Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Christopher J. Rahaim, Petitioner v. Nancy M. Ley, former Judge, Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida, et al.

Supreme Court briefJun 5, 2025

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no. 25 ° 56 04

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

JUN - 5 2025

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

<dsrirfg>^Aar~ \J *

-- PETITIONER

Vs.

S"fc4^ o-T

OPAcU cF

/^aA<y

A-HarrMi-y

-- RESPONDENT(S)

R&berUTTr\cj4|y Petarj

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI OORREgTEJ)

CHRISTOPHER J. RAHAIM

41063 N-Ol

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Is the deprivation of due process rights, in underlying state criminal litigation, exempt

from the civil prisoner litigation clause 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims filed

in lieu of habeas corpus petitions?

2. Does established law protect and enforce rights violated by vague, ambiguous, conflicting

state legislation and prolonged ex-parte influence?

3. Does established Federal and International laws enforce the right to a fair speedy trial

and correct the deprivation of the right, perpetrated through trickery, deceit, extrinsic

fraud depriving face to face confrontation, material evidence of impeachability, actual

innocence?

4. Does the deprivation of self-representation/access to courts, with the purpose of

preventing challenges to rights violations, entitle the victim, through established law, to

review of the disqualified challenges and or dismissal of criminal charges and release from

custody?

5. Should the established, freestanding public records right be enforced, the State lacking

any compelling evidentiary privilege, to insure the correction of false testimony, fabricated

evidence, fraud and the release of a falsely imprisoned victim?

6. Do established laws protect and prevent the indefinite suppression of public records that

show fraudulent prosecutions of non-existent crimes, impeachability of prosecution

witnesses, and the insufficiency of evidence to sustain any conviction?

7. Does stare decisis, established laws and rights, prevail over judicial political

partisanship, concealment of fraud by unlawful rulings, and judicial immunity facilitating

and authorizing abuses of discretion where the state court lacks jurisdiction?

8. Is this Court obligated to revisit, under stare decisis, the internal constitutional conflict

between the 9th and 14th Amendments for vague and ambiguous wording in the 9th

Amendment, violating International Law, when the application results in arbitrary

detention perpetrated by elected officials or others, falsely claiming a lawful authority?

9. Where the courts have shown the appearance of bad faith, bias and political

partisanship, disregarding stare decisis principle, but has an intent to divert

Petitioner/Appellant's case to the U.S. Supreme Court for the proper administration of

justice, does this not obligate this court to review, rule and prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice for either a bad faith obstruction of justice, or diversionary, scenario,

regardless of the good or bad faith of the judiciary?

10. Is it not justiciable, involving the highest levels of controversy, requiring the

supervisory correcting power of the U.S. Supreme Court, where judges facilitate and

participate in a fraudulent scheme and conspiracy disregarding the stare decisis doctrine,

to deprive an actually innocent Petitioner/Appellant rights to impeaching

public records, a judgment of acquittal and the correction of prolonged, arbitrary detention?

11. Do established laws need to be enacted to correct and settle the variations in issues

leaving discretionary authority unbound to deprive rights and condone/conceal fraud?

12. Will this Court accept the duty to acknowledge petitioner's allegations and the

deprivations of rights under color of law, as his final remedy, and fully resolve the

entanglement/dilemma in favor of the American Spirit of Liberty or all party's?

LIST OF PARTIES

[X]

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page

[ ]

All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A

list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject

of this petition is as follows.

RELATED CASES

1. State Circuit Court cases :06-23073CFANO; 06-26725CFANO

2. Rahaim v. State of Florida, 2018’5096 Second District Court of Appeal.

Judgment 5/22/20.

3. Rahaim v. State of Florida 2D19-3568 Second District Court of Appeal.

Judgment 6/17/20.

4. Rahaim v. State of Florida: 2D19-4211 Second District court of Appeal.

Judgment 7/15/20.

5. Rahaim v. State of Florida^ 2D19-4211 Second District court of Appeal.

6. Rahaim v. State of Florida: 2020-1986 Second District court of Appeal.

Judgment 7/23/20.

7. Rahaim v. State of Florida: 2D20-1804 Second District court of Appeal.

Florida Supreme Court

1. Rahaim v. State SC-20-918

2. Rahaim v. State SC-20-1218

Federal District Court

1. Rahaim v. State 8:22-cv-2868-TPB-SPF

2. Rahaim v. State 8:22‘Cv303’WFJ‘J5£ ■

3. Rahaim v. State 8:22-cv-2448-KKM*CPT

4. Rahaim v. State 8:24-cvO1721-TPB-SPF

11th Circuit Appellate Court

1. Rahaim v. State 24T2630'G

2. Rahaim v. State 24T4175‘J

3. Rahaim v. State 25T0142*F

TABLE OF CONTENTS

JURISDICTION

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

. ..............

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

CONCLUSION

OATH.........................................

61.

AfAvfTTa

Fo&AA PAUJSFTO-S'..................

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX Bt ft

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APPENDIX C.Den<<x(

APPENDIX DrX. 'Fin.d dncUr

APPENDIXES (2^k3-9 /ne^/i

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APPENDIX F • Ku(«_ ^>C> /A©-{~toH ;

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

AJg

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C&ur-i" <3^ty 4^. errbASuJO f 3jlxm4Z-to<| (

[ ] For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix-------- to

the petition and is

[ ] reported at; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix £>---- to

the petition and is

[ ] reported at; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at

Appendix

to the petition and is

[ ] reported at-----------------------------------------------------------; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the

appears at Appendix

to the petition and is

[ ] reported at-----------------------------------------------------------; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

court

JURISDICTION

[X]

For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case

was February 5th, 2025.

[ ] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case. Motion to

reinstate appeal was filed February 19th, 2025.

[X] A timely petition for reinstatement was denied by the United

States Court of Appeals on the following date: May 9th. 2025, and a copy of

the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix

------ .

[X] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was

granted to and including June 5th, 2025 (date) on May 9th, 2025 (date) in

Application No. 24 A 1082.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1); 28

U.S.C. §1367! 28 U.S.C. §1331; 28 U.S.C. §1343(a), 42 U.S.C. §1983, Article

III §2 Clause 2 United States Constitution.

resufc CkrbdTwy AefadioA ly e.l«ikA

Adbibuar- O^IAIoa by

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was

X)/,A

i A copy of that decision appears at Appendix

•

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the

following date:, and a copy of the order denying rehearing

appears at Appendix.

Cui'S.

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for writ of certiorari was

granted to and including

(date) on —-------------- (date)

in Application No. A.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

United States Constitution: 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th, 14th Amendments

Florida Constitution: Article 1 §15 §9; §21; §245 Article 3 §2, §6, Article 10 §13

Federal Statutes and Rules: 18 U.S.C. §241, §242, §1512(b)(c), §3161(h)(8),

§3500.

28 U.S.C. §1331, §1343, §1915, §2241, §2244(d)(1)(b), §2254. 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Rules: 16(a)(1)(c), 44, 48(b), federal rules criminal procedure 9(b), 12,

56(c)(1)(B), 59 federal rules civil procedure.

301, 80i, 803 federal rules of evidence.

State statutes and rules:

Fla statute §90.104(l)(b), §90.302, §90.501, §90.608(5); §90.803(6)(7)(10),

§119.01, §454.18, §768.28, §794.11, §843.0855(3), (5)(a)(c).

Rules of criminal procedure: 3.140(g), 3.191, 3.220.

Rules of Professional Conduct: 4.37, 4.84(c).

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s) Issue

1. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. 435 U.S. 589 (1978) ---------------------------- PR

XO,3-2 fiFf

2. Drete v. Heley, 541 U.S. 386 (2004)-----------------------------------------------------------PR

3. Newman v. Graddick, 696 F. 2d 796 (11th Cir. 1983)--------------------------------------- PR

4. Romero v. Drummond, 480 F. 3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2007) ------------------------------------ PR

5. United States v. Wright, 2023 U.S. Dis. LESS 74388 (11th Cir. 2023)-------------------- PR

6. Callahan v. United Network For Organ Sharing, 17 F. 4th 1356 (11th

Cir. 2021 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ PR

<23

7. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) -------------------------------------------------- SRP

al ^1^7

8. Chapman v. U.S., 554 F. 2d 886 (5th and 11th Cir. 1977)-----------------------------------SRP

9. Henderson v. Florida, 754 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 1999) ------------------------------------------ PR

10. Bryan v. State, 748 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1999) -------------------------------------------------PR

11. Buenoano v. State, 798 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1998) -------------------------------------------- PR

3£

12. Hollandv. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) ----------------------------------------------------ET

13. McKinney v. Pate, 20 F. 3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994) --------------------------------------- DPR

XLfS

14. Shows v. Morgan, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1435 (11th Cir. 1999) -------------------------------- DPR

'SA.

15. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) -------------------------------------------- ST

16. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)-------------------------------------------------------- ST

17. United States v. Ortega, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14967 (8th Cir. 2002)------------------ ST

18. Walker v. San Francisco Unified School District, 46 F. 3d 1449 (9th

Cir. 1995)---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- FR

19. Logan v. State, 846 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 2003)---------------------------------------------------- J

34/3o

20. Bowen v. City ofNew York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986) ------------------------------------------SC

21. Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795 (9th Cir. 1969) ----------------------------------------- FE

Page(s) Issue

22. Zahrey v. Coffee, 221 F. 2d 342 (2nd Cir. 2000) -------------------------------------------- FE

23. A.L.H. v. State, 723 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ------------------------------------ PK

24. United States v. Vallejo, 297 F. 3d 1154 (11th Cir. 2002)---------------------------------- FT

, 33

25. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972)------------------------------------------------ FT

loin

26. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) -------------------------------------------------- FT -

27. United States v. Bagley, 413 U.S. 667 (1985) --------------------------------------------- IMP X3

28. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) ----------------------------------------------------- IMP

29. United States v. Agurs, 417 U.S. 97 (1976) ----------------------------------------------- IMP HH

30. Rogers v. State, 782 So. 373 (Fla. 2011) --------------------------------------------------- IMP XI

31. Arthur v. King, 500 F. 3d 1335 (11 * Cir. 2007) -------------------------------------------- ME 3j_

32. Daker v. Commr. Ga. Dept of Corrections, 820 F. 3d 1278 (11th Cir.

2016) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3ST OX

33. Fourstar v. Garden County Group Inc., 875 F. 3d 1147 (D.C. Cir.

2017) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3ST

34. Martin v. United States, 96, F. 3d 853 (7th Cir. 1996) ------------------------------------ IFP

35. Madden v. Myers, 102 F. 3d 74 (3rd Cir. 1996)--------------------------------------------- IFP

36. In Re Green, 669 F. 2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1981) -------------------------------------------- ATC

37. Schmidt v. Crusoe, 878 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 2003)---------------------------------------------- IFP 3X

38. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) -------------------------------------------------- HAB 417,3^

39. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1972)-------------------------------------------------- VA

40. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (1989) ------------------------------------------------------- NP XX 3S

41. Blanco v. Florida, 817 Fed. Appx. 794 (11th Cir. C.O.A. Cir. 2020)-------------------- NP 35*

42. Morrow v. Federal Bureau ofPrisons, 610 F. 3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2010)------------------ NP '£XJ35'

43. Ojo v. I.N.S., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 12683 (11th Cir. 1997) ---------------------------- NP 35

44. Rivera v. U.S. 761 F. Supp 126 (11th Cir. 1991) ------------------------------------------ ATC

Page(s) Issue

45. Baker v. Baker ECLES, 242 U.S. 394 (1917) ------------------------------------------- ATC

46. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) ------------------------------------------------ ATC

tK>

47. Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F. 2d 967 (5th and 11th Cir. 1983)------------------------------- WE 56

48. McMillan v. Johnson, 88 F. 3d 1554 (5th and 11th Cir. 1996) --------------------------- WE 53

49. Chappell v. Rich, 340 F. 3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2003) -------------------------------------- ATC

