Petition for Writ of Certiorari — In Re Ahmad Aljindi, Petitioner
Supreme Court briefSep 22, 2025
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Case: 24-1997
Document: 27
Page: 1
Filed: 02/10/2025
Note: This disposition is nonprecedential.
OLlnitcti States Court of Appeals;
for the Jfeberal Circuit
AHMAD ALJINDI,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
2024-1997
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. l:24-cv-00242-DAT, Judge David A. Tapp.
Decided: February 10, 2025
Ahmad Jamaleddin Aljindi, Irvine, CA, pro se.
ERIC P. Bruskin, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing
ton, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
Brian M. Boynton, Patricia M. McCarthy.
Per Curiam.
Case: 24-1997
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ALJINDI v. US
2
Dr. Ahmad Aljindi has published research on infor
mation security, artificial intelligence (Al), and legacy in
formation systems, and he owns a small business, Al Net
Group LLC. In 2021, his business unsuccessfully sought
an Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) from the federal
government’s Small Business Administration (SBA). In
2024, after he had brought several other suits, Dr. Aljindi
filed a complaint in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims
(Claims Court), seeking $65.4 million in compensation (a)
for the government’s use of his research, which he said was
a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and (b) for
the SBA’s denial of the loan. The Claims Court dismissed
the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and fail
ure to prosecute. Aljindi v. United States, No. 24-242, 2024
WL 3024654, at *1, *5 (Fed. Cl. June 17, 2024) (Claims
Court Opinion). The Claims Court also denied Dr. Aljindi’s
motion to disqualify Judge Tapp. Dr. Aljindi appeals. We
affirm.
I
A
Dr. Aljindi claims that he discovered the field of re
search into the relationship between information security,
artificial intelligence, and legacy information systems and
that he registered his dissertation on that topic with the
Library of Congress in December 2015. Appellant’s Infor
mal Br. at 19; Claims Court Opinion, at *2. He has filed
several cases against the federal government for allegedly
infringing on his “copyrighted property” by engaging in and
publishing research on this field. Claims Court Opinion,
at *2 & n.2. The present case is related chiefly to two ear
lier cases Dr. Aljindi filed in the Claims Court.
The first case (“Aljindi IP litigation”) resulted in sev
eral opinions. He filed that case pro se in the Claims Court
in April 2021. See Aljindi v. United States, No. 21-1295C,
2021 WL 4807205, at *1-2 (Fed. CL Oct. 15, 2021) (Aljindi
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7).1 Alleging that judicial misconduct infected the dismis
sal of separate cases he had brought in the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California, he sought $32.7
million in damages for “employment discrimination,” “in
tellectual property and copyright)] law[] violations” result
ing from the government’s alleged use of his dissertation
research, and “negligence and tort, based on the conduct
described” for the discrimination and intellectual-property
claims. Aljindi v. United States, No. 21-1295C, 2022 WL
1464476, at *1 (Fed. Cir. May 10, 2022) (Aljindi II); Aljindi
I, at *1-2. The Claims Court (Judge Schwartz) dismissed
the complaint. Aljindi I, at *1. It held that it lacked juris
diction over the employment-discrimination, negligence
and tort, and judicial-misconduct claims and that the intel
lectual-property claim, asserted as a Fifth Amendment
takings claim, was not sufficiently supported by alleged
facts (e.g., “what the property consisted of, how it was
taken, and what the government did with it”) to make a
takings claim plausible. Aljindi I, at *1-2; Aljindi II, at
*1-2.
On appeal, we affirmed the Claims Court’s dismissal of
Dr. Aljindi’s employment-discrimination, negligence and
tort, and judicial-misconduct claims. Aljindi II, at *2-3.
We also affirmed the dismissal of the takings claim because
Dr. Aljindi did not “provide the minimum required factual
allegations in his complaint to support this claim.” Id. at
*3; see also id. at *3 n.4. But we remanded the case in part
for the Claims Court to consider whether Dr. Aljindi had
stated a claim for copyright infringement. Id. at *3-4.
On remand, the Claims Court held that the complaint
did not support a claim of copyright infringement on which
relief could be granted, because the allegations “relate[d]
to uncopyrightable ideas” and to the uncopyrightable
1
We use the names assigned by the Claims Court to
those prior cases. S. Appx. 1-7.
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“topic” or “field” of information security, artificial intelli
gence, and legacy information systems. Aljindi v. United
States, No. 21-1295C, 2022 WL 17330006, at *1-2 (Fed. Cl.
Nov. 28, 2022) (Aljindi III). We affirmed that ruling.
Aljindi v. United States, No. 21-1295C, 2023 WL 2778689,
at *2-3 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 5, 2023) (Aljindi IV). We also de
clined to consider Dr. Aljindi’s argument on appeal that the
Claims Court erred by dismissing his takings claim be
cause we had already affirmed the Claims Court’s dismis
sal of that claim in Aljindi II. Id. at *2 n.3.
The second case of relevance to the present action was
initiated by Dr. Aljindi’s July 2021 filing of a pro se com
plaint in the Claims Court. Complaint, Aljindi v. United
States, No. 21-1578C, 2021 WL 5177430 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 30,
2021), ECF No. 1. Dr. Aljindi sought $32.7 million in dam
ages for alleged judicial misconduct (i.e., bribery, fraud,
and obstruction of justice) committed by judges in other
courts through their dismissals of his intellectual-property
(including copyright) claims, and for the SBA’s then-recent
less-than-affirmative response to the application for a loan
(under the EIDL program) to his business, Al Net Group
LLC. Id. at 2-4, 6-7; Aljindi v. United States, No. 211578C, 2021 WL 5177430, at *1-3 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 30, 2021)
(Aljindi SBA Opinion). The Claims Court (Judge Tapp)
dismissed his complaint. Aljindi SBA Opinion, at *1, *4.
It held that the judicial-misconduct claim was outside its
jurisdiction and that, regarding the SBA allegations, the
complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Aljindi SBA Opinion, at *2—3. On the SBA claim,
the Claims Court explained that, “[e]ven if SBA’s EIDL de
cisions are reviewable,” the SBA’s decision was not final:
SBA notified Dr. Aljindi that it needed additional docu
mentation to review the application but Dr. Aljindi did not
allege that he provided such documentation. Id. at *3. And
even if SBA issued a final decision, the Claims Court ex
plained, Dr. Aljindi had failed to state a claim upon which
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relief could be granted because he “ha[d] not availed him
self of the administrative remedies available to him.” Id.
B
On February 14, 2024, Dr. Aljindi filed the complaint
in this case, seeking $65.4 million in compensation. Com
plaint at 19, Aljindi v. United States, No. 24-242, 2024 WL
3024654 (Fed. Cl. June 17, 2024), ECF No. 1 (Claims Court
Compl.); S. Appx. I;2 Appellee’s Response Br. at 4. The
complaint includes two counts for relief—first, a claim for
an alleged Fifth Amendment taking of his 2015 research,
Claims Court Compl. at 2-15; second, a claim of intentional
and systemic retaliation committed by SBA in denying an
EIDL for Al Net Group LLC, id. at 15-19. See Claims
Court Opinion, at *1—2, *4. Dr. Aljindi simultaneously
moved for summary judgment. Id. at *1. The case was
assigned to Judge Tapp. Notice of Direct Assignment,
Aljindi v. United States, No. 24-242, 2024 WL 3024654
(Fed. Cl. June 17, 2024), ECF No. 7 (Notice of Direct As
signment). On February 20, 2024, Dr. Aljindi moved to dis
qualify Judge Tapp. S. Appx. 60-84. On April 17, 2024,
the government moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the United
States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC). S. Appx. 10-24.
