Opposition Brief — Donna Elizabeth Summers, Petitioner v. Montana
Supreme Court briefFeb 17, 2026
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. 25-588
In the Supreme Court of the United States
DONNA ELIZABETH SUMMERS,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
Montana Supreme Court
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
Austin M. Knudsen
Attorney General
Christian B. Corrigan
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
MONTANA DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE
215 N. Sanders Street
Helena, MT 59601
(406) 444-2026
christian.corrigan@mt.gov
Counsel for Respondent
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether, despite this Court’s settled totality-ofthe-circumstances test for determining voluntary consent, a driver always remains seized after an officer
concludes a traffic stop and returns the driver’s documents based solely on the singular fact that the officer
and the driver then engage in further conversation.
ii
LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioner Donna Elizabeth Summers was the defendant in the state trial court and the appellant in
the Montana Supreme Court. The State of Montana
was the plaintiff in the state trial court and the appellee in the Montana Supreme Court.
iii
STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS
Supreme Court of the State of Montana
State of Montana v. Donna Elizabeth Summers,
Case No. DA 23-0365 (June 17, 2025)
Supreme Court of the State of Montana
State of Montana v. Donna Elizabeth Summers,
Case No. DA 23-0365 (May 27, 2025)
Montana Twenty-First Judicial District Court,
Ravalli County
State of Montana v. Donna Elizabeth Summers,
Case No. DC 22-103 (Sept. 12, 2022)
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Question Presented ..................................................... i
List of Parties to the Proceeding ................................ ii
Statement of Related Proceedings ............................ iii
Table of Authorities ..................................................... v
Introduction ................................................................ 1
Opinions Below ........................................................... 3
Jurisdiction ................................................................. 3
Constitutional Provision Involved ............................. 4
Statement of the Case ................................................ 4
Reasons for Denying the Petition ............................ 10
I. No circuit split exists ........................................ 11
A. The Fourth Amendment rules for extending
traffic stops are settled ............................... 11
B. The circuits and state courts are not split .. 14
II. The Montana Supreme Court applied the correct totality-of-the-circumstances standard .... 26
III. Summers’s petition is a poor vehicle for
answering the question presented ................... 30
Conclusion ................................................................. 32
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Anderson v. Bessemer City,
470 U.S. 564 (1985) ................................................ 31
Brendlin v. California,
551 U.S. 249 (2007) ................................................ 13
California v. Hodari D.,
499 U.S. 621 (1991) ................................................ 13
Case v. Montana,
No. 24-624, slip op. (U.S. 2026) ............................. 14
Ferris v. State,
735 A.2d 491 (Md. 1999) ........................................ 18
Florida v. Bostick,
501 U.S. 429 (1991) ........................... 1, 2, 12, 13, 21,
23, 25, 27, 28, 30
Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491 (1983) .......................... 8, 13, 27, 29, 30
Hill v. State,
859 S.E.2d 891 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021) ....................... 20
Illinois v. Caballes,
543 U.S. 405 (2005) .......................................... 11, 27
Michigan v. Chesternut,
486 U.S. 567 (1988) ................................................ 13
Ohio v. Robinette,
519 U.S. 33 (1996) ...... 1, 2, 12, 20, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30
Ornelas v. United States,
517 U.S. 690 (1996) ................................................ 31
Rodriguez v. United States,
575 U.S. 348 (2015) .............................. 11, 27, 28, 30
vi
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973) ......................... 1, 10, 12, 19, 21,
22, 25, 28, 30
State v. Barks,
128 S.W.3d 513 (Mo. 2004) .................................... 19
State v. Case,
162 P.3d 849 (Mont. 2007) ....................................... 9
State v. Ellis,
71 So.3d 41 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) ....................... 25
State v. Hansen,
63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002) .................................. 19, 20
State v. Hill,
94 P.3d 752 (Mont. 2004) ......................................... 9
State v. Merrill,
93 P.3d 1227 (Mont. 2004) ....................................... 9
State v. Outlaw,
2022 WL 4075091 (N.C. Ct. App. 2022) ................ 25
State v. Pichardo,
623 S.E.2d 840 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) ...................... 20
State v. Ready,
565 N.W.2d 728 (Neb. 1997) .................................. 24
State v. Robinette,
685 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio 1997) ............................. 18, 19
State v. Rodriguez,
2019 WL 1785298 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019)................ 25
State v. Snell,
99 P.3d 191 (Mont. 2004) ......................................... 9
State v. Strawn,
419 P.3d 249 (Okla. Crim. App. 2018) .................. 24
vii
United States v. Bradford,
423 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2005) .............................. 23
United States v. Brown,
355 F. App’x 36 (7th Cir. 2009) ............................. 22
United States v. Brown,
447 F. App’x 706 (6th Cir. 2012)...................... 16, 22
United States v. Chan,
136 F.3d 1158 (7th Cir. 1998) ................................ 22
United States v. Clark,
902 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 2018) ................................... 17
United States v. Drayton,
536 U.S. 194 (2002) .......................................... 27, 28
United States v. Jenson,
462 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 2006) .................................. 22
United States v. Lattimore,
87 F.3d 647 (4th Cir. 1996) .............................. 21, 25
United States v. Lewis,
843 F. App’x 683 (6th Cir. 2021)............................ 16
United States v. Lowe,
791 F.3d 424 (3d Cir. 2015) ................................... 17
United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544 (1980) ......................... 2, 12, 13, 15, 18,
20, 25, 27, 28
United States v. Munoz-Villalba,
251 F. App’x 90 (3d Cir. 2007) ............................... 18
United States v. Ramirez,
476 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2007) .............................. 24
United States v. Richardson,
385 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 2004) ...................... 14, 15, 16
viii
United States v. Shields,
789 F.3d 733 (7th Cir. 2015) .................................. 22
United States v. White,
81 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 1996) .................................... 23
United States v. Whitley,
34 F.4th 522 (6th Cir. 2022) .................................. 16
United States v. Williams,
784 F. App’x 876 (5th Cir. 2019)............................ 22
United States v. Wilson,
413 F.3d 382 (3d. Cir. 2005) .................................. 17
Constitutional Provisions:
U.S. Const., amend. IV ............................................... 4
1
INTRODUCTION
This case involves a routine Fourth Amendment issue governed by settled Fourth Amendment rules.