50. United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878)----------------------------------------- EF

51. Shaw v. Garrison, 467 F. 2d 113 (5th and 11th Cir. 1972) -------------------------------- FP 34j33

52. Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117 (1975)----------------------------------------------------- FP

53. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37(1975) ----------------------------------------------------- FP 33,34,Xl

54. Hughes v. Attorney General ofFlorida, 377 F. 3d 1258 (11th Cir.

2004)------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- FP 53

55. United States v. Leonard, 50 F. 3d 1152 (2nd Cir. 1995) ----------------------------------- FP 53

56. Monell v. New York Dept of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)--------------------- CAP HX

57. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)------------------------------------------------------- ATC 20.^4

58. Christopher v. Harbury, 526 U.S. 407 (2002) -------------------------------------------- ATC 3Z

59. United States v. Ortega, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14967 (8th. Cir

2002) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ST MO

60. Cook v. Monroe County Sheriff, 402 F. 3d 1092 (11th Cir. 2005)------------------------CAP 4X

61. Willette v. Airpods, 700 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) ---------------------------------- SL 4S62. Salser v. State, 613 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1993) ------------------------------------------------ JUR

63. State v. Gonzalez, 212 So. 3d 1094 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) ------------------------------- JUR 2F1

64. State v. Weinberg, 780 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) -------------------------------- JUR 37

65. Brent v. Tetlow, 328 F. 2d 890 (11th Cir. C.O.A. 1964) ----------------------------------- PC 37

66. Giordenello v. United'States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958) ---------------------------------------- PC 37

67. Metzler v. Kenner City, 695 Fed. Appx. 79 (5th and 11th Cir. 2017) ------------------- PC 37

Page(s) Issue

68. State v. Anderson, 537 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 1989) ------------------------------------------- JUR 32

69. Farnsworth v. Zerbst, 98 F. 2d 541 (5th and 11th Cir. C.O.A. 1938)--------------------- JUR 3?

70. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) ----------------------------------------------------- JUR 32

71. State v. Glossum, 462 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1985) --------------------------------------------- CIS 47

72. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) ------------------------------------------------------- CIS 47

73. Oldenv. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988) ------------------------------------------------Ef^EF “3X^2

74. Case v. Eslinger, 555 F. 3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2009) ----------------------------------------- CIS 44

75. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) ------------------------------------------------------- CIS 34,44

76. Cippollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). ---------------------------------- SLI 44

77. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1986) ---------------------------------------------- SLI

78. English v. General Electric, 496 U.S. 72 (1990) ------------------------------------------ SLI

79. Boyd v. Becker, 627 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1983) ---------------------------------------------- SOP 50

80. United States v. Clark, 442 Fed Appx 523 (11th Cir. C.O.A. 2011) -------------------- FT.

81. Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) ---------------------------------------------------- FT

82. United States v. Campbell, 743 F. 3d 802 (11th Cir. C.O.A. 2014) -------------------- FFC

83. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) ------------------------------------------------ FFC 3X,4?

84. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) ---------------------------------------------------------- OL 52L

85. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) --------------------------------------------- FFC 4?

86. Moffett v. Robbins, 14 F. Supp 602 (D. Kansas 1935) ------------------------------------- EF 2-3>}55'

87. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) ------------------------------------------------- HAB XL,47

88. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) -------------------------------

IR 5X

89. First Amendment of the United States Constitution ---------------------------------------- SR

90. Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ------------------------------------ SR

(37^0 '■

91. Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution -------------------------------------- SR 36 ,43

92. Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution -------------------------------------- SR MO, XL.

Page(s) Issue

93. Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution------------------------------------ DSR

45^

94. Fourteenth Amendment of the United StatesConstitution --------------------------------- SR 33,44,47

95. Article 1 §1, Florida Constitution ----------------------------------------------------------- SR 18,40,42.

96. Article 1 §9, Florida Constitution ----------------------------------------------------------- SR 47

97. Article 9 “Covenant On Civil andPolitical Rights” --------------------------------------- AD 44

98. Article 1 §24, Florida Constitution--------------------------------------------- PR

99. Article 10 & 13, Florida Constitution ---------------------------------------- IM

100. 18 U.S.C.S. §242; §241-------------------------------------------------------- OJ

X.H ,34>

101.28 U.S.C. §2244 (d)(1)(b) ---------------------------------------------------------------- HAB

102.18 U.S.C.S. §1512(b)(c) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- OJ

33,34

103. 18 U.S.C.S. §3161 (h)(8) --------------------------------------------------------------------- ST

104. 18 U.S.C.S. §3500 Jencks Act. ----------------------------------------------------------- IMP

X7 ,3ft

105 28 U.S.C. §2241 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------HAB

1-7

106. 28 U.S.C. §1331 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ EF

3,1.1 5^

107. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------EF

108. U.S.C. §1915 -------------------------------------------

ifp- U.iTBo

109. 42 U.S.C. §1983 ---------------------------------------

cr-jjWsi

110. Rule 16(a)(1)(c) Federal Rules Criminal Procedure

iMP-xn^q1

111. Rule 48(b) Federal Rules Criminal Procedure -----

-ST

112. Rule 56(c)(B) Federal Rules Criminal Procedure -

-—DP

113. Rule 59 Federal Rules Civil Procedure -------------

— ME 316 50 31

114. Rule 802 Federal Rules of Evidence

- COE

115. Rule 803 Federal Rules of Evidence

- COE

116. Rule 301 Federal Rules of Evidence

—FUI

3*7

30,4^,53

Pagels) Issue

21,41

117. Florida Statue §90.501 ----------------------------

—WIT

118. Florida Statue §90.104(1 )(B) --------------------

—EC 2-7,44

119. Florida Statue §90.608(5) -------------------------

- VJE

120. Florida Statue §119.01 -----------------------------

—PR

121. Florida Statue §90.803(6) (7) --------------------

- LOE

122. Florida Statue §843.0855(3),(5)(A), (C) -------

- ATC

23,44

123. Florida Statue §768.28 ----------------------------

1*7,4&HZ.

43,5^

— OL--HZ

124. Florida Statue §90.302 ----------------------------

—FUI

125. Rule 3.140(g) Florida Rules Criminal Procedure

-------- j

126. Rule 3.220 Florida Rules Criminal Procedure —

—CIS

127. Rule 4.84 Florida Rules Professional Conduct

— UI

17.41,43

ADDENDUM OF CASES

128. Soroa-Gonzales v. Civiletti, 515 F. Supp 1049 (11th Cir. 1981)------------------------- AD

129. Martinez v. City ofLos Angeles, 141 F. 3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1998) ----------------------- AD

130. A.L.H. v. State, 773 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ---------------------------------- PK 11,43

131. Conner v. Aiderman, 159 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1964) ------------------------------PR

231

132. Cofield v. Alabama Sservices, 936 F. 2d 512 (5th and 11th Cir. 1991) -------------- ATC

133. Bolin v. Story, 225 F. 3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2000) ------------------------------------------ OL S3 ,5^

134. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) OL------------------------------------------------- OL

135. Sanchez v. Degoria, 773 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) ------------------------------FR

136. U.S. v. Plattner, 330 F. 2d 271 1963)------------------------------------------------

M(H±

137. Strickland v. Green, 527, U.S. 263 (1999) ---------------------------------------------- NLE

<^L|

138. Terranova v. State, 474 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1985) --------------------------- LAE

139. Hughes v. Slomka, 807 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2002) ------------------------------- LAE

140. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 73 F.R.D. 612 (9th Cir. 1977) ---------------------- EF

141. Booker v. Dugger, 825 F. 2d 281 (11th Cir. COA 1987)

-------------------------------- EF

Page(s) Issue

142. Lewis v. McNeal, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59378 (11thCir. 2009)------------------ HAB IM

143. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) ---------------------------------------------------- ATC ^7

144. Carroll v. Gross, 984 f. 2d 392 (1101 Cir. 1993) ---------------------------------------- IFP

145. Hatch v. Briley, 230 Fed. Appx. 598 (7th Cir. 2007) ------------------------------------SOL 33

146. Booker v. State, 503 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 19897) ---------------------------------------------- EF MV

147. Shevin v. International Workers, 353 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1977) ---------------------------- VA

148. Brunell v. State, 360 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1978) ----------------------------------------------- VA MS'

149. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”; Articles 10,11.1,30 --------------------- AD

150. Perkins v. State, 576 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1991) -------------------------------------------- VA H5*

151. Arce v. Garcia, 434 F. 3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2006) -----------------------------------------ET 46

152. Pace v. Diguglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) ------------------------------------------------ET 46

153. Bailey v. State, 768 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2000) ------------------------------------ AF 44

154. CutYft'ingham v. District Attorney ofEscambia County, 592 F. 3d. 1237

(lltn Cir. 2010) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ATC 4?

155. Walker v. San Francisco Unified School District, 46 F. 3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1995) -— FR SD

156. Wright v. City ofMiami Gardens, 200 So. 3d 765 (Fla. 2016) ------------------------- VA

52.

157. Pembaur v. City • of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) ---------------------------------- OL

158. Tarter v. Hury, 646 F. 2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1981) ------------------------------------------ OL

159. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997) -------------------------------------------------- OL

160. Buckley v. Fizsimmons, 509 U.S. 250 (1993) -------------------------------------------- OL 54^

161. Austin v. State Ex. Rel. Christian, 310 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1975) -------------------------- UO 5X

162. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152 (1990) ----------------------------------------- VA

163. Florida Statute, §794.011 ------------------------------------------------------------------- JUR 56,43

164. Fla. Stat. §454.18 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ SR 25- ,41

165. Rule 3.191 Fla. r. crim.procedure ---------------------------------------------------------- ST 40^6

166. Article III §2, §6 Florida Constitution ---------------------------------------------------- JUR

167. Rule 4.37 Fla. r.professional conduct -----------------------------------------------------WIT

168. Hurley v. Irish American Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) --------------------------------- CR

169. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) ----------------------------------------------------- FE 5ttf-5rl

Page(s) Issue

170. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) ------------------------------------------------- FT

3Z) ,54

171. Anderson v. Singletary 111 F. 3d 801 (11th Cir. C.O.A. 1997) ---------------------- IFP

172. Doe v. Hampton, 566 F. 2d 265 (D.C. Cir. C.O.A. 1977) ---------------------------- EXP

S"6

173. Palmer Trin. Prvt. School v. Village Palmewtto Bay, 802 F. Supp. 1322

(11th Cir. 2011) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- EXP

174. Ford v. Wainreight, All U.S. 399 (1986)

---------------------------------------------- EXP

-5&

175. Mcaffee v. Procunier, 761 F 2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1985) --------------------------------- EXP

33,54

176. Depree v. Thomas, 946 F. 2d 784 (11th Cir. C.O.A. 1991) ----------------------------EXP

177. Gifford v. Dennis, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78718 (4th Cir. 2024) -------------------- NCI

£7

178. Towbin v. Antonacci, 287 F.R.O. 672 (11th Cir. 2012)

------------------------------- NCI

179. Huet v. Tromp, 912 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) ------------------------------------- EP

180. American Civil Liberties Union v. Finch, 638 F. 2d 1336 (5th and 11th Cir. 1981) —EP

181. Hancock v. Hobbs, 967 F. 2d 462 (11Cir. C.O.A. 1992) ------------------------------ EP

182. Newspress Pub. V. Wisler, 345 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1977) ---------------------------------PR

5°!

