Reply Brief — Biobele Georgewill, Petitioner v. Joshua M. Ball, et al.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

BIOBELE GEORGEWILL, Petitioner

JOSHUA M. BALL and HODGES poGuny & CARSON PLLC, Respondents

Case No. 25-5754

Date: November 12, 2025

REPLY TO RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Petitioner: Biobele Georgewill

Contact Information:

Phone: 423-561-5480

Email: biogeorgewill@gmail.com

Date: November 12, 2025

et

| RECEIVED

NOV 18 2025

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT Us

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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2. ALQUIMNCNA -aaiics:cnssxmisiancacsnsniaancnstaiccanisisnmencescseaitetects 5

|. Federal Question Remains Undeveloped ..................... 5

Il. Misapplication of the Federal Recusal Standard .....................

Ill. Bias and Dual Interest ........00...000.0.0000000000., 6

IV. Federal Guidance and the Ongoing Conflict .................. 7

V. Circuit Split on Recusal Standards ..........0.0.000..0... 7,8

VI. Due Process Implications ...................... 9

VII. National Significance of Clarifying Recusal Standards .....................

VIII. Affidavit Acknowledgment .................. 10

IX. Inconsistent Protections Across States .......................0 ecco

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

|. Cases

Bean v. Bailey, 280 S.W.3d 798 (Tenn. 2009)

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009)

In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd., 570 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2009)

In re Hawsawi, 955 F.3d 152 (D.C. Cir. 2020)

Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988).

Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).

United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985)

United States v. Couch, 896 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1990)

Winder v. Winder, No. E2019-01636-COA-T10B-CV, 2020 WL 4200832 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19,

2020)

Il. Statutes / Codes

28 U.S.C. § 455(a)

Ill. Rules / Court Guidance

Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10, Canon 2.11(A)

Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 2, Ethics and Judicial Conduct, Pt. B: Advisory Opinions

IV. Secondary Authorities / Advisory Opinions

Massachusetts Committee on Judicial Ethics Opinion No. 95-6 (1995)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

|. Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a judge to recuse

when a longstanding professional relationship with a law firm that is now a party creates a

reasonable appearance of bias.

Il. Whether state courts violate federal due process by denying recusal based on a judge’s

subjective belief in their own impartiality, even when a sworn affidavit establishes a formal and

factual basis for recusal.

Ill. Whether inconsistent treatment of historical professional relationships across state and federal

courts creates a recurring and nationally significant problem affecting litigants’ constitutional right

to an impartial tribunal.

LIST OF PARTIES

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6, the following parties appear in this case:

Petitioner:

Biobele Georgewill

Respondents:

Joshua M. Ball

Hodges, Doughty & Carson, PLLC

1. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner submits this reply to emphasize that the federal constitutional question, whether a judge

must recuse when historical professional relationships create a reasonable appearance of bias,

is compelling and of national significance. Respondents’ characterization of the facts minimizes

the constitutional implications.and understate the due process concerns. Petitioner respectfully

requests that this Court grant certiorari to clarify the constitutional standard for recusal.

Since the filing of this petition, the same law firm, Hodges, Doughty & Carson PLLC, has appeared

on behalf of additional defendants in related appeals filed by Petitioner. This development further

compounds the appearance of bias and reinforces the ongoing entanglement between the bench

and the Respondents’ counsel. The growing overlap between the judge’s former firm and the

parties before her magnifies the very structural due process concern this case presents: the

erosion of public confidence in the impartiality of judicial proceedings.

This Court’s intervention is warranted to clarify that such circumstances, where a judge’s former

firm repeatedly appears before her, including in related matters involving the same litigant, violate

the constitutional demand for a neutral decisionmaker.

2. ARGUMENT

I, Federal Question Remains Undeveloped and Peculiar

The Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process requires an impartial tribunal free from

even the probability of bias.

The core issue is whether the due process guarantee of an impartial tribunal under the Fourteenth

Amendment is violated when a judge presides over a case in which they have prior, significant

professional ties to a law firm that is either a party or represents parties before the court.

