Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Biobele Georgewill, Petitioner v. Joshua M. Ball, et al.
Supreme Court briefSep 5, 2025
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FILED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
08/29/2025
Clerk of the
Appellate Courts
BIOBELE GEORGEWILL v. JOSHUA M. BALL, ET AL.
Circuit Court for Hamilton County
No. 25C-293
No. E2025-00911-SC-R10-CV
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a recusal appeal filed by Biobele Georgewill.
On June 12, 2025, Georgewill filed a motion in the Tennessee Court of Appeals seeking
recusal of Court of Appeals Judge Kristi M. Davis. Judge Davis found no basis for
recusal and entered an order denying the motion on June 25, 2025. Georgewill filed a
motion for court review, which a panel of the Court of Appeals denied on July 18, 2025.
Georgewill has now filed a Petition for Review and Supporting Brief, which we construe
as a recusal appeal from the Court of Appeals pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule
10B § 3.02(c).
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Judge Davis properly denied
the motion to recuse. As Judge Davis recognized, the motion is defective because it does
not “affirmatively state that it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” Tenn.
Supr. Ct. R. 10B, § 3.01. The motion also is not “supported by an affidavit under oath or
a declaration under penalty of perjury on personal knowledge.” Id. Finally, even
, assuming the motion complied with these requirements, no person of ordinary prudence
could reasonably question Judge Davis’s impartiality in this case. The mere fact that
Judge Davis worked at Hodges, Doughty, & Carson PLLC eleven years ago is insufficient
to require her recusal.
Georgewill filed a supplemental motion to recuse Judge Davis in the Court of
Appeals on July 28, 2025, which largely made the same arguments as the first recusal
motion. Judge Davis again found no basis for recusal and entered an order denying the
motion on August 1, 2025. Georgewill did not file a motion in the Court of Appeals
seeking court review of the August 1, 2025 order. Consequently, that order is not
appealable to this Court under Rule 10B. See Tenn. Supr. Ct. R. 10B § 3.02(c) (allowing
an appeal to the Supreme Court where a motion for court review was denied or unavailable
in the intermediate appellate court).
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this recusal appeal is DENIED.
are taxed to Biobele Georgewill, for which execution may issue if necessary.
PER CURIAM
Costs
FILED
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
07/18/2025
Clerk of the
Appellate Courts
BIOBELE GEORGEWILL v. JOSHUA M. BALL et al.
Circuit Court for Hamilton County
No. 25C-293
No. E2025-00911-COA-UNK-CV
ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon what this Court construed as a Tenn. Sup. Ct.
R. 10B § 3.02(b) motion filed by the pro se appellant, Biobele Georgewill, for court review
of an order entered by Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II, and an order entered by Judge Kristi
M. Davis, wherein Judge Frierson and Judge Davis each denied Ms. Georgewill’s motions
seeking their recusal. The motion for court review was timely filed. Because the motion
for review must be decided by three judges of this court who were not subjects of the
recusal motions, see Tenn. Sup. Ct R. 10B § 3.02(b), the motion for court review was
assigned to Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney, Judge J. Steven Stafford, and Judge John W.
McClarty.
Under Rule 10B § 3.02(b), the three-judge review panel must review the motion
upon a de novo standard of review. “De novo” is defined as “anew, afresh, a second time.”
Simms Elec., Inc. v. Roberson Assocs., Inc., No. 01-A-01-9011-CV-00407, 1991 WL
44279, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 1991) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed.
1979)). As a consequence, we have examined the record anew, with no presumption of
correctness, and reached our own conclusion. Gentry v. Gentry, No. M2016-01765-COAR3-CV, 2016 WL 7176981, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9,2016).
Upon consideration of the appellant’s two motions seeking the recusal of Judge
Frierson and Judge Davis, we conclude, as did Judge Frierson and Judge Davis, that the
appellant’s motions are not in compliance with Rule 10B in that they do not “affirmatively
state that it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation” and the motions are not
“supported by an affidavit under oath or a declaration under penalty of perjury on personal
knowledge. ...” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 3.01. Rule 10B requires a litigant seeking the
recusal of a judge to file a written motion that strictly complies with Rule 10B. See
Burkhart v. Burkhart, No. M2023-01390-CDA-T10B-CV, 2023 WL 6818637, at *4 (Tenn.
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Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2023). The appellant has not complied with the requirements of Tenn.
Sup. Ct. R. 10B.
Even reviewing the allegations in the motion for recusal, the appellant has not
demonstrated that recusal is required in this appeal by either Judge Frierson or Judge Davis.
As to Judge Frierson, the appellant states in her motion for recusal that she previously filed
a judicial misconduct complaint against Judge Michael Jenne, who is the judge whose
denial of recusal she is appealing in a separate but related appeal, Biobele Georgewill v.
