Amicus Curiae Brief — St. Mary Catholic Parish, Littleton, Colorado, et al., Petitioners v. Lisa Roy, in Her Official Capacity as Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Early Childhood, et al.

No. 25-581

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

ST. MARY CATHOLIC PARISH, LITTLETON,

COLORADO, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

LISA ROY, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE COLORADO

DEPARTMENT OF EARLY CHILDHOOD, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of A ppeals for the Tenth Circuit

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE FREEDOM

FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT

OF RESPONDENTS

Patrick C. Elliott

Counsel of Record

Charlotte R. Gude

Freedom From Religion

Foundation, Inc.

P. O. Box 750

Madison, WI 53701

(608) 256-8900

pelliott@ffrf.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

395869

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

INTEREST OF AMICUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

I.

Laws often have statutory exemptions,

which must be constitutionally permitted

for legislative bodies to do their jobs . . . . . . . . . . 4

II. Colorado’s Universal Preschool Program’s

non d i s c r i m i n a t ion r e q u i r e m e nt i s

generally applicable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

A. Disability and income nondiscrimination laws are based on different

f u nda ment a l u nder st a nd i ng s of

providing equal access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

1.

Disability anti-discrimination law

is fundamentally different from

other types of anti-discrimination

law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

2. Leg i sl at ion reg u l a rly t a ke s

income into account for the benefit

of those who are low-income . . . . . . . . 12

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Page

III. Anti-discrimination laws are widespread

and should not be readily undermined

based on religious claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

A. States have historically required

nond iscr i m i nation by pr ivat e

organizations when they participate in

public funding programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

B. Striking down generally applicable

a nt i- d i scr i m i nat ion law s may

encou r a g e “ p at ent ly f r i volou s”

religious liberty claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

iii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES:

Boddie v. Conn.,

401 U.S. 371 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Bullock v. Carter,

405 U.S. 134 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Dandridge v. Williams,

397 U.S. 471 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Douglas v. California,

372 U.S. 353 (1963) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15

Emp. Div., Dept. of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith,

494 U.S. 872 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 23

Fulton v. City of Phila., Pa.,

593 U.S. 522 (2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8

Griffin v. Illinois,

351 U.S. 12 (1956) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15

Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections,

383 U.S. 663 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,

519 U.S. 102 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

iv

Cited Authorities

Page

Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights

Commission,

584 U.S. 617 (2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

McGinnis v. Royster,

410 U.S. 263 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,

390 U.S. 400 (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,

411 U.S. 1 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v.

Milivojevich,

426 U.S. 696 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Su v. Stephen S. Wise Temple,

32 Cal. App. 5th 1159 (2nd App. Dist. 2019) . . . . . . . 24

Tate v. Short,

401 U.S. 395 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Tenn. v. Lane,

541 U.S. 509 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div.,

450 U.S. 707 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

U.S. v. Ballard,

322 U.S. 78 (1944) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

v

Cited Authorities

Page

United States v. Lee,

455 U.S. 252 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

U.S. v. Seeger,

380 U.S. 163 (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,

535 U.S. 391 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 11

Vill. of Arlington Heights v.

Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,

429 U.S. 252 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Williams v. Ill.,

399 U.S. 235 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Zablocki v. Redhail,

434 U.S. 374 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

U.S. CONSTITUTION:

Amend. I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 23

FEDERAL STATUTES AND RULES:

7 U.S.C. § 2131 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

26 U.S.C. § 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

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26 U.S.C. § 2010(c)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

42 U.S.C. § 608(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

42 U.S.C. § 1382 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10

42 U.S.C. § 12182(2)(A)(iv) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

24 C.F.R. § 5.105 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

38 C.F.R. § 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b), 122 Stat 3553 (2008) . . . . . . 5

Pub. L. No. 111-154, § 1(c), 124 Stat 1087 (2010) . . . . . . . 5

STATE STATUTES:

8 Colo. Code Regs. 1404-1 § 4.109(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

8 Colo. Code Regs. 1401-1 § 4.110(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

vii

Cited Authorities

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11 R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-24-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

24 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 20-2011-B(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

34 R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-37-3(18) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

34 R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-37-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 955(h) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 955(i) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 21

625 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-205(c)(3) (2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-103(O-5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-102 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 19

2024 Md. Laws ch. 101, Md. House Bill 200

§ R00A03.05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Ala. Code § 16-6j-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Ala. Code §§ 24-8-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Alaska Stat. § 18.80.230 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Alaska Stat. § 18.80.240 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-2401 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

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Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43-1601 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 21

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-107 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-314 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Ark. Code Ann. § 6-35-107(D) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Cal. Civ. Code § 51 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 12140 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Cal. Gov’t Code § 12955 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-502 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 26.5-4-202(1)(a)(V) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 26.5-4-205(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 26.5-4-205(2)(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 11

Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 26.5-4-201–210 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-63(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

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Del. Code Ann. tit. 6 § 4603 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4504 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4602(29) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Fla. Stat. § 553.503 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Fla. Stat. § 760.08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Fla. Stat. § 760.23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Ga. Code Ann. § 160-5-1-.34(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Ga. Code Ann. § 160-5-1-.34(4)(a)(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Ga. Code. Ann. § 8-3-202 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 489-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 515-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Idaho Code § 67-5909 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Ind. Code § 22-9-1-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 19

Ind. Code § 20-51-4-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Iowa Code § 216.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

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Iowa Code § 216.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1009(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.120 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.360 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

La. Stat. Ann. § 17:3996(C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 21

La. Stat. Ann. § 17:4031(D)(1)(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

