Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Isaiah Stacy Alstad, Petitioner v. United States

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,25-58 71

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

OCT 0 3 2025

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

ISAIAH S. ALSTAD,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

FROM THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

Mr. Isaiah S. Alstad # 22559-509

FCI-Victorville Medium # 1 / P.O. Box 3725

Adelanto, CA. 92301

RECEIVED

OCT - 9 2025

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT, U-S.

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QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

QUESTON NUMBER ONE:

Whether the district court abused its discretion by Summarily

Dismissing Ground One, Conflict of Interest claim and did the Eighth

Circuit abuse its discretion by the affirmation of the district court's

decision as such claim was not wholly frivolous did this violate the U.S.

Supreme Court's Rulings in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); and

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 80-82 (1977) ?

QUESTION NUMBER TWO:

Whether the district court abused its discretion by Summarily

Dismissing Ground Two, as his ex-lawyer provided him with ineffective

assistance of counsel by failing to raise within his pre-trial Motion to

Dismiss several defects in his Superseding Indictment, and did the

Eighth Circuit abuse its discretion by the affirmation of the district

court's decision as such claim is not wholly frivolous did this violate

the U.S. Supreme Court's Rulings in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41

(1957); and Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 80-82 (1977) ?

QUESTION NUMBER THREE:

Whether the district court abused its discretion by Summarily

Dismissing Ground Three sentencing phase ineffectiveness claim and

did the Eighth Circuit abuse its discretion by the affirmation of the

district court's decision as such claim is not wholly frivolous did this

violate the U.S. Supreme Court Rulings in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41

(1957); and Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 80-82 (1977) ?

LIST OF PARTIES

[x] All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

[ ] All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover

page. A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose

judgment is the subject of this petition is as follows:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS BELOW..................................................................................... 1

JURISDICTION............................................................................................ 3

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED.................5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE......................................................................... 6

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT....................................................... 6

CONCLUSION............................................................................................19

INDEX OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX A- Opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals

APPENDIX B- Opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals Denying Panel

Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc

APPENDIX C-Opinion of the District Court

APPENDIX E-Grand Jury Superseding Indictment at page 9-11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES

PAGE NUMBER

Conley v. Gibson, 335 U.S. 41 (1957)

7,8,10,11,14,15

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 80-82 (1977)

7,8,10,11,14,15

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)

7,10,14,18

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003)............................7

Machibroda v. U.S., 368 U.S. 487, 495-496 (1962)

8,9,11,14,15,

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980)........................ 9

Thomas v. Foltz, 818 F.2d 476, 482 (6th Cir. 1987)

9

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893-94 & f.n. 4 (1983)

10

Stirone v. U.S., 361 U.S. 212, 219 (1960)

12

U.S. v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 139-40 (1985)

12

U.S. V. Demmon, 483 F.2d 1093,1095 (8th Cir. 1973)

12

U.S. v. Olson, 262 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 2001)

12

U.S. V. Davis, 184 F.3d 366, 371 (4th Cir. 1999)

12

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)

13

Lee v. U.S., 137 S. Ct. 1958,198 L. Ed. 2d 476 (2017)

13

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)

15

U.S. v. Francis, 129 F. Supp. 2d 612, 616 (S.D.N.Y., 2001)

16

U.S. v. Bakeas, 987 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D. Mass., 1997)

16

U.S. v. Kramer, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11275 (N.D. Cal., 2023)

16

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007)

17

U.S. v. Thomas, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 9588 (6th Cir. 2024)........18

U.S. v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079,1084 (3d Cir. 1991)................. 18

U.S. v. Castro, 26 F.3d 557, 560 (5th Cir. 1994)........................... 18

U.S. v. Harst, 168 F.3d 398, 404-05 (10th Cir. 1999).................... 18

STATUTES AND RULES

PAGE NUMBER

Sup. Ct. Rule 10.............................................................. 7

28 U.S.C. 2253 (c) (2)......................................................7

28 U.S.C. 2255................................................................... 7

Section 2255 Rules, supra note 2928, at R. 4 (b).............. 8,11,15

OTHER

PAGE NUMBER

U.S.S.G. 5H1.1 (Age).................................................... 17

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the

judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

[x] For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at

Appendix A, to the petition and is

[ ] reported at; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported;

or,

[x] is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at

Appendix B to the petition and is

[ ] reported at; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported;

or,

[x] is unpublished.

