildlife v. Cleveland Cliffs, 471 Mich 608, 684 N.W.2d 800 (Mich 2004) 3,13
People v. DeJonge, 442 Mich. 266, 501 N.W.2d 127 (Mich 1993)
18,19
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009)
20
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 U.S. 1207 (2011)
20
Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 134 U.S. 1811 (2014)
21
Trinity Lutheran Church of Colombia v. Corner, 137 U.S. 2012 (2017)
21
West Virginia Bd of Ed v Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943)
19
United States Constitution
Fifth Amendment
passim
Fourteenth Amendment
.passim
Michigan Constitution of 1963
Article I, § 2
.passim
Article I, § 17
.passim
Article IV, § 52
.passim
vi
Treaties
Treaty of Tripoli (1797), Article 11
.passim
Statutes
42 U.S.C. § 1983
.passim
MCL 24.306(1)
.passim
MCL 324.1317(4)
passim
MCL 324.1317(5)
.passim
MCL 324.32723(12)
passim
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner Peter Bormuth respectfully submits this petition for a writ of certiorari
to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan.
--------------------------- 4--------------------------
OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW
The final order of the Michigan 4th Judicial Circuit Court in Case No. 23-1508 AA
appears in Appendix A. The order of the EPRC in MOHAR Docket No. 22-024450
appears in Appendix B. The order of Administrative Judge Pulter, acting for
MOHAR in Docket No. 22-024450, appears in Appendix C. The order of the
Michigan Court of Appeals in Docket No. 370598 appears in Appendix D. The
orders of the Michigan Supreme Court in Docket No. 168019 appear in Appendix E.
--------------------------- 4--------------------------
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Michigan Supreme Court’s final order was issued on July 25, 2025. Appellant
invokes this Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), having timely filed this
petition for a writ of certiorari within ninety days of the Michigan Supreme Court's
judgement.
--------------------------- 4-------------------------
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Fifth Amendment
No person shall...be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law...
Fourteenth Amendment
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
42 U.S.C. § 1983
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
------------------------- ♦-----------------------Michigan Constitution of 1963, Article I, § 2
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be
denied the enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be discriminated against in
the exercise thereof because of religion, race, color or national origin.
Michigan Constitution of 1963, Article I, § 17
No person shall...be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
The right of all individuals, firms, corporations and voluntary associations to fair
and just treatment in the course of legislative and executive investigations and
hearings shall not be infringed.
Michigan Constitution of 1963, Article IV, § 52
The conservation and development of the natural resources of the state are hereby
declared to be of paramount public concern in the interest of the health, safety and
general welfare of the people.
------------------------------>----------------------------
TREATIES INVOLVED
Treaty of Tripoli (1797), Article 11
As the Government of the United States of America, is not in any sense, founded on
the Christian Religion;...
------------------------- ♦-------- :---------------
INTRODUCTION
This case raises two important due process issues regarding standing doctrine
in Michigan. For the benefit of the Court, Petitioner provides a brief introduction to
Michigan standing jurisprudence, which differs from federal law.
Michigan law traditionally embraced a limited prudential doctrine where a
litigant has standing if they have a special injury or some substantial interest
separate from the citizenry at large or if the statutory scheme implied that the
Legislature intended to confer standing on the litigant. See In re Critchell's Estate,
361 Mich. 432, 105 N.W.2d 417 (1960).
That changed in 2001 when the majority of the Michigan Supreme Court chose
to follow federal standing jurisprudence as articulated in Lujan v Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 US 555, 578; 112 S Ct 2130; 119 L Ed 2d 351 (1992) holding that “to
have standing on appeal, a litigant must have suffered a concrete and
particularized injury.” See Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs, 464 Mich 726, 629
NW2d 900 (Mich 2001).
The Michigan Supreme Court followed up their decision in Lee with a trio of
cases affirming the federal standing doctrine: Nat'l Wildlife v. Cleveland Cliffs, 471
Mich. 608, 684 N.W.2d 800 (Mich. 2004); Federated Ins. Co. v. Oakland County
Road Com’n, 475 Mich. 286, 715 NW2d 846 (2006); and Manuel v. Gill, 481 Mich.
637, 753 NW 2d 48 (Mich 2008).
3.
This situation changed in 2010 when the Michigan Supreme Court conducted a
thorough review of Michigan standing jurisprudence in Lansing Sch. Ed. Ass’n u.