La. Stat. Ann. § 51:2247 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

La. Stat. Ann. § 51:2606 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272 § 98 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-304 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-701(j) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-705 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Me. Stat. tit. 5, § 4581 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

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Me. Stat. tit. 5, § 4591 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Minn. Stat. § 363A.03(47) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Minn. Stat. § 363A.09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Minn. Stat. § 363A.11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Miss. Code Ann. § 37-181-15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Miss. Code Ann. § 43-33-723 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 166.700 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.040 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.065 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Mont. Code Ann. § 20-7-1703 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Mont. Code Ann. § 20-7-1703(6)(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-304 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-305 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-562.5(c1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41A-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

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N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.4-02(19) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.4-14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.5-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 194-F:6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 21

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-9.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-1-7(F) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-1-7(G) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40-c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(36) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2-a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-134 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-318 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

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Nev. Rev. Stat. § 118.100 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 651.070 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02(G) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02(H) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 1402 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 1452 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Okla. Stat. tit. 68 § 2357.206(H)(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Okla. Stat. tit. 68 § 2357.206(H)(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

S.C. Code Ann. § 12-6-3790 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

S.C. Code Ann. § 31-21-40 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

S.D. Codified Laws § 20-13-20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

S.D. Codified Laws § 20-13-23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-601 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-2607 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Utah Code Ann. § 53E-7-403(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

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Utah Code Ann. § 57-21-2(25) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Utah Code Ann. § 57-21-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3904 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4501(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4503 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

W. Va. Code § 16B-17-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

W. Va. Code § 16B-18-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

W. Va. Code § 18-31-11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.030(1)(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.030(1)(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Wis. 1989 Acts 336, § 228 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Wis. 1995 Acts 27, § 4010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Wis. Stat. § 106.50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Wis. Stat. § 106.52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Wis. Stat. § 118.60(2)(a)(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

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Wis. Stat. § 119.23(2)(a)(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-26-103 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

Comm’n on Disabi lity Rights, Histor y of

Disability Rights Milestones and Laws,

Am. Bar Ass’n (last visited Aug. 18, 2026)

https://tinyurl.com/mr37xka8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-18

Earned Income Tax Credit Overview, National

Conference of State Legislatures (June 9, 2026)

https://tinyurl.com/48j2c2pd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Pamela D. Frasch et al., State Animal Anti-cruelty

Statutes: An Overview, 5 Animal L. 69 (1999) . . . . . 5

Daniel J.H. Greenwood & Nicholas E. Tramposch,

After Smith Falls: Corporate Free Exercise

Lochnerism, 76 S.C.L. Rev. 287 (2024) . . . . . . . . . . 23

Eric A. Hanushek et al., Long-run Trends in

the U.S. SES-Achievement Gap, 17 Educ.

Fin. & Pol’y 608 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Head Start Approach, HeadStart.gov, (last

visited August 18, 2026) https://headstart.

gov/programs/article/head-start-approach . . . . . . . 16

xvi

Cited Authorities

Page

Head Star t’s Impact, National Head Start

Association, (last visited August 18, 2026)

https://nhsa.org/about-nhsa/our-impact/ . . . . . . . . . 16

Pa mela S. K a rlan & G eorge Rutherglen,

Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable

Accommodation, 46 Duke L.J. 1 (1996) . . . . . . . . . 8-9

Jana L. Kern, Trends in Teen Sex Are Changing,

But Are Minnesota’s Romeo and Juliet

Laws?, 39 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1607 (2013) . . . . . 4-5

A n d r e w K o p p e l m a n , T h e In c r e a s i n g l y

Dangerous Variants of the “Most-FavoredNati o n” Th eo r y of Reli gi o u s Liber ty,

108 Iowa L. Rev. 2237 (2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6

Pandora’s Box of Religious Exemptions, 136 Harv.

L. Rev. 1178 (2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Parading the Horribles: The Risks of Expanding

Religious Exemptions, Law, Rights, and Religion

Project (2022) https://tinyurl.com/2epkd7rf . . . . . . 24

Alex Raskolnikov, Law for the Rich, 109 Minn.

L. Rev. 1399 (2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev.

871 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

xvii

Cited Authorities

Page

School Requirements, EdChoice (last visited

August 18, 2026) https://tinyurl.com/ycx7hu3f . . . . 20

Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different

D if fer e n ce: A DA Acco mm od a ti o n s a s

Antidiscrimination, 153 Univ. Pa. L. Rev.

579 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World:

The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 Cal.

L. Rev. 841 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Universal Pre-K (UPK) FAQs, Joint Initiative

for Youth and Families, at 2, 4 (Feb. 15, 2023)

https://tinyurl.com/2k4vbbjf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS1

Amicus curiae Freedom From Religion Foundation

(FFRF) is the largest national association of freethinkers,

representing atheists, agnostics, and others who form

their opinions about religion based on reason, rather

than faith, tradition, or authority. More than 11 percent

of FFRF’s nearly 41,000 current members nationwide are

LGBTQ+ individuals, according to a recent and definitive

membership survey. FFRF’s two primary purposes are

to educate the public about nontheism and to defend the

constitutional separation between state and church.

Arguably the greatest current threat to individual

freedom of conscience is a nationwide effort to radically

redefine “religious freedom” as the right to impose one’s

religious beliefs on others. FFRF and its members are

concerned that religious exemptions within government

funded programs would allow believers to discriminate,

and inflict harm on others in violation of fundamental civil

rights protections. FFRF supports civil rights protections

for LGBTQ+ Americans and opposes misinterpreting

the First Amendment to mean that the right to religious

freedom includes the right to discriminate within taxpayer

funded programs.

