Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Geneva Kristina Hudson, Petitioner v. United States

NO. ____________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

________________________________________________

Geneva Kristina Hudson,

Petitioner,

-vs.United States of America,

Respondent.

_______________________________________________

APPENDIX

______________________________________________

APPENDIX

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ..................... 1a

Order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa Denying

Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (D. Ct. Doc.

24) .................................................................................................................................. 6a

Judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa (D.

Ct. Doc. 25) ................................................................................................................. 13a

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 24-3037

___________________________

Geneva Kristina Hudson, also known as Geneva Hudson

Petitioner - Appellant

v.

United States of America

Respondent - Appellee

____________

Appeal from United States District Court

for the Southern District of Iowa - Central

____________

Submitted: March 20, 2025

Filed: June 16, 2025

____________

Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

____________

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

After a jury convicted her of various drug offenses, Geneva Hudson sought

post-conviction relief, claiming her attorney failed to inform her of the benefits of

pleading guilty. The district court 1 denied her motion without a hearing. Hudson

appeals, and, having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

1

The Honorable Stephen H. Locher, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of Iowa.

Appellate Case: 24-3037

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Date Filed: 06/16/2025 Entry ID: 5527385

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I.

Hudson was indicted on one count of conspiracy to distribute controlled

substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)-(B), and 846, and three

counts of distribution of a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),

(b)(1)(A)-(C). Hudson’s co-defendants pled guilty, but she chose to proceed to trial.

On the first day, the Government dismissed one of the distribution counts, and the

jury eventually found Hudson guilty of the other three charges. After calculating a

United States Sentencing Guidelines range of 324 to 405 months’ imprisonment, the

district court varied downward and sentenced Hudson to 270 months’ imprisonment

on each count to be served concurrently. Hudson appealed her sentence and

conviction, and we affirmed. See United States v. Hudson, No. 21-1887, 2022 WL

1210089 (8th Cir. Apr. 25, 2022) (per curiam).

Hudson then filed a pro se motion to vacate her sentence under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255. In a sworn affidavit, she claimed that trial counsel had been constitutionally

deficient because, as relevant here, he “failed to advise [her] as to all facts and law

relevant to her decision to plead not guilty and proceed to trial.” Had he done so,

Hudson claimed, “there is a reasonable probability that [she] would have pleaded

guilty and/or nolo contendere and/or proceeded to a bench trial on stipulated facts

and/or would have pleaded to a Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) agreement which

substantially reduced her sentence exposure.” The district court appointed counsel

for Hudson, who filed an amended § 2255 motion. In that motion, Hudson alleged

that her trial counsel “failed to adequately advise [her] of the benefits of pleading

guilty as opposed to going to trial, even in the absence of a plea agreement, including

benefits under the United States Sentencing Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. [§] 3553(a).”

Unlike her pro se motion, however, these allegations were not sworn to or verified

by Hudson.

At the Government’s suggestion, the district court ordered Hudson’s trial

counsel to submit an affidavit answering the allegations. He did so, detailing his

conversations with Hudson from her indictment up to and through her conviction at

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trial. In particular, trial counsel recounted how he sent a representation letter to

Hudson informing her that “[c]ooperation with the Government c[ould] lower [her]

sentence significantly” and that she would “lose the benefit of ‘acceptance of

responsibility’” should she proceed to trial and be convicted. He also detailed other

communications with Hudson, including a letter informing her that “there [wa]s a

three (3) point reduction for proper ‘acceptance of responsibility’” and that “there

may be additional reductions if [she chose] to provide ‘substantial assistance.’” In

addition to written correspondence, trial counsel recalled numerous phone calls and

in-person conversations with Hudson, many of which involved “trial preparation,”

“discussion[s] of plea options,” and “Guideline calculations of trial v. pleading

guilty.” Despite these conversations, trial counsel recalled that Hudson was

uninterested in “any meaningful, or substantive, plea negotiations.”

