Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Raymond Dugan, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefJul 29, 2025

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Text

S3.

FILED

JUL 29 2025

No.

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT, U.S.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

RAYMOND DUGAN

Petitioner

-vUNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Respondent

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Raymond Dugan pro se

FCI Elkton

P.O. Box 10 Unit HA

Lisbon, OH 44432

(330) 420-6200

RECEIVED

AUG 1 2 2025

Questions Presented

1. Did the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals construe the "Joint-Venture” doctrine too

narrowly to comply with constitutional protections?

2. Should the procedure the Fourth Circuit Courts followed in evaluating probable

cause to an affidavit for search, of information provided by a known foreign law

enforcement agency, been applied at a higher standard to comply with the Fourth

Amendment?

3. Did the Fourth Circuit frame Supreme Court precedents at too high a level of

generality and fail to properly apply the reasoning of those holdings to their

decisions?

4. Should the Supreme Court update the instructions of Gates and Leon to better

contend with modern invasive technology, and the dubious expant ion of elusive

supranational law enforcement it empowers?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions presented

Table of contents

'l.‘

Table of authorties

Opinions below

II.

Jurisdiction

III.

Statutory provisions involved

IV.

Petition introduction

Reasons for granting the petition

VI.

Question 1

Question: 2

Question 3

Question 4

Conclusion

Index to appendices

Circuit court opinion

Circuit court judgement

District court order

Pre-trial motion to suppress (unavailable - sealed by court)

Pre-trial motions to compel (unavailable - sealed by court)

Table of Authorities

Cases:

pages

Alabama V. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)

Al-Turki V.

Asso. V. Douds,

F. Supp. 1153 (10th cir. 2016)

339 U.S.

382 (1950)

AP V. DOJ, 549 F.3d 62 (snd cir.

2008)

- Arizona V.Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995)

Banks V. Dietke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004)

(new case) No. 23-1 239 (2025 )

Benanti V. United States, 302 U.S. 382 (1937)

Berger V. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967)

Bully V. United States 19-80702-cv Rosenburg (S.D.FL 2019)

Carey V. Duckworth, 738 F.2d 875 (7th cir.

Barnes V.Felix,

1984)

Carpenter V. United States 585 U.S. 875 (2018)

passim

Cottom V. DOJDOD, 6:23-cv-6307 EAW (W.D.NY 2025)

Davis V. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011)

Franks V. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)

Illinois V. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)

passim

In. re U.S. ex rel an Order, 849 F. Supp. 526 (2nd cir. 2011)

Koeppel V. Speirs, 808 N.W. 2nd 177 (IOWA 2011)

Kyles V. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995)

passim

Kyllo V. United States 533 U.S. 27 (2001)

L. Beautiful Struggle V. Balt. Police, 2 F.4th 330 (4th cir. 2021)

116 (1999)

Lilly V. Virginia, 527 U.S.

Lopez V. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963)

1, 2, 22

Montgomery V. Bobby, 654 F.3d 668 (6tj cir. 2011)

Merrill V. State Police,

2:19-cv-0039-JDL (D.ME. 2020)

Murray V. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988)

Nardone V. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937)

Pag An-GonzA1Az V. Moreno, 9919 F.3d 582 (CAI 2019)

Riley V. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014)

1, 7

Roe V. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)

Sanders V. FBI, Civ. No. 20-3672(ABJ)

(D.DC 2022)

Schuchardt V. Pres., 839 F.3d 336 (3rd cir. 2016)

Turse V. DOD, 220cr-2 970 (APM ) (D.DC 2025 )

2016)

United States V. Aleem, 641 Fed. Appx. 96 (2nd cir. 2016)

United States V. Allen, 864 F.3d 63 (2nd cir. 2017)

United States V.

Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292 (10th cir.

United States V. Agurs, 427 U.S. 91 (1976)

United States V.

17, 18,

Bagley, 473 U.S. 619 (1985)

17, 20, 24

United States V. Bateman, 1:20-cr-10012-1T (D.MA 2022)

United States V. Bosy1^, 786 Fed. Appx. 399 (4th cir. 2019)

passim

United States V.

17, 20

Caro, 597 F.3d 608 (4th cir. 2010)

United States V. Copion, 185 F.2d 629 (2nd cir. 1950)

United States V. Chatrie, 136 F.4th 100 (4th cir 2025)

United States V. Chavez,

3 :14-cr-00185(JAM)

(D.CT 2016)

United States V. Delaney, 22-10955 2023 7193281 (N.D.NY 2023)

933 F.3d 110 (2nd cir. 2019)

993 F.2d 1146 (1993)

United States V. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974)

1, 7

United States V. Eldred,

United States V.

Elwood,

United States V. Howell, cr21-0190-JCC (W.D.WA 2025 )

United States V.

Ishmael, 843 F. Supp . 205 ( E.D.TX 1994)

United States V. Jennings, 7 : 24 - cr-00127 (W.D.VA 2022 )

United States V. Kiejzo, 4 : 20-40036-TSH (D.MA 2023)

United States V. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)

2, 4

passim

United States V. Lewis, 81 F.4th 460 (6th cir. 2023)

United States V. Loera, 24 F.4th 144 (2nd cir. 2022)

United States V. Milligan, 20-cr-20234 (E.D.MI 2023)

United States V. Mitrovich, 95 F.4th 1064 (7th cir 2024)

United States V. Mitrovich, 547 F. Supp. 3d 883 (N.D.IL 2021)

19, 24

United States V. Mitrovich, 458 Supp . 961 (ND.D.IL 2020 )

passim

United States V. Mitrovich, 18-cr-789 (N.D.IL 2019)

United States V. Modanlo, 954 F. Supp. 384 (D.MA 2013)

United States V. Owen, 18-cr-157 (E.D.WI 2019)

United States V. Pobre, 2 :19-cr-348-PX (D.MD. 2022)

United States V. Sanders, 107 F.4th 223 (4th cir. 2024)

United States V.

Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993 (10th cir.

United States V.

Smith, 110 F.4th 817 (5th cir.

United States V.

Smith, 4 :15-cr-00467 (S.D.TX 2016)

3, 4

2011)

2024)

United States V. Stuart, 21-cr-OOO7 (LJM)(JJM) (W.D.NY 2023)

4, 5

United States V. Underwood, 275 F.3d 1076 (9th cir. 2013)

United States V. Werdene, 883 F.3d 204 (3rd cir. 2017)

United States V. White, 3 : 21-cr-155-DJH (W.D.NY 2024)

United States V. Wo 1fenbarger,

United States V.

16-cr-005190-CHK-l (N.D.CA 2020)

Zak, 16-cr-65-V (W.D.NY 2017)

Weatherford V. Bursey, 429 U.S.

545 (1977)

Weeks V. United States 232 U.S. 383 (1914)

Statutes and Rules:

... j,,t

Fed. R. Crim. P. 16

19,

Other:

U.S. CONST. Amend.

U•S. CO NS T. Amend IV

passim

U.S. CONST. Amend V

1,16

28 U.S.C. §0.85(g)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays

that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgement below.

I. Opinions Below

The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at 136 F.4th 162. The opinion of the

district court is reported at 2:21-cr-00127-l.

II. Jurisdiction

The judgement of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was entered on May 1,2025. The

jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

Ill. Statutory Provisions Involved

Constitutional:

U.S. CONST. Amend. I:

Congress shall make no law respecting and establishment of religion, or prohibiting

the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or

the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a

redress of grievances.