1. No party’s counsel in this case authored this brief in whole or

in part. No party or party’s counsel contributed any money intended

to fund preparing or submitting this brief. No person, other than

amicus, its members, or its counsel contributed money that was

intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief.

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In 2020, the people of Colorado voted overwhelmingly

to create a fund for a statewide, voluntary, universal

preschool program. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 26.5-4-202(1)(a)

(V). To facilitate the program, the Colorado General

Assembly passed the “Early Childhood Act.” The Act

required a minimum number of instructional hours, a

maximum educator-to-child ratio, qualifications standards

for teachers, continued education development for

teachers, and many more best practices, including the

nondiscrimination requirement at issue in this litigation.

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 26.5-4-205(2). Both in statute, and

in the rules later promulgated for the program, the

nondiscrimination requirement mandates that preschool

providers give children an “equal opportunity to enroll

and receive preschool services regardless of race,

ethnicity, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, gender

identity, lack of housing, income level, or disability, as such

characteristics and circumstances apply to the child or the

child’s family.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 26.5-4-205(2)(b); 8 Colo.

Code Regs. 1401-1 § 4.110(B).

Petitioners arg ue that the nondiscr imination

requirement “excludes” them from the program because it

forbids them from discriminating against LGBTQ+ fouryear-olds or four-year-olds with LGBTQ+ parents. Pet’rs’

Opening Br. 11–15. They argue that the nondiscrimination

requirement is not a neutral and generally applicable

law because preschools are allowed to prioritize seats

for children with disabilities and low-income children.

Pet’rs’ Opening Br. 35–43. This, say Petitioners, is an

exemption to the requirement that undermines the state’s

nondiscrimination interests in a comparable way to their

desire to discriminate against LGBTQ+ children. Id.

3

Effective legislation requires exemptions. Legislation

usually has multiple competing purposes, which legislators

must balance. To effectively balance these, exemptions

are often necessary. If any secular “exemption” means

religious exemptions must be allowed, the door is open

to religious exemption claims to most laws. A decision

that calls equality for those with disabilities or who

are low-income an “exemption” and compares that to

discrimination against LGBTQ+ people is not aligned

with anti-discrimination in those areas and would

effectively defang most nondiscrimination laws.

Petitioners’ argument fundamentally and deliberately

misconstrues disability and income nondiscrimination. For

both disability and income, nondiscrimination law reflects

the reality that to treat people with disabilities and those

who are low-income exactly the same as others often

perpetuates inequality, rather than resolves it. A school

building with stairs is ostensibly open to all students, but

students needing wheelchair access cannot actually enter.

Ensuring actual equality for people with disabilities and

those who are low-income is not an “exemption” from

nondiscrimination requirements, but instead is fully

aligned with the legal landscape. Further, to argue that

ensuring equality for preschool students with disabilities

or students whose families are low-income is comparable

to LGBTQ+ discrimination is like comparing apples and

durians. One is a popular air freshener scent while the

other would quickly empty a room.

Finally, nondiscrimination rules within government

funding programs are not new. Nondiscrimination

requirements have a long history and tradition in

government funding programs. At least seventeen states

have school voucher programs with nondiscrimination

4

requirements for participating private schools. Striking

down generally applicable anti-discrimination laws may

encourage “patently frivolous” religious liberty claims.

Petitioners’ arguments should be rejected and this

Court should affirm the 10th Circuit’s decision.

ARGUMENT

I.

Laws often have statutory exemptions, which must

be constitutionally permitted for legislative bodies

to do their jobs.

Legislation is often a balancing act. This Court has

recognized this fact in the past: “Legislation is frequently

multipurposed: the removal of even a ‘subordinate’

purpose may shift altogether the consensus of legislative

judgment supporting the statute.” McGinnis v. Royster,

410 U.S. 263, 276–77 (1973). “Rarely can it be said that

a legislature or administrative body operating under a

broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a

single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the

‘dominant’ or ‘primary’ one.” Vill. of Arlington Heights v.

Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). Because

of this required balancing by legislators, “courts refrain

from reviewing the merits of their decisions, absent a

showing of arbitrariness or irrationality.” Id.

Var ious important laws include some secular

exemptions. Private clubs are exempt from federal public

accommodations law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e). “Romeo and

Juliet” provisions are exemptions to statutory rape

laws for violators who are under or around the age of

consent themselves. Jana L. Kern, Trends in Teen Sex

Are Changing, But Are Minnesota’s Romeo and Juliet

5

Laws?, 39 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1607, 1611–14 (2013).

Most animal cruelty laws include exemptions for wildlife

or farm animals. Pamela D. Frasch et al., State Animal

Anti-cruelty Statutes: An Overview, 5 Animal L. 69,

75 (1999). Executive, administrative, and professional

employees are exempt from the Fair Labor Standards

Act’s minimum wage and overtime provisions. 29 U.S.C.

§ 213(a)(1). Even laws against speeding sometimes have

exemptions for ambulances. E.g., 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11205(c)(3) (2025). 2

Legislative balancing is often recognized by Congress

itself in the “Findings and Purposes” sections of

congressional acts. There are often multiple, very

different purposes cited in enacted legislation. See,

e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (stating the intent for the Animal

Welfare Act Amendments as both to ensure humane

treatment and to protect owners of animals from theft);

Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act of 2009, Pub. L.

No. 111-154, § 1(c), 124 Stat 1087, 1088 (2010) (declaring

the purposes of the PACT Act to include discouraging

tobacco trafficking, increase excise taxes on tobacco, and

prevent youth access to tobacco); ADA Amendments Act

of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b), 122 Stat 3553, 3554

(2008) (stating its purposes as carrying out the ADA,

conveying Congressional intent about standards, and to

reject Supreme Court interpretations of the statute).

