Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Eric Sean Roloson, Petitioner v. Washington

Supreme Court briefJul 28, 2025

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APPENDIX

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Opinion of the Court of Appeals of Washington ...................................................App. 1

Order of the Supreme Court of Washington .......................................................App. 15

Relevant Portions of Trial Court Transcripts.....................................................App. 16

Judgment and Sentence ......................................................................................App. 70

Order of the Court of Appeals of Washington ....................................................App. 88

Relevant Filings in the Trial Court ....................................................................App. 89

Relevant Portion of Mr. Roloson’s Opening Brief .............................................App. 103

Relevant Portion of Mr. Roloson’s Motion to Reconsider .................................App. 107

Relevant Portion of Mr. Roloson’s Petition for Review ....................................App. 117

Relevant Sources of Washington Law...............................................................App. 124

Appendix 1

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

October 8, 2024

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

No. 56823-3-II

Respondent,

ERIC SEAN ROLOSON,

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant.

VELJACIC, A.C.J. — Eric S. Roloson pled guilty to two counts of rape of a child in the first

degree. As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend a special sex offender

sentencing alternative (SSOSA). The trial court rejected the recommendation and imposed a

standard range sentence. Roloson appeals, contending that the State breached the plea agreement

by nominally recommending a SSOSA and then raising aggravating facts to persuade the court not

to impose a SSOSA. He also contends he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas because

they were involuntary. Roloson lastly contends that the court erred by imposing a $500 victim

penalty assessment (VPA), a $100 deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) collection fee, and a $100

domestic violence assessment. We affirm Roloson’s convictions, but remand for the trial court to

strike the VPA and DNA collection fee and reconsider the domestic violence assessment.

FACTS

Following allegations in January 2020 of sexual abuse involving Roloson and his

stepdaughters, Roloson left for Hawaii. He was arrested in August 2020 and brought back to

Appendix 2

56823-3-II

Washington in October 2020.1 The State charged him with two counts of rape of a child in the

first degree and two counts of child molestation in the first degree. All crimes included a special

allegation of domestic violence.

Roloson agreed to plead guilty to two counts of rape of a child in exchange for the State

dropping the molestation charges and recommending a SSOSA. It was the parties’ understanding

that the victims also endorsed a SSOSA for Roloson.

At the plea hearing, the trial court informed Roloson of the standard sentencing range on

both charges and that both counts were subject to the Indeterminate Sentencing Review Board.

Roloson expressed no reservations. The court also informed him that it was aware of the parties’

joint recommendation for a SSOSA, but the court did not have to follow that recommendation and

instead it could impose a sentence anywhere within the standard sentencing range. Roloson stated,

“I do understand that, Your Honor.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 19. Roloson then pled guilty to two

counts of rape of a child in the first degree. The court ordered a presentencing investigation report

(PSI).

The PSI indicated that the girls’ mother and one of the girls “initially agreed that a SSOSA

sentence was appropriate, but that they do not want that now.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 21. The

PSI also indicated that the mother reported that “[t]he girls have a life sentence dealing with what

happened to them. [Roloson] should have a life sentence in prison because you can’t take it back.”

CP at 21. Based on the victims’ statements, Roloson’s statements, and a risk assessment, the PSI

recommended that Roloson receive a standard range sentence.

The delay in returning to Washington was because Roloson was incarcerated in Hawaii and,

while in custody, he was attacked by other inmates. His injuries were significant, resulting in a

lengthy hospital stay and ultimately delaying commencement of proceedings in Washington.

Appendix 3

56823-3-II

At the 2022 sentencing hearing, the State began by stating that there was an agreed

recommendation for a SSOSA. The State then addressed the somewhat inconsistent statements

from the victims in the PSI about initially supporting a SSOSA but then appearing to change their

minds. The State explained that it had been a long and difficult process for them in part because

Roloson “took flight to Hawaii,” was brought back to Washington in October 2020, and the matter

had been pending ever since. RP at 36.

The State went on to explain that it described the sentencing recommendation alternatives

with the victims and they agreed a SSOSA would be best, and most importantly, they wanted

finality. The State clarified that the girls and their mother “did support the SSOSA. They still do

support the SSOSA, but as with everything in life, there are conflicts. And they’re—they’re just

normal people who have had a really bad thing happen to them, and they have some conflicts.

They’re going to have an opportunity to express that to Your Honor.” RP at 36-37.

The girls’ mother spoke at the sentencing hearing. She told the trial court that she

supported the plea agreement, including a SSOSA recommendation, to prevent her daughters from

having to testify and relive Roloson’s horrendous actions. She further stated that she had “fears

that if he is released into the community, he will recommit these horrendous crimes. Repeating

the same actions of molesting, raping, physically and mentally abusing my family. . . . I do fear

[Roloson] will try to come after us if he is released.” RP at 41. She requested that if the court

decided to impose a SSOSA that Roloson not be permitted to “be released into Cowlitz County.

The thought of him living in the same town as us is completely devastating.” RP at 41.

The girls also made statements at the sentencing hearing. One told the trial court that “[t]he

only reason I chose to let him have the SSOSA deal was because I was scared of facing him in

trial.” RP at 43. The other girl stated, “I fear that if proper action isn’t taken, that others may be

Appendix 4

56823-3-II

hurt and abused by [Roloson].” RP at 47. She asked the court to take into consideration “the

safety of our community.” RP at 47.

Roloson then interjected that the sentencing hearing must stop because he was going to file

a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The trial court stopped the sentencing hearing and allowed

briefing on the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas.

Roloson argued that he wanted to withdraw his guilty pleas on the basis that his pleas were

not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the State breached the plea agreement. Roloson

claimed that he only took the plea agreement because of the State’s assurances that the victims

would support a SSOSA and it appeared that was not the case at the sentencing hearing. Roloson

claimed he was “bombarded” and that the plea agreement was “undercut” in a way that created a

manifest injustice. RP at 67-68.

The State responded that it satisfied its obligation under the plea agreement by

recommending a SSOSA and that the victims expressed their desire for a SSOSA even though they

had concerns about Roloson in the community. The State further argued that there was no breach

because it could not control what the victims would say and that the victims were not parties to the

plea agreement. The State commented that it appeared defense counsel was implying that Roloson

“only admitted behavior in order to get this deal and not that he was actually admitting to the

behavior. That’s a problem.” RP at 71.

In an affidavit in support of its memorandum opposing Roloson’s motion to withdraw the

guilty plea, the prosecutor stated that the PSI caused him “some concern” based on both Roloson’s

and the victims’ statements so he met with the girls and their mother after the PSI and felt satisfied

that they “remained supportive” of a SSOSA. CP at 136-37.

Appendix 5

56823-3-II

The trial court denied Roloson’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, finding that the State

did not breach the plea agreement. The court reminded Roloson that the court did not have to

follow the State’s sentencing recommendation or the victims’ wishes.

The matter proceeded to sentencing. The State informed the trial court that it “adheres to

its recommendation” for a SSOSA and asked the court to “follow that.” RP at 77.

The trial court went through the statutory factors of whether to impose a SSOSA. It found

that Roloson could benefit from treatment, but it also found that there were allegations that Roloson

committed numerous acts of sexual assault over the years against his young stepdaughters and

therefore a SSOSA appeared too lenient. The court also found that Roloson was a significant risk

to the community. The court stated that the victims and their mother “said the words, they wanted

SSOSA imposed” and appeared to “desire for SSOSA” RP at 84-85. The court acknowledged

that the mother “kind of strayed” and the girls appeared to want a SSOSA “largely to avoid trial.”

RP at 84-85. The court also noted that Roloson’s leaving the area to avoid prosecution caused

concern that he may do the same if there was a SSOSA violation and a sanction was imposed. The

court noted, “the risk is huge if there’s a re-offense.” RP at 88.

Ultimately, the trial court denied the SSOSA recommendation and imposed the low end of

a standard range sentence of 120 months to life on both counts, to be served concurrently. The

court found Roloson was indigent, but imposed a $500 VPA, a $100 DNA collection fee, and a

$100 domestic violence assessment as legal financial obligations (LFOs).

Roloson appeals.

Appendix 6

56823-3-II

ANALYSIS

BREACH OF PLEA AGREEMENT

Roloson contends the State breached the plea agreement by nominally recommending a

SSOSA and then raising aggravating facts to persuade the trial court not to impose a SSOSA. He

further alleges he should be entitled to withdraw his guilty plea or demand specific performance

based on the State’s alleged breach. We disagree.

Legal Principles

Whether a breach of a plea agreement has occurred is a question of law we review de novo.

State v. Molnar, 198 Wn.2d 500, 513, 497 P.3d 858 (2021). A plea agreement is a contract between

the defendant and the State. Id. at 512. Because plea agreements concern the fundamental rights

of the accused, the State has a “‘good faith obligation to effectuate the plea agreement.’” Id.

(quoting State v. Sledge, 133 Wn.2d 828, 840, 947 P.2d 1199 (1997)).

“A prosecutor is obliged to fulfill the State’s duty under the plea agreement by making the

promised sentencing recommendation.” Sledge, 133 Wn.2d at 840. “The recommendation need

not be made ‘enthusiastically.’” Id. at 840 (quoting State v. Coppin, 57 Wn. App. 866, 873, 791

P.2d 228 (1990)). But the prosecutor is obligated not to undermine the terms of the agreement

either explicitly or through conduct demonstrating an intent to evade the terms of the plea

agreement. Sledge, 133 Wn.2d at 840.

Just because the parties reached an agreed recommendation does not mean the sentencing

court “[sh]ould be faced with a one-sided hearing.” State v. Talley, 134 Wn.2d 176, 186, 949 P.2d

358 (1998). “The State must be allowed to use descriptive words in addition to stipulated facts

because, while the State’s ‘recommendation need not be made enthusiastically,’ it need not be

made so unenthusiastically that it is unhelpful to the sentencing court.” Molnar, 198 Wn.2d at 517

Appendix 7

56823-3-II

(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Sledge, 133 Wn.2d at 840). Thus,

the mere mention of aggravating facts does not automatically breach the plea deal. Molnar, 198

Wn.2d at 516.

Ultimately, we “‘review [the] prosecutor’s actions and comments objectively from the

sentencing record as a whole to determine whether the plea agreement was breached.’” State v.

Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, 433, 387 P.3d 650 (2017) (alteration in original) (quoting State v.

Carreno-Maldonado, 135 Wn. App. 77, 83, 143 P.3d 343 (2006)). “A breach occurs when the

State ‘undercut[s] the terms of the agreement explicitly or implicitly by conduct evidencing an

intent to circumvent the terms of the plea agreement.’” Id. (quoting Carreno-Maldonado, 135 Wn.

App. at 83). We review the State’s actions objectively, focusing “‘on the effect of the State’s

actions, not the intent behind them.’” Id. (quoting Sledge, 133 Wn.2d at 843 n.7). If we find a

party breached the plea agreement, the nonbreaching party may either rescind or specifically

enforce the terms of the plea agreement. State v. Wiatt, 11 Wn. App. 2d 107, 111, 455 P.3d 1176

(2019).

No Breach

Here, the State addressed how difficult the process was for the victims and mentioned that

this was in part due to Roloson taking “flight to Hawaii” after the abuse allegations, which

extended the time for them to have finality. RP at 36. In response to Roloson’s motion to withdraw

his guilty pleas, the State argued that there was no breach because it could not control what the

victims would say and that the victims were not parties to the plea agreement. Later, the State

commented that it appeared defense counsel was saying that Roloson “only admitted behavior in

order to get this deal and not that he was actually admitting to the behavior. That’s a problem.”

RP at 71.

Appendix 8

56823-3-II

Relying on State v. Xaviar, State v. Jerde, and Carreno-Maldonado, Roloson argues these

statements amount to a breach of the plea agreement.

In State v. Xaviar, 117 Wn. App. 196, 198-201, 69 P.3d 901 (2003), the State and the

defendant agreed to a recommendation at the bottom of the standard sentencing range. But at

sentencing, the prosecutor emphasized the graveness of the crime, reiterated the charges that the

State did not bring, noted that the State could have, but did not, ask for a 60-year exceptional

sentence, highlighted aggravating factors that would support an exceptional sentence, and referred

to the defendant as “‘one of the most prolific child molesters that this office has ever seen.’” Id.

at 200. Division One of this court held that the prosecutor’s conduct constituted a breach of the

plea agreement. Id.

In State v. Jerde, 93 Wn. App. 774, 776-77, 970 P.2d 781 (1999), the State agreed to

recommend a standard range sentence, while the PSI recommended an exceptional sentence. At

sentencing, the prosecutor briefly noted the State’s recommendation but proceeded to identify

aggravating factors that the court could consider in support of an exceptional sentence, including

factors that were not contained in the PSI. Id. at 777-78, 782. This court concluded that the

prosecutor’s conduct amounted to a breach of the plea agreement, making specific note of the

prosecutor’s reference to aggravating factors not mentioned in the PSI and observing that the

prosecutor “advocated for an exceptional sentence by highlighting aggravating factors and even

added an aggravating factor not found in the [PSI].” Id. at 782.

Finally, in Carreno-Maldonado, 135 Wn. App. at 79-80, the State agreed to make a lowend recommendation on one count of rape in the first degree, a midpoint recommendation of 240

months on five counts of rape in the second degree, and a high-end standard range recommendation

on a count of assault in the second degree. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court set out the

Appendix 9

56823-3-II

standard range sentence, acknowledged having reviewed the PSI and plea agreements, then asked

the State if it had anything to add. Id. at 80. The prosecutor then made a statement “‘on behalf of

the victims’” in which the prosecutor referred to the defendant’s “‘very extreme violent behavior’”

and his preying on “‘what would normally be considered a vulnerable segment of our community’”

in carrying out “‘crimes . . . so heinous and so violent [they] showed a complete disregard and

disrespect for these women.’” Id. at 80-81. Only when defense counsel objected and suggested

that the State was failing to comply with the plea agreement did the prosecutor respond, “‘I’m

speaking here on behalf of the victims and on behalf of the [S]tate[.] And I’m not going beyond

my recommendation in this case. It’s an agreed recommendation. M[y] recommendation [for the

rape in the second degree is] 240 months.’” Id. at 81 (alterations in original). This court held that

the prosecutor’s statements at the sentencing hearing breached the plea agreement by undercutting

the State’s agreed sentence recommendation. Id. at 79.

In this case, the State commented on Roloson leaving to Hawaii, recognized there was

some inconsistency with the victims’ and their mother’s wishes, and commented during the motion

to withdraw the guilty plea that Roloson’s timing of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea seemed

to suggest he “only admitted behavior in order to get this deal and not that he was actually

admitting to the behavior.” RP at 71. But we do not view these statements in isolation. Ramos,

187 Wn.2d at 433.

Viewing the sentencing record as a whole, the State clearly stated that it adhered to its

recommendation and hoped the trial court would follow it. The State also stated that it described

the sentencing recommendation alternatives with the victims, they agreed a SSOSA would be best,

and most importantly, they wanted finality. The State clarified that the girls and their mother “did

support the SSOSA. They still do support the SSOSA.” RP at 36. Additionally, Roloson’s travel

Appendix 10

56823-3-II

to Hawaii was significant because it caused months of delay in the Washington proceedings

because of his concomitant hospital stay. This was relevant to the length of the proceeding and

related difficulty this caused for the victims, which explains in part their conflicted position as to

the SSOSA. The State was not advocating against the plea agreement in highlighting this fact.

Based on the above, the facts of this case are distinguished from Xaviar, Jerde, and

Carreno-Maldonado. While the State may not have enthusiastically recommended a SSOSA, it

did not undercut the terms of the plea agreement explicitly or implicitly.

Because we hold that the State did not breach the plea agreement, we need not reach

Roloson’s argument that he is entitled to either withdraw his guilty plea or request specific

performance of the parties’ agreement. See State v. McNichols, 128 Wn.2d 242, 253, 906 P.2d

329 (1995) (based on the court’s dispositive holding, it need not reach issue regarding proper

remedy).

II.

WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEAS

Roloson next contends that he should be entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas because his

pleas were involuntary due to the State’s false assurance that the victims would recommend a

SSOSA. We disagree.

Legal Principles

Because this issue was raised before the trial court, our review is focused on whether the

trial court abused its discretion in denying Roloson’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. State v.

Lamb, 175 Wn.2d 121, 127, 285 P.3d 27 (2012). Discretion is abused if the court’s decision lacked

a tenable basis in law or fact. State v. Arndt, 194 Wn.2d 784, 799, 453 P.3d 696 (2019). Trial

courts must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea to prevent a manifest injustice. State v.