Lansing Bd. of Ed, 487 Mich 349 (2010). The Court observed that the
Lee/Cleveland Cliffs/Gill standing doctrine was at the expense of the public
interest because it prevented litigants from enforcing public rights, despite the
presence of adverse interests and parties (Id at 370) and concluded that “Lee and
its progeny should be overruled.” (Id at 372).
The Lansing Court then ordered that:
We hold that Michigan standing jurisprudence should be restored to a
limited, prudential doctrine that is consistent with Michigan's long
standing historical approach to standing. Under this approach, a
litigant has standing whenever there is a legal cause of action...Where
a cause of action is not provided at law, then a court should, in its
discretion, determine whether a litigant has standing. A litigant may
have standing in this context if the litigant has a special injury or right,
or substantial interest, that will be detrimentally affected in a manner
different from the citizenry at large or if the statutory scheme implies
that the Legislature intended to confer standing on the litigant.
Lansing at 372
The historical limited prudential doctrine reestablished by Lansing
repudiates the federal standing doctrine under Lujan where a litigant must
have suffered “a concrete and particularized injury.” Michigan standing
jurisprudence grants standing to a litigant if “they have a special injury or
right, or substantial interest, that will be detrimentally affected in a manner
different from the citizenry at large.”
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
Facts giving rise to the case
This Application For A Writ Of Certoroi involves a water withdrawal permit
issued to Consumers Energy Company by a state agency, the Michigan Department
of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy (EGLE), under Part 327 of the Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA) on May 26, 2022.
On January 26, 2022 Consumers Energy Company submitted a water
withdrawal permit application to EGLE under Part 327 of the Natural Resources
and Environmental Protection Act, 1994 PA 451 as amended. (Stip Admin Rec, p.
0311). As required by subsection MCL 327.32723(4), EGLE invited a public
comment period on the permit application from March 4, 2022 until April 20, 2022.
(Stip Admin Rec, p. 0312). The Petitioner made public comments filed with EGLE
on Apr,il 17, 2022 (Stip Admin Rec, p. 0312).
On May 26, 2022 EGLE issued the permit to Consumers Energy, a basis for
decision statement and a response to public comments. (Stip Admin Rec, p. 0312).
On July 25, 2022 the Petitioner filed a Sworn Petition for a Contested Case
Hearing under MCL 324.32723(12) with EGLE. EGLE subsequently added a
second date stamp to the petition (July 26, 2022) to make it look like the petition
was filed a day late. Pursuant to MCL 324.1317(1), the contested case was assigned
for final decision to an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), Daniel L. Pulter, on
August 9, 2022. (Stip Admin Rec, pp. 0345-0348).
5.
On September 11, 2022, Petitioner/Appellant filed with the ALJ an official
status report electing to hold the contested case in abeyance for 60 days. (Stip
Admin Rec, pp. 0341-0342). Consumers Energy moved to intervene in the
proceedings as the permit holder of record, and was granted intervenor status by
ALJ Pulter on December 12, 2022. (Stip Admin Rec, pp. 0334-0340). On February
22, 2023, Consumers filed its required Pre-Hearing Statement and a Motion for
Summary Disposition Under MCR 2.116(C)(4), (5), and (8), and Incorporated Brief
in Support. (Stip Admin Rec pp. 0293-0304). Petitioner filed a response to that
motion on March 1, 2023 (Stip Admin Rec, pp. 0260-0272).
A pre-hearing video conference with all of the parties took place on March 7,
2023. EGLE took no position on Intervenor Consumers Energy’s Motion for
Summary Disposition based on standing. (Transcript of May 15, 2023 EPRC
hearing, testimony of Chris Conn, p. 11,1. 22-25).
/
The Petition was denied by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Pulter on March
16, 2023 on the basis that the Petitioner was not an aggrieved person, and
therefore lacked standing to contest the permit.
On April 3, 2023 Petitioner petitioned for review of the ALJ’s Order to a panel of
the
Environment Permit Review
Commission
(EPRC)
pursuant to MCL
324.1317(2). At that meeting Legal Counsel Maul and Crouch failed to perform
their legal duty under MCL 324.1317(5) when they neglected to inform the EPRC
panel of the definition of “aggrieved” previously adopted by the EPRC as precedent
G.
in MOAHR Docket No. 20-026200. On May 26, the EPRC issued a written decision
adopting in whole ALJ Pulter’s Order pursuant to MCL 324.1317(4).
B.