The Claims Court granted the government’s motion to
dismiss and denied Dr. Aljindi’s motion for summary judg
ment as moot. Claims Court Opinion, at *1, *5. Noting
that Dr. Aljindi cited five different government documents
(published between October 2016 and August 2019) as evi
dence for his Fifth Amendment takings claim, the Claims
Court ruled that Dr. Aljindi’s claim involving one govern
ment component (the National Science and Technology
Council, or NSTC) was time-barred by the six-year statute
2 “S. Appx.” refers to the Supplemental Appendix
submitted by the Appellee.
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of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2501 but that his claims relat
ing to other government components3 were timely. Id. at
*2 & n.l. Nevertheless, the Claims Court concluded that
the takings claim was barred in whole by the doctrine of
res judicata and also because it was “not facially plausible.”
Id. at *2-4. To the extent that the takings claim could be
interpreted to be asserting intellectual-property theft, the
Claims Court added, the claim would be a tort claim out
side its jurisdiction. Id. at *3; 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Re
garding the alleged retaliation by SBA in handling the
request for an EIDL for Al Net Group LLC, the Claims
Court concluded that Rule 83.1 of the Claims Court’s Rules
barred Dr. Aljindi, a pro se plaintiff, from representing Al
Net Group LLC or any other entity besides himself and,
thus, his SBA retaliation claim had to be dismissed for lack
of prosecution under Rule 41(b). Id. at *4—5.
On the same day that it issued its opinion dismissing
Dr. Aljindi’s complaint, the Claims Court denied Dr.
Aljindi’s motion to disqualify Judge Tapp. Order, Aljindi
v. United States, No. 24-242, 2024 WL 3024654 (Fed. Cl.
June 17, 2024), ECF No. 25 (Order); S. Appx. 60-84. In his
motion to disqualify, Dr. Aljindi cited the decisions in the
two cases discussed in Part LA above and argued that they
supported his allegation that Judge Tapp was prejudiced
against him and must disqualify himself pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 455. S. Appx. 60-61. Dr. Aljindi also argued that
Chief Judge Kaplan should hear his case as he had “[t]yped
[her] name” in his filings. S. Appx. 61. In denying Dr.
Aljindi’s motion to disqualify, the Claims Court explained
that Dr. Aljindi had “fail[ed] to identify any personal bias
or prejudice” on the part of Judge Tapp and that the prior
3 Those other components are the Office of the Direc
tor of National Intelligence, Department of Defense, De
partment of Justice, and National Institute of Standards
and Technology. Id. at *2 n.l.
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rulings did not constitute a proper basis for disqualification
for bias or prejudice. Order at 1-2.
Dr. Aljindi timely appealed. We have jurisdiction un
der 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
II
In this case, where the factual allegations of the com
plaint are not challenged for purposes of the dismissal mo
tion, we review the dismissal (for lack of jurisdiction or for
failure to state a claim) de novo. Taylor v. United States,
959 F.3d 1081, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citations omitted).
“In either case, ‘[w]e take all factual allegations in the com
plaint as true and construe the facts in the light most fa
vorable to the non-moving party.’” Inter-Tribal Council of
Arizona, Inc. v. United States, 956 F.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed.
Cir. 2020) (alteration in the original) (citations omitted).
Although pleadings by pro se litigants are held to “less
stringent standards” than those for lawyers, pro se plain
tiffs must still meet their jurisdictional burden. Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520—21 (1972); Kelley v. Secretary,
U.S. Department of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
1987). A trial court has “broad discretion to manage [its]
docketf].” Procter & Gamble Co. v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc.,
549 F.3d 842, 848-49 (Fed. Cir. 2008). We review the de
nial of a motion to disqualify under 28 U.S.C. § 455 for
abuse of discretion. Allphin v. United States, 758 F.3d
1336, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Shell Oil Co. v. United
States, 672 F.3d 1283, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2012). We address
the takings issue, then the retaliation issue, and finally the
disqualification issue.
A
Dr. Aljindi challenges the Claims Court’s dismissal of
his takings claim, arguing that the government “has taken
his property by engaging in research” in the “combined
field of [information security, artificial intelligence (Al),
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and legacy information systems (LIS)].” Appellant’s Infor
mal Br. at 19. We reject the challenge.
Regarding the takings claim related to a published
strategic plan of the NSTC, the Claims Court properly held
that claim to be time-barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2501. Claim
Court Opinion, at *2. That provision, which is a jurisdic
tional limitation, John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States, 552 U.S. 130. 133-34 (2008), requires that a claim
be brought “within six years after such claim first accrues,”
28 U.S.C. § 2501. Dr. Aljindi contends that the “six-yearQ
statute of limitations does not apply here simply because
the 2016 example [of the NSTC strategic plan] . . . was dis
covered by [him] around December 2018.” Appellant’s In
formal Br. at 24. But “[a] claim first accrues when all the
events have occurred that fix the alleged liability of the
government and entitle the claimant to institute an ac
tion,” Ingrum v. United States, 560 F.3d 1311, 1314 (Fed.
Cir. 2009), and Dr. Aljindi did not establish in the Claims
Court and does not establish here that the publication was
concealed or unknowable or that he should not have known
of it, see id. at 1314-14; Appellant’s Informal Br. at 19, 24,
so there is no basis for suspending the accrual past the
NSTC publication date in 2016, more than six years before
his suit here.
Dr. Aljindi also has not identified reversible error in
the Claims Court’s holding that the takings claim (as to the
timely and untimely challenged uses) was precluded by the
doctrine of res judicata based on the Aljindi IP litigation.
See Claims Court Opinion, at *2-3. “A claim is barred by
res judicata when ‘(1) the parties are identical or in privity;
(2) the first suit proceeded to a final judgment on the mer
its; and (3) the second claim is based on the same set of
transactional facts as the first.’” Cunningham v. United
States, 748 F.3d 1172, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting
Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 334 F.3d 1052, 1055 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)). All three elements are present here.
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First, the parties (Dr. Aljindi and the United States)
are identical to the parties in the Aljindi IP litigation. Sec
ond, Dr. Aljindi’s Fifth Amendment takings claim was pre
viously dismissed in Aljindi I (and affirmed in Aljindi II
and Aljindi IV) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. Aljindi I, at *2; Aljindi II, at *3; Aljindi
IV, at *2 n.3; see Claims Court Opinion, at *3. A dismissal
for failure to state a claim constitutes a final judgment on
the merits, and thus has res judicata effect. See Spruill v.
Merit Systems Protection Board, 978 F.2d 679, 687 (Fed.
Cir. 1992). Third, we agree with the Claims Court that his
“present takings claim is based on the same set of transac
tional facts as his prior [Aljindi IP) litigation” because his
present case against “ALL formal Al Strategies published
by the federal government” necessarily includes the 2019
publication by the Department of Defense that was the fo
cus of his prior claim. Claims Court Opinion, at *3. Dr.
Aljindi is attempting to litigate “issues that were or could
have been raised” in his earlier suit, which res judicata pre
vents. See First Mortgage Corp. v. United States, 961 F.3d
1331, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Dr. Aljindi has similarly shown no error in the Claims
Court’s dismissal of the takings claim for failure to meet
the pleading standard of setting forth facts that plausibly
establish the elements of the asserted wrong. Claims
Court Opinion, at *3-4; but see Appellant’s Informal Br. at
19 (arguing the claim is “facially plausible”). Dr. Aljindi
had to allege plausibly, among other things, that he owned
property protected by the Takings Clause and that it was
taken by the government. He has pleaded that he discov
ered the entire field of research into the relationship be
tween information security, artificial intelligence, and
legacy information systems, Claims Court Compl. at 4, but
at a minimum he has not shown that it is plausible that he
has a cognizable property interest (for Takings Clause pur
poses) in that general idea and “everything built on top of
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[his] research” and that the government has taken that
from him, Claims Court Opinion, at *4.
