Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Latisha Anderson, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefJul 1, 2025

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25-5900

No. 25-

Li t! ij

------ Supreme Court, U.S.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA TES FILED

JUL 0 1 2025

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

LATISHA SHANTEY ANDERSON

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to

the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Denzil H. Forrester

Counsel for Petitioner

3325 Washburn Avenue

Suite 103

Charlotte, NC 28205

(704) 632-9992

denzilfesq@aol.com

Dated: September 8, 2025

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION FINDING NO

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT OR NO IMPROPER

INTERFERENCE BY THE DISTRICT COURT IS CONTRARY TO

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT’S DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR IT

DEPRIVES PETITIONER OF LIBERTY WITHOUT DUE

PROCESS BY OPEN AND NOTORIOUS MANIPULATION OF

THE TRIAL AND SENTENCING PROCESS.

II.

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IS CONTRARY TO THE

SIXTH AMENDMENT, WHICH REQUIRES DEFENDANTS TO

HAVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The parties to this proceeding are Petitioner, Latisha Anderson, and the

United States of America, who is the Respondent.

III. TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

II.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

III.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IV.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

OPINION BELOW

VI.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

VII.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

............................................... 1-2

............................... iii

VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

.....2

IX.

REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD BE

GRANTED

......... 2

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION FINDING NO

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT OR NO IMPROPER

INTERFERENCE BY THE DISTRICT COURT IS CONTRARY TO

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT’S DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR IT

DEPRIVES PETITIONER OF LIBERTY WITHOUT DUE

PROCESS BY OPEN AND NOTORIOUS MANIPULATION OF

THE TRIAL AND SENTENCING PROCESS.

II.

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IS CONTRARY TO THE

SIXTH AMENDMENT, WHICH REQUIRES DEFENDANTS TO

HAVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

CONCLUSION

XI.

APPENDICES

la-13a

iii

Court Order filed Granting Motion to Dismiss Appeal; Denying Motion

to file Supplemental Brief to the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit filed November 8, 2024. United States v. Latisha

Anderson,

(No. 23-4109) (4th Cir. 2024)

Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

filed November 8, 2024.

Original Judgment in a Criminal Case. Entered February 15, 2023.

Order of The United States Court of Appeals For the Fourth Circuit

Re: Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc filed March 31, 2025.

IV. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

Alabama v. Shelton, 534 U.S. 654 (2002)

16, 26, 29

Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)

8, 20

6, 9, 26, 28

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)

19, 22

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)

12, 14

Flowers v Mississippi, 139 S.Ct. 2228 (2019)

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)

Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. 232, (2019)

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)................................................

Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972)

16, 22

6, 28

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942)

.................. 19

Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008)

Lafler v.Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 180, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1394, 182 L.Ed. 2d 398

(2012)..'.........................

Lamon v. Boatwright, 467 F. 3d 1097 (7th Cir. 2006)

........................... 29

Martinez. v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S.

152 (200)

.......................................................................................... 13, 14

Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002)

Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 at 26-27 (1983)

Parrish v. United States. 605 U.S.(2025)

Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S.

14, 15, 16

, (2017)

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987)

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932),

1...23

Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009)

............... 8

Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981)

Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979)

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)

................................ 21

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)

United States v. Barber, 80F.3d 964 (4th Cir. 1996)

United States v. Caro, 597 F.3d 608, 614 (4th Cir. 2010)

United States v. Carreon, 11 F.3d 1225 (5th Cir. 1994)

•...... 28

United States v. Cassidy, 48 Fed. Appx. 428 (2002)

United States v. O’Conner, 64 F.3d 355 (8th Cir. 1995)................................. 28

United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006)................................. 28

United States v. Malmquist. 92 F.4th 555 (5th Cir. 2024)............................... 7

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)................................................. 18

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).................................................. 24

United States v. Watkins, 23-4094................................................... 6, 8, 23, 30

United States v. Webb, 965 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2020).....................

United States v. Wood, 57 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 1995)........................................ 37

Upjohn Company v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).............................. 28

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970)........................................................ 26

STATUTES

18U.S.C. § 3500..............................................

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).......................................................................................... 3

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)..................................................................................... 3

SENTENCING GUIDELINES

U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(b)(1)......................................................................................4, 5

U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a)............................................................................................. 4

U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(b)........................................................................................... 4

RULES

Fed.R.Crim.P. 16................ ............................................................................. 8

Fed.R.Crim.P. 26.2.................................................................................... ........ 8

Fed. R.Crim.P. 32(f)(l)(2)(3)..........................................................

Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 601................................................................,............... 33

vii

OPINIONS BELOW

The Court Order filed Granting Motion to Dismiss Appeal; Denying Motion to

file Supplemental Brief to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit filed November 8, 2024, effectively affirming Petitioner’s conviction

and sentence are reprinted on pages la through 2a of the Appendix

VI.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Order of The United States Court of Appeals For the Fourth Circuit Re:

Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc filed March 31, 2025, is reprinted on

page 9a of the Appendix. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. § 1254(1). A Rule 14.5 extension of 60 was granted on July 10, 2025.