Wilson, 162 Wn. App. 409, 414, 253 P.3d 1143 (2011); CrR 4.2(f). Our courts generally recognize

Appendix 11

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four indicia of a manifest injustice: (1) denial of effective assistance of counsel, (2) failure of the

defendant or one authorized by him to do so to ratify the plea, (3) involuntary plea, and (4) violation

of plea agreement by the prosecution. State v. S.M., 100 Wn. App. 401, 409, 996 P.2d 1111 (2000).

Lack of information may render a guilty plea involuntary. State v. Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d

582, 587-88, 591, 141 P.3d 49 (2006). But a guilty plea is not involuntary if “the defendant was

correctly informed of all of the direct consequences of his guilty plea.” Id. at 591.

Washington State Constitution, article I, section 35 (amend. 84) provides crime victims

and their families or representatives the opportunity to make a statement at a defendant’s

sentencing. See also State v. Gentry, 125 Wn.2d 570, 624, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995). As it relates to

the rights of victims and their families, the amendment provides, “[t]his provision shall not

constitute a basis for error in favor of a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” WASH. CONST. art.

I, § 35. In addition to constitutional protections, RCW 7.69.030(1)(m) and (n) permit victims and

victims’ families or representatives to submit victim impact statements to the court and to

personally make a statement at a sentencing hearing in a felony case.

No Abuse of Discretion

Here, the State charged Roloson with two counts of rape of a child in the first degree and

two counts of child molestation in the first degree. In exchange for the State dropping both child

molestation charges and recommending a SSOSA, Roloson agreed to plead guilty to the child rape

charges.

At the sentencing hearing, the State informed the trial court that there was an agreed

recommendation for a SSOSA. The State went on to explain that it described the sentencing

recommendation alternatives with the victims and they agreed a SSOSA would be best, and most

importantly, they wanted finality. The State clarified that the victims and their mother “did support

Appendix 12

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the SSOSA. They still do support the SSOSA, but as with everything in life there are conflicts.

And they’re—they’re just normal people who have had a really bad thing happen to them, and they

have some conflicts. They’re going to have an opportunity to express that to Your Honor.” RP at

36-37. After the trial court denied Roloson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the State

reiterated that it “adheres to its recommendation” for a SSOSA and asked the court to “follow

that.” RP at 77.

While the victims made statements detailing Roloson’s years of abuse and their fear that

he would continue to hurt people in the future, these statements were within their rights and did

not result in a breach of the plea agreement between Roloson and the State. Notably, the victims’

mother and one of the victims expressed their support of the SSOSA. RCW 7.69.030(1)(m) and

(n); Gentry, 125 Wn.2d at 624. Moreover, the trial court clearly advised Roloson that it was not

bound by the sentencing recommendation in the plea agreement. See RCW 9.94A.431(2).

Based on the above, there was no manifest injustice based on an involuntary guilty plea to

warrant the withdrawal of Roloson’s guilty pleas. The trial court properly concluded likewise.

Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Roloson’s motion to withdraw his

guilty plea.

III.

LFOS

Roloson next contends that the trial court erred by imposing a $500 VPA, a $100 DNA

collection fee, and a $100 domestic violence assessment after finding Roloson indigent. The State

took no position on Roloson’s arguments.

When the trial court sentenced Roloson, it was required to impose a VPA of $500 under

former RCW 7.68.035(1)(a) (2018), regardless of a defendant’s indigency, as well as a $100 DNA

collection fee under former RCW 43.43.7541 (2018). But those statutes have since been amended.

Appendix 13

56823-3-II

Now, a “court shall not impose the [VPA] under this section if the court finds that the defendant,

at the time of sentencing, is indigent as defined in RCW 10.01.160(3).” LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449,

§ 1. The legislature also eliminated the $100 DNA collection fee for all defendants. See LAWS OF

2023, ch. 449, § 4. Both amendments took effect July 1, 2023. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, § 27.

Although these amendments took effect after Roloson’s sentencing, they apply to cases pending

appeal. See State v. Ellis, 27 Wn. App. 2d 1, 16, 530 P.3d 1048 (2023). Therefore, we remand for

the trial court to strike the VPA and DNA collection fee.

Regarding the domestic violence assessment, former RCW 10.99.080(1) (2015) states that

the trial court may impose a domestic violence assessment on any adult offender convicted of a

crime involving domestic violence. Recent amendments to this statute did not change this

language. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 470, § 1003. Sentencing courts have discretion as to whether to

impose a domestic violence assessment, which is to be used for the purposes of domestic violence

advocacy and domestic violence prevention. See RCW 10.99.080(1), (2)(a); LAWS OF 2015, ch.

275, § 14. The assessment is not mandatory. Sentencing courts “are encouraged to solicit input

from the victim or representatives for the victim in assessing the ability of the convicted offender

to pay the penalty,” but are not required to do so. See RCW 10.99.080(5), LAWS OF 2015, ch. 275,

§ 14. Because there is no explanation in our record regarding the trial court’s decision to impose

the domestic violence assessment, we permit Roloson to move for the trial court to reconsider that

fee on remand in light of Roloson’s indigence.

Appendix 14

56823-3-II

CONCLUSION

We affirm Roloson’s judgment and sentence but remand to strike the VPA and DNA

collection fee and potentially revisit the domestic violence assessment.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

_ _ _~f--,~_:

-·Veljacic, A.C.J.

We concur:

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Lee, J.

Gk,t

Che, J.

Appendix 15

FILED

SUPREME COURT

STATE OF WASHINGTON

4/30/2025

BY SARAH R. PENDLETON

CLERK

THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

ERIC SEAN ROLOSON,

Petitioner.

______________________________________

)

No. 103812-7

ORDER

Court of Appeals

No. 56823-3-II

Department II of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Stephens and Justices Madsen,

Gordon McCloud, Montoya-Lewis, and Mungia, considered at its April 29, 2025, Motion Calendar

whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b) and unanimously agreed that the

following order be entered.

IT IS ORDERED:

That the petition for review is denied.

DATED at Olympia, Washington, this 30h day of April, 2025.

For the Court

~ I

(!{J

CHlEFJUsncE /

Appendix 16

THE BAILIFF: No. 12, Eric Roloson.

THE COURT: All right. Sir, are you Eric Sean Roloson?

MR. ROLOSON: I am, Your Honor.

THE

COURT:

And,

Ms.

Townsend,

you're

here

with

Mr. Roloson? Is that correct?

MS. TOWNSEND: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. Mr. Roloson, did you read

the Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty?

MR. ROLOSON: I did.

THE COURT: Did you understand it?

MR. ROLOSON: I do, Your Honor.

THE

COURT:

All

right.

You

understand

that

prove

Count I the State would have to prove that—excuse me. Just

one second. All right. The State would have to prove that on

or about—between January 1st of 2012 and January 24th of

2020, being at least 36 months older than T.B., a family or

household member, you had sexual contact with T.B. for the

purpose of sexual gratification and that you were—T.B. was

less than 12 years old and was not married to you and was

not in a state-registered domestic partnership with you. Do

you understand that?

MS. TOWNSEND: Your Honor, the—the facts as I have them

is that between January 1, 2012, and January 24th, 2020, in

Cowlitz County, being 24 months older than T.B., a family or

household member, had sexual intercourse with T.B. And then

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

Appendix 17

as to—

THE COURT: Okay.

MS.

TOWNSEND:

—Count

II,

January

2012

and

January 24th, 2020, being 24 months older than G.B., a family

or household member, had sexual intercourse with G.B., who

was less than 12 years old at the time.

MR. PHELAN: I think the plea's supposed to be to I and

III.

THE COURT: Okay. And I see Count I in the—okay, wait a

minute. In 372, Count I is a Rape of a Child charge. Count II

is Child Molestation. Here—

MS. TOWNSEND: Right. He's pleading to Counts I and III.

THE COURT: I and III. Okay.

MS. TOWNSEND: And we're dismissing the other counts on

the record today, right, Counsel?

MR. PHELAN: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Maybe I just misread this. I may have—

maybe I read "Count II." So, Count I is between January 1st

and January 24th of—January 1st of 2012 and January 24th of

2020, being at least 24 months older than T.B., a family or

household member, had sexual intercourse with T.B. T.B. was

less than 12 and was not married to or in a state-registered

domestic

understanding, Mr. Roloson?

MR. ROLOSON: Yes, it is.

partnership

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

with

Mr.

Roloson.

that

your

Appendix 18

THE COURT: For Count III, the State would have to prove

that you, during that same date range, January 1st, 2012 to

January 24th, 2020, being at least 24 months older than G.B.,

a family or household member, had sexual intercourse with

G.B., who was less than 12 years old and was not married to

you and not in a state-registered domestic partnership with

you. Do you understand that?

MR. ROLOSON: I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You've got a number of rights that you give

up by pleading guilty: Those are the right to a speedy and

public trial by an impartial jury in the county where the

crime was allegedly committed, the right to remain silent

before and during the trial, and the right to refuse to

testify against yourself, the right at trial to hear and

question the witnesses who testify against you, the right at

trial to testify and have witnesses testify for you. Those

witnesses can be made to appear at no expense to you. You

have the right to be presume—presumed innocent unless the

State proves the charge beyond a reasonable doubt or you

enter a plea of guilty. And you have a right to appeal a

finding of guilt after a trial. Do you have any question

about the rights you're giving up today?

MR. ROLOSON: I do not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Regarding the consequences here, the standard

range is listed as 120 to 160 months with lifetime community

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Appendix 19

custody and a maximum term of life in prison and a $20,000

fine. Count III has the same standard range: 120 to 160

months, lifetime community custody with a maximum term of

life, and a $20,000 fine. These are both offenses where the

Court would set a term between 120 and 160 months. And I

believe

review your sentence at that period—at that point in time

and—and determine if you were to get out at that point in

time. Do you understand that?

the

Indeterminate

Sentencing

Review

Board

would

MR. ROLOSON: I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Your offender score is listed as being 3. And

it's

later

discovered

you

have

additional

criminal

history, and specifically felony criminal history, you could

be brought back and resentenced if this offender score of 3

is not correct. Do you understand that?

MR. ROLOSON: Yes, Your Honor.

MS. TOWNSEND: Bless you.

THE COURT: Okay. It looks like the—it says here that the

Prosecutor

will

recommend

what's

stated

the

plea

agreement. And I'm looking through this, and I'm seeing a

number of conditions for community custody. I'm not seeing

any period of time recommended. Is there—

MS. TOWNSEND: A joint recommendation for SSOSA. And this

is a case that'll require a PSI, Your Honor. But the victims

have endorsed SSOSA for this individual. And so, we're going

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

Appendix 20

to be doing the change of plea today and asking for the PSI

to be completed. And we'll produce for the Court the DOC

report along with the psychosexual evaluation that's been

completed and provided to the Prosecutor and to the family.

THE COURT: Mr. Roloson, is that your understanding of

the plea agreement?

MR. ROLOSON: It is, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And you—you understand I don't have to follow

that recommendation? I can give you anywhere within the

standard range?

MR. ROLOSON: I do understand that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. If you're not a citizen of United

States, a plea of guilty to an offense punishable as a crime

under state law is grounds for deportation, exclusion from

admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization

pursuant to the laws of the United States. Do you understand

that?

MR. ROLOSON: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Do you understand that as a result of the

conviction you may not own, possess, or have under your

control any firearm, and under federal law, any firearm or—

or ammunition?

MR. ROLOSON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you understand you'll lose your right to

vote as a—as a result of the conviction?

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

Appendix 21

MR. ROLOSON: I do.

THE COURT: And also, you'll be required to register where

you reside, study, or work. When I say "register," you'll

have to register with the Sheriff as a sex offender. Do you

understand that?

MR. ROLOSON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Also, this—these are both strike offenses.

Together they're one strike offense. If it's later determined

you have two prior strike offenses, you could be resentenced

to the—to a life sentence without the possibility of parole.

Do you understand that?

MR. ROLOSON: Yes, I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Knowing those things, how do you plead to

Count I, Rape of a Child in the First Degree, Domestic

Violence, guilty or not guilty?

MR. ROLOSON: Guilty.

THE COURT: And how do you plead to Count II, Rape of a

Child in the First Degree, Domestic Violence?

MR. ROLOSON: Guilty.

THE COURT: Do you make the plea freely and voluntarily?

MR. ROLOSON: Yes.

THE COURT: Has anyone threatened harm of any kind to you

or anybody else in order to make you enter this plea?

MR. ROLOSON: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Has anybody made any promises of any kind to

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Appendix 22

cause you to enter this plea except as set forth in this

statement?

MR. ROLOSON: No, Your Honor.

THE

COURT:

Your

statement

says,

"On

between

January 1st, 2012 and January 24th, 2020, in Cowlitz County,

Washington, being 24 months older than T.B., a family or

household member, I had sexual intercourse with T.B., who

was less than 12 years old and was not married to and not in

a state-registered domestic partnership. And further, this

crime was committed by one" family house—"or household member

against another, as the term is defined by statute, and that

this is a domestic violence offense." Is that true?

MR. ROLOSON: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Looking at Count III—

MS. TOWNSEND: Judge, on Line 3, could you just correct

that "T" to a "G"?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. TOWNSEND: I see a typo there.

THE COURT: The—I—I—yes.

MS. TOWNSEND: Thank you, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. So, on Count III, it says, on—"On or

between January 1st, 2012, and January 24th, 2020, in Cowlitz

County, Washington, being 24 months older than G.B., a family

or household member, had sexual intercourse with G.B., who

was less than 12 years old and was not married to and not in

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

Appendix 23

a state-registered domestic partnership. And further, this

crime was committed by one family or household member against

another, and that this is a crime of domestic violence as

defined by statute." Is that true?

MR. ROLOSON: It is, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you want me to accept your guilty plea?

MR. ROLOSON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything else from the parties?

MS. TOWNSEND: Just that we set a sentencing date so that

we can get the packages completed and before the Court for

its consideration at sentencing, Your Honor.

THE

COURT:

All

right.

will

your

plea,

Mr. Roloson, find that it's knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily made and with a factual basis to support it. I

will dismiss Count II and Count IV pursuant to the agreement.

I'm going to revoke any bail that's been set. So, you'll be

held without bail pending sentencing.

And are we still six weeks in terms of these kinds of

things?

MS. TOWNSEND: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So, realistically, let's look at—would

January 4th work for the parties?

MR. PHELAN: That should be fine for the State.

MS. TOWNSEND: Right now, I'm scheduled to be in trial

that day, Your Honor. And I believe that it's going to go.

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Appendix 24

THE COURT: January 11th be better?

MS. TOWNSEND: Could I look at maybe the 28th? Could we

do the 28th of December maybe? That's about eight weeks.

THE COURT: Yeah, if the parties don't mind this being in

front of any judge. I don't know who'll be—be doing that

28th docket.

MS. TOWNSEND: No, that's fine.

MR. PHELAN: We don't have an objection.

MS. TOWNSEND: No objection.

THE COURT: All right.

THE

BAILIFF:

Your

Honor,

Judge

Bashor

does

that

docket, we may need another judge to come on to hear it.

THE COURT: Okay. We'll—I guess we'll just have to cross

that bridge when we come to it.

THE BAILIFF: Actually, I'm sorry. I correct myself. There

is not an NOD in this case. So, that would be fine.

THE COURT: And I'm just filling out a bench order for a

PSI.

MS. TOWNSEND: Thank you, Your Honor. And what time on

the 28th, sir?

THE COURT: Nine o'clock in the morning.

MS. TOWNSEND: Thank you.

THE BAILIFF: Your Honor, was that for December 28th?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. TOWNSEND: Yes.

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Appendix 25

THE BAILIFF: The nine o'clock docket would be—

MR. PHELAN: The readiness docket.

THE BAILIFF: —the readiness docket. Would you like that

at 1:30?

THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. I was looking at a Wednesday.

I was looking at 2022. So, the 20—yes, 1:30. I'm sorry. 1:30

on the 28th.

All right. I have signed an order for the PSI. That

should be available for the parties via Odyssey within the

next day or two.

MS. TOWNSEND: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Roloson, we'll see you back on

the 28th of December.

MR. ROLOSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

[Session ends.]

December 28, 2021, 1:41 p.m.

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Appendix 26

THE CLERK: We're on the record.

THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon. We're here for the

1:30 criminal motions docket. I'm Thad Scudder. If people

could mute your microphones until your case is called and

then just remember you're in court, I'd appreciate those

things. We're going to start with the Jail.

THE JAIL: No. 7, Eric Roloson.

THE COURT: All right. This is 20-1-00372-08. Mr. Roloson

is on today for sentencing. I've reviewed the PSI, I've

reviewed the report from Olivia Lovely, and I also reviewed

some submissions from Ms. Townsend's office. So, Mr. Laurine,

anything you'd like to add?

MR. LAURINE: Yes, Your Honor. Having reviewed the PSI,

you

may

question

yourself,

why

there

agreed

recommendation of SSOSA? And so, I want—I want to work

through that process with you so you understand where we're

at and—and the concerns that both parties had regarding that

PSI before we make the recommendation.

Sometime back in September, Mr. Dino Gojack contacted

our office and presented an option for a plea. When that was

presented to me, I took it to the victims,

[break in audio] the victim's mother, Elizabeth. We sat down

and we had a long conversation about all—all the options

that were available for Mr. Roloson. I explained the process

of SSOSA. I explained what he was potentially looking at if

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

and

Appendix 27

he didn't receive SSOSA.

I then made it clear to them that I didn't want them to

make a decision at that time. I wanted them go home, think

about it, and get in contact with me whether it was the next

day or a week. I wanted them to be thoroughly—I wanted them

to make the decision that they—they felt was best for them.

Obviously, this has not been an easy process for them. It's

been a long duration in time. Mr. Roloson was originally

interviewed years ago and then took flight to Hawaii, at

which point he was in custody there before he was brought to

our jail in 2020—end of 2020, like, October of 2020. And

then has then awaited either trial or plea since then.

They did—the two victims as well as their mother went

home and discussed this. And they contacted our office the

next morning and stated that they were in support of SSOSA.

That doesn't necessarily—isn't necessarily reflected well in

the PSI. I think some of the concerns that they have are

going to be better expressed to Your Honor, but what they do

want is some—they want this—they wanted an opportunity for

this to be resolved. They wanted to—they recognized some of

the concerns that are there for them as—as witnesses. But

more importantly, they wanted finality. They did support the

SSOSA.

everything in life, there are conflicts. And they're—they're

just normal people who have had a really bad thing happen to

They

still

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

support

the

SSOSA,

but

with

Appendix 28

them, and they have some conflicts. They're going to have an

opportunity to express that to Your Honor.

don't

see

them

the—there

go.

Hope

Project

advocate is there now and Elizabeth is here. She's going to

be able to present to Your Honor, and then I believe

and

to you, probably better than what I could, what the process

that they went through and why it is that they support SSOSA

even though that they—they are conflicted.

Elizabeth, did you want to speak?

MS. ROLOSON: Sure. Uh, I have my victim impact statement,

will also speak to Your Honor, and they'll express

Your Honor, if I could read it now?

THE COURT: Yeah, if you could start just by telling me

your name?

MS. ROLOSON: Sure. Uhm, I'm Elizabeth Roloson.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MS. ROLOSON: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. ROLOSON: Uhm, when I think about the life I lived

with Eric Roloson, one word comes to mind: prisoner. The

kids and I were held captive under the abuse of Eric for

nine years. Excuse me. Our voices were slowly silenced, and

we were convinced we were the problem. The one true thing we

had in our lives, the Bible, was used to manipulate and

deceive us into thinking he was doing the will of God. Eric

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Appendix 29

would use scripture, prayer, and people from the church into

believing he was a devoted father and husband. When you're

constantly under the control of your abuser, you start to

live in a false reality, not knowing the difference between

right and wrong. Life gets to the point of trying to survive,

not just physically, but mentally as well. I remember feeling

like I was literally losing my mind. I was too scared to

reach out for help. And being told I was the problem, I began

to believe it.

When asked to write how I've been impacted by the crimes

of Eric Roloson, I have a hard time putting it into words.

I can start with how I see my children impacted. First, I

have my two oldest daughters whose innocence was stolen long

before they knew what they even meant. I've had to watch my

daughter

was having PTSD and literally thought she was fighting

against the man who relentlessly raped her over the course

of nine years. I've had to hold her, hoping she would come

back to reality and being scared she may never come out of

it.

be taken away into handcuffs because she

And then I have

who went through a time of not

talking with me about any of the abuse. Then finding out she

had been cutting herself to deal with the pain and trauma.

suffers from extreme anxiety and struggles to feel

accepted at school and at church.

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Appendix 30

My oldest son, Elijah, had suffered the physical abuse

of Eric so severely that he chose to live with his biological

dad after Eric had left. He is very angry and blames me for

not leaving soon enough.

Eric and I have had two children in common, the oldest

being Ezekiel, who has asked to have his name changed so it

does not share the same name of the man who screamed and

yelled so much at his mom he was scared to go to sleep at

night. Ezekiel does not know of the sexual abuse of his

sisters yet. I'm afraid when he is old enough to know the

crimes of his father, he will be devastated and question if

it's in his own DNA. I dread the day he is old enough to ask

and

sisters.

understand

the

crimes

his

father

committed

his

Then I have precious Naomi, who was only one year old

when Eric chose to run from police and abandoned her and her

big brother. She will certainly have questions as well. I

will be the one to answer those questions and to hold both

of them as they hurt and try to make sense of something so

evil and wicked. I can only pray they find forgiveness and

choose to not live in bitterness and anger.

As for me, I not only have held everything together for

these five souls, but I've had to go from being a stay-at-

home mom to working fulltime and supporting the children on

my own. I do have PTSD and nightmares of being strangled

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Appendix 31

while Eric held Naomi as an infant. I struggle to believe

this isn't all my fault. I know it isn't, but when my children

hurt so profoundly, I feel as though I have let them down.

Eric is truly an evil man who does not have remorse. He

ran for eight months without one shred of empathy for the

crime he committed on my family. He has been able to afford

a criminal attorney and a divorce attorney while I have

supported all of the children, not just financially but

emotionally. His mother served me with papers to leave the

only home my children knew as soon as Eric fled to Hawaii

where she lives. I was then locked out of the home with our

belongings still inside. Eric has not shown one shred of

regret or sorrow for the crimes that have taken place. The

devastation that has been caused cannot be reversed. The

time Eric has spent in jail does not compare to the lifetime

of sorrow and scars he has left on my daughters.

I did choose to agree to the SSOSA deal because I did

not want my daughters to be retraumatized by having to tell

their story again. My daughter,

function in a healthy way after sharing her story. When told

she would have to be put in a position of being questioned

about the horrendous things that happened to her, my choice

was clear: I would agree to the SSOSA deal. The thought of

my family waiting for trial and then being doubted by Eric's

attorney was just unbearable.

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

could hardly eat or

has been able to fall

Appendix 32

in love and get married. And to set her back in her healing

is not an option for me. Trial would have brought all the

pain and heartache back to reality. It was certainly a hard

choice to know that he may be getting what he wants after

all the years of him manipulating and holding his evil way

so well, but I chose to put him in your hands, Your Honor,

and ultimately in God's hands where true justice will take

place.

I do have fears that if he is released into the community,

he will recommit these horrendous crimes. Repeating the same

actions

abusing my family show that he is very unstable and has no

remorse for his actions. I do fear Eric will try to come

after us if he is released. He has said on numerous occasions

that he could be—could kill and never be caught, that he

could disappear and never be found. He is obviously mentally

ill and needs treatment in or out of prison.

molesting,

raping,

physically

and

mentally

If you choose to release him into the SSOSA, I ask that

he not be released into Cowlitz County. The thought of him

living in the same town as us is completely devastating. The

worry of one of us—the worry of one of us running into him

is completely heart-wrenching and downright scary. He is

capable of horrendous things, and I do not want my family

within his reach if he were to act out in resentment of what

has taken place.

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Appendix 33

The children have paid so much already for what this man

has done to them. They will suffer for a lifetime from the

crimes that were committed against them. They do not have a

choice to get the innocence back that was stolen from them.

They did not even get the pleasure of enjoying the holiday

season without this hanging over their heads.

A lot has taken away from these girls since the first

time Eric laid his hands on them. Please consider that they

will live in a prison of shame and heartache for the rest of

their lives. They don't get to have a redo or another chance.

They had their innocence stolen from them, and they will

never get that back.

I do not believe Eric Roloson is sorry for his actions.

He has shown that by running from police for eight months

and trying to take the easy way out with the SSOSA deal. He

is currently trying to get visitations with Naomi and Ezekiel

his—without the thought of them being in danger of his

horrendous acts on children. He refuses to settle in our

divorce and continues to manipulate and control from his

jail cell. He is an evil man who deserves the same life

sentence he gave my daughters when he decided to rape them

for nine years.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Do either one of your daughters

wish to be heard?

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Appendix 34

MS. ROLOSON: Yes, sir. Both of them do.

THE COURT: All right.

MS.

ROLOSON:

I'm

gonna

put

the

screen.

Introduce yourself.

: I'm

THE COURT: Okay. Whenever you're ready.

: I was so little when it started, and I

don't understand how someone could hurt a child the way Eric

hurt me. When it was happening, I felt so small and like I

had no control of what was happening to me. I used to get

really sad when I saw other girls with their dads because I

wanted a dad to take care of me and have fun with me in a

healthy way. For a while I thought the abuse was normal.

Now that it's over, I struggle with really bad anxiety

and feel like I just want this to be over. I don't want—I

don't want Eric to be able to hurt other children the way he

hurt my family. I think that he is evil and does not deserve

any freedom, happiness, or a new life. I honestly don't think

that he is sorry at all. He had so many chances to change,

but he never did. The only reason I chose to let him have

the SSOSA deal was because I was scared of facing him in

trial. And he still scares me and always will.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

Your Honor.

Appendix 35

THE COURT: All right. Whenever you're ready.

amount

words

could

ever

describe, excuse me, the horror that my family and I have

lived through. Just one moment. How do I fit nine years of

abuse into one statement? How do I list all the pain and

trauma caused by Eric's actions? Just a little under half of

my life has consisted of constant emotional and sexual abuse.

For nine years I kept a secret, scared I would be punished

or that others in my family would be. I spent my elementary

years oblivious to what was actually happening to me, and my

teens denying that anything was wrong. At home I was tortured

and manipulated into believing I was the one who was wrong

and twisted. The very man I believed to be my dad hurt me.

Eric manipulated me into believing he was a good and safe

parent. Eric hurt me emotionally, mentally, and physically.

He stole my innocence at age eight, and that is something I

can never get back.

Eric made me believe I was weak and incapable. He made

me believe I was wrong and manipulative. He made me believe

I was a horrible daughter when I did not let him do as he

pleased. He made me believe that I hurt my family and that

I was a bad person. Excuse me, Your Honor. I now know I am

none of those things. I am a good daughter and sister. I do

not hurt people because I care about others. That I am

strong, brave, and capable of anything I set my mind to. I

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Appendix 36

do not manipulate people to get what I want. My family

chooses me, my husband chooses me, my friends choose me

because I am compassionate and kind person. It's taken me a

long time to truly believe these things. It is easy for me

to forget and blame myself because of the imprint Eric left

on me. I now know I did nothing wrong. Eric chose his

destructive path and I just happened to be a victim.

Since I came forward, my life in a lot of ways has been

better, but in most ways has been more challenging. I had to

face the consequences of Eric's actions. During high school,

I worked countless hours to earn a whole year of college

scholarships. Because of the way Eric's abuse affected me,

I had to leave college and my dream of being a teacher

behind. I experience night terrors and extreme depressive

episodes. I was diagnosed with PTSD about three months after

coming out with my story. Since then, I have had five trips

to the emergency room. Two of those I was taken in a police

car due to the severity of the PTSD attack. One of those

trips, I was put in cuffs to restrain me from hurting myself.

These

experience. They are a direct result of the brutal trauma

caused by Eric's abuse.

attacks

are

not

normal

thing

for

people

When I have a PTSD attack, my brain tricks me into seeing

Eric and I believe he's coming to hurt me or my family. I'm

unable to shake the feeling of visions of him watching me,

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Appendix 37

waiting for me to be left alone. I often cannot make out

complete sentences, which makes it hard to explain what is

happening. Sometimes I remain speechless until the next

morning.

These attacks end up one of two ways. I am either rushed

to the ER when I'm unable to calm down or I have to take my

anxiety meds and wait it out. I cannot be alone in my own

house. I jump at the sound of doors slamming or police

sirens. I fear for my own safety whenever I'm alone.

I would like to make it very clear that Eric's abuse has

impacted and continues to impact all aspects of my life.

Because of the abuse, I have to receive weekly counseling

and prescription anxiety medication for when I have an

attack. It has taken me two years of intense work to get

where I am now. I will continue to have hope in my progress.

Though I am slowly healing, nothing can erase what has

happened to me and my family. Even when I think back on

everything that has happened, I can't remember it all.

Then I remember my sweet little sister, my

She

went through it too. I can't begin to describe the pain I

feel for her, a thousand times worse than my own. I would

have done anything if it meant she could have remained safe.

I would do anything to take her hurt away if only it were

possible.

Your Honor, Eric Roloson makes me fear for my safety, my

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

Appendix 38

family's, and our community's. He has shown that he's willing

to repeat sexual abuse continuously with no remorse or will

to change. He manipulated me and my family into supporting

him and his behaviors for nine years, and I'm scared he may

contributing and safe member of society, and he has proven

that time and time again. He should not be trusted in any

regard. I would like to state that this is no longer just

about the safety and justice of my family, it is now about

the safety of our community. I fear that if proper action

isn't taken, that others may be hurt and abused by Eric. I

cannot live with that. I ask that you consider the safety of

all involved. I do not wish what my family and I have endured

on even my worst enemy.

that

someone

else.

Eric

cannot

trusted

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. TOWNSEND: Your Honor, I have to interject. I'm going

to ask to stop the sentencing so I can file a motion to

withdraw our plea. I've advised Mr. Laurine via email as

this is completely unanticipated by both sides and not what

we agreed to. I plan to file a motion to withdraw his plea,

Your Honor. We had a plea agreement; this is not consistent

with that plea agreement. I believe that Mr. Laurine is

completely surprised by what has just transpired. And I can't

in good faith go forward because this is—is not what we

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Appendix 39

talked about, what we agreed to, and what I was told was

going to be happening today. I've been completely blindsided,

has—has been my client, by the announcements that we heard

today, which I can tell you are not consistent with the

emails that I received from Mr. Laurine about what was going

to happen today. It's a complete 180 from what I was told.

And so, I—I cannot let this go forward as his lawyer, and

I'm going to have to file a motion.

THE COURT: State's position?

MR. LAURINE: Well, Ms. Townsend is within her right to

move to withdraw a plea and the Court can hear that motion

[inaudible].

MS. TOWNSEND: I would like to be able to file that motion,

Your Honor. Mr. Laurine and I have had email exchanges with

regards to this and my concerns, my request, to make sure

that the—the statute requires that the victims be on board

with SSOSA. I'd been assured prior to accepting the plea

offer that they were. Even after the PSI was done and we

both agreed it didn't read the way that they had claimed, I

received additional emails assuring me that the victims were

on board with SSOSA. There's no way that this Court or I

could even begin to fathom that that is their position. I

think they've made that clear. I think that's their right,

but it is not what was anticipated or agreed to or what

certainly led to Mr. Roloson accepting the offer.

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Appendix 40

And so, you know, I have to do my due diligence and bring

to the Court's attention what those agreements were because

I—there's

Mr. Laurine. I don't think that he expected that today. I

don't think he's done anything untoward. I think that it was

just an unexpected outcome based on what the agreements were.

And I have to do my due diligence and bring those issues

before the Court and request that we be able to withdraw the

plea because there's been a material breach.

MS. ROLOSON: Your Honor, can I speak?

THE COURT: Not on this issue. I would—I understand your

position, Ms. Townsend. I don't think there's anything in

front of me that would indicate that the State has failed to

live up to their end of the—the bargain here, and I think

the record should reflect that. The—

been

material

breach.

And

don't

blame

MS. TOWNSEND: To be fair, Your Honor, I received an email

from Mr. Laurine today. And for the record it says, "I am

blindsided by this. I don't do business like this," which

will be part of my motion. I believe that Mr. Laurine and I

were both blindsided by the presentation today. And so, I

would hope, because he is a member of the Court, that he

would advise this Court that this was unanticipated and not

part of what we agreed to and that he would not oppose the

motion.