B
Dr. Aljindi challenges the Claims Court’s dismissal of
his claim of systemic and intentional retaliation by SBA for
lack of prosecution, arguing that he “can pursue this claim
pro se on behalf of his single member LLC and disregarded
entity company because he is the founder and the only
owner of his company” and because “the SBA’s retaliation
is directed toward [him] directly because of his federally
protected classes, statuses, and federally protected activi
ties.” Appellant’s Informal Br. at 19-20. We disagree. The
Claims Court correctly found that, even when reading the
correspondence with SBA that Dr. Aljindi provided, the
SBA’s action regarding the requested EIDL was directed at
Al Net Group LLC and thus his claim is “on behalf of Al
Net Group LLC, not Dr. Aljindi as an individual.” Claims
Court Opinion, at *4; Claims Court Compl. Ex. at 368 (SBA
document confirming receipt of documents for an EIDL ap
plication for Al Net Group LLC). Under the Claims Court’s
Rule 83.1, Dr. Aljindi cannot represent Al Net Group LLC,
and the Claims Court’s dismissal, under its Rule 41(b), for
Dr. Aljindi’s failure to comply with this rule is not an abuse
of discretion. See Claims Court Opinion, at *4. We there
fore affirm the Claims Court’s dismissal for lack of prose
cution. Id.
We also agree with the Claims Court that if Dr. Aljindi
brought this claim on behalf of himself, the Claims Court
would lack jurisdiction because retaliation claims are tort
claims. Id. at *4 & n.8; 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); see Aljindi
II, at *1. To the extent Dr. Aljindi claims discrimination
here, there is no basis for Claims Court jurisdiction over
such a claim. See Aljindi I, at *1-2; Aljindi II, at *1—2;
Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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c
Dr. Aljindi challenges the Claims Court’s denial of his
motion to disqualify, arguing that Judge Tapp denied his
summary-judgment motion as moot “illegally and mali
ciously,” that his “actions are criminal,” and that his “mo
tive was malicious and retaliatory.” Appellant’s Informal
Br. at 20-21.4 The assertions supply no basis for setting
aside Judge Tapp’s decision not to disqualify himself.
Dr. Aljindi cites to Judge Tapp’s prior dismissals of his
complaints, id., but he has no right to a new judge because
he has earlier lost before a given judge, and that judge has
gained some knowledge of the litigant. See Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994) (“[N]ot subject to depreca
tory characterization as ‘bias’ or ‘prejudice’ are opinions
held by judges as a result of what they learned in earlier
proceedings. It has long been regarded as normal and
proper for a judge to sit in the same case upon its remand,
and to sit in successive trials involving the same defend
ant.”). He cites to various procedural orders, such as the
court’s grant of the government’s motion for extension of
time, Appellant’s Informal Br. at 21-22, but those are
simply examples of the court exercising its inherent au
thority to manage its docket, and nothing indicates that the
court abused its discretion in exercising that discretion,
much less did so in a way that supplies a ground for dis
qualification. Dr. Aljindi supplies no basis for suggesting
misconduct in the assignment of the case to Judge Tapp.
Rule 40.2 of the Claims Court’s Rules requires that parties
identify related cases in their complaint, RCFC 40.2(a)(1)(3), and instructs that “the clerk will assign the case to the
4 Dr. Aljindi also claims to have filed, and cites to,
other motions to disqualify other judges, but we decline to
consider them as they are not relevant to the present case.
See, e.g., Appellant’s Informal Br. at 6; Appx29, 31-34; Ap
pellant’s Informal Reply Br. at 2-3.
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judge to whom the earliest-filed case is assigned,” RCFC
40.2(a)(4)(A). Dr. Aljindi identified the case resulting in
Judge Tapp’s SBA Opinion (Case No. 21-1578C) as a re
lated case, Claims Court Compl. at 1-2, and the clerk
properly assigned Judge Tapp to the underlying case here
pursuant to Rule 40.2(a)(4)(A), Notice of Direct Assign
ment. See Appellant’s Informal Br. at 5-7. At bottom, Dr.
Aljindi has no basis for asserting bias or prejudice except
his own beliefs about Judge Tapp and Judge Tapp’s prior
dismissal. But “subjective beliefs about the judge’s impar
tiality are irrelevant” in the objective test required by 28
U.S.C. § 455(a), Allphin, 758 F.3d at 1344, and Judge
Tapp’s past judicial rulings alone do not constitute a valid
basis for recusal in this case, particularly as his opinions
do not display “favoritism or antagonism that would make
fair judgment impossible,” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555; see Or
der at 1-2. We thus affirm the Claims Court’s denial of Dr.
Aljindi’s recusal motion.
Ill
We have considered Dr. Aljindi’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. We affirm the Claims Court’s
dismissal of Dr. Aljindi’s complaint and denial of his mo
tion to disqualify.
AFFIRMED
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®uitL'b States Court of Appeals;
tor tlje jfeberal Circuit
AHMAD AL JINDI,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
2024-1997
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in No.
l:24-cv-00242-DAT, Judge David A. Tapp.
JUDGMENT
THIS Cause having been considered, it is
Ordered and Adjudged:
AFFIRMED
FOR THE COURT
February 10, 2025
Date
Jarrett B. Perlow
Clerk of Court
Case: 24-1997
Document: 31
Page: 1
Filed: 04/23/2025
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.
Wntteii States Conrt of Spprals
for tfje jFe&eral (Orcirit
AHMAD AL JINDI,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
2024-1997
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. l:24-cv-00242-DAT, Judge David A. Tapp.
ON PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING AND
REHEARING EN BANC
Before MOORE, Chief Judge, LOURIE, Dyk, PROST,
Reyna, Taranto, Chen, Hughes, Stoll, Cunningham,
and STARK, Circuit Judges.1
Per Curiam.
ORDER
i
Circuit Judge Newman did not participate.
Case: 24-1997
Document: 31
Page: 2
Filed: 04/23/2025
2
ALJINDI v. US
On March 24, 2025, Ahmad Aljindi filed a combined
petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc [ECF
No. 29]. The petition was referred to the panel that heard
the appeal, and thereafter the petition was referred to the
circuit judges who are in regular active service.
Upon consideration thereof,
It Is Ordered That:
The petition for panel rehearing is denied.
The petition for rehearing en banc is denied.
For the Court
April 23, 2025
Date
Jarrett B. Perlow
Clerk of Court
Case: 24-1997
Document: 34
Page: 1
Filed: 05/05/2025
®ntte& States Conn of Appeals
for tlje jfeberal Circuit
AHMAD ALJINDI,
Plaintiff-Appellant
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
2024-1997
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. l:24-cv-00242-DAT, Judge David A. Tapp.
MANDATE
In accordance with the judgment of this Court, entered
February 10, 2025, and pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the formal mandate is
hereby issued.
FOR THE COURT
May 5, 2025
Date
Jarrett B. Perlow
Clerk of Court
Case l:24-cv-00242-DAT Document 26 Filed 06/17/24 Page 1 of 7
Sn tfje
Court of jFeberal Claims?
No. 24-242
Filed: June 17, 2024
DR. AHMAD ALJINDI,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE UNITED STATES,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Dr. Ahmad Aljindi (“Dr. Aljindi”) seeks $65.4 million as compensation
for a Fifth Amendment takings claim and alleged retaliation by the Small Business
Administration (“SBA”). (Compl. at 1-19, ECF No. 1). Simultaneously with the filing of his
Complaint, Dr. Aljindi moved for summary judgment, repeating his claims, and further arguing
the United States could not present “any persuasive evidence to defend” against his takings and
retaliation claims. (Compare Compl. at 2-19, with Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 3-21, ECF No. 4).
Before the Court is the United States’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules of the Court
of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) 12(b)(1) and (6). (Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 22). Because the Court
finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and that Dr. Aljindi failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, the United States’ Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 22), is granted and
Dr. Aljindi s Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 4), is denied as moot. For reasons
discussed below, the Court also dismisses Dr. Aljindi’s retaliation claim.