The district court denied Hudson’s motion without a hearing. First, the court

noted that Hudson was equivocal about what she would have done had she been

advised of the consequences of proceeding to trial as she alleged. In any event, the

court noted that Hudson’s only sworn affidavit, included as part of her pro se motion,

did not establish a reasonable probability of receiving a better sentence, as several

of her proposed alternatives would not entitle her to a credit for acceptance of

responsibility. Ultimately, the district court rejected Hudson’s claim because she

did not suggest that she even considered pleading guilty before trial. The district

court further noted that, in contrast to Hudson’s unsworn allegations, trial counsel

provided, in a sworn affidavit, his advice about the potential benefits of pleading

guilty, and Hudson did not directly contest any of trial counsel’s statements.

Because she did not offer any evidence or sworn statement rebutting trial counsel’s

representations, the district court denied Hudson’s motion. Hudson now appeals.

II.

Hudson argues that she was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on her

ineffective assistance claim. “A petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on

a § 2255 motion unless ‘the motion and the files and the records of the case

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conclusively show that [she] is entitled to no relief.’” United States v.

Ledezma-Rodriguez, 423 F.3d 830, 835-36 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). We

review a district court’s ultimate decision not to hold such a hearing for an abuse of

discretion, but we “look behind that discretionary decision to the court’s rejection of

the claim on its merits, which is a legal conclusion that we review de novo.” Id. at

836 (citation omitted).

In a claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant bears the

burden to show that trial counsel acted “outside the wide range of professionally

competent assistance” and that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Sanders v. United States, 341 F.3d 720, 721-22 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-94 (1984)). When a petitioner claims

her attorney failed to properly advise her on the benefits of pleading guilty, she must

show that she would have pled guilty “but for [her] counsel’s advice” to carry her

burden. See id. at 722 (quoting Engelen v. United States, 68 F.3d 238, 241 (8th Cir.

1995)).

Such a claim, however, “can be dismissed without a hearing if (1) the

petitioner’s allegations, accepted as true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief, or

(2) the allegations cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the

record, inherently incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of fact.”

Engelen, 68 F.3d at 240. In other words, to justify an evidentiary hearing, Hudson

“must present some credible, non-conclusory evidence that [s]he would have pled

guilty had [s]he been properly advised.” See id. at 241.

She has not done so. Hudson claims that, had counsel informed her of the

benefits of pleading guilty, she would have done so. But “[t]he record is completely

barren of any evidence” in support of that claim. See id. In both her sworn pro se

pleading and her unsworn amended motion, Hudson does not mention anything

beyond a cursory recitation of the ineffective assistance standard from Strickland.

Conclusory allegations like these without factual support do not justify an

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evidentiary hearing. See Hyles v. United States, 754 F.3d 530, 535 (8th Cir. 2014)

(“Nothing in the record indicates [the defendant] wanted [to plead guilty] even if

properly advised about the risks of trial.”). Because Hudson’s sworn statement, at

most, presents only “conclusions rather than statements of fact,” she was not entitled

to an evidentiary hearing. See Sanders, 341 F.3d at 722 (citation omitted); see also

Voytik v. United States, 778 F.2d 1306, 1308 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting that a § 2255

movant must provide more than “conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics”

(citation omitted)). Thus, Hudson cannot carry her burden of showing prejudice.

See Sanders, 341 F.3d at 722-23.

Nor has she shown that her counsel was deficient. In contrast to Hudson’s

pleadings, trial counsel’s affidavit is both sworn to and factually detailed. He

describes at length his communications to Hudson about the benefits of pleading

guilty, and Hudson “has not submitted any affidavits or other evidence of h[er] own”

which contradict counsel’s recollection. See id. at 723. Indeed, Hudson has

provided no sworn statement, documentary record, or evidence of any kind

suggesting that counsel’s statements are untrue. Her only argument is that her

general claims of deficient performance and prejudice are sufficient to justify an

evidentiary hearing. Under our precedent, she is wrong. See id. at 722-23 (affirming

denial of evidentiary hearing where trial counsel submitted an affidavit recounting

discussions on benefits of pleading guilty); Engelen, 68 F.3d at 240-41 (same).

Thus, to the extent Hudson even makes non-conclusory factual assertions, “they are

contradicted by the record [and] inherently incredible.” See Engelen, 68 F.3d at 240.

“[T]he motion, files[,] and records of th[is] case conclusively show” that Hudson is

not entitled to relief. See id. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Hudson an evidentiary hearing, nor did the district court err in

denying her motion on the merits.

III.

