Amicus Curiae Brief — St. Mary Catholic Parish, Littleton, Colorado, et al., Petitioners v. Lisa Roy, in Her Official Capacity as Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Early Childhood, et al.

No. 25-581

In the Supreme Court of the United States

__________

ST. MARY CATHOLIC PARISH, LITTLETON, COLORADO,

ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

LISA ROY, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE

DIRECTOR OF THE COLORADO DEPARTMENT

OF EARLY CHILDHOOD, ET AL.,

Respondents.

____________________

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_______________

BRIEF FOR FELLOWSHIP OF CHRISTIAN

ATHLETES, THE NAVIGATORS, CAMPUS

CRUSADE FOR CHRIST, INC., INTERVARSITY

CHRISTIAN FELLOWSHIP/USA, YOUNG LIFE,

AND CHI ALPHA CAMPUS MINISTRIES AS

AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

__________

CHRISTOPHER MILLS

Counsel of Record

Spero Law LLC

557 East Bay Street #22251

Charleston, SC 29413

(843) 606-0640

cmills@spero.law

Counsel for Amici Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Authorities .....................................................ii

Interest of Amici Curiae .............................................. 1

Summary of the Argument ......................................... 4

Argument ..................................................................... 7

I. Martinez has led to blatant discrimination

against religious student groups. ...................... 7

II. Martinez has led schools to deprive students

of many constitutional rights. ......................... 19

III.Campus student groups are especially

susceptible to official pressure......................... 23

Conclusion.................................................................. 28

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Arizona Students’ Ass’n v. Arizona Bd. of Regents,

824 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2016) .................................. 24

Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale,

530 U.S. 640 (2000) ................................................ 21

Bus. Leaders in Christ v. Univ. of Iowa,

991 F.3d 969 (8th Cir. 2021) ...................... 11, 12, 20

Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal.,

Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez,

561 U.S. 661 (2010)

............................... 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17,

18, 19, 20, 23, 26, 27, 28

Cradle of Liberty Council, Inc. v. City of

Philadelphia,

851 F. Supp. 2d 936 (E.D. Pa. 2012) ..................... 18

Edwards v. Aguillard,

482 U.S. 578 (1987) ................................................ 24

Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Ore.

v. Smith,

494 U.S. 872 (1990) ................................................ 20

Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue,

591 U.S. 464 (2020) ...................................... 4, 19, 20

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,

556 U.S. 502 (2009) ................................................ 25

Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. D.C.,

2026 WL 275995 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 2026)

.............................................................. 16, 17, 21, 22

iii

Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. D.C.,

743 F. Supp. 3d 73 (D.D.C. 2024) .................... 17, 23

Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. San Jose Unified

Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.,

46 F.4th 1075 (9th Cir. 2022), vacated, 59 F.4th

997 (9th Cir. 2023) ................................................... 8

Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. San Jose Unified

Sch. Dist.,

82 F.4th 664 (9th Cir. 2023) ................ 7, 8, 9, 20, 24

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia,

320 F. Supp. 3d 661 (E.D. Pa. 2018), aff’d, 922 F.3d

140 (3d Cir. 2019), rev’d and remanded, Fulton v.

City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522 (2021)............. 18

Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,

280 U.S. 1 (1929) .................................................... 22

Healy v. James,

408 U.S. 169 (1972) ................................................ 26

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch.

v. EEOC,

565 U.S. 171 (2012) ................................................ 23

InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA v. Bd. of

Governors of Wayne State Univ.,

534 F. Supp. 3d 785 (E.D. Mich. 2021) ..... 14, 15, 21

InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA v. Univ. of

Iowa,

5 F.4th 855 (8th Cir. 2021) ............ 12, 13, 14, 21, 22

Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley,

664 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2011) ................................ 18

Mahmoud v. Taylor,

606 U.S. 522 (2025) ................................................ 24

iv

Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru,

591 U.S. 732 (2020) .......................................... 22, 23

Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,

515 U.S. 819 (1995) ................................................ 22

Seattle’s Union Gospel Mission v. Woods,

142 S. Ct. 1094 (2022) ...................................... 27, 28

Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer,

582 U.S. 449 (2017) .................................................. 5

Watson v. Jones,

80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871) ................................. 22

Youth 71Five Ministries v. Williams,

2024 WL 3749842 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2024)....... 19, 20

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Benjamin A. Fleshman, How Do You Solve A Problem

Like Martinez?,

29 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 231 (2025) ........ 17, 18, 26, 27

Brief for City Respondents, Fulton v. City of

Philadelphia, No. 19-123,

2020 WL 4819956 (U.S. Aug. 13, 2020) .................. 5

Brief for Intervenor-Respondents, Fulton v. City of

Philadelphia, No. 19-123,

2020 WL 4820032 (U.S. Aug. 13, 2020) .................. 5

Brief for the Federal Respondent, Hosanna-Tabor

Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, No.

10-553, 2011 WL 3319555 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2011) ....... 5

Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment and a Permanent Injunction,

InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA v. Bd. of

v

Governors of Wayne State Univ., No. 3:19-cv-10375,

2020 WL 13311473 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 19, 2020) .... 16

Brief of D.B., Hannah Thompson, and Jacob Estell as

Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. San Jose

Unified Sch. Dist., No. 22-15827

(9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2023) ............ 10, 11, 12, 13, 25, 26

Brief of Defendants-Appellants, InterVarsity

Christian Fellowship/USA v. Univ. of Iowa, No.