Petitioner sought recusal before any adjudication to avoid prejudice. The underlying case, in

which the law firm is a defendant, remains pending at the trial court due to procedural returns

from the Tennessee Court of Appeals. If dismissed, it is likely to return on appeal before the same

judge. Additionally, the same law firm represents defendants in other appeals where Petitioner is

the plaintiff. This dual role, as a defendant in one case and counsel for defendants in other

pending appeals, creates a concrete risk of adjudication by a judge with longstanding professional

ties to the firm, undermining impartiality under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Courts within Tennessee and other states have reached inconsistent conclusions on whether

historical professional relationships warrant disqualification, highlighting the urgent need for

Supreme Court guidance to establish a uniform federal standard for recusal.

Tennessee courts have inconsistently applied standards for recusal, allowing judges discretion

that creates uncertainty for litigants nationwide. The absence of uniform national standards for

judicial recusal based on historical professional ties has produced irreconcilable conflict among

state and federal courts, directly implicating the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of an

impartial tribunal.

ll. Misapplication of the Federal Recusal Standard

The state courts dismissed Petitioner's recusal motion as “speculative,” contrary to the ordinaryperson perception test articulated in Caperton and reaffirmed in Lilieberg v. Health Services

Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988). The relevant inquiry is not whether actual bias can be

proven, but whether an objective observer would reasonably question the judge’s impartiality.

The Tennessee courts failed to apply this standard. Their cursory denial overlooked the factual

context, both the judge’s prior professional relationship and the ongoing appearance of alignment

between her former firm and parties before her. The later emergence of that firm’s participation in

related appeals underscores precisely why the Caperton framework exists: to prevent erosion of

public trust in the judiciary through apparent favoritism or divided loyalty.

By refusing to recognize this constitutional threshold, the lower courts effectively insulated state

judges from federal due process review and left litigants without a meaningful safeguard against

structural bias.

lll. Bias / Dual Interest

The probability of bias in this case is substantial and readily perceivable by an ordinary person.

Judge Kristi M. Davis maintained a 14-year professional partnership with the law firm Hodges,

Doughty & Carson PLLC, which is now a defendant in one case before her and represents

defendants in other pending appeals in which Petitioner is the plaintiff. Such longstanding ties

inevitably create professional loyalty and could influence, consciously or unconsciously, the

judge's treatment of matters involving the firm or its clients.

IV. Federal Guidance and the Ongoing Conflict

Federal judicial ethics guidance emphasizes that longstanding professional relationships can

create a continuing risk of perceived bias. The Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 2, Ethics and

Judicial Conduct, Pt. B: Advisory Opinions recommends a minimum “cooling-off’ period of

two years after a judge leaves a law firm before that firm appears before them, but explicitly notes

that longer periods may be warranted depending on circumstances. Relevant circumstances

include: the tength and nature of prior association (here, 14 years at Hodges, Doughty &

Carson PLLC), the dual role of the firm as both a defendant in one case and counsel for

defendants in other pending appeals before the same judge, the ongoing litigation, and the

potential public perception of impropriety.

In the present situation, the judge’s prior 14-year affiliation with the firm, combined with the firm’s

dual roles, creates precisely the type of scenario the federal guidance warns could require a

longer cooling-off period or complete recusal. Petitioner filed a recusal motion with a sworn

affidavit citing these conflicts, yet the judge denied the motion, even in cases where the firm

represents defendants other than itself. Respondents’ claims that no affidavit was filed are

factually incorrect.

V. Circuit Split on recusal standards for historical professional ties:

Tennessee applies subjective standards for recusal (Winder v. Winder, 2020 WL 4200832; Bean

v. Bailey, 280 S.W.3d 798), allowing judges to deny recusal even after long-term prior firm

affiliations. By contrast, federal guidance under §455(a) and cases like /n re Hawsawi, 955 F.3d

152 (D.C. Cir. 2020), United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985), United States v.

Couch, 896 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1990), and In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd., 570 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir.

2009) show a circuit split: some circuits apply an objective standard where the appearance of bias

matters, while others defer to the judge’s self-assessment. This disuniformity highlights the need

for Supreme Court guidance.