To take into account all of these competing reasons

for legislation, exemptions have to be made so that laws

2. For further discussion of secular exemptions in the law, see

Pandora’s Box of Religious Exemptions, 136 Harv. L. Rev. 1178, 1191

(2023); Andrew Koppelman, The Increasingly Dangerous Variants

of the “Most-Favored-Nation” Theory of Religious Liberty, 108

Iowa L. Rev. 2237, 2248 (2023).

6

are not overinclusive. Citing an ambulance rushing to a

hospital to save a life for speeding does not further the

goals of a speeding statute that is designed to save lives

by preventing accidents. Mandating complete religious

exemptions every time any secular exemption is allowed

would create a chaotic system and would require legislation

to minutia that legislatures are not prepared to handle.

The question of what counts as an exemption is

dependent on language. When there is not language

specific enough to get at some topic, exemptions might

be used. Exemptions occur because of the “often

fortuitous circumstance that the language available to

circumscribe a legal rule or principle is broader than

the regulatory goals the rule or principle is designed to

further.” Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. Chi. L.

Rev. 871, 872 (1991). For example, there is no single word

for “health-promoting vaccinations” such that those who

cannot get vaccinated for medical reasons would simply

never be considered within the law, rather than requiring

some “exemption.” Andrew Koppelman, The Increasingly

Dangerous Variants of the “Most-Favored-Nation”

Theory of Religious Liberty, 108 Iowa L. Rev. 2237, 2267

(2023). “Where the language in which the rule is written

contains a word . . . that itself excludes what the drafters

wish to exclude from the scope of the rule, no exception is

necessary . . . . But where language does not provide any

word . . . terms . . . are likely to be overinclusive.” Schauer,

supra, at 874–75.

Legislators are confined to the language that exists.

Thus, they are going to have to include exemptions to

get at the goals they have for legislation. If any secular

exemption in the law means that religious exemptions

7

must also be allowed, the door is open to novel, sham, and

unlimited claims for religious exemptions.

II. Colorado’s Universal Preschool Prog ram’s

nondiscrimination requirement is generally

applicable.

The Free Exercise Clause does not give an individual

the ability to avoid compliance with a “valid and neutral

law of general applicability.” Emp. Div., Dept. of Hum.

Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting

United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 (1982) (Stevens, J.,

concurring in judgment)). However, “a law is not generally

applicable if it ‘invites’ the government to consider the

particular reasons for a person’s conduct by providing

‘a mechanism for individualized exemptions,’” Fulton

v. City of Phila., Pa., 593 U.S. 522, 533 (2021), or if the

law prohibits religious conduct while permitting secular

conduct that “undermines the government’s asserted

interests in a similar way.” Id. at 534.

The nondiscrimination requirement at issue in this

case is neutral on its face. It applies to all preschools that

wish to be part of the program. The Act does not single

out religion for disfavored treatment. In fact, the only

mention of religion in the Act is a prohibition on religious

discrimination. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 26.5-4-201–210. Even

considering the deeper analysis of hostility in Masterpiece

Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 584 U.S.

617, 634–38 (2018), there is no evidence that plaintiffs can

point to in this case that shows “official expressions of

hostility to religion.” Id. at 639. In fact, the Department of

Early Childhood convened working groups with religious

preschools as the program was being developed. Pet’rs’

App. 302a.

8

There is no mechanism for individualized exemptions

to the nondiscr imination requi rement either. In

Fulton, it was the “inclusion of a formal system of

entirely discretionary exceptions in” the contractual

nondiscrimination requirement itself that “render[ed]

the contractual non-discrimination requirement not

generally applicable.” Fulton, 593 U.S. at 536 (emphasis

added). The alleged “catchall exemption” here directly

states that when used, “eligible preschool providers must

still comply with” the nondiscrimination requirement, thus

expressly disallowing its use to provide an exemption to

the nondiscrimination requirement. 8 Colo. Code Regs.

1404-1 § 4.109(B).

Finally, the fact that Colorado allows preschools

to prioritize serving low-income preschoolers and

preschoolers with disabilities does not undermine

Colorado’s interests in nondiscrimination.

A.

Disability and income nondiscrimination

laws are based on different fundamental

understandings of providing equal access.

Petitioners argue that allowing some preschools to

prefer enrolling children with disabilities or children

who qualify for the Head Start program are exemptions

to the nondiscrimination requirement. Pet’rs’ Opening

Br. 35 – 43. Petitioners fundamentally misconstrue

anti-discrimination law for these groups. To combat

discrimination based on disability and income, the law

has to take into account the differences, lest treating

those with disabilities or who are low-income exactly

the same becomes a new form of unequal access. See

Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities,

9

Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46

Duke L.J. 1, 10 (1996). Thus, there is no “exemption” here

being given for preschools that specifically serve children

who are disabled or low-income. Rather, targeted services

for children with disabilities and low-income families fit

perfectly within the legal landscape of nondiscrimination.

1.

Disability anti-discrimination law is

fundamentally different from other types

of anti-discrimination law.

Addressing disability discrimination requires a

unique approach because it is fundamentally different

from other forms of discrimination. To address disability

discrimination in the same manner as other forms

of discrimination would be ineffective at best and, at

worst, lead to further disparity. The findings of the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) identify many

forms of discrimination that people with disabilities face,

including “the discriminatory effects of architectural,

transportation, and communication barriers” and a

“failure to make modifications to existing facilities and

practices.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5). The ADA further

defines discrimination to include “not making reasonable

accommodations to the known physical or mental

limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a

disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added).