When a traffic stop ends, an officer’s authority to detain the motorist ends with it. Any further interaction
is lawful only if supported by independent reasonable
suspicion or by the motorist’s voluntary consent. And
whether consent is truly voluntary turns on a well-settled, fact-intensive inquiry: considering the totality of
the circumstances, would a reasonable person feel free
to decline the officer’s requests and go about her business? See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996);
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
The Montana courts applied that settled doctrine
in a textbook fashion. After reviewing dash-camera
footage and hearing live testimony, the trial court
found that Petitioner Donna Summers was not subject
to undue coercion or duress, and thus voluntarily
agreed to answer additional questions after the traffic
stop ended. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, explaining that the encounter—viewed in its full context—would not have conveyed to a reasonable person
that she was required to remain. Pet.App.13a-23a.
That decision reflects a straightforward application of
this Court’s precedents and appropriate deference to
the trial court’s factfinding. See Robinette, 519 U.S. at
40.
Summers nonetheless asks this Court to intervene,
insisting that the lower courts are divided over what
happens when an officer proceeds to unrelated questioning “immediately” after a traffic stop ends. But
Summers’s supposed split is illusory. Every lower
2
court decision that Summers identifies applies the
same standard that this Court has established: Under
the totality of the circumstances, would a reasonable
person have felt free to leave? Some courts, on particular facts, have concluded that an immediate transition to unrelated questioning conveyed continued restraint. Others, on different facts, have concluded that
it did not. Those differing outcomes reflect different
fact-bound records, not different legal rules.
In effect, Summers’s petition urges this Court to
adopt a new bright-line rule to govern the moments
after a traffic stop. She seeks a rule that whenever an
officer asks additional questions immediately after a
traffic stop ends, the motorist necessarily remains
seized. See Pet.35-36. But that invitation collides
head-on with this Court’s precedents. Robinette
squarely rejected a near-identical attempt to manufacture a categorical rule for post-stop encounters. 519
U.S. at 39-40. The Court has maintained that the
Fourth Amendment does not require magic words or
“bright-line” formulas before an officer may seek consent to search. Id. Voluntariness should be assessed
case by case under the totality of the circumstances—
not by rigid per se commands.
The rule Summers seeks would do precisely what
Robinette forbids. It would elevate one factor—temporal proximity—into a dispositive test and displace
the context-sensitive inquiry this Court has repeatedly mandated. But a Fourth Amendment seizure
does not depend on a stopwatch. It turns on whether
police conduct, viewed as a whole, would cause a reasonable person to believe she must stay. See Bostick,
501 U.S. at 439; see also United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.).
3
Even if Summers had identified a split or an unresolved legal question—and she has not—this case
would be a poor vehicle for addressing it. The dispute
here centers on a state trial court’s factfinding reviewed only for clear error. Since Summers cannot
point to an improper or missing legal rule, she wants
nothing more than for this Court to reweigh the state
trial court’s factual determinations. That is not a
proper or worthwhile use of this Court’s limited resources.
This case presents no circuit split, no doctrinal confusion, and no suitable vehicle. It presents only the
fact-bound, ordinary application of settled Fourth
Amendment law. The Court should deny the petition.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Montana Supreme Court opinion (Pet.App.1a27a) is published at 569 P.3d 542 (Mont. 2025). The
Montana Supreme Court’s decision denying rehearing
(Pet. App.28a-30a) is unreported. The state trial
court’s order denying Summers’s motion to suppress is
unreported.
JURISDICTION
The Montana Supreme Court entered its judgment
on May 27, 2025, Pet.App.2a, and denied rehearing on
June 17, 2025, Pet.App.30a. Justice Kagan granted
Summers’s application for an extension and extended
the time to file a petition through November 14, 2025.
4
Summers timely filed her petition. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1257(a).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED
U.S. Const., amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. In May 2022, Ravalli County Detective Nick
Monaco observed Petitioner Donna Elizabeth Summers speeding on a highway in Montana and initiated
a traffic stop. Pet.App.2a-3a. Summers had one passenger, Benjamin Ryan, in her vehicle. Id.
Summers did not slow down until about twentyfive seconds after Detective Monaco activated his
emergency lights, and did not pull over for another
twenty-five seconds after that. Id. at 3a. During that
time, Detective Monaco observed what he described as
“erratic movements” by Summers. Mont.Br.5. Once
both vehicles were stopped, Detective Monaco approached Summers’s vehicle and asked why she took
so long to stop. Pet.App.3a. Summers answered that
she had not noticed the flashing lights at first because
she had been “singing” and dancing while driving, and
then delayed stopping while looking for a safe place to
pull over. Id.; Mont.Br.5-6, 8.
5
While Summers looked for her registration and insurance, Detective Monaco asked: “You seem really
nervous, is everything okay?” Pet.App.3a (cleaned up).
Summers said yes and explained that she was doing
work at her house. She also volunteered that her husband had passed away—which Detective Monaco
found “a little out of context.” Mont.Br.6. Detective
Monaco also requested Ryan’s identification.
Pet.App.3a. Ryan did not have identification with him
but provided Detective Monaco his full name and
birthdate. Id.
Detective Monaco returned to his vehicle and contacted dispatch to verify the information on Summer
and Ryan and to run routine checks. Id. Dispatch confirmed that Summers had a valid driver’s license and
no outstanding warrants. Dispatch also told Detective
Monaco that Summers had a history of drug possession and drug-paraphernalia possession. Id. Detective
Monaco then returned to Summers’s vehicle, which he
noted was parked at the highway’s edge. Mont.Br.10.
He asked Summers to exit the vehicle, both for safety
purposes and since he couldn’t hear her answers well.
See id.; Pet.App.3a. Detective Monaco also asked
whether Summers had an up-to-date insurance card
and independently confirmed through dispatch that
she had valid insurance on the vehicle. Id.
By this point, Summers was standing on the side
of the highway between her vehicle and Detective
Monaco. Id. at 17a. Detective Monaco then had the following exchange with Summers:
MONACO: Here’s everything that you
gave me, okay, your license, registration,
6
and insurance, okay. So, I’m gonna put you
down for a warning for the speed.
SUMMERS: Okay.