VII.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides

as follow:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or

otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment

of indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases

arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,

when in actual service in time of War public

danger; nor shall any person be subject for the

same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or

limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to

be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of laW; nor

shall private property be taken for public use,

without just compensation.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides

as follow:

In all criminal prosecution the accused shall enjoy

the right to a speedy and public trial, by an

impartial jury of the State and district wherein the

crime shall have been committed; which district

shall have been previously ascertained by law, and

to be informed of the nature and cause of the

accusation; to be confronted with the witness

against him; to have compulsory process for

obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the

assistance of counsel for his [defense].

VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner, Ms. Latisha Anderson (“Anderson”), was one of nine

defendants named in a twenty-three-count Bill of Indictment filed in the

Western District of North Carolina, Charlotte Division, on June 15, 2021.

Joint Appendix to Fourth Circuit (“JA”).1 JA 196, JA 224. The Bill of

Indictment charged Petitioner with Conspiracy to Distribute and Possession

with the Intent to Distribute Controlled Substances, Eutylone, in violation of

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 841 (b)(1)(C).

Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to Count One of the Third Superseding

Bill of Indictment, on September 1, 2021. JA 73, JA 206-210. Petitioner,

pursuant to a written plea agreement expressly accepted responsibility for

drug trafficking. JA 64-65, JA 207, JA 210, JA 219. In the presentence

investigation report (“presentence report”), Petitioner received a three-point

reduction in offense level for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (a) and U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(b). JA 207, JA 216, JA 220, JA241.

Petitioner filed an objection to the presentence report denying possession of a

1 Joint Appendix to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

firearm in connection with the drug trafficking offense, U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(b)(1).

JA 230. The Government failed to file an objection to the presentence report

as required, under Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(f)(l)(2)(3).

On June 7, 2022, after entering a plea agreement with the

Government, Petitioner was subpoenaed to testified at the trial of her co

defendant, Kenneth Watkins. JA 89-126. Petitioner was without counsel at

the Watkins’ trial. Petitioner was asked compound questions by the

Government at that trial. On December 1, 2022, the Government filed a

sentencing memorandum asserting, Petitioner made misrepresentations on

the witness stand at Mr. Watkins’ trial. The Government contends it was

Kenneth Watkins who gave Petitioner the Eutylone pills, not the unnamed

black man. JA 108, JA 256. While failing to object within 14 days after the

publication of the presentence report, the Government was allowed to argue

for revocation of the three-point reduction in Petitioner’s offense level under

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (a) and U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(b). JA 219, 254-258. With a listed

criminal history category as I; Petitioner’s total offense level was set at 25. JA

249. That projected a Guidelines range for imprisonment at a minimum of 57

months to a maximum of 71 months. JA 249. The United States Probation

Officer did not revise the final presentence report. JA 234-253. At the

sentencing hearing, Petitioner contested all arguments for recall of her

reduction for acceptance of responsibility. JA 174. The district court

disagreed with Petitioner, then increased her offense level by three points for

testifying falsely at the trial of Kenneth Watkins. JA 261. The district court

overruled Petitioner’s objection to the two-level enhancement in the

presentence report for “possession of a firearm.” JA 173, JA 261. On a

separate occasion, Petitioner inadvertently left her Romarm/Cugir Draco 762

pistol at Mr. Cloud’s residence, following a romantic gathering. The

correlating upward sentence enhancement of two levels was pursuant to

U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(b)(1).

Petitioner and co-defendant, Steven Cloud, were at one time

romantically involved. JA109, JA139. On November 29, 2020, she traveled to

Atlanta, Georgia to meet someone else, in a separate and distinct conspiracy

to receive Eutylone from an unnamed person in a red sports car. Additionally,

as a substantial favor for Mr. Cloud she collected $4,500.00 from Mr. Watkins

on the behalf of Mr. Cloud.

The district court entered the Judgment In A Criminal Case on

February 13, 2023, which was filed on February 15, 2023. A3a-6a. The

Statement of Reasons was filed on February 15, 2025. A10-14a. Petitioner

filed a timely, Notice of Appeal on February 24, 2023.

Procedurally, the district court heard an untimely phantom objection,

by the Government, to the presentence report. The Government never filed

an objection to the presentence report. JA 252. The Government, having

never filed an objection to the presentence report, successfully sought to

prohibit Petitioner from receiving her reduction in sentence for acceptance of

responsibility, without filing a proper objection to the presentence report.

JA172.

REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD BE GRANTED

The writ should be granted because the Government’s defective crossexamination of Petitioner occurred when she was without counsel, and it was

abusive. The Government compounded the constitutional violation by using

the ill-begotten answers to fuel allegations of obstruction of justice by the

Petitioner. That led to phantom objections to the presentence report which

formed the basis for sentencing enhancements against Petitioner. The above

Government’s misconduct is a breach of the plea agreement. Prosecutorial

misconduct invalidates the appeal waiver in the plea agreement. Therefore, a

merit appeal is appropriate.

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION FINDING NO

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT OR NO IMPROPER

INTERFERENCE BY THE DISTRICT COURT IS CONTRARY TO

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT’S DUE PROCESS CLAUSE, FOR IT

DEPRIVES PETITIONER OF LIBERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS

BY OPEN AND NOTORIOUS MANIPULATION OF THE TRIAL AND

SENTENCING PROCESS.

Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Clearly On The Record

Substantively, incompetent evidence was used to demonstrate alleged

prevarication by Petitioner at the trial of a co-defendant, Kenneth Watkins.