19-3389, 2020 WL 279047

(8th Cir. Jan. 10, 2020) .......................................... 14

Defendants’ Brief in Support of Their Resistance to

Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,

InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA v. Univ. of

Iowa, No. 3:18-cv-80, 2019 WL 10749771

(S.D. Iowa Jan. 15, 2019) ....................................... 14

Defendants’ Resistance to Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment, Bus. Leaders in Christ v.

Univ. of Iowa, No. 3:17-cv-80, 2018 WL 7377715

(S.D. Iowa Nov. 6, 2018) ........................................ 13

Defendants-Appellees’ Answering Brief, Fellowship

of Christian Athletes v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist.,

No. 22-15827, 2022 WL 2898933

(9th Cir. July 18, 2022) .......................................... 11

First Amendment Protections on Public College and

University Campuses: Hearing Before the

Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice

of the Committee on the Judiciary House of

Representatives, 114th Cong. 39–58 (June 2, 2015),

Supp. Hrg. Rec. 62–64 (Letter from Michael Berry

vi

to Chairman Trent Franks (June 5, 2015)),

available at https://perma.cc/H274-8MFB ............ 25

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Amici curiae are religious organizations that have

served students on thousands of school campuses

nationwide for many decades. Unfortunately, public

schools discriminate against amici all too often. Those

schools, like Colorado here, invoke this Court’s

egregiously wrong decision in Christian Legal Society

Chapter of the University of California, Hastings

College of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010).

Because Colorado echoes the Martinez justifications

for discrimination that amici regularly face, they have

a significant interest in this case. Amici share a

concern in protecting the ability of religious

organizations to follow their beliefs. *

Fellowship of Christian Athletes (FCA) is a

global nonprofit sports ministry with a vision to see

the world transformed by Jesus Christ through the

influence of coaches and athletes. FCA operates sports

programming, including camps, leagues and clubs,

and on-campus “huddles” at schools ranging from

elementary schools to universities. FCA has repeatedly faced exclusion from campus recognition, access

to facilities, and participation in student-organization

programs because of its religious beliefs, and such

policies directly burden FCA’s religious exercise and

associational rights.

* In accord with Rule 37.6, no counsel for a party authored this

brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a

monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or

submission of this brief. No person other than amici curiae, their

members, or their counsel made a monetary contribution to its

preparation or submission.

2

The Navigators is a Christian discipleship

organization that helps people grow in Christ through

one-on-one discipleship, Bible study, evangelism, and

leadership development. Its collegiate ministry has

communities on nearly 200 college campuses around

the United States, reaching approximately 25,000

college students each year. Through Bible studies,

one-on-one discipleship, retreats, and campus events,

the Navigators Collegiate aims to equip students to be

lifelong disciplemakers who will make Christ known

not only on campus, but wherever they go after

graduation.

Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc., operates in

the United States under the name “Cru.” Cru has

established affiliated chapters—student organizations—on over 2,000 American college campuses and

hundreds of high schools, with more than 106,000

students involved. These chapters, like many religious

student organizations, require their leaders to

articulate Christian beliefs and live a Christian

lifestyle. Cru has an interest in upholding the

religious, expressive, and associational interests of

religious student organizations on college and high

school campuses across the nation.

InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA is a

Christian ministry that establishes and advances

witnessing communities of students and faculty who

follow Jesus as Savior and Lord on nearly 700 college

and university campuses in the United States. Its

employees and participants pursue this mission with

a commitment to grow in love for God, God’s word,

God’s people of every ethnicity and culture, and God’s

purposes in the world.

3

Young Life is a Christian youth ministry

organization committed to sharing the Good News of

Jesus Christ with adolescents. Through local clubs

and destination camps, Young Life desires to provide

fun, adventurous, life-changing, and skill-building

experiences, preparing kids for a lifelong relationship

with Christ and a love for His word, His mission, and

the local church. Young Life provides opportunities for

thousands of middle school, high school, and college

students of all backgrounds and abilities to form

student groups on their campuses to encourage

personal

spiritual

development

and

create

communities of fellowship and campus outreach.

Chi Alpha Campus Ministries, Inc. is a

pentecostal university outreach affiliated with the

General Council of the Assemblies of God. At each of

its 272 campus chapters across the country, it strives

to reconcile diverse groups of students to Christ and to

equip them through Spirit-filled communities of

prayer, worship, fellowship, discipleship, service, and

missions. Chi Alpha chapters welcome everyone to

their meetings, activities, and events. But they could

not accomplish their respective missions without

ensuring that their leaders embody their core religious

beliefs.

4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Sixteen years ago, this Court “arm[ed] public

educational institutions with a handy weapon for

suppressing the speech of unpopular groups”—

especially religious ones. Martinez, 561 U.S. at 707

(Alito, J., dissenting). In Martinez, the Court held that

colleges could force a religious student group “to

accept members who do not share the organization’s

core beliefs about religion,” “on pain of relinquishing

the advantages of recognition.” Id. at 668 (majority

op.).

Below, Colorado invoked Martinez, saying that

decision “made clear that requiring public-funding

recipients to comply with certain conditions as a

condition of receiving those subsidies does not

impermissibly burden expression.” CA10 Answer Br.