MONACO: Okay, just be mindful [it’s] 60
top-end on Eastside Highway, okay? Um,
do you have any—
SUMMERS: Yeah, ’cause I had my cruise
on, so, I was like sixty-five, or—
MONACO: Okay, you were dip, you would
go dip from 62 up to about 71, so—
SUMMERS: Well, I was serious I had my
cruise on so maybe there is something
messed up with that.
MONACO: Okay. So, um, since I got you
here, do you mind if I ask you a couple of
questions?
SUMMERS: Go ahead.
Id. Detective Monaco then asked Summers how she
knew Ryan, since, as he later explained, former drug
users “often associate with folks who they are not familiar with.” Mont.Br.6. Summers responded that she
did not know Ryan well and had hired him to help her
with home repairs. Pet.App.4a. Detective Monaco also
asked if there was anything illegal in the vehicle and
whether Summers still used illegal drugs. Summers
initially responded that she had not taken illegal
drugs in the last “few years,” but then changed her answer and said she had last used a few months earlier.
Id.; Mont.Br.6-7.
After this, Detective Monaco asked Summers if he
could search her vehicle. Pet.App.4a. Summers
7
responded: “[G]o ahead.” Id. She also mentioned that
she was on parole, so Detective Monaco called her parole officer and obtained permission to search Summers’s vehicle. Id. During the vehicle search, Detective Monaco discovered a methamphetamine pipe and
a small bag of methamphetamine. Id. Summers admitted that the pipe belonged to her. Id.
2. The State charged Summers with felony possession of illegal drugs and misdemeanor possession of
drug paraphernalia. Id. Summers moved to suppress
the evidence from the vehicle search, arguing that Detective Monaco lacked particularized suspicion to lawfully prolong the traffic stop, and also that her consent
to search was invalid because it came during a coercive and unauthorized seizure. Id. The State responded that Detective Monaco had particularized
suspicion to expand the traffic stop into a drug investigation based on his observations of Summers’s behavior, Summers’s nervous and inconsistent answers,
and Summers’s history of drug use. Id. The State also
responded that there was no seizure after the traffic
stop ended and the additional questioning occurred
during a voluntary and consensual exchange.
The state trial court held an evidentiary hearing
where it reviewed Detective Monaco’s dash-camera
footage and heard him testify. After that hearing, the
trial court denied Summers’s motion to suppress. Id.
at 5a. Summers then pleaded no contest to the charges
but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling. Id.
3. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The
Court first ruled, unanimously, that Detective Monaco
lacked particularized suspicion to expand the traffic
8
stop into a drug investigation. Id. at 12a, 23a, 25a. But
the Court also ruled, by a 4–3 vote, that once the traffic stop ended, Summers voluntarily consented to continue the interaction and answer Detective Monaco’s
additional questions. Id. at 2a, 22a-23a. Detective
Monaco’s consent search was therefore lawful because
Summers was not already seized when she gave consent. Id.
The majority opinion started with the settled
Fourth Amendment rule that an officer’s authority for
a valid seizure relating to a traffic stop “ends when
tasks related to the traffic infraction reasonably
should have been completed,” and that “[f]urther questioning” is justified in only “two circumstances”—
when an officer acquires “reasonable ... suspicion,” or
when “the driver voluntarily consents to the officer’s
additional questioning.” Id. at 6a (cleaned up). Voluntary consent, in turn, can be “tainted” if the individual
is already “illegally detained” when the consent is
given. Id. at 13a (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
507-08 (1983) (plurality)). So to determine whether
consent was truly voluntary or had been obtained
through a coercive seizure, the majority considered
“the totality of the circumstances” and whether “an objectively reasonable person would believe” that they
would not be “free to leave the officer’s presence.” Id.
at 14a (cleaned up).
The majority recognized that this totality-based
voluntariness inquiry is “dependent on the facts of
each case, with no single fact being dispositive.” Id. at
13a (cleaned up). To that end, courts look to factors
such as: “the person’s age, education, and intelligence;
misrepresentation of the law by the officer (indicating
coerciveness); whether the person was in custody or
9
under arrest; whether the person was informed of the
right not to consent; whether they were threatened or
coerced in any way; and whether the questioning was
repeated and prolonged.” Id. (cleaned up). The factual
determinations on those factors, and on the threshold
question of voluntariness, are reviewed only for “clear
error.” Id. at 5a (cleaned up).
The majority then carefully analyzed the Montana
Supreme Court’s prior cases about when a post-stop
encounter is voluntary and when it amounts to a continuing seizure. See Pet.App.14a-16a (citing State v.
Merrill, 93 P.3d 1227 (Mont. 2004); State v. Hill, 94
P.3d 752 (Mont. 2004); State v. Snell, 99 P.3d 191
(Mont. 2004); State v. Case, 162 P.3d 849 (Mont.
2007)). In doing so, the majority explained that its
task was not to apply any rigid formula, but to examine “the facts of each case, with no single fact being
dispositive,” and in light of the governing “reasonable
person” standard. Pet.App.19a. The majority also explained that traffic stops, where a “person is under police authority ... and it may not be clear ... when the
stop has ended,” are “unlike” other interactions where
a person is simply approached by police on the street.
Pet.App.21a. The majority acknowledged that unrelated questioning after traffic stops may be inherently
“cloud[ed]” by the potential for an inference of continuing seizure from the prior lawful seizure. Id.
Applying those prior cases here and “[c]onsidering
the record as a whole,” the majority concluded that the
trial court’s “factual findings”—that Summers voluntarily consented to the continued conversation—were
not “clearly erroneous.” Id. at 22a. The majority therefore affirmed the denial of Summers’s motion to suppress. Id. at 23a.
10
4. Justice Shea, who joined the majority, concurred separately. He said that given the fact-intensive legal standard, other judges might “consider[] this
same record in its entirety” in the first instance and
“conclude[] that Summers’s consent was not voluntary.” Pet.App.24a. Yet because “voluntariness of consent is a question of fact” committed to the sound discretion of the trial court that “conduct[s] a hearing”
and “t[akes] testimony,” Justice Shea said the trial
court’s factual findings should never be “reversed unless the finding is clearly erroneous.” Id. (cleaned up).
Applying that standard of review, and given the factintensive nature of the voluntariness inquiry, Justice
Shea agreed that the trial court’s decision must be affirmed.