JA 22, JA 261. This Court should review the Fourth Circuit’s decision

denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc filed March 31, 2025, due to the clear

case of prosecutorial misconduct, explained below. In this matter the Panel

Decision is flawed because it affirmed the following failures of the

Government: not filing timely objections to the presentence report; eliciting

convoluted answers from Petitioner at trial; suborning the testimony of

Detective Sardelis, and the district court’s failure to preside observantly over

the examination of multiple witnesses at trial and at the sentencing in this

matter. A major error of the district court was the failure to address

Petitioner’s non-frivolous mitigating arguments, to ameliorate suspicion of

fabrication against her. United States v. Webb, 965 F.3d 262, 265, 268 (4th Cir.

2020). citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.

2d 445 (2007). Discovery or discoverable information and the duty to search

for it includes information required to be disclosed by Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 and

26.2, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (the Jencks Act), Brady and Giglio). Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150

(1972). In the-published decision by the Fourth Circuit, in the case of United

States v. Kenneth Watkins, 23-4094, the Fourth Circuit mentioned the

purported corroborative testimony made by two separate witnesses, Ayesha

O'Neill and Kizzy Childs, at the Kenneth Watkins trial. The collective

testimony is that the witnesses saw a light-skinned black male in a red sports

car, giving a Versace box to this Petitioner at a gas station. Later that same

day, they saw co-defendant, Kenneth Watkins, handed this Petitioner $4,500

cash to deliver to co-defendant, Steven Cloud. The witnesses’ collective

version of the event was similar to that of the Petitioner. This revelation is

material for at the time of sentencing trial counsel for the Petitioner believed

the law enforcement witness, Detective Sardelis, was merely a rogue actor

and that no other witnesses’ testimony supported that of the Petitioner. This

subsequent news undermines the veracity of the Government’s untimely

claim of material misrepresentation by Petitioner at Kenneth Watkin’s trial.

It shows the Government breached the plea agreement by championing the

cause to revoke Petitioner’s acceptance of responsibility, when they knew or

should have known the truth. This news undermines the integrity of the

ruling at Petitioner’s sentencing hearing; the news reveals the district court

should have been cognizant of the colloquial misunderstanding by Petitioner.

Breach of the plea agreement by the Government is a factor in voiding

the signed appellate waiver in Petitioner’s plea agreement, with the

Government. The “Government’s plain error in breaching plea agreement by

advocating against sentence reduction affected defendant’s substantial

rights.” United States v. Malmquist. 92 F.4*h 555, 560-561 (5th Cir. 2024) 2024

WL 439438. The Fifth Circuit takes a bright line approach to plea-agreement-

breach claims. Id. at 561. Petitioner preserved her prosecutorial-misconductand-Government-breach objection in the district court. JA 73, 174, 185.

Specifically championing the point, Petitioner met with an unnamed

individual in Atlanta, Georgia about the time of her arrest, other than Mr.

Watkins. She received the Eutylone from the unknown individual. JA 153.

There is no doubt Petitioner deserves her sentencing reduction. Petitioner

satisfied the United States Probation Officer and was awarded a three-point

reduction for acceptance of responsibility in the final presentence report. JA

212 and JA 220. The Government breached the contract by advocating for

withdrawal of Petitioner’s acceptance of responsibility when she, was

subpoenaed then had to testify, albeit, reluctantly as a witness in co

defendant’s trial. She was not interested in talking to Watkins’ defense

attorney [Mr. Rael], JA92. “It is true enough that when the Government

reneges on a plea deal, the integrity bf the system may be called into

questions.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 142-143, 129 S.Ct. 1423,

1433, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009). Only after the district court sentenced

Petitioner, it was gleaned from a decision of the Fourth Circuit that other

witnesses corroborated Petitioner’s version of events at the Watkins’ trial.

Supplemental Brief of Appellant, Document No. 53 pp.7-8. The dispositive

disclosure came in the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Kenneth Watkin’s appeal

decision. United States v. Watkins, No. 23-4094 (4th Cir. 2024). The Fourth

Circuit demonstrated that Ms. Ayesha O’Neill and Ms. Kizzy Childs

corroborated Petitioner. Document No. 63 pp.4-5. This information revealed

the mens rea behind the protracted unwarranted attack on Petitioner. Berger

v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). The Petitioner, Ayesha O’Neill and

Kizzy Childs all testified, at the Kenneth Watkins’ trial, that a light-skinned

black male in a red sports car gave a box to Petitioner at a gas station.

Petitioner had been in custody since September 1, 2021, and was isolated

from the corroborating witnesses, Ms. O’Neill and Ms. Childs. JA 93. The

district court and the Government knew of this fact at Petitioner’s sentencing

hearing. As mentioned above, defense counsel at the sentencing hearing was

not privy to that information. Defense counsel’s ignorance of the corroborated

testimony at the trial of Kenneth Watkins is of great importance for it sheds

light on the Government’s mindset in tolerating Detective Sardelis’

suspicious answers and gesticulations towards the prosecution’s table, at the

sentencing hearing. JA 147,150. His testimony demonstrated his intent to

deceive all in attendance, including the district court.

Due process requires the prosecution to disclose to the defense any

evidence that is material either to guilt or to punishment. Pennsylvania v:

Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987); United States v.