In cases interpreting the statute, this Court has said

that the objectives of the ADA “will sometimes require

affirmative conduct.” US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535

U.S. 391, 401 (2002).

Colorado’s efforts to ensure that children with

disabilities have access to pre-k programming is consistent

10

with other areas of disability anti-discrimination law. The

argument that Petitioners advance about a supposed

“categorical exemption” for children with disabilities,

Pet’rs’ Br. 38, represents a fundamental misunderstanding

of anti-discrimination law for people with disabilities. At

its core, a different approach is required to address antidiscrimination and nondiscrimination based on disability

when compared to most other types of anti-discrimination

law.

Scholars have advocated that in order to achieve legal

protection for certain groups, sometimes action is required

to level the playing field. See Michael Ashley Stein, Same

Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations

as Antidiscrimination, 153 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 579 (2004).

Disability anti-discrimination is one of the few areas

where this has been recognized legally, as reflected by

the congressional findings within the Americans with

Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5). Other sections

of the ADA require “reasonable accommodations” in

employment or require public accommodations to remove

architectural barriers. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A),

12182(2)(A)(iv). This is because it is understood that to say

that people with disabilities “have the right to live in the

world,” it must also be ensured that they “have the right

to make their way in it and therefore must be entitled to

use the indispensable means of access, and to use them on

terms that will make the original right effective.” Jacobus

tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled

in the Law of Torts, 54 Cal. L. Rev. 841, 848 (1966). Simply

saying that people with disabilities have a right to use

public transit does not help those in wheelchairs get into

the bus or those who are blind identify which stop they

are at. A right that cannot be exercised is meaningless.

11

This Court has recognized this difference implicitly,

saying that reasonable accommodations are “needed

for those with disabilities to obtain the same workplace

opportunities that those without disabilities automatically

enjoy.” US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397; see

also, Tenn. v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 532 (1978) (“Recognizing

that failure to accommodate persons with disabilities

will often have the same practical effect as outright

exclusion, Congress required the States to take reasonable

measures to remove architectural and other barriers to

accessibility.”).

Thus, Petitioners fail to identify an exemption, much

less one similar to what they seek, when they point to

accommodations made for students with disabilities.

Colorado’s nondiscrimination requirement requires

preschools to “provide eligible children an equal

opportunity to enroll and receive preschool services

regardless of . . . disability.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 26.5-4205(2)(b). Colorado is letting preschools that are designed

to facilitate preschool for children with disabilities do so

by allowing them to cater to children with disabilities for

enrollment. J.A. 293–294. This preference was put in place

because not every preschool setting can accommodate

children with disabilities and so that children are placed

in locations that can fulfill their needs according to their

Individualized Education Plan (IEP). J.A. 251. IEPs can

include many forms of specialized services. 3

3. Specialized services can include “speech-language pathology

and audiology services, interpreting services, psychological services,

physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic

recreation, social work services, school nurse services…, counseling

services, including rehabilitation counseling, orientation and mobility

services, and medical services.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(a).

12

It is farcical to equate Petitioners’ request to

discriminate on the basis of LGBTQ+ status with

accommodations that ensure preschoolers with disabilities

have access to vital services. For example, Petitioners’

position would impinge schools that reserve priority for

deaf children when they have ASL interpreters on staff.

Instead, this argument would say, both the preschool

and a deaf child must simply hope the child lucks into

placement at one of the few seats that ensure access to

that vital service rather than the seat going to a child who

has no need for interpreters. Petitioner’s interpretation

is completely at odds with accepted understandings

of disability anti-discrimination, lacks common sense,

and cannot be viewed as an “exemption” from antidiscrimination rules. Even if disability preference could be

viewed as an “exemption,” it is not one that “undermines”

the interests of nondiscrimination in the same way that

barring LGBTQ+ preschoolers or parents from enrolling

at a preschool does.

2.

Legislation regularly takes income into

account for the benefit of those who are

low-income.

Laws administering social programs often make

classifications based on income. These administrative

decisions and classifications are largely left to state

legislatures, not the courts. See Dandridge v. Williams,

397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (“But the intractable economic,

social, and even philosophical problems presented by

public welfare assistance programs are not the business

of this Court.”). It is a basic fact of policymaking that

legislation can differentiate based on income. For example,

progressive taxation and means-testing for benefit

13

programs both differentiate based on income. 26 U.S.C.

§ 1; 42 U.S.C. § 1382.

Benefits statutes have income ceilings to determine

eligibility for various programs. Most states and the

federal government have some kind of an Earned Income

Tax Credit program, which explicitly reduces the amount

of taxes owed for those eligible based on maximum

earnings requirements. Earned Income Tax Credit

Overview, National Conference of State Legislatures

(June 9, 2026) https://tinyurl.com/48j2c2pd. Meanwhile,

there are no laws that have explicit eligibility income

floors for benefit programs. See Alex Raskolnikov, Law

for the Rich, 109 Minn. L. Rev. 1399 (2025). Laws that

do have income floors instead impose greater burdens

on those whose income exceeds the floors. The estate

tax, for example, is imposed only on those who have over

$15,000,000 at their death. 26 U.S.C. § 2010(c)(3).

Like laws related to disability, income-based

classifications are tailored to provide benefits to those

who are in need of assistance. This is not illegally

“discriminatory” towards high-income earners. In reality,

it is understood that income must be taken into account

in some situations to aid those who need additional

assistance. For example, in the context of education,

research has demonstrated that there is an achievement

gap between children from high-income and low-income

households. Eric A. Hanushek et al., Long-run Trends

in the U.S. SES-Achievement Gap, 17 Educ. Fin. & Pol’y

608 (2022).