CMH Homes, Inc., No. E2025-00865-COA-T10B-CV. The appellant argues that because
Judge Frierson ruled on the previous judicial misconduct complaint, such involvement
“raises a reasonable question as to his impartiality in this matter.” The motion does not
specify in what capacity Judge Frierson had ruled on such judicial complaint against Judge
Jenne. In a separate Motion to Transfer Venue or Panel Due to Conflict of Interest, the
appellant further states that Judge Frierson had been on a panel of judges that had
previously denied her petition for writ of mandamus, which allegedly had presented an
appearance of bias and prejudgment.1
In the aforementioned motions, the appellant’s allegations against Judge Frierson
are essentially that he has participated in certain proceedings and ruled against her in the
past. As Judge Frierson stated in his order denying recusal, our Supreme Court has held
that adverse rulings, “even if erroneous, numerous and continuous, do not, without more,
justify disqualification.” Adams v. Dunavant, 674 S.W.3d 871, 879 (Tenn. 2023) (quoting
Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 821 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)); see also State v. Cannon,
254 S.W.3d 287,308 (Tenn. 2008); State v. Reid, 213 S.W.3d 792,816 (Tenn. 2006); Davis
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 38 S.W.3d 560, 565 (Tenn. 2001).
In subsequent motions seeking a “rehearing en banc” and contesting the denial of
recusal by Judge Frierson, the appellant expands her allegations against Judge Frierson to
state that he is a current member of the Tennessee Board of Judicial Conduct, that he had
participated in a review of the misconduct complaint of Judge Jenne, and that his
knowledge and involvement with the judicial complaint created “a direct conflict of interest
and a reasonable appearance of bias.” The allegation that Judge Frierson is a current
member of the Tennessee Board of Judicial Conduct is a new allegation that was not in the
original motion to recuse filed on June 12, 2025. Nonetheless, this Court takes judicial
notice of the Administrative Office of the Courts’s website identifying the current members
and officers of the Tennessee Board of Judicial Conduct, which does not list Judge Frierson
as a member. See Officers & Members, Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts,
1 We note that the order denying the appellant’s petition for writ of mandamus to which the appellant refers
is in a separate appeal, Biobele Georgewill v. Clayton Homes, Inc., No. E2025-00308-COA-WRM-CV.
That order, like nearly all orders of this Court, was entered “per curiam,” which literally translates to “by
the court.” Per curiam orders are always decided by one or .more judges of the Court, but do not identify
the particular judges involved. It is unclear why the appellant believes Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II; Judge
Kristi M. Davis; and Justice Jeffrey S. Bivens are the panel ofjudges deciding that appeal.
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https://tncourts.gov/boards-commissions/board-judicial-conduct/officers-members (last
visited July 17, 2025). Based on the foregoing, Ms. Georgewill has failed to demonstrate
actual bias or produce evidence that would prompt a person of ordinary prudence in Judge
Frierson’s position, with knowledge of all facts known to Judge Frierson, to find a
“reasonable basis for questioning (the judge’s] impartiality.” See Adams, 674 S.W.3d at
878. Therefore, we find no error in Judge Frierson’s denial of Ms. Georgewill’s motion
for recusal.
As to the allegation against Judge Davis in the motion for recusal, the appellant
simply argues that Judge Davis’s previous affiliation with the law firm of Hodges, Doughty
& Carson, PLLC, “raises a legitimate concern regarding impartiality” or creates an
appearance of a conflict of interest that would undermine “public confidence in the
integrity and neutrality of the judiciary.” As Judge Davis pointed out, she had not been
employed by such law firm for more than ten years, which does not by itself require recusal.
See Tyus v. Pugh Farms, Inc., No. W2011-00826-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 938509, at *4
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 19,2012). In her motion to recuse, the appellant provided no further
evidence of a lack of impartiality other than pure speculation that such prior affiliation will
affect Judge Davis’s impartiality. Such speculation, by itself, is unlikely to be sufficient to
require recusal. Kelly M. v. Agness M., No. E2024-00629-CGA-T10B-CV, 2024 WL
2564454, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2024). In the separate Motion to Transfer Venue
or Panel Due to Conflict of Interest, the appellant further includes that Judge Davis had
been on the panel of judges with Judge Frierson that had previously denied her petition for
writ of mandamus, which allegedly presented an appearance of bias and prejudgment.
Even if Judge Davis was on the panel of judges that had denied her petition for writ of
mandamus, such action would be an adverse ruling, which, without more, does not justify
disqualification of the judge. Adams, 674 S.W.3d at 879 (internal citations omitted).
In this case, the appellant’s speculation that Judge Davis’s prior affiliation with
Hodges, Doughty & Carson, PLLC will somehow affect her ability to be impartial and the
allegation that Judge Davis ruled against her as part of a panel of judges denying her
petition for writ of mandamus in another appeal are insufficient to necessitate Judge
Davis’s recusal in this appeal. As such, Ms. Georgewill has failed to provide evidence that
would prompt a person of ordinary prudence in Judge Davis’s position, with knowledge of
all facts known to Judge Davis, to find a “reasonable basis for questioning [the judge’s]
impartiality.” See Adams, 674 S.W.3d at 878. Therefore, we find no error in Judge Davis’s
denial of Ms. Georgewill’s motion for recusal.