65. Colorado quoted one of the worst portions of

Martinez—that denying recognition supposedly

creates “only indirect pressure” on a religious student

group “to modify its membership policies.” Id. at 66

(quoting Martinez, 561 U.S. at 682). And, according to

Colorado and Martinez, the religious group “may

exclude any person for any reason if it forgoes the

benefits of official recognition.” Id. (quoting Martinez,

561 U.S. at 682). The Tenth Circuit relied on Martinez

for the same point. Pet. 46a.

School officials regularly try to wield Martinez to

put religious student groups to the same “choice” that

this Court has repeatedly rejected in other contexts:

“being religious or receiving government benefits,”

including simple school recognition. Espinoza v.

Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 591 U.S. 464, 480 (2020);

see Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v.

5

Comer, 582 U.S. 449, 462 (2017). Small wonder, then,

that the parties invoking Martinez in this Court’s

cases are government actors unconstitutionally

suppressing the free exercise of religion guaranteed by

the First Amendment. 1

Martinez must be overruled. Beyond its plain

inconsistency with this Court’s more recent

precedents protecting the autonomy and exercise

rights of religious organizations, Martinez has been a

disaster on campuses nationwide. This brief presses

three related points.

First, Martinez has unleashed a wave of

discrimination against religious student groups.

Recent scholarship shows that schools are

derecognizing far more religious groups than in the

past. Most groups lack the resources to sue and simply

vanish. Those that fought back tell one story. FCA lost

its recognition at Pioneer High School after a teacher

publicly denounced its beliefs and the district

chartered a Satanic Temple Club to mock it. Business

Leaders in Christ and a 25-year-old InterVarsity

chapter—along with Sikh, Muslim, Latter-day Saint,

and Protestant groups—were purged at the

University of Iowa. A 75-year-old InterVarsity chapter

was singled out at Wayne State while fraternities,

sports teams, and other faith groups kept their own

1 See, e.g., Brief for Intervenor-Respondents 30, Fulton v. City of

Philadelphia, No. 19-123, 2020 WL 4820032 (U.S. Aug. 13, 2020);

Brief for City Respondents 28, id., 2020 WL 4819956 (U.S. Aug.

13, 2020); Brief for the Federal Respondent 28, Hosanna-Tabor

Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, No. 10-553, 2011

WL 3319555 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2011).

6

membership rules. And an FCA chapter was shut

down at a District of Columbia high school in 2022. In

each, the school’s defense was Martinez. And Martinez

now reaches well beyond student recognition. Courts

have invoked it to let officials subject a Christian

counseling student to mandatory sensitivity training,

strip a Boy Scouts chapter of city property use, and

cancel faith-based youth-mentoring grants. Colorado

runs the same playbook here. This is no scattering of

outliers—it is a nationwide pattern, and it traces to

Martinez.

Second, the discrimination fostered by Martinez

tramples core constitutional rights. It denies religious

students and groups the equal terms—including

recognition—that secular groups enjoy. Martinez

collides with the freedoms of speech and association as

well. Forcing a faith group to take leaders who reject

its faith strips it of any real way to express its views

with others. In the same way, Martinez contravenes

the religious autonomy rights of these organizations to

select their ministry leaders.

Third, religious student groups are uniquely

exposed to this pressure—which is what makes

Martinez so destructive. School communities are

transient and fragile, their members impressionable,

and their officials hold disproportionate power over

campus life. Against that backdrop, derecognition

inflicts lasting harm. It strips groups of meeting space,

advisors, funding, and the means of communicating

with the students they must reach to survive. It

brands members as bigots and drives them off. The

“consequence” for groups “that cannot in good

conscience agree . . . that they will admit persons who

7

do not share their faith” “is marginalization”—or, all

too often, outright extinction. Martinez, 561 U.S. at

741 (Alito, J., dissenting).

These wounds are Martinez’s doing. They will not

heal until this Court overrules it. This Court should

reverse the decision below and reject any analysis

based on Martinez—and ideally overrule it.

ARGUMENT

I.

Martinez has led to blatant discrimination

against religious student groups.

Many cases in the lower courts show the harm that

Martinez has wrought on campuses nationwide.

Discrimination resulting in litigation is likely only the

tip of the iceberg; most discrimination against

religious student groups quickly achieves its goal of

stamping such groups out of existence, and no

litigation occurs. The egregious facts in the existing

litigation, however, underscore the damage Martinez

has done to campus religious groups—including many

affiliated with amici.

1. Begin with a Fellowship of Christian Athletes

group at Pioneer High School in California’s San Jose

Unified School District. In April 2019, Pioneer teacher

Peter Glasser began a campaign against FCA’s

“objectionable” “moral stances,” including using his

classroom whiteboard to confront the group’s

statement of faith in front of his class. Fellowship of

Christian Athletes v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 82

F.4th 664, 673 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc) (“San Jose”).

Glasser was on the school’s “Climate Committee,” a

leadership group whose stated purpose was “to discuss

8

anything negatively impacting the climate or culture

on campus.” Id. at 691 (citation modified).

Glasser complained that FCA’s views injured “the

rights of others in my community to feel safe,”

requiring urgent action. Fellowship of Christian

Athletes v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 46

F.4th 1075, 1083 (9th Cir. 2022), vacated, 59 F.4th 997

(9th Cir. 2023). He pressured the school principal to

remove FCA’s recognized status because he felt that

“attacking these views is the only way to make a better

campus.” San Jose, 82 F.4th at 674. He wrote:

I feel that there’s only one thing to say that will

protect our students who are so victimized by

religious views that discriminate against them:

I am an adult on your campus, and these views

are bullshit to me. They have no

validity. . . . I’m not willing to be the enabler for

this kind of “religious freedom” anymore.

