Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Pierre Alexander Amerson, Petitioner v. Leslie Cooley Dismukes, Secretary, North Carolina Department of Adult Correction, et al.

FILED: May 5, 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-6728 (L)

(1:23-cv-00579-TDS-JLW)

PIERRE ALEXANDER AMERSON

Petitioner - Appellant

v.

LESLIE COOLEY DISMUKES, Director; TIMOTHY D. MOOSE, Chief Deputy

Secretary

Respondents - Appellees

No. 24-7214

(1:23-cv-00579-TDS-JLW)

PIERRE ALEXANDER AMERSON

Petitioner - Appellant

v.

LESLIE COOLEY DISMUKES, Director; TIMOTHY D. MOOSE, Chief Deputy

Secretary

Respondents - Appellees

ORDER

The court denies the petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. No judge

requested a poll under Fed, R, App, P. 40 on the petition for rehearing en banc.

Entered at the direction of the panel: Judge King, Judge Berner, and Senior

Judge Traxler.

For the Court

Zs/ Nwamaka Anowi, Clerk

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-6728

PIERRE ALEXANDER AMERSON,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

TODD E. ISHEE, Director; TIMOTHY D. MOOSE, Chief Deputy Secretary,

Respondents - Appellees.

No. 24-7214

PIERRE ALEXANDER AMERSON,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

TODD E. ISHEE, Director; TIMOTHY D. MOOSE, Chief Deputy Secretary,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at

Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, District Judge. (l:23-cv-00579-TDS-JLW)

Submitted: February 10, 2025

Decided: April 3, 2025

Before KING and BERNER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Pierre Alexander Amerson, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

2

PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated cases, Pierre Alexander Amerson, a North Carolina inmate

who is serving a sentence of life without parole, seeks to appeal the district court’s orders

(a) accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on Amerson’s

28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition; and (b) denying Amerson’s “true” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion

for relief from judgment in which Amerson alleged errors in the habeas proceeding. The

orders are not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of

appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); see United States v. McRae, 793 F.3d 392,

399-400 & n.7 (4th Cir. 2015) (concerning the certificate of appealability requirement in

the context of a “true” Rule 60(b) motion). A certificate of appealability will not issue

absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”

28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this

standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists could find the district court’s assessment

of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115-17

(2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must

demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that the petition

states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S.

134, 140-41 (2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)).

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Amerson has not

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and

dismiss the consolidated appeals. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

3

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

PIERRE ALEXANDER AMERSON,

)

)

Petitioner,

)

v.

)

1:23CV579

)

TODD E. ISHEE, et al.,

)

)

Respondents.

)

ORDER

On June 5, 2024, the United States Magistrate Judge's Order

and Recommendation was filed and notice was served on the parties

in accordance with 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b) .

Objections were filed

within the time limits prescribed by section 636.

(Docs. 20, 21.)

The court has reviewed the portions of the Magistrate Judge's

a de

novo

determination in accord with the Magistrate Judge's report.

The

report

to which

objections were made

and has made

court therefore adopts the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation.

While none of Petitioner's objections has merit, one requires

brief discussion.

In his objections, Petitioner continues to press

his claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) .

at

6

(Petition,

transcript

in

which

Doc.

1

Ground Two);

Petitioner's

Doc.

attorney

3

at

6,

advises

(See, e.g.,

30

(trial

court

that

"After the victim was shot, a lady in a silver/grey-colored van

stopped and tried to pick up the victim" and noting that she stayed

until the police came"), 51

(asserting that the lady "disturb[ed

Case l:23-cv-00579-TDS-JLW Document 22 Filed 07/22/24 Page 1 of 3

the] scene of incident before the police showed up"), 65 (same).)

Petitioner now asserts:

"exculpatory evidence claim points to a

gun being taken off the deceased by the lady in silver/grey van.

Access to the State files of the incidents at the family home of

the deceased would prove a matter, fact."

(Doc. 21 at 2.)

The problem with Petitioner's theory, whether raised in the

original

petition or the objections

is

Recommendation,

when

implicated

to the Magistrate

Judge's

that it is entirely speculative.

Brady is

material

withheld.

evidence

is

actually

"[R]ank speculation as to the nature of the allegedly suppressed

materials

.

States v.

Briscoe,

.

.

cannot

establish

101 F.4th 282,

United States v. Young,

a Brady violation."

United

(4th Cir.

(quoting

297

916 F.3d 368,

383

2024)

(4th Cir.

2019);

see

also United States v. Paulino, No. 95-5961, 1996 WL 671346, at *2

(4th

Cir.

Nov.

20,

2006)

(unpublished)

(per

curiam)

("Mere

speculation that Brady material exists does not justify fishing

expeditions in government files."); United States v. Navarro, 737

F.2d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 1984)

("Yet here the defendants have given

no indication of the existence of such material information or

that the government knows of such information which would likely

have changed the verdict or created a reasonable doubt that did

not otherwise exist. . . . Mere speculation that a government file

may contain Brady material is not sufficient to require

reversal for a new trial.").

.

Petitioner's new assertion that a

gun was taken from the victim he shot by a lady in a van is utter

speculation.

Moreover, Petitioner never claimed that he shot the

victim in self-defense.