5. Justice Bidegaray, joined by Justices McKinnon
and Gustafson, dissented in part. They agreed with
the majority about which standard applies: “The voluntariness of consent is evaluated under the totality
of circumstances.” Pet.App.25a (citing Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-27 (1973)); compare id.
at 13a-14a (majority). But within that totality-of-thecircumstances calculus, the dissent thought the majority “insufficiently address[ed]” certain “factors”
such as Detective Monaco’s “positioning” and the
“roadside environment.” Id. at 26a. The dissent also
said that the majority failed to place the proper weight
on Detective Monaco’s statement of “[s]ince I got you
here, do you mind if I ask you a couple questions?” Id.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
This Court’s precedents already answer Summers’s question presented. Settled rules already govern whether a person subject to a traffic stop remains
11
seized after that stop ends. The purported split Summers identifies amounts to nothing more than different fact-bound outcomes in cases applying those settled legal rules, which the Montana Supreme Court
faithfully followed here. And this case is not a good vehicle for further considering this question. The Court
should deny the petition.
I. No circuit split exists.
A. The Fourth Amendment rules for extending traffic stops are settled.
1. An officer’s lawful authority to “seize” a motorist extends no further than the completion of the traffic stop itself. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,
407 (2005). A “seizure that is lawful at its inception”
can “become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the
time reasonably required to complete that mission.”
Id. There is no “de minimis” exception that justifies
continuing a seizure after the traffic stop is completed.
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 353-58
(2015). An officer can ask about unrelated matters
while conducting the traffic stop (so long as it does not
unreasonably “prolong” the traffic stop itself), but the
lawful “[a]uthority for the seizure ... ends when tasks
tied to the traffic infraction are” done. Id. at 354.
After finishing those tasks, officers may still engage a motorist in further conversation. But any continued interaction must rest on a new and independent justification. If the officer has developed reasonable suspicion of another crime, that may warrant additional questioning. But when—as here—an officer
continues to ask unrelated questions without independent reasonable suspicion after the traffic stop
ends, one of two rules applies.
12
On one hand, if the motorist voluntarily continues
the conversation and answers the officer’s questions,
the “encounter is consensual” and “does not constitute
a seizure.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991).
After all, “[t]he Fourth Amendment test for a valid
consent to search is that the consent be voluntary.”
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996). “‘[V]oluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the
circumstances.’” Id. at 40 (quoting Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973)).
On the other hand, if the motorist felt like she had
no choice but to stay and answer the new questions
due to some “duress or coercion, express or implied,”
the officer has extended the seizure without lawful authority. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248; United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980) (opinion of
Stewart, J.).
In other words, when a traffic stop ends and the
officer asks additional unrelated questions, the interaction becomes either a consensual conversation or a
coercive seizure. See Robinette, 519 U.S. at 40;
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49. And this Court has
already repeatedly articulated the test that distinguishes a voluntary encounter from a coercive seizure:
Did the officer’s conduct convey to a reasonable person
that he or she was not free to decline the officer’s requests or otherwise terminate the encounter? Bostick,
501 U.S. at 439. This is a “fact-specific” inquiry that
“examin[es] the totality of the circumstances.” Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39; see also Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at
223.
The upshot? A motorist has been “seized” by additional questioning after a traffic stop only when “all
13
the circumstances surrounding the incident” would
have led “a reasonable person” to “believe[] that he
was not free to leave.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554
(opinion of Stewart, J.). If, considering all the facts and
the totality of the circumstances, “a reasonable person
would feel free to disregard the police and go about his
business,” then “the encounter is consensual” and is
not a seizure. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434 (cleaned up); see
also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007);
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1991);
Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1988);
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (plurality).
2. Summers’s petition asks this Court to answer
whether a driver who was lawfully seized in a traffic
stop remains seized after the traffic stop ends and the
officer asks additional unrelated questions. Summers
tries to frame that as an unanswered question by
claiming that Robinette left a “gap” in the analytical
framework for “traffic stops that evolve into consent
requests.” Pet.2. As Summers describes it, that “gap”
has created “persistent disagreement” between courts
that think a motorist “remains seized when police proceed immediately to unrelated questioning” and courts
that “allow immediate, follow-on questioning” that
“prolong[s]” the traffic stop. Id. at 3, 18, 23.
Summers is wrong. This Court’s cases leave no
such “gap.” Rodriguez confirms that the lawful seizure
ends at the completion of the traffic stop. Robinette
confirms that whether continued questioning causes
Fourth Amendment problems turns on the totality of
the circumstances. Just earlier this term, this Court
again affirmed that the post-stop questioning in Robinette represents one of the many “Fourth Amendment
contexts” that is “evaluated by looking at the ‘totality
14
of the circumstances.’” Case v. Montana, No. 24-624,
slip op. at 10 (U.S. 2026). The lack of any analytical
gap is reason enough to deny Summers’s petition.
B. The circuits and state courts are not split.
Beyond that, no lower-court split exists on this
question. Their decisions follow the Court’s established rules: First, the lawful authority for a seizure in
a traffic stop extends no further than the completion
of the traffic stop. Second, any additional, unrelated
conversations after the traffic stop ends are the product either of a voluntary, consensual encounter or of a
coercive seizure. Third, courts determine whether a
given scenario is a voluntary conversation or a coercive seizure through a fact-intensive “totality of the
circumstances” inquiry that looks to whether “a reasonable person” would feel free to leave. Consider
Summers’s cited cases.
1. Summers contends that the Sixth and Third Circuits, and some state courts, have adopted a brightline rule that “when an officer proceeds immediately
to unrelated questioning upon concluding a traffic
stop, it effects a detention.” Pet.18. But the petition
supports that contention with stray lines wrenched
from context. The facts and holdings of each case confirm that those courts apply the same fact-based, totality-of-the-circumstances test from Robinette, Bostick, and Schneckloth to analyze whether a reasonable
person would have felt free to leave.
a. Start with the Sixth Circuit. In United States v.
Richardson, an officer observed a vehicle “recklessly
swerving” between other vehicles on a highway. 385
F.3d 625, 627 (6th Cir. 2004). After issuing a citation
and inspecting (and returning) the identification
15
documents of the driver and passengers, the officer
asked the driver to “remain behind the vehicle,” saying “just hang out right here for me, okay?” Id. at 630.