THE

COURT:

And

I—I

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

also

don't

doubt

that

factual

Appendix 41

recitation. I don't doubt that there was some—I don't know

if I'd go as far as blindsided by—for anybody. I think sort

of the—well, the nature of the PSI obviously demonstrated

there was, at the very least, ambivalence. And Mr. Laurine,

I think, indicated a recognition of conflict but—okay, what

I'm going to do, I guess, I will—I took the plea, so the—any

motion would have to be in front of me. I'm going to continue

this for one week, partially to do my own research. And I

guess the question I have is whether I should proceed to

sentencing and then address your motion or vice versa,

address your motion and then go wherever that takes us. My

sense is I'm going to probably address your motion first.

MR. LAURINE: I think it's actually appropriate to address

the motion prior to sentence.

THE COURT: And I don't—yeah, I think I would address the

motion first. But I—I think I'm going to need some specific

law on this specific fact pattern where I don't think there's

been any breach by the State. And so, essentially, the facts

are the—the victim essentially changed their mind is—is the

way I see it. And I see Elizabeth Roloson sort of shaking

her head no, but I also heard pretty clearly the victim

statements, which I think are certainly not in line with the

Court imposing a SSOSA sentence. And that's absolutely fine.

They—they have every right to sort of endorse whatever they

want at this point. The question is whether or not that has

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

Appendix 42

an impact on Mr. Roloson's plea.

So, and actually I'm going to set this two weeks I think.

Let's look at this again on the—

MR. LAURINE: 14th?

THE COURT: —14th of February at 1:30. And I—I've heard

the—from the victims. I don't necessarily need to hear from

them again, but they're obviously free to attend any of the—

the hearings that they want to here.

So, Mr. Roloson, you're still held without bail. You're

going to be back the 14th of February at 1:30.

[Session ends.]

February 14, 2022, 2:12 p.m.

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

Appendix 43

THE COURT: We can start with the Jail.

THE JAIL: Thank you, Your Honor. We have Mr. Roloson,

No. 1 on the docket.

THE COURT: All right. This is State versus Eric Roloson,

20-1-00372-08.

Today

Mr. Roloson's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. I have

received and reviewed the motion to withdraw guilty plea

with affidavit and memorandum, the State's response to the

Defendant's motion with attached declarations, and then the

reply to the State's response. And I—I've read all of those

documents.

MR.

LAURINE:

Your

we're

scheduled

Honor,

last

for—to

week,

address

believe

Mr. Swenson, who is pictured here in—in the Zoom, filed what

is essentially, I'll call it, an amici brief in support of

the SSOSA as—as well as the retention of the plea. Did

Your Honor receive that? It was unrequested by the State,

but it was filed regardless.

MS. TOWNSEND: And I'm sorry, Mr. Laurine, who filed that?

MR. LAURINE: Mr. Swenson, who is—

MR. SWENSON: I'm present, Your Honor. For the record,

Steven Swenson, the attorney for the victims. And it was

filed with a bench copy on Thursday last week.

MS. TOWNSEND: I don't think I have it, Mr. Swenson.

MR. SWENSON: We sent it to you by email and regular mail.

MS. TOWNSEND: I can tell you I didn't get it via regular

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

Appendix 44

mail. I can check my spam to see.

MR. SWENSON: You responded to the email.

MS. TOWNSEND: It came from my staff.

THE COURT: I—I have not reviewed that. I'm going to just

check and see if it's in Odyssey.

MR. LAURINE: And for the Court's record as well as

Ms. Townsend, it was sent by Sherrill Strassburg.

MS. TOWNSEND: Oh. Let me see if I can find that.

MR.

SWENSON:

And

received

from

you,

Ms. Townsend, at 1:50 p.m. on February 10th saying, "hard

copies mailed and courtesy copies as well."

MS. TOWNSEND: Right. And then I've got an email that

says, "It's going to be filed today with a bench copy for

Judge Scudder."

checking my spam now to see if the one with the attachment

is there. That's the one I have from you, Mr. Swenson. It

says—it's just an email with no attachment saying it's going

to be filed today with a bench copy for Judge Scudder.

from

attachments.

what

have

email so

I'm

MR. SWENSON: Yeah, the first one was sent at 12:40 p.m.

That's

SherillStrassburg@NorthwestJustice.org

with

the

MS. TOWNSEND: Okay. Let's look for Roloson; maybe that'll

help.

THE COURT: Okay. We—I'm not sure where I'm getting—I need

everybody to mute your microphones unless your case is being—

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

Appendix 45

unless your case is being addressed right now.

Okay, I want to proceed with the motion to withdraw the

guilty plea. I'm going to hear from the State as well as

Ms. Townsend. Ms. Townsend, it's your motion. While the

defendants have a right to speak at sentencing, I'm not going

to hear them in regard to this motion.

MR. LAURINE: You mean the victims?

THE COURT: Victims, excuse me.

MR. SWENSON: Your Honor, I would ask that we be able to

be heard since the basis of the motion to withdraw is the

victims' statement, which they have a constitutional and

statutory right to make.

THE COURT: Okay. And I—right now, no, on the—on the

withdraw of the guilty plea, I'm not going to hear from you,

Mr. Swenson.

MR. SWENSON: Okay. For the record, I'll just note my

objection.

THE COURT: And your pleading is on file with the Court,

so I understand your objection.

MR. SWENSON: Thank you.

THE COURT: Ms. Townsend?

MS. TOWNSEND: Thank you. I would like to call my client,

Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Roloson, you want to raise your

right

hand?

Do you

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

swear

under penalty

perjury

the

DEFENDANT ERIC ROLOSON – Direct examination

Appendix 46

testimony you're about to give will be true?

MR. ROLOSON: I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Tell me your name and spell your last name

for the record.

MR. ROLOSON: Eric Roloson, R-O-L-O-S-O-N.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Townsend?

MS. TOWNSEND: Thank you.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MS. TOWNSEND:

Mr. Roloson, prior to you entering a guilty plea, did I meet

with you at the jail more than one occasion with regards to

a SSOSA request?

Yes, you did.

And did we discuss in detail the necessity of the victims

being on board and supporting SSOSA in order for the Judge

to consider that under the statute?

Very much so.

And did we have several conversations to your knowledge with

the

Prosecutor

with

treatment for you?

regards

the

victims

endorsing

We did, and they declared that they were onboard.

Was that the only reason that you decided to accept the plea

offer from the State, was the statement that the endorsement

by the victims would be made on the record?

Yes, certainly. I would never have taken that deal if they

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

DEFENDANT ERIC ROLOSON – Direct examination

were not on board.

Appendix 47

And would it be fair to say that we had more than half a

dozen conversations between Mr. Gojack, myself, and you

regarding this very situation?

At least, Josie.

And then after we received the presentence investigation,

did we discover that there were errors in the presentence

investigation?

We did.

And did we also then again address the issues that we

observed with regard to the victims not being on board with

SSOSA and our hesitancy to move forward?

Yes.

Did you receive reassurances from me that the victims were

going to state on the record that they were in support of

you going to treatment?

Yes, they reconfirmed that they were—were in—in favor of

that, yes.

And did that affect your decision to accept the plea offer?

It certainly did.

When the victims spoke on the record, did you observe the

Prosecutor make any attempts to cross-examine them with

regards to their change of position?

None whatsoever.

And do you feel that your plea agreement was breached by the

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

DEFENDANT ERIC ROLOSON – Direct examination

Appendix 48

statements that were presented to the Court?

I do.

Is it your request that the Court withdraw your plea and

allow this matter to go to trial?

Yes, it is.

Thank you.

MS. TOWNSEND: Your Honor, I know that you've read the—

the materials. Of particular note, we provided in the case

law that once the victims started to go down a different

path than they had indicated to both the Prosecution and

myself, the Prosecutor had an obligation to treat it as a

cross-examination with regards to their support for SSOSA.

I do recognize—

THE COURT: Can you tell me what case that's from?

MS. TOWNSEND: I will pull up my memo. I believe that it's

in our original memo.

THE COURT: And given that the victim has a right to speak

at sentencing under Article I, Section 35, how could the

Prosecutor do that?

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, because they could have—he could

have—he

could

have

stopped

specifically if they were withdrawing their motion for SSOSA

based upon the statements that they were making. And I

believe he had an obligation to do—do so. And basically,

stop and regroup or ask them questions with regards to

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

and

asked

the

victims

very

Appendix 49

whether or not they were endorsing. Because the statements

made by the victims—and I'm not chastising the victims for

how they may feel, that is not my intent as you may imagine—

THE COURT: I understand—

MS. TOWNSEND: —but—

THE COURT: —that.

MS. TOWNSEND: —but what they said on the record was that

my client deserves a life sentence. They described him

basically as being a monster. We were advised that they were

going to endorse him going to treatment. There was none of

that in their statements to the Court. After we received the

PSI and we approached the Prosecutor and said this does not

indicate

specifically said they weren't endorsing SSOSA, they had

changed their mind. So, we advised the Prosecutor that we

were not going to go forward with the plea. And I was advised

by the Prosecutor that that was a mistake, they didn't say

that to the investigator, that they were endorsing SSOSA,

and that they never made those statements, never made them.

And so, I went back to my client with that information

because I think that Mr. Laurine made those statements to me

in good faith. I'm not trying to chastise Mr. Laurine. I

think that he's absolutely true. And I saw in the affidavits

from his staff people that that's exactly what the victims

had told him. But then when we got to the sentencing, it was

a—a

position

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

support

SSOSA.

The

PSI

Appendix 50

something totally different than what they had proposed to

us, what they proposed to the Prosecutor. And, you know, the

statute is very clear that the Court is to give the greatest

weight to what the victims are requesting. And what the

victims specifically requested on the record was a life

sentence for my client and that breaches the agreement.

And so, I think that based on all of those things that

happened and the case law, that it's very clear that my

client should be entitled to withdraw his plea and take this

matter to trial. I think what happened, it's part in response

by the—the Prosecutor, is that the victims did not want to

have to go through the—the stress of a trial and so they

decided to say that they were going to support SSOSA to

everyone that listened. But then when it came time, they did

not support SSOSA. I don't think this Court or anyone who

was at that hearing could say that they support SSOSA.

I saw the State's response to our motion to withdraw the

plea and he's trying to say, well, now the victims say that

they do endorse SSOSA, we just have different reasons. But

that's not what was proposed. That's not what was said. What

was said on the record is that he deserves a life sentence.

And that is a breach of the agreement that we made, that

the—that the victims would, in fact, endorse SSOSA. And

that's not what happened.

And I—I want to be very clear, this is not against

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Appendix 51

Mr. Laurine. I think that Mr. Laurine acted in a manner by

the information that he was given. But I think that he had

an obligation to meet with the victims, to go over what they

were going to say, to hear and understand that before coming

to me before the plea and saying they're endorsing SSOSA. I

think he had an obligation to interview them and to make

sure that their statements were consistent with what they

were telling him and that didn't happen.

And I think that that is a breach. I think that there's

a manifest injustice that has occurred with regards to the

sentencing. There's no way that my client, hearing that from

the victims, would have agreed to change his plea, he would

have gone to trial. I'm not going to speak to the—the

settlement arrangement, but the reason that he accepted

responsibility

disagreed with was because of their endorsement for him to

go to treatment. So, he was positively misinformed about

what

Prosecutor's Office. And we have to lay that responsibility

upon the Prosecutor because he's the only one that had the

right, really, to talk to the victims about what they were

going to say and what their real position was. It wasn't

something that I could do. I couldn't interview them and—and

say, you've told the Prosecutor you're going to do this, is

that the truth or not? I don't think the Court would have

was

for

going

certain

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

happen

charges

that

ultimately

sentencing

the

Appendix 52

liked that very much, and it may have affected their—their

position at that time if I had done so. So, I think that—

THE COURT: Did you—did you ask Mr. Laurine if you could

interview the victims about their position at sentencing? I

understand

typically offers that are made that require victims not be

interviewed. But once you had that concern, once the DOC

report came out and was—I guess, gave—gave us all information

that at best they were ambiguous about their desires here,

did you—did you request to interview them?

that

there

was—I

understand

that

there

are

MS. TOWNSEND: I asked that he did. I think that me

interviewing them would have been not a good situation for

my client. I didn't want them to see that as a breach either,

but I did ask for the Prosecutor to look into it and to

interview them. And I think that he did. I think that they

misled him as well. That's the point, is that I think that

they gave him information that he relied on; he gave that

information to me. And that's why he sent me that exchange

that says, "I'm completely blindsided by this. I don't do

business like this," because that did not reflect what they

had said to him when he interviewed them post-PSI.

And so, I think that—I don't think it would have mattered

who interviewed them, Your Honor. I think that they would

have given the same story to either one of us, the story

that they gave to Mr. Laurine. And so, I don't think that

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Appendix 53

that could have been relied upon. But the basis is that we

both relied on it. We both relied on what they were saying.

When Mr. Laurine sent me a response that said they did not

say that to the investigator, they did not say those things

to the—to the PSI, and they're going to correct it, I relied

on that. My client relied on that. And that—that is the

issue.

So, the Court does not just have to look to whether or

not there was a breach, but whether or not there would be a

manifest injustice for my client to rely on that assertion

and then change his plea based on what he was told was going

to happen at the plea agreement. But I also—

THE COURT: Do you think—do you think the statute somehow

conveys a right upon defendants to negotiate with—with the

victim?

bound to say they're going to recommend something pursuant

to the statute and then follow through with it.

Because

essentially,

you're

saying

the

victim's

MS. TOWNSEND: Right. But the case law says, "Although

the state need not enthusiastically make the sentencing

recommendation,

participate in the sentencing proceeding, ask the questions

candidly,

testimony, or argument that undercuts the state's obligation

under the plea agreement." And by allowing the victims to

testify at that hearing, the State offered information by

and

not

obliged

offer

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

information

act

way

good

faith,

report,

Appendix 54

way of testimony that undercuts the State's obligation under

the plea agreement. Because the State's obligation under the

plea agreement was that there would be an endorsement by the

victims of SSOSA. And there was not an endorsement by the

victims

sentence. And that is State v. Xavier, 117 Wn.App., 196 from

2003. Breach where the defendant was called one of the most

prolific child molesters. In this one, the victims called

him a monster.

SSOSA,

there

was

an endorsement

for

life

THE COURT: Weren't the facts that—

MS. TOWNSEND: [Inaudible]—

THE COURT: —weren't the facts that the—in Xavier that

the—the prosecutor actually called the probation officers as

witnesses and actually rebutted some of the things that the—

I guess that were recommended in the plea agreement through

those witnesses?

MS. TOWNSEND: Correct. And here that's what—exactly what

happened here. He called the victim who rebutted what was

offered in the plea agreement. So, that is the analysis, is

that—

THE COURT: Well, if—

MS. TOWNSEND: —he offered testimony in exact opposite of

what caused the plea agreement to occur, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. So, your position is that he actually

called the victims as witnesses here.

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

Appendix 55

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, they did. They testified; they were

witnesses. They were witnesses at the sentencing, and they

were the ones that—the only ones, really, that could really

undercut this agreement. And under which they knew, they

knew that the statute says you have to give the most weight

to their testimony or their opinions or their wishes. And

their wishes, which were relayed to Mr. Roloson, was that

they endorsed treatment. Their statements undercut that by

stating

difference here.

deserves

life

sentence.

That's—that's

the

And, yes, Mr. Laurine, as the prosecutor, called these

individuals, allowed them to testify, and—and that should

not have happened the way that it happened. And again, I

think he was taken by surprise. That's why he said, "this is

not the way that I do business." Because I don't think—I

don't think on—on earth that Mr. Laurine would have offered

that testimony if he'd known what they were going to say, if

they'd

Mr. Laurine would have come to me and said that we have an

agreement if he'd known the true feelings of the victims

with this particular case.

been

honest

with

him.

And

don't

think

that

That—that is what happened, is the victims didn't want

to go to trial, they didn't want to be interviewed. That was

part of the agreement as—as the Court rightly surmised. And

so, instead they said we'll—we'll propose that he get SSOSA,

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Appendix 56

that he get treatment, but then they did something entirely

different because they felt entirely differently. But to get

the benefit of not having to go through interviews and trial,

they said that they would endorse SSOSA several times but

that is not what happened. But that was the reason, the only

reason, that Mr. Roloson decided against going to trial.

Because when I came on board, he was set to go to trial, he

had asked me to do these interviews. We were ready to go

when

approaching the Prosecution and saying, are you sure? I do

not want to give up a trial on these issues that he has some

discourse with unless the victims are really on board because

that's what the statute says.

got

this

offer.

