Opposition Brief — Mao Hin, Petitioner v. California

No. 25-5219

In the Supreme Court of the United States

MAO HIN,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

ROB BONTA

Attorney General of California

HELEN H. HONG

Acting Solicitor General

JAMES WILLIAM BILDERBACK II

Senior Assistant Attorney General

JOSHUA A. KLEIN

Deputy Solicitor General

ROSS K. NAUGHTON

JEFFREY A. WHITE*

Deputy Attorneys General

August 25, 2025

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

1300 I Street, Suite 125

Sacramento, CA 95814

(916) 210-7682

Jeff.White@doj.ca.gov

*Counsel of Record

i

CAPITAL CASE

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a California jury that has already found unanimously and

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed first-degree murder

and that special circumstances exist rendering him eligible for the death

penalty must also, in order to return a penalty verdict of death, find beyond a

reasonable doubt that specific aggravating factors exist, and that those

aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances.

ii

DIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDINGS

California Supreme Court:

People v. Hin, No. S141519 (judgment partially affirmed and partially

vacated February 3, 2025; opinion modified and rehearing denied April

23, 2025) (this case below).

In re Hin on Habeas Corpus, No. S288290 (pending).

San Joaquin County Superior Court:

People v. Hin, No. SF090168B (judgment entered February 24, 2006) (this

case below).

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Statement ............................................................................................................ 1

Argument ............................................................................................................. 3

Conclusion.......................................................................................................... 12