U.S. CONST. Amend. IV:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants

shall

issue,

but

upon

probable

cause,

supported

oath

affirmation,

and

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be

seized.

U.S. CONST. Amend V:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless

on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land

or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public

danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in

jeopardy of life and limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a

witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just

compensation.

Rules;

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Rule 16. Discovery and Inspection

(a) Government's Disclosure

(1) Information Subject to Disclosure.

(E) Documents and Objects. Upon a defendant's request, the government

must permit the defendant to inspect and

to copy or photograph books, papers,

documents, data, photographs, tangible objects, building or places, or copies or

portions of these items, if the item is within the government's possession, custody,

or control and:

(i) the item is material to preparing the defense;

(ii) the government intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at

f;i.aI.

trial; or

(iii) the item was obtained from or belongs to the defendant.

Code:

28 U.S.C. §0.85

The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall:

(g) Operate the Federal Bureau of Investigation to serve not only the Federal

Bureau of

Investigation,

but

also

provide,

without cost,

technical

and

scientific assistance, including expert testimony in Federal or local courts,

for all duly constituted law enforcement agencies, other organizational units of

the Department of Justice, and other Federal agencies, which may desire to avail

themselves of the service. As provided for in procedures agreed upon between the

Secretary of State and the Attorney General, the services of the Federal Bureau

Investigation

Laboratory

may

enforcement agencies and courts.

also

made

available

foreign

law

IV.

Petition Introduction

principle

The

questions

posed

this

petition

lie

the

nexus

powerfully invasive investigative technology, the rapid expanse of supranational law

enforcement, and the lower courts inability and unwillingness to accept and adapt to

the evolving circumstances of a modern world; in order to protect the constitutional

rights and liberties afforded to this nation as defined by the United States Supreme

Court in Carpenter v United States 585 u.s. 296, 305(2018) (citing Kyllo v United

States 533 u.s. 27(2001)

"We.have kept this attention to founding-era understanding in mind when

applying the Fourth Amendment to innovations in surveillance tools. As

technology has enhanced the Government's capacity to encroach upon areas

normally guarded from inquisitive eyes, this Court has sought to 'assure

[ ] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that

existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.'"

This holding underscores that Fourth Amendment protections of privacy does not yield

to invention and changing law enforcement tactics, and this Court is the guardian of

that authority.

From Nardone v United States 302 u.s. 379, 382(1937) where this Court "laid

down the underlying premise upon which

is based

all

subsequent considerations"

creating "a prohibition against any person violating the integrity of a system of...

communication and that evidence obtained in violation of this prohibition may not be

used to secure a federal conviction." Benanti v United States 355 u.s. 96, 100(1957)

to the suppression of "pen register" devices (see) United States v Giordano 416 u.s.

505(1974)

guarding

against

"through-the-wall"

surveillance

Kyllo

533

u.s.

27(2001) and protecting from cell phone data intrusion Riley v California 533 u.s.

373(2014) this Court has supported that "the fantastic advances in the field of

electronic communication constitute a great danger to the privacy of the individual;

that

indiscriminate

use

such

devices

law

enforcement

raises

grave

constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments". Lopez v United

- States, 373 u.s. 427, 441(1963), Holding that "we cannot forgive the requirements of

the Fourth Amendment in the name of law enforcement." Berger v New York, 388 u.s.

41, 62(1967). For the reason that "The Constitution would be an utterly impractical

instrument of contemporary government

it were deemed to reach only problems

familiar to the technology of the eighteenth century." Lopez, (at 459) which the

Court has frequently demonstrated that is not.

"left unchecked, technology has the potential to restrict as a

practical matter, the right to privacy to the confines of Roe v Wade,

410 u.s. 113(1973)... We must take care that the war on [cybercrime] not

count as one of its victims fundamental rights. The benefits to our

society of safeguarding the right to privacy is such that the courts

must say that there is a limit to the use of technological weapons."

United

States

Ishmael,

843

Supp.

205,

208(E.D.TX

Highlighting

1994).

reason why this Court should stand firm on abuses of law enforcement technology.

this

petition

the

demonstrates

massive

expansion

the

use

supranational law enforcement through advanced technologies exponentially increases

the

difficulty

investigations

properly

determining

joint

through

missions

that

the

exporting

not

circumventing

law

enforcement

constitutional

requirements applicable to American officials. To complicate these issues further,

"federal courts have repeatedly... accepted evidence obtained overseas by foreign

law

enforcement

through

means

that

deviate

from

United

States

Constitutional

protections" United States v Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993,1000(10th cir. 2011), It is

important to recognize that some of the courts are "wary of a practice by which the

Government

might

take

'see no

evil'

approach

working

with

foreign

law

enforcement agencies, even reliable ones, because it is difficult to access this

information within the confines of the Fourth Amendment." United States v Kiejzo,

4:20-40036-TSH page 8(D.MA 2023). Here the Fourth Circuit is tipping the scales of

justice with procedures that favor government secrecy and collusion with foreign law

enforcement

agencies

("FLA")

through

amalgamations

Supreme Court

precedents

applied with unacceptably broad generality and ignoring the reasoning set forth by

►' this Court.

issues

constitutional

The

involving

supranational

and

transnational

technological driven investigations are never going to be organically solved, with

the

rise

of government driven artificial

certainly appear

"unacceptable

and

exponentially.

grow

intelligence

("Al")

Freedom and

liberty cannot

issues

will

afford

and Orwellian cost of forfeiture of any claim of privacy" United

States v Chavez, 3:14-cr-00185(JAM)(D.CT 2016)

"the efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to

punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the

sacrifices of those great principles established by years of endeavor

and suffering which have resulted in the embodiment in the fundamental

law of the land."

Weeks

United

States,

232

u.s.

383

394(1914)

All

these

principles

are

compromised when, as noted by Fourth Circuit Judge Wynn in a statement in the denial

of rehearing en banc United States v Bosyk, 786 Fed. Appx 399(4th cir. 2019)

"The Government in this matter leads this Court to depart from the

wisdom of our sister circuits and endorse an unsustainable approach to

evaluating evolving technology... To many courts the internet is

abstract and the task of learning... is, something to approach with a

sense of dread... the preference to avoid taking the internet on its own

terms, to avoid learning new rules and starting from scratch, leads us

to not question basic assumptions when we should."

This .departure from wisdom establishing circuit precedents splitting away

from the other circuits,

.is derived from poorly applied logic, reason,

and

procedures. The precedents have now been ingrained with subsequent cases United

States v Sanders, 107 F. 223(4th cir. 2024), United States v Jennings, 7:24-cr-00014

(W.D.VA 2024). This is also one of those cases.

V... A.