Id. Glasser succeeded. Within a few weeks, FCA

became the first student club ever to lose official

approval in the school district. Id. at 675. The

principal felt it was “sufficient to deny” recognition

because “FCA holds” certain beliefs on sexual purity.

Id.

Derecognition did not end FCA’s ordeal. Teachers

objected to FCA having any presence on campus, and

urged students to “rally[] against the issue.” Id. at 676.

Glasser pressed leadership in repeated emails,

questioning whether the school could “ban FCA

completely from campus” by accusing FCA—led by

teenage girls—of “sexual harassment.” Id.

9

Doubling down, the school denied FCA’s

recognition application for the next school year but

granted recognition to a new Satanic Temple Club

chapter formed to openly “mock” FCA’s beliefs. Id. The

new club’s faculty advisor stated that “evangelicals,

like FCA are charlatans and not in the least bit

Christian based or they ‘conveniently’ forget what

tolerance means. . . . They choose darkness over

knowledge and they perpetuate ignorance.” Id.

Echoing school officials, students led loud protests

right outside Pioneer FCA’s meeting, carrying signs

disparaging the beliefs of FCA as “HATRED.” Id.

Later, student reporters attended an FCA meeting

and took photos within feet of any FCA student who

spoke. Id. at 677. A teacher present characterized it as

“intimidating” and “flat out bullying,” and said he had

“never seen a club, sports team, or class so targeted.”

Id. The protests continued at every FCA activity. Id.

That spring, two FCA students filed suit against

the school district. Id. In response, the school adopted

a new “All-Comers Policy,” modeled after the one in

Martinez, though the policy was riddled with

exceptions. Id. at 678. Though the students succeeded

years later at the Ninth Circuit, the school district

made their lives miserable during the litigation.

The district pressed to make the plaintiffs,

originally pseudonymous minors, reveal their names.

The school’s “attorneys turned the discovery process

into a grueling ordeal lasting nearly two years,

demanding thousands of text messages between [the

students] over three years regardless of whether they

were related to the litigation and demanding all

10

communications between FCA-affiliated students and

their mentor.” 2

They deposed the girls “for multiple days during

their freshman years of college, interrogating them

about their religious beliefs, their FCA affiliation, and

unrelated personal matters, and stretching two hours

past the agreed upon time limit to question one

plaintiff about her emotional distress and mental

anguish.” 3 “District attorneys even sought one

plaintiff’s counseling records from her freshman year

of college,” forcing her “to give up the ability to seek

damages related to counseling and any ongoing harm

after they graduated high school” in exchange for a

stipulation that shielded her private records. 4

The District’s bullying tactics extended beyond the

two plaintiffs to the students keeping the FCA club

alive after their graduation. 5 As soon as the school’s

attorneys learned about a new student leader, they

tried to depose her. 6 To protect her from a harassing

and invasive deposition, FCA’s attorneys signed a

stipulation to ensure that she would not be deposed

and agreed to give up its ability to call FCA-affiliated

students in exchange for this protection. 7 Another

student at the school initially expressed interest in

2 Brief of D.B., Hannah Thompson, and Jacob Estell as Amici

Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants 6, San Jose, No. 2215827 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2023) (“D.B. Br.”).

3 Id.

4 Id.

5 Id. at 7.

6 Id.

7 Id.

11

FCA leadership but backed out in intense anxiety

after the principal required her to meet with him as a

condition of participating in club rush, even though

she was only a freshman. 8

Though FCA eventually prevailed, litigation took

years. During that time, the FCA chapter was subject

to constant harassment by school officials. Indeed, the

harassment could be seen as calculated to stamp out

the group entirely—hence the school district’s

contentions in court about mootness due to an alleged

lack of interest in joining FCA. 9 And the school’s

defense on the merits was Martinez all the way down,

with the school’s Ninth Circuit brief mentioning

Martinez about 50 times. 10

2. Next, consider the case of Business Leaders in

Christ (BLinC) at the University of Iowa. Bus. Leaders

in Christ v. Univ. of Iowa, 991 F.3d 969 (8th Cir. 2021)

(“BLinC”). This small Christian business club at the

University of Iowa was founded by students so that

“seekers of Christ” could learn “how to continually

keep Christ first in the fast-paced business world.” Id.

at 974.

In spring 2016, one of the club’s members sought a

leadership role but stated that he would not abide by

the club’s position regarding Christian conduct. Id.

When refused, he filed a complaint with the

university, demanding it “[e]ither force BLinC to

8 Id.

9 Defendants-Appellees’ Answering Brief 20–23, San Jose, No.

22-15827, 2022 WL 2898933 (9th Cir. July 18, 2022).

10 See generally id.

12

comply with the nondiscrimination policy (allow

openly LGTBQ members to be leaders) or take away

their status of being a student organization.” Id. at

975.

The university investigated and told BLinC

leaders that the group could refuse leadership

candidates based on disagreement with their

“religious philosophy” but not “status”—refusing to

believe BLinC’s assertion it had done the former. Id.

Though the university had allowed clubs with

statements of faith for years, see InterVarsity

Christian Fellowship/USA v. Univ. of Iowa, 5 F.4th

855, 860 (8th Cir. 2021) (“Univ. of Iowa”), it required

BLinC to rewrite its constitution. BLinC, 991 F.3d at

976. And it rejected that constitution because it

“facially failed to ‘comply with the University’s

Human Right’s policy since its affirmation . . . would

have the effect of disqualifying certain individuals

from leadership positions.’” Id. (emphasis added).