Nondiscrimination statutes that include income

make this even clearer. The unfortunate reality is

14

that low-income families and children receiving public

assistance are faced with societal discrimination because

of their economic status. Higher earners who do not

need to participate in assistance programs, such as

vouchers or subsidy programs, do not face income-based

discrimination. A plethora of state laws reflects this reality

by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of receiving

assistance from these kinds of programs. E.g., Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 2, § 12140; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-63(3); Del.

Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4602(29); 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-103(O5); Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-701(j); Minn. Stat.

§ 363A.03(47); N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(36); N.D. Cent. Code

§ 14-02.4-02(19); 34 R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-37-3(18); Utah

Code Ann. § 57-21-2(25); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4501(6).

For instance, in North Dakota’s public accommodations

nondiscrimination statute, “status with regard to public

assistance” is defined as “the condition of being a recipient

of federal, state, or local assistance, including medical

assistance, or of being a tenant receiving federal, state,

or local subsidies, including rental assistance or rent

supplements.” N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.4-02(19) (emphasis

added). Both the term itself and the definition make clear

that the concern is that someone would discriminate

against those who are recipients of assistance or subsidies.

In fact, this Court’s precedent also makes clear that

concerns about disparate treatment are one-way. In

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), this Court required

states to provide an adequate transcript substitute to

indigent defendants appealing their criminal cases. In

Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), this Court

found that indigent defendants had a right to counsel on

direct appeal. Other cases have struck down incarceration

as a criminal penalty for the inability to pay a fine, see

15

Williams v. Ill., 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S.

395 (1971), and filing-fee requirements for candidates for

office. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). This Court

has even said that “Sentencing judges may, and often

do, consider the defendant’s ability to pay, but in such

circumstances they are guided by sound judicial discretion

rather than by constitutional mandate.” San Antonio Ind.

Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 22 (1973).

Criminal law is not the only place where inability to

pay must legally be taken into consideration. Poll taxes

are unconstitutional. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections,

383 U.S. 663 (1966). In M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102

(1996), this Court held that the dismissal of a mother’s

appeal of the termination of her parental rights based on

her inability to pay the record preparation fees violated

due process and equal protection. The Court has also

held that denying access to divorce proceedings because

of an inability to pay court fees and costs violates due

process. Boddie v. Conn., 401 U.S. 371 (1971). Likewise,

a law that required child support payments before being

able to enter into a new marriage was also struck down.

Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).

These cases explicitly require income to be taken

into account to prevent differential treatment. Griffin,

351 U.S. at 19 (“Destitute defendants must be afforded

as adequate appellate review as defendants who have

money enough to buy transcripts.”); Douglas, 372 U.S.

at 358 (“There is lacking that equality demanded by the

Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who appeals

as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel’s examination . . .

while the poor man . . . is forced to shift for himself.”);

Boddie, 401 U.S. at 380 (“a cost requirement, valid on

16

its face, may offend due process because it operates to

foreclose a particular party’s opportunity to be heard.)

Fundamentally, with income as with disability, it is

understood that to treat everyone at all income levels

equally actually means treating them differently. To not

consider income would effectively deny rights to those with

low-incomes that higher-income earners can vindicate.

Head Start programs enroll students whose families

meet certain low-income requirements, such as income at

or below the federal poverty line. Head Start Approach,

HeadStart.gov, (last visited August 18, 2026) https://

headstart.gov/programs/article/head-start-approach.

Research shows that Head Start programs put children

who might otherwise not have had access to early childhood

education at a more even starting line with children whose

families can pay for early childhood education. See Head

Start’s Impact, National Head Start Association, (last

visited August 18, 2026) https://nhsa.org/about-nhsa/

our-impact/. The combination of the universal preschool

program and Head Start program allows eligible lowincome preschoolers to attend full-day preschool without

out-of-pocket costs. Universal Pre-K (UPK) FAQs, Joint

Initiative for Youth and Families, at 2, 4 (Feb. 15, 2023)

https://tinyurl.com/2k4vbbjf.

Like Petitioners’ argument that providing appropriate

services to children with disabilities is “discrimination,”

their argument that coordinating multiple funding

sources so preschoolers may attend full-time preschool is

antithetical to the principle that the government should

work for the people — all of them, not just a lucky few.

Under Petitioners’ argument, it would be up to chance

whether Head Start programs were paired with lowincome children from the universal preschool program.

17

This would doom the program to fail. Because Head

Start programs must fill a minimum percentage of their

seats with low-income children to get their funding, they

would likely either have to withdraw from the universal

preschool program altogether or provide many fewer slots

for the universal preschool program in order to still reach

the required percentages for Head Start. Thus, families

who cannot pay for preschool would have more limited

options and could not layer both types of funding to get

their children the same access to preschool services as

those who can pay for a full-day out-of-pocket.

By coordinating placement of low-income children at

Head Start programs so that the children can access both

funding sources and thus full days of preschool, Colorado

is ensuring those children get the same access to preschool

as those whose parents can pay out-of-pocket. To view it

otherwise, as Petitioners do, is fundamentally unequal

and lacks any appreciation for the function and purpose

of the legislation. Preference for low-income students in

Head Start programs is not properly characterized as

an “exemption” from the nondiscrimination requirement.

It also does not undermine the government’s interest

in ensuring an equal opportunity to “enroll and receive

preschool services” in a similar way to how allowing

preschools to bar access to LGBTQ+ four-year-olds and

their parents would.

III. Anti-discrimination laws are widespread and

should not be readily undermined based on religious

claims.

Americans with disabilities have fought long and

hard to be able to participate as full members of society.