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Apprendi v. New Jersey

530 U.S. 466 (2000) .................................................................................. 6, 10

Becerrada v. California

583 U.S. 889 (2017) ........................................................................................ 4

Bell v. California

140 S. Ct. 294 (2019) ...................................................................................... 4

Blacksher v. California

565 U.S. 1209 (2012) ...................................................................................... 4

Boyce v. California

574 U.S. 1169 (2015) ...................................................................................... 4

Bracamontes v. California

143 S. Ct. 739 (2023) ...................................................................................... 3

Bramit v. California

558 U.S. 1031 (2009) ...................................................................................... 4

Brooks v. California

583 U.S. 1019 (2017) ...................................................................................... 4

Capers v. California

140 S. Ct. 2532 (2020) .................................................................................... 4

Caro v. California

140 S. Ct. 2682 (2020) .................................................................................... 4

Case v. California

586 U.S. 1232 (2019) ...................................................................................... 4

Cook v. California

552 U.S. 976 (2007) ........................................................................................ 4

Cunningham v. California

577 U.S. 1123 (2016) ...................................................................................... 4

DeBose v. California

574 U.S. 1051 (2014) ...................................................................................... 4

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page

Erskine v. California

140 S. Ct. 602 (2019) ...................................................................................... 4

Gomez v. California

140 S. Ct. 120 (2019) ...................................................................................... 4

Gonzalez v. California

142 S. Ct. 2719 (2022) .................................................................................... 3

Harrison v. California

546 U.S. 890 (2005) ........................................................................................ 4

Henriquez v. California

586 U.S. 897 (2018) ........................................................................................ 4

Huggins v. California

549 U.S. 998 (2006) ........................................................................................ 4

Hurst v. Florida

577 U.S. 92 (2016) ...................................................................................... 7, 8

Jackson v. California

581 U.S. 907 (2017) ........................................................................................ 4

Johnsen v. California

142 S. Ct. 353 (2021) ...................................................................................... 3

Johnson v. California

577 U.S. 1158 (2016) ...................................................................................... 4

Jones v. United States

526 U.S. 227 (1999) ........................................................................................ 8

Kansas v. Carr

577 U.S. 108 (2016) .................................................................................. 9, 10

Landry v. California

583 U.S. 834 (2017) ........................................................................................ 4

Lucas v. California

575 U.S. 1041 (2015) ...................................................................................... 4

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page

Mataele v. California

143 S. Ct. 751 (2023) ...................................................................................... 3

McKinney v. Arizona

589 U.S. 139 (2020) ........................................................................................ 8

Mendez v. California

140 S. Ct. 471 (2019) ...................................................................................... 4

Mickel v. California

581 U.S. 1019 (2017) ...................................................................................... 4

Miranda-Guerrero v. California

144 S. Ct. 115 (2023) ...................................................................................... 3

Mitchell v. California

140 S. Ct. 2535 (2020) .................................................................................... 4

Morgan v. California

552 U.S. 1286 (2008) ...................................................................................... 4

Penunuri v. California

586 U.S. 1053 (2018) ...................................................................................... 4

People v. Brown

46 Cal. 3d 432 (1988) ..................................................................................... 9

People v. Gonzales

52 Cal. 4th 254 (2011) .................................................................................... 6

People v. Montour

157 P.3d 489 (Colo. 2007) ............................................................................ 11

People v. Moon

37 Cal. 4th 1 (2005) ........................................................................................ 8

People v. Prince

40 Cal. 4th 1179 (2007) .................................................................................. 7

People v. Rangel

62 Cal. 4th 1192 (2016) .................................................................................. 3

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page

People v. Romero

62 Cal. 4th 1 (2015) ........................................................................................ 6

Pineda v. California

143 S. Ct. 1005 (2023) .................................................................................... 3

Poore v. California

143 S. Ct. 494 (2022) ...................................................................................... 3

Prieto v. California

540 U.S. 1008 (2003) ...................................................................................... 4

Ramirez v. California

143 S. Ct. 1027 (2023) .................................................................................... 3

Rangel v. California

580 U.S. 1057 (2017) ...................................................................................... 4

Rauf v. State

145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016) ........................................................................ 10, 11

Ring v. Arizona

536 U.S. 584 (2002) .............................................................................. 6, 7, 10

Scully v. California

142 S.Ct. 1153 (2022) ..................................................................................... 3

Smith v. California

540 U.S. 1163 (2004) ...................................................................................... 4

Taylor v. California

562 U.S. 1013 (2010) ...................................................................................... 4

Thompson v. California

583 U.S. 878 (2017) ........................................................................................ 4

Tuilaepa v. California

512 U.S. 967 (1994) ........................................................................................ 7

Vargas v. California

141 S. Ct. 1411 (2021) .................................................................................... 4

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page

Wall v. California

586 U.S. 865 (2018) ........................................................................................ 4

Wilson v. California

145 S. Ct. 1086 (2025) .................................................................................... 3

Woldt v. People

64 P.3d 256 (Colo. 2003) .............................................................................. 11

Woodward v. Alabama

134 S. Ct. 405 (2013) .................................................................................... 11

Zant v. Stephens

462 U.S. 862 (1983) ........................................................................................ 8

STATUTES

Delaware Code Title 11

§ 4209(c)(3) ................................................................................................... 10

§ 4209(d)(1) ................................................................................................... 10

California Penal Code

§ 190(a) ........................................................................................................... 4

§§ 190.1-190.9 ................................................................................................. 4

§ 190.2(a) ........................................................................................................ 8

§ 190.2(a)(17) .................................................................................................. 1

§ 190.2(a)(22) .................................................................................................. 1

§ 190.3 ................................................................................................... 5, 6, 11

Florida Statutes

§ 921.141(3) .................................................................................................... 7

§ 921.141(5) .................................................................................................... 7

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

United States Constitution

Fifth Amendment ........................................................................................... 3

Sixth Amendment ...................................................................................... 3, 6

Eighth Amendment ........................................................................................ 3

Fourteenth Amendment ............................................................................ 3, 6

1

STATEMENT

1. On October 10, 2003, petitioner Mao Hin and an associate named

Rattanak Kak approached Alfonso Martinez and Debra Pizano in a park in

Stockton, California. Pet. App. A 30-31. Kak pointed a gun at the couple as

petitioner demanded their money. Id. Martinez and Pizano complied, but

petitioner directed the couple to a darker area of the park. Id. at 31. There,

petitioner and Kak took additional items from the couple, including Pizano’s

watch and pieces of Martinez’s clothing. Id. As petitioner and Kak began to

walk away, petitioner commented on the danger of walking in the park at

night. Id. Petitioner and Kak then began laughing as Kak opened fire. Id.