After the university stripped BLinC of its

recognition, funding, and meeting space, BLinC’s

student leaders were profiled in the school newspaper

and local papers as “bigoted,” making them feel like

outsiders and jeopardizing future jobs. 11

BLinC was a two-year-old student club with ten

members when the university’s discrimination began,

and though the club eventually prevailed in litigation,

the university’s actions splintered and ultimately

11 D.B. Br., supra note 2, at 3.

13

destroyed the club. 12 Once again, the university urged

the courts to “use Martinez as [their] guide.” 13

3. In response to the BLinC litigation, the

University of Iowa derecognized 38 other student

groups for violating its “Human Rights Policy,”

including its 25-year-old InterVarsity Christian

Fellowship group—and Sikh, Muslim, and Latter-day

Saint groups. Confronting this litigation, the Eighth

Circuit said that it was “hard-pressed to find a clearer

example of viewpoint discrimination,” and that the

university “served” its asserted “compelling interest in

preventing discrimination” “by picking and choosing

what kind of discrimination was okay.” Univ. of Iowa,

5 F.4th at 864–65.

When reviewing groups’ constitutions after BLinC,

university officials “were told to ‘look at religious

student groups first’ for language that required

leaders to affirm certain religious beliefs.” Id. at 861.

The university derecognized 38 student groups,

several for requiring their leaders to affirm

statements of faith. Id. But it allowed other clubs with

statements of faith to remain.

LoveWorks, for example, “was formed by the

student who was denied a leadership role in BLinC.”

Id. at 864. It required “its members and leaders to sign

a ‘gay-affirming statement of Christian faith.’” Id.

“Despite that requirement—which violates the

12 Id. at 4.

13 Defendants’ Resistance to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment 6, Bus. Leaders in Christ, No. 3:17-cv-80, 2018 WL

7377715 (S.D. Iowa Nov. 6, 2018) (citation modified).

14

[university policy] just as much as InterVarsity’s—the

University did nothing.” Id.

In talks with the university, InterVarsity offered to

change its statement of faith, so it merely “requested”

or “strongly encouraged” leaders to subscribe, but the

university refused this substitute and derecognized

the group. Id. at 862.

“Afterwards,

InterVarsity

struggled

with

recruiting members, organizing activities, and spent

money and other resources in fighting its

deregistration.” Id. And even after being reinstated

following litigation, it had “lost a significant number

of members” “out of fear of ‘retaliation from the

University.’” Id.

Once again, the university’s briefing relied on

dozens of Martinez citations. 14

4. Moving over to Michigan’s Wayne State

University,

it

derecognized

its

75-year-old

InterVarsity chapter because its “leadership

standards ran afoul of the college’s ‘nondiscrimination policy’ in requiring that its faith

leaders profess to be faithful.” InterVarsity Christian

Fellowship/USA v. Bd. of Governors of Wayne State

Univ., 534 F. Supp. 3d 785, 796 (E.D. Mich. 2021).

14 See Brief of Defendants-Appellants 22–25, Univ. of Iowa, No.

19-3389, 2020 WL 279047 (8th Cir. Jan. 10, 2020); Defendants’

Brief in Support of Their Resistance to Plaintiff’s Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment 7–10, InterVarsity Christian

Fellowship/USA v. Univ. of Iowa, No. 3:18-cv-80, 2019 WL

10749771 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 15, 2019).

15

Other groups limited membership and leadership

based on categories in the non-discrimination policy

during and after InterVarsity’s derecognition but were

not derecognized. Club sports teams “excluded

members who did not fall within their prescribed sex

or gender identity categories,” and “Greek letter

fraternities and sororities excluded members and

leaders based on their sex and gender identity.” Id. at

798. “The Iraqi Student Organization required that its

leaders be ‘dedicated Iraqi student[s],’” and “[t]he

Muslim Student Association stated in its student

group registration that it would remove leaders for

‘[v]iolat[ing] an Islamic principle that deems him/her

unworthy to serve as a Muslim leader on campus.’” Id.

at 798–99. Many other religious organizations

likewise “limited leadership to those who shared the

groups’ religious principles,” but only InterVarsity

was derecognized. Id.

After derecognition, at the next major student

recruiting event, InterVarsity students “were required

to pay a fee, were excluded from a ballroom that

hosted the tables of registered student groups, and

were relegated to outside vendor status at a table on a

different floor near a Starbucks coffee shop.” Id. at

800. The group was “no longer permitted to hold

meetings at low or no cost using spacious and

convenient locations on campus,” and it “lost the

ability to communicate with students through Wayne

State’s online student organizations platform.” Id.

16

Years later, Wayne State lost in court, despite

relying heavily on Martinez. 15

5. At Jackson-Reed High School in the District of

Columbia, an FCA chapter was approved in

September 2022, with no complaints. Fellowship of

Christian Athletes v. D.C., 2026 WL 275995, at *2

(D.D.C. Feb. 3, 2026) (Friedrich, J.). A couple of weeks

later, Paul Legere—a part-time freshman baseball

coach—sent local FCA staff a social media message

stating that there was “no place for a group like FCA

in a public school.” Id. He also complained to the

principal and lodged a complaint with the DCPS

Comprehensive Alternative Resolution and Equity

(CARE) team, which ordered FCA to “immediately

cease operations” and removed it from the recognized

student organization list. Id. at *3.