For the foregoing reasons, this panel, having considered the Motion for Court
Review filed by Ms. Georgewill, concludes that the motion is not well taken. It is,
therefore, ordered that the motion is denied in all respects. The costs are assessed against
the appellant, Biobele Georgewill, for which execution may issue.
PER CURIAM
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FILED
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
06/25/2025
Clertt of the
Appellate Courts
BIOBELE GEORGEWILL v. JOSHUA M. BALL ET al.
Circuit Court for Hamilton County
No. 25C-293
No. E2025-00911-COA-UNK-CV
ORDER
On June 12, 2025, the appellant, Biobele Georgewill (“Appellant”), filed a motion
pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee seeking to have
Judge Kristi M. Davis of the Tennessee Court of Appeals recused from hearing this appeal.
The motion is not in compliance with the rule in that it does not “affirmatively state that it
is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation” and it is not “supported by an affidavit
under oath or a declaration under penalty of perjury on personal knowledge. . . ” Tenn.
Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 3.01. Rule 10B requires a litigant seeking the recusal of a judge to file
a written motion that strictly complies with Rule 10B. See Burkhart v. Burkhart, No.
M2023-01390-COA-T10B-CV, 2023 WL 6818637, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 17,2023).
Furthermore, even if Appellant had complied with the requirements of Rule 10B,
Appellant’s motion alleges no grounds that would require recusal by the undersigned judge.
Appellant’s sole allegation for the undersigned judge’s recusal stems from the undersigned
judge’s previous employment as a partner at the law firm of Hodges, Doughty & Carson,
PLLC. However, the undersigned judge was last employed at Hodges, Doughty & Carson,
PLLC, in 2014, which is eleven years ago. Since that time, the undersigned judge has had
no further affiliation with the law firm. See Tyus v. Pugh Farms, Inc., No. W2011-00826COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 938509, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 19,2012) (holding that recusal
was not required when more than thirteen years had passed since the judge had any business
dealings with his former law firm and over ten years had passed since the judge had
received any compensation for outstanding legal matters owed to him by the law firm).
Rule 1.2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as set forth in Rule 10 of the Rules of the
Supreme Court of Tennessee provides that “a judge shall act at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the
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judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” Mere
speculation that a judge’s ability to be impartial will be affected by a prior relationship
between the judge and a party or witness is likely not sufficient to necessitate recusal of
the judge. Kelly M. v. Agness M., No. E2024-00629-COA-T10B-CV, 2024 WL 2564454,
at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2024). Instead, allegations of bias or prejudice “must be
based on facts, not speculation or innuendo.” Id. (quoting Runyon v. Runyon, No. W201302651-COA-T10B-CV, 2014 WL 1285729, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31,2014).
The undersigned judge does not have an actual bias or prejudice against or toward
Appellant in this appeal, nor is the undersigned judge biased in favor of the law firm of
Hodges, Doughty & Carson, PLLC. In addition, no person of ordinary prudence in the
undersigned judge’ s position, knowing all of the facts as alleged in the motion and known
to the undersigned judge, would find a reasonable basis to question the undersigned judge’s
impartiality in this case. Cf. Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322, 341 (Tenn. 2011) (noting that
recusal is required, even if a judge subjectively believes he or she can be fair and impartial,
whenever “the judge’s impartiality might be reasonably questioned because the appearance
of bias is as injurious to the integrity of the judicial system as actual bias.” (quoting Bean
v. Bailey, 280 S.W.3d 798, 805 (Tenn. 2009))).
Because Appellant’s motion to recuse does not comply with the requirements of
Rule 10B and lacks a factual or legal basis, Appellant’s motion to recuse is hereby
DENIED.
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IN THE TENNESSEE COURT OF APPEALS AT KNOXVILLE
Cut No.: E2025-00911-COA-UNK-CV
Date: September 3,2026
Blobele Georgewlll, Plaintiff/Appellant v. Joshua M. Ball and Hodges Doughty and
Carson, PLLC, Defendante/Appellees
MOTION TO REFILE AND SUPPLEMENT RECORD WITH SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO
RECUSE JUDGE KRISTI M. DAVIS
Comes now, the Plalntiff/Appeflant, Blobele Georgewlll, and respectfully moves this
Court to accept and file the attached Supplemental Motion to Recuse Judge Kristi M.
Davis, and to supplement the appellate record accordingly. In support of this Motion,
Plaintiff states as follows:
1. Plaintiff previously prepared and submitted a Supplemental Motion to Recuse Judge Kristi M.
Davis, which included a sworn affidavit affirming that the motion was not submitted for purposes
of delay or harassment
2. Upon reviewing the appellate docket, Plaintiff discovered that the Supplemental Motion and
accompanying affidavit, and evidence were never entered into the docket or included in the
appellate record.