No. Circuit Case Standard Holding

1 D.C In re Hawsawi, Objective Recusal required

955 F.3d 152 if prior

(D.C. Cir. 2020) professional role

creates a

reasonable

appearance of

bias, even

absent actual

prejudice.

2 7th United States v. Objective Appearance of

Balistrieri, 779 bias from past

F.2d 1191 (7th associations

Cir. 1985) requires

objective inquiry

under § 455(a).

5th United States v. Subjective Judge’s personal

3 Couch, 896 F.2d belief in

78 (5th Cir. impartiality

1990) controls unless

extrinsic

evidence shows

bias.

4 11th In re Evergreen Subjective Judge’s self-

Sec., Ltd., 570 assessment

F.3d 1257 (11th entitled to

Cir. 2009) substantial

weight; recusal

denied absent

clear evidence of

bias.

Circuit Split Illustrates the Need for Clarity

VI. Due Process Implications and National Significance

The combination of federal circuit splits and Tennessee’s permissive approach produces a

nationally significant issue, affecting litigants across the country. When a judge with a longterm prior professional relationship presides over cases involving the same law firm, either as

a party or as counsel for another party, the risk of perceived bias is substantial. Caperton v.

A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), addresses only financial bias and does not resolve

these broader due process concerns. Supreme Court review is therefore warranted to establish

a uniform constitutional standard under § 455(a) and the Fourteenth Amendment, ensuring

that no reasonable observer could question judicial impartiality based on longstanding

professional entanglements.

The Due Process Clause prohibits not only actual bias but also the appearance of partiality that

would cause an ordinary observer to doubt the judge’s neutrality. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal

Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). This Court has consistently held that “justice must satisfy the

appearance of justice.” Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).

Here, the presiding judge maintained a 14-year professional relationship with the law firm

representing the Respondents. That enduring partnership, viewed through the lens of Caperton,

creates a constitutionally intolerable probability of bias. The risk is not speculative; it is grounded

in the judge’s long-standing affiliation with counsel now appearing before her in multiple matters.

VII. National Significance of Clarifying Recusal Standards

This issue is not merely a state law dispute but presents a federal constitutional question of

nationwide importance. This inconsistency is not confined to Tennessee. Other states, including

Massachusetts, have adopted approaches that sometimes require recusal where historical

professional affiliations exist. Massachusetts Committee on Judicial Ethics Opinion No. 95-6

(1995) mandates recusal or disclosure when a former firm appears before the judge within a

reasonable period post-separation, recognizing that a 14-year tenure creates an enduring

perception of divided loyalties.

Federal circuits remain divided, and this disuniformity, unresolved by Caperton v. A.T. Massey

Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), which addressed only financial conflicts, creates intolerable

uncertainty for litigants and risks systemic due process violations. Supreme Court review is

therefore essential to establish a clear, objective constitutional floor under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and

the Fourteenth Amendment, ensuring that no reasonable observer could question judicial

impartiality based on longstanding professional ties.

This unique combination of facts presents a situation not squarely addressed by prior federal

precedent, rendering this a nationally significant issue of constitutional law suitable for Supreme

Court review.

Respondents’ attempt to frame the judge’s historical ties as irrelevant or speculative is contrary

to Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), which emphasizes that the probability

of bias must be judged from an ordinary-person perspective. Petitioner’s allegations demonstrate

a credible probability of bias, satisfying the federal due process standard.

Federal precedent recognizes that due process is violated not only by actual bias but also by the

appearance of bias, and the assessment must be made from the perspective of a reasonable

observer familiar with the circumstances. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868

(2009). In this context, the judge’s historical relationship with the firm is neither remote nor trivial;

it is objectively substantial and raises a credible probability of bias sufficient to implicate the

Fourteenth Amendment.

VIII. Affidavit acknowledgment:

Respondents’ claim that no affidavit was filed is incorrect. The record contains a sworn affidavit

supporting Petitioner's recusal motion in the underlying appeal, and another in related appeals

where the firm represents defendants. Despite this, the judge denied recusal, demonstrating an

ongoing perception of bias and a procedural due process concern.