Jackson Circuit Court Proceedings
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review/Claim of Appeal/Motion to Present Proofs
of Alleged Irregularity in 4th Circuit Court, County of Jackson on June 21, 2023.
The case was assigned to Honorable Judge Thomas J. Wilson. On August 1, 2023
Hon. Judge Wilson held a hearing on Petitioner/Appellant’s Motion to Present
Proofs of Alleged Irregularity and denied the motion based on the arguments
presented at the hearing. On March 29, 2024 Hon. Judge Wilson issued an opinion
and final order AFFIRMING the ALJ’s order denying standing in this case.
C.
Michigan Court of Appeals Proceedings
Petitioner filed a Claim of Appeal under MCR 7.203(A)(1) on April 12, 2024. The
Court of Appeals dismissed this claim on April 19, 2024 for lack of jurisdiction. On
April 22, 2024 the Petitioner filed a delayed Application for Leave to Appeal under
MCR 7.205(A)(4)(b)(i)(ii). On December 19, 2024 the Court of Appeals issued an
Order denying the Petitioner’s Delayed Application for Leave to Appeal for lack of
merit in the grounds presented.
D.
Michigan Supreme Court Proceedings
On January 15, 2025 the Petitioner filed a notice of appeal and application for
leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, Docket No. 168019. On May 22,
2025 the Michigan Supreme Court issued an order denying the Petitioner’s
?.
application for leave to appeal. On June 11, 2025 the Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Michigan Supreme Court. On July 25, 2025 the Michigan
Supreme Court issued a final order denying the Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The question of whether State Administrative Agencies must follow clearly
established precedent or violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an important question of law
that this Court should answer.
The question of whether Michigan Courts have denied a Pagan the same rights
as Christians to due process of law is a pressing question this Court must answer.
Supreme Court Rule 10(c) is violated when a state court has decided an important
federal question in a way that conflicts with the relevant decisions of this Court.
I. REVIEW IS WARRANTED TO DETERMINE WHETHER DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS ARE VIOLATED WHEN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES DO NOT
FOLLOW CLEARLY ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT.
A. The ALJ violated Petitioner's right to due process
On page 5 of his March 16, 2023 Order, ALJ Pulter writes: “The controlling
question in this case is whether Petitioner has suffered “special damages” different
from the citizenry at large.” (Stip Admin Rec, p. 0015). When discussing
Petitioner’s claim that a central tenet and belief of his Pagan religion is “Water is
Life” and that Petitioner took a sacred oath to protect surface and underground
waters, Pulter writes: “Religious affiliation does not provide grounds for special
damages.” (Stip Admin Rec, p. 0018). Pulter concludes by saying “Because
Petitioner has failed to establish that he will suffer special damages that are
different and apart from the citizenry at large, Permittee’s Motion for Summary
Disposition is GRANTED and this contested case is DISMISSED.” (March 16, 2023
Order, p. 8-9) (Stip Admin Rec, p. 0018).
The problem with this analysis is threefold: it does not follow Michigan standing
jurisprudence as articulated by the Michigan Supreme Court in Lansing Sch. Ed.
Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Ed, 487 Mich 349 (2010); it does not follow Michigan
administrative law precedent as articulated by MOAHR Docket No. 20-026200,
Petition of Wayne County Conservation District, and; it does does not follow either
the Michigan Supreme Court or this Court’s precedent with regard to whether
violations of sincerely held religious beliefs may be grounds for special damages
and standing.
In Michigan, ALJ’s no longer have final authority over environmental hearings.
Because EGLE approves 97% of the permit applications it receives, denying only
.4% (the rest are withdrawn), the Legislature responded by creating the
Environmental Permit Review Commission (“EPRC”) pursuant to MCL 324.1317(2)
to provide more review of the permitting process. In doing so the Legislature gave
the EPRC final authority to adopt, remand, modify or reverse, in whole or in part a
final order or decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) under MCL
324.1317(4). The EPRC decisions are the final word in the administrative process
and thus precedential and binding on an Administrative Law Judge under MCL
324.1317. MCL 324.1317(4) states:
An environmental permit panel may adopt, remand, modify, or
reverse, in whole or in part, a final decision and order described in
subsection (1). The panel shall issue an opinion that becomes the final
decision of the department and is subject to judicial review as
provided under the administrative procedures act of 1969, 1969 PA
306, MCL 24.201 to 24.328, and other applicable law.