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L..Ed.2d 481 (1985); Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 at 87 (1963). In the instant matter, it is obvious the

prosecutor and the district court had personal knowledge of the testimony of

Ms. O’Neill and that of Ms. Childs. The Government’s obligation, to disclose,

is regardless of whether the suppression was intentional or accidental. The

evidence indicates the Government used creative options available to them to

increase the punishment for a Petitioner who did not cooperate with them.

The district court soundly refused to use the detective's sentencing-hearing

testimony. However, the sentencing court relied on the Petitioner’s

manipulated trial testimony as a safety net to secure the Government’s

phantom objections to the presentence report. Petitioner posits the

Government may not corrupt the testimony of a person on the witness stand

then rely on the ill-begotten gains to punish the same witness.

The immediate focus is the Government’s act of leaving all the

suspicious answers, from the trial and the sentencing hearing, for the district

court to rule on. That omission is tantamount to acquiescing to flawed

testimony. Such misconduct is a breach of the ethical performance consented

to in the plea agreement. The Government’s failure to uphold the ethical

obligation affects the validity of the appeal waiver. It should now be

considered breached, thereby allowing submission of a merit brief, due to

prosecutorial misconduct.

The soundness of the criminal justice system rests on the reviewing

courts having complete faith in the perception, recollection and

communication of knowledge to a trier-of-fact being genuine, before the

admission of such testimony as evidence. The sanctity of taking the oath to

tell the truth, the ability to recall the truth and to communicate is

fundamental and necessary to achieve justice.

The facts relied on by the district court as a basis for the enhanced

sentence were: (1) manipulated by the questioning of the prosecutor at a trial

the Petitioner testified in, when she was without the guidance of counsel. In

general, legal counsel for subpoenaed witnesses are not a party to the case.

Therefore, the non-party-attorney for the subpoenaed co-defendant may not

object to questions nor move to strike answers.

The Fourth Circuit focused on Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal.

That filing indicates the “record establishes that Petitioner entered her guilty

plea knowingly and voluntarily after a thorough plea colloquy with the

district court.” [Doc. 45 pl.] However, that is not the sole criterion. This

Court may consider deficiencies by the Government.

Feckless Performance By The Government Is In The Record

Ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct are

grounds to deny the Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. Even if done

unwittingly, the Government at times may also be ineffective. They were

ineffective in the following situations: in the questioning of Petitioner on

cross-examination; at sentencing, failing to move to strike its own witness’

flawed response on cross-examination by the defense and by shirking its

duties to file objections to the presentence report. The Government’s failure

allowed the district court to serve as a means of last resort in correcting the

prosecution’s ill-advised decisions.

The Government circumvented the mandates of Rule 32 by not filing

an objection much less a specific objection to the presentence report. The

Government, getting away with the creative use of the legal system by

maliciously abusing a witness, is outside the scope of the appellate waiver

signed by the Petitioner. No prosecutor would admit that a defendant should

expect less than professional behavior from the Government.

The Government acknowledges that Anderson admitted she had been

confused and denied lying during her testimony at co-defendant’s trial. JA

171. (Also Doc. 45. p6.). In court filings Anderson demonstrated the impetus

for her confusion was the prosecutor’s compound questions. In general,

requesting one answer for two or more questions is inherently confusing. Yet,

the Government posed the ineffective questions to Petitioner at Watkin’s

trial, when Petitioner was without counsel. JA 119-121. Though the district

court mentioned it would not consider Detective Sardelis’ testimony at

Petitioner’s sentencing hearing, in the aggregate his testimony demonstrates

a pattern of bad faith or misconduct by the Government. Those misconducts

added up to a breach of the plea agreement by the Government. Therefore,

the Government should not benefit from its poor performance.

. Inappropriate Judicial Interference Is Clearly In The Record.

Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to [self] representation was

violated by the unsolicited participation of overzealous standby counsel [the

district court]. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d

562. Faretta is instructive that overzealous third-party interference violates a

defendant’s right to counsel. In Faretta it was the pro se litigant whose rights

were infringed upon. Here it is Petitioner’s right to trial counsel that was

infringed upon. Applied to this case it magnifies the malice of the

Government in taking unfair advantage of the de facto pro se defendant at

trial, which the district court should have been aware of.

The selective inappropriate interference from the district court is a •

salient violation of Petitioner’s due process rights under the Fifth

Amendment. It links into the Governments breach of its obligations in the

plea agreement and to Petitioner’s right to counsel under the Sixth

Amendment. The causal connection is the ineffective performance at trial by

the cross-examining prosecutor. That deficient performance is the impetus for

the alleged misrepresentation by Petitioner. The district court observed the

Government’s multiple failures. While the judge is under no duty to provide

personal instructions on courtroom procedure or to perform any legal “chores”

for the defendant that counsel would normally carry out...the Government

has an interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial. Martinez,

v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 120

S.Ct. 684, 145 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000). As a subpoenaed witness Petitioner’s

counsel would have been precluded from objecting to questions and from

moving to strike answers. Therefore, there were no chores that defense

counsel would normally carry out. The federal court was expected to provide

some level of guidance and impartial assistance to ensure a fair trial.

The ruling in Martinez is instructive that the integrity of the trial is

paramount. Petitioner posits integrity is not found in asking convoluted

questions to elicit specious answers to be used at a later date against an

unsuspecting defendant.