Pizano was struck in her head and leg, but survived. Id. Martinez was struck

in his back and thigh and died at the scene. Id.

2. At the guilt phase of petitioner’s trial, the jury convicted him of

murder, attempted murder, and robbery for the attack on Martinez and

Pizano. Pet. App. A 28. The jury also convicted him of crimes related to his

involvement in a separate drive-by shooting. Id. And the jury found true,

beyond a reasonable doubt, two special circumstances: that the murder had

been committed during the commission of a robbery and that it had been

committed during the commission of a kidnapping.

Id.

Those special-

circumstance findings qualified petitioner for the death penalty under

California law. Id.; see Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17), (a)(22).

At the penalty phase, the prosecution relied on guilt-phase evidence

relating to the attack on Martinez and Pizano, the drive-by shooting, an

2

additional shooting, and petitioner’s gang involvement. Pet. App. A 38-40. The

prosecution also introduced victim-impact evidence and evidence about

petitioner’s involvement in several additional assaults and shootings. Id.

The defense challenged the credibility of the witnesses who identified

petitioner in the uncharged acts. Pet. App. A 40. The defense also presented

evidence of petitioner’s good character and lack of behavioral issues, and

evidence regarding petitioner’s troubled childhood and alleged cognitive

limitations. Id. at 40-42.

The court instructed that in choosing whether petitioner should be

punished by death or by life imprisonment without parole, jurors were to

“consider, take into account, and be guided by the applicable factors of

aggravating and mitigating circumstances”; that they were “free to assign

whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of

the various factors”; and that to “return a judgment of death, each of you must

be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in

comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead

of life without parole.” 20 RT 5757-5758.1 The jury returned a verdict of death.

Pet. App. A 28.

3.

The California Supreme Court affirmed the murder and robbery

convictions and the death judgment, while vacating certain other convictions

and enhancements not at issue here. Pet. App. A 28-171. As relevant to

1 RT refers to the Reporter’s Transcript; CT refers to the Clerk’s Transcript.

3

petitioner’s current claims, petitioner argued that his death sentence was

invalid because his jury was not required at the penalty phase to find any

aggravating circumstances unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, or to

agree beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors outweighed the

mitigating factors and that death was the appropriate sentence. Id. at 168169. The court rejected that claim, based on its prior decision in People v.

Rangel, 62 Cal. 4th 1192, 1235 (2016), cert. denied, 580 U.S. 1057 (2017). Pet.

App. A 168-169.

ARGUMENT

Petitioner argues that California’s death penalty system violates the

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments because state law does not

require the penalty-phase jury to unanimously find the existence of

aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, or to find beyond a reasonable

doubt that those aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. Pet. 9,

15-17. This Court has repeatedly denied review in cases presenting the same

or similar questions, and there is no reason for a different result here.2

2 See, e.g., Wilson v. California, 145 S. Ct. 1086 (2025) (No. 24-5916); Miranda-

Guerrero v. California, 144 S. Ct. 115 (2023) (No. 22-7373); Ramirez v.

California, 143 S. Ct. 1027 (2023) (No. 22-6445); Pineda v. California, 143 S.

Ct. 1005 (2023) (No. 22-6514); Mataele v. California, 143 S. Ct. 751 (2023) (No.

22-6088); Bracamontes v. California, 143 S. Ct. 739 (2023) (No. 22-6071); Poore

v. California, 143 S. Ct. 494 (2022) (No. 22-5695); Gonzalez v. California, 142

S. Ct. 2719 (2022) (No. 21-7296); Scully v. California, 142 S.Ct. 1153 (2022)

(No. 21-6669); Johnsen v. California, 142 S. Ct. 353 (2021) (No. 21-5012);

(continued…)