The officer then asked the other occupants whether
there were any guns in the vehicle. Id. at 628. After
receiving an affirmative answer, the officer sought
permission to search the vehicle, which ultimately led
to the discovery that Richardson (a felon) had a gun in
his possession. Id. Richardson moved to suppress the
evidence from the search, arguing that the occupants
of the vehicle had been unlawfully seized. Id. The district court granted the motion and suppressed the evidence, and the Sixth Circuit agreed. Id. at 627-28.
Richardson held that under these particular facts,
the occupants of the vehicle had been unlawfully
seized when the owner of the vehicle consented to the
search. Id. at 629-30. The court grounded its decision
in this Court’s Mendenhall fact-bound test about
whether “a reasonable person would not feel free to
walk away and ignore the officer’s requests.” Id. at 629
(citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554). While considering “whether [the] particular encounter between an officer and a citizen constitutes a seizure,” id., Richardson never said that the mere act of asking more questions automatically rendered the continued interaction a seizure, contra Pet.18. Instead, while analyzing
the totality of the circumstances, the court concluded
that after the officer “handed” the driver “the citation
and shook his hand,” the driver “was then free to
leave”—“until” the officer “asked him to remain
behand the vehicle” and ordered him to “hang out
right here for me.” Richardson, 385 F.3d at 630 (emphasis added).
16
According to Richardson, that combination of directions and words sufficed to “make a reasonable person in [the driver’s] shoes feel that he would not be free
to walk away and ignore [the officer’s] request.” Id.
Thus, Richardson did not apply any bright-line rule
about traffic stops always turning into seizures when
officers ask unrelated questions. It simply applied this
Court’s fact-based totality standard from Robinette,
Mendenhall, and Bostick.
Other Sixth Circuit decisions clarify that Richardson illustrates one way courts can properly resolve the
fact-intensive inquiry. “Whether a person is seized is
based on the totality of the circumstances,” since
“[s]imple police questioning is insufficient to constitute a seizure,” even though “[i]n certain circumstances … ‘words alone may be enough to make a reasonable person feel that he would not be free to leave.’”
United States v. Lewis, 843 F. App’x 683, 689 (6th Cir.
2021) (quoting Richardson, 385 F.3d at 629-30) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Brown, 447
F. App’x 706, 709 (6th Cir. 2012). Contrary to Summers’s claim, the Sixth Circuit applies this Court’s test
and looks to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a reasonable person would feel free to
leave.1
1 Summers also cites United States v. Whitley, 34 F.4th 522 (6th
Cir. 2022). See Pet.18-19. But in Whitley, the officer asked the
motorist during the traffic stop whether she had anything illegal
in the vehicle—and the officer asked that question “immediately
after” noticing “a scale in [the motorist’s] lap.” Id. at 530. Had the
officer asked the same question after the traffic stop ended and
without the reasonable suspicion from observing the drug scale,
the threshold question would be the same as it is here: whether
the conversation was voluntary or a coercive seizure.
17
b. So too in the Third Circuit. In United States v.
Clarke, after an officer conducted a routine traffic
stop, the officer returned to the vehicle and asked
whether a passenger in the vehicle had a criminal record. 902 F.3d 404, 407 (3d Cir. 2018). This sparked a
conversation that eventually led to searching the vehicle and discovering drugs and a firearm. Id. at 408.
Clark successfully moved to suppress the evidence,
and the Third Circuit affirmed. Id. at 406, 409. In doing so, the court reasoned that the questions about
criminality were “not tied to the traffic stop’s mission”
and “therefore impermissibly extended the stop.” Id.
at 411.
That holding correctly applies Rodriguez; it does
not support Summers’s alleged split on Robinette. The
improper questioning in Clarke occurred during the
traffic stop, not after the officer had returned the
driver’s license or otherwise indicated that the traffic
stop had ended. Id. at 406-07. Clarke thus offers no
insight into what happens when an officer proceeds to
“unrelated questioning upon concluding a traffic stop.”
Pet.18 (emphasis added).
Other Third Circuit decisions confirm that additional questioning after a traffic stop ends can be either “a consensual encounter or a second seizure,” and
to determine which, courts must examine “the totality
of the circumstances” to see if there are “circumstances so intimidating that, in combination, they
would have caused a reasonable person to perceive
that he was not free to leave.” United States v. Wilson,
413 F.3d 382, 384, 387 (3d. Cir. 2005) (emphasis
added); see also United States v. Lowe, 791 F.3d 424,
431-32 (3d Cir. 2015). Even United States v. MunozVillalba, which Summers cites, stated that “a district
18
court must consider the ‘totality of the circumstances’”
when considering whether a motorist’s consent to
search “was freely and voluntarily given.” 251 F. App’x
90, 92 (3d Cir. 2007).
c. State courts in Maryland, Ohio, Missouri, Utah,
South Carolina, and Georgia all apply the same test.
Start with Maryland. In Ferris v. State, an officer
completed a traffic stop and returned the motorist’s
“driver’s license and registration[,] along with a copy
of the citation,” before asking the motorist “if he would
mind stepping to the back of his vehicle to answer a
couple of questions.” 735 A.2d 491, 494 (Md. 1999).
The court stated that what determined whether the
additional questioning “constitute[d] a seizure, or ...
was simply a ‘consensual’ non-constitutional event is
whether a reasonable person would have felt free to
leave.” Id. at 501 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554).
This “inquiry is a highly fact-specific one” that looks to
the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 502-03. And
here, the Maryland court reasoned that the “cumulative effect” of all the facts meant “a reasonable person
would not have felt free to” leave. Id. at 503. Even so,
the court recognized that there is “no litmus-paper
test” and the inquiry is “necessarily imprecise,” even
for “questioning following the conclusion of [a] traffic
stop.” Id. at 501-02 (cleaned up). Maryland thus does
not adhere to the “drivers remain seized when police
proceed immediately to unrelated questioning” brightline rule that Summers imagines. Pet.18.