3. Plaintiff now has access to the e-filing system and is refiling the Supplemental Motion to
ensure it is properly docketed and considered by the Court
4. Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court accept the refiling of the Supplemental Motion to
Recuse, beat it as part of the original appellate filings, and supplement the record with this
motion and the accompanying affidavit
5. Ffling and docketing this motion is necessary to ensure a complete and accurate record for
tile Court's consideration of the recusal issue.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court
a) Accept and docket the attached Supplemental Motion to Recuse Judge Kristi M. Davis;
b) Supplement the appellate record to include the Supplemental Motion and affidavit as part of
the original filings; and
c) Grant any other relief deemed appropriate.
Respectfully submitted,
Blobele Georgewlll - Plaintiff/ Appellant
423-561-5480
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion was served via email on the
following parties on this 3rd day of September, 2025:
Jason Long, Esq.
Email: JLongQlewtsthomason.com and SYearyQlewfsthomason.com
Blobele Georgewlll
423 M1 6480
BlogoorgowfllQgmail.com
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IN THE TENNESSEE COURT OF APPEALS AT KNOXVILLE
Biobele Georgewill
Plaintiff,
v.
Joshua M. Ball and Hodges, Doughty, and Carson PLLC
Defendants.
Case No.: E2025- 00911- COA- UNK- CV
Date: July 24,2025
Supplemental Motion for Recusal of Judge Kristi Davis
Plaintiff respectfully moves this Court to order the recusal of Judge Kristi Davis from any further
proceedings in this matter due to a reasonable question regarding her impartiality arising from
her prior partnership with the law firm Hodges, Doughty, and Carson PLLC, which is a
Defendant in this case.
Grounds for Recusal
1. Publicly available records confirm that Judge Kristi Davis was previously a partner at Hodges,
Doughty, and Carson PLLC, the same law firm that is a Defendant in this case.
2. The nature of a partnership involves financial interests, shared client networks, and
professional relationships that extend beyond mere employment creating an appearance of
partiality or bias.
3. The Court’s implication that the Plaintiff must demonstrate actual bias or a continuing
relationship with the defendant misinterprets the proper standard for judicial disqualification. The
issue is not whether the judge continues to work with the law firm, the Issue is that Hodges,
Doughty & Carson, PLLC is a named defendant in this matter, and the judge formerly practiced
law at that same firm.
a) See Exhibit A, a screenshot of publicly available records demonstrating Judge Kristi Davis’s
former partnership with the Defendant law firm, Hodges, Doughty, and Carson PLLC,
establishing a direct professional relationship between the judge and the defendant in this
matter.
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b) According to public records. Judge Kristi Davis was sworn in to the Tennessee Court of
Appeals on August 3,2020, after serving as a circuit court Judge since 2014. Prior to her Judicial
career, she was a partner at Hodges, Doughty & Carson PLLC in Knoxville for approximately 14
years. This long-standing professional association with the law firm, currently a defendant in this
matter, raises a reasonable question about her impartiality. Such an extensive connection goes
beyond mere past employment and presents an appearance of bias, warranting recusal under
applicable legal standards.
This is a direct and disqualifying prior relationship with a party to the case.
c) Under Rule 10, Canon 2.11 (AX1) of the Tennessee Code of Judicial Conduct, a Judge must
disqualify herself in any proceeding where her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In
this case, Judge Davis is presiding over an appeal in which her former law firm is the named
defendant. Although she may not have personally worked on the matter, her current role in
reviewing claims that could impact the rights or liabilities of her former firm creates an
appearance of impropriety. This situation gives rise to a direct constitutional concern under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which guarantees litigants a fair and impartial
tribunal.
4. The appearance of impropriety atone, arising from the judge's prior professional affiliation with
a current defendant, is sufficient to warrant mandatory recusal. The standard is not whether
Appellant can prove actual bias, but whether a reasonable person would question the judge's
impartiality. That threshold is undeniably met here.
5. Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge must recuse himself or herself if the judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. The United States Supreme Court has recognized in Caperton
v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), that even the appearance of bias violates due
process.
4. Under Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10, RJC 2.11(A), the test for judicial recusal is whether "a person of
ordinary prudence in the judge's position, knowing all facts, would reasonably question the
Judge's impartiality.*
5. In Bean v. Bailey, 280 S.W.3d 798 (Tenn. 2009), the Tennessee Supreme Court reaffirmed
that the appearance of bias is as injurious as actual bias. The Court held that a judge must
disqualify himself or herself when their prior professional relationship with a party creates an
appearance of impropriety, regardless of whether actual bias exists. In the present case, Judge
Davis’s former partnership with the defendant raises legitimate concerns about impartiality
under this standard.