The Government should have filed objections to the presentence report

to place the unsuspecting Petitioner on alert. Notice and opportunity is a

fundamental tenet of jurisprudence. Secondly, the Faretta opinion recognizes

that a defendant must “voluntarily and intelligently” elect to conduct his own

defense. Martinez Id at. 161. This Petitioner never volunteered to be

subpoenaed. JA 92. In fact, she reports the United States Marshals advised

her, she would be held in contempt of court if she refused to go along with

them to the trial. “A trial judge may also terminate self-representation or

appoint “standby counsel”. It was obvious Petitioner was without counsel at

the hearing she had been subpoenaed to testify at. It was obvious the

prosecutor asked multiple questions at one time. During the Watkins’ trial,

the district court could have easily recessed the proceedings and summoned

the court appointed defense counsel. The district court did not call for

Petitioner’s trial counsel. Any anticipated excuse framed by the Government,

now, is simply an exercise of bureaucracy. This Court ruled against side

stepping the obvious notice or intent to appeal, over the impossible request of

mandating an imprisoned person to control the filing of matters outside of his

control within 60 days, after he had already given notice. Parrish u. United

States. 605 U.S.(2025). In the instant case the clarification below,

exchange or explanation of what it means to have simply met someone once

or twice versus knowing them, contributed to the district court’s conclusion

that Petitioner lied at Kenneth Watkins’ trial.

That don't mean that I know him just because I

met him before, and I wouldn't even call that like a meet and

greet. You know, it was just a transaction. And it wasn't

an illegal transaction. But it was just one transaction that

me and him had, and it didn't even last two minutes. So I

wouldn't say that, no, I don't know him. Have I seen him?

Yes. Do I know him? No.

Similar to the paperchase in Parrish, in this instant matter, there is

an underlying semantical debate regarding what it really means to know

someone. Petitioner finally clarified the distinction that she did in fact meet

Kenneth Watkins. JA 102. However, she failed to understand that, she does

not have privileges similar to that of the police.

Law enforcement officers are allowed to lie to suspects and tell them

they were pulled over for speeding when in fact, as here, the Petitioner was

pulled over because the officer was instructed to do so by other officials. JA

94-96. Another law enforcement official may have testified in court over

twenty times yet still have the expectation to ask questions of the lawyer

examiner and get away with it. And he also has the confidence to be evasive,

“quite a few” as opposed to simply admitting the number of times is

approximately 20. JA 147. However, for the simple nuance in parlance of

what it means to know somebody Petitioner’s earned sentencing reductions,

were rescinded. JA 261

That is why Petitioner was due legal counsel at the Watkins’ trial.

Every defendant has a right to legal counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.

335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). The Sixth Amendment does not

permit activation of a suspended sentence upon an indigent defendant’s

violation of the terms of his probation where the State did not provide him

counsel during the prosecution of the offense for which he is imprisoned.

Alabama v. Shelton, 534 U.S. 654- 655, 122 S.Ct. 1764-1765, 152 L.Ed.2d

888. (2002). Pursuant to Gideon v. Wainwright, Alabama v. Shelton and their

progeny, her liberty interest was in peril. Like the defendants in those cases,

Petitioner was a wounded prey versus the Government, against the

unfriendly defense counsel for Mr. Watkins (Attorney Rael), and against the

district court. JA 101-102, JA 176-177 and JA 261. In Parrish, the plain and

commonsensical intent of that petitioner was allowed to relate forward to the

date reopening is granted. This Court’s ruling afforded that petitioner the

ordinary meaning of what he wanted to effectuate under the law. Petitioner

now posits her truth which is in the record, that is to accept responsibility but

not capitulate to the Government’s false narrative of only once conspiracy,

should win-out over perceptions of her argumentative personality and ego. JA

102. Petitioner is a legal neophyte; she is not expected to understand

standards of review and trial procedures. She did not know law enforcement

is able to weave in and out of the truth when talking to suspects. Therefore,

they are compared by a different standard, and she is measured against a

much more stringent one, even though her opponents have the courtroom

experience to guide them. That being so, some officers forget the laxity of

their veracity out in the field, does not apply to their testimony in court under

oath. Petitioner’s lack of legal knowledge coupled with her never waiving her

right to a lawyer, is why Petitioner was without counsel at a critical stage in

the adjudication of her case.

Here it is as equally an improbable task to expect the currently

detained Petitioner to know in real time that Ms. O’Neill and Ms. Childs

corroborated her claim. JA 93. Here it is apparent that the Government

should have known defense counsel would have been clueless that

Petitioner’s testimony was supported by others. The Petitioner posits her

claim against the district court is based on the following observations,

inconsistency of interjection. There was none at the trial when Petitioner was

de facto pro se defendant, being abused by the Government. Then at the

sentencing hearing, the interference by the district court was excessive. Trial

defense counsel attempted to cross-examine the Government’s witness in

order to show the detective’s inability to recall and communicate facts he

allegedly perceived or learned. The soundness of the criminal justice system

rests on the public having complete faith in the collection, and recognition of

tangible information as being genuine. “The very integrity of the judicial

system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all

the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that

justice is done it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory

process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the

prosecution or by the defense.” United States u. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709, 94

S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974). Bias is the irrational predisposition in

favor of one side by a witness, while prejudice is an irrational predisposition

against one side. In the judgment of any district court, bias and prejudice

should not be considered discretionary matters, especially regarding the

impeachment of testifying law enforcement personnel.