Neither does Ohio. In State v. Robinette (“Robinette
III”), the Ohio Supreme Court reconsidered the Robinette case on remand from this Court. 685 N.E.2d 762
(Ohio 1997). Since this Court had just instructed that
19
the Fourth Amendment requires neither a “bright-line
test or magic words,” id. at 771 n.6, the Ohio court
then applied a “totality-of-the-circumstances test” to
determine whether “a reasonable person would believe that he or she had the freedom to refuse to answer further questions,” id. at 771 (citing Schneckloth,
412 U.S. at 248-49). The Ohio court did place weight
on the “troubling” “immediate transition” from the end
of the traffic stop to the unrelated questions, but it
never suggested that this single factor was determinative or displaced the normal totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry. Id. at 770-71.
Nor does Missouri precedent support Summers’s
supposed circuit split. In State v. Barks, an officer returned a motorist’s driver’s license and gave him a
copy of a traffic citation, then asked about the motorist’s nervous behavior and if there was anything illegal in the vehicle. 128 S.W.3d 513, 514-15 (Mo. 2004)
(per curiam). The Missouri court acknowledged that
“the mere fact that a law enforcement officer talks
with someone or asks a question does not mean the
person is seized or detained.” Id. at 517. But considering a variety of factors, such as the officer’s position,
the ongoing emergency lights, and the nature of the
officer’s questions, the Missouri court concluded that
under “the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable
person in [the motorist’s] position would have understood the situation to be one of custody.” Id.
So too in Utah. In State v. Hansen, after an officer
returned a motorist’s license and registration and administered a verbal warning, the officer asked
whether alcohol, drugs, or weapons were in the vehicle. 63 P.3d 650, 657 (Utah 2002). The Utah Supreme
Court concluded that this additional questioning
20
constituted a continued seizure, but only after stating
that the applicable standard is whether “a reasonable
person would believe, based on the totality of the circumstances, that he or she is free to end the encounter
and depart.” Id. at 661 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at
554). It also acknowledged that “no single factor is dispositive,” and it examined all present “factors in totality” before concluding that the motorist had been
seized. Id. at 662.
Finally, both intermediate state courts Summers
cites also apply a fact-bound totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry, rather than a bright-line rule about
immediate questioning following a traffic stop. The
South Carolina intermediate court stated that its test
for distinguishing voluntary interactions from coercive seizures is “examining the totality of the circumstances,” which is “highly fact-specific” and “no single
factor” dominates. State v. Pichardo, 623 S.E.2d 840,
849 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Robinette, 519 U.S. at
33). And the Georgia intermediate court held that
“[t]he voluntariness of consent is determined by the
totality of the circumstances” where “no single factor
controls,” and considered several other factors in addition to “the timing” of the additional questions. Hill v.
State, 859 S.E.2d 891, 895-96 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)
(cleaned up).
2. Summers next contends that the Fourth, Fifth,
Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits (and some
state courts) have adopted a bright-line rule that “allow[s] police to continue asking unrelated questions
after the purpose of a traffic stop has concluded.”
Pet.23. Not so. These courts apply the same test—
whether under a totality-of-the-circumstances review,
a reasonable person would feel free to leave.
21
a. Start with the Fourth Circuit. In United States
v. Lattimore, the court found that a motorist voluntarily consented to additional unrelated questions after
the officer “issued the citations and returned [his]
driver’s license.” 87 F.3d 647, 653 (4th Cir. 1996) (en
banc). Lattimore argued that his consent to search had
been tainted by a continuing coercive seizure, since
Lattimore was sitting in the passenger’s seat of the officer’s patrol car while the officer wrote out the ticket
and when the officer asked the unrelated questions.
Id. at 650.
The Fourth Circuit stated that “whether a consent
to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product
of duress or coercion,” is “a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.” Id.
(quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227). Weighing the
context of where Lattimore was sitting when the traffic stop ended against other factors—including his
“age, maturity, education, intelligence,” the “officer’s
conduct,” and “friendly conversation” during the encounter—the Fourth Circuit held that it was not
“clearly erroneous” for the trial court to conclude that
Lattimore voluntarily engaged in further conversation. Id. at 650-51. It did not rely on any single factor,
but concluded that since a “reasonable person would
have felt free to decline the officer[’s] requests or otherwise terminate the encounter,” the “[t]otality of the
circumstances presented indicate that from this point
forward the encounter was consensual.” Id. at 653
(quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438).
b. The Fifth Circuit applies the same test.
Whether “consent was voluntary” or tainted by “coercive” police actions turns on a “multi-factor test” that
is reviewed only for clear error. United States v.
22
Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 406 (5th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up).
Summers reads the Fifth Circuit to have adopted a
rule that “when a motorist’s documents are returned,”
the seizure “necessarily” evolves into a consensual encounter. Pet.26 (citing United States v. Williams, 784
F. App’x 876, 881 (5th Cir. 2019)) (emphasis added).
But far from adopting that bright-line or absolute rule,
in that case the Fifth Circuit examined a number of
factors present and concluded that absent “some coercive step beyond what the officers did here,” a reasonable person “should have felt free to leave” rather than
stay and answer questions. Williams, 784 F. App’x at
881.
c. The Seventh Circuit likewise looks not to any
single factor or “mechanical approach,” but to the “totality of the circumstances” to determine whether a
continuing interaction after a traffic stop ends is voluntary or a seizure. United States v. Chan, 136 F.3d
1158, 1159-60 (7th Cir. 1998); compare United States
v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 744-45 (7th Cir. 2015). Summers tries to cast doubt on the Seventh Circuit’s test
by cherry-picking a stray line from one case about
whether additional unrelated questions “only briefly
extended the length of the stop.” Pet.24 (quoting
United States v. Brown, 355 F. App’x 36, 39 (7th Cir.
2009) (order)). But even in Brown, the motorist did
“not explicitly argue that his consent” to the continuing encounter “was involuntary,” nor did the Seventh
Circuit think that there was a coercive seizure “under
the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 39 n.3 (citing
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49).
d. The Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits each
sift post-traffic stop voluntary interactions from seizures using this Court’s precedents on “totality of the
23
circumstances” and analyzing whether a “reasonable
person” would feel free to leave.
In United States v. White, the Eighth Circuit held
that there is “no litmus test” for distinguishing voluntary conversation from coercive seizure, but did outline a series of “factors” about “the characteristics of
the accused and the details of the environment.” 81
F.3d 775, 779-80 (8th Cir. 1996). Based on the relevant
“circumstances” and seven different factors, the court
found that “a reasonable person would feel free ‘to disregard the police and go about his business.’” Id. at 779
(quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434).