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits

appears at Appendix

11 P a g e

to the petition and is

[ ] reported at; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet

reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

court

The opinion of the

appears at Appendix

21 P a g e

to the petition and is

JURISDICTION

[x] For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided

my case was May 08, 2025.

[ ] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

[X] A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United

States Court of Appeals on the following date: 07/07/2025

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of

certiorari was granted to and including

(date) in Application No.A.

The jurisdiction of the Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

1254(1).

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The date in which the highest state court decided my case was

A copy of that decision appears at Appendix.

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the

following date:, and a copy of the order

denying rehearing appears at Appendix.

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari

was granted to and including(date) on

(date) in Application No.A

3|Page

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1257 (a).

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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

PAGE NUMBER

Sixth Amendment

10,11,12,14,15

Fifth Amendment.......................................................... 12

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In September of 2023, Petitioner Alstad filed his 2255 Motion to

Vacate and Affidavit (Doc. # 493). The Government filed their Response

Brief opposing relief being granted on February 21, 2024 (Doc. # 528).

In the beginning of April of 2024, Petitioner Alstad filed his 2255 Reply

Brief to conclude briefing schedule. The district court ordered that an

evidentiary hearing to be conducted as to ineffectiveness claim

regarding filing a Notice of Appeal (Doc. # 545), and on March 11,

2025, the district court denied 2255 Motion to Vacate after conducting

Evidentiary Hearing (Doc. # 563 and 564). A timely Notice of Appeal was

filed and on May 08, 2025, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied

Petitioner Alstad's request for a Certificate of Appealability and issued a

1-page Denial of COA Opinion in the case at bar.

Petitioner Alstad asserts that he now petitions this Honorable

U.S. Supreme Court to GRANT his Pro Se Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari, thus, issuing a Certificate of Appealability as to Questions

One, Two, and Three or as this Supreme Court deems warranted

in the case herein.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Petitioner Alstad, acknowledges that a review on a writ of

certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. A petition

for a writ of certiorari will be granted by this court only for compelling

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reasons, see Supreme Court Rule 10.

In the instant case, Petitioner Alstad respectfully request that

this Court GRANT his pro se Petition for a Writ of Certiorari as to

Questions Number One, Two, and Three as relevant to question #

1, 2, and 3, Isaiah Alstad asserts that the district court abused its

discretion by Summarily Dismissing Ground One, Two, and Three and

the Eighth Circuits affirmance of the district court's denial of his 2255

Motion to Vacate, thus, such claims was not wholly frivolous in which

violated the U.S. Supreme Court Rulings Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41 (1957); and Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 80-82 (1977).

Consistent with 28 U.S.C. 2253 (c) (2), and U.S. Supreme Court

precedents in Slack and Miller-El, thus, Isaiah Alstad is entitled to

issuance of Certificate of Appealability as to Questions 1, 2, and 3, in

the matter herein.

QUESTION NUMBER ONE:

Whether the district court abused its discretion by Summarily

Dismissing Ground One, Conflict of Interest claim and did the Eighth

Circuit abuse its discretion by the affirmation of the district court's

decision as such claim was not wholly frivolous did this violate the U.S.

Supreme Court's Rulings in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); and

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 80-82 (1977) ?

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Question Number One Is Debatable Or Wrong Among Jurists Of

Reason

The district court Summarily Dismissed Ground One, Conflict of

Interest Sixth Amendment violation as such claim was not wholly

frivolous in which violated the U.S. Supreme Court Rulings in Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, SO-

82 (1977); and Section 2255 Rules, supra note 2928 at R. 4 (b) (if on

face of motion movant is not entitled to relief, judge must summarily

dismiss motion).

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that: "The subsequent

presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is

subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face

of the record are wholly incredible." Machibroda v. United States, 368

U.S. 487, 495-496 (1962).