Particular facts, from the Watkins’s trial, relied on by the district

court to render the sentence in this matter were altered in open court by the

Government. The convoluted answers were elicited from an ineffective cross

examination, at trial by the Government. The ends of criminal justice would

be defeated if judgments were to be found on partial or speculative

presentation of facts. Id. Hence, this Court should grant certiorari of this

petition because further review is warranted due to the constitutional errors.

The Fourth Circuit Should Have Conducted An En Banc

Review

The Fourth Circuit’s Decision finding insufficient basis for en banc

review of the district court’s ruling, is tantamount to saying prosecutorial

fecklessness aided by judicial abuse of discretion was insufficient to void the

appellate waiver in the plea agreement. The Fourth Circuit’s decision is

questionable because comprehensive information was within the knowledge

of the sentencing court and the Government, but not the defense counsel. A

la-2a. Yet the district court found clarity in the convoluted testimony elicited

from Petitioner by the prosecutor at co-defendant’s trial. Again, Petitioner

should not be punished for the Government’s deficiencies regarding

investigating the accurate facts of the case. Nor should Petitioner carry the

detriment of the Government’s lack of proficiency in questioning her at the

trial of her co-defendant. “A pro se defendant may not ‘abuse the dignity of

the courtroom,” nor may he fail to ‘comply with relevant rules of procedural

and substantive law.” Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 185; 128 S.Ct.2379,

2392, 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008). Here, Petitioner was not protected by the

district court at the trial nor at the sentencing hearing. Petitioner posits, to

the extend a pro se defendant may not abuse the dignity of the courtroom,

neither should the Government. Petitioner was subpoenaed into an

impossible situation, either be held in contempt by not complying with the

subpoena or appear without counsel to face, at times, diametrically opposed

questions, from the Government, asking for one answer. Then at the

sentencing hearing, Petitioner’s trial counsel was prevented from actualizing

the right for a full cross examination. A cross-examiner is permitted to delve

into a witness’ story to test [the]witness’ perceptions and memory.

Traditionally, they are allowed to impeach, that is, discredit the witness.

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347

(1974). “Denial of right of effective cross-examination was a constitutional

error of the first magnitude so that no amount of showing of want of prejudice

could cure it.” Id. at 318, 1111. The Government benefited from the district

court’s differential treatment of Petitioner yet still pursued additional

punitive sanctions against her. Therefore, proving the impossible situation

Petitioner was called into, which stymied preserving a rich record for

appellate review.

In summation of argument I, the Government failed to honor

Petitioner’s benefit of her bargain: they did not file an objection to the

presentence report; they filed a sentencing memorandum accusing Petitioner

of wrongdoing knowing her testimony was corroborated by Ms. O’Neill and

Ms. Child, and they suborned inaccurate testimony by Detective Sardelis, at

the sentencing hearing. The calamity to Petitioner is that her trial counsel

did not have knowledge of the depth of the chicanery. That the Government

and the district court were aware of support for Petitioner’s acceptance of

responsibility. The Government then uses the awkward trial testimony, they

elicited, against Petitioner during the sentencing process. “The United States

Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but

of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its

obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal

prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”

Berger at 88. The above are affirmative and intentional steps by the

Government to thwart Petitioner’s sentencing reduction for acceptance of

responsibility.

The presumption of prejudice from attorney’s deficient performance

that costs a defendant an appeal applies regardless of whether defendant

signed an appeal waiver. Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. 232, 139 S.Ct. 738; 203

L.Ed.2d 77 (2019). Therefore, the overall fecklessness practiced by the

prosecution should void the appellate waiver in the same manner ineffective

assistance by defense counsel would for a defendant. In this case, the

prosecutor’s performance was below the standard for a seasoned Government

trial attorney. Additionally, failing to alert the defense of the O’Neill and

Childs corroborating testimony along with suborning the testimony of

Detective Sardelis, fall below the standards of any attorney. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052; 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

II.

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IS CONTRARY TO THE

SIXTH AMENDMENT WHICH REQUIRES DEFENDANTS TO

HAVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

A Subpoenaed Co-Defendant Witness Has A Right To Counsel

Petitioner was caught in a blind spot of justice, at the trial of a co

defendant she was subpoenaed to testify in. Petitioner was without her

defense counsel, without a seasoned federal prosecutor and without

understanding from the district court. Though Petitioner had appointed

counsel, non-party attorneys are not allowed to object to questions, nor may

they move to strike responses to awkward prosecutorial questions. Here,

Petitioner was subpoenaed to the trial by the defense counsel of, Kenneth

Watkins, her codefendant. Reluctantly she took the witness stand and faced

convoluted questions, by the Government. Subsequently, the Government

submitted an untimely filing to essentially increase Petitioner’s Guidelines

sentencing range, using the clumsily elicited nonsensical answers of

Petitioner.

During the Watkins’ trial, the district court allowed feckless

questioning by the Government. While at the sentencing hearing, the district

court admonishing defense counsel, not to argue with the witness he was

cross-examining, in violation of the tenets in Davis v. Alaska. JA150. Both

above situations infringed on Petitioner’s right to counsel. The first by

allowing, the insidious abuse of a de facto pro se witness by the Government.