For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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Case 4:23-cv-00261-SHL Document 24 Filed 09/05/24 Page 1 of 7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA

CENTRAL DIVISION

GENEVA KRISTINA HUDSON,

Petitioner,

No. 4:23-cv-00261-SHL

vs.

ORDER ON MOTION TO VACATE,

SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT

SENTENCE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

Petitioner Geneva Kristina Hudson (“Hudson”) moves to vacate, set aside, or correct her

sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (2255 Docket 1 ECF 9.)

I.

BACKGROUND.

In March 2020, Hudson was charged with four drug-related crimes in a multi-count

Indictment against herself and three co-defendants: Count 1: Conspiracy to Distribute Controlled

Substances, including 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 500 grams or more of a mixture

and substance containing methamphetamine, and 100 grams or more of a mixture and substance

containing heroin; Count 2: Distribution of a Controlled Substance (heroin); Count 3: Distribution

of a Controlled Substance (5 grams and more of methamphetamine); and Count 9: Distribution of

a Controlled Substance (50 grams and more of methamphetamine). (Crim. Dkt. ECF 36.) She pled

not guilty to all four charges, and her case went to jury trial in October 2020. (Crim. Dkt. ECF

151; Crim. Dkt. ECF 156; Crim. Dkt. ECF 157.) On the first day of trial, the Government

dismissed Count 2. (Crim. Dkt. ECF 151.) The jury found Hudson guilty on Counts 1, 3, and 9.

(Crim. Dkt. ECF 163.) She was later sentenced to a below-Guidelines sentence of 270 months’

imprisonment. (Crim. Dkt. ECF 249; Crim. Dkt. ECF 250.) She appealed, but the United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed her conviction and sentence on April 25, 2022.

(Crim. Dkt. ECF 288.)

On July 25, 2023, Hudson moved to vacate, set aside, or correct her sentence. (2255 Dkt.

ECF 1.) In response to a Court Order, and with the assistance of appointed counsel, she filed an

amended motion on November 22, 2023. (2255 Dkt. ECF 9.) As amended, she raises five grounds

of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) failure to conduct reasonable investigation into potential

All references to “2255 Dkt.” are to the electronic case filing docket in this post-conviction review case, Case No.

4:23-cv-00261 (S.D. Iowa). All references to “Crim. Dkt.” are to the electronic case filing (ECF) docket in Hudson’s

underlying criminal case, Case No. 3:20-cr-00040 (S.D. Iowa).

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Case 4:23-cv-00261-SHL Document 24 Filed 09/05/24 Page 2 of 7

defenses, including a potential alibi defense to Count 3; (2) failure to advise her of the likelihood

of success at trial; (3) failure to solicit or garner a plea offer from the Government; (4) failure to

inform her of her co-defendants’ guilty pleas in a timely fashion and explain the impact of those

pleas on her trial prospects; and (5) failure to advise her of the benefits of pleading guilty instead

of going to trial, even in the absence of a plea agreement. (2255 Dkt. ECF 9, ¶ 17.) Hudson’s trial

counsel, Jack Dusthimer, filed an Affidavit and related documents addressing Hudson’s

allegations. (2255 Dkt. ECF 15; 2255 Dkt. ECF 17; 2255 Dkt. ECF 18.) The Government resists

Hudson’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct her sentence. (2255 Dkt. ECF 22.) Relevant facts

will be discussed in the Legal Analysis section, below.

II.

LEGAL STANDARDS.

“Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 a defendant in federal custody may seek post conviction relief on

the ground that his sentence was imposed in the absence of jurisdiction or in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States, was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is

otherwise subject to collateral attack.” Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 2007).

However, “Section 2255 relief is not available to correct errors which could have been raised at

trial or on direct appeal, absent a showing of cause and prejudice, or a showing that the alleged

errors were fundamental defects resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Ramey v. United

States, 8 F.3d 1313, 1314 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (citation omitted) (first citing United States

v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167–68 (1982); and then citing United States v. Smith, 843 F.2d 1148,

1149 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). Proving actual innocence is one way for a defendant to obtain

post-conviction despite procedural default. See Dejan v. United States, 208 F.3d 682, 685–86 (8th

Cir. 2000).