IX. Inconsistent protections across states.

This case presents a recurring and nationally significant problem: judges frequently have

longstanding professional relationships with law firms or parties that later appear before them.

Without Supreme Court guidance;

1. Judges have broad discretion to deny recusal even when an ordinary person would perceive

bias.

2. The integrity of judicial proceedings is threatened, particularly when a judge’s impartiality is

reasonably questioned before the case is heard on the merits.

3. The Court’s review is necessary to set a uniform federal standard and to prevent individual

state courts from undermining due process rights through subjective or inconsistent application

of recusal rules.

10

3. Conclusion

For the reasons stated in Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari and reinforced here:

1. The federal question is clear and compelling.

2. Respondents’ mischaracterizations do not diminish the constitutional concerns.

3. The case presents a unique and nationally significant circumstance requiring clarification of the

due process standard for recusal.

Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court grant the petition for writ of certiorari and provide

guidance on the proper constitutional treatment of recusal when historical professional

relationships raise a reasonable probability of bias.

Respectfully submitted,

Biobele Georgewill, Petitioner

423-561-5480

biogeorgewill@gmail.com

11

4. APPENDIX

Appendix A — Petitioner's Recusal Motion and Sworn Affidavit

Filed in a related appeal where Hodges, Doughty & Carson PLLC represents defendants,

demonstrating the formal request for recusal based on the judge’s prior professional relationship

with the firm.

Appendix B — Recusal Denial Order

The trial court’s order denying Petitioner's recusal motion in the related appeal, showing the

ongoing conflict despite the sworn affidavit.

Appendix C — Filings Demonstrating Law Firm’s Dual Role

Court filings confirming that Hodges, Doughty & Carson PLLC is both a defendant in one case

and representing defendants in other pending appeals before the same judge.

12

Aectranictlly RECERED on Cetaber "7 2025 Cieetronically FILED vo Ortnbes 17 2024

Appeliaie Court Clerk Appeltatie Crart Cierk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Biobele Georgewill,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

CMH Homes, Inc. d/b/a Clayton Homes,

Defendants—Appellees.

Case No.: E2025-01606-COA-R3-CV

Date: October 17, 2025

MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE KRISTI M. DAVIS

The Plaintiff-Appellant, Biobele Georgewill, appearing pro se, respectfully requests that this

Court order Judge Kristi M. Davis to recuse herself from any further proceedings in this case

while the appeal is pending.

1. Procedural Background

1. Plaintifi-Appellant asserts claims arising from fraudulent inducement of an escrow

agreement.

2. In a separate proceeding involving related circumstances, Plaintiff previously raised concerns

regarding Judge Davis’s impartiality due to her prior affiliation with the law firm representing the

Defendants. That matter is currently pending before the United States Supreme Court and has

not been adjudicated on the merits.

2. Grounds for Recusal

A. Pending Supreme Court Review

Because the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet issued a ruling on the related matter, there

remains a legitimate question regarding Judge Davis's impartiality in this appeal.

B. Risk of Prejudice

Continuing proceedings before Judge Davis while the related matter is pending could prejudice

Plaintiff-Appellant and affect her right to a fair and impartial adjudication.

CumSconner

L23J CamScunner

Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10, Canon 2 and Tenn Code Ann § 17-1-101 require recusal

when a judge's mpartiatity might reasonably be questioned In light of the pending Supreme Court

renew continued participation by Judge Daws in this case could undermine public confidence in

judicial integnty

D. Legal Standara

Rule 108 requires recusa! where ‘a person of ordinary prudence sn the judge's position knowing

all the facts, would find a reasonable basis for questioning the judge's impartiality 'Beanv Baitey.