In the instant case, Mr. Alstad, argued that his former attorney

operated pursuant to a Conflict of Interest in violation of his Sixth

Amendment Rights of the U.S. Constitution.

(1) that counsel actively represented conflicting interests;

Mr. Alstad states that during the course of representation, that

his interests do diverge with respect to that of his former attorney

Mr. Dunn as he wished to file a Motion to Dismiss Fatally Defective

Superseding Indictment but counsel advised he would not pursue

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such a pre-trial Motion, thus, courses of actions were not taken

which establishes prong number one of the Cuvier test in the case

herein. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980).

(2) that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected the attorney's

performance;

Petitioner Alstad, asserts that a conflict of interest had an adverse

effect on specific aspects of counsel's performance as follows:

(1) failed to file Motion to Dismiss Fatally Defective Superseding

Indictment

(2) breakdown in communication through counsel and Alstad

(3) Attorney Dunn failed to explain the evidence as it bears on each

essential element to establish guilt if he decided to proceed to Jury

Trial so that he would know the strength of the Government's

evidence to render a rational decision on whether to proceed to

Jury Trial or plead guilty.

Mr. Alstad, argues that his guilty plea resulted from counsel's

conflict of interest, therefore, but for the conflict's effect on counsel's

advice, a reasonable probability existed that Mr. Alstad would have

insisted on a trial. Thomas v. Foltz, 818 F.2d 476, 482 (6th Cir. 1987).

The allegations in this case were not in themselves so "vague

[or] conclusory," Machibroda, 368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962), as to warrant

summary dismissal for that reason alone as it relates to Question

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Number One.

As it is at least debatable among jurists of reasons that Mr.

Alstad suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel, thus, a denial of

his Sixth Amendment rights of the U.S. Constitution. See Barefoot v.

Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893-94 & f.n. 4 (1983) (the U.S. Supreme Court

held that a petitioner must demonstrate that the issues are debatable

among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a

different manner]; or that the questions are' adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further."); and Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

473, 484 (2000) (same).

QUESTION NUMBER TWO:

Whether the district court abused its discretion by Summarily

Dismissing Ground Two, as his ex-lawyer provided him with ineffective

assistance of counsel by failing to raise within his pre-trial Motion to

Dismiss several defects in his Superseding Indictment, and did the

Eighth Circuit abuse its discretion by the affirmation of the district

court's decision as such claim is not wholly frivolous did this violate

the U.S. Supreme Court's Rulings in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41

(1957); and Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 80-82 (1977) ?

Question Number Two Is Debatable Or Wrong Among Jurists Of

Reason

The district court Summarily Dismissed Ground Two, ineffective

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assistance of counsel claim as his former attorney omitted several

meritorious defects to be included within his pre-trial Motion to

Dismiss Fatally Defective Superseding Indictment in violation of his

Sixth Amendment Rights of the U.S. Constitution. It follows that the

Sixth Amendment violation as such claim was not wholly frivolous in

which violated the U.S. Supreme Court Rulings in Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41 (1957); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 80-82 (1977); and

Section 2255 Rules, supra note 2928 at R. 4 (b) (if on face of motion

movant is not entitled to relief, judge must summarily dismiss motion).

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that: "The subsequent

presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is

subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face

of the record are wholly incredible." Machibroda v. United States, 368

U.S. 487, 495-496(1962).

In the instant case, Mr. Alstad, argued that his former attorney

provided him with pre-trial ineffective assistance of counsel in violation

of his Sixth Amendment Rights of the U.S. Constitution.

(1) Counsel's advice and performance fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness;

The fatal defects that exist within Count Eight and Ten of his

Superseding Indictment are as follows:

A. Count 8 and 10 of the Grand Jury Superseding Indictment omits the

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fifth "essential element" of Carjacking through "serious bodily injury"

rendering it fatally defective, see Sup. Indictment, at R. 38, Page 9-11,

Filed 12/15/20. The omission of an essential element of the

Superseding Indictment of Counts 8 and 10 of the Superseding

Indictment renders it fatally defective and subject to dismissal. See

Appendix D.