183. Wm. T. Thompson v. General Nutrition, 671 F. 2d 100 (3rd Cir. COA 1982) ------- FR

184. Hazel-Atlas Glass v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944) -------------------

ISSUES KEY: FR =

Rights; HAB = Habeas Corpus; NP = Non-prisoner; PR = Public

Records; FP = Fraudulent Prosectutions; CAP = Custom and Policy; ATC= Access to Courts;

WE = Withheld Evidence; EF= Extrinsic Fraud; VA = Vague and Ambiguous wording;

J Jurisdiction; IMP = Impeachability; ME = Manifest Errors; IFP = In Forma Pauperis; PK =

Prosecutor Knowledge; FE = Fabricated Evidence; SC = Secretive Conduct; SRP= Self-

Representation; ET = Equitable Tolling; ST = Speedy Trial; DPR = Due Process Rights; PC =

Probable Cause; CIS = Confidential Informant Status; SLI = State Law Inapplicable; SOP =

Separation of Powers; FT = False Testimony; SR = Substantive Rights; OL = Official liability;

FFC = Face to Face Confrontation; IR = Injunctive Rights; DSR = Deprivation of Substantive

rights’ AD = Arbitrary Detention; IM = Immunity; OJ = Obstruction of Justice; CR =

Constitutional Rights; FUI = Fraud undue Influence; LOE = Lack of Entry or Record; WIT =

Witness; U\ = Undercover Investigations; SOL = Statute of Limitations; UO = Unelected

Officials; CR = Certiorari Review; EXP = Ex-parte; NCI = Not compelling Interest; EP =

Evidentiary Privilege; 3ST = Three Strikes Rule.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Petitioner/Appellant has never had his day in court. His rights to a judgment of acquittal and

release from custody are being deprived through unlawful rulings in state and federal courts.

District and appellate judges, disregarding applicable federal and state laws and constitutional

rights, clearly established, have dismissed his Complaint and Appeal for no other claim, but a

failure to pay filing fees. His appeal is an appeal of right for underlying criminal proceedings

with a liberty interest where mandamus petitions were denied in bad faith. See: Carroll v. Gross,

984 F. 2d 392 (11th Cir. 1993); Martin; Madden (infra). Evidence presented and concealed is

necessary to prove deprivation of rights and that only fabricated evidence and false testimony is

falsely imprisoning the Petitioner. He is actually innocent.

2. The state courts disregarded petitioner’s Demands For Speedy Trial, Motions For Discharge

rendering the state court without jurisdiction for the willful refusal to provide a true, fair, speedy

trial of the merits. No conviction or trial is warranted for the concealed insufficiency of

evidence.

3. Public records laws and substantive rights to new light evidence, and hearings to settle

discovery violation disputes, were disregarded and denied in bad faith prejudicing the Petitioner

by and through rulings conflicting with established law and stare decisis doctrines.

4. Evidence, and over 20 witnesses, exists that would show that no reasonable finder of fact

could find the Petitioner guilty. If it was not for the constitutional violations, false testimony,

fabricated evidence and the state created impediment, preventing the production of documents,

Petitioner would be acquitted and released by a different outcome.

5. Petitioner/Appellant presented overwhelming evidence to all courts by a list of 111 facts,

proofs and elements, verified by over 120 exhibits. This evidence contains irrefutable evidence

in 50 prior inconsistent statements and fabricated evidence claims proving the charges against

him are false. Insufficiency of evidence and suppressed facts show lack of probable cause to

arrest.

6. The rulings in federal court refuse to acknowledge and apply stare decisis principles and

correct substantive rights violations by plain errors and abuses of discretion. Petitioner made

legally sufficient challenges citing controlling case laws, state and federal statutory laws and

established constitutional rights to be entitled to public records. Citing: Nixon; Dretke; Newman;

Romero; (infra). Petitioner requests public records, invalidation of convictions, any other relief

this court deems just.

7. Petitioner made constitutional challenges for the deprivation of the right to speedy trial.

Citing: Klopfer; Barker; Ortega (infra.); rule 48 (b) fed.r.crim.proc.; 18 U.S.C. §3161 (h)(8); rule

3.191 Fla. r. crim.procedure-

; Articleif

8. Petitioner made challenges for the deprivation of access to the courts. Citing: Lewis;

Christopher; Chappell (infra). The right to the correction of false testimony and fraud was

challenged, citing: Giglio; Vallejo; Kyles; Mooney; Zahrey; Imbler (infra). See; U.S, v. Clark,

442 fed appx 523 (11th Cir. C.O.A. 2011), Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263 (1999); Sargent v.

Fla. Dept, of Corrections, 480 Fed.Appx. 527 (11th Cir. C.O.A. 2012) providing imputation of

knowledge to all prosecutors. C/ear(y

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9. The informant accuser, in case 06-23073, was impeachable and gave so many conflicting

statements that she was not used in any proceeding violating Petitioner’s right to face to face

confrontation, pursuant to the 6th and 14th Amendments. Petitioner’s challenges resulted in no

relief, citing Throckmorton (infra). See; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); California

v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). Accuser’s statements prove sex could not have occurred, that she

never was on the Petitioner’s boat and he is actually innocent, citing: Murray v. Carrier. The 11th

Cir. case, U.S, v. Campbell deprives the 6th Amendment right to face to face confrontation/cross

examination.

10. Petitioner was fraudulently denied the right to self representation. Citing: Faretta; Plattner;

Fla. Stat. §454.18 (infra); Rule 44 fed r crim.proc. The defense attorney knows DNA evidence

does not match the Petitioner, but matches the undercover officer who had sex with his informant

the night she falsely accused the Petitioner of attack. The attorney cannot be an advocate and

witness, pursuant to Rule 4,37 p przrfi Conduct, and must give truthful testimony, pursuant to Fla.

Stat. §90.501. (infra).

11. Petitioner cited his right to be free from fraudulent prosecutions, brought in bad faith, with no

hope of obtaining a valid conviction. Citing: Shaw: Kugler; Younger (infra). Where the

prosecutors withheld evidence of the confidential informant status of accusers, there exists a

right to dismissal of criminal charges for that failure. Citing: Banks; State v. Glossum (infra).

12. Petitioner made valid arguments that he is entitled to relief in Federal court for state due

process violations when the state fails to provide an adequate process to remedy the

constitutional violations. Citing: McKinney; Shows (infra). This failure impedes, through

extrinsic fraud tactics, Petitioners right and ability to file meaningful habeas Petitions because of

the fraudulent concealment of material evidence, citing: Holland v. Florida; Pace (infra). See:

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)

13. Petitioner made legally sufficient arguments that he is entitled to proceed in all courts In

Forma Pauperis for procedural steps in criminal litigation. Citing Carroll; Martin; Madden;

Maleng; Blanco; Morrow; Ojo; 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(4) (infra).

14. Due process principles provide Petitioner has a right to evidence showing the impeachability

of witnesses, citing: Bagley; Kyles; Agurs; Ryland; Sargent (infra). As a non-prisoner, Petitioner

has the right to challenge, free from costs, the constitutionality of fraudulent convictions

obtained by false testimony under and through a §1983 lawsuit and not be bound by Heck or

habeas petitions to challenge procedural due process violations, citing: Spencer; Heck;

Wilkinson; Harden; Maleng; (infra).

15. Failure of the Federal government to acknowledge and correct these true violations and

factual realities will continually and irreparably injure the integrity of the judiciary and the

Petitioner through the perpetration of prolonged, arbitrary detention. Citing: Wolff; Martinez;

Soroa-Gonzalez; Article 9 International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights; Articles 10,

11.1, 30 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

16. Petitioners challenges to the vague and ambiguous wording doctrines applying stare decisis

for favorable rulings, citing: U.S, v. Bass; Crandon v. U.S. 494 U.S. 152 (1990), when combined

with the 11th Circuits holding that the victim of a crime in a criminal trial does not need to be

present in view of a jury if the defense had one opportunity to cross examine the witness, see:

U.S, v. Campbell, 743 f. 3d 802 (11th Cir. C.O.A. 2014) and this ruling conflicts with established

law in Crawford, California, Olden (supra) this provides a sufficient basis for U.S. Supreme

Court certiorari review, also because Fla. Stat §843.0855 is ambiguous with conflicting

principles between access to court rights, versus the courts ability to investigate using fraudulent

documentation. The statute should be resolved in Petitioner’s favor in accord with public

records, speedy trial rights, and face to face confrontation/due process rights^clearly established

as settled law.

17. Petitioner’s claims involve all the necessary elements to show that the perpetration of

extrinsic fraud exists, see: U.S, v. Standard Oil Company, 73 F.R.D. 612 (9 Cir. 1977) . He

invoked the federal courts jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331 and § 1343(a) for state

perpetrated extrinsic fraud, see: Moffett v. Robbins, 14 F. Supp 603 (D. Kansas 1935). Petitioner

has met the requirements to show extrinsic fraud by clear and convincing evidence and the

absence of fault or negligence on his own part, see: Booker y. Dugger, 825 F. 2d 281 (11 Cir.

C.O.A. 1987).

It is fundamentally unfair, involving the highest level of controversy, to criminally suppress

documents needed in an official proceeding, violating 18 U.S.C.S. §1512(b)(c) and inflict severe

emotional distress on an innocent victim when he has shifted the burden to the state to rebut the

raised presumption of undue influence and fraud, pursuant to Fla. Stat. §90.302, rule 301

fed.r.evidence, the state failing to rebut. This relentless, unwavering intent, by the state, to

fraudulently conceal all fact evidence, proves the level of controversy, because

who have

the power to prevent an International scandal;want these facts to be exposed despite Petitioner s

rights and actual innocence.U

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18. This court ruled in case: Hazel-Atlas Glass v. Hartford Empire Company, 322 U.S. 238

(1944) citing U.S, v. Throckmorton (infra) that any claim, that Petitioner has not exercised the

highest degree of diligence, cannot justify the denial of equitable relief from a judgment obtained

by fraud on the court. Petitioner spoke up at the sentencing hearing in September, 2008 stating

“The trial’s no good, the alleged victim never appeared before the court.” Statements showing

concession, by trial judge, were deleted from the written record, but this court’s doubt will be put

to rest by the audio recording, (see: Transcript exhibit #4 in case file 20-6168).

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19. Petitioner’s right to review is established for multiple reasons cited and all his remedies and

challenges have been denied with no hearings or opinions. Conclusions of law, disregarding the

stare decisis doctrine, as to federal rights, and the findings of fact, are so intermingled that

certiorari review is required, see: Hurley v. Irish (infra). The substantive right to be presumed

innocent, until proven guilty, has been reversed by an assimilated, unconstitutional process. In

Florida Courts, you are judged guilty, despite evidence available, until proven innocent.Under

these circumstances, It is truly tyrannical that the state process prevents exculpatory evidence

from being presented preventing the right to a judgment of acquittal. This is absolute obstruction

of justice and arbitrary detention depriving due process through criminal deprivation of rights

under color of law, 18 U.S.C.S. §242 .This requires and obligates the U.S. Supreme Court to

protect civil rights and revisit the laws, under stare decisis, for vague and ambiguous wording,

providing and facilitating this corrupted friethod and standard for incarceration, despite any

proprietary or compelling interest in conflict with Human Rights and International Law.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

20. Petitioner/Appellant is the victim of fraudulent prosecutions of non-existent crimes. He was

suing real estate investors in civil court. The investors could not prevail so they planned an

unconscionable scheme to falsely imprison the Petitioner/Appellant. Police were paid and used

confidential informant, they were using for sex, to seek out the Petitioner/Appellant and

fabricate sexual battery charges when no sex occurred with the Petitioner/Appellant.

21. Overwhelming evidence of actual innocence and conspiracy to falsely imprison

Petitioner/Appellant has been presented to all state and federal courts including the United States

Supreme Court. A List of 11T facts, proofs and elements with over 100 verifying exhibits show

the accusers were lying by at least 50 prior inconsistent statements and tangible evidence items

being fraudulently concealed. With all the evidence available and concealed, being presented in a

true contest of the merits, no reasonable finder of fact could find the Petitioner/Appellant guilty.

There is an insufficiency of evidence to sustain any conviction entitling Petitioner/Appellant to

judgments of acquittal and release from custody.