280 SW 3X4 798 805 {Tenn 2009) Tennessee law does not require proof of actua! bias even

the appearance of bias 1s enough Davis v Liberty Mut Ins Co, 38 SW 3d 560 564 (Tenn

2001)

3 Certificate of Good Faith

This motion is not to harass. delay or increase costs Piantiff files this in good faith because no

Impartial judge would force a party without consent to arbitrate threaten dismissal with prejudice

for refusal. retahate after a remand, or preside while being a defendant in Plaintiff's § 1983 |awsurt

for bias and denial of constitutional rights Recusal is the oniy way to protect Plaintiff's right to a

far trdunal

Plaintfl swears under penalty of pequry that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my

knowledge and belief, and that this motion ts filed in good faith, based on evidence bias and

Judrcia! misconduct

Request for Reief

Piaintiff—Appellant respectfully requests that this Court

1 Direct the immediate recusal of Judge Kristi M Davis from presiding over this matter pending

resolution of the related case by the US Supreme Court.

2 Assign a neutral and impartial judge to oversee proceeaings in the intenm, and

3 Preserve Plaintiff-Appeliant s ngnt to a fair and impartial! tribunal

Respectfully submitted,

Biobele Georgewill. Piaintiff-Appellant Pro Se

423-561-5480

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AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF

State of Tennessee

County of Hamilton —

Before me. the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared Biobele Georgewill. who. being

duly sworn, deposes and says

1 | am the Plaintiff in the above-captioned case

2 The statements made in the foregoing motion are true and correct to the best of my knowledge,

information, and belief

3 | understand that under Tennessee law making a false statement in this affidavit is subject to

penalties of penury pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann § 39- 16-702

Further affiant sayeth naught

Biabele Georgewil!

Plantff

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this _[ ith day of dc] ober 202 5

Notary Public. State of Tennessee

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

| hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Recuse Judge Kristi M

Davis was served by email on October 17, 2025 to.

Joshua Ball, Esq

Email: jbali@hdclaw com and lreed@hdclaw.com

SER

—-

Biobele Georgewill Plaintiff—~Appeliant

423-561-5480

Biogeorgewill@gmail com

a

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

FILED

1106/2025

Clon of Bo

BIOBELE GEORGEWILL v. CMH HOMES INC.

Circult Court for Hamilton County

No. 28C778

No. F2028-01606-COA-R3-CV

———

ORDER

On October 17, 2025, the appellant, Biobele Gcorgewill (“Appellant”), filed a

motion pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee seeking to

have Judge Kristi M. Davis of the Tennessee Court of Appeals recused from hearing this

appeal. Appellant's motion alleges no grounds that would require recusal by the

undersigned judge. Appellant's primary allegation for the undersigned judge's recusal

stems from the undersigned judge's previous employment as a partner at the law firm of

Hodges, Doughty & Carson, PLLC. However, the undersigned judge was last employed

at Hodges, Doughty & Carson, PLLC in 2014, which is eleven years ago. Since that time,

the undersigned judge has had no further affiliation with the law firm. See Tyus v. Pugh

Farms, Inc., No. W201 1-00826-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WI. 938509, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App.

Mar. 19, 2012) (holding that recusal was not required when more than thirteen years had

passed since the judge had any business dealings with his former law firm and over ten

years had passed since the judge had received any compensation for outstanding legal

matters owed to him by the law finn).

Rule 1.2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as set forth in Rule 10 of the Rules of the

Supreme Court of Tennessee provides that “a judge shall act at all times in a manner that

promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the

judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” Furthermore,

Rule 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires disqualification in the event that a

“judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Mere speculation that a judge’s

ability to be impartial will be affected by a prior relationship between the judge and a party

or witness is likely not sufficicnt to necessitate recusal of the judge. Kelly M. v. Agness

M,, No. E2024-00629-COA-T10B-CV, 2024 WL 2564454, at °7 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23,

2024). Instead, allegations of bias or prejudice “must be based on facts, not speculation or

innuendo.” /d (quoting Runyon v. Runyon, No. W2013-02651-COA-TLOB-CV, 2014 WL

1285729, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2014).