That's

why

kept

repeatedly

And, you know, I stand by my word. I would not do that

to my client. I would not go to my client and say, you have

to do this because this is your best option. If your—if your

alleged victims are on board with SSOSA, that is what the

judge is primarily going to listen to because he's required

to. He's required to give them their voice. And—and so, it

really goes against everything that we do in terms of plea

bargaining when you have that blow up. And it blew up. And

so, we're—we are asking that he be allowed to withdraw his

plea.

It doesn't mean, Your Honor, that we won't reach an

agreement in the future. It doesn't mean, necessarily, that

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

Appendix 57

we're going to end up in a trial. But it does mean under

these circumstances, it should not go forward. The sentencing

should not go forward because I—you know, as I stated in my

brief, you can't unring that bell. I think it would be very

difficult for me or for you or for anyone, really, to unhear

their request that he get a life sentence 'cause that's—

that's what they said. That's the most profound thing that

they said in that hearing.

THE COURT: You think this is a direct consequence, their—

what their recommendation is leads to a direct—is a direct

consequence of this—

MS. TOWNSEND: You know, Your Honor, you have discretion.

And I don't mean to under—undermine, you know, your authority

as the—as the—the person who makes the decision. I don't.

I'm—I'm looking at my years of experience of listening to

sentencing hearings in which the victims speak and how that

resonates. It resonates with both your—your mind, your heart,

your emotions as a human and as an individual. I think that

I have to measure all of those things based on my experience

statements that you heard. And I have to caution, you know,

my client in what that means. And then, you know, when I

read the interpretation of the statute and the interpretation

of the statute that says you have to give the greatest weight

to what the victims are asking for, I think that that is—

how—how

that

resonates

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

when

you

hear

the

types

Appendix 58

it's such a danger. I could not in good faith not make this

motion before the Court because of what you've heard and

because you're a human. You're human like the rest of us,

and it was a very powerful statement that was being made in

the courtroom.

And I'm not discounting that at all. I'm not discounting

what the victims may have felt. But in terms of how we

approach

Prosecutor was telling us was going to happen and then not

have that happen in any way, shape, or form has an impact.

And I think the—the proper and—and lawful thing to do is to—

to take that out of the equation and to set us back to—to

pre-plea so that we can readjust. And—and quite frankly, I

think in this case, if we were to come back with a different

agreement or go to trial, it would probably have to go,

honestly, in front of another judge. And the only reason I

say that is because you can't unring the bill [sic] of what

you heard. You—you heard their statements, you heard their

pleas, and—and I was affected by it just as a human, so I

couldn't imagine that you wouldn't be.

this

offer

and

how

relied

upon

what

the

So, that's my dilemma. I'm trying to do what's fair and

what's right and to correct a manifest injustice of what

happened to my client because he was—he was corralled into

making this agreement, and then he was bombarded in a way

that was never anticipated by anyone, certainly not by what

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Appendix 59

was proposed by the Prosecutor. And so, I—we're at—we're at

a point where this has to go back to the start, to prior to

the plea for us to regroup and decide what is going to be

the best, in this case, going forward, whether that be trial

or a different plea. But—but there was testimony, and it did

undercut the agreement, and it would create a manifest

injustice.

And I think that the—the Court might be in a bad position

as well, because you—you have the ultimate authority about

whether or not to grant SSOSA to Mr. Roloson at this point.

And I don't know if you would feel obligated to grant him

the SSOSA to override what was said by the victims, but

that's not the intent of the statute either. Those are—those

are issues that I don't think that you should have to wrestle

with as a judge or as a person, quite frankly. And so, I—I

think that we're—we're at that point, under the Xavier case

and under the—the VanBuren case, where—where Mr. Roloson

should be allowed to withdraw his plea and we—we go back to

the pre-plea positions. And then Mr. Laurine and I, we'll—

we'll sit down and talk and see what our options are at that

point.

THE COURT: Okay. We kind of got ahead of ourselves a

little bit here. And it may be my fault to some extent, but

Mr. Roloson did offer testimony. I didn't ask Mr. Laurine if

he had any questions of Mr. Roloson?

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

Appendix 60

MR. LAURINE: I have no questions of Mr. Roloson.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Laurine, do you have any

response?

MR. LAURINE: Your Honor, Defense has not shown that there

is a manifest injustice. The first concern that the—the Court

should consider is whether or not the State made an argument

that ran contrary to or outside the agreed recommendation.

And in this instance the State didn't. The State made it

clear at the beginning of the sentencing hearing that the

victims in this matter were coming to this resolution in a

different way than what we have anticipated or seen in the

past and that they were going to explain to the Court how it

is that they got there.

And in doing so, I made it very clear that this wasn't

the State's recommendation to begin with. This was brought

to us by Defense Counsel. So, to say that the Defendant was

corralled, was corralled, into this resolution fails. This

was the Defense request. And I took this request to the

victims. And I sat down for an hour and a half and explained

to the victims all of the ramifications of a plea, what could

happen if he didn't plea to a SSOSA, what he was looking at,

what would happen if it went to trial as I explained to the

Court. And then I—I expressed to them to go and think about

this on their own.

I don't need to belabor this. It's within my affidavit.

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

Appendix 61

Everything that transpired in this matter is within my

affidavit. More importantly, at sentencing I made clear that

opportunity to make, yet again, the request for the SSOSA

recommendation because the objection and motion to withdraw

the plea was made. So, it preempted my ability to go forward

with my recommendation or the State's recommendation, which

goes to the next point.

were

going

forward

with

the

SSOSA.

never

had

Victims are not parties to pleas, period. Now, they may

have a special input in—in the specific Special Sex Offender

Sentencing Alternative in which the Court is—is and provided

an opportunity to give them great weight, but even then the

Court does not have to follow their wishes. And there is a—

there's a mechanism for the Court to do that. If the Court

goes opposite or contrary to the victims' wishes, the Court

is to enter in written findings as to the reasons why it has

gone

legislature's

interpretations of the position that victims are. They're

just that, victims; they're not parties to the plea.

opposite

those

wishes.

well

So,

the

that

shows

court's

there

the

intentions

and

The victims did, indeed, inform the Court, as well as

the mother of the victims, that they were requesting SSOSA.

Yes, their statements went outside of what we normally hear

in regards to SSOSA requests. But, you know, we live in weird

times

and

sometimes

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

people

come

different—come

Appendix 62

conclusions by different means. And they wanted the Court to

be aware of that and understand that—the toll that it has

taken on them. That's what they informed the Court. But more

importantly, they also informed the Court that they still

support the SSOSA.

Now, nothing in the statute states that the State, the

victims, or any party that the Court hears from needs to

hold hands with the defendant, sing "Kumbaya," and express

his willingness for [break in audio] in order for SSOSA to

be granted. What it does suggest is that the defendant needs

to be appropriate, is receptive to treatment, that the—that

the victims, their opinion of this, is given great weight,

as well as the defendant must—must admit to the behavior.

In Defense Counsel's argument to withdraw the plea just

now, there's an indication that the Defendant only admitted

behavior in order to get this deal and not that he was

actually admitting to the behavior. That's a problem. And

that sets us out in a problem going forward. But more

importantly, everything that the State has provided you

suggests that the State has and still intends to uphold its

end of the bargain. We have not made any sort of recitation

of facts [break in audio] facts of other cases, from cases

from out of state, anything of that nature that would [break

in audio] this matter with [inaudible] case that we've

provided

the

Court

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

which

the

Court

Appeals

Appendix 63

determined that the plea was still good and that the—that

the State held its end of the bargain.

The State only, and the Court only, provided the victims

their constitutional right. Because they are victims and the

mother is the imputed victim, because one of the victims is

a minor and remains a minor still, were able to speak to the

Court. Now, do I find that much of the stuff that the victims'

mother provided to the Court to be relevant? No, I don't. I

was shocked by some of the things that were stated to the

Court. But that doesn't mean that during the conversations

that I held with the victims, the victims' mother as well,

on the instances in which I did speak with them, we didn't

discuss what was to be stated in the sentencing hearing.

That's not true; we did. We did discuss what was to be stated

in the sentencing hearing: To discuss the reasons why they

wanted the SSOSA, why they were in favor of it, as well as

to discuss the impact of the Defendant's actions on the

victims themselves. That's their right. Cannot remove that

right.

brought—brought in outside individuals to testify before the

court. To call victims' statements testimony, again, excuses

their constitutional right, which is not something this Court

has the ability to do.

They're

not

witnesses

Xavier.

Xaiver

you

Ultimately, the only time that the State and a witness

or a victim would be a—a—I think a party to the plea is if,

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

Appendix 64

indeed, they were, like, associated with the Prosecutor's

Office. At times law enforcement are and will be parties to

pleas.

enforcement. These victims are not associated with the Office

in any other way than the fact that they've been in our

offices to discuss the case and the actions of the Defendant.

So, we need to remove that thought from this argument.

They're not parties to the plea.

this

instance,

these

victims

are

not

law

The State has, and still intends, [break in audio] with

the recommendation of SSOSA. I don't feel that there—anything

further needs to be stated in that regard. Now, if the Court

wants to review Mr. Swenson's provided brief, it states very

much the same thing that the State has provided, cites the

very same cases that the State has cited, and ultimately

states that the victims still support SSOSA. Supporting SSOSA

and telling the impact of the Defendant's actions on the

victims, that's why we have Victim Impact Statements. And

it's for the Court [break in audio] and sift through what is

important to its decision. That's why we have sentencing

hearings. So, [break in audio] it has not at any point

violated the plea agreement, does not intend to violate the

plea agreement, nor does it intend, nor has it intended, to

violate the victims' rights as appointed to them by the

Constitution as well as statute. We ask that you deny Defense

motion to withdraw this plea.

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

Appendix 65

THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Townsend, anything else?

MS. TOWNSEND: I don't think that you could state to the

Court that the—the statements made by the victims were not

testimony. I believe that the case law clearly provides that

it would be a manifest injustice to go forward. I believe

that the plea agreement was broken, and I'm asking that you

allow him to withdraw his plea. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. The—the statute—the SSOSA

statute, which is 9.94A.670, indicates that "the court shall

give

offender should receive" treatment—"a treatment disposition

under this section. If the sentence is contrary to the

victim's opinion, the court shall enter written findings

stating its reasons for imposing the treatment disposition."

So, if I give treatment against the victims' wishes, I have

to set out written findings.

great

weight

the

victim's

opinion

whether

the

The—this does not, essentially, put the victim into a

position where they're negotiating or part of the plea

negotiation. They may have a position that's relayed, and in

this case they did. They were—their opinion was sought and

it was relayed to the Defendant, and I don't have any doubt

that the Defendant relied on that to some extent. But it's

not a direct consequence of his guilty plea because the Court

still has to exercise its discretion at sentencing. And there

are a number of factors that the Court has to take into

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

Appendix 66

consideration, and they're listed in RCW 9.94A.670, Sub 4.

The—the argument that the—the victims were witnesses, to

the extent that—I mean, this wasn't a real facts hearing.

They were not under oath. And they were not called by the—

the Prosecutor as a witness for the purpose of anything other

than they were offered the opportunity to speak, which is

their right under Article I, Section 35 of the Washington

Constitution.

allow for that. Even if the Prosecutor wanted to prevent

them from speaking at sentencing, I don't see he would have

any basis to do that. To say that he would have to—to put a

duty on him to cross-examine them, well, he pretty candidly

said he wasn't expecting this and he expected something

different from them.

There

are

also

statutory

provisions

which

In the plea colloquy—I went back and reviewed the plea

colloquy. And in some of the pleadings it's indicated that

Mr. Roloson was well aware that the Court did—does not have

to follow, A, the State's recommendation, or B, the victims'

wishes. The notion that the Court has to give the greatest

weight, the statute doesn't say that. It says the Court has

to give "great weight." But there are—again, there are a

number of factors the Court has to consider.

don't

find

that

the

State

breached

their

plea

agreement. I don't think the victim was acting as an agent

of the State. And I think that this is a situation where the

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

Appendix 67

plea agreement was not breached, so I would deny the motion

to withdraw the guilty plea.

MR. LAURINE: So, Your Honor, that leaves us at the point

where

the

State,

again,

needs

reiterate

its

recommendation. There was an agreed recommendation that was

originally and ultimately supported by the victims. It was

presented to us by Defense that the Defendant would request

SSOSA. We—we agreed to that recommendation based on the

earlier assent by the victims and I believe their continued

agreement and support of that, as evidenced by the affidavit

Mr. Swenson provided the State in addition to his amici brief

that he's provided to the Court that has been filed with the

court.

Obviously, these events have been [break in audio] and—

and harmful. And to return to one of my contrary arguments

to Ms. Townsend's own argument to withdraw, there's this

thinking that because people are going to [break in audio]

a SSOSA recommendation that all parties need to feel good

about that, there are multiple reasons why people come to a

determination why they want to have a specific resolution.

And not all of it is—is easy. And in this instance, it's one

of those moments where it wasn't easy, but it was—it was an

assent based on a desire to prevent further harm.

Obviously, there's some hope that Mr. Roloson can engage

in effectively and be successful in treatment, but ultimately

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

Appendix 68

So, I guess going back to risk. One of the things I have

to consider is if we impose this alternative, can I—I guess

how much faith do I have in Mr. Roloson? He's an adequate

candidate and he's of average risk, and when this whole thing

was discovered, he fled to Hawaii, fled the jurisdiction.

So, I guess, frankly, I don't—I don't know that I have a lot

of faith in Mr. Roloson. Counsel indicated that he's been

crime-free.

indicate that. It indicated that he had absconded from

Probation

absconded here.

His—his

evaluation

than—on

from

than

one

Ms.

Lovely

occasion.

didn't

And

So, this is a case, when I read Olivia Lovely's report

which was far—was an—was before I heard anything from the

victims, I was essentially not real impressed with the idea

that I was going to—that I would impose a SSOSA sentence

based on this evaluation. And while I respect that the

victims didn't want to go to trial and they did endorse

SSOSA, I—I don't think it's appropriate in this case. I think

with the—among the scheme of—in the scheme of things, this—

this was something that, again, was ongoing for a long period

of time. And I think that's where I end up coming down with

the greatest weight. And then to essentially leave the

jurisdiction to avoid prosecution, I—I don't have any faith

that if there was something that went haywire and there was

a SSOSA—or a SSOSA—some kind of report that said, hey, we

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

Appendix 69

recommend a sanction because Mr. Roloson's in violation of

his SSOSA, I don't know if he would stick around to deal

with it. And again, the risk is huge if there's a re-offense.

In terms of the sentence the Court imposes, this is a

situation where the maximum penalty is life and I just fix

a minimum term. The—and I just need to pull up the plea form

because I haven't been focused on—really on the minimum term.

MR. LAURINE: Your Honor, the minimum term is 120 to 160

months to life.

THE COURT: Mr. Roloson, I think I would be well within

my discretion given the offense to give you 160 months at

the minimum. I'm going to give you credit for the fact that

you did take responsibility for these offenses and plead

guilty and set the minimum at 120 months in each case. And

the Indeterminate Sentencing Review Board will set the—will

actually determine when you're released.

So, I'm also—today I'm signing a lifetime sexual assault

protection order that's in effect immediately. I am finding

that Mr. Roloson is subject to the indeterminate sentencing

under 9.94A.507. These are crimes of domestic violence. That

the victims were under 15 at the age of the offenses in

Counts I and II. There are prior—there's prior felony history

that washes. So, the only offense impacting the offender

score for Count I is Count III and for Count III is Count I,

so. Regarding legal financial obligations, is there a basis

Northwest Transcribers (425) 497-9760

Appendix 70

Appendix 71

Appendix 72

Appendix 73

Appendix 74

Appendix 75

Appendix 76

Appendix 77

Appendix 78

Appendix 79

Appendix 80

Appendix 81

Appendix 82

Appendix 83

Appendix 84

Appendix 85

Appendix 86

Appendix 87

Appendix 88

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

December 19, 2024

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

No. 56823-3-II

Respondent,

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

ERIC SEAN ROLOSON,

Appellant.

Appellant, Eric Sean Roloson, moves this court to reconsider its October 8, 2024 opinion.

After consideration, we deny the motion. It is

SO ORDERED.

Panel: Jj. Lee, Veljacic, Che

FOR THE COURT:

Veljacic, A.C.J.