6. The Tennessee Court of Appeals has consistently held that reasonable questions regarding
impartiality require recusal to preserve public confidence in the judiciary.
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7. Even patterns of ruling* that seem consistently unfavorable, tone, attitude, or other
conduct can support a reasonable perception of bias.
8. Under Tennessee law and the Code of Judicial Conduct (Rule 10, Tenn. Sup. Ct R. 10), a
judge must recuse herself whenever her impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless
of whether actual bias is proven. This includes situations where a judge has prior professional
ties or any relationship that creates an appearance of Impropriety.
9. Judge Kristi Davis served as a partner at Hodges, Doughty & Carson PLLC for approximately
14 years, a substantial and significant period during which she forged deep professional
relationships, financial interests, and lasting loyalties. Although she has not been formally
affiliated with the firm since 2014, such a lengthy and intimate association cannot simply be
dismissed or wiped away. The enduring influence and connections established over those years
remain relevant and potent.
10. This case involves Hodges, Doughty & Carson PLLC appearing as a defendant facing
claims for substantial damages. Furthermore, one of the defendant lawyers, affiliated with the
same firm, feces potential disciplinary action. These high stakes heighten the appearance of
bias and raise an undeniable conflict of interest for Judge Davis to preside over the case.
11. Her participation on the appellate panel directly threatens Plaintiff’s constitutional right to a
fair and impartial hearing. The very presence of Judge Davis in this case, given her
long-standing ties to a defendant with much to lose, creates an overwhelming perception of
partiality.
12. More troubling, however, Is Judge Davis's steadfast refusal to recuse herself despite these
glaring conflicts. This insistence only deepens the suspicion and raises serious questions about
her motivations for clinging to this case. If the perception of bias is as evident as it appears, then
the refusal to step aside only magnifies the appearance of impropriety and undermines public
confidence in the judiciary.
13. Plaintiff respectfully asserts that this refusal infringes upon the due process rights
guaranteed under the Constitution and demands immediate recusal to preserve the integrity of
these proceedings.
14. Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) establishes that a judge must
recuse not only when they are actually biased, but when their impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.
'The integrity of the judicial system is dependent upon the public's confidence in its judges.
Therefore, to protect the public's trust, courts must avoid both actual bias and the appearance of
bias or impropriety.'
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In Kinard, the court reversed a trial judge's decision after determining that the circumstances
could lead a reasonable person to question the judge's impartiality, even though there was no
proof of actual bias.
15. Davis v. Liberty Mutual, 38 S.W.3d 560 (Tenn. 2001) affirms that an objective appearance of
bias, even without personal bias, can warrant recusal.
16. Plaintiff contends that Judge Davis's former partnership with the Defendant Hodges,
Doughty & Carson, PLLC, creates a legitimate and reasonable basis for questioning her
impartiality in this matter. This is not mere speculation, it is a direct and disqualifying fact that
gives rise to the appearance of bias, which is independently sufficient for disqualification under
Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10, Canon 2.11(AX1).
17. The Court's suggestion that Plaintiff must prove actual bias or an ongoing relationship with
the Defendant in order to obtain recusal is legally incorrect and fundamentally disregards the
constitutional and ethical protections at issue. The disqualification standard does not require
proof of subjective bias; it requires only that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.
18. To dismiss this concern as speculative is to ignore the critical facts raised by Plaintiff and to
undermine Plaintiff’s fundamental right to a fair and impartial tribunal, as guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The judiciary’s
integrity demands that even the appearance of impropriety be taken seriously, especially when a
judge has previously maintained a professional and financial partnership with a party currently
before the court Accordingly, recusal is not only appropriate, it is mandatory.
19. Given the serious appearance of bias and the dear conflict arising from Judge Davis's
former partnership with the Defendant law firm, it is fundamentally improper for Judge Davis to
decide this Motion to Recuse. The impartiality of the tribunal is called into question, and allowing
the judge to rule on her own recusal would undermine public confidence in the integrity and
neutrality of the judiciary.
20. Plaintiff therefore respectfully requests that this Court assign the dedsion on this Motion to
Recuse to another, impartial judge, that Judge Davis recuse herself immediately from ruling on
this matter, and that all further rulings or proceedings in this case be stayed until this recusal
issue is resolved.
Good Faith Certification
This motion is filed in good faith and not for purposes of harassment or delay.
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nVyW 1W WMwT
Wherefore. Pfomtff respectfuffy requests that
1. The Court order Judge Kneti Davis to recuse herself from this case;
2. Any further proceedings ho assigned to a dMOrsnt judge.
3. The Court slay any further ruhngs or proceedmgs pending reeoMion of this Motion to
Recuse: and
4. Such oOtor relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Reapoctfuffy submMad.
Btobete GeorgewM
PtMWfl
423-561-5460
BiMeoroewiilfflamail com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
l hereby certify that on this 24th day of ASy. 2025. a true and correct copy of the foregoing
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE KRISTI DAVIS as served via email on.