Reasons For Granting The Petition

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals construed cthe "Joint-Venture" doctrine too

narrowly to comply with constitutional protections^

In the recent decade it can be easily estimated that thousands of federal

criminal

prosecutions

and

convictions

been

have

initiated by factually limited

"tips" of online communication submitted by FLA's to government officials. A sample

of these cases include: United States v Bateman, 1:20-cr-10012-IT(D.MA 2022), United

States v Stuart, 21-cr-0007(LJM)(JJM)(W.D.NY 2023), United States v Keijzo, 4:20-

40036-TSH(D.MA 2023), United States v White,

3:21-cr-155-DJH(W.D.NY 2024), United

States v Howell, cr21-0190-JCC(W.D.WA 2025), United States v Delaney, 22-10955 2023

7193281(N.D.NY 2023), United States v Sanders 107 F. 4th 234(4th cir. 2024), United

States v Lewis, 81 F. 4th 460(6th cir. 2023), United States v Milligan, 20-cr-20234

(E.D.MI 2023). Each of these cases have unique circumstances or identified method of

"tip" submission, but it can generally be determined that each of these FLA's come

from

Joint

Intelligence Allied Nation;

That each has ongoing relations with

specific government task forces and missions; That the Government has gone to great

lengths

disguise,

distract,

minimize,

and

deny

these

relations;

That

the

information submitted was derived through invasive computer technology weaponized

for

law enforcement;

that several of these FLA's have

clearance within the "Five Eyes" nations,

specialized intelligence

(see) Turse v POD, 220cr-2970(APM)(D.DC

2025)(Footnotes 3); and that each FLA has been well coached in legal strategies that

evade constitutional examination. To illustrate this, the affidavit for search of

the Petitioner's home contained nearly identical information and denials of FLA

misconduct as was submitted to the FBI in Sanders pages 7-8.

"[The FLA] notified the FBI that the [Foreign Agency] determined that

on..., a user of IP address [omitted] accessed online child sexual abuse

and exploitation material via a website that the [Foreign Agency]

named." "The [Foreign Agency]... advised U.S. lav; enforcement that it

obtained that information through independent investigation that was

Lawfully authorized in the [Foreign Agency]'s country pursuant to its

national laws. The [Foreign Agency] further advised U.S. law enforcement

that the [Foreign Agency] had not interfered with, accessed, searched,

or seized any data from any computers in the United States in order to

obtain that IP address information.

This statement of denial from this FLA occurs in nearly identical form from

other FLA's in many other cases, (see) Bateman, Stuart, Keijzo, Howell, and Delaney.

' On its face this revelation of calculated parlance unveils coordination of multiple

investigations. "Whether foreign law enforcement officers were acting as agents of

the U.S. Government is a mixed question of law and fact", United States v Aleem, 641

Fed. Appx. 96(2nd cir. 2016), knowing that "The FBI has worked closely with foreign

government agencies who have become partners with the FBI in its criminal and

transnational investigation!s]", Al-Turki v DOJ, F. Supp. 1153,1205(10th ciri 2016)

and that the former Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division Leslie

Caldwell in March of 2016 stated "(c]ollaboration and coordination among multiple

regulators

cross-border

matters

future

the

of...

criminal

enforcement"..

Perhaps the most striking development in cooperative conduct is the embedding of

U.S. prosecutors in foreign law enforcement. United States v Allen, 864 F. 3d 63,

89(2nd cir.

2017)

Caldwell continues on to announce that the DOJ has "recently

placed Criminal Division prosecutors with Eurojust in the Hague and INTERPOL in

France".

It is also more importantly confirmed, that the FLA in the Petitioner's

case also has embedded prosecutors from the DOJ, directly providing an unambiguous

aim of coordinating and directing investigations of American citizens.

Reviewing such information across a breadth of cases the FBI's connection

and influence over the FLA's,

and intent to direct and coordinate supranational

investigations is undeniable. When multiple allied FLA's all submit nearly identical

denials

misconduct

carefully designed

allow

submitted

information

avoid

constitutional inspection, and this occurs time and time again, it becomes obvious

that

this

behavior

being

controlled

federal

attorney

versed

the

Constitution, seeking to keep operations covert and out of the judgemental eye of

the courts. And with supranational online law enforcement operations there have been

plenty:

"Operation

2023),

"Operation Pacifier",

Torpedo",

Cottom

v DOJDOD,

6:23-cv-6307EAW pages

United States v Smith,

2-3(W.D.NY

4:15-cr-00467 page 8(S.D.TX

2016), "Operation Downfall", United States v Mitrovich, 458-F. Supp. 3d 961, pages

5-6(N.D.IL 2020), "Operation Swift Traveler I & II", United States v Wolfenbarger,

16-cr-00519-LHK-l(N.D.CA 2020), "Project Habitance", United States v Stuart, 21-cr-

0007(LJV)(JJM) page 7(W.D.NY 2023) to name a few.

Even in this case and others like it the subject websites are referred to as

"TARGET WEBSITE"

Target

capitolized noun

a proper name,

Website",

which

such

under

universal

title

English

grammer

or a name of a specific

operation. But, how is a defendant supposed to discover a rogue operation with the

current court precedents and interpretations? The Government's plan is they are not

supposed to know.

They cannot know,

leaked out unintentionally.

it is hidden from examination unless it is

"In Government,

the desire for power often coincides

with a determination to avoid accountability.",.

(After Chevron,

Peter Suderman,

Reason Magazine Oct. 2024) As the FBI so obtusely declares in Sanders v FBI civ. no.

20-3672(ABJ) pages 11-14(D.DC 2022) FOIA Request:

"Confirming or denying the existence or non-existence of responsive

records to the Plaintiff's request,... would reveal non-public FBI

techniques by revealing coordination (or lack thereof) between a

specific [foreign law enforcement agency or "FLA"] and the FBI in a

particular matter... merely acknowledging the types of information

shared between FBI and any specific FLA partner would reveal the FBI's

capabilities and vulnerabilities when it comes to coordination and

information sharing with certain FLA's; thus providing... details

concerning

the

scope

collection

and

information

gathering

capabilities and strengths of the FBI and/or FLA to exploit in these

investigative areas/ef forts.

''The declarant also avers that any

intelligence or investigative information shared between the FBI and any

foreign law enforcement agency* is often done so with the understanding

that the FBI's relationship and/or the information shared... will remain

confidential, and even if the foreign law enforcement agency authorizes

the FBI to acknowledge their relationship ‘‘that authorization does not

typically extend to authorize acknowledgment in specific matters or

revealing the very information provided' by that agency."

For an agency that claims there is nothing to hide an enormous amount of

effort, in the form of an entire department, "DOJ's Office of Information Privacy

AP v United States DOJ, 549 F. 3d 62, 64(2nd cir. 2008), and strategy, has

gone into hiding what supossedly doesn't exist. Or does it? "Such 'Creepy and UnAmerican' behavior should be checked by the Fourth Amendment." In re United States

rel

Order

Authorizing

Disclosure,

2011)(Kozinski,C .J. , dissenting)

849

Supp.

526,

543(2nd

cir.

Adversely,

criminal

defendants,

"even with

the tools of discovery quite

simply do not possess the breadth or depth of investigative power necessary to

unearth

these

types of

schemes.",

United

States v Mondenlo,

954 F.

Supp,

384,

389(D.MD 2013) So, what does exist in plain view? It is well known that the FBI has

a long history of weaponizing for law enforcement Undercover Investigative Software

tools ("UIS") such as "NIT", United States v Werdene, 883 F. 3d 204, 206(3rd cir.

2017),

"torrential Downpour or TDR",

United States v Oyyens, 18-cr-157 pages 5-

6(E.D.WI 2019), "Freenet Roundup", United States v Pobre, 2:19-cr-348-px page 7(D.MD

2022), "Roundup Emule", Merrill v State Police, 2:19-cv-0039-JDL page 8(D.ME 2020),

"Flexispy", United States v Loera, 24 F.4th 144 pages 21-22(2nd cir. 2022) and the

FBI Laboratory shares these UIS tools providing training, technical and scientific

assistance

to FLA’s

codefied

under 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(g);

That extensive joint

operations exist with FLA's, (see) United States v Mitroyich, 458 F. Supp. 961 page

3(D.N.IL 2020); That the Government has a history of abusing surveillance tools,

(see) Nardone, Giordano, Kyllo, Riley, Merrill, United States v Smith, 110 F. 4th

817(5th cir.