During CARE’s subsequent investigation, it

demanded “a list of names of students who

participated in the group, who attended the coach’s

meeting, what made Jackson Reed want to bring the

club back into the school, who used to run the club,

and whether any meetings or planning sessions had

taken place, and, if so, some names of individuals who

attended (coaches and students).” Id. (citation

modified).

CARE eventually found that FCA’s leadership

requirement—that student leaders “agree with FCA’s

15 Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment and a Permanent Injunction, InterVarsity Christian

Fellowship/USA v. Bd. of Governors of Wayne State Univ., No.

3:19-cv-10375, 2020 WL 13311473 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 19, 2020).

17

core Christian beliefs”—“violated the D.C. Human

Rights Act and DCPS’s Anti-Discrimination Policy.”

Id. at *1, 3. CARE’s findings led Jackson-Reed to strip

FCA of its official status and deny FCA’s appeal. Id.

Though the district court granted a preliminary

injunction—rejecting the school’s reliance on

Martinez—litigation continues nearly two years later.

Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. D.C., 743 F. Supp.

3d 73, 85, 89–90, 95–96 (D.D.C. 2024).

6. Many other examples can be collected of

governments

running

roughshod

over

First

Amendment rights in reliance on Martinez, much like

Colorado in this case. One recent study found that “in

the fifteen years since Martinez, more than twice as

many religious student groups have been

derecognized than in the twenty years beforehand,”

and “more than three times as many student groups

have faced intense pressure from their schools because

of their religious membership or leadership criteria.”

Benjamin A. Fleshman, How Do You Solve A Problem

Like Martinez?, 29 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 231, 235 (2025).

And this likely underestimates the problem, as

“[m]any (perhaps most) of [the derecognition

decisions] go unreported, particularly if the group

seeking recognition is doing so for the first time and

doesn’t have the resources or connections to do

anything more than lament their exclusion.” Id. at

240–41. “Martinez also ushered in an era of mass-derecognition events, wherein schools have kicked out

large swathes of religious student groups all at once,”

“caus[ing] significant harm to these students and

student groups.” Id. at 235; see id. at 249 (Vanderbilt

18

derecognized 14 Catholic and evangelical student

groups).

But Martinez’s ill-effects go beyond student

recognition. The Eleventh Circuit used Martinez to let

Augusta State University require a Christian

graduate student to undergo mandatory GLBTQ

sensitivity training after it perceived “deficiencies in

her ‘ability to be a multiculturally competent

counselor, particularly with regard to working with

gay,

lesbian,

bisexual,

transgender,

and

queer/questioning (GLBTQ) populations.’” Keeton v.

Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 867, 874 (11th Cir.

2011).

The City of Philadelphia relied on Martinez to

defend its decision to revoke rent-free use of city

property to a local Boy Scouts chapter unless it agreed

to receive openly homosexual participants into

membership. Cradle of Liberty Council, Inc. v. City of

Philadelphia, 851 F. Supp. 2d 936, 941–43 (E.D. Pa.

2012).

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania extended

Martinez outside the campus context to approve

Philadelphia’s move to compel faith-based foster care

organizations to place children in homes not in accord

with the organizations’ religious beliefs on marriage

and the family. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F.

Supp. 3d 661, 668, 681 (E.D. Pa. 2018), aff’d, 922 F.3d

140 (3d Cir. 2019), rev’d and remanded, Fulton v. City

of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522 (2021).

And Oregon raised Martinez to defend its decision

to cancel $410,000 in grant funds to 71Five Ministries,

a Christian organization that mentors at-risk youth,

19

based on its commitment to hiring only those who

share its faith commitments. Youth 71Five Ministries

v. Williams, 2024 WL 3749842, at *1, 3 n.2 (9th Cir.

Aug. 8, 2024).

All this shows what Martinez has wrought on

campuses nationwide: an environment in which small

student religious groups are subject to overwhelming

official pressure to be led by students who disagree

with the groups’ faith. Any vindication of the groups’

rights comes years later, often after the groups have

been harassed into extinction.

II.

Martinez has led schools to deprive

students of many constitutional rights.

These effects of Martinez on schools’ approach to

student

religious

groups

work

significant

constitutional harm. They result in denials of free

exercise, free speech and association, and religious

autonomy. The contradiction between Martinez and

core constitutional rights reinforces the need to

overrule Martinez.

Beginning with free exercise, depriving religious

students of the equal opportunity to gather for

fellowship and teaching severely burdens their

exercise of religion. This Court has repeatedly held

that “disqualifying otherwise eligible recipients from

a public benefit solely because of their religious

character imposes a penalty on the free exercise of

religion that triggers the most exacting scrutiny.”

Espinoza, 591 U.S. at 475.

Plus, these cases show “a pattern of selective

enforcement favoring comparable secular activities,”

as schools routinely allow student groups to

20

discriminate in membership or leadership on other

purportedly protected grounds like sex and ethnic

identity. San Jose, 82 F.4th at 689; see BLinC, 991

F.3d at 978 (noting that Iowa “approved the

constitutions of dozens of organizations that explicitly

restrict or control access to leadership or membership

based on race, national origin, sex, sexual orientation,

gender identity, status as a U.S. veteran, and/or

military service”).