22. The defendants and all courts are engaged in a continuing violation and fraudulent scheme to

deprive rights to self-representation, speedy trial and public records proving all claims of the

Petitioner/Appellant. He exhausted all state remedies and brought o. §1983 Complaint

challenging the substantive and procedural due process rights violations by the state court and

defendants. -

23. Acting as

advocates for the state, in a prosecutorial role, federal court judges unlawfully

dismissed the Complaint and Appeal, sua sponte, falsely alleging Petitioner/Appellant has 3

strikes, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(g). The denial of the Rule 59 Motion and the Appeal, for

non payment of the filing fee, clearly shows due process/access to courts violations requiring

U.S. Court review to settle law.

24. The district court abused its discretion, committing plain errors, falsely refuting

Petitioner/Appellant’s claim that he has no strikes ancrdoes not apply, for multiple reasons, to

this case. The denial of the rule 59 motion and the dismissal of the Complaint and appeal

requires the granting of this Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

25. In connivance in the Petitioner/Appellant’s defeat, all parties and courts are engaged in

conspiracy against rights, obstructing justice, impeding and preventing Petitioner/Appellant from

his substantive rights to be heard and access the courts by sua sponte dismissals of three

Complaints and denials of all claims in the state courts, see: Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539

(1974) ruling the right of access to courts is founded in the due process clause and assures that no

person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations

of constitutional rights see: Lewis, Christopher (infra).

DENIED ACCESS TO COURTS

26. Right of access to court’s challenges arise from several sources including the 1^ 5^ and 14^

Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, see: Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 407 (2002);

Chappell v. Rich, 340 F. 3d. 1279 (11th Cir. 2003). §1983 access to court claims must show

injury, see: Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) ruling that depriving a person of an arguable,

though not yet established, claim inflicts injury, see: Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 f. 2d 967 (5th and

11th Cir. 1983).

27. The failure of police and prosecutors, including defendant state Attorney Bruce Bartlett, to

disclose material, exculpatory or impeachment evidence is a cognizable injury under the due

process clause of the 14th Amendment, see: McMillan v. Johnson, 88 f. 3d 1554 (5th and 11th Cir.

1996). Law enforcement had a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to prosecutor. Prosecutor

has failed his duty to disclose evidence to the defense. Obstruction of Justice is found where

there is peijury, the prosecutor knew the testimony was false and failed to correct the fraud, see;

United States v. Vallejo, 297 F. 3d 1154 (11th Cir. 2002); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150

(1972); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935)j-5<vgeAf" v. Flo., De^rh

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ENTITLEMENT TO RECORDS SHOWING IMPEACHABILITY

28.

Petitioner/ Appellant is entitled to documents to assist in cases where witness^are

impeachable, see: Jencks Act 18 US.C. §3500; Rule 16(a)(1)(c) fed r. crim.procedure; Fla. Stat.

§90.104(1 )(a)(b); §90.608(5) rule 3.220 fla.r.crim.proc.

29. Records showing impeachability must be produced before trial, see: Kyles v. Whitley, 514

U.S. 419 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). The evidence is material and

must be produced if it will show the result of the proceeding would have been different had the

evidence not been suppressed. In this case in state court, defense counsels “motion for judgment

of acquittal” would have been granted. See: Rogers v. State, 782 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 2011).

Petitioner/Appellant’s 14th Amendment due process/access to courts rights were lost when

officials concealed key facts that would form the basis for redress by the impeachability of all

witnesses, see; Ryland (Supra). State prosecutors cannot claim ignorance to evidence

insufficiency to subvert the judicial process, see; A.L.H. V. State, 773 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 4th DCA

2000) ruling the prosecutor is presumed to have knowledge of all documents in the state’s file

and must disclose impeaching evidence to the defense. See. Sargent v. Fla. Dept, of Corr., 480

Fed Appx 523 (11th Cir. C.O.A. 2012) ruling: Knowledge of false testimony is imputated to all

prosecutors even by failure to correct unsolicited false testimony.

30. A conviction obtained using false testimony cannot stand, see: Giglio; Mooney (supra),

totally false testimony amounts to a sham trial. The defendants possible argument, that no

official trial has been held, does not relief the constitutional obligation to provide

Petitioner/Appellant the requested purchased records because they all show state’s witnesses lied

in pre-trial depositions and are impeachable, see: U.S. v. Bagley; Kyles (Supra).

THE FREESTANDING RIGHT TO PUBLIC RECORDS

31. Petitioner/Appellant has a freestanding, absolute constitutional right to the

public records he purchased. This common laws right has been characterized as fundamental to a

democratic society. The enforcement of this right does not depend on whether the

Petitioner/Appellant needs the documents for a proprietary interest or as evidence in a lawsuit,

see: Nixon v. Warner Communications Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978); Dre/e v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386

(2004); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F. 2d 796 (11th Cir. 1983); Henderson v. Florida, 754 So. 2d

319 (Fla. 1999). Petitioner/Appellant’s right is freestanding not requiring him to show anything

except that he paid for the records, pursuant to Fla. Stat. §119, Art. 1 §24 Fla. Const..

32. Florida law gives Petitioner/Appellant a substantive right to the public records paid for and

requested. See: Article 1 §24 Fla. Constitution; Fla. Stat. §119.01 public records act; Bryan v.

State, 748 So. 2d 1003 (1999); Buenoano v. State, 708 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1998). Records must be

produced despite incriminating results to their maker, see: Conner v. Aiderman, 159 So. 2d 890

(Fla. 2nd DCA 1964). Rule 3.220 fla.r.crim.procedure, may not be limited or expanded by Florida

Statute §119.01.

33. Petitioner/Appellant’s showing of materiality, additionally gives rights by federal law and the

14th Amendment’s equal protection and due process to the requested documents, see: The

Armstrong Decision, rule 16(a)(1)(c) Fed.R.Crim. Procedure; The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C.S.

§3500; Everyman’s Evidence Doctrine; Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice Doctrine; New Light

Evidence Doctrine.

34. Public records must be made available to all members of the public. Material, in connection

with pre-trial motions, that require judicial resolution on the merits, is subject to the common law

right to public records. See: Romero v. Drummond, 480 F. 3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2007). This right is

what secures the integrity of the judicial process, see: United States v. Wright, 2023 U.S. dist.

LEXIS 74388 (11th Cir. 2023) ruling; any motion presented to the court to invoke its power or

affect its decisions is subject to the public’s right of access, see: Callahan v. United Network For

Organ Sharing, 17 F. 4th 1356 (11th Cir. 2021).

35. The police report requested in clause 54 of the Complaint is a public record.The fire Dept,

dispatch records requested in clause 54 are public records. The alibi witness transcripts proving

Petitioner/Appellant’s actual innocence, being 40 miles away from a non-existent crime scene,

were purchased and not provided. The order document, granting defense’s motion 1b compel

DNA paperwork, is a public record that was literally stolen from the clerk’s file and missing,

witnessed by Frank Martin, (see: affidavit exhibit 39). Fraudulent concealment of these records

shows the bad faith obstruction of justice by all officials and defendants. The records show the

cover-up of new light evidence exonerating Petitioner/Appellant and the entitlement for him to

proceed in all courts in forma pauperis. He has made a showing of fundamental constitutional

rights violations in underlying criminal proceedings, see: Cofield v. Alabama Services, 936 F. 2d

512 (5th, 11th, Cir. 1991). The mandamus petitions for the production of these records were all

denied. This was procedural, criminal litigation, not civil in nature.§1915 does not apply, see:

Martin v. United States, 96 F. 3d 853 (7th 3d 853 (7th Cir. 1996); Madden v. Myers, 102 F. 3d

743 (3rd. Cir. 1996). The denial of the court for Petitioner/Appellant to appeal in Forma Pauperis

is plain error. The application of §1915(g) is statutory mistake, because the wording only applies

to civil litigation.

28 U.S.C. §1915 DOES NOT APPLY

36. 28 U.S.C. §1915 does not apply. The district court committed plain error showing bad faith,

dismissing the Complaint, ordering the Petitioner/Appellant that he could re-file and pay the

filing fee despite the facts that he has nor receives any money and he is time barred to re-file.

37. The district court abused its discretion denying the rule 59 motion to alter or amend

judgment. Petitioner/Appellant made rational arguments of law, citing each case and

circumstance, that he does not have three strikes to base the refusal to allow him to proceed in

forma pauperis on and not prepay the filing fee. There are multiple reasons why §1915 does not

apply.

38. There are manifest errors of law and fact in the order dismissing. The order is void. Decisions

of the court were reached contrary to law and statutory wording defining §1915. Prior court

rulings do not provide the necessary elements for a strike, and the blatant refusal to correct bad

faith deprivations of Petitioner/Appellant’s constitutional rights occurred. The court’s ruling

causes irreparable injury resulting in a fundamental miscarriage of justice and prevents his right

to be heard and access the court. These errors entitle relief, pursuant to rule 59 (e). see: Arthur v.

King, 500 F. 3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2007).

39. Petitioner/Appellant has been prevented by every court from ever being heard on the merits

of the state’s unconstitutional assimilated process. He has facts and evidence supporting his

claims all on his side. See: Rivera v. United States, 761 F. Supp. 126 (11th Cir. 1991); Baker v.

Baker ECCLES, 242 U.S. 394 (1917) ruling any case presenting the question of substantive

rights violations should be resolved in favor of setting aside an order dismissing where a litigant

has not been afforded an opportunity to be heard on the merits.

40. Contrary to the district court’s order, no cited cases in the order count as a strike, pursuant to

§ 1915(g). Petitioner/Appellant has no strikes, this being the sole basis for the dismissal of the

Complaint, requiring the reversal of the dismissal and the reinstatement of the Complaint.

41. District court judge, Thomas Barber, has overridden the cited cases original wording and

intent in bad faith. None of these orders dismissing provides Petitioner/Appellant will be charged

with a strike. The judges ruling violates Article 11(a)(1)(d) and Canon 5(c) exercising political

partisanship favoring the State of Florida and the Defendants,■'■circuit judge, Nancy Ley and state

attorney Bruce Bartlett.

42. In the order dismissing the Complaint, Judge Barber cites cases: Rahaim v. McCabe, et. al.,

case #8:21-cv-02868-TPB-TGW (M.D. Fla.); Rahaim v. Burke, et. al., case #8:22-cv-02448KKM-’ CPT (M.D. Fla.); and Rahaim v. Dixon, #4:22-cv-137-AW-MAF(N.D. Fla.).

43. A case by case review will show these three cases are underlying criminal proceedings and

are procedural steps in criminal litigation for liberty interest constitutional rights violations.

§1915(g) states only civil prisoner litigation can apply strikes for frivolous, malicious, failure to

state a claim. Cases 137 and 2868 do not have the specific wording in their orders dismissing to

count as a strike. (See: rule 59 exhibits 1, 3, and 5); see: Daker v. Comm. Georgia Dept, of

Corrections, 820 F. 3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2016), ruling under the negative implicating canon, the

only grounds that can render a dismissal as a strike are (A). Frivolous. (B) Malicious. (C).

failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The P.L.R.A. is concerned with the

grounds articulated in the order. Express statements must be specifically articulated with the

words “frivolous,” “malicious,” “failure to state a claim.” Case 137 was criminal collateral for

the restoration of gain-time in prison disciplinary proceedings. §1915 did not apply, see: Schmidt

v. Crusoe, 878 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 2003) criminal collateral and no specific wording, § 1915(g) does

not apply. The conflicting case, Anderson v. Singletary, 111 F. 3d 801 (11th Cir. C.O.A. 1997)

does not recognize free §1983 filings in lieu of habeas petitions, that are exempt from fees, when

habeas is unavailable.

44. Petitions for mandamus relief, in all three cases, directly challenging underlying criminal or

criminal collateral proceedings, are not civil in nature and do not count as strikes, see: Martin;

Madden (supra), ruling; where the underlying litigation is criminal, the petition or Complaint

need not comply with the P.L.R.A. Actions related to state court criminal proceedings are not

challenges as to conditions of confinement.