Comm’n on Disability Rights, History of Disability Rights

18

Milestones and Laws, Am. Bar Ass’n (last visited Aug. 18,

2026) https://tinyurl.com/mr37xka8. Petitioners’ argument

threatens to callously use those efforts towards inclusion

to instead nullify anti-discrimination laws across the

country. For instance, an overwhelming majority of states

include disability alongside race and other identity groups

in their fair housing nondiscrimination requirements.

Ala. Code §§ 24-8-4; Alaska Stat. § 18.80.240; Ark.

Code Ann. § 16-123-107; Cal. Gov’t Code § 12955; Colo.

Rev. Stat. § 24-34-502; Del. Code Ann. tit. 6 § 4603; Fla.

Stat. § 760.23; Ga. Code. Ann. § 8-3-202; Haw. Rev. Stat.

§ 515-3; Idaho Code § 67-5909; 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3102; Ind. Code § 22-9-1-2; Iowa Code § 216.8; Kan. Stat.

Ann. § 44-1016; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.360; La. Stat.

Ann. § 51:2606; Me. Stat. tit. 5, § 4581; Md. Code Ann.,

State Gov’t § 20-705; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(6);

Minn. Stat. § 363A.09; Miss. Code Ann. § 43-33-723; Mo.

Rev. Stat. § 213.040; Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-305; Neb.

Rev. Stat. § 20-318; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 118.100; N.H. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 354-A:10; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-9.1; N.M.

Stat. Ann. § 28-1-7(G); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2-a); N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 41A-4; N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.5-02; Ohio

Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02(H); Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 1452;

43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 955(h); 34 R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-37-4;

S.C. Code Ann. § 31-21-40; S.D. Codified Laws § 20-13-20;

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-601; Utah Code Ann. § 57-21-5; Vt.

Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4503; Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.030(1)(c);

W. Va. Code § 16B-18-5; Wis. Stat. § 106.50; Wyo. Stat.

Ann. § 40-26-103.

Thirty-six states have public accommodations

nondiscrimination laws that list disability alongside race

and other identity groups. Alaska Stat. § 18.80.230; Ark.

Code Ann. § 16-123-107; Cal. Civ. Code § 51; Colo. Rev.

19

Stat. § 24-34-601; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-64; Del. Code

Ann. tit. 6, § 4504; Fla. Stat. § 760.08; Haw. Rev. Stat.

§ 489-3; 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-102; Ind. Code § 22-9-1-2;

Iowa Code § 216.7; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1009(c); Ky. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 344.120; La. Stat. Ann. § 51:2247; Me. Stat.

tit. 5, § 4591; Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-304; Mass.

Gen. Laws ch. 272 § 98; Minn. Stat. § 363A.11; Mo. Rev.

Stat. § 213.065; Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-304; Neb. Rev.

Stat. § 20-134; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 651.070; N.H. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 354-A:17; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(f); N.M. Stat.

Ann. § 28-1-7(F); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40-c; N.D. Cent.

Code § 14-02.4-14; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02(G);

Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 1402; 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 955(i); 11

R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-24-2; S.D. Codified Laws § 20-13-23;

Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3904; Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.030(1)

(b); W. Va. Code § 16B-17-2; Wis. Stat. § 106.52.

These states generally also provide that discrimination

in the case of disability includes the failure to make

reasonable accommodations in housing or businesses for

those with disabilities. E.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-314;

Fla. Stat. § 553.503 (adopting the federal Americans with

Disabilities Act Standards for Accessible Design).

A ruling by the Court that accommodations for students

with disabilities within Colorado’s program invalidates the

nondiscrimination rules could have a significant national

impact. Others might argue that ensuring access to

housing via reasonable accommodations undermines

the government’s interests of equal access to housing or

that requiring access to buildings via wheelchair ramps

undermines the government’s interests in equal access to

public accommodations. This would make religious claims

about discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or national

20

origin by landlords or business owners significantly

harder to prevent.

A.

States have historically required

nondiscrimination by private organizations

when they participate in public funding

programs.

Pe t i t i o n e r s a n d a m i c i c o m p l a i n t h a t t h e

nondiscrimination requirement at issue in this legislation

was “targeted” to burden their religion. Pet’rs’ Br. 29–31.

In reality, most public funding programs have strings

attached to ensure that the programs actually achieve

their goals. Even school voucher programs typically

include a variety of requirements for participating schools,

including requirements for teacher education, calendar/

curriculum requirements, financial requirements, and

nondiscrimination requirements. School Requirements,

EdChoice (last visited August 18, 2026) https://tinyurl.

com/ycx7hu3f. The first publicly funded school voucher

program, the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program,

enacted in 1990, included these types of requirements

for participating schools. See Wis. 1989 Acts 336, § 228.

In 1995, the program’s statute was amended to include

requirements that participating private schools adhere to

federal nondiscrimination laws. Wis. 1995 Acts 27, § 4010.

The Milwaukee program is not the only one with

these requirements. School voucher laws in Arizona,

Georgia, Louisiana, Montana, and Oklahoma prohibit

discrimination on the basis of disability. Ariz. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 43-1601; Ga. Code Ann. § 160-5-1-.34(4)(a)(6); La.

Stat. Ann. § 17:3996(C); Mont. Code Ann. § 20-7-1703(6)

(c); Okla. Stat. tit. 68 § 2357.206(H)(5). New Hampshire

21

and Pennsylvania require voucher programs to comply

with all state and federal anti-discrimination laws; both

states prohibit sex discrimination and New Hampshire

prohibits discrimination based on gender identity in public

accommodations law. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 194-F:6; N.H.