Many of these cases also “demonstrate animus by

government decision-makers.” San Jose, 82 F.4th at

692; see id. (“One teacher and Climate Committee

member disparaged FCA’s beliefs by calling them

‘bullshit’ and deeming them without ‘validity,’” with

another “calling [student members] ‘charlatans.’”).

And given the unequal treatment between religious

student groups and other groups, these schools cannot

satisfy strict scrutiny. See id. at 693–94 (noting

recognition of Satanic Temple Club); see also

Espinoza, 591 U.S. at 486; accord Youth 71Five

Ministries, 2024 WL 3749842, at *3 n.2 (Ninth Circuit

noting that Martinez “runs headlong into more recent

Supreme Court authority”).

Martinez itself brushed away free exercise

problems by invoking this Court’s decision in

Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Ore. v.

Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–82 (1990). See 561 U.S. at

697 n.27. This invocation underscores a deep problem

with both Martinez and Smith: when the focus is on

the mechanics of the government rule instead of the

undisputed

damper

on

religious

exercise,

governments will twist—and retwist—their rules in

pretzels to harass student groups yet avoid liability.

21

See id. at 737 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting “[s]hifting

policies” in Martinez (citation modified)); see also

Univ. of Iowa, 5 F.4th at 861 (moving goalposts in

recognized student group policy).

These schools also violate the freedom of

association protected by the First Amendment. “This

right is crucial in preventing the majority from

imposing its views on groups that would rather

express . . . perhaps unpopular[] ideas.” Boy Scouts of

Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647–48 (2000). “The forced

inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes

the group’s freedom of expressive association if the

presence of that person affects in a significant way the

group’s ability to advocate public or private

viewpoints.” Id. at 648.

Forcing a religious group to accept someone who

disagrees with its faith as a leader significantly affects

its expressive association. “[P]ermitting that to

happen would . . . change[] the religious and

expressive nature of the organization.” Wayne State,

534 F. Supp. 3d at 825. Sometimes, the investigation

itself inflicts a chill on associational rights. See, e.g.,

D.C., 2026 WL 275995, at *2 (noting that “CARE

demanded ‘a list of names of students who

participated in the group’” and “‘names of individuals

who attended’”). And again, schools could not satisfy

any strict scrutiny, for “many other student groups

[a]re permitted to limit leadership to those who

support the groups’ missions.” Wayne State, 534 F.

Supp. 3d at 825; see also Univ. of Iowa, 5 F.4th at 865

(“Basically, some RSOs at the University of Iowa may

discriminate in selecting their leaders and members,

but others, mostly religious, may not.”).

22

These schools’ violations of free speech are just as

obvious. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit said that “[w]e are

hard-pressed to find a clearer example of viewpoint

discrimination” than when a school derecognizes a

religious organization for adhering to faithful

leadership standards, while recognizing other groups

with their other leadership standards—like

“LoveWorks,” which “requires its members and

leaders to sign a ‘gay-affirming statement of Christian

faith.’” Univ. of Iowa, 5 F.4th at 864. Courts have

routinely held that derecognition of religious student

groups—while “carving out exemptions and ignoring

other violative groups with missions [the schools]

presumably supported”—clearly violates the Free

Speech Clause. Id. at 867; see, e.g., D.C., 2026 WL

275995, at *13–14 (collecting cases); see also

Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515

U.S. 819, 831 (1995).

But that’s not all. This Court has long recognized

that the Religion Clauses prohibit courts from

intervening in matters of religious “discipline, or of

faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.” Watson v.

Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871). This

religious autonomy doctrine encompasses the “right to

organize voluntary religious associations to assist in

the expression and dissemination of any religious

doctrine.” Id. at 728–29.

A critical “component of [religious] autonomy is the

selection of the individuals who play certain key

roles.” Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. MorrisseyBerru, 591 U.S. 732, 746 (2020); cf. Gonzalez v. Roman

Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929)

(“[I]t is the function of the church authorities to

23

determine what the essential qualifications of a

chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses

them.”). Without that autonomy, a religious group

could not “shape its own faith and mission,” HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC,

565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012): “a wayward [leader]’s

preaching, teaching, and counseling could contradict

the [group’s] tenets and lead the congregation away

from the faith.” Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 747. School

officials’ “interference with [that] internal [religious]

decision” necessarily affects the organization’s “faith

and mission.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190; see

D.C., 743 F. Supp. 3d at 83.

This list is not exhaustive. For instance, schools

that recognize some religious groups and not others

violate the Establishment Clause. And state-level

Religious Freedom Restoration Acts should protect

religious student groups at public institutions. But

despite these overlapping protections for the rights of

religious students to gather in faithful union, schools

keep disregarding these rights and harassing their

groups. That is because of Martinez.

III. Campus student groups are especially

susceptible to official pressure.

Derecognition causes religious groups and their

student members significant tangible and intangible

harms, especially because of their vulnerability to

official pressures on campus. Sustained official

pressure threatens these groups’ survival.

By their nature, school communities are transient

and often fragile. Schoolchildren are easily

impressionable. And schools are characterized by an

24

“inherent power asymmetry,” as officials control both

the policy and the tone of the school environment.

Arizona Students’ Ass’n v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 824

F.3d 858, 869 (9th Cir. 2016). Few children would be

willing to stand against continual pressure by those in

authority. See Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.S. 522, 555

(2025) (“Young children . . . are often impressionable

and implicitly trust their teachers.” (citation

modified)); id. at 554–55 (“The State exerts great

authority and coercive power through public schools

because of the students’ emulation of teachers as role

models and the children’s susceptibility to peer

pressure.” (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584

(1987))).