Determining the Court’s jurisdiction over a claim is a threshold inquiry. Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998). The Tucker Act grants this Court
jurisdiction over claims (1) founded on an express or implied contract with the United States; (2)
seeking a refund for a payment made to the government; and (3) arising from federal
constitutional, statutory, or regulatory law mandating payment of money damages by the United
States. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a); see also United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976). The
burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction rests with the plaintiff, who must do so by a
preponderance of the evidence. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Typically,
the Court holds pro se plaintiffs pleadings to “less stringent standards” than those of lawyers,
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), but pro se plaintiffs must still meet their
jurisdictional burden. Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t ofLabor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
If the Court determines that “it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter, it must dismiss the
claim.” Matthews v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 274, 278 (2006).
Case l:24-cv-00242-DAT Document 26 Filed 06/17/24 Page 2 of 7
When faced with a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to
RCFC 12(b)(1), dismissal is warranted when, assuming the truth of all allegations, jurisdiction
over the subject matter is lacking.” Palafox St. Assocs., L.P. v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl. 773,
779 (2014) (internal citation omitted). To ascertain the propriety of its exercise of jurisdiction
over a case the Court may look to evidence outside of the pleadings. Rocovich v. United States,
933 F.2d 991, 994 (Fed. Cir. 1991), affd in relevant part, Martinez v. United States, 281 F.3d
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Further, dismissal is warranted under RCFC 12(b)(6) when “the facts
asserted by the claimant do not entitle him to a legal remedy.” Lindsay v. United States, 295 F.3d
1252, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Importantly, “[fjactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are
true.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”) (Internal citation omitted).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Dr. Aljindi claims that he pioneered research of the relationships between Information
Security, Artificial Intelligence (“Al”), and Legacy Information Systems (“LIS”), and
subsequently registered that research with the Library of Congress in December 2015. (Compl. at
2-15; Compl. Ex. at 9, ECF No. 1-2). Dr. Aljindi also claims that “prior to [his] scientific
discoveries and research findings this knowledge and this property was undiscovered and did not
exist to the entire world[.]” (Compl. at 6). Therefore, Dr. Aljindi asserts that any government
research into the field “used” his copyrighted property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
(Id.).1 For its part, the United States argues that Dr. Aljindi’s taking claim is: (1) time-barred; (2)
violates the doctrine of res judicata; (3) can be construed as a tort claim; and (4) not facially
plausible and fails to state a claim. (Def.’s Mot. at 4—10). Despite the leniency afforded to pro se
plaintiffs, the Court agrees with the United States and addresses each argument in turn.
First, [e]very claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction
shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.”
28 U.S.C. § 2501. Here, Dr. Aljindi alleges that the federal government first “used” his scientific
discoveries in October 2016 when a subcommittee for the National Science and Technology
Council published “The National [Al] Research and Development Strategic Plan.” (Compl. at 6—
7; Compl. Ex. at 206-53). However, Dr. Aljindi filed his Complaint on February 14, 2024, which
falls outside so the Court cannot hear any claim accruing before February 14, 2018. (Compl. at
1 Dr. Aljindi identifies the following “Fifth Amendment Takings Evidence:” (1) a National
Science and Technology Council strategic plan for Al research and development published in
October 2016, (Compl. at 6—7; Compl. Ex. at 205—53); (2) an Office of Director of National
Intelligence (“ODNI”) initiative for “augmenting intelligence using machines” published in
January 2019 (Compl. at 7; Compl. Ex. at 254-79); (3) a Department of Defense (“DoD”) Al
strategy published in Februaiy 2019 (Compl. at 8; Compl. Ex. at 280-97); (4) a Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) data strategy published in February 2019, (Compl. at 7-8; Compl. Ex. at 298311); and (5) a National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) plan regarding Al
published in August 2019, (Compl. at 8-9; Compl. Ex. at 312-364).
2
Case l:24-cv-00242-DAT Document 26 Filed 06/17/24 Page 3 of 7
6-7; Compl. Ex. at 206-53). Therefore, the Court may hear the claims relating to ODNI, DoD,
DOJ, and NIST, but Dr. Aljindi’s claim relating to the National Science and Technology Council
is time-barred. 28 U.S.C. § 2501.
Second, the Court is bound by the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion. See
Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 525 F.3d 1319, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining the term “res
judicata” denotes the concept of claim preclusion); see also Cunningham v. United States, 748
F.3d 1172, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“A claim is barred by res judicata when ‘(1) the parties are
identical or in privity; (2) the first suit proceeded to a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the
second claim is based on the same set of transactional facts as the first.’”) (quoting Ammex, Inc.
v. United States, 334 F.3d 1052, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). Claim preclusion occurs when “a
judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their
privies based on the same cause of action.” Acumed LLC, 525 F.3d at 1323 (quoting Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.5 (1979)). Importantly, claim preclusion applies not
only to the claims that were brought in that first action, but also to those that could have been
brought. Brain Life LLC v. Elekta, Inc., 746 F.3d 1045, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Put simply, claim
preclusion prevents a party from relitigating claims it already or could have brought. Id.
In prior litigation,2 Dr. Aljindi alleged that the United States infringed on his copyright
when it “used [his] scientific work about ‘Information Security, [Al], and [LIS] without giving
him credit.” (Def’s Mot. Ex. 1 at 2, ECF No. 22-1); Aljindi v. United States, No. 21-1295C,
2021 WL 4807205, *1-2 (Oct. 15, 2021) (“Aljindi U), remanded in relevant part 2022 WL
1464476 at *2 (Fed. Cir. May 10, 2022) (fAljindi H”)? Although that litigation was primarily for
2 The Court conducted a cursory search on PACER and notes that Dr. Aljindi has also filed the
following cases in district court and appeals in the Ninth Circuit against the United States:
Aljindi v. United States, Case No. 8:18-cv-02301 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2019); Aljindi v. United
States, Case No. 8:19-cv-01434 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2019) (finding Dr. Aljindi’s complaint as
“similarly infirm” as his previous complaint in Aljindi, Case No. 8:18-cv-02301); Aljindi v.
United States, Case No 19-55926, Doc. No. 13 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) (appeal dismissed as
frivolous); Aljindi v. United States, Case No. 8:20-cv-00002, Doc. No. 13 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 24,
2020) (dismissed on the same ground as Aljindi Case Nos. 8:18-cv-02301 and 8:19-cv-01434);
Aljindi v. United States, Case No. 20-55111 (9th Cir. Aug. 7, 2020) (appeal dismissed as
frivolous); Aljindi v. United States, Case No. 8:2020-cv-00796, Doc. No. 108 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16,
2021) , Aljindi v. United States, Case No. 20-55688 (9th Cir. July 23, 2020) (denying motion for
reconsideration and specifying that “[n]o further filings will be entertained in this closed case.”);
Aljindi v. United States, Case No. 20-55166 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2021) (appeal dismissed as
frivolous).
3 Dr. Aljindi’s claims of employment discrimination, theft of intellectual property, and
negligence and tort were originally dismissed by this Court. Aljindi I. On appeal, the Federal
Circuit affirmed dismissal on Dr. Aljindi’s claims of employment discrimination and negligence
and tort, but remanded-in-part so the Court could consider whether Dr. Aljindi provided the
minimum required factual allegations to support a copyright infringement claim. Aljindi II. On
remand, the Court determined Dr. Aljindi’s copyright claims were not facially plausible and
explained that a “topic” or “field” of study is not copyrightable, so the Court dismissed his
complaint for failure to state a claim. Aljindi v. United States, No. 21-1295C, 2022 WL
3
Case l:24-cv-00242-DAT Document 26 Filed 06/17/24 Page 4 of 7
copyright infringement, the Court also determined that Dr. Aljindi failed to state a Fifth
Amendment takings claim. Aljindi I, at *2 (“Even assuming Plaintiff meant to allege a Fifth
Amendment taking of his intellectual property, his allegations are not facially plausible without
factual allegations about what the property consisted of, how it was taken, and what the
government did with it.”), aff’d in relevant part, Aljindi II, at *3 (“We agree with the trial court
that Dr. Aljindi's [takings claim] ‘allegations are not facially plausible without factual allegations
about what the property consisted of, how it was taken, and what the government did with it.’”);
Aljindi IV, at *2 n.3 (“[W]e affirmed [the] dismissal of this [Fifth Amendment takings] claim and
remanded only for consideration of his copyright infringement claim.”).4
Here, Dr. Aljindi is again suing the United States; the parties are identical. (Compl.);
Cunningham, 748 F.3d at 1179. Further, Dr. Aljindi’s previous takings claim reached final
judgment on the merits because “[dismissals for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted are judgments on the merits, and, thus, entitled to res judicata effect.” e Video Inc. v.