4

1. A California death sentence depends on a two-stage process prescribed

by California Penal Code Sections 190.1 through 190.9. At the first stage, the

guilt phase, the jury initially determines whether the defendant committed

first-degree murder. Under California law, that crime carries three potential

penalties: a prison term of 25 years to life with the possibility of parole, a

prison term of life without the possibility of parole, or death. Cal. Penal Code

§ 190(a). The default sentence is a prison term of 25 years to life. The penalties

of death or life without parole may be imposed only if, in addition to finding

Vargas v. California, 141 S. Ct. 1411 (2021) (No. 20-6633); Caro v. California,

140 S. Ct. 2682 (2020) (No. 19-7649); Mitchell v. California, 140 S. Ct. 2535

(2020) (No. 19-7429); Capers v. California, 140 S. Ct. 2532 (2020) (No. 19-7379);

Erskine v. California, 140 S. Ct. 602 (2019) (No. 19-6235); Mendez v. California,

140 S. Ct. 471 (2019) (No. 19-5933); Bell v. California, 140 S. Ct. 294 (2019)

(No. 19-5394); Gomez v. California, 140 S. Ct. 120 (2019) (No. 18-9698); Case

v. California, 586 U.S. 1232 (2019) (No. 18-7457); Penunuri v. California, 586

U.S. 1053 (2018) (No. 18-6262); Henriquez v. California, 586 U.S. 897 (2018)

(No. 18-5375); Wall v. California, 586 U.S. 865 (2018) (No. 17-9525); Brooks v.

California, 583 U.S. 1019 (2017) (No. 17-6237); Becerrada v. California, 583

U.S. 889 (2017) (No. 17-5287); Thompson v. California, 583 U.S. 878 (2017)

(No. 17-5069); Landry v. California, 583 U.S. 834 (2017) (No. 16-9001); Mickel

v. California, 581 U.S. 1019 (2017) (No. 16-7840); Jackson v. California, 581

U.S. 907 (2017) (No. 16-7744); Rangel v. California, 580 U.S. 1057 (2017) (No.

16-5912); Johnson v. California, 577 U.S. 1158 (2016) (No. 15-7509);

Cunningham v. California, 577 U.S. 1123 (2016) (No. 15-7177); Lucas v.

California, 575 U.S. 1041 (2015) (No. 14-9137); Boyce v. California, 574 U.S.

1169 (2015) (No. 14-7581); DeBose v. California, 574 U.S. 1051 (2014) (No. 146617); Blacksher v. California, 565 U.S. 1209 (2012) (No. 11-7741); Taylor v.

California, 562 U.S. 1013 (2010) (No. 10-6299); Bramit v. California, 558 U.S.

1031 (2009) (No. 09- 6735); Morgan v. California, 552 U.S. 1286 (2008) (No. 079024); Cook v. California, 552 U.S. 976 (2007) (No. 07-5690); Huggins v.

California, 549 U.S. 998 (2006) (No. 06-6060); Harrison v. California, 546 U.S.

890 (2005) (No. 05-5232); Smith v. California, 540 U.S. 1163 (2004) (No. 036862); Prieto v. California, 540 U.S. 1008 (2003) (No. 03-6422).

5

the defendant guilty of first-degree murder, the jury also finds true one or more

statutorily enumerated special circumstances. Id. §§ 190.2(a), 190.4. The

jury’s findings on these special circumstances are also made during the guilt

phase of a capital defendant’s trial, and a “true” finding must be unanimous

and beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. § 190.4(a), (b).

During the guilt phase of petitioner’s trial, the jury found him guilty of

the murder of Alfonso Martinez. Pet. App. A 28. The jury also found true the

special circumstances that the murder had been committed during the

commission of a robbery and kidnapping.

Id.

The jury’s findings were

unanimous and made under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. 4 CT

965, 973, 1022, 1085-1086.

The second stage of California’s death penalty trial process, the penalty

phase, proceeds under California Penal Code Section 190.3.