2024); That’the government compartmentalizes 7 information by bouncing

referrals to other agencies, task forces and departments; and that the FBI has no

intention

revealing

infringements

constitutional

malfeasance

its

operations.

One

information

can

summize

through

that

parallel

these

unconstitutional

constructed

scheme,

are

sharing

orchestrating

virulent

endeavors

operatives, or passing around information like a hot potato through different FLA's

until it is laundered clean. But, in reality, the currently overly narrow definition

of 'joint-venturd' does not apply in a practical sense. Courts are construing pre

internet era descriptions

"joint-venture"

so narrow that it harkens back to

Thelma and Louise locking elbows and driving off a cliff together. But, that's not

what is really occuring. Technology removes the need for explaining embedded agent

f behaviors

requirements.

communication and

Everything

else

All

that

now

needed

UIS

software,

covert

a clandestine supranational arrangement or misapplied treaty.

covered

ignorance,

willful

misguided

interpretations

precedents, and a poor application of the "good-faith" exception of the exclusionary

The Supreme Court has not fully weighed in on high tech supranational or

rule.

transnational joint ventures with law enforcement, but the time is here. Lest we end

up with a more dangerous international varient of the "Silver Platter Doctrine"

surrendering out liberty to unregulatible authorities.

: The procedure the Fourth Circuit Courts followed in evaluating probable cause

affidavit

for

search,

information provided

a known

foreign

law

should “have jbedn .applied-'at': a . highet'j standard -to’: cbmply? ;with.

enforcement agency,

the-Fourth Amendment.

Beginning with de novo review of the procedures followed by the Fourth

Circuit

Courts

examining

establishing

the more basic

probable

veracity,

cause

basis of knowledge,

start

with

and reliability of

the

necessary

information provided in the affidavit for search submitted to the Magistrate Court

below which issued the search warrant of the Petitioner's home,

and whether the

Courts below had set the standard of probable cause far too low when evaluating the

totality of the circumstance. The veracity of the initial information provided by

the known

FLA

the

FBI

substantially vague and

information states that on May 25,

rather unvericious.

This

2019 a specific IP address had accessed the

homepage of a website that was know to share child sexual abuse material (CSAM). The

FLA informed the FBI that this was a "TARGET WEBSITE" and provided a screenshot of r,

the homepage accessed. It was determined that this website was on the TOR Network (a

network developed by the U.S. Government for private military communication and now

publically available). The homepage accessed contained no visible images, videos, or

CSAM,

and had writing in an unspecified foreign language.

No other evidence of

activity by this IP address was included, no further entry into additional pages, no

specific file names downloaded, no images viewed, and no links followed to other

pages; just the bare homepage to a "TARGET WEBSITE". Nor was it determined what

nation this website's server was located. Only the use of the verb "accessed" which

is defined as: to get at: gain access to (Merriam-Webster's Dictionary 2006) and

only establishes proxmity in the past tense.

In a physical world case such as narcotics trafficking where an anonymous

informant provides only a tip of proximity to a potential crime, that tip is wholly

insufficient information to even begin establishing a circumstance. The standard of

veracity requires more details such as the type of narcotics, the amount or weight

exchanged,

the

controlled buys.

frequency of exchanges,

and physical

evidence

from purchases or

Such as in Illinois v Gates, 4fe2 u'.'s ;-213'.-245X-1-9'8.3)"The anonymous

letter contained a range of details relating not to just easily obtained facts and

conditions at the time of the tip, but to future actions... not easily predicted."

should a different standard of procedure apply to online information

So,

provided lacking a range of details versus detailed information provided from the

physical world? If held equal to information provided by informants in physical

situations the information provided to the FBI by the FLA is no more than a temporal

proximity to a place of a potential crime. But, this is not an average informant,

this is a world renowned government intelligence agency with vast resources and

extraordinary investigative abilities. The technology employed by the FLA to unmask

the Petitioner's IP address would have certainly revealed additional and detailed

evidence of

included.

a crime which an agency of

But,

didn't.

such esteem would have most assuredly

downloads,

illegal

file

sharing,

incriminating conversations, no registration, no corroborating evidence whatsoever,

just a factually bare allegation. It is what's not said by the FLA that diminishes

the veracity and basis of knowledge of the information provided. "Both factors -

quantity and quality are considered in the totality of the circumstance - the whple

picture". Alabama v White, 496 u.s. 325, 330(1990), Yet, here the FLA intentionally

leaves a vacuum. Was there ever a crime or was the FLA hiding its own questionable

conduct, may never be determined.

Turning to the reliability factor of this known FLA with a purported history

of sharing reliable information to the FBI. The Government led these Courts below to

broadly assume the reliability standard was met without a procedure of examination.

But, what beyond a reputation sets reliability of the information? Were the previous

tips more fact based or bare? Would these previous tips have met constitutional

scrutiny? What is the relation of the informant with the Government and should the

depth be examined? Was is the Government's claim of reliability or was if factually

based? Or is it simply that previous reliability was also broadly assumed based on

another broad assumption of reliability, and so on. "Deciding whether a particular

statement bears the proper indicia of reliability under the Confrontation Clause

precedent 'may be [again] a mixed question of fact and law', but the mix weighs

heavily on the 'fact'

side." Lilly v Virginia,

527 u.s.

116,

148(1999) When the

facts are bare and a magistrate judge broadly assumes reliability in the face of a

lack of

indicia,

detatched.

the magistrate judge abandons his

appropriate

range

details

become

duty to remain neutral and

even

necessary

when

complicated modern technology is part of the equation.

In addition to the bare tip the Panel below notates several other factors

listed in the affidavit beginning with the TARGET WEBSITE was a TOR hidden service

and therefore only accessible through the TOR Network making it "extremely unlikely

that any user could simply stumble upon TARGET WEBSITE without understanding its

purpose and content." Then the affidavit outlines the requirements to create an

account, followed by an opinion, it is exceedingly rare for a registered user to

access that website and never return." (appx. A 15-16) The Affiant emphasized that

TARGET WEBSITE was not accessible by way of the traditional internet, that a user

had to install TOR software and navigate to a 16 or 56 character web address to

and

it;

reach

that

address

was

often

on malicious

listed

directories.

This

explanation while technically possible is misleading.

TOR software is an internet browser, just like Internet Explorer, Google

Chrome,

Safari,

Apple

but with

extra

security

features

that

allow

communicate privately with a large variety of networks beyond the World Wide Web.

This includes networks in other countries, universities, corporations, Government,

gaming, etc... Every user who accesses the internet downloads browser software. With

the current abundance of online scams, information tracking, and theft, for reasons

of security, alternate platform browsing has become common.

But, what is grossly misrepresented is. the suggestion of a narrow path of

navigation to the TARGET WEBSITE through a complex web address located on specific

directories with illegal content. What the Affiant describes is nothing more than a

Universal Resource Locator ("URL") which every website and every webpage within

every website has assigned to it.

URL's frequently do not provide any external

indication of the content to which they navigate and randomness of the URL has no

bearing on the complexity of reaching a website. In the early days of the internet

most websites were reached by typing in a www dot com address which is linked to a

hypertext containing the URL of the intended webpage and forwarding the user to the

desired website, but those days are long gone.

In today's

internet most websites

are

reached

by a single click of a

hyperlink to a URL. Users can encounter hyperlinks to URL's in a myriad of ways as

they

are

posted

everywhere across

the

internet.