United States, 136 Fed. Cl. 164, 169 (2018), aff’d 1^ F. App’x 327 (Fed. Cir. 2019); see also
Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n. 3 (1981) (“The dismissal for failure
to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a ‘judgment on the merits.’”).
As explained above, both this Court and the Federal Circuit determined that Dr. Aljindi’s takings
claim was not facially plausible and therefore failed to state a claim. Aljindi I, at *2; Aljindi II, at
*3; Aljindi IV, at *2 n.3. Accordingly, the Court proceeded to final judgment on the merits of Dr.
Aljindi’s original takings claim. Cunningham, 748 F.3d at 1179.
Similarly, Dr. Aljindi’s present takings claim is based on the same set of transactional
facts as his prior litigation in Aljindi IV. There, Dr. Aljindi alleged that DoD “used [his] scientific
work about [Information Security, Al, and LIS] without giving him credit.” (Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1 at
2). On appeal, Dr. Aljindi specified that the “Government used [his] property in ALL formal Al
Strategies published by the federal government... as [he had] discovered this entire scientific
field in its entirety.” AIjindi /Fat *2 (emphasis in original). Although Dr. Aljindi’s prior claim
initially focused on DoD’s publications, he expanded his claim to encompass all federal
government publications regarding Information Security, Al, and LIS. Id.-, (Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1 at
2). That expansion is fatal. As highlighted above, Dr. Aljindi now cites several federal
government publications to argue that the United States is again “using” his research. (Compl. at
6-9; Compl. Ex. at 205-364). The Court understands “ALL formal Al Strategies published by
the federal government” to include the 2019 publications identified in the present complaint.
Aljindi IV at *2; (Compl. at 6—9; Compl. Ex. at 205—364).5 Therefore, Dr. Aljindi is attempting
17330006 (Nov. 28, 2022) (“Aljindi IIF). The Federal Circuit affirmed. Aljindi v. United States,
No. 2023-1230, 2023 WL 2778689 (Apr. 5, 2023) (“Aljindi IV’).
4 To the extent that Dr. Aljindi’s present Complaint relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) and reiterates
his prior copyright infringement claim, the Court’s claim preclusion analysis applies. See Aljindi
I-TV. Therefore, the Court declines to address a copyright infringement claim in any detail.
5 Even if the Court misconstrues Dr. Aljindi’s present set of transactional facts, Dr. Aljindi could
have brought his present claim because he cites publications from 2019 and he filed his initial
complaint in 2021. Brain Life LLC, 746 F.3d at 1053.
4
Case l:24-cv-00242-DAT Document 26 Filed 06/17/24 Page 5 of 7
to relitigate claims he already raised with the Court. Cunningham, 748 F.3d at 1179.
Accordingly, Dr. Aljindi’s takings claim is precluded.
Third, this Court lacks jurisdiction over tort claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); Rick’s
Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The plain
language of the Tucker Act excludes from the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction [over] claims
sounding in tort. ). To the extent that Dr. Aljindi’s present takings claim can be interpreted as
intellectual property theft, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear it. Aljindi Hat *2-3 (“We therefore
affirm the trial court’s determination that it lacks jurisdiction to review Dr. Aljindi’s tort claims,
including ... intellectual property theft.”).
Fourth, it is well-settled that “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Dr.
Aljindi alleges to have discovered the entire scientific field of Information Security, Al, and LIS.
(CompL at 2-15). He also argues that any government publications addressing this field
necessarily violate his Fifth Amendment right. (Id. At 5 (“[Everything built on top of [Dr.
Aljindi’s] taken property is [Dr. Aljindi’s] property)). This is unavailing. The United States
argues, and the Court agrees, such a claim is “too vague and implausible to survive a motion to
dismiss. (Def.’s Mot. At 8). As stated above, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Further, Dr. Aljindi appears to cherry-pick passages from government publications to
show they “used” his research. (Compl. at 7-9). For example, Dr. Aljindi highlights that the
NIST publication used the phrase “Al technologies and systems” and continued that IT can be
used for “capture, storage, retrieval, processing, display, representation, security, privacy and
interchange of data and information.” (Compl. at 9). Based on the Court’s judicial experience
and common sense, it is not plausible that Dr. Aljindi “discovered this entire field in its entirety”
and “everything built on top of’ Dr. Aljindi’s research is his property. (Compl. at 5-6); Ashcroft,
556 U.S. at 679 (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.”). Nothing provided by Dr. Aljindi even remotely supports his claim that he
alone originated the relationship between information security, Al, and LIS. (See generally
Compl.). Accordingly, Dr. Aljindi’s takings claim is not facially plausible and fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
Dr. Aljindi further claims that the SB A intentionally and systematically retaliated against
him because he filed several lawsuits6 and Equal Employment Opportunities (“EEO”) claims
involving the SB A. (Id. at 15-19). Specifically, Dr. Aljindi argues that the SB A intentionally
retaliated against him when it denied the application for Economic Injury Disaster Loan
( EIDL ) for his small business, Al Net Group LLC. (Id. at 15—19). The United States raises a
litany of arguments on why the Court lacks jurisdiction over Dr. Aljindi’s retaliation claim.
6 Dr. Aljindi cites the following: (1) Aljindi v. United States, Case No. 8:20-cv-00796 (C.D. Cal.
2021) (fAljindi V’); (2) Aljindi I; and (3) Aljindi v. United States, No. 21-1578C, 2021 WL
5177430 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 30, 2021) (“Aljindi VI”) (assigned to the undersigned).
5
Case l:24-cv-00242-DAT Document 26 Filed 06/17/24 Page 6 of 7
(Def.’s Mot. at 11-14). Although the Court disagrees with the United States’ kitchen sink
approach to Dr. Aljindi’s retaliation claim, the Court agrees it must be dismissed.
Fundamentally, Dr. Aljindi is alleging that the SBA denied Al Net Group LLC’s EIDL
application because he asserted his EEO rights in federal courts. (Compl. at 16-17). To support
his claim, Dr. Aljindi provided correspondence with the SBA about the loan status and apparent
screenshots from the SBA’s loan application portal. (Compl. Ex. at 385—414). Even when read
liberally, the Court understands Dr. Aljindi’s claim to be on behalf of Al Net Group LLC, not
Dr. Aljindi as an individual. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21; {see Compl. at 15-19). The Court
draws this conclusion because Al Net Group LLC’s—not Dr. Aljindi’s—EIDL application was
denied. (Compl. at 16-17; Compl. Ex. at 385—414).
Critically, under RCFC 83.1, a pro se plaintiff may only represent himself.7 In fact,
RCFC 83.1 explicitly provides that a pro se litigant “may not represent a corporation, an entity,
or any other person in any proceeding before this court.” Therefore, any claims brought by Dr.
Aljindi on behalf of Al Net Group LLC, are barred. Id. When a plaintiff fails to comply with this
Court’s rules, the Court may dismiss the complaint. RCFC 41(b) (“If the plaintiff fails
to ... comply with these rules ..., the court may dismiss on its own motion[.]”); e.g., Brewer v.