Appendix 89

Appendix 90

Appendix 91

Appendix 92

Appendix 93

Appendix 94

Appendix 95

Appendix 96

Appendix 97

Appendix 98

Appendix 99

Appendix 100

Appendix 101

Appendix 102

Appendix 103

Relevant Portion of Mr. Roloson's

Opening Brief in the Washington

Court of Appeals

Therefore, this Court should vacate Mr. Roloson’s sentence and remand so he can either withdraw his plea or elect specific performance. Van Buren, 101 Wn. App. at 208 (ordering this

disposition after finding the State breached a plea agreement).

2. Because Mr. Roloson pleaded on the basis of a false

and deceptive promise, his plea was involuntary and

should have been withdrawn.

Even if this Court concludes the State did not breach its

agreement, Mr. Roloson is still entitled to withdraw his plea. The

record demonstrates that he pleaded on the basis of a false and

deceptive promise, rendering it involuntary.

Under CrR 4.2(f), a trial court “shall allow a defendant to

withdraw the defendant’s plea of guilty whenever it appears that

the withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” An involuntary plea represents such a manifest injustice. State v. Os-

borne, 102 Wn.2d 87, 98, 684 P.2d 683 (1984). A plea is involuntary if it was “the product of or induced by coercive threat, fear,

persuasion, promise, or deception.” Woods v. Rhay, 68 Wn.2d

601, 605, 414 P.2d 601 (1966).

Appendix 104

Mr. Roloson only pleaded guilty because the prosecutor—

on several occasions—guaranteed the victims would support a

SSOSA. RP 55–56, 65; CP 58, 66, 93–94. As Mr. Roloson reasonably understood, the victims’ support for a SSOSA was crucial.

RP 55; see RCW 9.94A.670(4) (“The court shall give great weight

to the victim's opinion whether the offender should receive a treatment disposition under this section.”). He would not have pleaded

guilty if he knew the victims did not support that sentence. RP 55–

56, 65. At no point before sentencing did the prosecutor tell Mr.

Roloson that the victims had reservations about a SSOSA and

would share those reservations with the trial court. See CP 58–59.

But, as the trial court acknowledged, the victim statements

were “certainly not in line with the Court imposing a SSOSA sentence[.]” RP 50–51. Beyond simply not advocating for a SSOSA

sentence, the victims articulated why Mr. Roloson should not receive that sentence and effectively argued for a lengthy prison sentence. RP 37–47. Mr. Roloson’s shock was apparent, as he immediately moved to withdraw his plea after the victims made their

Appendix 105

statements. RP 47. His shock was understandable, because the

promise of the victims’ SSOSA recommendation was a key factor

in Mr. Roloson’s decision to forfeit his trial rights and plead guilty.

RP 55–56.

Mr. Roloson was deceived into thinking that, by pleading

guilty, the victims would recommend a SSOSA. “[C]oercion may

render a guilty plea involuntary, irrespective of the State’s involvement.” State v. Frederick, 100 Wn.2d 550, 556, 674 P.2d 136

(1983), overruled on other grounds by Thompson v. Dep’t of Li-

censing, 138 Wn.2d 783, 982 P.2d 601 (1999). It thus does not

matter whether the victims deceived the prosecutor into thinking

they would support a SSOSA sentence or whether the prosecutor

deceived Mr. Roloson into believing as such.

Mr. Roloson pleaded based on a false and deceptive premise. His plea was thus involuntary. This Court should therefore

reverse and remand so the trial court can accept Mr. Roloson’s

plea of not guilty. See State v. Krois, 74 Wn.2d 404, 408, 445 P.2d

Appendix 106

24 (1968) (ordering that disposition where the defendant made an

involuntary plea of guilty).

3. The trial court improperly ordered Mr. Roloson to

pay the $500 victim penalty assessment, the $100

DNA collection fee, and a $100 domestic violence

assessment.

Because the trial court found Mr. Roloson indigent, it was

precluded from ordering him to pay the $500 victim penalty assessment, the $100 DNA collection fee, or a $100 domestic violence assessment.

Due to a recent amendment, RCW 7.68.035(4) now prohibits a trial court from ordering an indigent defendant to pay the

victim penalty assessment. Engrossed Substitute House Bill 1169,

Chapter 449, Laws of 2023. RCW 43.43.7541 was also amended

to remove the DNA collection fee requirement for indigent defendants. Laws of 2023, ch. 449, § 1.

These amendments apply prospectively to cases, like Mr.

Roloson’s, that are currently on direct review. State v. Ellis, 27

Wn. App. 2d 1, 16–17, 530 P.3d 1048 (2023); see State v. Reed,

__ P.3d __, 2023 WL 8014314, at *1 (Wash. App. Nov. 20,

Appendix 107

COURT OF APPEALS OF

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION TWO

)

STATE OF WASHINGTON,)

Respondent,

)

ERIC S. ROLOSON,

)

Appellant.

)

No. 56823-3-II

MOTION TO

RECONSIDER

IDENTITY OF MOVING PARTY AND

STATEMENT OF RELIEF

The appellant, Eric Roloson, respectfully moves this

Court to reconsider its decision dated October 8, 2024, in

order to serve the ends of justice pursuant to RAP 12.4.

II.

GROUNDS FOR RELIEF AND

ARGUMENT

In his appeal, Mr. Roloson made two separate

arguments to support the withdrawal of his guilty plea.

Appendix 108

Relevant here is Mr. Roloson’s second argument—that his

plea was involuntary because it was induced by a

misrepresentation that the victims would support a SSOSA.

Br. of App. at 28–31.

With respect, the Court overlooked the law and facts

in rejecting Mr. Roloson’s argument. Most significantly, the

Court misapplied the law by holding the plea was voluntary

because the victim statements did “not result in a breach of

the plea agreement.” Slip Op. at 12. That holding does not

resolve whether Mr. Roloson was misinformed about

whether the victims would support a SSOSA. Likewise, the

Court applied the incorrect standard of review to the

voluntariness argument.

Because Mr. Roloson’s plea was involuntary, it was

“obtained in violation of due process.” McCarthy v. United

States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418

(1969). This Court should reconsider its decision and

remand so Mr. Roloson can withdraw his plea.

Appendix 109

A. Because Mr. Roloson pleaded guilty due to the

misrepresentation that the victims would

support a SSOSA, his plea was involuntary.

Mr. Roloson pleaded guilty to two counts of first

degree rape of a child based on the prosecutor’s repeated

assurances that the victims would endorse a SSOSA. RP 55–

56, 65; CP 58, 66, 93–94. Mr. Roloson was specifically told

the victims would recommend a SSOSA and explain why

the court should grant him that treatment disposition. CP 60,

93–94; RP 56. Indeed, he turned down a lesser plea to first

degree child molestation and pleaded to more significant

charges based on that assurance. CP 135; RP 55. As even the

trial court acknowledged, however, the victims did not

effectively support a SSOSA sentence. RP 50. Instead, they

asked for a life sentence in prison. RP 40, 42–43, 46–47.

In short, Mr. Roloson pleaded guilty because he

thought he would receive victim support for a SSOSA. They

did not support that treatment disposition, indicating he

pleaded guilty based on a misrepresentation. Assessing this

Appendix 110

situation under binding U.S. Supreme Court case law reveals

his plea was involuntary.

The Court reached a different result by applying the

wrong legal standards. Reconsideration is warranted.

Whether a plea is involuntary is a

constitutional issue that is reviewed de novo,

not for an abuse of discretion.

“Due process requires that a defendant’s guilty plea be

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” State v. Weyrich, 163

Wn.2d 554, 556, 182 P.3d 965 (2008). Likewise, “a

defendant gives up constitutional rights by agreeing to a plea

agreement, and, because fundamental rights of the accused

are at issue, due process considerations come into play.”

State v. Walsh, 143 Wn.2d 1, 7, 17 P.3d 591 (2001). Thus,

“The constitutional right to due process protects against

entry of an involuntary plea.” State v. Horntvedt, 29 Wn. App.

2d 589, 599, 539 P.3d 869 (2023). And “a claim that a guilty

plea pursuant to a plea agreement was involuntary” is a

“constitutional error.” Walsh, 143 Wn.2d at 8.

Appendix 111

As a result, this Court reviews “the constitutional

adequacy of a defendant’s plea de novo.”1 State v. Snider, 199

Wn.2d 435, 444, 508 P.3d 1014 (2022). Specifically, the

Court reviews whether a plea was involuntary “de novo

without giving deference to the trial court’s ruling.” State v.

Buckman, 190 Wn.2d 51, 57 n.2, 409 P.3d 193 (2018).

But this Court reviewed this issue for an abuse of

discretion. Slip Op. at 10. That is the incorrect standard of

review.

In Buckman, the Court observed, “Normally, we

review CrR 7.8 motions to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse

of discretion.” 190 Wn.2d at 57. That standard of review

does not apply when the “request for withdraw” is “based on

a claimed constitutional error,” such as involuntariness. Id.

In that circumstance, appellate courts review de novo, not

for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 57, 57 n.2.

Mr. Roloson preserved this issue by moving to

withdraw his plea immediately after the victims spoke at

sentencing. RP 47; see State v. Blanks, 139 Wn. App. 543,

Appendix 112

The Court thus applied the incorrect standard of

review to this issue. It also applied the incorrect line of case

law when it denied Mr. Roloson’s claim on the merits.

Even if a defendant was correctly informed of

the direct consequences of their plea, their plea

may still be involuntary if it was induced by a

misrepresentation.

“[A] guilty plea is a grave and solemn act to be

accepted only with care and discernment[.]” Brady v. United

States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 74

(1970). “A defendant who enters such a plea simultaneously

waives several constitutional rights, including his privilege

against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by

jury, and his right to confront his accusers.” McCarthy, 394

U.S. at 466. “For this waiver to be valid under the Due

Process Clause,” it must be voluntary. Id. If not, the plea

“has been obtained in violation of due process and is

therefore void.” Id.

The Supreme Court in Brady established the standard

550, 161 P.3d 455 (2007).

Appendix 113

for determining the voluntariness of a guilty plea: “A plea of

guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences

must stand unless induced by misrepresentation (including

unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises).” Brady, 397 U.S. at 755

(cleaned up & emphasis added).

The standard from Brady controls. State v. Radcliffe, 139

Wn. App. 214, 224, 159 P.3d 486 (2007) (“The United

States Supreme Court is the final authority on the federal

constitution.”). But this Court used a far different standard

than the one expressed in Brady.

Citing State v. Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d 582, 591, 141 P.3d

49 (2006), this Court wrote, “a guilty plea is not involuntary

if ‘the defendant was correctly informed of all of the direct

consequences of his guilty plea.’” Slip Op. at 11. That is not

the law.

As Brady established, even if a defendant was correctly

informed of the direct consequences of the plea, the plea

may still be involuntary if it was induced by a

Appendix 114

misrepresentation. Brady, 397 U.S. at 756. Indeed, this is

already reflected by Washington case law.

Similar to the standard in Brady, our Supreme Court

observed a plea is involuntary if it was “the product of or

induced by coercive threat, fear, persuasion, promise, or

deception.” Woods v. Rhay, 68 Wn.2d 601, 605, 414 P.2d 601

(1966). And as Division Three of this Court recently

observed, “A plea may be involuntary due to circumstances

such as misinformation, threats, or mental coercion.”

Horntvedt, 29 Wn. App. 2d at 599.

Our Supreme Court’s decision in Mendoza is not to the

contrary. Instead, that decision simply indicated a plea “may

be deemed involuntary when based on misinformation

regarding a direct consequence of the plea.” Mendoza, 157

Wn.2d at 591. Nowhere in Mendoza did the Court indicate

that was the only way for a plea to be involuntary.

Multiple cases in Washington highlight how a plea

can be involuntary irrespective of whether the defendant was

Appendix 115

correctly informed of direct consequences. For instance, a

prosecutor’s threat to add charges if the defendant does not

plead guilty may render the plea involuntary. State v.

Swindell, 93 Wn.2d 192, 198, 607 P.2d 852 (1980). Similarly,

coercion from a third party may render a plea involuntary.

State v. Frederick, 100 Wn.2d 550, 556, 674 P.2d 136 (1983).

A plea can also be involuntary if it was induced by a

prosecutor’s appeal to fears of racial bias. Horntvedt, 29 Wn.

App. 2d at 599. And a misrepresentation about a collateral

consequence can render a plea involuntary. State v. Stowe, 71

Wn. App. 182, 188, 858 P.2d 267 (1993)

None of these decisions focus on whether the

defendant was correctly informed of the direct consequences

of a plea. Rather, courts focus more broadly on “the relevant

circumstances surrounding” the plea. State v. Williams, 117

Wn. App. 390, 398, 71 P.3d 686 (2003).

As stated above, one such relevant circumstance is

whether the plea was induced by a misrepresentation. See

Appendix 116

Brady, 397 U.S. at 755. That is the relevant consideration in

this case, yet this Court neglected to consider it.

Because Mr. Roloson pleaded guilty based on a

misrepresentation that the victims would

support a SSOSA, his plea was involuntary.

A guilty plea is involuntary and must be withdrawn if

it was induced by a “misrepresentation (including unfulfilled

or unfulfillable promises).” Brady, 397 U.S. at 755. That is

exactly what occurred here, as Mr. Roloson’s guilty plea was

induced by the misrepresentation the victims would endorse

a SSOSA.

Mr. Roloson pleaded guilty with a joint

recommendation for a SSOSA. RP 18. He did so believing

the victims would also endorse a SSOSA and explain why

he should be granted that treatment disposition. RP 18, 56,

60. He turned down an offer to plead to lesser charges

because he thought he would have victim support, and he

realized their opinion would be given “great weight” under

RCW 9.94A.670(4). RP 55–56; CP 135. As Mr. Roloson

Appendix 117

Relevant Portion of Mr. Roloson's

Petition for Review in the

Washington Supreme Court

The court then denied a SSOSA and sentenced Mr. Roloson

to 120 months to life on both counts, to be served

concurrently. RP 88; CP 101–02.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the court did

not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Roloson’s motion to

withdraw his plea. Slip Op. at 11–12. It reasoned the victim

statements “did not result in a breach of the plea agreement

between [Mr.] Roloson and the State.” Slip Op. at 12.

F. LAW AND ARGUMENT

Because the prosecutor’s misrepresentation

that the victims and their mother would

support a SSOSA induced Mr. Roloson’s

guilty plea, his plea was involuntary.

Mr. Roloson pleaded guilty to two counts of child

rape because he believed the victims and their mother would

endorse a SSOSA and explain why the court should impose

that treatment disposition. The opposite happened at

sentencing: both victims and Ms. Roloson asked the court to

impose a life sentence. The court refused to withdraw Mr.

Roloson’s plea and sentenced him to life in prison.

Appendix 118

The victims’ endorsement of a SSOSA was a

misrepresentation, and it induced Mr. Roloson to plead

guilty. Under binding United States Supreme Court

precedent, his plea was involuntary and void. But the Court

of Appeals misconstrued and ignored precedent when it

rejected Mr. Roloson’s argument. The court’s mishandling

of the issue reveals that this Court’s guidance is required, as

there is a dearth of similar cases in Washington. This Court

should grant review of this significantly important

constitutional issue and reverse so Mr. Roloson can

withdraw his plea.

1. Even if an accused person was correctly informed of

the direct consequences of their plea, the plea may

still be involuntary if it was induced by a

misrepresentation.

“[A] guilty plea is a grave and solemn act to be

accepted only with care and discernment[.]” Brady v. United

States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 74

(1970). “A defendant who enters such a plea simultaneously

Appendix 119

waives several constitutional rights, including his privilege

against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by

jury, and his right to confront his accusers.” McCarthy v.

United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed. 2d

418 (1969).

Because “a defendant gives up constitutional rights by

agreeing to a plea agreement, and, because fundamental

rights of the accused are at issue, due process considerations

come into play.” State v. Walsh, 143 Wn.2d 1, 7, 17 P.3d 591

(2001). “For this waiver to be valid under the Due Process

Clause,” it must be voluntary. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466. If

not, the plea “has been obtained in violation of due process

and is therefore void.” Id.

The United States Supreme Court in Brady established

that knowledge of the plea’s direct consequences is not

enough: “A plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the

direct consequences must stand unless induced by

misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable

Appendix 120

promises).” Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (cleaned up & emphasis

added). The Brady standard “does not limit unfulfillable

promises to those made knowingly, but merely states that

the defendant’s plea is involuntary when the

misrepresentation for which the defendant based his

agreement on could not be fulfilled.” Sawyer v. United States,

279 F. Supp. 3d 883, 888 (D. Ariz. 2017); accord United States

v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 467 (4th Cir. 2013).