The crux of the first issue presented is what definition of “aggrieved” is to be
applied. Petitioner claims the due process right to the definition set by the EPRC in
MOAHR Docket No. 20-026200, Petition of Wayne County Conservation District.
MCL 324.32723(12) states:
(12) A person who is aggrieved by a determination of the department
under this section related to a water withdrawal permit may file a
sworn petition with the department setting forth the grounds and
reasons for the complaint and asking for a contested case hearing on
the matter pursuant to the administrative procedures act of 1969,
1969 PA 306, MCL 24.201 to 24.328...
“Aggrieved” is not defined within the statute. The common dictionary definition
of “aggrieved” is “feeling resentment at having been unfairly treated.” Counsel for
Consumers argues “aggrieved” is a legal term of art. But all parties agree that the
Legislature has the power to define aggrieved, and in creating the EPRC, the
Legislature delegated that power to the EPRC.
On December 15, 2021, a panel of the EPRC utilized this power delegated by the
Legislature to define “aggrieved” in MOAHR Docket No. 20-026200, Petition of
Wayne County Conservation District. The Petition involved a permit given to Waste
\0 .
Management, and the ALJ ruled that under MCL 324.30319(2) Wayne County
Conservation District was not “aggrieved” utilizing the exact same legal logic and
case law as the ALJ in this case. The ALJ required Wayne County Conservation
District to have “suffered special damages or harm distinct from the citizenry at
large.” The EPRC panel disagreed with the ALJ and defined “aggrieved” as it is
used in Part 303 to mean “having a special interest in something that can be
negatively impacted.”
MOAHR Docket No. 20-026200, Petition of Wayne County Conservation District
was not appealed by the parties and therefore is a final decision or order of an
administrative agency. It is binding on the ALJ, MOAHR, and EGLE under MCL
324.1317(4).
Under established Michigan law administrative agencies like EGLE or MOHAR
have a duty to follow their own duly promulgated administrative rules and
decisions unless those rules or decisions have been overturned on judicial review.
Micu v. City of Warren, 147 Mich.App. 573, 382 N.W.2d 823 (1985). Once decided,
the rules or decisions made by an agency to govern its activity cannot be violated or
waived by the agency. See De Beaussaert v Shelby Twp, 122 Mich. App. 128, 129;
333 N.W.2d 22 (1982). "An agency's interpretation of its own regulation is of
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation." In re Petition of Attorney General for Investigative Subpoenas, 274
Mich App 696 (2007)
n.
The legal reason for this is obvious. EGLE and MOEHR must be consistent in
applying their rules and decisions. They cannot vary their definition of “aggrieved”
on a case by case basis, or due process, which requires the same legal standards to
be applied to each petitioner, is violated. The essence of the right of due process is
the principle of fundamental fairness. In re Adams Estate, 257 Mich.App. 230,
233-234, 667 N.W.2d 904 (2003). "Due process requires fundamental fairness,
which is determined in a particular situation first by 'considering any relevant
precedents...'" In re Brock, 442 Mich. 101, 111, 499 N.W.2d 752 (1993), quoting
Lassiter v. Durham Co. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68
L.Ed.2d 640 (1981).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 offers redress when state agencies fail to follow due process of
law. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961) this Court explained that:
[i]t is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was
to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of
prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might
not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights,
privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
might be denied by the state agencies.
The two essential elements to a § 1983 action are present: (1) the conduct
complained of was committed by ALJ Pulter, a state actor and (2) this conduct
deprived the Petitioner of due process of law secured by the Constitution of the
United States. The ALJ’s denial of the contested case hearing under MCL
324.32723(12) (when prior agency precedent in MOAHR Docket No. 20-026200
granted Petitioner Wayne County Conservation District a contested case hearing
based on the definition of "aggrieved" as “having a special interest in something
that can be negatively impacted”) is a failure to provide due process and certainly
constitutes a deprivation. Petitioner is a “person” who was "aggrieved" under that
definition and state law MCL 324.32723(12) gives such persons a right to a
contested case hearing.1
B. The Circuit Court Violated Petitioner’s Right To Due Process
The Circuit Court’s Order of March 29, 2024 cites Federated Ins. Co. v. Oakland
County Road Com’n, 475 Mich. 286, 291-92 (2006) for the proposition that: “To have
standing on appeal, a litigant must have suffered a concrete and particularized
injury.” (Order, 4/29/24, p.2, n.3). But the Michigan Supreme Court in Lansing Sch.