Petitioner Alstad, argues that his Superseding Indictment as to

Counts 8 and 10 in which omits the fifth "essential elements" of

Carjacking "serious bodily injury" in which is fatally defective as it

fails to charge a federal offense in violation of his Fifth and Sixth

Amendment rights of the U.S. Constitution. See Stirone v. United

States, 361 U.S. 212, 219 (1960); United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130,

139-40 (1985); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 770 (1962);

United States v. Demmon, 483 F.2d 1093,1095 (8th Cir. 1973); and

United States v. Olson, 262 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 2001).

Thus, Mr. Alstad, argues that his Indictment as to Count 8 and

10, is legally insufficient as it fails to charge the "fifth element" of

federal Carjacking "serious bodily injury" and subject to dismissal as

such counts fail to state a material element of the offense. See United

States v. Davis, 184 F.3d 366, 367, 371 (4th Cir. 1999) (indictment

charging defendant with violation of "failure to stop" statute

insufficient because failed to allege great bodily injury element of

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offense, thus preventing defendant from preparing sufficient defense).

Mr. Alstad, argues that his ex-lawyer Attorney Glenn Bruder

provided him with 'deficient performance' in which establishes the first

prong of the Hill test, see Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).

(2) the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleading guilty

and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 (1985);

Actual prejudice exists as the result of Isaiah S. Alstad's guilty

plea was entered unknowingly and unintelligently as there is a

reasonable probability that he would not have plead guilty,

however, insisted on going to Jury Trial absent Attorney Glenn Bruder's

'deficient performance,' thus, his Sixth Amendment Rights of the U.S.

Constitution were violated in the matter herein. See Hill, 474

U.S. at 59 (1985). The U.S. Supreme Court in Lee v. United States,

137 S. Ct. 1958,198 L. Ed. 2d 476 (2017) (In Lee, the U.S. Supreme

Court recently modified the prejudice inquiry of Hill v. Lockhart,

second prong test as it focuses on a defendant's decision-making,

which, may not turn solely on the likelihood of conviction after

trial. Thus, as the result of Lee was deprived altogether, therefore,

Lee's Sixth Amendment Rights were violated.). The same applies

in the case herein, thus, Isaiah S. Alstad was deprived, of a

proceeding altogether, therefore, his Sixth Amendment Rights

131 Pa ge

of the U.S. Constitution were violated in the matter herein.

The allegations in this case were not in themselves so "vague

[or] conclusory," Machibroda, 368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962), as to warrant

summary dismissal for that reason alone as it relates to Question

Number Two.

Mr. Alstad, argues that a Certificate of Appealability should issue

as to Question Number Two as it is adequately to deserve

encouragement to proceed further in the case herein. Slack, 529 U.S.

473, 484 (2000) (adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further).

QUESTION NUMBER THREE:

Whether the district court abused its discretion by Summarily

Dismissing Ground Three sentencing phase ineffectiveness claim and

did the Eighth Circuit abuse its discretion by the affirmation of the

district court's decision as such claim is not wholly frivolous did this

violate the U.S. Supreme Court Rulings in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41

(1957); and Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 80-82 (1977) ?

Question Number Three Is Debatable Or Wrong Among Jurists Of

Reason

The district court Summarily Dismissed Ground Three, sentencing

phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim as his former attorney

violated of his Sixth Amendment Rights of the U.S. Constitution. It

141 P a g e

follows that the Sixth Amendment violation as such claim was not

wholly frivolous in which violated the U.S. Supreme Court Rulings in

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63,

80-82 (1977); and Section 2255 Rules, supra note 2928 at R. 4 (b) (if on

face of motion movant is not entitled to relief, judge must summarily

dismiss motion).

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that: "The subsequent

presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is

subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face

of the record are wholly incredible." Machibroda v. United States, 368

U.S. 487, 495-496 (1962).

In the instant case, Mr. Alstad, argued that his former attorney

provided him with sentencing phase ineffective assistance of counsel in

violation of his Sixth Amendment Rights of the U.S. Constitution.