A showing of ineffective assistance of counsel also typically “satisfies both cause and

prejudice.” United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996). The Sixth Amendment

guarantees a criminal defendant’s right to “effective assistance of counsel.” Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14

(1970)). “Generally, to be successful on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant

must ‘show both deficient performance by counsel and prejudice to the defense caused by that

performance.’” Thomas v. United States, 737 F.3d 1202, 1207 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Barger v.

United States, 204 F.3d 1180, 1181 (8th Cir. 2000)). “Deficiency means that counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and prejudice means that, but for

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counsel’s errors, a reasonable probability exists that the result of the sentencing would have been

different.” Deltoro-Aguilera v. United States, 625 F.3d 434, 437 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). “The defendant bears the burden to overcome the strong

presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.” Thomas, 737 F.3d at 1207 (citing

Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 846 (8th Cir. 2006)). “However, strategic choices made due to

a lack of preparation or investigation are not protected by the same presumption.” Id. (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91)). “An attorney is not incompetent in exercising reasonable

professional judgment even when, in hindsight, the decision may have been a mistake.” Id. (citing

Brown v. United States, 656 F.2d 361, 363 (8th Cir. 1981)). “But, an attorney must conduct more

than a cursory investigation.” Id. (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 527 (2003)).

III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS.

A. Hudson Is Not Entitled to Post-Conviction Relief on Her Theory that Trial Counsel

Failed to Conduct Reasonable Investigation.

Hudson argues, first, that Attorney Dusthimer failed to conduct reasonable investigation

into potential defenses at trial, “including a potential alibi defense to Count 3 of the Indictment.”

(2255 Dkt. ECF 9, ¶ 17.a.) She does not, however, explain what the additional investigation would

have uncovered that might have changed the outcome. She does not, for example, explain what

her alibi defense would have been on Count 3 or how she would have presented evidence of it,

nor does she identify any other evidence or defenses that Dusthimer might have uncovered

through additional investigation. In these circumstances, even assuming Dusthimer’s performance

was deficient in some way, Hudson has not shown the existence of a factual dispute that, if

resolved in her favor, would show that she was prejudiced by those deficiencies. See, e.g., Palmer

v. Clarke, 408 F.3d 423, 445 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of post-conviction relief where

petitioner failed to explain how additional research or investigation would have impacted his

case); Gillimas v. United States, No. 4:09CV1118 JCH, 2011 WL 3648265, at *13 (E.D. Mo.

Aug. 18, 2011) (denying § 2255 motion where petitioner merely offered “conclusory statements”

for why additional investigation might have impacted the outcome). This aspect of her motion is

therefore denied.

B. Hudson Is Not Entitled to Post-Conviction Relief on Her Theory that Trial Counsel

Failed to Provide Effective Advice Regarding Whether to Plead Guilty.

Hudson’s remaining allegations revolve in some way or another around Dusthimer not

doing enough to get her to plead guilty. Specifically, she alleges that he did not: (a) garner (or at

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least solicit) a plea offer from the Government; (b) advise her of the benefits of pleading guilty

without such an offer; and/or (c) help her understand the strength of the Government’s case,

especially after her co-defendant’s guilty pleas. (2255 Dkt. ECF 9, ¶ 17.b–e). The factual support

for her position is murky. In her original § 2255 filing, which she submitted under penalty of

perjury, she stated that Dusthimer “failed to advise [her] as to all facts and law relevant to her

decision to plead not guilty and proceed to trial. Had [she] been fully advised, there is a reasonable

probability that [she] would have pleaded guilty and/or nolo contendere and/or proceeded to a

bench trial on stipulated facts and/or would have pleaded to a Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C)

agreement which substantially reduced her sentence exposure.” (2255 Dkt. ECF 1, pp. 5–6; see

also id., p. 16.) In her amended pleading, she narrowed her language, stating that she “would have

pleaded guilty rather than proceeding to trial and, as a result, likely would have received a shorter

sentence.” (2255 Dkt. ECF 9, ¶ 19.) Her amended pleading was not, however, sworn under penalty

of perjury.

The Court does not need an evidentiary hearing to deny Hudson’s theory that she was

prejudiced by Dusthimer’s failure to solicit or garner a plea offer. A defendant “has no right to be

offered a plea,” Ramirez v. United States, 751 F.3d 604, 608 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Missouri v.

Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 148 (2012)), and there is nothing in the record to suggest the Government

tried to make an offer only to be rebuffed by Dusthimer. Hudson therefore clearly is not entitled

to post-conviction relief on this theory. See id. (affirming denial of motion for post-conviction

relief where petitioner “simply has not shown that a reasonable probability existed that the

government would have extended a plea offer”).

Similarly, an evidentiary hearing is not necessary on Hudson’s theory that Dusthimer

failed to advise her regarding the strength of the Government’s case. Shortly after Hudson was

charged, the Court held a detention hearing in which she heard testimony from the lead case agent

summarizing the Government’s evidence against her. (Crim. Dkt. ECF 31.) This included, among

other things, testimony regarding controlled purchases of methamphetamine and marijuana from

Hudson on January 10 and February 9, 2020—the latter of which was made by an undercover

officer who “met directly with Ms. Hudson, and she provided four ounces of methamphetamine

in exchange for $1600.” (Crim. Dkt. ECF 111, pp. 7–8.) The testimony also covered other

evidence of Hudson’s involvement in drug activity, including her arrest in late September 2019

while in possession of heroin. (Id., pp. 11–12.) At the end of the hearing, United States Magistrate

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Judge Stephen Jackson stated, in Hudson’s presence, that “the weight of the evidence against Ms.

Hudson is strong. There are two purchases made by an undercover agent [from] her of significant

quantities of controlled substances. Again, not surprising, federal court case, the weight of the

evidence is significant.” (Id., p. 33.) Judge Jackson later reiterated this finding in his written ruling,

identifying the strength of the evidence as a reason for ordering Hudson detained and stating that

she “has been a main player in distributing significant quantities of controlled substances over a

long period of time from her residence . . . .” (Crim. Dkt. ECF 32, p. 3.) Given what Hudson heard

directly from a federal judge about the strength of the Government’s case, it is not reasonable for

her to suggest that she was prejudiced in some way by Dusthimer’s alleged failure to reiterate the

same message. See Jones v. United States, No. CIV.A.108-CV-3249RWS, 2009 WL 1285866, at

*4 (N.D. Ga. May 5, 2009) (denying § 2255 motion where petitioner was present at pretrial

hearing and thus “well aware of the strength of the government’s case prior to trial”).

Hudson’s only remaining theory is that Dusthimer failed to advise her of the benefits of

pleading guilty without a plea agreement, including the potential for her to receive acceptance of

responsibility credit that would substantially reduce her Sentencing Guidelines range. As noted

above, Hudson’s pleadings are equivocal on how she would have used this information. Her sworn

pleading states that better advice from Dusthimer would have caused her to “plead[] guilty and/or

nolo contendere and/or proceed[] to a bench trial on stipulated facts and/or . . . plead[] to a Fed.

R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) agreement which substantially reduced her sentence exposure.” (2255

Dkt. ECF 1, pp. 5–6.) Two of these proposed courses of action—pleading nolo contendere and

proceeding to a bench trial on stipulated facts—are: (i) rare in the Southern District of Iowa; and

(ii) inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. See, e.g., United States v. Grant, 688 F. App’x

411, 412 (8th Cir. 2017) (affirming denial of acceptance of responsibility for defendant who pled

nolo contendere); United States v. Agboola, 241 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1026 (D. Minn. 2003) (“[A]

plea of nolo contendere effectively precludes a downward adjustment for acceptance of

responsibility.”). Hudson is therefore not entitled to post-conviction relief on these theories

because there is not a reasonable probability of a different sentence. See Valdivia-Perez v. United

States, No. C08-4006-MWB, 2009 WL 4049586, at *6 (N.D. Iowa Nov. 17, 2009) (denying

motion for post-conviction relief where defendant failed to show reasonable probability of

different sentence).

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Similarly, for reasons explained above, Hudson’s suggestion that she might have pled

guilty pursuant to an agreement governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(C) is not a basis for postconviction relief. The Government was not obligated to make a plea offer at all, much less to

recommend a particular sentence. Thus, again, Hudson’s has not shown a reasonable probability

of a different sentence. See Valdivia-Perez, No. C08-4006-MWB, 2009 WL 4049586, at *6.