Ed. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Ed, 487 Mich 349 (2010) ruled that “Lee and its
progeny should be overruled.” (Id at 372). Federated Ins. Co. was overruled. It
is actually Justice Weaver’s dissent in Federated that reflects current Michigan
law.2
1 Petitioner notes that the aggrieved standard created by the EPRC in Petition of Wayne County
Conservation District is functionally identical to the standard created by the Michigan Supreme
Court in Lansing Sch. Ed. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Ed, 487 Mich 349 (2010). The EPRC held that to
be “aggrieved” a petitioner must have “a special interest in something that can be negatively
impacted.” Lansing held that to be “aggrieved” a litigant must have a “substantial interest, that will
be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large.”
2 Justice Weaver wrote in dissent: “Yet by reference to inapplicable federal law, the majority
redefines who is an "aggrieved party," stating: [T]o have standing on appeal, a litigant must have
suffered a concrete and particularized injury.” Federated Ins. Co. v. Oakland County Road Com’n,
475 Mich. 286, (2006) at 853. After noting that in Nat'I Wildlife v. Cleveland Cliffs, 471 Mich. 608
(Mich. 2004), the same majority superimposed the same inapplicable federal constitutional
constraints on the standing of Michigan citizens in state court actions, Justice Weaver concluded
that: “[T]he majority's redefinition of "aggrieved party" to require a "concrete and particularized
injury" imposes a higher threshold than this Court's previous articulations of "aggrieved party." Id
at 861.
Petitioner’s claim of a due process violation by the ALJ was dismissed by the
Circuit Court, as Hon. Judge Wilson accepted the fallacious argument of the
appellee that Legal Counsel Maul and Crouch had no legal responsibility under
MCL 324.1317(5) to inform Petitioner’s EPRC panel of the definition of “aggrieved”
previously adopted by the EPRC on December 15, 2021: “Lastly, Appellant claims
that the dismissal of his claim by the ALJ and the subsequent adoption of that
decision by the EPRC was a violation of his due process rights. As Appellee
correctly points out in their brief, Appellant fails to show such a violation.” (Order,
4/29/24, p.3). However, the Petitioner clearly showed a Due Process violation under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Circuit Court’s egregious decision necessitates review by this
Court.3
II. REVIEW IS WARRANTED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE FIFTH &
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS ENCOMPASS
CITIZENS OF MINORITY RELIGIOUS BELIEFS.
A. Petitioner’s religious beliefs and status
The Petitioner claims a substantial interest separate from the citizenry at large
based on his sincerely held religious beliefs as a Pagan. Pagan comes from the
Latin paganus, connoting a “non-christian” or “follower of a polytheistic religion”
3 Petitioner notes that Hon. Judge Wilson has come under some scrutiny for his actions while
performing his duties. Perhaps the fact that his cousin, Michael Wilson, is Assistant General
Counsel at Consumers Energy contributed to this egregious decision.
https://www.clickondetroit.com/news/local/2025/09/18/alcohol-sexual-comments-conflicts-a-deep-dive
-into-accusations-against-michigan-judge/
https://www.mlive.com/news/jackson/2025/10/embattled-jackson-judge-given-extension-to-respond-to
- misconduct-claims .html
\L1
but the word “has recently evolved to become a general term for the followers of
magical, shamanistic, and polytheistic religions which hold a reverence for nature
as a central characteristic of their belief system.” Pagans reject the Christian god of
the theologians who exists outside of nature. Pagans believe that nature is god(s).
Druids remember the old Testament god that Abraham took with him when he left
the Chaldean city of Ur as one of the sons of EL, the high god of the Canaanites.
Pagans absolutely reject the New Testament jesus story, though acknowledging
that the mythic structure is plagiarized from the Egyptian Osiris/Horus myth,4
while Christian morality is derived from the Essenes.5 Pagan are polytheists who
worship nature and reject jesus christ.
According to a 2014 Pew Research Center study only 0.4% of Americans identify
as Pagan or Wiccan, so the Petitioner belongs to a subset of the population that is
clearly distinguished from the citizenry at large.
4 On the walls of the temple of Luxor (1800 BC) are images of the conception, birth, and adoration of
the divine child god Horus with Thoth announcing to the virgin (unmarried) Isis that she will
conceive Horus with Kneph, the Holy Ghost impregnating the virgin, and with the infant being
attended by three kings or magi bearing gifts. The Egyptians knew that the three wise men were
the stars Mintaka, Anilam, and Alnitak in the belt of Orion but the star wisdom that is the basis of
the story fails to be transferred into the Christian myth. Everything else is plagiarized.