45. This legal doctrine applies to these cases, (see: Rule 59 motion, exhibits 1, 2, 5). Plaintiff

cannot be charged with a strike in any case. His challenges and complaints were filed in good

faith with legal merit. They are not frivolous or malicious and submitted, supporting, evidence

proves bad faith acts of the defendants, qualifying as exceptions to the Younger Abstention

doctrine, see: Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1973). It is only by the abuses of discretion in

unlawful rulings that Petitioner/ Appellant is having to litigate in defense of rights and law

violations.

46. Plaintiff has a constitutional right to be free from fraudulent prosecutions, brought in bad

faith, with no hope of obtaining a valid conviction, see: Shaw v. Garrison, 467 F. 2d 113 (5th and

11th Cir. 1972); Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117 (1975), the showing of bad faith is the

equivalent of showing irreparable injury. The refusal to correct, and the rulings by the judges in a

retaliatory / prosecutorial role, provides liability for corrective, injunctive relief, see: Bolin v.

Story, 225 F. 3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2000); Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984)

Petitioner/Appellant has shown there is a serious risk of continuing irreparable injury if the

requested relief is not granted.

47. The dismissal in case #02868 was because the claim was out of the statute of Limitations.

Petitioner/Appellant lost not because he failed to state a claim, but because he failed to sue in

time, see: Hatch v. Briley, 230 fed. Appx. 598, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 9200 (7th Cir. 2007)

ruling where a Complaint was dismissed as untimely, not for frivolous or malicious, it did not

count as a strike under-t-. This case was not frivolous or malicious. Petitioner/Appellant was

deprived of the initial sworn statements of accusers in his criminal cases. Mandamus petitions

were denied. Petitioner/Appellant acquired the statements not through any court order. These

statements'lproved to be exculpatory showing evidence of •&!««. accusations and why the state was

so intent on keeping them concealed. One statement showed the alleged victim never came to the

investigation hearing giving no sworn testimony in violation of the 4th Amendment, providing

and arrest must be by the finding of probable cause under oath. Petitioner/ Appellant is actually

innocent. Only the fraudulent manufacturing of probable cause, in bad faith, has falsely

imprisoned him. The state court has no jurisdiction for due process, probable cause violations

and an invalid charging document filed with fraudulent intent. The totality of circumstances

shows Petitioner/Appellant’s complaints were for only his effort to prove actual innocence and

acquire documents to show he is falsely imprisoned. It is fundamentally and morally unfair and

unlawful to charge him with strikes and require him to pay a filing fee to get justice and freedom

from criminal imprisonment. He is indigent and receives no money.

48. Judge Barber’s order in case 2868 never wrote or found the case and Complaint was

frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Therefore, no

strike could be charged. Dismissing this appeal’s, district court’s case# 1721, for 3 strikes, did

not correspond to the reason case 2868 was dismissed for a violation of the statute of limitations.

The statute of limitations was an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c) fed.r.civ.procedure, which

the Complaint did not need to anticipate or plead. Petitioner/Appellant’s Complaint stated

recognized legal claims challenging criminal proceedings in good faith, see: Fourstar v. Garden

County /group Inc., 875 F. 3d 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ruling if a court dismisses one or more of a

prisoners claim for a reason, that is not enumerated in the P.L.R.A., the case does not count as a

strike. Petitioner /Appellant cannot be charged with a strike for an underlying criminal

mandamus proceeding and the federal Complaint being dismissed as time barred. He’s also not a

prisoner.

3<F

49. The Petitioner/Appellant is not a prisoner as defined in §1915 to be necessary for this statute

to apply. He is not in custody for the primary case and arrest where that 15 year sentence has

fully expired in state case 06-23073. (see: Exhibit 1 attached to the Motion for Leave To Appeal

In Forma Pauperis in 11th circuit court of appeals case #24-14175-J). see: Maleng v. cook, 490

U.S. 488 (1989); Blanco v. Florida, 817 fed. Appx. 794 (11th cir. C.O.A. 2020); Morrow v.

Federal Bureau of Prisons., 610 F. 3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2010). Appellant is not a prisoner. The

filing fee provisions in §1915 do not apply, see; Ojo v.. I.N.S., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 12683

(11th Cir. 1997). Habeas petitions did not apply the filing fee provisions of §1915. See; Anderson

v. Singletary (Supra). Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed for failure to pay fee where habeas is

unavailable to a non-prisoner.

50. The statutory language and intent of §1915(b)(4) cannot prevent a prisoner from being heard

in state case #06-26725 or depriving access to court rights. If this court insists the 5 reasons,

Petitioner/Appellant gives, for the non-application of 1915, do not concur with the 11 findings,

then clause (b)(4) of the statute is violated by Judge Barber’s dismissal order.

Petitioner/Appellant’s access to courts rights are deprived. He cannot re-file. He is time barred

by the 4-year fraud statute, Fla. Stat. §95.11, from the July 17th, 2020 date of exhaustion in case#

SC20-918 and September 3rd, 2020 for SC20-1218 in the Florida supreme Court. He cannot pay

the filing fee and this cannot be the reason to deprive him the correction of fundamental rights

violations with irreparable injury involving criminal state litigation with a liberty interest. This

court must hear the cases and reverse the finding that Petitioner/Appellant has 3 strikes and apply

stare decisis to that erroneous ruling in forma pauperis. That finding prevents him from

proceeding in the future in forma pauperis and irreparably injures him, in bad faith, depriving

access to court rights, see: Wolff (supra); In Re Green, 699 F. 2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The

blatant abuse of discretion by both appellate and district court judges dismissals, are the primary

issues for U.S. Supreme Court review.

EVIDENCE SHOWING LACK OF STATE COURT JURISDICTION

51. The Florida statute §794.011, that Petitioner/Appellant is being held under, contains no

enacting clause as required by Article III §6, Florida Constitution. The state court has no

jurisdiction because the statute is a void, invalid law.

52.

Evidence, showing bad faith and the fraudulent manufacturing of probable cause, is

requested and purchased. The state court is concealing documents in bad faith. It is trying to

prevent the documents for use in an official proceeding, violating 18 U.S.C.S. §1512(b)(c) by

and through a conspiracy against rights 18 U.S.C.S. §241 engaging in a fraudulent scheme by

alleging facts about self-representation and speedy trial which are errors of fact, depriving rights

under color of law 18 U.S.C.S. §242.

53. The State Court lost jurisdiction when it denied both motions for discharge, see: Salser v.

State, 613 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1993). Petitioner/Appellant’s issue of self-representation, before the

court, allows Motions For discharge to be filed pro se. see: Logan v. State, 846 So. 2d 472 (Fla.

2003) providing an exception for Motions to discharge under Rule 3.191 Fla.r.crm.procedure, if

the issue to discharge counsel is before the court. Otherwise the hybrid representation doctrine

nullifies every other motion filed by a pro se defendant. The issue of self-representation was

before the Florida Supreme Court in case# SC20-918 when Petitiner/Appellant filed the motion

for rehearing of the petition for writ of prohibition and habeas corpus in the 2nd DCA on July

16th, 2020 for the issue of lack of the court’s jurisdiction, because it denied both motions for

AWeX,

discharge in both state cases 06-23073 and 06-26725. See: Salser (supra), (see; exhibit 112).

SMjJnder Rule 4.37, Fla.r.prof.conduct, Petitioner/Appellant’s state lawyer, Richard N. Watts,

cannot be a witness and an advocate. He told Petitioner/Appellant by a paper-note, after trial, that

DNA evidence is a match to undercover police officer and handler of the informant/alleged

victim, Mary, Jerry Rexrod, who had unprotected sex with his informant on the night she falsely

accused Petitioner/Appellant of sexual battery. Watts can confirm all facts of fraud and

conspiracy alleged by Petitioner/appellant.j\ll officials are preventing any hearings to record this

evidence ,and documents, purchased by the Petitioner/Appellant, are suppressed in bad faith

obstructing justice.

55. The confidential informant/alleged victim in case 06-26725 never gave sworn testimony

prior to the filing of the charging document, (see: exhibit 108). see: State v. Gonzalez, 212 So. 3d

1094 (Fla. 5th DCA 201) citing: State v. Weinberg, 780 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), ruling

hearsay testimony of a detective is insufficient, pursuant to Rule 3.140(g) Fla.r.crim.procedure,

to establish material witness testimony. Pure hearsay testimony is not admissible to find probable

cause under oath This charge as not sworn to by any alleged victim/material witness and is void.

see: Brent v. Tetlow, 328 F. 2d 890 (11th Cir. C. O.A. 1964). These cases are on point with the

factual series of events that occurred. Tku victai-t*

4©r a«o ocvfL/proMa k. Coo-Tc..

56. A charge not sworn to is subject to dismissal. A charge is insufficient where it

appears the complaining officer had no knowledge of the matter on which the charge was based.

cs.

see: Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958). The detective, defendant, Eclard R. Judy,

is not a material witness, see: Metzler v. Kenner City, 695 Fed.Appx. 79 (5th and 11th Cir. 2017).

The detective cannot produce admissible corroborating evidence to support the fact, see; Rule

56(c)(1)(B) fed.r.civ.procedure.

Pure hearsay testimony is not admissible, see: Rule 802

Fed.r.evidence. The facts why the state did not swear in the alleged victim are material. She

would have most likely given testimony that showed actual innocence of the Petitioner/Appellant

and that no probable cause existed for an arrest. Po

-Po-a

57. Absent a valid charging document, the state court lacks jurisdiction, see: State v. Anderson,

537 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 1989). The court lost all jurisdiction because of the constitutional

violations and an invalid charging document, see: Farnsworth v. Zerbst, 98 F. 2d 541 (5th and

11th Cir. C.O.A. 1938). The supporting oath or affirmation needed to establish probable cause,

may not be satisfied by the mere filing of an unsworn information signed by a prosecutor, see:

Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). The charging document in case #06-26725 is invalid,

void. The court has no jurisdiction. This issue of lack of state court jurisdiction, by invalid

charging document, needs review.

58. The charging document in case #06-23073 is also invalid, failing to properly establish the

state court’s jurisdiction. The same detective, defendant Edward R. Judy lied there was semen on

the informant’s buttocks and lied they found her sunglasses in Petitioner/Appellant’s boat. All

evidence proves the informant/alleged victim was never on the boat and sex did not occur. See:

clauses 52-62 in the Complaint in district court case #8:22-cv-303; appellate court case #2414175-J. The assistant state attorney, defendant Broaderick Levert Taylor, refers to the alleged

victim as the defendant twice in the invest document, (see exhibit 109). Informant has told 3

different versions of multiple events proving non-cred- ability. She is not the victim and lied to

avoid being arrested for carjacking Petitioner/Appellant’s Jeep Grand Cherokee. No reasonable

finder of fact would find there was probable cause to arrest Rahaim. The charging document was

filed in bad faith and is void ab-initio. The state court has no jurisdiction.

59. The Heck bar and the Younger abstention doctrine cannot be applied where a state court’s

jurisdiction is being challenged and evidence, supporting that challenge, is being concealed in

bad faith. The Petitioner/Appellant is being held in prison on the only remaining charge, case

#06-26725, with no sworn statement, alibi witnesses placing him 40 miles away of a non-existent

crime scene (alibi witness transcripts suppressed) and the total fabrication of evidence by

prosecutors, see: Zahrey (infra). Evidence shows prosecutors knew before filing and withheld

testimony from the alleged victims that showed the manufacturing of probable cause by two

informants paid to lie. see: case: Illinois (infra); Kyles (supra) \

60. The evidence showing bad faith and fraudulent intent by police and prosecutors is

overwhelming. Fabrication of evidence, the willful false testimony by the accusers, and

defendants, and the proof of the state court’s lack of jurisdiction, all supports

Petitioner/Appellant’s entitlement to be heard in Forma pauperis for fundamental rights

violations of procedural and substantive law and due process. All cited circumstances prove

federal judges are acting as advocates for the state officials in a prosecutorial role against the

Petitioner/Appellant. They have used an invalid statute1 as a means to prevent scandalous facts,

and criminal acts of the defendants, from being exposed. The bias, political partisanship, errors

in the application of law, and the abuse of discretion, all provide the order dismissing the Appeal

for the 3 strikes rule, § 1915(g) is void and invalid. Petitioner/Appellant is entitled to relief.

THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL

61. The abuse of discretion by federal judges further deprives Petitioner/Appellant of the right to

a Speedy Trial and true contest of Petitioner/Appellant’s merits. The state and defendants cannot

use a fraudulent scheme to prevent the Petitioner/Appellant from a trial, acquittal and release

from custody. See: Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.

514 (1972) providing constitutional rights to a Speedy Trial. Any delay in bringing a defendant

to trial, even by waiver of speedy trial, cannot exceed one year. See: United States v. Ortega,

2002 U.S. Dist. LE XIS 14967 (8th Cir. 2002). Defendant’s waiver of speedy trial is not adequate

to satisfy the requirements of 18 U.S.C. §3161 (h)(8). This federal right andstSfcte. cannot be

invalidated by Article 1 § 1 Fla. Constitution or by Fla. Stat. §843.0855(3); (5)(a). see: Walker v.

San Francisco Unified School District, 46 F. 3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1995); Sanchez v. Degoria, 733

So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), state rules and laws cannot invalidate federal rights.

62. Petitioner/Appellant re-invoked his right to speedy trials filing Demands for Speedy Trial

pursuant to the 6th and 14th Amendments, complying with rule 3.191 fla.r.rim.procedure.

Petitioner/Appellant filed Notices of the Expiration of Time for Speedy Trial and Motions For

Discharge in both cases 06-23073 and 06-26725. The fac|" that Petitioner/Appellant was still

represented by counsel, and the hybrid representation doctrine prevented him from submitting

motions, was defeated, by the exception that motions to discharge counsel had been filed and the

issue of the denial of the right to self-representation was pending in the Florida Supreme Court

when the Petitioner/Appellant filed the Rehearing Motion, for the denial of the Petition For Writ

of Prohibition and Habeas Corpus, on July 16th, 2020. see: Logan (supra), see: cases SC20-918;

/Appeixkix. &

2D20-1986. (see: exhibit 112 in case 8:22-cv-02448).

63. The district courts order dismissing the Complaint, that challenges the state’s deprivation of

rights and its refusal to provide an adequate process to remedy, facilitates and enables the

defendants to not be accountable. Petitioner/Appellant’s entitlement to evidence, for future

challenges, to lack of state court jurisdiction and his entitlement to judgment of acquittals, for the

insufficiency of evidence to sustain any convictions, all is eliminated by the dismissal,

erroneously applying § 1915(g)’s “Three Strikes Rule.”

Petitioner/Appellant is irreparably

damaged resulting in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. He should be relieved of the

impediment to secure his release from custody. The appellate court order dismissing should be

reversed and the appeal reinstated.

THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION

64. Petitioner/Appellant has a constitutional right to act pro se in state court, see: Faretta v.

California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Chapman v. Harris, 553 F. 2d 886 (5th Cir. 1977); U.S. v.

Plattner, 330 F. 2d 271 (1963); Fla. Stat. §454.18. The defendants are engaged in a custom and

policy to fraudulently represent that Petitioner/Appellant is already proceeding pro se. This

misrepresentation is designed to do only one thing, prevent a person from filing motions with

legal merit to challenge the unconstitutionality of Florida’s assimilated process that violates

substantive due process rights, see: Btyden v. City of New York, 416 U.S. 467 (1986) ruling;

secretive conduct by the government that prevents a party from knowing about a constitutional

violation cannot prejudice or prevail against the unknowing party preventing any challenges to

rights violations.

65. Petitioner/Appellant has been denied all hearings and to be heard and call his defense

attorney, Richard Watts, to provide testimony about state perpetrated fraud on the court. Pursuant

to rule 4.37, fla.r.prof.conduct, the attorney cannot be an advocate and a witness for the

Petitioner/Appellant. Attorney cannot refuse to be a witness, see: Fla. Stat. §90.501. Therefore,

he must be discharged and give truthful testimony about the unconscionable scheme falsely

imprisoning the Petitioner/Appellant. Denial of this evidence violates the Everyman’s Evidence

Doctrine, The New Light Evidence . Doctrine and the fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

Doctrine. In a continuing violation of the defendants and states deprivation of this evidence,

denying hearings, subpoena’s and mandamus production, the Appellate court erroneously, with

fraudulent intent, and bad faith, dismissed this case. This requires redress and reversal.

THE UNLAWFUL CUSTOM AND POLICY

UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW

66. All defendants acted under color of state law. They implemented operational functions under

a custom and policy of the State of Florida. This custom and policy is the moving force of the

constitutional violations, see: Monell v. New York Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658

(1978).

67. The State of Florida, the Pinellas County Office of the state attorney, and the city of Saint

Petersburg, are persons for a custom and policy within the meaning of §1983. They have waived

their sovereign immunity for constitutional violations and negligent activities, that are

operational tasks, where a duty of care exists to provide the Petitioner/Appellant the requested,

purchased records, pursuant to

Article 10 §13 Fla. Constitution and Fla. Stat. §768.28 see: Cook v. Monroe County Sheriff 402

F. 3d 1092(11th Cir. 2005).

68. The defendants are acting under the color of the following state laws: Article 1 §1 Fla.

Constitution; Fla. Stat. §843.0855(3),(5)(a); rule 4.84(c) Fla. rules professional conduct and rule

3.220 Fla.r.crim.procedure. These laws fail to provide the lawful authority exception required in

and by §843.0855(5)(a), being against (5)(c), to fabricate fraudulent documents, including court

orders, judgments and public records as provided by Fla. Stat. §843.0855(3).

69. The following reasons, arguments, eliminate the state’s false claim to this lawful authority.

Fla. Stat. §794.011, that Petitioner/Appellant is being held under, is not a valid law containing no

enacting clause required by Article III §6 Fla. Const.... This renders the state court with no

jurisdiction. The corrupted uses of undercover investigations, provided by rule 4.84(c), are

unlawful by the statutory language in the contradictory wording contained in §843.0855(5)(a)

against (5)(c). The method of secrecy employed within undercover investigations obviously will

prevent a party from instituting or responding to a legitimate and lawful legal process, because

the party cannot know how, or what, to respond to. This fundamentally prevents, prohibits and

limits a persons lawful and legitimate access to courts provided in §843.0855(5)(c). see: Bowen

(supra) ruling it is unconstitutional to prevent a party from knowing about constitutional rights

violations by the government’s conduct. SQ&Jmbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795 (9th Cir. 1969)

where a prosecutor knowingly permits false evidence to be introduced at trial, and such evidence

will inevitably create a false impression in the minds of the jury, no legal justification can exist

for that false misrepresentation, see: Zahrey v. Coffee, 221 F. 2d 342 (2nd Cir. 2000) ruling: it is

a 5th Amendment violation for a prosecutor to fabricate false evidence and testimony with the

knowledge that the evidence will send the accused to prison,

4^ prosecution "to Jleceivc'lke- court'uitfk

rts 'u*>pen»xtS5akle

oP Xaowa 4^(se_

70. State prosecutors cannot claim ignorance to evidence insufficiency to subvert the judicial

process, see; A.L.H. v. State, 773 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ruling: the prosecutor is

presumed to have knowledge of all documents in the state’s file. Constitutional error occurs

regardless if the prosecutor had knowledge of the fraud or acted in good or bad faith, see: Giglio

(supra). Obstruction of justice is found where there is perjury, the prosecutor knew the testimony

was false and failed to correct the fraud, see; United States v. Vallejo, 297 F. 3d 1154 (11th Cir.

2002). see: Booker v. State, 503 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1987) ruling: The fraud must be exposed. All

prosecutors are imputed with knowledge and must correct false testimony and evidence even if

they did not solicit the false testimony, see: Sargent (11th Cir. 2012).

71. A conviction obtained using false testimony cannot stand, see: Giglio v. United States, 405

U.S. 150 (1972); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) ruling: Totally false testimony

amounts to a sham trial.

72/xThe defendants possible argument that no official trial has been held, does not relieve them

from the constitutional obligation to provide Petitioner/Appellant the requested purchased public

records, because the records will show all state’s witnesses lied in pre-trial depositions and are

impeachable, see: United states v. Bagley, 474 U.S. 667 (1985); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419

(1995); United States v. Agurs, 417 U.S. 97 (1976) all ruling evidence showing the

impeachability of witnesses must be provided, see: Rogers v. State, 782 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 2011);

Fla. Stat. §90.104(l)(b); §90.608(5). Withholding evidence affects the substantive rights of a

party if the evidence contains material facts proving fraud or prior inconsistent statements

showing non-credibility and reasonable doubt, see: Strickland v. Green, 527 U.S. 263 (1999)

evidence favorable to Petitioner/Appellant puts the case in a whole new light. The outcome of

the proceeding would have been different had the concealed evidence been produced, see: U.S.

v. Bagley; Kyles (supra). Police have a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor,

further obligating the prosecutor’s role to have knowledge of all true facts. Imputation of

knowledge to all prosecutors. See: Sargent (supra)J<M'P^

72. Petitioner/Appellant’s Complaint and 111 facts, proofs and elements, verified by over 100

attached exhibits, raises the presumption of fraud and undue influence, shifting the burden to the

defendants and state to present evidence to disprove or rebut the presumption, pursuant to Fla.

Stat. §90.302 and rule 301 fed rules of evidence.The defendants have willfully refused to allow

hearings and the production of the purchased records showing consciousness of guilt.TFiey have

failed to rebut, fraudulently concealing all proof of Petitioner/Appellant’s merits, showing the

perpetration of bad faith, obstruction of justice and arbitrary, unlawful detention. These facts

provide Petitioner/Appellant the right to proceed in forma pauperis.

73. Petitioner/Appellant Rahaim has a valid challenge to the unconstitutionality of

The fraudulent process provided in rule 4.84(c) Fla.r.prof.conduct. This administrative rule is

superseded and nullified by the access to court provisions in Fla. Stat. §843.0855(5)(c). see;

Willette v. Airpods, 700 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) ruling: Statutory laws take precedent

over administrative rules. The fraudulent concealment of purchased public records prejudices

and prevents the Petitioner/Appellant from filing meaningful challenges in state court, see: Wolff

v. McDonnell 418 U.S. 539 (1974) ruling: the right of access to courts is founded in the due

process clause and assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the

judiciary allegations concerning constitutional rights violations.

74. In Complaint clause 69, Petitioner/Appellant cites theAhgue and ambiguous wording doctrine,

see: United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) ruling: any challenges to vague and ambiguous

wording, that fails to give a person of common intelligence fair warning of the laws intent,

having to guess at the laws meaning, must be ruled on in favor of a criminal defendant, see:

Shevin v. International Workers, 353 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1977); Brunell v. State, 360 So. 2d 70 (Fla.

1978). Both the 9th Amendment, U.S. Constitution and Article 1 §1, Fla. Constitution, employ

the word “others” and are vague and ambiguous, intentionally creating doubt and failing to give

fair warning. This conflicts with the 14th Amendment’s provision that no state shall enact any

law that abridges the rights of citizens, see: Perkins v. State, 576 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1991).

75. Petitioner/Appellant must be heard, in forma pauperis, for the correction of

evidence concealment proving he is unlawfully, arbitrarily detained, because of the false

testimony and fabricated evidence by prosecutors, proving all witnesses are impeachable. Denial

of a fair trial and acquittal cannot be justified and violates international law, “Universal

Declaration of Human Rights,” Articles 10: 11.1 and 30 and Article 9 of the International

Covenant On Civil and Political Rights, which the United States has ratified on April 2nd, 1992

accepting this as law of the U.S. . see; Martinez v. City ofLos Angeles, 141 F. 3d 1373 (9th Cir.