A single webpage can

contain

hundreds of hyperlinks to URL's with little to no description of the destination.

Some hyperlinks will even deceptively activate without a click when a cursor glides

past, it is no exaggeration to state that a single URL can be disseminated millions

of additional times, often in a matter of seconds. Single click hyperlinks are an

effective communication tool yet fraught with danger. Spoofing, for example, is when

■ a hyperlink creator disguises the content description of a website destination to

misdirect an unwitting user to a different website altogether. Other dangers of

unsolicited connections include "pop-up" viruses and malware, landing unaware users

on undesired websites without direct action. With hyperlinks and URL's, absent of

specific facts, there is no conclusion that can be drawn of a restricted path to a

single click of a homepage, (see) United States v Bosyk 933 F. 3d 319, 343-347(4th

cir. 2019)(Wynn,J. dissenting)

In this case the Courts below identify no facts in the affidavit supporting

the bald assertion that it is unlikely that a user would innocently access the

TARGET WEBSITE and never return.

regarding

language

the

Instead

characteristics

citing to the affidavit's boilerplate

individuals

who

"collect"

child

pornography and where it can be located. As these factors are considered as the

substantial basis to issue the search warrant for the Petitioner's home, there rare

foundational faults in the Government's logic skewing the conclusion. The Government

and the lower Courts in this case read the affidavit using an inapplicable logic of

enclosure,

assuming

limitations

that

not

exist

online,

assuming

further

encroachment of the TARGET WEBSITE beyond the homepage, and incorrectly concluding

that the person using the Petitioner's IP address was a registered user of the

TARGET WEBSITE.

When individualized information connecting a person to a crime is absent, an

affiant, much less a court cannot rely on generalized boilerplate assumptions about

criminal habits, (see) United States v Underwood, 275 F. 3d 1076, 1082-1083(9th cir.

2013) Here, like in Underwood, the lower Courts rely on the affidavit's explaination

of the generalized habits of collectors of child pornography, left unsupported by

individualized facts demonstrating that someone using the Petitioner's IP address

was,

in fact,

a collector of child pornography; thus,

these lower Courts cannot

permissibly rely on the generalized habits of those who view and possess. Therefore,

that language in the affidavit has no bearing on the likelihood of an innocent user

accessing the homepage inadvertently.

"In the digital age, the ubiquity of link shortening services and

randomly generated URL's render browsing the internet a great exercise

in trusting strangers. The average internet user does not-indeed,

cannot-know with certainty that all links they follow will take them

where they expect. The system works because we follow links on faith.

What then, should a court assume when an affidavit alleges nothing more

than a single click occurred? Very little, if anything."

United States v Bosyk, 786 Fed. Appx. 398, 399(4th cir. 2019)(Wynn, J. dissenting in

the denial of reh'g en banc). An Affiant's deceitful omission strips a magistrate

judge of the ability to perform their constitionally prescribed gatekeeping role and

the opportunity to deny law enforcement the ability to exploit unconstitutional

(see) Pagan-Gonzalez v Moreno, 919 F. 3d 582, 613(CA1 2019). Worse, when

conduct,

courts

leap

past

such predictable

defects

zealous

affiants

the process

fairness breaks down.

To proceed beyond the bate nature of the affidavit,

questions must be

answered related to the basis of knowledge in how the IP address was initially

identified and

those revolve

around the technology.

A brief explanation of the

network, TOR is an open source anonymized version of the Firefox internet browser

that allows a computer user to conceal his IP address and location by relaying his

traffic through the TOR Network. Thus, a user in the United States is protected from

his

information being shared anywhere in the United States or abroad.

Network was developed by the U.S.

The TOR

Government and is still being funded by the

Government. Now publicly available the network has growing credibility and privacy

issues that are of the Government's own making, (see) United States v Mitrovich, 458

Supp.

3d 961,

963(N.D.IL 2020),

Bully v United States, 19-80702-CV Rosenburg

(S.D.FL 2019)

To search and seize information from users on this network the FBI developed

software known as Network Investigative Technique("NIT").

works

by using

an "exploit"

which

takes

advantage

This invasive software

software vulnerabilities

designed

into

protections.

the

TOR

Browser

Computer code

the

Government

is added to the digital

circumvent

the

security

content of a webpage,

that

augmented set of data travels through the network and into a users computer. Without

the users knowledge, the code deploys exploiting the vulnerability in the browser

causing it to transmit identifying information back to the website. For the FBI to

deploy this intrusive tool requires a special type of NIT warrant, and since 2014 the

FBI has executed these searches thousands of times, (see) United States v Eldred,

933 F. 3d 110, 114-115(2nd cir. 2019), United States v Zak 16-cr-65-v(W.D.NY 2017).

Every circuit has numerous cases involving NIT warrants and all officials are fully

aware of the requirement when implementing this type of search.

However, in recent years FLA's have supplanted the FBI as the primary source

of these types of searches on U.S. citizens circumventing the NIT warrant process.

In many cases, such as this one, in the affidavit is a blanket statement of denial,

(see supra,

page 4)

that the FLA had not interfered with, accessed,, searched, or

seized and data from any computer in the United States in order to obtain the IP

address, (appx. A5) But, the information submitted is only in the United States and

held under privacy security software on a users computer. How is it being accessed

from abroad without a warrant on a Government created and funded network? The lower

Courts logic is again failing in these cases because it assumes reliability of the

statement

without

corroboration

the

face

facts

that

demonstrate

the

improbability of the warrant necessary to seize the information. What does it say if

"the only evidence available that the warrant[less] search was wholly independent is

the testimony of the agents who conducted the illegal search"? Murray v United

States, 487 u.s. 533, 549(1988).

Courts are not expected to be experts in technology, and that presents a

problem, but are expected to apply scepticism and corroboration in the common sense

approach to crediting hearsay, especially in the complicated arena of high tech. In

these newer cases involving FLA's and NIT type searches the procedure of applying

common sense is blatantly lacking thoroughness.

By assuming the way through the

process and thoughtless consideration the Courts below are setting the standard of

probable cause evaluation so low it has rapidly erased all standards when it comes

to online information provided by FLA's.

Across

the

circuits NIT warrants

have been heavily

litigated

being

general warrants to no avail. These courts have routinely relented to government

demands for warrants by yielding to "a power, that places the liberty of every man

in the hands of every petty officer." Arizona v Evans, 514 u.s. 1, 23(1995)(quoting

John Adams). Now the NIT warrant process is less often applied as the Government is

skirting the warrant requirement by foreign proxy to seize information from citizens

in the U.S. and courts are excusing these schemes. "Indeed, it’s long since, accepted

that the [Fourth] Amendment's proscriptions apply not just to governmental entities

but also to those who serve as the government's agents in particular cases." United

States v Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1300(10th cir. 2016). This inaction by the lower

courts is, in effect, creating a virtual "writ of assistance" by default, allowing

free range of warrantless searches from abroad and government is exploiting the

collected

information,

invasion of

privacy our founders

sought

so hard

prevent, "The founding generation crafted the Fourth Amendment as a response to the

reviled general warrants and writs, of assistance of the colonial era, which allowed

British Officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of

criminal activity.", Carpenter v United States, 585 u.s. 296, 303(2018), "For what

would have been the point of the Amendment if the government could have instantly

rendered

dead

letter

the

simple

expedient

delegating

agents

investigative work it was forbidden from undertaking itself?'", Ackerman, at 1300.

There is no irony to be drawn in the relation and conduct of FLA's and the

government in these cases, and the rummaging by officials from foreign lands that

our founders feared,

(see) U.S.