5 This Jewish splinter group had a strong presence in cities and separate communities throughout
the Holy Land. Jesus was reputed to have studied with them, while Paul borrowed liberally from
their texts. Their ideas show strong traces of Zoroastrian dualism, which the Jews absorbed during
the Captivity in Babylon, and brought back with them when they returned from Exile. The Essenes
hated matter and sexuality, believed the soul to be eternal, reviled women, thought pleasure evil,
idealized work, charity & poverty, had a ritual of baptism & common meals, and believed they were
the last generation before the Judgment when the Children of Light would be separated from the
Children of Darkness. Naturally they identified themselves with the Children of Light who would
be saved while the Children of Darkness would perish and suffer eternal damnation. You can go to
any fundamentalist church today and hear the same doctrines propounded.
Central tenets of the Pagan faith are that “the Earth is a living conscious deity”
and that “Water is Life.” Pagans reject the Old Testament morality of “dominion
over nature” and believe humans are part of the web of life. Pagans reject the New
Testament morality of “forgiveness of sins” and believe in responsibility for actions,
especially actions affecting nature and the environment.
Pagan morality is ecological, not sexual. Christian morality condemns as sinful
practices such as contraception, abortion, homosexuality, and same-sex marriage.
Pagan morality leaves all those decisions to the individual, condemning none.6
What is “sinful” in Pagan morality is poisoning the air or water or harming the
environment and other creatures by taking more resources than you need. As a
Druid, Petitioner’s religious and spiritual role is to protect water (and air), Druids
are responsible for mediating between the living conscious environment and the
human community.
Another important religious concept for Pagans is to have a word. Fulfilling an
oath is a religious responsibility. When Petitioner completed his 19 year course of
study as a Druid, he took a sacred religious oath to protect water. This Court must
accept the Petitioner’s good-faith characterization that his activity is grounded in
religious belief because "[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality
of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants'
6 Artemis is a Pagan deity of the Moon, Mistress of mountains, Mistress of wild creatures, and
Goddess of childbirth. The ancient law of Artemis states that: “She who gives birth, may terminate.”
Thus Pagan women may claim a religious right to contraception and abortion.
interpretations of those creeds." Hernandez v Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 490 US
680; 109 S Ct 2136; 104 L Ed 2d 766, 786 (1989).
Petitioner has repeatedly demonstrated his substantial religious interest in
water by making public comments before administrative agencies like the United
States Dept, of State, the United States EPA, MDEQ, EGLE, WDNR, and by filing
cases such as Bormuth v. West Bay, 869 N.W.2d 604 (2015); Bormuth v. MDOT &
Kirk Stuedle, Director, Civil No: 15-205-MZ (Mich. COC, 2015); Bormuth v. GREAT
& Kenny Price, Case No. 321865 (Mich. COA, 2016); Bormuth v. WDNR &
Enbridge Energy, Appeal No: 2014-AP-2590 (Wis. COA, 2014); Bormuth v. EAB,
No. 13-4411 (6th Cir. 2015) proving the sincerity of Petitioner’s religious beliefs.
The Petitioner’s motivation in defending the water is religious, not secular in
nature, which distinguishes him from other environmentalists.
B. The ALJ and the Circuit Court deny religious standing
In the hearings below Petitioner argued that his religious status as a Druid with
a special religious responsibility for protecting water distinguished him from other
members of the community and made him “aggrieved” under MCL 324.32723(12)
and therefore conferred standing.
The ALJ responded to this argument by writing:
Religious affiliation does not provide grounds for special damages.
Petitioner simply fails to demonstrate how Druids are different from
any other religious or non-religious environmentally conscious members
of the public. Each religious or environmental group is equally affected
by the issuance of the permit.
(Order of March 16, 2023, p. 8)
The Circuit Court responded by holding:
Appellant claims he has standing based on his religious status as a
Pagan Druid, which distinguishes him from the citizenry at large. This
Court affirms the ALJ's finding that Appellant's religious belief
regarding water conservation is insufficient to demonstrate a concrete
injury that is different from other environmentally conscious members
of the general public.
(Order of March 29, 2024. p.2)
The first thing to notice about these respective statements is that they are
unsupported by citation. Both the ALJ and the Circuit Court have just pulled this
concept out of thin air. Petitioner asks this Court to examine Michigan and Federal
case law where standing has been granted when sincerely held religious beliefs are
violated by the government.