1998); Soroa-Gonzalz v. Civiletti, 515 f. supp. 1049 (11th Cir. 1981); Wolff (supra).

EQUITABLE TOLLING FOR DEPRIVED

RIGHTS AND PUBLIC RECORDS

76. Equitable tolling applies to this case because Petitioner/Appellant is impeded, by state

created violations, from filing meaningful challenges to secure relief and the release from

custody, see: Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) ruling: time is tolled until the date the

state created impediment is removed,

see: 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(l)(b). Equitable tolling is

appropriate when a movant untimely files because of the extraordinary circumstances that are

both out of his control and unavoidable even with diligence: see: Arce v. Garcia, 434 F. 3d 1254

(11th Cir. 2006); Pace v. Diguglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005).

77. The failure of defense counsel to find public records and evidence, showing impeachability

and fraud, cannot be charged to the defendartt. see: Bailey v. State, 768 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 2nd DCA

2000) ruling: where police reports were available but lawyer failed to find them, defendant could

not be charged with constructive knowledge. Newly discovered evidence claims did not apply to

the two-year time limit for ineffective assistance claims, see: Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362

(2000).

1°^

i s oj\pO'Sffr

cc^e.

78. Petitioner/Appellant must receive the F.D.L.E. records showing no DNA submission in case

06-26725 and the requested police report from the St. Petersburg Police, filed on September 19th,

2006. These records prove all state’s witnesses falsely testified to events they know did not

occur, prejudicing the Petitioner/Appellant sending him to prison. These records show the non

occurrence of events by the lack of entry in the record, pursuant to Fla. Stat. §90.803(6).(7).(10);

rule 803(6)(7) federal r.evidence.' see; Terranova v. State, 474 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1985);

Hughes v. Slomka, 807 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2002). Judge Barber’s dismissal of the

Complaint refuses to remove the state created impediment.

FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT OF THE CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMANT STATUS OF ACCUSERS

79. Due process/access to courts rights have been violated by the fraudulent concealment of the

confidential informant status of accusers, pursuant to the 14th Amendment of the U.S.

Constitution, and Article 1 §9 Fla. Constitution. See; Banks v. Dretke, 540 668 (2204); State v.

Glossum, 462 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1985). These caselaws provide for the dismissal of criminal

charges for the concealment.

80. The state is applying rule 3.220(g) Fla.r.crim.procedure, providing they do not have to

disclose the status if they are not calling the informant as a witness to testify in court. The

informant is the alleged victim and must appear to comply with Petitioner/Appellant’s 6th and

14th Amendment right to the face-to-face confrontation rule. No valid conviction can exist by her

absence, failing to make aprima facie case, see; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

81. The alleged victim/confidential informant, paid to lie, must be cross examined in view of the

jury. Her testimony is the sole determining factor of her credibility. In this case, the informant

told triply contradicting versions about 5 claims proving fabricated allegations, false testimony,

showing Petitioner/Appellant’s actual innocence. This material evidence, in 25 prior inconsistent

statements and facts, must be displayed in front of a jury to show the alleged victims reactions

being caught in several lies. Under proper cross examination, she would most likely confess to

fabricating the whole charge, on the night in question, to avoid being arrested for carjacking the

Petitioner/Appellant’s jeep, wallet and cell phone. The assistant prosecutor even listed the

informant twice in the investigation report as the defendant, (see: exhibit 109 in district court

case: 8:22-02448-KKM-CPT). In court, prosecutors showed consciousness of guilt and their

knowledge of Petitioner/Appellant’s actual innocence by refusing to put her on the stand to

testify. Prosecutor’s feared the informant, who has a history of mental illness, would break

down

and

confess

she was never sexually battered,

collapsing the whole case.

Unconstitutionally, the state denied Petitioner/Appellant his right to confront this sole material

witness in open court, see: California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).He.r imp«ocfvd>iliiy is mfena.

82. The state used a look-a-like imposter on the stand in place of the informant/alleged victim

showing bad faith and intent to defraud. The imposter’s testimony was completely fraudulent,

violating every ethical duty of everyone involved, see: Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988).

Rule 3.220(g) conflicts with Petitioner/Appellant’s federal rights and is pre-empted by

constitutional law. No valid conviction exists in the alleged victim’s absence. Due process/access

to court rights are violated, see: Cunningham v. District Attorney’s Office for Escambia County,

592 F. 3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2010); Ryland; Wolff (supra). The fraudulent misrepresentation, that a

witness is before the court, is the perpetration of extrinsic fraud,

see: United States v.

Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878). Booker (supra). AyuAsf'ckAuve. coua-TcV

K .'ttAstty Pei^wl<xl loureA.

83.

All

evidence

and

erpac^orffol ,

<Uv<)c<kAuA Action ’fer <x_

the

informant’s

statements,

alleging

sexual

battery

Petitioner/Appellant’s boat, prove she was never on the boat and sex could not have occurred in

the position she claims her attacker was in, “straddling her, his legs constricting her legs closed”

(see: List of 111 facts with verifying exhibits #67 in Appeal case #24-12630-G; District court

case #8:22-cv-02448-KKM-CPT.

84.

Petitioner/Appellant’s initial false arrest was perpetrated by a lack of trustworthy

information from a confidential informant, see: Case v. Eslinger, 555 F. 3d 1317 (11th Cir.

2009). There was no independent corroboration to the informant’s allegations and in case 0623073, the informant was referred to twice as the defendant not the victim, (see: exhibit 109 in

case 8:22-cv-02448). In case 06-26725, the informant gave no sworn statement to lawfully

establish probable cause to arrest. The totality of circumstances, in both cases shows bad faith

and is the proper standard for determining probable cause based on the information of a

confidential informant, see; Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). The detective, defendant

Edward R. Judy, lied there was semen on the informant’s buttocks 1o manufacture probable cause

at the petition for a search warrant and at the investigation hearing.

STATE LAW NOT IN EFFECT

85. State laws will not have effect and will be pre-empted where they stand as obstacles to the

execution of the purposes of congress, see: Cippolllne v. Liggett Group Inc., 505 U.S. 504

(1992); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1986); English v. General Electric Corp. 496 U.S.

72 (1990).

86. Florida’s Constitution and state laws cannot invalidate speedy trial, public records and

evidence rights, see: Walker v. San Francisco Unified School District, 46 F. 3d 1449 (9th Cir.

1995). Florida law cannot abridge federal rights. It is axiomatic that the judicial branch cannot

abridge or create substantive law under the guise of procedural rulemaking, because doing so

would violate the separation of powers doctrine, see; Boyd v. Becker, 627 So. 2d 481 (Fla.

1993).

87. The state, the defendants and the federal district court have committed plain errors in bad

faith, obstructing justice, dismissing every challenge by the Petitioner/Appellant. Abuses of

discretion, by a corrupt application of legal interpretation, must be corrected. All court officials

have violated every right of the Petitioner/Appellant.AH arguments and supporting laws prove

Petitioner/Appellant has an absolute right to the reversal of the order dismissing the Complaint,

and appeal, erroneously applying § 1915(g) 3 strikes where there are not 3 strikes, and to the

relief requested. Petitioner/Appellant prays for this court to honor the constitutional right, he has,

to be heard by granting certiorari review to correct fundamental miscarriages ofjustice.

JUDGE, PROSECUTOR AND DEFENDANT LIABILITY

88. Former Judge, Nancy M. Ley, does not have judicial immunity for claims involving

injunctive and declaratory relief, see: Bolin v. Story, 225 F. 3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2000); Pulliam v.

Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984). Petitioner/appellant meets these cited cases requirements by showing

there is a serious risk of continuing irreparable injury if the requested relief is not granted. He is

time-barred to re-file a

§1983. It is the only adequate remedy, because habeas corpus is not available for case 06-23073

lacking “in custody” status, and in case 06-26725, habeas petitions cannot enforce public records

laws, correct errors of fact, review the impeachability of witnesses or grant the relief only a

§1983 lawsuit can. The evidence proving the lack of state court jurisdiction was being

fraudulently concealed by the very official who is exposed to greater liability by the showing of a

lack of jurisdiction by her former court. She’s committed criminal acts in bad faith.

89. State officials held subject to liability for damages under §1983 based on official acts, see:

Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) ruling: Officials, acting under color of state law, caused the

deprivation of a federal right by the capacity in which the official inflicts the injury. To establish

a §1983 claim, it is enough to show the official caused the injury or deprivation of the federal

right for personal liability. The Petitioner/Appellant need not establish a connection to

governmental policy or custom. Defendant Bartlett has access to all requested evidence

purchased.

90. State prosecutors actions established a final policy to deprive Petitioner/Appellant the

requested records and the right to speedy trial by a fraudulent scheme to force him to be

represented by counsel. Their actions established a custom and policy where they had other

courses of action to follow, see: Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986).

91. Prosecutor, defendant Bruce Bartlett, does not have immunity for injunctive and declaratory

relief, see; Tarter v. Hury, 646 F. 2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1981); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118

(1997); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 250 (1993).

92. A federal court may enjoin the attorney general of a state, where a general duty is to enforce,

from proceeding to enforce, a state statute which violates the federal constitution. See: Ex Parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

93. Bruce Bartlett, the defendant, was appointed to replace Bernard McCabe, S.A., after

McCabe’s death. Bartlett was not retained by the peoples vote. All assistant prosecutors assigned

to Petitioner/Appellant’s state criminal cases are not officers of the state and also are not retained

by the peoples vote, see: Austin v. State Ex. Rel Christian, 310 So. 2d 89 1975 LEXIS 3470 (Fla.

1975). They cannot use Article 1 §1 and rule 4.84(c) fla.r.prof.conduct, as the lawful authority

and shield to commit fraud, deceit, misrepresentation provided in Fla. State. §843.0855(3); rule

4.84(c) and must honor the public’s substantive rights.

94. Only an elected official, retained by the peoples vote, cannot be impaired or denied by the

enumeration of rights in the constitution, see: Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2000)

ruling and interpreting that Article 1 §1, Fla. Const, defines the inherent right of the people by

their vote in an election. See: Wright v. City of Miami Gardens, 200 So. 3d 765 (Fla. 2016).

Assistant prosecutors assigned to Petitioner/Appellant’s case: Frederick L. Schaub; Michael

Marr; Kelly McKnight and Broderick L. Taylor are not retained by the people and are not

officers of the state. Their actions are not immune to deprive Petitioner/ Appellant’s rights to

speedy trial, judgment of acquittal and the purchased public records showing impeachability.

They violated rights, knowingly employing all false testimony, against an innocent Rahaim to

establish probable cause by fraud using confidential informants paid to lie. This is an issue for

review in the U.S. Supreme Court.

95. Petitioner/Appellant has a right to be free from fraudulent prosecutions, brought in bad faith

til

without the hope of obtaining a valid conviction, see: Shaw v. Garrison, 467 F. 2d 113 (5 ,11 ,

Cir. 1972); Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117 (1975);

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The showing of bad faith is the equivalent of showing

irreparable injury. Where there is evidence of state proceedings motivated by bad faith, and there

is no adequate or fair state forum where the constitutional violations were corrected, because of

the officials refusal and fraud, the Younger Abstention doctrine does not apply, see; Hughes v.

attorney General ofFlorida, 377 F. 3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2004).