British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S.

Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, Wash. Post (June 7, 2013) Schuchardt v

President

the

United

States,

F.3d

839

336(footnotes

8)(3rd

cir.

2016).

Unrestrained searches have no place in U.S. law enforcement, not in physical nor

virtual electronic

situations,

and the courts have a duty not to endorse such

actions. The manifestation and consent of an agency relationship doesn't have to be

formalized in any particular way. It can be created by written or spoken word or

implied conduct which, reasonably interpreted, causes the agent to believe that the

government desires him to act. This malevolent encouragement can only thrive when

standards

evaluating

information

lowered

are

through

logic,

poor

quick

assumptions, and derelict examination. Liberty is lost when the bar is set too low

and the courts ignore or avoid procedure designed to protect citizens.

The Fourth Circuit framed Supreme Court precedents at too high a level of

generality and failed to properly apply the reasoning of those holdings to their

decision.

This

case also demonstrates how the Fourth Circuit Courts violated the

structural protections of the Constitution and the Fifth Amendment; failed to remain

impartial; favored law enforcement action over a defendant's right to fair and just

due process; stacked overbroad interpretations and improperly applied this Court's

precedents. The Fourth Circuit is establishing their own precedents in conflict with

this Court and other sister circuits by isolating quotes from this Court's opinions,

expanding

the

generality beyond

acceptable

levels,

and

framing

these holdings

outside of the original context and reasoning.

The Panel below begins addressing the question of a Brady violation by

conceding that,

"Under Brady, materiality

'is not a sufficiency of the evidence

test' and a defendant need not demonstrate that after discounting the inculpatory

evidence in light of

the undisclosed evidence 'there would not have been enough left

to convict.'" (see) Kyles v Whitley, 514 u.s. 419, 434-435(1995)(appx. All) After

this pragmatic admittance the panel pivots and attempts to backtrack this holding by

mashing together a trifecta of broadly generalized quotes. Beginning with "Even so,

favorable evidence is only material if a defendant can demonstrate "there is a

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the

result of the proceeding would have been different." (see) United States v Caro 597

3d 608,

619(4th cir.

2010) (quoting United States v Bagley 473 u.s. 619,

682

(1985))(appx. 11-12) But, then immediately ignores the reasoning of the opinion in

Bagley skipping ahead to their conclusion without incorporating crucial elements of

the holding. With the first being;

"A "reasonable probability" is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome. This standard of materiality is sufficiently

flexible to cover cases of prosecutorial failure to disclose evidence to

the defense regardless of whether the defense makes no request, a

general request, or a specific request. Although the prosecutor's

failure to respond fully to specific request may impair the adversary

process by having the effect of representing to the defense that certain

evidence does not exist, this possibility of impairment does not

necessitate a different standard of materiality. Under this standard

stated above, the reviewing court may consider directly any adverse

effects that the prosecutor's failure to respond might have had on the

preparation or presentation of the defendant's case."

Instead of following the complete holding and standard of materiality from

Bagley

the

Court

attempts

cover

the

erroneous

conclusion with

n[T]he mere

possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense,

or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish 'materiality in

the constitutional sense."" (see) United States v Agurs 427 u.s. 91, 109-110(1976)

(appx.Al'2) This extremely broad conclusion of materiality from Agurs in 1976 ignores

the more recent precedent of materiality from Kyles v Whitley 514 u.s. 419, 437

(1995) defining "the fourth and final aspect of Bagley materiality to be stressed

here is its definition in terms of suppressed evidence considered collectively, not

item

accounting

item."

the

addition,

the

reasoning behind

circumstantial evidence

Fourth

Circuit

errors

the

holding.

In Agurs

again with

the ruling

incomplete

turns on

coming to light after the trial, evidence that the defense

did not seek, ifot on evidence specifically sought by the defense and suppressed by

* the government and prosecution. Regardless of the differing circumstances, the Court

continues on in the opinion "There are situations in which evidence is obviously of

such substantial value to the defense that elementary fairness requires it to be

disclosed

even without

request."

specific

Agurs

427

u.s.

97,

110-111(1976)

continuing on

"the fact that such evidence was available to the prosecutor and not

submitted to the defense places it in a different category than if it

had simply been discovered from a neutral source after trial. For that

reason the defendant should not have to satisfy the severe burden that

newly discovered evidence probably would have resulted in acquittal."

But, what truly impeaches the lower Court's reasoning is this Court's touchstone of

materiality from Kyles v Whitley "Kyles instructed that the materiality standard for

Brady claims is met when "The favorable evidence could be reasonably be taken to put

the whole case in such a different light as to undermine the confidence in the

verdict." Banks v Dretke 540 u.s. 668, 698(2004)

that

Knowing

the

Petitioner

had

made

specific

requests

for

evidence

challenging the veracity, basis of knowledge, and reliability of the prosecutions

witness in pre-trial and objected that these requests had been unfilled, the circuit

court avoided the Kyles materiality standard and rounded out the trifecta with an

overtly broad and vague observation "[T]here is no?general’.;ti’?hstit'i!on'al'. right to

discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one." (see) Weatherford v

Bursey 429 u.s.

545, 559(1977), stripped away from its original context "that the

prosecution must reveal the names of all witnesses who will testify unfavorably."

Across the

lower courts

this monstrous generality has been widely perverted to

"rubber stamp" denials of motions for discovery with little to no effort put into

examining the procedural need for the evidence.

regurgitates

final

only

admonishment

facts

favorable

evidence requests were grounded

claim

the

Petitioner's

Brady

the

prosecution,

stating

the

Court

suppressed

in speculation and unsupported by evidence and

1-8

cannot satisfy Brady1s material requirement. However, the Sixth Circuit completely

rebukes this very methodology.

"In a Brady materiality inquiry, a reviewing court cannot just enumerate

the facts and reach a conclusion. Instead, it must evaluate any holes

and weaknesses in the case against the defendant and determine whether,

given this totality of the evidence, inclusion of the suppressed

exculpatory evidence creates a "reasonable probability" of a different

outcome"

Montgomery v Bobby 654 F. 3d 668, 709(6th cir. 2011)

While the Constitution is not specific in a right to discovery for criminal

defendants, neither does it grant the Government discovery immunity. Notwithstanding

this absent decree, the Constitution does provide a right to petition the Government

for a redress of grievances under the First Amendment and the right of due process

in federal criminal cases under the Fifth Amendment. Therefore, if a defendant's

grievance is the Government's relation with a FLA, how evidence was collected, and

to verify if Fourth Amendment rights to privacy were violated, then under the Fifth

Amendment the constitutionally correct redress is discovery. Here the Petitioner's

motions for discovery fall well within these provisions. Yet, the Fourth Circuit

turns logic upside down by disregarding these essential constitutional instructions.

Looking to the Seventh Circuit in United States v Mitrovich 95 F. 4th 1064 page

12(7th cir.