Counsel for Defendant,
Jason Long. Esq.
Emal: JLongQtewisthomason.com and SYearyQtewtsthomason.com
Biobete GeorgewM
Plaintiff
423 Ml 5400
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(worn Affidavit of lloMo GeorgewW
I. Btobale Georges*. declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the Stale ofTonneeeee
that the foregoing atatementa are true and correct to the beat ot my knowledge and belief
I further certify foal thia motion la mode m good faith and not for the purpose of harassment or
undue delay.
Executed thia
.day of
. 20»
PiaintMf
Notary Acknowledgment
State of Tomeeaee
County of V^*V.
SuMcnbed and sworn to before me on the
day
----- •2025 ®°e*e
George**
Notary Pubhc Sgnoture
My oommisaion expires:
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Judge Kristi Davis Joins the Court of
Appeals
August 3,2020
Judge Kristi Davis was sworn in today
as Tennessee's newest member of the
Court of Appeals. She was appointed
to the Court by Governor Bill Lee just
over 60 days ago.
Judge Davis, who has been a circuit
court Judge in the Sixth Judicial District
in Knoxville since 2014, Is the second
female judge to serve on the Court of
Appeals from the Eastern Division and
the sixth woman to serve on the Court
of Appeals. She fills the vacancy left by
the retirement of the Honorable
Charles D. Susano Jr. in April 2020.
Prior to her judicial career, she was a
partner at the firm of Hodges, Doughty
& Carson In Knoxville, where she
practiced for 14 years. She is a
graduate of the University of
Tennessee College of Law.
"We are excited to have Judge Davis
join the Court of Appeals," Chief Judge
D. Michael Swiney said. "We are
fortunate that her experience will
enable her to hit the ground running,
which is an important benefit to the
people of Tennessee and the Court of
Appeals. We look forward to August 3
finally getting here.”
An unconventional path to the
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•>?!
RECEIVED
JUN 1 2 2025
^Zozs-OO^II-CmH- UNK-cv
Clerk of the Appellate Cottrfa THE COURT OF APPEALS CHF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE
REc'd By
-------Biobele Georgewill,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
Joshua M. Ball Esq., and Hodges Doughty and Carson PLLC
Defendant-Appellee,
filed
JUN I 2 2025
Clerk of the. Appellate Court*
REc'd By
ft? "<^“25“
Case NO 25C293
bate: June 6,2025
MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE KRISTI M. DAVIS
COMES NOW the Plaintiff/Appellant, Biobele Georgewill. and respectfully moves this Honorable
Court to recuse the Honorable Judge Kristi M. Davis from presiding over the above-captioned
matter, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10, Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon
2.11(A). on the foltowing grounds:
1 . Judge Kristi M. Davis was previously employed as a partner at the law firm of Hodges,
Doughty & Carson, PLLC, a law firm which is currently involved in this case as legal counsel for
the Defendant/Appellee CMH Homes Inc., dba Clayton Homes, or otherwise maintains an
interest in the outcome of the litigation.
2. Judge Davis's prior association with the firm raises a legitimate concern regarding impartiality,
of at minimum, creates the appearance of a conflict of interest that undermines public
confidence in the integrity and neutrality of the judiciary.
3. Canon 2.11 (A)(6)(a) of the Tennessee Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge shall
disqualify herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, including when the judge previously practiced, law with a firm currently representing
a party before the court
4. Given Judge Davis's longstanding history with Hodges, Doughty & Carson, and the firm's
known involvement in this matter, her continued participation could give rise to an appearance
of bias and diminish confidence in the fairness of these proceedings.
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7/J
CERTIFIED MAIL
RECEIVED
)UL ’it
Clerk of The
aK=>
Biobele Georgewill
plaintiff/Appeliant,
CMH Homes mo., dba Clayton Homes.
OefendanVAppellee.
FILED
JUL 0 7 2025
Clerk of the Appellate Cou
REc'd Bv
t
Case Number E202SXJ0865-COA-T10B
And
Biobele Georgewill.
Plaintiff/Appellant,
LnuaM. Ba. Esq., and Hodges Doughty and Carson PUC.
Defendant/Appelfe®-
Case Number : E2025- 00911-COA-UNK-CV
Date: July 2,2025
Court as follows:
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shat her
present in this case.
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FILED
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
07/18/2025
Cleric of the
Appellate Courts
BIOBELE GEORGEWILL v. JOSHUA M. BALL et al.
Circuit Court for Hamilton County
No. 25C-293
No. E2025-00911-COA-UNK-CV
ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon what this Court construed as a Tenn. Sup. Ct.