96. By an abuse of discretion , refusing to grant rule 59 relief for its manifest error applying the 3

strikes rule in § 1915(g), the district court refused, in bad faith, to conduct evidentiary hearings to

determine bad faith prosecutions of non-existent crimes, committing reversible error,

see:

United States v. Leonard, 50 F. 3d 1152 (2nd Cir. 1995). The showing of undue influence and

fraud, by the Petitioner/Appellant’s submitted list of 111 facts, and verifying exhibits, raises the

presumption shifting the burden to the state and defendants to rebut and disprove the

Petitioner/Appellant’s claims of fraud, see: Fla. Stat. §90.302; Rule 301 fed.r.evidence. The

district judge Thomas Barber knows the claims of fraud are true. Showing evidence of

consciousness of guilt, the judge relieves the burden of the state and defendants to disprove

Petitioner/Appellant’s claims by simply dismissing the Complaint fraudulently applying the 3

strikes rule. All issues argued in this petition are relevant to show the merit and factual legal

analysis for the entitlement of the Petitioner/Appellant to be granted a Writ of Certiorari. This

petition has shown all facts necessary for a judgment to be entered in favor of the

Petitioner/Appellant, Christopher J. Rahaim, granting this Petitions Relief Requested.

There is a conflict in laws that leaves a victim of fabricated evidence

and false testimony with no remedy requiring this court’s ruling. Challenges

to fabricated evidence issues, pursuant to Napue, Giglio, Strickler, Zahrey,

Kyles, Sargent, where the courts favorable judgment would invalidate any

conviction, exclusively requiring only habeas petitions, pursuant to Heck, the

rulings in the 11th Cir. disqualify relief under habeas petitions for any

evidentiary errors, see: Lewis v. McNeil. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59378 (11th

Cir. 2009); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) ruling'- no right to

discovery in habeas proceedings.

The somewhat unsettled §1983 v. habeas issuezin Heck and Spencer,

was considered in Edwards v. Balisok. 520 U.S. 641 (1997) ruling- A prisoner,

unable to use a habeas petition, was permitted to use a §1983 for the

prevention of the use of exculpatory evidence in prison disciplinary hearings.

This principle must be found applicable to judgments in criminal courts,

because the touchstone of due process is protection of the individual from

arbitrary action. This challenged, unsettled legal precedent is properly

applied to this case, because Petitioner/Appe||ant cannot use a habeas

petition being a non-prisoner, in the main case, and he has exhausted all

state remedies where the issue of exhaustion was a primary factor of concern

in this court’s decisions in Heck and Spencer v. Kenma, 523 U.S. 1 (1998).

Petitioner/Appaljant has thoroughly and diligently petitioned the

courts for relief giving the State more than its opportunity to correct the

rights violations and rebut the presumption of fraud failing to meet its

burden, §90.302 Fla. Stat. The State has proven bad faith and an intent to

permanently suppress evidence through criminal obstruction mandating the

correction by the federal rights doctrines. Petitioner/Appelj ant has invoked

this court’s jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331 and §1343 for extrinsic

fraud perpetrated by the State, see: Moffetbv. Robbins, 14 F. Supp. 602 (D.

Kansas 1935). Supplemental jurisdiction for State law claims is invoked

under §1367 for State violations of breach of contract that provide federal

jurisdiction for due process violations of the 5th and 14th Amendments, see:

McKinney v. Pate, 20 F. 3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994),

Chapter

133 §2104- Supreme Court will hear cases in the same manner as District

Courts.

EX PARTE VIOLATIONS

97. Secretive conduct by the government that prevents a party from knowing about a

constitutional violation cannot prevail against an unknowing party preventing any challenges to

seek relief from rights violations, see: Bowen (supra).

98. Multiple arguments showing judges abuses of discretion, political partisanship and stare

decisis violations, must be determined and settled by an impartial process, void of ex-parte

influence, providing an opportunity for both sides to present its case on the merits without exparte communications, submissions and considerations.

99. Lack of state court jurisdiction and due process/access to courts violations, where there is an

appearance of bias, improper influence and fraud, by unlawful rulings, should be subject to

reversal and correction for their questionable validity.

100. Ex-parte communications, by an adversary party, to a decision maker in an adjudicatory

proceeding, are prohibited as fundamentally at variance with our conceptions of due process,

see: Doe v. Hampton, 566 F. 2 265 (D.C. Cir. C.O.A. 1977). A presumption arises that the exparte contact was prejudicial, see; Palmer Trinity Private School v. Village of Palmetto Bay, 802

F. Supp 2d 1322 (11th Cir. 2011).

101. Any government claim of compelling interests cannot trump or disregard Petitioner’s claims

for substantive and procedural due process violations, pursuant to stare decisis application of

established laws, through ex-parte communications not affording him the right to be heard and

present rebuttal evidence, see; Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); McAffee v. Procunier,

F. 2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1985); Depree v. Thomas, 946 F. 2d 784 (11th Cir. C.O.A. 1991); Stone

v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).

102. The merit in Petitioner/Appellant’s arguments is proven by consciousness of guilt evidence

by all judges

refusing to allow hearings to settle discovery violation disputes and ex-parte

argument disputes. The evidence, submitted ex-parte, conflicts, regarding the truthfulness of the

information as well as if it was properly before the court, see: McAffee (supra)

103. Petitioner’s pro se status cannot disqualify the overwhelming submitted and concealed

evidence that proves, way beyond a preponderance, that disregarding the substantive rights to

face to face confrontation, a fair speedy trial, acquittal and release, all with questionable

conflicting claims of lawful authority, cannot be permitted, condoned or concealed, see; Faretta;

Nixon; Napue; Giglio; Crawford; California v. Green (supra).

104. Appeal §751 provides the federal constitutional rule requires the U.S. Supreme Court to

review a state courts findings of fact where a conclusion of law, as to a federal right, and the

findings of fact, are so intermingled that it is necessary to analyze the facts, see; Hurley v. Irish

American Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).

COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTERESTS

NOT APPLICABLE

105. Any government contention, that its interests trump the rights to fair trials and public

records, cannot prevail, especially when they are presented ex-parte refusing to allow the

submission of opposing evidence and arguments, see: Gifford v. Dennis, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

78718 (4th Cir. 2024) ruling: the proponent of continued confidentiality bears the burden of

persuasion. It does not create a compelling government interest that precludes or automatically

passes a First Amendment right to access.

106. This cases defendant state officials cannot bypass the truth seeking function of the court.

First Amendment violations and the use of the cover of continuing undercover investigations, as

a compelling interest, cannot be given deference to deprive substantive rights and federal law.

Federal courts have ruled provisions, for confidentiality requirements for production of

documents, specifically declines to extend confidentiality to an evidentiary privilege. Nothing

will be construed to prevent the production of evidence in the U.S. courts, pursuant to federal

rules of evidence and federal rules of civil procedure. See: Towbin v. Antonacci, 287 F.R.D. 672

(Uh Cir. 2012), ruling: Florida statues create a privilege where the federal statutes do not. The

state privilege ceases when the material or testimony is intended for trial, see; Huet v. Tromp,

912 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). The states confidentiality needs do not outstrip federal

rights, see: Walker v. San Francisco; Sanchez v. Degoria; Tofcin (supra).

107. Under the stare decisis rule, that courts must give deference and respect to its prior rulings

and those of a superior court, Petitioner’s claims for federal courts refusal to adhere to

established law shows his entitlement to this courts supervisory power. Pursuant to Petitioners

§1983 Complaint, documents dealing with the alleged wrongdoing of public officials did not

apply the state evidentiary privilege, see: American Civil Liberties Union v fmch. 638 F. 2d 1336

(5th and 11th Cir. 1981), ruling: The challenged communications did not originate in the

confidence that they will not be disclosed. This is on point with Petitioners entitlement to the

production of police reports, fire dept dispatch records, alibi witness transcripts, purchased, but

all fraudulently concealed, after the fact, to cover-up false testimony and fabricated evidence

falsely imprisoning an innocent Petitioner. When the privilege of confidentiality is in conflict,

the court will not create a new federal evidentiary privilege, see: Hancock v, Hobbs, 967 F. 2d

462 (11th Cir. C.O.A. 1992), ruling: federal laws govern the discoverability of evidence and any

confidentiality privilege. Personnel records show misconduct by Petitioner’s trial judge, Robert

Timothy Peters, in reference to Peter’s disbarment in 2015, and must be given the right of public

access, see: News Press Pub. Co. v. Wisher. 345 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1977).

108. When there are federal law claims in a case, also presenting state law claims, the federal

rule favoring admissibility, rather than state law privilege, is the controlling rule, see: Wm. T.

Thompson v. General Nutrition Co., 671 F. 2d 100 (3rd Cir. C.O.A. 1982).

109 (a). The overwhelming facts, public records and disciplinary actions taken against police,

prosecutors and judges, totaling at least 6 officials on Petitioner’s case, show the criminal efforts

to destroy, conceal and deny evidence records proving fraud, actual innocence and false

imprisonment. These actions and violations cannot be condoned, justified and require this courts

intervention in the interest of truth, justice over tyranny and oppression.

CONCLUSION

109(b). Petitioner should be given the privilege of certiorari review. This court, in Good Faith,

must recognize the conflicts in the 11th Circuit Court of appeals rulings in reference to issues of

substantive rights to face to face confrontation, entitlement to in forma pauperis status for §1983

complaints where petitioner has exhausted all state remedies involving underlying criminal

litigation, the right to speedy trial and the right to public records all being deprived by plain error

and abuses of discretion.

110. Vague and ambiguous wording doctrines, in reference to the 9th Amendment, Art. 1 § 1 Fla.

Const.,Fla. Stat. §843.0855 and rule 4.84(c) may be individually reviewed or dismissed as each

provides the obligation to favorable rulings to the Petitioners claims that there is no lawful

authority to dismiss or allow Florida’s custom and policy to indefinitely deprive substantive

rights. The impact of actuality and stare decisis provides this court the discretion to review and

revisit for the deprivation of liberty, property interests.

111. There may never have been a situation involving a pre-meditated unconscionable scheme

and criminal conspiracy where the victim/petitioner has provided a chronology of events and

submitted over 111 facts, proofs and elements verified by over 120 exhibits. There is an

appearance of bias, political partisanship, judicial misconduct and violations of criminal law by

the refusals and denials to grant any relief or justice to an innocent victim of pre-meditated false

imprisonment and abuse of process. This appearance will be confirmed as fact if the federal

courts final decision fails to acknowledge and issue favorable rulings by enforcement of

established law.

112. All evidence presented and concealed proves the Petitioner’s actual innocence, fraudulent

prosecutions of non-existent crimes, invalid charging documents filed in bad faith through the

manufacturing of probable cause in violation of 4th Amendment due process failing to take

Sworn Oath from the alleged victims. The jurisdiction of the state was never established and

certainly was forfeited by denial of Motions To Discharge violating speedy trial rights. The

actions all prove a government scheme using confidential informant prostitutes to falsely

imprison and bad faith by officials to conceal evidence of botched prosecutions exposing state

secrets.

113. The law is clear. Arguments and verifying evidence submitted, thoroughly shows, way

beyond the preponderance standard, no justification to condone and facilitate the elimination of

stare decisis doctrines depriving rights to face to face confrontation, speedy trial, acquittal and

release from false imprisonment.

114. Petitioner/Appellant prays this court acknowledges the impact of actuality, the public

interest, the lack of lawful authority, by the state, to commit fraud by Florida’s custom and

policy and the level of controversy, all requiring and obligating this court to grant this Petition

for Writ of Certiorari. Review is necessary to correct and reinforce the blessings of liberty clearly

deprived by a tyrannical abuse of governmental authority and judicial immunity. This Petitioner

prays for God’s speed in the proper administration of justice.

Respectfully submitted:

SWORN OATH

Under the penalties of perjury, the Petitioner/Appellant Christopher J. Rahaim does

swear and affirm that all facts and assertions contained in the Petition For Writ of Certiorari are

true and correct. (18 U.S.C. §1621).

Signed:

Sworn to, affirmed and signed before me on this ()

day of June, 2025 by Christopher

J. Rahaim who is personally known by me or has produced an identification card.

Notary Public:

RECIEVED

UNION CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

JUN

BY:

FOR

My Commission Expires:

1 (2-

SAMANTHA RANDALL

Notary Public

State of Florida

Comfh#HHS93896

Expires 9/16/2028

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.