Then to subsequently use the ill-gotten answers to buttressed reversal of her

acceptance of responsibility, during sentencing. This was done as a default

measure after the detective was exposed by defense counsel. JA 150-151. His

sentencing hearing testimony had been impeached. In the eyes of the

Petitioner, these are two examples of how the Government served as the

setup pitcher for the unwitting district court.

In both situations Petitioner was without the effective assistance of

counsel. That was a violation of the Petitioner’s right to appointed counsel, as

established by this Court in seminal cases. Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45

(1932). In these cases, counsel either was not provided or was prevented from

discharging his normal functions. It was determined that no showing of

prejudice was required. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 at 26-27 (1983).

These two cases, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) and Scott

v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), required provision of counsel in any petty

offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution...” that actually leads to

imprisonment even for a brief period” Argersinger, at 33. The separate action

of the district court and the separate uncoordinated action of the Government

are inappropriate. When combined the separate acts deprived Petitioner of

the effective assistance of counsel. The district court suppressed Petitioner’s

guaranteed right to counsel as follows: ignoring prosecutorial misconduct

towards the Petitioner as a witness and by tacitly allowing feckless

performance by the Government at a time Petitioner was temporarily

unrepresented.

The district court then stymied defense counsel’s advocacy when the

Government had two lawyers at its table. The district court seemingly

condoned corrupt testimony at the sentencing hearing, while discounting

credible testimony of Ms. Ayesha O’Neill and Ms. Kizzy Childs at the

Kenneth Watkins’ trial. The Fourth Circuit noted the corroboration in United

States v. Kenneth Watkins, 23-4094 published opinion. The sanctuary of the

system should have compelled an arbiter to value the trial testimony of those

two witnesses.

No other circuit openly allows a prosecution witness to look at the

Government’s table to catch answers on cross-examination. The Petitioner

contends her right to counsel is as valuable as they are for a sympathetic

business or political person who has been targeted and charged with a crime.

In a world of blind justice, each defendant is equally deserving of the right to

effective assistance of counsel.

Additionally, a defendant has a right to have the Government prove its

case at all critical stages in the process. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,

228, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1933, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1149 (1967). The sentencing hearing is

a critical state of the process. Lafler v.Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 180, 132 S.Ct.

1376, 1394, 182 L.Ed. 2d 398 (2012). The district court should have offered

Petitioner the ability to confront Detective Sardelis’ corrupt answers. JA150.

It does in the Fifth Circuit. All witnesses are presumed competent to testify,

the only grounds for disqualifying a witness as incompetent are that the

witness does not have knowledge of the matter, the capacity to recall or he

does not understand the duty to testify truthfully. Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 601.,

United States v. Cassidy, 48 Fed. Appx. 428 2002 WL 2022520. The detective

should have been exposed to an aggressive cross examination in the Fourth

Circuit as he would have been in the Fifth Circuit. That opportunity was

necessary once the sentencing court decided to ignore the findings in the

presentence report. In said document the U.S. Probation Officer found that

Petitioner accepted responsibly and in turn reduced her offense level.

Fairness in the trial process should not take a backseat to a trier-of-fact’s

reliance on [unfounded] predispositions. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580

U.S.,137 S.Ct. 855, 879, 197 L.Ed.2d 107, 85WSLW4071 (2017). This

Court found the Sixth Amendment interests are more profound than the long

standing no-impeachment rule, an evidentiary rule. Here, Petitioner is not

alleging racial bias. The focus of Petitioner is the unfounded predisposition

that the Government’s offering is competent. That is as dangerous as racial

bias.

When Counsel For Both Sides Are Not Given An Even Chances

of Being Heard, The Court Is Mitigating The Right To Counsel

It is evident on the record of the disparate treatment of opposing

counsels. One should not receive preferential handling and the other receives

differential treatment. In this matter that is the second fringe benefit

received by the Government. The Government did not submit, into, evidence:

affidavits; photographs; video images or even drug journal entries

demonstrating Petitioner received the drugs from Kenneth Watkins. Yet, the

Government’s oral assertion regarding misrepresentation of Petitioner, when

she had no legal representation as a witness, was sufficient for the district

court. “The adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a

poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their

cards until played. We find ample room in that system, at least as far as ‘due

process’ is concerned, for (a rule) which is designed to enhance the search for

truth in the criminal trial by insuring both the defendant and the State

ample opportunity to investigate certain facts crucial to the determination of

guilt or innocence.” Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26

L.Ed.2d. 446 (1970). In Williams this Court emphasized, the constitutionality

of such rules might depend on reciprocity to the parties.

The Petitioner claims reciprocity is called for under Maryland v.

Brady. In this matter either the district court or the Government should have

taken public notice of the corroborating testimony of Ms. O’Neill and Ms.

Childs, they did not. As such Petitioner was without the effective assistance

of counsel. For trial counsel was the only entity not in on the secret that

Petitioner had support for her testimony at the Watkins trial.

The Government’s position was to continue to advocate for the

temporary and selective manipulation of an unrepresented defendant at a

codefendant’s trial. Kenneth Watkins has a need for compulsory process and

Petitioner has a right to be represented at a hearing which impacts the

length of her liberty interest. Petitioners’ interest should win out. The Sixth

Amendment does not permit activation of a suspended sentence where the

State did not provide counsel. Shelton, at 654-655. As in Shelton, Petitioner’s

liberty interest is negatively impacted, when she was without effective

assistance of counsel.