2024) "The Government cannot "get around Brady by keeping itself in

ignorance or compartmentalizing information about different aspects of the case"

(quoting)

Carey v Duckworth 738 F.2d 875,

responsibility

for

failing

disclose

878(7th cir.

known,

1984)

favorable

"the prosecutions

evidence

rising

material level of importance is inexcapable" Kyles 514 u.s. 419, 438(1995)

'.The ■'Panel then attempts to bridge this trifecta of misguided interpretations

over Brady to the Petitioner's motion to compel under Rule 16(a)(1)(E).(appx.A1314)

Here

the

Court

applies

overbroad

interpretations

their

own precedents

following the same line of conclusions without looking at their own reasoning. The

Court

cites

"To

however,

establish materiality,

the defendant must

"some

show

indication that the pretrial disclosure of the disputed evidence would have enabled

the defendant significantly to alter the quantum of proof in his favor.''" United

States v Caro 597 F. 3d 608, 621(4th cir. 2010) Again the lower circuit court misses

the rest of the reasoning "[E]vidence is material as long as there is a strong

indication that it will play an important role in uncovering admissable evidence...

or assisting impeachment or rebuttal" (see) Caro 621* Given that the prosecution had

already established a relationship between the FBI and the FLA, seeking evidence of

a joint venture would have been critical to the defense strategy and more than

establish materiality. There shouldn't be an alternating standard of materiality and

the complete reasonably probability

standard

cited

in Bagley and Kyles

should

suffice. Looking further into Bagley in concurrence Justice White, joined by Chief

Justice Burger and

Justice Rehnquist,

wrote

"lower court

practices

with Agurs

convinces me that courts and prosecutors have come to pay "too much deference to the

federal common law policy discouraging discovery in criminal cases, and too little

regard to due process of law for defendants.'" Dicta worth the reconsideration of

this current Court given the obvious difficulties of analyzing modern technology and

transnational law enforcement operations.

Turning next to the assessment of denial

of a motion to suppress,

the

circuit court reviews the district court's legal conclusions de novo and its factual

findings for clear error. Then ^a questionable application of law arises with origins

i-n Illinois v Gates 462 u.s. 213(1983) migrating through a genesis of case law and

morphing into a structural violation that appears in the aggregate. In assessing a

probable cause determination by a magistrate the court applies "a deferential and

pragmatic

standard to determine whether the judge

'had a substantial basis for

concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing'" and consider "Only

the facts presented in the warrant application."(appx.A9) both relatively accurate

20>

interpretations of Gates at 236. This Court's progression of Gates through United

States

v Leon,

468

u.s.

897,

914(1984)

subsequently adjusts

and

curtails this

standard with "Deference to the magistrate, however, is not boundless." But, the

Fourth Circuit ignores the Leon holding and expands Gates with "we review the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below." Which has its

origins in the Fifth Circuit United

States

v Elwood 993 F.

2d 1146,

1151(1993).

Although similar to the Gates instruction the shift in diction creates a fatal flaw

in the reasoning by favoring the prosecution in the adversarial process over the

defendant, limiting the Judicial Branch's (the reviewing court) robust discretion to

check

the

Executive

Branch

structural protection of

(the prosecution

individual

rights

and

law enforcement),

violating a

'particularly subject to

(which are

encroachment' in the criminal law process).

Based on the broadened instructions the circuit court briskly moves past

examining for known or reckless falsity of the affidavit on which that determination

was based,

(see Leon at 914 and Franks v Delaware 438 u.s. 154(1978)) making no

examination

or determination of

the

contention

that

warrantless

was

conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Albeit, very recently the Supreme

Court reiterated "The Fourth Amendment requires... that a court

'Slosh [its] way

through a factbound morass.'" (see) Barnes v Felix, no.23-1239 page 8(2025). Instead

the circuit court invokes an exceptionally elastic holding "probable cause is not a

high bar and does not require certainty; it merely requires 'a fair probability that

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place'", (see) Gates

at 238(appx. A14) This preface conjoined with the listless and dismissive regard

this circuit has applied to the factors of this case and other cases similar to it,

expands the generality of the Gates holding indefinitely suggesting there’s almost

standard

all.

allows

every unsuitable

affidavit

cluttered with bare

conclusions

meet

probable cause,

whether

exists

or not,

banishing

that

requirement clause from the Fourth Amendment. Such a consideration imposes a heavier

responsibility on the Supreme Court

in its

supervision of the

fairness in the

federal court system, (paraphrasing) Lopez v United States 373 u.s. 427, 441(1963)

•7 The seductive plausibility of

a single step in a chain of evolutionary

development of a legal rule is not often perceived until the third, fourth, or fifth

'logical'

extention

occurs. Each step, when taken, appeared a reasonable step in

relation to that which proceeded it, although the aggregate or end result is one

that would never have been seriously considered in the first instance. This kind of

gestative propensity calls for

legislative process

'line drawing'familiar in the judicial, as in the

'thus far but not beyond.'" United States v 12200-Ft. Reels 413

u.s. 123, 127(1973)

Perhaps the time has come for this Court to revisit these rulings of a pre

internet era and narrow the lower courts overly broad applications that are altered

to deny discovery in criminal cases, considering all the intricate issues of lav?

enforcements

application

modern

advanced

technology

and

supranational

investigations.

The Supreme"Court .should update the instructions of Gates and Leon to better contend

with modern invasive technology, and the dubious expansion of elusive supranational

law enforcement it empowers*

The questions posed so far in this petition expose the following:

1) The standard of evaluating probable cause has been set so low in the

Fourth Circuit concerning online matters that any petty officer with enough bare

opinions of statistics, and little more than a nod from an informant can gain a

search warrant on any citizen at any time.

2) The Government's assumed reliability of foreign law enforcement is being

determined with little to no inspection of fact.

3) The Government is orchestrating investigative operations with Foreign

law enforcement agencies and potentially other third parties, both from afar and

with imbedded criminal prosecutors providing coordination, in a manner that seeks to

evade constitutional restrictions.

4) A dubious expansion of elusive supranational law enforcement is being

empowered by government developed and weaponized undercover investigative software

tools,

times

a network developed

and

funded by the Government,

against

citizens in the United States in a manner that violates Fourth Amendment protections

of privacy without a warrant.

5) The Fourth Circuit Courts have so narrowed the doctrine of joint venture

in online investigations that it broadens the Government's opportunities to hide

unconstitutional schemes and operations rooted in malfeasance.

6) The Government has organized a front to disguise, dissuade, distract,

discourage, and prevent any inspection into potentially unconstitutional schemes,

operations or treaties involving supranational or transnational law enforcement and

UIS technologies.

7) The Fourth Circuit Courts are unwilling and unable to compel discovery of

unconstitutional schemes and operations.

The

Fourth

Circuit

Courts

have

departed

far

from

acceptable

interpretations of Supreme Court precedents that raises the level of generality far

too high and ignores Court reasoning.

Just

from

this

short Fistt it'is obvious

that

law

enforcement

tactics,

techniques and technology that has emerged presents significant issues with not only

how our founders valued privacy, but also how our citizens today treasure that civil

right.

Nonetheless,

drives

government

collection,

while

the competitive

enterprises of law enforcement and politics

to excuse surreptitious

essential

national

incursions

security,

and backhanded information

universally

abhorred

and

inexcusable when directed at the individual citizen. The primary tenet of a Fourth

Amendment

inquiry

may

gratuitously unreasonable.

ethics.

grossly

reasonableness,

It has no

enhances

"the

but

modern

limits, no borders,

Government's

capacity

online

technology

no conscience,

and no

encroach upon areas

normally guarded from inquisitive eyes." Carpenter at 305(2018) While technology

"allows

government

watchers

remain

(physically)

unobtrusive

'the

impact

(is ' conspicuous in the lives of those least empowered to object.)"

surveillance'

Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v Balt. Police Dept. 2F. 4th 330 page 37(4th cir.