United States, 150 Fed. Cl. 248, 248-51 (2020) (“[A]s an unrepresented entity, plaintiff is in
violation of RCFC 83.1(a)(3). Plaintiffs claims must be dismissed for lack of prosecution
pursuant to RCFC 41(b).”). Accordingly, the Court will not address the retaliation claim8 and
must dismiss it for lack of prosecution under RCFC 41(b).
For the stated reasons, the United States’ Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 22), is
GRANTED. This matter is DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under RCFC
12(b)(1), failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under RCFC 12(b)(6), and
failure to prosecute under RCFC 41(b). Further, Dr. Aljindi’s Motion for Summaiy Judgment,
(ECF No. 4) is DENIED AS MOOT. Dr. Aljindi’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma
pauperis, (ECF No. 2), is GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly.
The Clerk also is DIRECTED TO REJECT any future submissions in this case unless
they comply with this Court’s rules regarding post-dismissal submissions. The Court
CLARIFIES that this provision does not act as an anti-filing injunction or a sanction. Allen v.
United States, 88 F.4th 983, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (holding that courts must provide pro se
plaintiffs with notice and opportunity to be heard before issuing an anti-filing injunction). Dr.
Aljindi is not enjoined from proper post-dismissal filings in this case, nor is Dr. Aljindi required
7 A limited exception exists under RCFC 83.1 for representation of immediate family members.
See Mandry v. United States, 165 Fed. Cl. 170, 172 (2023) (discussing RCFC 83.1), aff’d^o.
2023-1693, 2023 WL 7871692 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2023).
8 The Court notes that retaliation claims are considered torts. Baker v. United States, 642 F.
App’x 989, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (identifying retaliation has “long been recognized as [a] tort
claimf.]”). Even if this claim were brought on behalf of an individual, as discussed above, the
Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over claims sounding in tort. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).
6
Case l:24-cv-00242-DAT Document 26 Filed 06/17/24 Page 7 of 7
to seek leave before filing future actions in this Court. See id. This provision is a mechanism to
reject non-compliant filings in the above-captioned action once it is dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/DAVID A. TAPP, Judge
7
Case l:24-cv-00242-DAT Document 27 Filed 06/17/24 Page 1 of 1
Jn tljc
Btatcs Court of jfefceral Claim#
No. 24-242 C
Filed: June 17, 2024
DR. AHMAD ALJINDI
Plaintiff
v.
JUDGMENT
THE UNITED STATES
Defendant
Pursuant to the court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order, fded June 17, 2024, granting
defendant’s motion to dismiss,
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this date, pursuant to Rule 41(b), that plaintiffs
complaint is dismissed for failure to prosecute, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to
RCFC 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to RCFC
12(b)(6).
Lisa L. Reyes
Clerk of Court
By:
'De&ta
Soentvi
Deputy Clerk
NOTE: As to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 60 days from
this date, see RCFC 58.1, re number of copies and listing of all plaintiffs. Filing fee is $605.00,
effective December 1, 2023.
Case l:24-cv-00242-DAT
Document 34
Filed 08/21/25
Page 1 of 7
Sn tlje SIniteb states Court of jfrbernl Claim#
No. 24-242
Filed: August 21, 2025
AHMAD ALJINDI,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE UNITED STATES,
Defendant.
ANTI-FILING INJUNCTION
When the courthouse doors are repeatedly forced open for vexation rather than
vindication, the Court must act—not in reprisal, but to safeguard its constitutional function.
Here, pro se Plaintiff Dr. Ahmad Aljindi (“Dr. Aljindi”), has demonstrated a sustained course of
conduct marked by repetitive filings, identical legal theories, and collateral challenges to the
Court’s authority, despite consistent rulings denying relief. It must end. Therefore, Dr. Aljindi is
hereby ENJOINED from making further pro se submissions in this jurisdictioh without first
obtaining leave of the Chief Judge or securing legal representation.1
“Courts ofjustice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with
power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful
mandates.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,43 (1991). A Court may, in its discretion,
impose sanctions as it deems appropriate to address conduct that undermines the integrity of the
proceedings. See RCFC 11. Anti-filing injunctions are an appropriate sanction “where a pro se
litigant has engaged in repeated and frivolous lawsuits[.]” O’Diah v. United States, 722 F. App’x
1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Bergman v. Dep’t of Commerce, 3 F.3d 432, 435 (Fed. Cir.
1993); In re Powell, 851 F.2d 427, 430-31 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Anti-filing injunctions are “an
extreme remedyf;]” given their extreme nature, courts must “take great care not to unduly impair
a litigant’s constitutional right of access to the courts.” Hemphill v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 374 F.
App’x 41, 44-45 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
In determining whether to restrict a litigant’s future ability to sue, the Court should
consider “whether a litigant who has a history of vexatious litigation is likely to continue to
abuse the judicial process and harass other parties.” Eliahu v. Jewish Agencyfor Israel, 919 F.3d
1 Dr. Aljindi filed a new action in this Court after receiving the Show Cause Notice, (Order
Denying 60(b) Mot., ECF No. 31), preceding this injunction. Aljindi v. United States, Case No.
25-1288 (Hadji, J.). Whether by design or coincidence, the timing of that filing places it outside
the scope of this Order.
Case l:24-cv-00242-DAT
Document 34
Filed 08/21/25
Page 2 of 7
709, 714 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986)). Before
issuing any sanction, the Court must undertake a careful review of the record and the relevant
procedural history. O’Diah, 722 F. App’x at 1004. Other Courts have identified specific factors
that should be weighed when determining whether to issue an anti-filing injunction:
(1) the litigant’s history of litigation and in particular whether it entailed
vexatious, harassingf,] or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant’s motive in
pursuing the litigation, e.g., does the litigant have an objective good faith
expectation of prevailing?; (3) whether the litigant is represented by counsel;
(4) whether the litigant has caused needless expense to other parties or has
posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their personnel; and (5)
whether other sanctions would be adequatef.]
Iwachiw v. N.Y. State Dep’t ofMotor Vehicles, 396 F.3d 525, 528 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
(quoting Safir, 792 F.2d at 24). Before a trial court may impose an anti-filing injunction, the
litigant must be provided with notice that such a sanction is being considered and an opportunity
to be heard on the question of whether it should be imposed.2 Allen v. United States, 88 F.4th
983, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
This case is Dr. Aljindi’s third attempt in this Court to relitigate claims rooted in either
his alleged creation of Artificial Intelligence or perceived judicial misconduct. Dr. Aljindi
previously initiated two pro se actions, one assigned to the undersigned and the other to another
judge of this Court, both seeking $32.7 million in damages. See Case No. 21-1295 (Shwartz, J.);
Case No. 21-1578 (Tapp, J.). For his first action in April 2021, Dr. Aljindi alleged employment
discrimination, intellectual property violations stemming from the purported use of his
dissertation, negligence, and judicial misconduct. Aljindi v. United States, No. 21-1295C, 2021
WL 4807205, at *1-2 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 15, 2021) (Schwartz, J.). The Court dismissed all claims,
finding it lacked jurisdiction over most and that the takings claim was factually deficient. Id. Dr.
Aljindi appealed that decision; the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissals but remanded for
consideration of a possible copyright infringement claim. Aljindi v. United States, No. 21-1295C,
2022 WL 1464476, at *1 (Fed. Cir. May 10, 2022), cert denied 143 S. Ct. 436 (2022). On
remand, the Court dismissed the allegations as concerning uncopyrightable subject matter, and
the Federal Circuit affirmed. Aljindi v. United States, No. 21-1295C, 2022 WL 17330006, at *12 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 28, 2022), aff’d, Aljindi v. United States, No. 23-1230C, 2023 WL 2778689, at
*2-3 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 5, 2023).
In his second action, filed in July 2021, Dr. Aljindi accused judges in other courts of
judicial misconduct stemming from their dismissal of his intellectual property claims and
contested the Small Business Administration’s (“SBA”) response to his application for an
Economic Injury Disaster Loan. Aljindi v. United States, No. 21-1578C, 2021 WL 5177430 (Fed.