The standard from Brady is the “final authority”

concerning whether a guilty plea complies with federal due

process. State v. Radcliffe, 139 Wn. App. 214, 224, 159 P.3d

486 (2007). But the Court of Appeals used a far different

standard than the one expressed in Brady.

Citing State v. Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d 582, 591, 141 P.3d

49 (2006), the Court of Appeals wrote, “a guilty plea is not

involuntary if ‘the defendant was correctly informed of all of

the direct consequences of his guilty plea.’” Slip Op. at 11.

Appendix 121

That is not the law, under both Brady and Washington case

law.

This Court held a plea is involuntary if it was “the

product of or induced by coercive threat, fear, persuasion,

promise, or deception.” Woods v. Rhay, 68 Wn.2d 601, 605,

414 P.2d 601 (1966). Division Three of the Court of Appeals

similarly observed, “A plea may be involuntary due to

circumstances such as misinformation, threats, or mental

coercion.” State v. Horntvedt, 29 Wn. App. 2d 589, 599, 539

P.3d 869 (2023). This Court has also acknowledged that a

misrepresentation does not need to be knowingly made. E.g.,

Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d at 587–90 (discussing cases).

This Court’s decision in Mendoza did not alter any of

this settled precedent. Instead, that decision simply indicated

a plea “may be deemed involuntary when based on

misinformation regarding a direct consequence of the plea.”

Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d at 591 (emphasis added). Nowhere in

Appendix 122

Mendoza did the Court indicate that was the only way for a

plea to be involuntary.

Multiple cases in Washington highlight how a plea

can be involuntary irrespective of whether the defendant was

correctly informed of direct consequences. For instance, a

prosecutor’s threat to add charges if the defendant does not

plead guilty may render the plea involuntary. State v.

Swindell, 93 Wn.2d 192, 198, 607 P.2d 852 (1980). Similarly,

coercion from a third party may render a plea involuntary.

State v. Frederick, 100 Wn.2d 550, 556, 674 P.2d 136 (1983),

overruled on other grounds by Thompson v. State, Dep't of

Licensing, 138 Wn.2d 783, 982 P.2d 601 (1999). A plea can

also be involuntary if it was induced by a prosecutor’s appeal

to fears of racial bias. Horntvedt, 29 Wn. App. 2d at 599. And

a misrepresentation about a collateral consequence can

render a plea involuntary. State v. Stowe, 71 Wn. App. 182,

188, 858 P.2d 267 (1993).

Appendix 123

None of these decisions focus on whether the

defendant was correctly informed of the direct consequences

of a plea. Rather, courts focus more broadly on “the relevant

circumstances surrounding” the plea. State v. Williams, 117

Wn. App. 390, 398, 71 P.3d 686 (2003).

As stated above, one such relevant circumstance is

whether a misrepresentation induced the plea. See Brady, 397

U.S. at 755. That is the relevant consideration in this case,

yet the Court of Appeals refused to consider this crucial

issue. This Court should grant review and clarify that the

Brady standard ultimately controls when determining the

voluntariness of a plea.

2. The Court of Appeals misread the facts and

misapplied this Court’s precedent and other law.

A guilty plea is involuntary and must be withdrawn if

it was induced by a “misrepresentation (including unfulfilled

or unfulfillable promises).” Brady, 397 U.S. at 755. That is

exactly what occurred here, as the prosecutor’s

9.94A.670. Special sex offender sentencing alternative, WA ST 9.94A.670

Appendix 124

West's Revised Code of Washington Annotated

Title 9. Crimes and Punishments (Refs & Annos)

Chapter 9.94A. Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (Refs & Annos)

Sentencing Alternatives

West's RCWA 9.94A.670

9.94A.670. Special sex offender sentencing alternative

Currentness

(1) Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the definitions in this subsection apply to this section only.

(a) “Sex offender treatment provider” or “treatment provider” means a certified sex offender treatment provider or a certified

affiliate sex offender treatment provider as defined in RCW 18.155.020.

(b) “Substantial bodily harm” means bodily injury that involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or that causes a

temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any body part or organ, or that causes a fracture of any body

part or organ.

(c) “Victim” means any person who has sustained emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property

as a result of the crime charged. “Victim” also means a parent or guardian of a victim who is a minor child unless the parent

or guardian is the perpetrator of the offense.

(2) An offender is eligible for the special sex offender sentencing alternative if:

(a) The offender has been convicted of a sex offense other than a violation of RCW 9A.44.050 or a sex offense that is also

a serious violent offense. If the conviction results from a guilty plea, the offender must, as part of his or her plea of guilty,

voluntarily and affirmatively admit he or she committed all of the elements of the crime to which the offender is pleading guilty.

This alternative is not available to offenders who plead guilty to the offense charged under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.

25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) and State v. Newton, 87 Wash.2d 363, 552 P.2d 682 (1976);

(b) The offender has no prior convictions for a sex offense as defined in RCW 9.94A.030 or any other felony sex offenses in

this or any other state;

(c) The offender has no prior adult convictions for a violent offense that was committed within five years of the date the current

offense was committed;

(d) The offense did not result in substantial bodily harm to the victim;

9.94A.670. Special sex offender sentencing alternative, WA ST 9.94A.670

Appendix 125

(e) The offender had an established relationship with, or connection to, the victim such that the sole connection with the victim

was not the commission of the crime; and

(f) The offender's standard sentence range for the offense includes the possibility of confinement for less than eleven years.

(3) If the court finds the offender is eligible for this alternative, the court, on its own motion or the motion of the state or the

offender, may order an examination to determine whether the offender is amenable to treatment.

(a) The report of the examination shall include at a minimum the following:

(i) The offender's version of the facts and the official version of the facts;

(ii) The offender's offense history;

(iii) An assessment of problems in addition to alleged deviant behaviors;

(iv) The offender's social and employment situation; and

(v) Other evaluation measures used.

The report shall set forth the sources of the examiner's information.

(b) The examiner shall assess and report regarding the offender's amenability to treatment and relative risk to the community.

A proposed treatment plan shall be provided and shall include, at a minimum:

(i) Frequency and type of contact between offender and therapist;

(ii) Specific issues to be addressed in the treatment and description of planned treatment modalities;

(iii) Monitoring plans, including any requirements regarding living conditions, lifestyle requirements, and monitoring by family

members and others;

(iv) Anticipated length of treatment; and

(v) Recommended crime-related prohibitions and affirmative conditions, which must include, to the extent known, an

identification of specific activities or behaviors that are precursors to the offender's offense cycle, including, but not limited to,

activities or behaviors such as viewing or listening to pornography or use of alcohol or controlled substances.

9.94A.670. Special sex offender sentencing alternative, WA ST 9.94A.670

Appendix 126

(c) The court on its own motion may order, or on a motion by the state shall order, a second examination regarding the offender's

amenability to treatment. The examiner shall be selected by the party making the motion. The offender shall pay the cost of any

second examination ordered unless the court finds the defendant to be indigent in which case the state shall pay the cost.

(4) After receipt of the reports, the court shall consider whether the offender and the community will benefit from use of this

alternative, consider whether the alternative is too lenient in light of the extent and circumstances of the offense, consider

whether the offender has victims in addition to the victim of the offense, consider whether the offender is amenable to treatment,

consider the risk the offender would present to the community, to the victim, or to persons of similar age and circumstances

as the victim, and consider the victim's opinion whether the offender should receive a treatment disposition under this section.

The court shall give great weight to the victim's opinion whether the offender should receive a treatment disposition under this

section. If the sentence imposed is contrary to the victim's opinion, the court shall enter written findings stating its reasons

for imposing the treatment disposition. The fact that the offender admits to his or her offense does not, by itself, constitute

amenability to treatment. If the court determines that this alternative is appropriate, the court shall then impose a sentence or,

pursuant to RCW 9.94A.507, a minimum term of sentence, within the standard sentence range. If the sentence imposed is less

than eleven years of confinement, the court may suspend the execution of the sentence as provided in this section.

(5) As conditions of the suspended sentence, the court must impose the following:

(a) A term of confinement of up to twelve months or the maximum term within the standard range, whichever is less. The

court may order the offender to serve a term of confinement greater than twelve months or the maximum term within the

standard range based on the presence of an aggravating circumstance listed in RCW 9.94A.535(3). In no case shall the term of

confinement exceed the statutory maximum sentence for the offense. The court may order the offender to serve all or part of

his or her term of confinement in partial confinement. An offender sentenced to a term of confinement under this subsection

is not eligible for earned release under RCW 9.92.151 or 9.94A.728.

(b) A term of community custody equal to the length of the suspended sentence, the length of the maximum term imposed

pursuant to RCW 9.94A.507, or three years, whichever is greater, and require the offender to comply with any conditions

imposed by the department under RCW 9.94A.703.

(c) Treatment for any period up to five years in duration. The court, in its discretion, shall order outpatient sex offender treatment

or inpatient sex offender treatment, if available. A community mental health center may not be used for such treatment unless it

has an appropriate program designed for sex offender treatment. The offender shall not change sex offender treatment providers

or treatment conditions without first notifying the prosecutor, the community corrections officer, and the court. If any party or the

court objects to a proposed change, the offender shall not change providers or conditions without court approval after a hearing.

(d) Specific prohibitions and affirmative conditions relating to the known precursor activities or behaviors identified in the

proposed treatment plan under subsection (3)(b)(v) of this section or identified in an annual review under subsection (8)(b)

of this section.

(6) As conditions of the suspended sentence, the court may impose one or more of the following:

(a) Crime-related prohibitions;

9.94A.670. Special sex offender sentencing alternative, WA ST 9.94A.670

Appendix 127

(b) Require the offender to devote time to a specific employment or occupation;

(c) Require the offender to remain within prescribed geographical boundaries and notify the court or the community corrections

officer prior to any change in the offender's address or employment;

(d) Require the offender to report as directed to the court and a community corrections officer;

(e) Require the offender to pay all court-ordered legal financial obligations as provided in RCW 9.94A.030;

(f) Require the offender to perform community restitution work; or

(g) Require the offender to reimburse the victim for the cost of any counseling required as a result of the offender's crime.

(7) At the time of sentencing, the court shall set a treatment termination hearing for three months prior to the anticipated date

for completion of treatment.

(8)(a) The sex offender treatment provider shall submit quarterly reports on the offender's progress in treatment to the court and

the parties. The report shall reference the treatment plan and include at a minimum the following: Dates of attendance, offender's

compliance with requirements, treatment activities, the offender's relative progress in treatment, and any other material specified

by the court at sentencing.

(b) The court shall conduct a hearing on the offender's progress in treatment at least once a year. At least fourteen days prior to

the hearing, notice of the hearing shall be given to the victim. The victim shall be given the opportunity to make statements to the

court regarding the offender's supervision and treatment. At the hearing, the court may modify conditions of community custody

including, but not limited to, crime-related prohibitions and affirmative conditions relating to activities and behaviors identified

as part of, or relating to precursor activities and behaviors in, the offender's offense cycle or revoke the suspended sentence.

(9) At least fourteen days prior to the treatment termination hearing, notice of the hearing shall be given to the victim. The

victim shall be given the opportunity to make statements to the court regarding the offender's supervision and treatment. Prior

to the treatment termination hearing, the treatment provider and community corrections officer shall submit written reports to

the court and parties regarding the offender's compliance with treatment and monitoring requirements, and recommendations

regarding termination from treatment, including proposed community custody conditions. The court may order an evaluation

regarding the advisability of termination from treatment by a sex offender treatment provider who may not be the same person

who treated the offender under subsection (5) of this section or any person who employs, is employed by, or shares profits with

the person who treated the offender under subsection (5) of this section unless the court has entered written findings that such

evaluation is in the best interest of the victim and that a successful evaluation of the offender would otherwise be impractical.

The offender shall pay the cost of the evaluation. At the treatment termination hearing the court may: (a) Modify conditions of

community custody, and either (b) terminate treatment, or (c) extend treatment in two-year increments for up to the remaining

period of community custody.

9.94A.670. Special sex offender sentencing alternative, WA ST 9.94A.670

Appendix 128

(10)(a) If a violation of conditions other than a second violation of the prohibitions or affirmative conditions relating to

precursor behaviors or activities imposed under subsection (5)(d) or (8)(b) of this section occurs during community custody, the

department shall either impose sanctions as provided for in RCW 9.94A.633(1) or refer the violation to the court and recommend

revocation of the suspended sentence as provided for in subsections (7) and (9) of this section.

(b) If a second violation of the prohibitions or affirmative conditions relating to precursor behaviors or activities imposed under

subsection (5)(d) or (8)(b) of this section occurs during community custody, the department shall refer the violation to the court

and recommend revocation of the suspended sentence as provided in subsection (11) of this section.

(11) The court may revoke the suspended sentence at any time during the period of community custody and order execution

of the sentence if: (a) The offender violates the conditions of the suspended sentence, or (b) the court finds that the offender is

failing to make satisfactory progress in treatment. All confinement time served during the period of community custody shall

be credited to the offender if the suspended sentence is revoked.

(12) If the offender violates a requirement of the sentence that is not a condition of the suspended sentence pursuant to subsection

(5) or (6) of this section, the department may impose sanctions pursuant to RCW 9.94A.633(1).

(13) The offender's sex offender treatment provider may not be the same person who examined the offender under subsection (3)

of this section or any person who employs, is employed by, or shares profits with the person who examined the offender under

subsection (3) of this section, unless the court has entered written findings that such treatment is in the best interests of the victim

and that successful treatment of the offender would otherwise be impractical. Examinations and treatment ordered pursuant to

this subsection shall only be conducted by certified sex offender treatment providers or certified affiliate sex offender treatment

providers under chapter 18.155 RCW unless the court finds that:

(a) The offender has already moved to another state or plans to move to another state for reasons other than circumventing the

certification requirements; or

(b)(i) No certified sex offender treatment providers or certified affiliate sex offender treatment providers are available for

treatment within a reasonable geographical distance of the offender's home; and

(ii) The evaluation and treatment plan comply with this section and the rules adopted by the department of health.

(14) If the offender is less than eighteen years of age when the charge is filed, the state shall pay for the cost of initial evaluation

and treatment.

Credits

[2009 c 28 § 9, eff. Aug. 1, 2009; 2008 c 231 § 31, eff. Aug. 1, 2009; 2006 c 133 § 1, eff. June 7, 2006. Prior: 2004 c 176 § 4,

eff. July 1, 2005; 2004 c 38 § 9, eff. July 1, 2004; 2002 c 175 § 11; 2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 § 316; 2000 c 28 § 20.]

OFFICIAL NOTES

Effective date--2009 c 28: See note following RCW 2.24.040.

9.94A.670. Special sex offender sentencing alternative, WA ST 9.94A.670

Appendix 129

Intent--Application--Application of repealers--Effective date--2008 c 231: See notes following RCW 9.94A.701.

Severability--2008 c 231: See note following RCW 9.94A.500.

Severability--Effective date--2004 c 176: See notes following RCW 9.94A.515.

Effective date--2004 c 38: See note following RCW 18.155.075.

Effective date--2002 c 175: See note following RCW 7.80.130.

Intent--Severability--Effective dates--2001 2nd sp.s. c 12: See notes following RCW 71.09.250.

Application--2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 §§ 301-363: See note following RCW 9.94A.030.

Technical correction bill--2000 c 28: See note following RCW 9.94A.015.

West's RCWA 9.94A.670, WA ST 9.94A.670

Current with all effective legislation of the 2025 Regular Session of the Washington Legislature. Some statute sections may

be more current, see credits for details.

End of Document

Appendix 130

§ 35. Victims of Crimes--Rights, WA CONST Art. 1, § 35

West's Revised Code of Washington Annotated

Constitution of the State of Washington (Refs & Annos)

Article 1. Declaration of Rights (Refs & Annos)

West's RCWA Const. Art. 1, § 35

§ 35. Victims of Crimes--Rights

Currentness

Effective law enforcement depends on cooperation from victims of crime. To ensure victims a meaningful role in the criminal

justice system and to accord them due dignity and respect, victims of crime are hereby granted the following basic and

fundamental rights.