Appellant further states in her motion that she has filed a petition for writ of

certiorari with the United States Supreme Court that remains pending that “could prejudice

Plaintiff-Appellant and affect her right to a fair and impartial adjudication.” Such petition

for writ of certiorari involves the undersigned judge's denial of a previous recusa!l motion

involving the same allegations as the current motion for rccusal. As the Tennessee

Supreme Court has explained, recusal of a judge is not required “simply because the person

seeking recusal has filed some type of complaint against the judge.” See Salas v.

Rosdeutscher, No. M2021-00157-COA-T10B-CV, 2021 WL. 830009, at *3 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Mar. 4, 2021) (citing Moncier v. Bd. of Prof't Responsibility, 406 $.W.3d 139, 162

(Tenn. 2013)). In order to require recusal, the movant must present additional evidence

demonstrating bias or prejudice resulting from the complaint filed against the judge. Salas,

2021 WL 830009, at °3.

The undersigned judge does not have an actual bias or prejudice against or toward

Appellant in this appeal, nor is the undersigned judge biased in favor of the law firm of

Hodges, Doughty & Carson, PLLC, or the law firm's client. In addition, no person of

ordinary prudence in the undersigned judge's position, knowing all of the facts as alleged

in the motion and known to the undersigned judge, would find a reasonable basis to

question the undersigned judge’s impartialily in this case. Cf. Smith y. State, 357 S.W.3d

322, 341 (Tenn. 2011) (noting that recusal is required, even if a judge subjectively believes

he or she can be fair and impartial, whenever “the judge’s impartiality might be reasonably

questioned because the appearance of bias is as injurious to the integrity of the judicial

system as actual bias.” (quoting Bean v. Bailey, 280 S.W.3d 798, 805 (I enn. 2009))). We

note that Appellant has filed similar motions in other appeals before this Court, which have

all been denied. Furthermore, the Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed the undersigned

judge’s denial of one of Appellant's previous recusal motions and determined that even if

Appellant had complied with the relevant procedural rules, “no person of ordinary

prudence could reasonably question Judge Davis’s impartiality in this case.” See Biobele

Georgewill v, Joshua M. Ball et al., No. E2025-0091 1-SC-R10-CV, Ord. (Tenn. Sup. Ct.

Aug. 29, 2025). As such, the Supreme Court denied the recusal appeal. /d.

Because Appellant’s motion to recuse lacks a factual or legal basis, Appellant's

motion to recuse is hereby DENIED.

PA 7 D , = —

LARISTI M. VS. JUDGE

ar -l- is dersigned judge's recusal,

| Appellant relies in part on Tenn, Code Ann. § 17-1 101 as a basis for the undersign

which requires that a judge of this Court be at least thirty (30) years of age. The undersigned judge has met

the age requirement in section 17-1-101.

Cc TFO T EE

BIOBELE GEORGEWILL,

Plaintiff / Appellant,

No. 25C778

Vv.

CMH HOMES INC. d/b/a CLAYTON HOMES,

Nee? Sea? Nee? Ne! Ne! Nae! “Nee! Wee! See

Defendant / Appellee.

DEFENDANT CMH HOMES INC. d/b/a CLAYTON HOMES’ OBJECTION TO AND

MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S STATEMENT OF THE EVIDENCE

Comes the Defendant, CMH Homes Inc. d/b/a Clayton Homes (hereinafter “Clayton

Homes”), by and through counsel, pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c) and 24(e), and respectfully

objects to and moves to strike Plaintiff's Statement of Evidence.' In support, Clayton Homes

would show unto the Court as follows:

INTROD ON

On June 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit alleging claims of fraud in the

inducement, breach of escrow agreement, fraud, and breach of contract against Clayton Homes

related to her purchase of a manufactured home from Clayton Homes. Clayton Homes moved to

dismiss the action, which the Court granted. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed multiple motions

challenging the Court’s dismissal of the action. On October 13, 2025, the Court entered a final

order denying Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend the Order of Dismissal. Plaintiff filed a notice

' Clayton Homes will refer to the document filed by Plaintiff on October 21, 2025, as a “Statement of Evidence”

because that is how Plaintiff title the document; however, as discussed herein, Clayton Homes maintains said

document is not “a fair, accurate and complete account of what transpired” and thus, is not a valid statement of the

evidence pursuant to the requirements of Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c).