Petitioner agrees that “federal judges should be accorded ample

discretion in determining how best to conduct the voir dire” and in the

instant situation, sentencing hearing, and other matters closely fettered to

specific facts of the case. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189,

101 S.Ct. 1629, 68 L.Ed.2d 22(1981). United States v. Barber, 80F.3d 964, 967

(4th Cir. 1996) (noting that voir dire “must be committed to the good judgment

of the trial judge whose immediate perception determines what questions are

appropriate for ferreting out relevant prejudices” (internal quotations

omitted)). United States v. Caro, 597 F.3d 608, 614 (4th Cir. 2010). Petitioner’s

contention regards the recourse for her. Notwithstanding the ruling the

sentencing court made, which was subsequently upheld by the Fourth

Circuit, a denial of counsel is of great importance.

No matter a prosecutor’s outstanding history with knowledge of the

facts of their case, a judge must determine whether the prosecutor’s proffered

reasons are the actual reasons, or whether the proffered reasons [questions]

are pretextual. Flowers v Mississippi, 139 S.Ct. 2228, 2244, 204 L.Ed.2d 638

(2019). In this matter, abuse of a defendant at the trial stage when she was

without representation of counsel is significant and blatantly obvious and

discouraging to most observers, except for the Government and the district

court in this matter.

Again, Petitioner maintains several circuits show contempt for such

manipulation of evidence. It was an error for the Government not to disclose

to the defense the fact that one of the Government’s witnesses had been

threatened, since that fact would have been relevant to the credibility of the

witness. United States v. O’Conner, 64 F.3d 355 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).

It is the Food and Drug Administration’s duty in a criminal trial to disclose

the contents of Investigational New Drug applications that bear on the safety

of the drug a defendant is charged with unlawfully dispensing. United States

v. Wood, 57 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 1995). That case was remanded to the district

court to conduct an in-camera inspection and make appropriate findings as to

whether the presentence report of the government witness contained any

Brady or Giglio materials. United States v. Carreon, 11 F.3d 1225 (5th Cir.

1994). Petitioner contends there is no finding of similar abuse of a witness in

other circuits and to be consistent her sentence should be vacated due to the

Government’s breach of the plea agreement.

An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results

in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege

at all. Upjohn Company u. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66

L.Ed.2d 584 (1981). In this matter the Fourth Circuit’s decision illustrates a

different application of the right to counsel; a higher threshold than required

in other circuits. “The right to counsel “has been accorded...not for its own

sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a

fair trial.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 145, 126 S.Ct. 2557,

2562, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006). citing Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166, 122

S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002). If a trial is unfair the Sixth Amendment

has been violated.

The Seventh Circuit maintains an objective view on testifying

witnesses compared to that of the Fourth Circuit. The sentencing court

should have assessed the credibility of the prosecutor and her reason for

striking the law enforcement testimony and inserted her own. Lamon v.

Boatwright, 467 F. 3d 1097, 1101 (7th Cir. 2006). Otherwise, the Government

is allowed to warp its own witness’s narrative with illogic regarding

identifying multiple conspiracies.

Prudence by the Government’s attorney would have complied with the

current constitutional requirement of notice and opportunity. The irony of

this case is Petitioner was initially awarded a reduction in offense level for

acceptance of responsibility then punished for differences between her

version of events which is supported by corroborating testimony and logic.

The lenient evidentiary standard at sentencing is not as long-standing nor

does it out-rank the appearance of propriety and the need for legal counsel by

a defendant at any adversarial setting. Id. Shelton at 654- 655.

The Fourth Circuit’s position of reliance on the presumption of

reasonableness doctrine is tantamount to the old way of viewing the

sentencing guidelines as mandatory. The blind adherence to a presumption of

reasonableness in the face of prosecutorial and judicial error is a skewed view

of impartiality. If this Court adopts the lower court’s ruling it will send a

message to both parties that the Government may game the system and

proffer unreliable testimony to the sentencing court.

The height of hypocrisy is to seemingly double-team a subpoenaed

witness, while she is without counsel. And subsequently use her manipulated

responses as the basis for punitive enhancements against said Petitioner.

This type of system makes a mockery of the due process clause and the

constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.

X. CONCLUSION

In comparing the published decision by the Fourth Circuit, in the case

of United States v. Kenneth Watkins, 23-4094, to this instant matter. It was

revealed that the Fourth Circuit in one setting ruled a different way than it

did in another setting when reviewing similar sets of testimonies.

Uniformity is necessary to guarantee constitutional protection at the

sentencing phase for non-capital defendants. Otherwise, we have a system

wherein the Government may cleverly rescind its promises in the plea

agreement.

Based on the foregoing reasons, arguments and authorities, Petitioner

hereby respectfully requests the Supreme Court to grant a writ of certiorari

and reverse the judgment and sentence in this case.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

Counsel respectfully requests oral argument on behalf of the

Petitioner.

Respectfully submitted,

This 8th day of September 2025

By Counsel

/s/Denzil Forrester_______

N.C. State Bar No. 24976

Attorney for the Petitioner

Denzil H. Forrester, Attorney-at-Law

3325 Washburn Avenue

Suite 103

Charlotte, NC 28205

T: (704) 632-9992

F: (704) 632-9969

denzilfesq@aol.com

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.