During the

penalty phase, the jury hears evidence that it is allowed to consider “as to any

matter relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence, including but not

limited to” certain specified topics. Cal. Penal Code § 190.3. “In determining

the penalty,” the jury must “take into account any” of a list of specified factors

“if relevant”—including “[t]he circumstances of the crime of which the

defendant was convicted” and “[a]ny . . . circumstance which extenuates the

gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.” Id. The

jury need not agree unanimously on the existence of a particular aggravating

circumstance, nor must it find the existence of such a circumstance beyond a

6

reasonable doubt (with the exception of prior unadjudicated violent criminal

activity and prior felony convictions). See People v. Romero, 62 Cal. 4th 1, 56

(2015); People v. Gonzales, 52 Cal. 4th 254, 328 (2011). If the jury “concludes

that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances,”

then it “shall impose a sentence of death.” Cal. Penal Code § 190.3. If it

“determines that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating

circumstances,” then it “shall impose a sentence of confinement in state prison

for a term of life without the possibility of parole.” Id.

2. Petitioner contends California’s capital sentencing statute is

unconstitutional because it does not require the jury during the penalty phase

to unanimously find the existence of an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable

doubt, or to find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors

beyond a reasonable doubt. Pet. 15-17. But the Constitution does not impose

such requirements. In support of his contentions, petitioner relies (see Pet. 1314, 17) on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rule that “[i]f a State makes

an increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment contingent on the finding

of a fact, that fact—no matter how the State labels it—must be found by a jury

beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002)

(applying rule to Arizona death penalty); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530

U.S. 466, 490 (2000). California law is consistent with this rule because once

a jury finds unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant has

committed first-degree murder with a special circumstance, the maximum

7

penalty prescribed by statute is death. See People v. Prince, 40 Cal. 4th 1179,

1297-1298 (2007); see generally Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971-972

(1994) (“To render a defendant eligible for the death penalty in a homicide case,

we have indicated that the trier of fact must convict the defendant of murder

and find one ‘aggravating circumstance’ (or its equivalent) at either the guilt

or penalty phase.”). Imposing that maximum penalty on a defendant once

these jury determinations have been made unanimously and beyond a

reasonable doubt thus does not violate the Constitution.

In arguing to the contrary, petitioner cites Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92,

94-95, 98, 100 (2016). Pet. 14-20. Under the Florida system considered in

Hurst, after a jury verdict of first-degree murder, a convicted defendant was

not “eligible for death,” 577 U.S. at 99-100, unless the judge further determined

that an enumerated “aggravating circumstance[] exist[ed],” Fla. Stat.

§ 921.141(3). The judge was thus tasked with making the “‘findings upon

which the sentence of death [was] based,’” Hurst, 577 U.S. at 96 (quoting Fla.

Stat. § 921.141(3))—determinations that were essentially questions of fact, see

Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5) (listing aggravating circumstances, such as whether the

crime was committed with a purpose of pecuniary gain). This Court held that

Florida’s system suffered from the same constitutional flaw that Arizona’s had

in Ring: “The maximum punishment” a defendant could receive without judgemade findings “was life in prison without parole,” and the judge “increased”

8

that punishment “based on [the judge’s] own factfinding.” Hurst, 577 U.S. at

99.

In contrast, under California law, a defendant is eligible for a death

sentence once the jury finds true at least one of the special circumstances in

California Penal Code Section 190.2(a). See McKinney v. Arizona, 589 U.S.

139, 144 (2020) (“Under Ring and Hurst, a jury must find the aggravating

circumstance that makes the defendant death eligible.”). That determination,

which the jury must agree on unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, is

part of how California fulfills the “constitutionally necessary function” of

“circumscrib[ing] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.” Zant v.

Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983).

The jury’s subsequent consideration of aggravating and mitigating

factors at the penalty phase fulfills a different function: that of providing an

“individualized determination . . . at the selection stage” of who among the

eligible defendants deserves the death penalty. Zant, 462 U.S. at 879; see

People v. Moon, 37 Cal. 4th 1, 40 (2005) (“The penalty jury’s principal task is

the moral endeavor of deciding whether the death sentence should be imposed

on a defendant who has already been determined to be ‘death eligible’ as a

result of the findings and verdict reached at the guilt phase.”).

Such a

determination involves a choice between a greater or lesser authorized

penalty—not any increase in the maximum potential penalty. See Jones v.

United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999).

9

Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. 108 (2016) effectively forecloses any argument

that determinations concerning the existence of aggravating or mitigating

factors at the penalty selection phase must be made beyond a reasonable doubt.