Cl. Aug. 30, 2021) (Tapp, J.). The Court dismissed the judicial misconduct claim for lack of
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, noting the absence of a final agency decision and failure
2 Following Dr. Aljindi’s motion to reopen this action, the Court directed him to show cause as
to why the Court should not subject him to an anti-filing injunction. (Order Denying 60(b) Mot.
at 5).
2
Case l:24-cv-00242-DAT
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Page 3 of 7
to pursue administrative remedies. Id. In that Opinion, the Court recapitulated Dr. Aljindi’s
litigation in other jurisdictions, reflecting a recurring pattern of vexatious conduct.3 Id. at *1-2.
For his third act—the case at bar—Dr. Aljindi sought $65.4 million for alleged Fifth
Amendment takings and retaliation by the Small Business Administration (“SBA”), based on
claims that the government misappropriated his copyrighted research linking Information
Security, Artificial Intelligence, and Legacy Information Systems. (Compl. at 1-19, ECF No. 1).
Within a week of filing suit, Dr. Aljindi moved to disqualify the undersigned, alleging bias based
on the outcome of his previous case. (ECF No. 8). The Court dismissed the action and denied his
motion to disqualify, finding no evidence of bias or misconduct. (ECF No. 26); Aljindi v. United
States, No. 24-242, 2024 WL 3024654, at *1, *5 (Fed. Cl. June 17, 2024).4 On appeal, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Aljindi v. United States, No. 2024-1997, 2025 WL
440123, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 10, 2025). The Circuit likewise upheld the denial of
disqualification, emphasizing that adverse rulings and docket management do not constitute
judicial bias. Id. at 5.
Marking yet another chapter in Dr. Aljindi’s ongoing effort, Dr. Aljindi returned to the
Court seeking to resurrect a series of baseless allegations against both the undersigned and the
Circuit. (Order Denying 60(b) Mot. Supp., ECF No. 31-1). Dr. Aljindi framed his request to
reopen his case under RCFC 60(b) due to what he perceived to be “a brazen pattern of judicial
crimes—docket tampering, evidence suppression, factual fabrication, legal perversion, deliberate
obstruction ofjustice, and post-judgment directives designed to thwart accountability.” {Id. at 1).
The filing reflected a broad challenge to prior proceedings and institutional integrity across
several forums; Dr. Aljindi used it as a platform to assert claims of appellate misconduct
following a bribery scandal, institutional coverups by the Supreme Court, purported hate crimes
and abuse involving the Federal Circuit and Court of Federal Claims (including the undersigned),
and assertions of discriminatory conduct by the Department of Justice and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. {Id. at 2).
3 On April 24, 2020, Dr. Aljindi filed a fourth lawsuit in the Central District of California,
alleging employment discrimination, negligence, torts, and unauthorized publication of his
scientific work. Aljindi v. United States, Case No. 8:20-cv-00796 (C.D. Cal. 2021). He named
twelve federal officials, claiming they denied him employment and infringed his intellectual
property. See id. This followed three prior suits dismissed as frivolous. See Aljindi, No. 211578C, 2021 WL 5177430, at *1. The first was rejected as incoherent and implausible. Aljindi v.
United States, Case No. 8:18-cv-02301, Doc. No. 8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2019). The second and
third were similarly dismissed, as were the related appeals. Aljindi v. United States, Case No.
8:19-cv-01434, Doc. No. 8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2019) (finding Dr. Aljindi’s complaint as
“similarly infirm” as his previous complaint); Aljindi v. United States, Case No 19-55926, Doc.
No. 13 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) (appeal dismissed as frivolous); Aljindi v. United States, Case
No. 8:20-cv-00002, Doc. No. 13 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2020); Aljindi v. United States, Case No. 2055111 (9th Cir. Aug. 7, 2020) (appeal dismissed as frivolous).
4 In that Order, the Court again cited Dr. Aljindi’s eight other cases in district courts and appeals
in the Ninth Circuit against the United States. Aljindi, 2024 WL 3024654, at *2 n.2.
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On July 31, 2025, the Court denied Dr. Aljindi’s request to reconsider the Court’s earlier
dismissal; it found that Dr. Aljindi’s allegations were untimely, unsupported, baseless, and “an
affront to judicial impartiality.” (Order Denying 60(b) Mot. at 3, ECF No. 31 (citing Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (“[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the
facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are
judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.”); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989) (defining pleading as frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.”); In re Cashion Fam. Tr., 669 B.R. 341, 384 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2025) (holding that pleadings
and allegations are frivolous when they are baseless and made without a reasonable and
competent inquiry))). Given Dr. Aljindi’s latest unsupported assertions, his repeated attempts to
relitigate matters already resolved, and the continued reliance on unfounded claims, the Court
ordered Dr. Aljindi to show cause as to why he should not be enjoined from future filings in this
Court. {Id. at 5 (citing Allen, 88 F.4th at 988)).
In response, Dr. Aljindi, loquacious as ever, filed not one but two documents. The first he
titled as “Plaintiffs Combined Motion to Reconsider and Reopen Case Under RCFC 59(a) and
60(b) by an Impartial Judge for Fraud on the Court; Motion to Strike and Vacate Order (ECF 31)
for Fraud Escalation and Judicial Misconduct; Motion to Disqualify Judge David A. Tapp for
Bias and Non-judicial Acts; and Opposition to Show-Cause Order for Anti-Filing Injunction.”
(Pl.’s Show Cause Resp., ECF No. 32). Notably, the Clerk docketed this filing as “Plaintiffs
Opposition to Show Cause Order[.]” The second filing seeks to correct that docket text pursuant
RCFC 60(a), citing a clerical error and alleging fraud. (ECF No. 33). The Court addresses these
in reverse order.
As an initial point, the text of a docket entry is administrative in nature and does not bear
upon the Court’s substantive consideration of the filing. It does not affect the merits or outcome
of a proceeding. Although Dr. Aljindi’s document expands upon the scope of the Court’s Show
Cause Order, as the docket text would suggest, the Court has reviewed the submission in full,
and Dr. Aljindi suffers no prejudice from the docket text itself. Even so, the Court previously
directed the Clerk to reject “any future submissions in this case unless they comply with this
Court’s rules regarding post-dismissal submissions[.]” Aljindi, 2024 WL 3024654, at *5. The
Court’s Order directed a response from Dr. Aljindi solely to the Show Cause Order. Accordingly,
the docket entry accurately reflects the scope of the Order and does not contain any
misrepresentation. Dr. Aljindi’s motion to correct the docket text, (ECF NO. 33), is therefore
DENIED.
The Court next considers Dr. Aljindi’s response to the Show Cause Order and finds that it
reiterates previously rejected assertions and continues a pattern of unsupported and inflammatoiy
allegations. In fact, it begins with motions for reconsideration, to strike and vacate the Court’s
order denying relief under RCFC 60(b), and for the undersigned to disqualify himself. (Pl.’s
Show Cause Response at 5-8). Before scaling the mountain, the Court begins with the first
foothold: Dr. Aljindi’s misinterpretations and half-truths.
First, Dr. Aljindi states, “[Judge] Tapp’s formally proven hate crimes are an intentional
and systemic malicious attack against the judicial impartiality, the United States Constitution, the
public trust in our courts, ‘WE THE PEOPLE.’ He was found guilty and in contempt of our
courts, ‘WE THE PEOPLE.’” (Pl.’s Show Cause Resp. at 2 (incoherence in original)). He offers
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no citation to support this proposition, and the undersigned remains unaware of having been
convicted of any offense. Second, Dr. Aljindi asserts that “[Judge] Tapp directed the clerk to
tamper with the docket, refuse to file the Motion to Reopen (ECF 31-1), issue a defect memo,
and forge docket text by falsely labeling it under ‘69(B)’ instead of 60(b).” {Id. at 3). Dr.