Upon notifying the prosecuting attorney, a victim of a crime charged as a felony shall have the right to be informed of and,

subject to the discretion of the individual presiding over the trial or court proceedings, attend trial and all other court proceedings

the defendant has the right to attend, and to make a statement at sentencing and at any proceeding where the defendant's release

is considered, subject to the same rules of procedure which govern the defendant's rights. In the event the victim is deceased,

incompetent, a minor, or otherwise unavailable, the prosecuting attorney may identify a representative to appear to exercise the

victim's rights. This provision shall not constitute a basis for error in favor of a defendant in a criminal proceeding nor a basis

for providing a victim or the victim's representative with court appointed counsel.

Credits

Adopted by Amendment 84 (Laws 1989, S.J.R. No. 8200, approved Nov. 7, 1989), eff. Dec. 7, 1989.

West's RCWA Const. Art. 1, § 35, WA CONST Art. 1, § 35

Current through Nov. 5, 2024, General Election.

End of Document

Appendix 131

9.94A.510. Table 1--Sentencing grid, WA ST 9.94A.510

West's Revised Code of Washington Annotated

Title 9. Crimes and Punishments (Refs & Annos)

Chapter 9.94A. Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (Refs & Annos)

Sentencing

West's RCWA 9.94A.510

9.94A.510. Table 1--Sentencing grid

Currentness

TABLE 1

Sentencing Grid

SERIOUSNESS

LEVEL

OFFENDER SCORE

XVI

Life sentence without parole/death penalty for offenders at or over the age of eighteen. For offenders

under the age of eighteen, a term of twenty-five years to life.

23y4m

24y4m

25y4m

26y4m

27y4m

28y4m

30y4m

32y10m

36y

40y

240-

250-

261-

271-

281-

291-

312-

338-

370-

411-

320

333

347

361

374

388

416

450

493

548

14y4m

15y4m

16y2m

17y

17y11m

18y9m

20y5m

22y2m

25y7m

29y

123-

134-

144-

154-

165-

175-

195-

216-

257-

298-

220

234

244

254

265

275

295

316

357

397

12y

13y

14y

15y

16y

17y

19y

21y

25y

29y

123-

134-

144-

154-

165-

175-

195-

216-

257-

298-

164

178

192

205

219

233

260

288

342

397

9y11m

10y9m

11y8m

12y6m

13y5m

15y9m

17y3m

20y3m

23y3m

93-

102-

111-

120-

129-

138-

162-

178-

209-

240-

123

136

147

160

171

184

216

236

277

318

7y6m

8y4m

9y2m

9y11m

10y9m

11y7m

14y2m

15y5m

17y11m

20y5m

XIV

XIII

XII

Appendix 132

9.94A.510. Table 1--Sentencing grid, WA ST 9.94A.510

VIII

VII

III

78-

86-

95-

102-

111-

120-

146-

159-

185-

210-

102

114

125

136

147

158

194

211

245

280

5y6m

6y6m

7y6m

9y6m

10y6m

12y6m

14y6m

51-

57-

62-

67-

72-

77-

98-

108-

129-

149-

102

130

144

171

198

3y6m

4y6m

5y6m

7y6m

8y6m

10y6m

12y6m

31-

36-

41-

46-

51-

57-

77-

87-

108-

129-

102

116

144

171

2y6m

3y6m

4y6m

6y6m

7y6m

8y6m

10y6m

21-

26-

31-

36-

41-

46-

67-

77-

87-

108-

102

116

144

18m

2y6m

3y6m

5y6m

6y6m

7y6m

8y6m

15-

21-

26-

31-

36-

41-

57-

67-

77-

87-

102

116

13m

18m

2y6m

3y6m

4y6m

5y6m

6y6m

7y6m

12+-

15-

21-

26-

31-

36-

46-

57-

67-

77-

102

13m

15m

18m

2y2m

3y2m

12+-

13-

15-

22-

33-

41-

51-

62-

72-

13m

15m

18m

2y2m

3y2m

4y2m

5y2m

6y2m

12+-

13-

15-

22-

33-

43-

53-

63-

11m

14m

20m

2y2m

3y2m

4y2m

12+-

17-

22-

33-

43-

51-

13m

16m

20m

2y2m

3y2m

4y2m

0-90

12+-

14-

17-

22-

33-

43-

Days

Appendix 133

9.94A.510. Table 1--Sentencing grid, WA ST 9.94A.510

13m

16m

20m

2y2m

0-60

0-90

12+-

14-

17-

22-

Days

Numbers in the first horizontal row of each seriousness category represent sentencing midpoints in years(y) and months(m).

Numbers in the second and third rows represent standard sentence ranges in months, or in days if so designated. 12+ equals

one year and one day.

Credits

[2014 c 130 § 1, eff. June 1, 2014; 2002 c 290 § 10. Prior: 2000 c 132 § 2; 2000 c 28 § 11; prior: 1999 c 352 § 2; 1999 c 324

§ 3; prior: 1998 c 235 § 1; 1998 c 211 § 3; prior: 1997 c 365 § 3; 1997 c 338 § 50; 1996 c 205 § 5; 1995 c 129 § 2 (Initiative

Measure No. 159); (1994 sp.s. c 7 § 512 repealed by 1995 c 129 § 19 (Initiative Measure No. 159)); 1992 c 145 § 9; 1991 c

32 § 2; 1990 c 3 § 701; prior: 1989 c 271 § 101; 1989 c 124 § 1; 1988 c 218 § 1; 1986 c 257 § 22; 1984 c 209 § 16; 1983

c 115 § 2. Formerly RCW 9.94A.310.]

OFFICIAL NOTES

Application--2014 c 130: “Sections 1 through 9 of this act apply to all sentencing hearings conducted on or after June 1, 2014,

regardless of the date of an offender's underlying offense.” [2014 c 130 § 12.]

Effective date--2014 c 130: “This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or

support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and takes effect June 1, 2014.” [2014 c 130 § 16.]

Effective date--2002 c 290 §§ 7-11 and 14-23: See note following RCW 9.94A.515.

Intent--2002 c 290: See note following RCW 9.94A.517.

Technical correction bill--2000 c 28: See note following RCW 9.94A.015.

Effective date--1998 c 211: See note following RCW 46.61.5055.

Finding--Evaluation--Report--1997 c 338: See note following RCW 13.40.0357.

Severability--Effective dates--1997 c 338: See notes following RCW 5.60.060.

Findings and intent--1995 c 129: “(1) The people of the state of Washington find and declare that:

(a) Armed criminals pose an increasing and major threat to public safety and can turn any crime into serious injury or death.

(b) Criminals carry deadly weapons for several key reasons including: Forcing the victim to comply with their demands; injuring

or killing anyone who tries to stop the criminal acts; and aiding the criminal in escaping.

(c) Current law does not sufficiently stigmatize the carrying and use of deadly weapons by criminals, and far too often there

are no deadly weapon enhancements provided for many felonies, including murder, arson, manslaughter, and child molestation

and many other sex offenses including child luring.

Appendix 134

9.94A.510. Table 1--Sentencing grid, WA ST 9.94A.510

(d) Current law also fails to distinguish between gun-carrying criminals and criminals carrying knives or clubs.

(2) By increasing the penalties for carrying and using deadly weapons by criminals and closing loopholes involving armed

criminals, the people intend to:

(a) Stigmatize the carrying and use of any deadly weapons for all felonies with proper deadly weapon enhancements.

(b) Reduce the number of armed offenders by making the carrying and use of the deadly weapon not worth the sentence received

upon conviction.

(c) Distinguish between the gun predators and criminals carrying other deadly weapons and provide greatly increased penalties

for gun predators and for those offenders committing crimes to acquire firearms.

(d) Bring accountability and certainty into the sentencing system by tracking individual judges and holding them accountable

for their sentencing practices in relation to the state's sentencing guidelines for serious crimes.” [1995 c 129 § 1 (Initiative

Measure No. 159).]

Short title--1995 c 129: “This act shall be known and cited as the hard time for armed crime act.” [1995 c 129 § 21 (Initiative

Measure No. 159).]

Severability--1995 c 129: “If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the

remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected.” [1995 c 129 § 22

(Initiative Measure No. 159).]

Captions not law--1995 c 129: “Captions as used in this act do not constitute any part of the law.” [1995 c 129 § 23 (Initiative

Measure No. 159).]

Finding--Intent--Severability--Effective dates--Contingent expiration date--1994 sp.s. c 7: See notes following RCW

43.70.540.

Application--1989 c 271 §§ 101-111: “Sections 101-111 of this act apply to crimes committed on or after July 1, 1989.” [1989

c 271 § 114.]

Severability--1989 c 271: “If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the

remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected.” [1989 c 271 § 606.]

Severability--1986 c 257: See note following RCW 9A.56.010.

Effective date--1986 c 257 §§ 17-35: See note following RCW 9.94A.030.

Effective dates--1984 c 209: See note following RCW 9.94A.030.

West's RCWA 9.94A.510, WA ST 9.94A.510

Current with all effective legislation of the 2025 Regular Session of the Washington Legislature. Some statute sections may

be more current, see credits for details.

End of Document

9.94A.515. Table 2--Crimes included within each seriousness..., WA ST 9.94A.515

Appendix 135

West's Revised Code of Washington Annotated

Title 9. Crimes and Punishments (Refs & Annos)

Chapter 9.94A. Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (Refs & Annos)

Sentencing

West's RCWA 9.94A.515

9.94A.515. Table 2--Crimes included within each seriousness level (Effective April 1, 2025)

Currentness

TABLE 2

CRIMES INCLUDED WITHIN EACH

SERIOUSNESS LEVEL

XVI

Aggravated Murder 1 (RCW 10.95.020)

Homicide by abuse (RCW 9A.32.055)

Malicious explosion 1 (RCW 70.74.280(1))

Murder 1 (RCW 9A.32.030)

XIV

Murder 2 (RCW 9A.32.050)

Trafficking 1 (RCW 9A.40.100(1))

XIII

Malicious explosion 2 (RCW 70.74.280(2))

Malicious placement of an explosive 1 (RCW 70.74.270(1))

XII

Assault 1 (RCW 9A.36.011)

Assault of a Child 1 (RCW 9A.36.120)

Malicious placement of an imitation device 1 (RCW

70.74.272(1)(a))

Promoting Commercial Sexual Abuse of a Minor (RCW

9.68A.101)

Rape 1 (RCW 9A.44.040)

Rape of a Child 1 (RCW 9A.44.073)

Trafficking 2 (RCW 9A.40.100(3))

Manslaughter 1 (RCW 9A.32.060)

Rape 2 (RCW 9A.44.050)

Rape of a Child 2 (RCW 9A.44.076)

9.94A.515. Table 2--Crimes included within each seriousness..., WA ST 9.94A.515

Appendix 136

Vehicular Homicide, by being under the influence of intoxicating

liquor or any drug (RCW 46.61.520)

Vehicular Homicide, by the operation of any vehicle in a reckless

manner (RCW 46.61.520)

Child Molestation 1 (RCW 9A.44.083)

Criminal Mistreatment 1 (RCW 9A.42.020)

Indecent Liberties (with forcible compulsion) (RCW

9A.44.100(1)(a))

Kidnapping 1 (RCW 9A.40.020)

Leading Organized Crime (RCW 9A.82.060(1)(a))

Malicious explosion 3 (RCW 70.74.280(3))

Sexually Violent Predator Escape (RCW 9A.76.115)

Abandonment of Dependent Person 1 (RCW 9A.42.060)

Assault of a Child 2 (RCW 9A.36.130)

Explosive devices prohibited (RCW 70.74.180)

Hit and Run--Death (RCW 46.52.020(4)(a))

Homicide by Watercraft, by being under the influence of

intoxicating liquor or any drug (RCW 79A.60.050)

Inciting Criminal Profiteering (RCW 9A.82.060(1)(b))

Malicious placement of an explosive 2 (RCW 70.74.270(2))

Robbery 1 (RCW 9A.56.200)

Sexual Exploitation (RCW 9.68A.040)

VIII

Arson 1 (RCW 9A.48.020)

Commercial Sexual Abuse of a Minor (RCW 9.68A.100)

Homicide by Watercraft, by the operation of any vessel in a

reckless manner (RCW 79A.60.050)

Manslaughter 2 (RCW 9A.32.070)

Promoting Prostitution 1 (RCW 9A.88.070)

Theft of Ammonia (RCW 69.55.010)

VII

Air bag diagnostic systems (causing bodily injury or death)

(RCW 46.37.660(2)(b))

Air bag replacement requirements (causing bodily injury or

death) (RCW 46.37.660(1)(b))

9.94A.515. Table 2--Crimes included within each seriousness..., WA ST 9.94A.515

Appendix 137

Burglary 1 (RCW 9A.52.020)

Child Molestation 2 (RCW 9A.44.086)

Civil Disorder Training (RCW 9A.48.120)

Custodial Sexual Misconduct 1 (RCW 9A.44.160)

Dealing in depictions of minor engaged in sexually explicit

conduct 1 (RCW 9.68A.050(1))

Drive-by Shooting (RCW 9A.36.045)

False Reporting 1 (RCW 9A.84.040(2)(a))

Homicide by Watercraft, by disregard for the safety of others

(RCW 79A.60.050)

Indecent Liberties (without forcible compulsion) (RCW

9A.44.100(1) (b) and (c))

Introducing Contraband 1 (RCW 9A.76.140)

Malicious placement of an explosive 3 (RCW 70.74.270(3))

Manufacture or import counterfeit, nonfunctional, damaged,

or previously deployed air bag (causing bodily injury or death)

(RCW 46.37.650(1)(b))

Negligently Causing Death By Use of a Signal Preemption

Device (RCW 46.37.675)

Sell, install, or reinstall counterfeit, nonfunctional, damaged, or

previously deployed airbag (RCW 46.37.650(2)(b))

Sending, bringing into state depictions of minor engaged in

sexually explicit conduct 1 (RCW 9.68A.060(1))

Unlawful Possession of a Firearm in the first degree (RCW

9.41.040(1))

Use of a Machine Gun or Bump-fire Stock in Commission of a

Felony (RCW 9.41.225)

Vehicular Homicide, by disregard for the safety of others (RCW

46.61.520)

Bail Jumping with Murder 1 (RCW 9A.76.170(3)(a))

Bribery (RCW 9A.68.010)

Incest 1 (RCW 9A.64.020(1))

Intimidating a Judge (RCW 9A.72.160)

Intimidating a Juror/Witness (RCW 9A.72.110, 9A.72.130)

9.94A.515. Table 2--Crimes included within each seriousness..., WA ST 9.94A.515

Appendix 138

Malicious placement of an imitation device 2 (RCW

70.74.272(1)(b))

Possession of Depictions of a Minor Engaged in Sexually

Explicit Conduct 1 (RCW 9.68A.070(1))

Rape of a Child 3 (RCW 9A.44.079)

Theft of a Firearm (RCW 9A.56.300)

Theft from a Vulnerable Adult 1 (RCW 9A.56.400(1))

Unlawful Storage of Ammonia (RCW 69.55.020)

Abandonment of Dependent Person 2 (RCW 9A.42.070)

Advancing money or property for extortionate extension of credit

(RCW 9A.82.030)

Air bag diagnostic systems (RCW 46.37.660(2)(c))

Air bag replacement requirements (RCW 46.37.660(1)(c))

Bail Jumping with class A Felony (RCW 9A.76.170(3)(b))

Child Molestation 3 (RCW 9A.44.089)

Criminal Mistreatment 2 (RCW 9A.42.030)

Custodial Sexual Misconduct 2 (RCW 9A.44.170)

Dealing in Depictions of Minor Engaged in Sexually Explicit

Conduct 2 (RCW 9.68A.050(2))

Domestic Violence Court Order Violation (RCW 7.105.450,

10.99.040, 10.99.050, 26.09.300, 26.26B.050, or 26.52.070)

Extortion 1 (RCW 9A.56.120)

Extortionate Extension of Credit (RCW 9A.82.020)

Extortionate Means to Collect Extensions of Credit (RCW

9A.82.040)

Incest 2 (RCW 9A.64.020(2))

Kidnapping 2 (RCW 9A.40.030)

Manufacture or import counterfeit, nonfunctional, damaged, or

previously deployed air bag (RCW 46.37.650(1)(c))

Perjury 1 (RCW 9A.72.020)

Persistent prison misbehavior (RCW 9.94.070)

Possession of a Stolen Firearm (RCW 9A.56.310)

Rape 3 (RCW 9A.44.060)

9.94A.515. Table 2--Crimes included within each seriousness..., WA ST 9.94A.515

Appendix 139

Rendering Criminal Assistance 1 (RCW 9

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