R. 10B § 3.02(b) motion filed by the pro se appellant, Biobele Georgewill, for court review
of an order entered by Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II, and an order entered by Judge Kristi
M. Davis, wherein Judge Frierson and Judge Davis each denied Ms. Georgewill’s motions
seeking their recusal. The motion for court review was timely filed. Because the motion
for review must be decided by three judges of this court who were not subjects of the
recusal motions, see Tenn. Sup. Ct R. 10B § 3.02(b), the motion for court review was
assigned to Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney, Judge J. Steven Stafford, and Judge John W.
McClarty.
Under Rule 10B § 3.02(b), the three-judge review panel must review the motion
upon a de novo standard of review. “De novo” is defined as “anew, afresh, a second time.”
Simms Elec., Inc. v. Roberson Assocs., Inc., No. 01-A-01-9011-CV-00407, 1991 WL
44279, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 1991) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed.
1979)). As a consequence, we have examined the record anew, with no presumption of
correctness, and reached our own conclusion. Gentry v. Gentry, No. M2016-01765-COAR3-CV, 2016 WL 7176981, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9,2016).
Upon consideration of the appellant’s two motions seeking the recusal of Judge
Frierson and Judge Davis, we conclude, as did Judge Frierson and Judge Davis, that the
appellant’s motions are not in compliance with Rule 10B in that they do not “affirmatively
state that it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation” and the motions are not
“supported by an affidavit under oath or a declaration under penalty of perjury on personal
knowledge.. ..” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 3.01. Rule 10B requires a litigant seeking the
recusal of a judge to file a written motion that strictly complies with Rule 10B. See
Burkhartv. Burkhart,No. M2023-01390-CGA-T10B-CV, 2023 WL6818637, at*4(Tenn.
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Ct App. Oct. 17, 2023). The appellant has not complied with the requirements of Tenn.
Sup. Ct. R. 1 OB.
Even reviewing the allegations in the motion for recusal, the appellant has not
demonstrated that recusal is required in this appeal by either Judge Frierson or Judge Davis.
As to Judge Frierson, the appellant states in her motion for recusal that she previously filed
a judicial misconduct complaint against Judge Michael Jenne, who is the judge whose
denial of recusal she is appealing in a separate but related appeal, Biobele Georgewill v.
CMHHomes, Inc., No. E2025-00865-COA-T10B-CV. The appellant argues that because
Judge Frierson ruled on the previous judicial misconduct complaint, such involvement
“raises a reasonable question as to his impartiality in this matter.” The motion does not
specify in what capacity Judge Frierson had ruled on such judicial complaint against Judge
Jenne. In a separate Motion to Transfer Venue or Panel Due to Conflict of Interest, the
appellant further states that Judge Frierson had been on a panel of judges that had
previously denied her petition for writ of mandamus, which allegedly had presented an
appearance of bias and prejudgment.1
In the aforementioned motions, the appellant’s allegations against Judge Frierson
are essentially that he has participated in certain proceedings and ruled against her in the
past. As Judge Frierson stated in his order denying recusal, our Supreme Court has held
that adverse rulings, “even if erroneous, numerous and continuous, do not, without more,
justify disqualification.” Adams v. Dunavant, 674 S.W.3d 871, 879 (Tenn. 2023) (quoting
Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 821 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)); see also State v. Cannon,
254 S.W.3d 287,308 (Tenn. 2008); State v. Reid, 213 S.W.3d 792,816 (Tenn. 2006); Davis
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 38 S.W.3d 560, 565 (Tenn. 2001).
In subsequent motions seeking a “rehearing en banc” and contesting the denial of
recusal by Judge Frierson, the appellant expands her allegations against Judge Frierson to
state that he is a current member of the Tennessee Board of Judicial Conduct, that he had
participated in a review of the misconduct complaint of Judge Jenne, and that his
knowledge and involvement with the judicial complaint created “a direct conflict of interest
and a reasonable appearance of bias.” The allegation that Judge Frierson is a current
member of the Tennessee Board of Judicial Conduct is a new allegation that was not in the
original motion to recuse filed on June 12, 2025. Nonetheless, this Court takes judicial
notice of the Administrative Office of the Courts’s website identifying the current members
and officers of the Tennessee Board of Judicial Conduct, which does not list Judge Frierson
as a member. See Officers & Members, Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts,
1 We note that the order denying the appellant’s petition for writ of mandamus to which the appellant refers
is in a separate appeal, Biobele Georgewill v. Clayton Homes, Inc., No. E2025-00308-COA-WRM-CV.
That order, like nearly all orders of this Court, was entered “per curiam,” which literally translates to “by
the court.” Per curiam orders are always decided by one or more judges of the Court, but do not identify
the particular judges involved. It is unclear why the appellant believes Judge Thomas R. Frierson, H; Judge
Kristi M. Davis; and Justice Jeffrey S. Bivens are the panel ofjudges deciding that appeal.