This leaves Hudson with one theory: that she would have pled guilty if Dusthimer had

informed her that she could do so without a written plea agreement and receive acceptance of

responsibility credit. There are two fatal problems with this theory. First, Hudson has not properly

supported it, as her sworn (original) pleading does not even mention it. Instead, it came up for the

first time in her unsworn, amended pleading. Even there, however, Hudson does not suggest that

she ever considered pleading guilty prior to trial; instead, at most, her position seems to be that

Dusthimer should have pressured her to do so against her will. This is not enough for an

evidentiary hearing under Eighth Circuit precedent, which has repeatedly and consistently

recognized that “[a] defendant who maintains his innocence at all the stages of his criminal

prosecution and shows no indication that he would be willing to admit his guilt undermines his

later § 2255 claim that he would have pleaded guilty if only he had received better advice from

his lawyer.” Sanders v. United States, 341 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming denial of §

2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing); see also Hyles v. United States, 754 F.3d 530, 535

(8th Cir. 2014) (“Nothing in the record indicates she wanted to accept the plea offer and would

have acknowledged her guilt even if properly advised about the risks of trial.”); Ramirez, 751 F.3d

at 608 (similar); United States v. Stevens, 149 F.3d 747, 748 (8th Cir. 1998) (similar). These cases

are governing here.

Second, and relatedly, Hudson never directly contests the portion of Dusthimer’s Affidavit

stating that he sent two letters to Hudson advising her of the potential benefits of cooperating and

accepting responsibility. (2255 Dkt. ECF 15, ¶¶ 14–16; 2255 Dkt. ECF 17; 2255 Dkt. ECF 18.)

Instead, at most, Hudson vaguely alleges at a general level in the unsworn pleading that Dusthimer

failed to “adequately” advise her of the benefits of pleading guilty, and that she would have pled

guilty rather than proceed to trial if she had “received effective assistance.” (2255 Dkt. ECF 9, ¶¶

17, 19.) More than this is required for Hudson to create the kind of factual dispute that would

warrant an evidentiary hearing. See Sanders, 341 F.3d at 723 (affirming district court’s decision

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to deny post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing where petitioner did not submit any

affidavits or evidence to rebut trial counsel’s affidavit regarding potential sentencing outcomes).

IV.

CONCLUSION.

The Court DENIES Hudson’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (2255 Dkt.

ECF 9) and her related Motion for Relief (2255 Dkt ECF 11).

The Court further concludes that Hudson largely has failed to make a “substantial showing

of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and has not shown that the issues

raised in her motion for post-conviction relief “are debatable among reasonable jurists” or

otherwise “deserve further proceedings,” Flieger v. Delo, 16 F.3d 878, 882–83 (8th Cir. 1994).

The Court therefore declines to grant a Certificate of Appealability on most of Hudson’s claims.

The only exception is her claim of ineffective assistance based on trial counsel’s alleged failure to

advise her that she could plead guilty without a plea agreement and receive acceptance of

responsibility credit. The Court is reasonably confident that it has correctly applied Eighth Circuit

precedent in concluding that Hudson needed to create a stronger factual record on that issue to be

entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Nonetheless, reasonable jurists could disagree, and thus the

Court grants a Certificate of Appealability on the following narrow question: is an evidentiary

hearing required when a petitioner generically asserts that she would have pled guilty without a

plea agreement had she been advised of the benefit of doing so but: (a) offers no factual evidence

suggesting she ever considered pleading guilty in the first place; and (b) does not directly rebut

factual evidence in trial counsel’s affidavit identifying times in which counsel made her aware of

the benefits of pleading guilty?

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 5, 2024

______________________________________

STEPHEN H. LOCHER

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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Case 4:23-cv-00261-SHL Document 25 Filed 09/06/24 Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA

Geneva Kristina Hudson

CIVIL NUMBER: 4:23-cv-00261-SHL

Petitioner,

v.

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

United States of America

Respondent,

✔ DECISION BY COURT. This action came before the Court. The matter has

been fully submitted and a decision has been rendered.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

Petitioner's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is

denied. Judgment entered in favor of respondent against petitioner. Case closed. The Court

declines a Certificate of Appealability except for her claim of ineffective assistance based on

trial counsel’s alleged failure to advise her that she could plead guilty without a plea

agreement and receive acceptance of responsibility credit.

Date: September 6, 2024

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

/s/_____________________________

B.German

By: Deputy Clerk

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