(1) that his counsel's performance was deficient, see Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984);

A. Failing to entail with Mr. Alstad's Sentencing Memorandum and

argue at his federal sentencing to request an "downward variance"

due to the harsh pre-trial confinement through COVID-19 pandemic

As Mr. Alstad stated within his Memorandum of Law, at page 11,

that: "Through COVID-19 pandemic Petitioner Alstad endured

Lockdowns and no visitation with his Family and Loved Ones and a

151 Page

potential COVID-19 infection and deprived of Medications and proper

Medical Treatment, therefore, a "downward variance" was warranted."

See United States v. Francis, 129 F. Supp. 2d 612, 616 (S.D.N.Y., 2001)

(one level departure granted for pretrial confinement that was harsh);

and United States v. Bakeas, 987 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D. Mass., 1997) ("[A]

downward departure is called for when, as here an unusual factor

makes the conditions of confinement contemplated by the guidelines

either impossible to impose or inappropriate.").

During the COVID-19 pandemic the Government were actually

recommending to federal judges that criminal defendants receive

"downward variance” based upon the COVID-19 pandemic and

the harsh conditions of confinement. See United States v. Estrada,

2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80602, 2021 WL 1626309 (S.D. Cal., Apr. 27,

2021) (the court departed from Guideline range of 46-57 months

and imposed a non-guideline sentence of 24 months in part due

to conditions of confinement were particularly harsh during the

pandemic); and United States v. Kramer, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

11275, 2023 WL 361092 (N.D. Cal., Jan. 23, 2023) (considered the

COVID-19 pandemic during sentencing and reduced based upon

harsh conditions).

Taken Mr. Alstad’s factual allegations as true as required by

U.S. Supreme Court precedents Isaiah S. Alstad was in fact

161 Pa ge

entitled to a prompt evidentiary hearing as to whether counsel

provided Alstad with sentencing phase ineffective assistance of

counsel by failing to request a “downward variance” due to his

harsh pre-trial confinement through COVID-19 pandemic. See

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (“In deciding whether

to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider

whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the

petition’s factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the

applicant to federal habeas relief”).

Regarding failing to include within Sentencing Memorandum

and at his Sentencing Hearing a request for a downward variance

due to lack of maturity, however, this claim has been strengthened

by the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s New Policy Statement-5H1.1Age-The amendment adds language specifically providing that

downward departure may be warranted in cases in which the

defendant was youthful at the time of the instant offense or any

prior offenses.

At the time of the offenses Mr. Alstad was 21 years old of age

and mentally immature, thus, he was not fully aware of his actions

by involving himself in the crimes in which he was convicted of as

he was not armed with a gun and had a minimal role in the crime

all which justified a downward variance in the case herein. See

171 P a g e

United States v. Thomas, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 9588, 2024 WL

1672371, at *4 (6th Cir. 2024) (As an initial matter, Thomas argued

that the criminal history points he accrued before 25 should not

count in calculating his criminal history category because his brain

had not fully matured.). See United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d

1079,1084 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding defendant’s counsel ineffective

where counsel failed to argue for an applicable downward

departure); United States v. Castro, 26 F.3d 557, 560 (5th Cir. 1994)

(same); and United States v. Harfst, 168 F.3d 398,404-05 (10th Cir.

1999) (same).

The allegations in this case were not in themselves so "vague

[or] conclusory," Machibroda, 368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962), as to warrant

summary dismissal for that reason alone as it relates to Question

Number One.

Mr. Alstad, argues that a Certificate of Appealability should issue

as to Question Number Three as it is adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further in the case herein. Slack, 529 U.S.

473, 484 (2000) (adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further).

181P a g e

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Date: /Of

191P a g e

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ISAIAH ALSTAD- PETITIONER

VS.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA-RESPONDENT(S)

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Isaiah Alstad, do swear or declare that on this date, Friday,

October 03, 2025, as required by Supreme Court Rule 29,1 have served

the enclosed PETITION Forthat party's counsel, and on every other

person required to be served, by depositing an envelope containing the

above documents in the United States mail properly addressed to each

of them and with first-class postage prepaid, or by delivery to a third-

party commercial carrier for delivery within 3 calendar days.

The names and addresses of those served are as follows:

U.S. Solicitor General

Department of Justice

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Room 5616

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

201 P a g e

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on

211 P a g e

AoMer

2025.