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https://tncourts.gov/boards-conmiissions/board-judicial-conduct/officers-members (last
visited July 17, 2025). Based on the foregoing, Ms. Georgewill has failed to demonstrate
actual bias or produce evidence that would prompt a person of ordinary prudence in Judge
Frierson’s position, with knowledge of all facts known to Judge Frierson, to find a
“reasonable basis for questioning [the judge’s] impartiality.” See Adams, 674 S.W.3d at
878. Therefore, we find no error in Judge Frierson’s denial of Ms. Georgewill’s motion
for recusal.
As to the allegation against Judge Davis in the motion for recusal, the appellant
simply argues that Judge Davis’s previous affiliation with the law firm of Hodges, Doughty
& Carson, PLLC, “raises a legitimate concern regarding impartiality” or creates an
appearance of a conflict of interest that would undermine “public confidence in the
integrity and neutrality of the judiciary.” As Judge Davis pointed out, she had not been
employed by such law firm for more than ten years, which does not by itself require recusal.
See Tyus v. Pugh Farms, Inc., No. W2011-00826-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 938509, at *4
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2012). In her motion to recuse, the appellant provided no further
evidence of a lack of impartiality other than pure speculation that such prior affiliation will
affect Judge Davis’S impartiality. Such speculation, by itself, is unlikely to be sufficient to
require recusal. Kelly M. v. Agness M., No. E2024-00629-CGA-T10B-CV, 2024 WL
2564454, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2024). In the separate Motion to Transfer Venue
or Panel Due to Conflict of Interest, the appellant further includes that Judge Davis had
been on the panel of judges with Judge Frierson that had previously denied her petition for
writ of mandamus, which allegedly presented an appearance of bias and prejudgment.
Even if Judge Davis was on the panel of judges that had denied her petition for writ of
mandamus, such action would be an adverse ruling, which, without more, does not justify
disqualification of the judge. Adams, 674 S.W.3d at 879 (internal citations omitted).
In this case, the appellant’s speculation that Judge Davis’s prior affiliation with
Hodges, Doughty & Carson, PLLC will somehow affect her ability to be impartial and the
allegation that Judge Davis ruled against her as part of a panel of judges denying her
petition for writ of mandamus in another appeal are insufficient to necessitate Judge
Davis’s recusal in this appeal. As such, Ms. Georgewill has failed to provide evidence that
would prompt a person of ordinary prudence in Judge Davis’s position, with knowledge of
all facts known to Judge Davis, to find a “reasonable basis for questioning [the judge’s]
impartiality.” See Adams, 674 S.W.3d at 878. Therefore, we find no error in Judge Davis’s
denial of Ms. Georgewi ll’s motion for recusal.
For the foregoing reasons, this panel, having considered the Motion for Court
Review filed by Ms. Georgewill, concludes that the motion is not well taken. It is,
therefore, ordered that the motion is denied in all respects. The costs are assessed against
the appellant, Biobele Georgewill, for which execution may issue.
PER CURIAM
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FILED
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
08/01/2025
Clertc of the
Appellate Courts
BIOBELE GEORGEWILL v. JOSHUA M. BALL ET al.
Circuit Court for Hamilton County
No. 25C-293
No. E2025-00911-COA-UNK-CV
ORDER
The undersigned judge entered an order on June 25, 2025, denying the pro se
appellant’s first motion for recusal, which was based upon the undersigned judge’s former
affiliation with Hodges, Doughty & Carson, PLLC. The appellant subsequently filed a
motion, which the Court construed as a motion for court review, pursuant to Tennessee
Supreme Court Rule I OB, section 3.02. A panel of three other judges were appointed to
review the undersigned judge’s denial of the appellant’s first recusal motion. The panel of
judges consisting of Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney, Judge J. Steven Stafford, and Judge
John W. McClarty determined that the appellant’s motion for court review was not well
taken and denied such motion.
The appellant has now filed a supplemental motion seeking the undersigned judge’s
recusal for a second time. This motion again is based on the undersigned judge’s previous
employment as a partner of Hodges, Doughty & Carson, PLLC, that the appellant alleges
causes an appearance of impropriety requiring recusal. Rule 1.2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct as set forth in Rule 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee provides
that “a judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety.” Mere speculation that a judge’s ability to be impartial will
be affected by a prior relationship between file judge and a party or witness is likely not
sufficient to necessitate recusal of the judge. Kelly M. v. Agness M., No. E2024-00629COA-TIOB-CV, 2024 WL 2564454, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2024). Instead,
allegations of bias or prejudice “must be based on facts, not speculation or innuendo.” Id.
(quoting Runyon v. Runyon, Nd. W2013-02651-COA-T10B-CV, 2014 WL 1285729, at *9
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31,2014).
Following her initial departure from Hodges, Doughty & Carson, PLLC, the
undersigned judge voluntarily recused herself from presiding over cases as circuit court
judge involving the law firm for at least a year. However, the Undersigned judge has had
no affiliation with Hodges, Doughty & Carson, PLLC for eleven years.
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