C. Michigan case law
In People v. DeJonge, 442 Mich. 266, 501 N.W.2d 127 (Mich 1993) the Michigan
Supreme Court upheld the religious rights of Mark and Chris DeJonge to teach
their children at home without complying with a state mandated certification
requirement because they wished to provide for their children a "Christ-centered
education." The DeJonges believed that utilizing a state-certified teacher was
sinful under their Christian beliefs. The Michigan Supreme Court ruled that:
“Their faith, although unusual, may not be challenged or ignored.” Id at 283. The
Michigan Supreme Court specifically noted that religious orthodoxy was not
necessary to obtain the protection of the Free Exercise Clause.
Religious belief and conduct need not be endorsed or mandated by a
religious organization to be protected. Emmanuel Baptist Preschool,
supra at 392 (CAVANAGH, J., concurring). Indeed, because popular
religious beliefs are rarely threatened by elected legislators, the Free
Exercise Clause's major benefactors are religious minorities or
dissidents whose beliefs and worship are suppressed or shunned by the
majority. To hold otherwise would be to deny that "Religion ... must be
left to the conviction and conscience of every man...." See also Smith,
supra at 887; Emmanuel Baptist Preschool, supra at 392 (CAVANAGH,
J., concurring).
DeJonge at 285
Despite Michigan’s deeply rooted commitment to education, the Michigan
Supreme Court ruled for the DeJonges, and citing this Court, held: “[F]reedom of
t
worship ... is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere
shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that
touch the heart of the existing order.” [West Virginia Bd of Ed v Barnette, 319 US
624, 638, 642; 63 S Ct 1178; 87 L Ed 2d 1628 (1943).
This precedent has existed in Michigan since 1993 and yet it was not applied by
the ALJ or the Circuit Court to the Petitioner. The petitioner can find no
subsequent case that overturned this principle of law. For the Michigan Supreme
Court to deny review of such a blatant due process violation undermines the rights
of all religious minorities to due process. Christians were accorded this right. Why
is a Pagan denied his religious right to differ as to things that touch the heart of
the existing order?
D. Federal case law
Since Chief Justice Roberts was appointed in 2005, this Court has decided
numerous cases dealing with religion. In Hein v. Freedom From Religion
Foundation, 551 U.S. 587 (2007) this Court ruled that the creation of the White
House Office of Faith-based and Community Initiatives, as well as eight
Cabinet-level offices of faith-based initiatives was legal because federal taxpayers
do not have the right to challenge executive branch violations not explicitly
authorized by the legislative. In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460
(2009) this Court ruled that placing a monument with the ten commandments in a
public park is government speech, so it is not controlled by the First Amendment.
In Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2011), this
Court denied Arizona taxpayers the right to challenge, under the Establishment
Clause, tax credits for tuition payments to a parochial school.. In Snyder v. Phelps,
131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011), Christians from the homosexual hating Westboro Baptist
Church were allowed to display placards such as "You're going to hell", "God hates
you", "Fag troops", "Semper fi fags" and "Thank God for dead soldiers" during the
funeral service of deceased U.S. Marine, Matthew Snyder. This Court's ruling in
Hosanna Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012) gave sweeping deference to churches and abandoned the longtime practice of
balancing the interest in the free exercise of religion against important government
interests like protection against workplace bias or retaliation. In Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby, 573 U.S. 682 (2014), this Court ruled that Christians Hahns and Greens had
standing because of their sincere religious belief that life begins at conception and
allowed the christian-led for-profit corporation to restrict female employees' access
to contraceptives or abortion. In Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811
(2014) this Court allowed sectarian legislative prayers by chaplains or lay persons.
In Trinity Lutheran Church of Colombia v. Corner, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) this
Court allowed state taxpayer funds to be used to resurface a private religious
school's playground, thus opening the door to government funding of private
religious
institutions.
In Masterpiece
Cakeshop
v.
Colorado
Civil Rights
Commission, 584 U.S. 617 (2018) this Court ruled that the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission’s conduct in evaluating a cake shop owner's reasons for declining to
make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple violated the Free Exercise Clause, even
though all comments made by the Commissioners were historically true. In
American Legion v. American Humanist Association, 588 U.S.