In United States v. Bradford, the Tenth Circuit
likewise stated that whether a continued encounter is
“consensual” depends on whether a “reasonable person” would believe that “she was not free to decline the
officer’s requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” 423 F.3d 1149, 1158 (10th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up).
Contrary to Summers’s suggestion, see Pet.25-26, the
Tenth Circuit did not apply a bright-line rule that all
conversations become consensual after an officer returns a motorist’s documents. Instead, Bradford wrestled with factors that pointed in different directions—
on one hand, the motorist remained seated “in the patrol car”; on the other, no other common “coercive” actions that might “indicat[e] that compliance might be
compelled” were present. Id. at 1158-59. Considering
all the facts, Bradford affirmed the district court’s
finding that after the traffic stop concluded, the officer
and motorist “engaged in a consensual encounter.” Id.
at 1159.
And the Eleventh Circuit agrees “with [its] sister
circuits” that there is “no bright-line ‘litmus test’” to
24
determine between “a seizure” and “a consensual encounter.” United States v. Ramirez, 476 F.3d 1231,
1240 (11th Cir. 2007). So, contrary to Summers’s suggestion that the Eleventh Circuit applies a rule that
“simultaneous” unrelated questioning is always a
“consensual encounter,” Pet.26, that court instead “examine[s] the ‘totality of the circumstances’ in each
case” and “weigh[s] a range of factors.” Ramirez, 476
F.3d at 1240. In fact, Ramirez stated that its “conclusion ... is based upon more than timing” and that it
was not “creating a per se rule that once a person’s documentation has been returned to him in a traffic stop,
it has automatically converted into a consensual encounter.” Id. Summers thus errs by arguing that the
Eleventh Circuit applies some bright-line rule instead
of this Court’s totality-of-the-circumstances and reasonable-person standards.
e. Oklahoma, Nebraska, Alabama, North Carolina, and Arizona also apply this Court’s totality-ofthe-circumstances test rather than a bright-line rule
favoring consensual encounters. In State v. Strawn,
the Oklahoma court stated that it “consider[s] if a reasonable person would have felt free to leave considering the totality of the circumstances,” and examined a
variety of factors before concluding that the continued
conversation was consensual. 419 P.3d 249, 255-56
(Okla. Crim. App. 2018) (cleaned up). Nebraska recognizes that “voluntariness” is “a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the giving of consent.” State v. Ready, 565
N.W.2d 728, 733 (Neb. 1997) (citing Robinette, 519
U.S. at 33). And the intermediate courts in Alabama,
North Carolina, and Arizona all apply this Court’s “totality-of-the-circumstances” test rather than the
25
bright-line rule that Summers claims. See State v. Ellis, 71 So.3d 41, 47-48 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (per curiam) (first citing Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39-40; then
citing Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435-36); State v. Outlaw,
2022 WL 4075091, at *6 (N.C. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting
Lattimore, 87 F.3d at 650); State v. Rodriguez, 2019
WL 1785298, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439).
*****
Carefully analyzing this caselaw from the Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits (and several states) exposes the fatal flaw in Summers’s petition: There is no actual disagreement among the lower courts.
Every lower court applies the identical legal standard. Each finds an unlawful seizure when an officer
asks questions after a traffic stop ends and, under the
totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person
would not have felt free to leave. See Robinette, 519
U.S. at 40; Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. No court has
adopted anything like a bright-line rule (or even a presumption) that immediate questioning after a traffic
stop ends automatically triggers either a consensual
encounter or a continuing seizure. On the contrary—
every lower court Summers identifies agrees that
“[v]oluntariness is a question of fact to be determined
from all the circumstances.” Robinette, 519 U.S. at 40
(quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49).
What Summers calls a circuit split is nothing more
than different fact-bound outcomes from applying the
same fact-intensive legal test. Some courts have found
that the immediate transition from a completed traffic
stop to unrelated questioning makes a reasonable
26
person feel seized. Other have found that the same
temporal proximity, alongside other facts, did not
cause a seizure. This is not a conflict; it’s precisely how
fact-bound standards work.
At end of day, Summers’s effort to manufacture a
circuit split reduces to nothing more than differences
on how much weight to give one factor among many.
But differential weighing of one factor in a “totality-ofthe-circumstances” analysis does not create a legal
conflict that warrants this Court’s review. Were it otherwise, nearly every fact-bound standard of review
this Court announces would generate perpetual circuit
splits.
The lower courts faithfully apply this Court’s totality-of-the-circumstances and reasonable-person precedents. Unsurprisingly, they reach different conclusions as they confront different facts. That is a feature,
not a bug, of this Court’s framework from Robinette,
Bostick, and Schneckloth. The Court should deny the
petition.
II.
The Montana Supreme Court applied the
correct totality-of-the-circumstances standard.
In this case, the Montana Supreme Court did exactly what this Court’s precedents require: It examined the totality of the circumstances and determined
whether the trial court clearly erred in concluding that
a reasonable person in Summers’s position would have
felt free to leave. Pet.App.14a, 19a, 22a. The court
made no legal error. And the necessary factual findings have ample support in the lower court record. The
mere fact that Summers disagrees with how the trial
27
court weighed those facts does not warrant this
Court’s review.
A. The majority applied the rules this Court has
articulated for decades. It recognized that a lawful seizure for a traffic infraction “ends when tasks related
to the traffic infraction reasonably should have been
completed,” and that additional questioning is justified only in “two circumstances”—when an officer develops reasonable suspicion or when the motorist “voluntarily consents” to further interaction. Pet.App.6a
(cleaned up); see also Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354; Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407. It also acknowledged that consent obtained during an unlawful detention is
“tainted,” so courts must determine whether the motorist who gave consent was already seized when she
consented. Pet.App.13a (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 50708 (plurality)).
From there, the court below applied the test this
Court has prescribed: Whether, under the totality of
the circumstances, “an objectively reasonable person”
would have believed she was free to leave.
Pet.App.14a; see also Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439;
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (opinion of Stewart, J.);
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2002).
The court emphasized that this inquiry is “dependent
on the facts of each case,” that “no single fact” controls,
and that courts must examine all relevant circumstances rather than rely on any bright-line rule.