Against that vulnerability, official pressure and

derecognition cut even deeper. Tangible harms include

loss of benefits like school resources, a faculty advisor,

means of communication with other students, and

funding. Intangible harms include stigma associated

with group membership; simply consider the San Jose

teacher’s message on his classroom board asserting

that FCA’s views injured “the rights of others in my

community.” Supra p. 8. Closely tied to this stigma is

intimidation of existing and prospective members.

Lack of school recognition discourages students from

joining or taking leadership roles—or starting a group

in the first place. The school-sanctioned message to

students interested in the religious group is clear: stay

away and keep your religious views to yourself. And

that message inevitably encourages hostility from

others in the school community, including peers. See

supra pp. 9, 12; San Jose, 82 F.4th at 676–77

(“[S]tudents . . . came to the conclusion that [a] protest

25

was necessary to ‘express [their] dissatisfaction.’”);

accord FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S.

502, 519 (2009) (“[C]hildren mimic the behavior they

observe—or at least the behavior that is presented to

them as normal and appropriate.”).

These harms are common when student religious

groups try to choose committed leaders in an

atmosphere of hostility to that right. For example, at

the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, after

a student complained that the Christian Legal Society

chapter was requiring that leaders and voting

members hold its Christian beliefs, the chapter’s

student president faced a hostile education

environment in which he was “often the subject of

name-calling, gossip, and rumor-mongering,” was

“verbally admonished” by classmates for his religious

beliefs, and was “warned by upperclassmen not to take

courses by certain professors who were not likely to

give [him] fair evaluations.” 16

One of the students who co-founded Business

Leaders in Christ at the University of Iowa likewise

suffered through an article in the school newspaper

“portraying her and her club as bigoted.” 17 She and

other leaders of the small group “had to spend dozens

16 First Amendment Protections on Public College and University

Campuses: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution

and Civil Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary House of

Representatives, 114th Cong. 39–58 (June 2, 2015), Supp. Hrg.

Rec. 62–64 (Letter from Michael Berry to Chairman Trent

Franks (June 5, 2015)), available at https://perma.cc/H2748MFB.

17 D.B. Br., supra note 2, at 3.

26

of hours defending their religious beliefs against the

University’s actions, which distracted them from their

studies, affected their grades, and made them feel like

outsiders.” 18 They were “especially concerned about

how hostile newspaper articles from local press and

the school newspaper would affect [their] future

career[s].” 19 How many college students want to spend

four years being “bull[ied]” by school officials and

tagalong students for associating with a “skeletal

group desperately trying to operate on a hostile

campus”? Fleshman, supra, at 302–03.

Unsurprisingly, derecognition often spells the end

of student organizations, and the idea of a viable

alternative path of existence is a myth. See Martinez,

561 U.S. at 716–18 (Alito, J., dissenting). Continuity

between graduating classes is much harder to achieve

without a recognized organization. Universities are

naturally subject to four-year amnesia where

institutional knowledge is lost as students graduate.

See Fleshman, supra, at 263 (noting a group that “was

unable to last beyond the graduation of its founding

members”). And cut off from channels of recruitment

and communication, groups struggle to grow or

sustain themselves: “If an organization is to remain a

viable entity in a campus community in which new

students enter on a regular basis, it must possess the

means of communicating with these students.”

Martinez, 561 U.S. at 719 (quoting Healy v. James, 408

U.S. 169, 181 (1972)).

18 Id. at 4.

19 Id.

27

Indeed, the Christian Legal Society at Hastings

College of Law died out soon after Martinez, “unable

to continue as an unrecognized group on campus.”

Fleshman, supra, at 261. “Even today, there is no CLS

chapter” at the school. Id. Business Leaders in Christ

at Iowa met the same fate after being “locked out of

several crucial university resources”: it “could not

participate in student fairs (a primary recruitment

opportunity),” “wasn’t listed on the University’s

student organization website,” “couldn’t use the

University communication system,” and couldn’t

“meet on campus without paying to reserve rooms—a

difficult ask considering BLinC also lost all of its

access to funding.” Id. at 268. And InterVarsity at

Iowa “lost nearly one-half of its membership.” Id. at

270.

Of note, BLinC and InterVarsity suffered these

fates even though they eventually prevailed after

costly and time-consuming litigation. And bringing

litigation is not an option for many groups,

particularly those “lack[ing] the connections and

resources to challenge the schools’ actions.” Id. at 302.

“This is a particular burden for minority religious

groups, who may face campus antagonism on other

fronts and may not want to drum up further

opposition.” Id. at 303.

*

*

*

In sum, “[t]o force religious organizations to [select]

messengers and other personnel who do not share

their religious views would undermine not only the

autonomy of many religious organizations but also

their continued viability.” Seattle’s Union Gospel

Mission v. Woods, 142 S. Ct. 1094, 1096 (2022) (Alito,

28

J., respecting the denial of certiorari). “Driving such

organizations from the public square would not just

infringe on their rights to freely exercise religion”—

and speak and associate—“but would greatly

impoverish our Nation’s civic and religious life.” Id.

Martinez must be overruled.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court should reverse.

Respectfully submitted,

CHRISTOPHER MILLS

Counsel of Record

Spero Law LLC

557 East Bay Street

#22251

Charleston, SC 29413

(843) 606-0640

cmills@spero.law

Counsel for Amici Curiae

JULY 2, 2026