(2019), this
Court ruled that a Latin cross could remain on public land because the passage of
time has given it historical and cultural significance. In Espinoza v. Montana
Department of Revenue, 591 U.S. 464 (2020), this Court held that a provision of the
Montana Constitution barring government aid to any school “controlled in whole or
in part by any church, sect, or denomination” violated the Free Exercise Clause
because it prohibited families from using otherwise available scholarship funds at
religious schools. In Kennedy v. Bremerton School District 597 U.S. 507 (2022), this
Court affirmed a football coach's right to unquestionably public religious
expression after games, holding that it was private. In Carson v. Makin, 596 US
767 (2022), this Court ruled that states cannot exclude religious schools from
tuition assistance programs. In 303 Creative v. Elenis, 600 US 570 (2023), this
Court ruled that Christian Lorie Smith had standing to bring her case because of
her sincere Christian belief that marriage is between a man and a woman. In Groff
v. DeJoy, 600 US 447 (2023) this Court clarified employer requirements to
accommodate a Christian employee’s religious practices under Title VII. In
Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.S.
(2025) this Court gave standing to conservative
Islamic and Christian (Catholic & Orthodox) parents to opt their children out of
certain LGBTQ+ curriculum readings based on their sincerely held religious
beliefs. This Court has deliberately and consciously elevated the Free Exercise
Clause and demolished the Establishment Clause.
The Petitioner cited several of these cases in his briefs below and directly asked
the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court to consider his
religious claims under the federal jurisprudence interpreting the free exercise
clause in 303 Creative v. Elenis, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Hile v. State of Michigan
(6th Cir.), and Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. v. Becerra (5th Cir.), but the Michigan Court
i
of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court remained contumacious and denied
review. Clearly these cases establish the principle in our federal law that religious
beliefs can be grounds for standing. Supreme Court Rule 10(c) is violated when a
state court has decided this important federal question in a way that conflicts with
relevant decisions of this Court.
We have reached a point in this country where only Christians (or conservative
adherents of other Abrahamic religions) are being accorded their religious and due
process rights. An impartial observer might suggest this is being done intentionally
by the courts. Does this Court intend to overthrow our pluralistic Jeffersonian
religious tradition along with the Establishment Clause? It is a question of
enormous public interest and importance. Pagans, Wiccans, Buddhists, Hindus,
Sikhs, Taoists, Confucians, Zoroastrians, and even Muslims and Jews, all wonder if
this Court is going to uphold their religious due process rights or whether they will
soon be placed in detention camps because they do not believe in jesus christ.
CONCLUSION
The Michigan Courts have deliberately denied a Pagan the same rights they
have previously given to Christians. Certiorari must be granted to preserve the due
process rights of citizens who follow minority religions. In 1776 the Virginia
Legislature passed Thomas Jefferson's Statute on Religious Freedom with the wise
and unrelenting assistance of James Madison. An amendment was proposed to
insert the words 'Jesus Christ' in the preamble so that it would read "coercion is a
departure from the plan of Jesus Christ, the holy author of our religion." Jefferson
noted, "the insertion was rejected by a great majority, in proof that they meant to
comprehend, within the mantle of its protection, the Jew and the Gentile, the
Christian and the Mohometan, the Hindoo, and infidel of every description."7
7 The Works of Thomas Jefferson. Collected and edited by Paul Leicester Ford. Federal Edition. 12
vols. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1904-5.
Like the Petitioner, Thomas Jefferson also expressed his disbelief in "artificial
systems invented by ultra-Christian sects" such as the doctrines of "the
immaculate conception of Jesus, his deification, the creation of the world by him,
his miraculous powers, his resurrection & visible ascension, his corporeal presence
in the Eucharist, the Trinity, original sin, atonement, regeneration, election orders
of Hierarchy etc."8
WHEREFORE this Pagan infidel respectfully requests that this Court grant this
petition for a writ of certiorari and uphold every American citizen’s free exercise
rights, regardless of faith. The 1797 Treaty of Tripoli, Article 11 clearly states that:
“...the Government of the United States of America, is not in any sense, founded on
the Christian Religion;”
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: October 15, 2025
Peter Bormuth
Druid
810 Centre St. Apt #7
Traverse City, Michigan, 49686
(517) 782-0298
earthprayer@outlook.com
8 Thomas Jefferson - Letter to William Short, October 31, 1819, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
(ed. A. A. Lipscome and A. E. Bergh) Volume XV (Washington DC: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial
Association 1905 pp. 219-224).
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.