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:17; 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 20-2011B(e); 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 955(i). Montana and Arizona

also prohibit discrimination in their programs based on

familial/marital status. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43-1601;

Mont. Code Ann. § 20-7-1703. Montana additionally

includes sex, creed, and age. Mont. Code Ann. § 20-7-1703.

Maryland explicitly forbids discrimination based on sexual

orientation and gender identity. 2024 Md. Laws ch. 101,

Md. House Bill 200 § R00A03.05. Other school voucher

laws enacted between 2007 and 2025 include requirements

that schools comply with federal nondiscrimination laws.

Ala. Code § 16-6j-5; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-2401; Ark.

Code Ann. § 6-35-107(D); Ga. Code Ann. § 160-5-1-.34(4);

Ind. Code § 20-51-4-3; La. Stat. Ann. § 17:4031(D)(1)

(b); La. Stat. Ann. § 17:3996(C); 2024 Md. Laws ch. 101,

Md. House Bill 200 § R00A03.05.; Miss. Code Ann. § 37181-15; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 166.700; Mont. Code Ann. § 207-1703; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-562.5(c1); Okla. Stat. tit.

68 § 2357.206(H)(5); S.C. Code Ann. § 12-6-3790; Tenn.

Code Ann. § 49-6-2607; Utah Code Ann. § 53E-7-403(2);

W. Va. Code § 18-31-11; Wis. Stat. § 119.23(2)(a)(4); Wis.

Stat. § 118.60(2)(a)(4).

Federal programs also regularly have nondiscrimination

requirements for private entities that participate. The

Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grant, enacted

as part of the Social Security Act in 1935 and amended

in 1981, requires all programs or activities that receive

funding to comply with the Age Discrimination Act, the

22

Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act,

and the Civil Rights Act’s nondiscrimination requirements.

42 U.S.C. § 608(d). Department of Veterans Affairs

assistance programs were prohibited from discriminating

as early as 1964. 38 C.F.R. § 18. Federal regulations for the

Department of Housing and Urban Development require

nondiscrimination in all HUD programs. 24 C.F.R. § 5.105.

These strings have been attached for decades and

updated as nondiscrimination standards changed.

Including nondiscrimination requirements for private

entities that receive funding from the government is not

a new phenomenon that is somehow targeting religious

organizations.

B. Striking down generally applicable antidiscrimination laws may encourage “patently

frivolous” religious liberty claims.

In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390

U.S. 400, n.5 (1968), this Court called claims of religious

exercise requiring racial discrimination “patently

frivolous.” However, the question of determining whether

something is a sincere religious claim is much more

difficult. This Court has held that judicial inquiry into

the truth of one’s religious beliefs is a violation of the free

exercise clause. U.S. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).

The Court has reaffirmed this idea: “The determination

of what is a ‘religious’ belief or practice is more often than

not a difficult and delicate task.” Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of

Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).

This makes sense functionally. Any attempt by the

Court to define religion would necessarily plunge the Court

23

into inter- and intra- religion controversy, destroying the

goals of the First Amendment. Daniel J.H. Greenwood

& Nicholas E. Tramposch, After Smith Falls: Corporate

Free Exercise Lochnerism, 76 S.C.L. Rev. 287, 324 (2024).

For example, the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the

church law of the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox

Church to require different proceedings to remove a

bishop for canonical misconduct than the Church had used.

On review, the Court said that Illinois’s interpretation of

church law was “unconstitutionally undertaken” because

“the resolution of quintessentially religious controversies”

is committed by the First Amendment “exclusively to

the highest ecclesiastical tribunals of this hierarchical

church.” Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can.

v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 719–20 (1976). To do

otherwise would require courts to become experts on

ecclesiastical laws of different religions and would likely

require determining a highest authority that even those in

a given religious sect may not agree on. Thus, the Court

relies on a more “good faith” analysis about whether a

belief is sincere and functions in the adherent’s life in a

parallel way to more generally accepted religious beliefs.

Greenwood, supra, at 325; U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163,

165–66 (1965).

However, the problem is that people acting in bad

faith may use religion as a cloak to get exemptions for

personal, and potentially immoral or self-serving, reasons.

In Smith, the Court listed rebuffed attempts to gain

religious exemptions to manslaughter and child neglect

laws, minimum wage laws, child labor laws, animal cruelty

laws, and laws “providing for equality of opportunity for

the races.” Smith, 494 U.S. at 889.

24

Though it may seem farfetched that these kinds of

claims continue, questionable religious exemption claims

are still asserted against laws across the country. In

2019, a religious preschool argued that the ministerial

exception should apply to its teachers in response to

an action filed by California to require the preschool to

provide its teachers with rest breaks, meal breaks, and

overtime pay. Su v. Stephen S. Wise Temple, 32 Cal. App.

5th 1159 (2nd App. Dist. 2019). Religious exemption claims

have been made in the last 20 years against minimum

wage laws, workplace harassment laws, laws prohibiting

discrimination against pregnant women, laws providing

for evolution-based science education, and even the crimes

of kidnapping, sexual assault, and corporal punishment,

among others. Parading the Horribles: The Risks of

Expanding Religious Exemptions, Law, Rights, and

Religion Project (2022) https://tinyurl.com/2epkd7rf.

Whether these claims for exemptions are sincerely held or

shams for the benefit of avoiding the law, they still continue

to be invoked. A ruling in favor of the petitioners in this

case would give those who would assert them a new basis

to argue for problematic exemptions.

25

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision below should

be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

Patrick C. Elliott

Counsel of Record

Charlotte R. Gude

Freedom From Religion

Foundation, Inc.

P. O. Box 750

Madison, WI 53701

(608) 256-8900

pelliott@ffrf.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae