Supplemental Brief — Hubert Arvie, Petitioner v. Cathedral of Faith Missionary Baptist Church, et al.

Rev. Hubert Arvie, Petitioner 1901 Knapp Street Cellular: 337-244-6776

Lake Charles, Louisiana Home Phone: unavailable

December 12, 2025

To : Scott S. Harris, Clerk of Court

United States Supreme Court

One First Street, North East

Washington, D.C., Zip 20543

Phone Num: (205) 479-3000

Subject: Arvie v. Cathedral of Faith MBC, Et AL, #25-5979

Notice of Supplemental Authority to the Justices

To Clerk Scott S. Harris:

This Rule 15.8 Notice is presented filing. It is prepared similarly to a notice entered on

the Court’s Journal as of Jan. 14, 2025. See Free Speech Coalition vy. Paxton, No. 23-1122.

Petitioner submits this Notice regarding Question Three assigned in the Petition docketed

on Oct. 28, 2025. The succinct reasons for submitting the Notice are as follows:

1.) The Petition asked the court to decide “[w]hether civil liability can be imposed

on judges, the judicial staff of the court, and licensed attorneys in their

administrative and personal capacity if the officers fail in their duty to report all

known illegal acts or omissions of impropriety committed by judges, licensed

attorneys, or the like if they are required to do so by legislative directive or written

judicial policies; or (2) whether civil liability can be imposed on elected

governmental officers in their administrative managerial capacity for failing in their

duty to promulgate a written policy requiring all members of the judiciary to report

all known illegal acts or omissions of impropriety to the proper authorities for

protecting the rights of citizens” in the State of Louisiana. See Pet. at 2.

2.) Citing Williams v. Reed, 604 U. S. 168 (2025), the Petition inartfully argued

under the Third Reasons for Granting Relief that the appeals court erred as a matter

of both law and fact by holding state law immunize Louisiana public officers from

liability under § 1983, Title 42 U.S.C., for failing in and continuing to breach their

duty requiring the officers report all known illegal acts or omissions of impropriety,

either mandated by Canon 3B(3) of the Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct or a

Presumptive Administrative Written Policy promulgated by the Chief and associate

judges in their administrative capacity. See Pet. at 64-66.

3.) After Oct. 28, 2025, the court issued attached opinion reaffirming that “a State

has no power to confer immunity from federal causes of action.” The Justices

reaffirmed previous decisions in Williams, given the fact Louisiana immunizes

Page 1 of 7

healthcare providers from civil liability during public health emergencies contrary

to well settled precedent. See Infra at 3-4; Doe v. Dynamic Physical Therapy,

LLC, No. 25-180, 2025 WL 3506945, at *1 (U.S. Dec. 8, 2025).

5.) Withing the meaning of Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution,

the attached opinion reaffirmed that “[t]he Judges in every State” are bound to

follow federal law, “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the

Contrary notwithstanding.” See Infra at 3-4; Doe v. Dynamic Physical Therapy,

LLC, No. 25-180, 2025 WL 3506945, at *1 (text) (italics added).

6.) Those bedrock precepts are equally applicable in the instant matter. The Fifth

Circuit clearly misapprehended or otherwise drastically departed from the settled

standards over the scope of immunization under state law. See Infra at 5-7; Clark

v. Sweeney, No. 25-52, 2025 WL 3260170, at *1-2 (U.S. Nov. 24, 2025). The Sth

Circuit likewise failed to follow Supremacy law mandated by the Constitution. See

Infra at 3-4; Doe v. Dynamic Physical Therapy, LLC, 2025 WL 3506945, at *1.

In the end, circulate this Notice of Supplemental Authority Letter to the Justices for taking

the into consideration with the arguments previously raised in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari

and Appendix as prepared and mailed for docketed on Oct. 28, 2025. The Court’s Journal convey

that the Petition is scheduled to be heard by conference on Friday, January 9, 2025.

This Notice was presented by hand to the United States Postal Service for mailing to the

Clerk Scott S. Harris on the date of this official document. I asked for and the postal service agent

provided a certificate showing the Notice was accepted for mailing on December 12, 2025.

Copy of this Rule 15.8 Notice of Supplemental Authority, attached one-page Declaration,

and the attached four-page Certificate of Service List has been electronically emailed to the parties

named in the Certificate. Each document has been separately prepared and presented for filing on

the matter of Arvie v. Cathedral of Faith MBC, Et Al., Docket No. 25-5979.

Authored & Filed By:

bh ites

Rev. Hubert Arvie, Petitioner

Pro se Counsel-Civil Litigation

1901 Knapp Street

Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601

Phone Number (337) 244-6776

EM: Rharviel958@gmail.com

First Class Mail Dec. 12, 2025

ce: See Declaration & Service List

Page 2 of 7

Doe v. Dynamic Physical Therapy, LLC, 607 U.S. ---- (2025)

--- $.Ct. ----, 2025 WL 3506945

--- §.Ct. ----

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

Supreme Court of the United States.

John DOE

v.

DYNAMIC PHYSICAL THERAPY, LLC,

et al.

No. 25-180.

Decided December 8, 2025

Synopsis

Background: Patient brought action against physical

therapist and therapist’s employer, asserting federal

claims under Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and

Rehabilitation Act and state-law claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress, based on allegations of

denial of service due to patient’s HIV status. The

Louisiana District Court, 22nd Judicial District, St.

Tammany Parish, No. 202)-15372, Alan A. Zaunbrecher,

J., sustained defendants’ peremptory exception of no

cause of action. Patient appealed. The Louisiana Court of

Appeal, McClendon, J., 404 So.3d 1008, affirmed, and

the Louisiana Supreme Court denied patient’s application

for writ of certiorari, Patient petitioned for writ of

certiorari.

{Holding:] Upon granting certiorari, the Supreme Court

held that under the Supremacy Clause, the Louisiana

Health Emergency Powers Act’s (LHEPA) immunization

of healthcare providers from civil liability during public

health emergencies could not confer immunity from

federal causes of action.

Certiorari granted; judgment of Louisiana Court of

Appeal reversed; remanded.

West Headnotes (2)

It] Health?=Immunity in general

WHESTLAYY ©:

Page 3 of 7

Under the Supremacy Clause, the Louisiana

Health Emergency Powers Act’s (LHEPA)

immunization of healthcare providers from civil

liability during public health emergencies could

be applied only to state-law causes of action,

and the State could not confer immunity from

federal causes of action. U.S. Const. art. 6, el. 2;

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 2, 42

U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq.; Rehabilitation Act of

1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C.A, § 794; La. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 29:771(B)(2)(e)(i).

|2) StateseEnforcement of federal law, rights, ot

claims

Statese=Other particular powers

Defining the scope of liability under state law is

the State’s prerogative, but under the Supremacy

Clause a State has no power to confer immunity

from federal causes of action. U.S. Const. art. 6,

cl. 2.

West Codenotes

Limited on Preemption Grounds

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29:771(B)(2)(c)(i)

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

*1 §T PlLouisiana immunizes healthcare providers from

civil liability during public health emergencies. La. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 29:771(B)(2)(c)(i) (West 2022). Below, the

Louisiana Court of Appeal held that this state statute

barred plaintiffs federal claims. 2024--0723, pp. [1-12

(La. App. | Cir. 12/27/24), 404 So.3d 1008, 1017-1048,

writ denied, 2025-00105 (La. 4/29/25), 407 So.3d 623.

That decision is incorrect. Defining the scope of liability

under state law is the State’s prerogative. But 9 State has

ho power to confer immunity from federal causes of

2O Thomsen Reuters Neo claim to original lh Ss Government Worigs

Doe v. Dynamic Physical Therapy, LLC, 607 U.S. ---- (2025)

--- §.Ct. ----, 2025 WL 3506945

action. See, e.g., Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 383, [10

S.Ct. 2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332 (1990); Haywood v. Drown,

556 U.S. 729, 740, 129 S.Ct. 2108, 173 L.Ed.2d 920

(2009); Williams v. Reed, 604 U.S. 168, 174, 145 S.Ct.

465, 221 L.Ed.2d 44 (2025). “[T]he Judges in every

State” are bound to follow federal law, “any Thing in the

Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary

notwithstanding.” U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.

Plaintiff's federal claims may well fail on other federal

grounds. Cf. Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, 596

U.S. 212, 222, 142 S.Ct. 1562, 212 L.Ed.2d 552 (2022).

But that is for the Louisiana courts to decide in the first

End of Document

instance. The petition for certiorari is granted, the

judgment of the Louisiana Court of Appeal is reversed,

and the case is remanded for further proceedings not

inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

All Citations

607 U.S. ----, --~ S.Ct. ----, 2025 WL 3506945

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Clark v. Sweeney, 607 U.S. -—- (2025)

--- S.Ct. —-, 2025 WL 3260170, 2025 Daily Joumal D.AR. 10,748

--- §.Ct. ----

Supreme Court of the United States.

Terence CLARK, Director, Prince

George’s County Department of

Corrections, et al.

Vv.

Jeremiah Antoine SWEENEY 7

No. 25-52.

Decided November 24, 2025

Synopsis

Background; State prisoner filed federal habeas petition

challenging his Maryland conviction for second-degree

murder and several other crimes. The United States

District Court for the District of Maryland, Paul Ww.

Grimm, J., 2022 WL 1120066, denied the petition.

Prisoner appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for [3]

the Fourth Circuit, Gregory, Circuit Judge, 2025 WL

800452, reversed and remanded with instructions to issue

a conditional order of release unless a new trial was

completed within a period determined by the district

court. The Supreme Court, 145 §.Ct. 2729, 2025 WL

800452, denied an application to stay the mandate of the

Court of Appeals and for an administrative stay.

|Holding:| Upon granting certiorari, the Supreme Court

held that Court of Appeals transgressed party-presentation

principle by granting habeas relief on a claim prisoner

never asserted.

Certiorari reversed and remanded with

directions.

granted;

West Headnotes (5)

|] Federal Civil Procedure*=Hearing, evidence,

and presentation of arguments

The adversarial system of adjudication follows

the principle of party presentation under which |4]

a a

re Ley

Page 5 of 7

the parties frame the issues for decision, while

the court serves as neutral arbiter of matters the

parties present.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

Federal Civil Procedures+flearing, evidence,

and presentation of arguments

Under the principle of party presentation, courts

call balls and strikes; they do not get a tum at

bat.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

Habeas Corpusé=Presentation and reservation

in lower habeas court of grounds of review

Habeas Corpus® Determination and

Disposition

Court of Appeals transgressed

party-presentation principle so drastically as to

have abused its discretion, by granting federal

habeas relief on a claim that state prisoner never

asserted in his federal habeas petition, which

challenged his Maryland conviction for

second-degree murder and other crimes, and that

the State never had chance to address, where

petition asserted one, and only one, claim,

namely that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to investigate whether other jurors had

been prejudiced by one juror’s unauthorized

crime-scene visit, but instead of ruling on that

claim, Court of Appeals devised a new one,

based on combination of extraordinary failures

from juror to judge to attomcey that deprived

prisoner of his rights to confrontation and to trial

by an impartial jury. U.S. Const. Amend. 6; 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(d).

Habeas Corpus®-Adequacy and Effectiveness

Clark v. Sweeney, 607 U.S. ---- (2025)

~- §.Ct. ----, 2025 WL 3260170, 2025 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,748

of Counsel

Habeas Corpus?Counsel

When assessing a Sirick/cincl claim that a state

court has already adjudicated, a federal habeas

court’s analysis under the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) is doubly

deferential. U.S. Const. Amend. 6; 28 U.S.C.A

§ 2254(d).

|§| Habeas Corpusy=Adequacy and Effectiveness

of Counsel

A federal habeas court may grant relief on a

Strickland claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel only if every fairminded jurist would

agree that every reasonable lawyer would have

made a different decision. U.S. Const. Amend.

6; 28 ULS.C.A. § 2254(d).

Opinion

Per Curiam.

“1 A Maryland jury found Jeremiah Sweency guilty of

second-degree murder and several other crimes.

Sweency’s convictions were affirmed on appeal, and his

bid for post-conviction relief in state court was

unsuccessful. Sweeney sought habeas relief in Federal

District Court, and that court, too, denied relief. But the

Fourth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial, relying on

a claim that Sweeney never asserted. Because the Court of

Appeals departed dramatically from the principle of partly

presentation, we reverse.

According to the State’s witnesses at trial, Jeremiah

Sweeney was arguing one night with neighbors about

stolen marijuana. He eventually opened fire, missing his

—_

intended targets but killing a bystander who was about 75

yards away. At issue during trial was whether Sweeney

could have been the shooter given his location and the

angle of the bullet wound.

After the State rested its case, Juror 4’s curiosity got the

best of him, and he decided to check out the crime scene

for himself. Shortly after jury deliberations began, Juror 4

told the jury about his visit, and the jury promptly

reported his visit to the court. The parties conferred and

eventually agreed that rather than declare a mistrial, the

court would dismiss Juror 4 and deliberations would

proceed with I! jurors, Sweency was convicted, and his

convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.

Sweeney later filed a petition for postconviction relief in

state court. He argued, among other things, that his trial

counsel was ineffective under Srrickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674

(1984), for not seeking to voir dire the entire jury to

ensure that no other juror was tainted by Juror 4’s

unauthorized crime-scene visit. The state court denied

relief after a hearing. With the help of appointed counsel,

Sweeney then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under

28 ULS.C. § 2254 in Federal District Court. As in state

court, Sweeney argued that his trial counsel was

ineffective for not seeking to voir dire the entire jury. The

District Court denied Sweeney’s petition, concluding that

the state court’s application of Siwickland was not

objectively unreasonable.

In an unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit

reversed—but not on the ineffective-assistance claim that

Sweeney brought. Instead, the Fourth Circuit declared

that Sweeney’s trial was marred by a “combination of

extraordinary failures from juror to judge to attorney” that

deprived Sweeney of his right to be confronted with the

witnesses against him and his right to trial by an impartial

Jury. App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a, 29a. That error, the Court

of Appeals concluded, entitled Sweeney to a new trial.

Judge Quattlebaum dissented, criticizing the majority for

“flout[ing]” traditional principles of party presentation.

Id., at 99a-103a.

I

"1 PlTn our adversarial system of adjudication, we follow

the principle of party presentation.” United States y,

Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375, 140 S.Ct. 1875, 206

1..Ed.2d 866 (2020). The parties “ ‘frame the issues for

decision,’ " while the court serves as ° ‘neutral arbiter of

matters the parties present.’ ” /hicd. (quoting Creenlaww v

WEEE OES © 202% Thomson Reuters. No claim to orginal US Governnent Works

Page 6 of 7

Clark v. Sweeney, 607 U.S. ---- (2025)

-- S.Ct. ----, 2025 WL 3260170, 2025 Daily Joumal D.A.R. 10,748

United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243, 128 S.Ct. 2559, 171

L..Ed.2d 399 (2008)). To put it plainly, courts “call balls

and strikes”; they don’t get a turn at bat. Lomay vy.

Ortiz-Marquez, 590 WU. S. ——, -——, 140 S.Ct. 1721,

207 L.Ed.2d 132 (2020).

*2 DlThe Fourth Circuit transgressed _the

party-presentation principle by granting relief on a claim

that Sweeney never asserted and that the State never had

the chance to address. Sweeney asserted “one, and only

one,” claim in his federal habeas petition: that his counsel

was ineffective for failing to investigate whether other

jurors had been prejudiced by Juror 4’s crime-scene visit,

App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a (Quattlebaum, J., dissenting).

Instead of ruling on that claim, the Fourth Circuit devised

a new one, based on a “combination of extraordinary

failures from juror to judge to attorney.” /d., at 22a. The

Fourth Circuit’s “radical transformation” of Sweeney’s

simple — ineffective-assistance claim “departed so

drastically from the principle of party presentation as to

constitute an abuse of discretion.” Sineneng-Smith, 590

U.S., at 380, 375, 140 S.Ct. 1575. We accordingly reverse

the judgment of the Fourth Circuit and remand the case

for further proceedings.

1 15lOn remand, the Fourth Circuit should analyze the

ineffective-assistance claim that Sweeney asserted. Under

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996, relief is barred unless the state court’s decision was

End of Doctiment

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). When assessing a Swrickland claim that a state

court has already adjudicated, the “analysis is “doubly

deferential.” ” Dunn y. Reeves, 594 U.S. 731, 739, 141

S.Ct. 2405, 210 L.Ed.2d 812 (2021) (per curiam) (quoting

Burt v, Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 15, 134 S.Ct. 10, 187 L.Ed.2d

348 (2015)). “[A] federal court may grant relief only if

every ‘fairminded jurist’ would agree that every

reasonable lawyer would have made a different decision,”

594 US., at 739-740, 141 S.Ct. 2405 (quoting

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101, 131 S.Ct. 770,

178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011).

The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the

Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

All Citations

607 U.S, ----, --- S.Ct. ----, 2025 WI. 3260170, 2025

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