Aljindi’s mischaracterization of the Court’s administrative procedures is unsupported and
immaterial. His RCFC 60(b) motion was filed post-appeal, outside the scope of any operative
order or rule, and appropriately triggered a defect memo—an internal notification process for
procedurally deficient filings. As previously noted, docket text carries no weight in the Court’s
substantive analysis. The inclusion of a scrivener’s error had no bearing on the Court’s
reasoning, which references RCFC 60(b) thirty-three times and makes no mention of “Rule
69(b), a rule that does not exist. More fundamentally, Dr. Aljindi’s allegations overlook the fact
that the Court accepted and ruled on his filing. (Order Denying 60(b) Mot. at 1 (‘“Plaintiffs
Motion to Reopen Case Under Rule 60(b) for Fraud on the Court,’ is accepted and filed by the
Court’s leave.”)). The Court appended the document as a Supplement to the Order, which Dr.
Aljindi himself cites. {Id. Supp.; PL’s Show Cause Resp. at 3). Further, Dr. Aljindi wrongly
equates the lack of government representation with malice on the Court’s part—a misreading of
RCFC 11(c)(3), which expressly authorizes sua sponte sanctions without counsel’s involvement.
{See PL’s Show Cause Resp. at 3). Accordingly, the absence of government counsel offers no
support for Dr. Aljindi’s claim and reflects a misapprehension of the governing rule.
Of greater significance, Dr. Aljindi states that, through this filing, “[Judge] Tapp is
formally notified that he is named as Doe 1 in the sealed Bivens complaint filed [August 11,
2025] in [the Central District of California.]” (PL’s Show Cause Resp. at 3 (citing Exhibit K)).
While Dr. Aljindi’s Exhibit K resembles a legal filing, its redactions render its content
indiscernible. Further, the undersigned has not been informed of any such litigation, and PACER
reflects no record of it. Even so, the mere fact that a judge has been involved in litigation with a
party does not, standing alone, compel recusal under any governing rule. See Green v. 1900 Cap.
Tr. IIby U.S. Bank Tr. Nat’l Ass ’n, 619 B.R. 121, 133 (D. Md. 2020), aff’dsub nom. Green v.
Shellpoint Mortg. Servicing, 834 F. App’x 18 (4th Cir. 2021); Strange v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 46 F. Supp. 3d 78, 85 (D.D.C. 2014); In re Taylor, 417 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2005); Del
Vecchio v. Illinois Dept, of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1375 (7th Cir.1994) (en banc); United
States v. Watson, 1 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d 929, 933
(10th Cir. 1977). Courts reject a per se disqualification rule to prevent judge-shopping through
strategic lawsuits against the presiding judge. United States v. Quintanilla, 114 F.4th 453, 469
(5th Cir. 2024) (citing Grismore, 564 F.2d at 933 (“A judge is not disqualified merely because a
litigant sues or threatens to sue him.”)). Stated differently, a party may not manufacture a judicial
conflict by initiating litigation against the presiding judge. Dr. Aljindi appears to be employing
the same tactic he has used with other judges, suing the presiding officer and hoping for the best.
While Dr. Aljindi is within his constitutional rights to file suit, exercising that right in this
context does little to bolster his position—and certainly does not entitle him to a different judge.
Ultimately, Dr. Aljindi offers no basis for reconsideration or vacatur of the Court’s prior order,
and no grounds warranting recusal by the undersigned.
Having cleared the procedural brush, the Court turns to Dr. Aljindi’s cause as to why an
anti-filing injunction should not be issued against him. In sum, Dr. Aljindi contends that the
proposed injunction infringes his First Amendment and due process rights, amounts to
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retaliation, and serves as another blow from the judiciary aimed squarely at him. (Pl.’s Show
Cause Resp. at 8-10). These arguments are not compelling and do not adequately show cause.
While it is true that access to the federal courts constitutes a fundamental right, that right is not
absolute. See Allen, 88 F.4th at 987. Federal courts possess inherent authority to impose
sanctions for conduct undertaken in bad faith, including the pursuit of vexatious or abusive
litigation. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46. When a litigant has engaged in this sort of bad faith
litigation, Courts must comply with the mandates of due process. Id. at 50. Here, the Court’s
inherent authority to curb Dr. Aljindi’s abusive filings is paramount, but the operative term is
abusive. Dr. Aljindi’s First Amendment rights remain intact; the injunction does not impose a
categorical bar on his ability to seek redress. Should he possess a meritorious claim, he may still
pursue it in this Court—subject to obtaining prior authorization from the Chief Judge. Moreover,
the anti-filing order and its limitations apply solely to Dr. Aljindi’s pro se submissions. If
represented by counsel, he may initiate a meritorious action without seeking such approval. The
Court has fulfilled its due process obligations by affording Dr. Aljindi an opportunity to respond
to the proposed anti-filing injunction. He has failed to meaningfully do so, choosing instead to
till the same barren soil where his arguments have already failed to take root.
Dr. Aljindi fatally interpreted the Court’s previous directive as an invitation to
collaterally attack the Court’s Order. Specifically, Dr. Aljindi asserts that the Order denying him
60(b) relief is evidence of “docket tampering, evidence suppression, factual fabrication, legal
perversion, deliberate obstruction ofjustice, and post-judgment directives designed to thwart
accountability^]” “unworthy of the ink it was written with or the time wasted reading it[.]” (Pl.’s
Show Cause Resp. at 2 (citing Order Denying 60(b) Mot.)). Consistent with prior filings, Dr.
Aljindi offers neither relevant authority nor coherent reasoning, relying instead on volume as a
proxy for substance. Simply put, accusations do not evince cause. The Court has expended
considerable resources addressing these matters and finds no justification for continued
engagement.
Dr. Aljindi has completed the procedural equivalent of screaming from the rooftops.
Beyond this Court, he sought review from the California District Court, the Ninth Circuit, the
Federal Circuit, and even the Supreme Court of the United States. (See supra pp. 1-3 and note
3). To reiterate the Court’s prior finding, “[w]here several courts have consistently found no
basis for relief, the issue may rest with the merits of the claims rather than the reasons invoked
for dismissal.” (Order Denying 60(b) Mot. at 5). While persistence has its place, the continued
presentation of misconduct allegations and previously rejected arguments in a terminated
proceeding is a misuse of judicial process and must cease. As another tribunal recently
recognized:
Every litigant is entitled to be heard. And this Court has listened — patiently,
repeatedly, and at great length. But a litigant is not entitled to be heard
forever, nor to use the Court’s process as a platform to relitigate settled
questions, to hurl accusations untethered to evidence, or to disrupt the fair
administration of justice.
In re Vital Pharms., Inc., No. 22-17842-PDR,
B.R.
, 2025 WL 2016291, at *1 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. July 17, 2025). Dr. Aljindi has demonstrated a pattern of vexatious and duplicative
litigation. At this juncture, it is not reasonable to conclude that he could maintain an objective,
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good-faith expectation of success. Dr. Aljindi’s persistent pattern of meritless filings has placed
an undue strain on judicial resources and personnel. Filings previously deemed frivolous by other
Courts have not deterred Dr. Aljindi. The totality of the record indicates that a lesser sanction,
such as an admonition, would likely prove ineffective in curbing future misuse of judicial
resources.
Effective immediately, Dr. Aljindi is ENJOINED from filing new complaints pro se in
this Court without first obtaining leave to file from the Chief Judge. If Dr. Aljindi seeks to file a
new complaint in this Court, he shall move for leave to file and explain why the new complaint
is timely and properly before this Court. Any such motion must attach a proposed complaint
meeting RCFC 8’s pleading standards. Dr. Aljindi may file a new complaint if the complaint is
signed and filed by an attorney who is duly licensed and authorized to practice law under the
laws of at least one state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia, and is a
member in good standing of the Bar of the United States Court of Federal Claims. Finally, the
Court CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would
not be taken in good faith because Dr. Aljindi is a vexatious litigant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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DAVID A. TAPP, Judge
7
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.