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of appeal and appellate brief on October 15, 2025. On October 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Statement

of Evidence (“the Statement”).

Clayton Homes objects to and requests this Court to strike the Statement because Plaintiff

has failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24. First, the Statement should

be rejected, at least with regard to the August 25, 2025 hearing, because a transcript of the

proceedings was available. As a result, Plaintiff was required to either file the entire transcript or

designate the relevant parts to be considered on appeal. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). In addition,

the Statement should be rejected because it does not provide a fair, accurate, or complete account

of what transpired regarding the issues on appeal. The Statement contains brief explanations of

Plaintiff's arguments and the Court’s rulings, scantly summarizes Clayton Homes’ arguments, fails

to provide an accurate record of the verbal exchanges and exhibits presented during the

proceedings, and completely omits the underlying facts of the dispute. Thus, the Statement of the

Evidence is not a fair, accurate, or complete account of what transpired.

LAW AND ARGUMENT

When no transcript of evidence or proceedings is available, “the appellant shall prepare a

statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, including the appellant’s

recollection.” Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c). “The statement should convey a fair, accurate and complete

account of what transpired with respect to those issues that are the bases of appeal.” Jd. Upon the

appellant’s filing of a Statement of the Evidence, the appellee has fifteen days to file an objection.

Id. Any differences regarding the Statement of the Evidence “shall be submitted to and settled by

the trial court regardless of whether the record has been transmitted to the appellate court. Absent

extraordinary circumstances, the determination of the trial court is conclusive.” Tenn. R. App. P.

24{e).

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Rule 24 “express[es] a preference for a verbatim record if reasonably available, and an

approval of other statements of evidence and proceedings if a verbatim record is not available.”

Beef N' Bird of Am., Inc. for Use & Benefit of Galbreath v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 803 S.W.2d 234, 240

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). Here, a hearing on Clayton Homes’ motion to dismiss was conducted on

August 25, 2025. Clayton Homes hired a court reporter for the hearing and has filed a transcript

of the hearing contemporaneously with this objection to be included in the record on appeal. Thus,

a statement of the evidence regarding the August 25, 2025 hearing on the motion to dismiss is

improper. For this reason, Clayton Homes requests that the section titled “First Hearing (Motion

to Dismiss)” in the Statement be stricken from the record.

Clayton Homes objects to the remaining sections of the Statement, titled “Second Hearing

(Motion to Set Aside Dismissal #1)” and “Third Motion (Motion to Set Aside Dismissal #2 /

Motion to Alter or Amend)”, as incomplete and inaccurate. The purpose of a transcript or statement

of the evidence is “simply to convey an accurate record of the verbal exchanges and exhibits

presented during the proceedings.” Watson v. City of Jackson, 448 S.W.3d 919, 931 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2014). The Statement is far from an accurate record of the verbal exchanges and exhibits

presented because it only briefly recites Plaintiff's arguments and the Court’s rulings but makes

no mention of any exchange involving Clayton Homes or its attorneys. In fact, the second and

third sections of the Statement include absolutely no mention of Clayton Homes. For this reason,

Clayton Homes requests that the sections titled “Second Hearing (Motion to Set Aside Dismissal

#1)” and “Third Motion (Motion to Set Aside Dismissal #2 / Motion to Alter or Amend)” in the

Statement be stricken from the record.

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WHEREFORE, Clayton Homes respectfully objects to and moves to strike Plaintiff's

Statement of the Evidence.

Respectfully submitted this va day of November, 2025.

HODGES, DOUGHTY & CARSON, PLLC

By: ble

Joshua Mf. Ball (BPR # 020626)

I. McKay DeVault (BPR # 040457)

Breana N. Query (BPR # 041311)

445 S Gay Street, Ste. 401

Knoxville, TN 37902

P.O. Box 869

(865) 292-2307

jball@®hdclaw.com

mdevault@hdclaw.com

bquery(whdelaw.com

Attorneys for CMH Homes, Inc. d/b/a Clayton Homes

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