As Carr reasoned, it is possible to apply a standard of proof to the “eligibility

phase” of a capital sentencing proceeding, “because that is a purely factual

determination.” Id. at 119. In contrast, it is doubtful whether it would even

be “possible to apply a standard of proof to the mitigating-factor determination

(the so-called ‘selection phase’ of a capital-sentencing proceeding),” because

“[w]hether mitigation exists . . . is largely a judgment call (or perhaps a value

call): what one juror might consider mitigating another might not.” Id.; see,

e.g., People v. Brown, 46 Cal. 3d 432, 456 (1988) (California’s sentencing factor

regarding “[t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime” may be either a

mitigating or an aggravating factor in the same case: the defendant may argue

for age-based mitigation, and the prosecutor may argue for aggravation

because the defendant was “old enough to know better”).

This Court further observed that “the ultimate question of whether

mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances is mostly a

question of mercy,” and “[i]t would mean nothing . . . to tell the jury that the

defendants must deserve mercy beyond a reasonable doubt.” Carr, 577 U.S. at

119.

That reasoning leaves no room for petitioner’s argument that the

Constitution requires a capital sentencing jury to determine the relative

weight of the aggravating and mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.

10

3. Petitioner is likewise wrong to assert that this case implicates any

conflict in the lower courts. Pet. 17-20. As petitioner admits, numerous other

courts have joined the California Supreme Court in concluding that the

principles of Apprendi and Ring do not require that a sentencing jury apply

the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard to the weighing of aggravating versus

mitigating circumstances. See Pet. 19-20.

Petitioner cites Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016), as reaching the

opposite conclusion. Pet. 17-18. The fractured opinions in that case collectively

hold that a determination as to the existence and relative weight of

aggravating and mitigating factors in the application of Delaware’s death

penalty must be made unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt. See 145

A.3d at 434 (per curiam); id. at 481-482 (Strine, J., concurring); id. at 487;

(Holland, J., concurring); but see id. at 487 (Valihura, J., dissenting). The

rationale of those opinions is not clear, and they notably failed to cite or discuss

this Court’s reasoning on the issue in Carr. In any event, the most notable

feature of the Delaware law invalidated in Rauf was that the jury’s choice

between a life sentence and death was completely advisory: the judge could

impose a sentence of death even if all jurors recommended against it, as long

as the jury had unanimously found the existence of a single aggravating factor.

See Del. Code tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3), (d)(1); Rauf, 145 A.3d at 457 (Strine, J.,

concurring) (under Delaware law the judge “has the final say in deciding

whether a capital defendant is sentenced to death and need not give any

11

particular weight to the jury’s view”). In contrast, under California law, the

death penalty may be imposed only if the jury has unanimously voted for

death. See Cal Penal Code § 190.3. It is by no means clear from the opinions

in Rauf that that court would have reached the same result if it had considered

California’s quite different statute.3

The Colorado decisions petitioner cites are even further afield. See Pet.

18 (citing Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256 (Colo. 2003), and People v. Montour, 157

P.3d 489 (Colo. 2007)). Woldt considered a statute under which, once the jury

found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder, determinations regarding

eligibility for the death penalty and the selection of that penalty were made by

a three-judge panel. Woldt, 64 P.3d at 265-266. And Montour held that a

capital defendant did not lose his right to have a jury decide his penalty simply

because he had pled guilty to the underlying charge of murder. Montour, 157

P.3d at 498. Neither decision has relevance here: California’s statute specifies

special circumstances that must be found by the jury unanimously and beyond

a reasonable doubt for the defendant to be eligible for a death sentence, then

requires a jury determination of whether that sentence should in fact be

imposed. See supra pp. 4-6.

A similar shortcoming undercuts petitioner’s reliance on the opinion

dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct.

405 (2013). Pet. 18. The statute in Woodward allowed the judge to impose the

death penalty even where the jurors voted against it. See Woodward, 134 S.

Ct. at 406, 410-412 (jury’s decision as to whether the defendant should be

executed was merely an “advisory verdict”).

3