Pet.App.13a-14a, 19a; Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39 (rejecting “litmus-paper tests” and per se rules).
That methodology hews perfectly to this Court’s
precedents. The Court has repeatedly held that “law
enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth
28
Amendment by merely approaching an individual”
and asking questions, so long as their conduct does not
objectively convey the impression that compliance is
required. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434; Drayton, 536 U.S.
at 200-01. Conversely, a seizure occurs when police
conduct, either expressly or by implication, would
cause a reasonable person to believe she is not free to
terminate the encounter and walk away. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. at 554 (opinion of Stewart, J.); see also
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49. The Montana court’s
decision faithfully implemented those principles.
B. After articulating the correct legal standard,
the majority conducted a precedent-by-precedent
analysis of its own post-stop cases, explaining why
some facts supported a finding of voluntariness and
others supported a finding of continued detention.
Pet.App.13a-16a. It then returned to the record here
and applied the identified legal framework to this
case’s facts.
The majority first noted how Detective Monaco
completed the traffic stop’s purpose. Pet.App.17a. He
returned Summers’s driver’s license, registration, and
insurance card; told her that she would receive only a
warning; and told her to “be mindful” of the speed
limit. Id. Those acts—returning documents and concluding the citation process—are the kind of signals
that ordinarily mark the end of a traffic stop. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354. Only after that point did Detective Monaco ask, a single time, whether Summers
would “mind” answering a few more questions.
Pet.App.17a (“So, um, since I got you here, do you
mind if I ask you a couple of questions?”). Summers
replied: “Go ahead.” Id. Detective Monaco did not retain her identification, did not issue commands, did
29
not move his position to block her ability to return to
her vehicle, and did not suggest that she was required
to remain. Nor did he engage in prolonged or repetitive
questioning. See Pet.App.13a-14a.
The majority evaluated those facts in light of its
own precedents. Pet.App.13a-16a. It compared cases
where officers expressly told motorists they were “free
to go,” returned documents, and asked permission before each additional step—circumstances that supported
findings
of
consensual
encounters.
Pet.App.13a-15a (discussing Merrill, Hill, and Snell).
It contrasted that against a case where officers directed the motorist to again exit the vehicle, positioned multiple officers in a way that restricted movement, or otherwise conveyed continued authority—circumstances that combined to support findings of continued detention. Pet.App.16a (discussing Case).
This precedent-by-precedent analysis demonstrates the opposite of what Summers (and the dissent) claimed. Rather than adopting a categorical rule
keyed to “immediacy,” the majority treated the additional questions’ temporal proximity to the traffic
stop’s conclusion as just one factor among many—just
what a totality inquiry demands. Pet.App.13a (“no single fact being dispositive”). That approach tracks this
Court’s repeated admonition that Fourth Amendment
encounters involve “endless variations” and therefore
should not be decided with bright-line rules that focus
on one fact over all others. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39;
Royer, 460 U.S. at 506-07 (plurality).
C. The Montana Supreme Court’s decision is a
paradigmatic application of this Court’s settled doctrine. The traffic-stop seizure ends when the traffic
30
stop’s purpose ends. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354. Further interaction is permissible only by independent
justification or voluntary consent. Robinette, 519 U.S.
at 39-40. Voluntariness turns on the totality of the circumstances and the reasonable-person inquiry.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 248-49; Bostick, 501 U.S.
at 439. And appellate review respects trial-court factfinding absent clear error. Pet.App.5a, 23a-25a. Nothing about this straightforward application of settled
Fourth Amendment principles warrants plenary review.
III. Summers’s petition is a poor vehicle for answering the question presented.
This case would a poor vehicle for further review of
the splitless question presented in any event. Summers wants this Court to decide not a pure question of
law, but a record-bound challenge to the Montana
courts’ factual determination that her post-stop interaction with Detective Monaco was voluntary. This
Court routinely declines to conduct that kind of factbound, clear-error review of a state court’s judgment.
Clear error review applies here. Voluntariness is
not a pure question of law. It is “a question of fact to
be determined from all the circumstances.” Robinette,
519 U.S. at 40 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 24849). Whether a reasonable person in Summers’s position would have felt free to leave (and thus, engaged
in a voluntary conversation or was coercively seized)
turns on the “endless variations” of real-world encounters—tone, phrasing, positioning, timing, and context.
Id. at 39 (quoting Royer, 460 U.S. at 506). Those are
factual determinations entrusted to the trial court.
For that reason, the Montana Supreme Court properly
31
reviewed the trial court’s finding of voluntariness only
for “clear error.” Pet.App.5a, 23a-25a.
That procedural posture alone makes this case a
poor candidate for certiorari. This Court does not
grant certiorari to reweigh evidence or correct factbound applications of settled law—particularly from
state courts—nor does it sit to reweigh competing inferences drawn from a particular traffic stop. See Sup.
Ct. R. 10 (review is “rarely granted” where the asserted error consists of “the misapplication of a
properly stated rule of law”). Summers asks this Court
to second-guess the Montana courts’ evaluation of the
facts and substitute its own view of how a reasonable
person might have perceived the encounter. That it
should not do.
This Court regularly declines similar invitations.
In Fourth Amendment cases especially, the Court has
emphasized that “a reviewing court should take care
both to review findings of historical fact only for clear
error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from
those facts by resident judges.” Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). It does not matter if
this Court thinks that “it would have weighed the evidence differently” had it been “the trier of fact”;
“[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be
clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470
U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985). Put simply, the Court does
not sit to reexamine case-by-case nuances of fact-dependent encounters.
Justice Shea’s concurrence below illustrates the
point. He acknowledged that reasonable judges could
see the facts differently, but stressed that the clearly
32
erroneous standard by itself bars reversal. See
Pet.App.24a-25a. The dissent is of a piece. It accepted
the governing standard and argued only that the majority should have placed greater weight on certain
factors. See Pet.App.25a-27a. This Court is ill suited
to reweighing whether particular facts found by a
state trial court within a totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis constitute clear error.
CONCLUSION
The petition for certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
Austin M. Knudsen
Attorney General
Christian B. Corrigan
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
MONTANA DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE
215 N. Sanders Street
Helena, MT 59601
(406) 444-2026
christian.corrigan@mt.gov
Counsel for Respondent
FEBRUARY 2026
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.