2021)

Compounding this issue is the seismic shift in the Government's inordinate

reliance

investigative

information

coming

from joint allies

’and

other

compelled third parties. The power of technology has reached the capacity to allow

foreign law enforcement and other third parties to do sordid and unconstitutional

work for the Government from afar without question. To a defendant of one of these

investigations

no mechanism currently

relationships,

treaties,

and

available can

procedural

reach past

encumbrances

the clandestine

to' acquire

the

factual

information necessary to make a reasonable determination about a Fourth Amendment

violation. Brady doesn't, even with the doctrine of constructive possession invoked.

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure doesn't, as Rule 16(a)(1)(E) extends only to

information controlled by the Government, but not beyond. Current court precedent

and interpretation doesn't, as the evolution of Gates, Leon, Bagley, and Kyles, has

moved away from a mandate for discovery. A case that exemplifies this constellation

of issues is United States v Mitrovich 95 F. 4th 1064(7th cir. 2024), 547 F. Supp.

3d 883(2021),

458 F.

Supp.

3d 961(2020),

18-cr-789(N.D.IL 2019) The defense in

Mitrovich through the procedings managed to overcome the hurdles of joint venture

and

the

frustrations

government resistance

to discovery only to have

efforts thwarted by the FLA's refusal to disclose methods.

their

The

exists,

Government

not

only knows

that

cryptic

situational

circumstance

it is exploiting the opportunity to eschew oversight and authority with

plausible deniability. However, our founders has the foresight to prevent such a

preposterous manipulation of law. The First Clause of the Fourth Amendment, "The

right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated" is intentionally

left open ended. The clause does not specify by whom, what, or how, it is unlimited.

Courts, politicians and scholars have often added to the clause by implying it is

limited

construction,

government

the

and

states.

But,

statements

the

surrounding

per

the

casus

omissus

canon

other amendments are specific.

Amendments I, II, III, V, VI, VII, and X are clearly directed at whom, what, or how.

In Amendment IV there is no such enclosure, it is intentionally omitted. According

to the Framers professed fears, this kind of violation of the right to privacy could

come from afar, as their immediate concerns came from their experiences with the

authorities of Great Britain or third parties with whom the Crown granted authority

such as privateers, (see supra page 15). Additionally, the Fourth Amendment should

not be considered compromisable

in the furtherance of law enforcement ease and

expediency. The inclusion of the Warrant Clause by the Framers was the compromise

designed

into the Amendment for law enforcement ease and expediency. "Here the

progress of science has afforded law enforcement a powerful new tool [and tactic] to

carry out its important responsibilities. At the same time, this tool [and tactic]

risks government of the sort the Framers, "after consulting the lessons of history",

drafted the Fourth Amendment to prevent." Carpenter, at 528.

The Fourth Circuit Courts have had a recent history of struggling with these

modern circumstances, and a severe hesitation to properly applying the Constitution

to technologically challenging situations as has been noted in Bosyk, Sanders, and

in United States v Chatrie, 136 F. 4th 100 at 38(4th cir. 2025)(on reh'g en banc),

'* concurrance by Judge Wynn with whom Judges Thacker, Harris, Benjamin, Berner, and

Gregory joined.

"by declining to reach the merits in this matter, this Court squanders a

critical opportunity to clarify the Fourth Amendment application to

emerging surveillance technologies. Instead we take shelter in the

judge-made doctrine of "good-faith" leaving both, courts and citizens to

grope in the dark as to the limits of governmental power in the digital

age. The result? Individuals subject to sweeping, sophisticated

surveillance with little to no judicial oversight - an outcome wholly at

odds with our Constitutional design."

So, what can be done to close such liable procedural defects? Short of an

act of Congress or an amendment to the Constitution, the only remedy open is Supreme

Court

instruction.

consideration

But,

that

what

internet

would

that

information

instruction

can

look

directed

like?

Taking

into

across

the

globe

instantly and stored virtually anywhere including borderless maritime locations, the

but does not clearly

internet has features of being both domestic and foreign,

qualify as either. In this ambiguous circumstance lurks predatory government. This

debase opportunistic incentive of an "International Silver Platter Doctrine" needs

to be removed.

A rule should be created that online investigative information coming from

any law enforcement or third party acting as law enforcement, including vigilantes

is rebuttably presumed to have been unlawfully invasive. ufltil; ;proven

. otherwises

encumbrance,

but without

Government and prosecutors might be unhappy with this

placing limitations on virtual agents, UIS software, bots, and foreign governments

the

U.S.

Government

would

powerless

from

preventing

unauthorized

police

activities. "[T]he harm occurs when the electronic invasion of privacy takes place"

regardless of whether it is directed by human or machine. Koeppel v Speirs 808N.W.

2nd 177, 182(Iowa 2011) Additionally, since the proposition that inference insulates

a search has been rejected, Kyllo at 36(2001) The duty of proving otherwise should

be placed on the Government. Similar to the wiretap case United States v Capion 185

629,

636-637(2nd

cir.

1950)

where

the

burden

proof

was

the

-J' government, but differing slightly, due to the manifold of technical possibilities

and ambiguous territorial determinations, the defendant wouldn't need to establish

an unlawful search before applying the burden of proof on the government. FLA's

would be required to seek warrants through Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties prior to

doing any search on an America citizen's information, otherwise the information is

void and unconstitutional. Additionally, the Government would not be- allowed to rely

on any FLA or third party information unless full disclosure of techniques and

technology is provided to verify Fourth Amendment compliance. In short, the Fourth

Amendment would apply to the internet as a whole.

The last item would be an expanded explanation or additional exception to

the "good-faith" doctrine to the exclusionary rule. A sub-rule that distinguishes

the difference between good-faith, and willful of devised ignorance. It has become

too simplistic for a skilled task force with vast resources to mimic legitimate

travail when the only real effort is being directed at cloafcifig'. the exploitation of

wrongful loopholes. As was suggested in Davis v United States, 564 u.s. 229, 248

(2011), "is a future case, we could, if necessary, recognize a limited exception to

the good-faith exception for a defendant who obtains a judgement overruling one of

our Fourth Amendment precedents."

For these reasons this petition is brought forth. "It is not the function of

our government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of

the citizen to keep the government from falling into error." Asso. v Douds, 339 u.s.

382, 442-443(1950)(Justice Robert H. Jackson). While the tedious and confusing work

making

investigative

contentious

activity,

credibility

tied

determinations

ambiguous

when

evaluating

law enforcement collaborations

online

using

inaccessible invasive software, improper conduct can hide in plain view without any

chance

of disclosure.

This

presents

the perfect opportunity for government

disguise malfeasance, in the name of ease and expediency. A growing situation that

necessitates instruction, guidance, and correction by this Supreme Court.

Regrettably,

this

petition

could

only

concentrate

one

these

techniques, albeit effecting thousands of cases, other corresponding circumstances

are even more detrimental. Al is already able to identify and target terrorist

communication through enigmatic deductive reasoning of information extracted from

computers and cell phones worldwide. What prevents this tool from diverting other

information and tips through foreign proxies outside

the reach of examination?

Similarly, foreign operated social media and data collecting companies such as Kik

Messenger

(Kik

Interactive)

and

TikTok

(ByteDance)

are

the

new

frontier

for

government utilizing third party entrapments with courts already flooded from cases

originating on these platforms. Without improved procedural mechanisms it will be

impossible to unpack and inspect numerous layers of compartmentalized operations

through multiple entities.

Tens of

thousands of future defendants will be left

without the ability to exercise their fundamental constitutional rights, just as

thousands of defendants have already lost. An exceedingly unacceptable proposition.

Conclusion

The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Date

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.