So, even if there were evidence that the

victim had a gun on him (which there is not), Petitioner has not

tied any alleged Brady violation to any claim for relief.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Respondent's motion for summary

judgment

(Doc.

11)

is

GRANTED,

that

the

Petition

(Doc.

1)

DENIED, and that Judgment be entered dismissing the action.

/s/

Thomas D. Schroeder

United States District Judge

July 22, 2024

Case l:23-cv-00579-TDS-JLW Document 22 Filed 07/22/24 Page 3 of 3

is

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

PIERRE ALEXANDER AMERSON, )

)

)

Petitioner,

)

v.

)

)

TODD E. ISHEE, et al.,

)

1:23CV579

)

)

Respondent.

)

ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Petitioner, Pierre Alexander Amerson, a prisoner of the State of North Carolina, seeks

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Docket Entries 1 and 3.) Respondent

filed an answer (Docket Entry 10), a motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry 11), and a

supporting brief (Docket Entry 12). Petitioner then filed a response (Docket Entry 14) to the

motion for summary judgment and a brief (Docket Entry 15). Petitioner has also filed a

motion for the appointment of counsel. (Docket Entry 8.) This matter is ready for a ruling.

Procedural Background

In 2019, in Lee County Superior Court, Petitioner was convicted, after a jury trial, of

first-degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. (Docket Entry

12, Exs. 1-2.) The North Carolina Court of Appeals found no prejudicial error. See State v.

Amerson, 280 N.C. App. 129 (2021). The North Carolina Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s

petition for discretionary review. State v. Amerson, 871 S.E.2d 522 (N.C. 2022).

On September 6,2022, Petitioner filed a motion for appropriate relief (“MAR”) in Lee

County Superior Court. (Docket Entry 12, Ex. 8.) The trial court denied the MAR on October

10,2022. (Id, Ex. 9.) On October 17,2022, Petitioner filed an “Attachment” to his MAR. (Id,

Ex. 10.) The trial court denied it on October 25, 2022. (Docket Entry 3 at 41.) Petitioner

sought review of the October 10, 202,2 order denying his MAR by filing a petition for a writ

of certiorari in the North Carolina Court of Appeals (Id., Ex. 11), which the Court of Appeals

denied (Docket Entry 3 at 42). Petitioner next filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the

North Carolina Supreme Court, again seeking review of the October 10, 2022, order denying

his MAR (Docket Entry 12, Ex. 12), which the state supreme court dismissed (Docket Entry

3 at 40). Petitioner then filed the instant petition on July 13,2023. (Docket Entry 1.) On August

2, 2023, Petitioner filed a “memorandum of law in support.” (Docket Entry 3.)

Factual Background

The North Carolina Court of Appeals set forth the following factual background in

evaluating Petitioner’s appeal:

On the evening of 10 March 2014, Defendant was sitting on Ciola

Tysor’s porch in Sanford, North Carolina, with Manquell Tysor.

Kentreal Quick joined them on the porch for approximately 15

minutes, and then Mr. Quick and Defendant walked down the

street to meet Dante Berryman. As they stood on the street, 15year-old Thomas Dolby, Jr., walked by them; Defendant later

described Mr. Dolby as “walking tough, like musclebound stiff,

like, mean walking.” Defendant “made a joke” to Mr. Quick,

saying, “That kid could beat you up.” Mr. Quick and Mr.

Berryman then left the area.

Mr. Dolby passed Defendant again while walking back, and he

bumped into Defendant. Defendant said something like, “Oh,

f***,” or “F*** you.” Mr. Dolby turned back to face Defendant

and said, “That’s your problem. You talk too much.” Defendant

then pulled a gun from his right side and shot Mr. Dolby three

times. Defendant immediately fled the scene.

An ambulance transported Mr. Dolby to Central Carolina

Hospital; he was later transported by helicopter to the University

of North Carolina Hospital, where he died. An autopsy

subsequently revealed that Mr. Dolby sustained three gunshot

wounds: one to the inside of his right heel, one to his left upper

arm, and a fatal wound to the face.

On 13 March 2014, an arrest warrant for murder was issued for

Defendant, and law enforcement officers arrested him the same

day. On 31 March 2014, a Lee County grand jury returned an

indictment formally charging Defendant with first-degree

murder. On 8 May 2014, the State gave notice of its intent to

proceed capitally.

The matter came on for trial on 3 September 2019 in Lee County

Superior Court before the Honorable Charles W. Gilchrist. In his

opening statement, defense counsel admitted that Defendant

shot and killed Mr. Dolby, but he challenged the State’s assertion

that Defendant had acted with premeditation and deliberation.

Counsel argued that Defendant suffers from post-traumatic

stress disorder (“PTSD”), and that his mental condition caused

him to be hypervigilant and react disproportionately to Mr.

Dolby’s statements to him on the street.

In support of this theory, Defendant presented the testimony of

Dr. George Corvin, M.D., an expert in general and forensic

psychiatry, and Dr. Jennifer Sapia, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist,

both of whom conducted psychological assessments of

Defendant and diagnosed him with PTSD. At trial, Dr. Sapia

recounted Defendant’s “extensive history of adverse childhood

experiences, including abuse, trauma, neglect, exposure to

domestic violence, exposure to parental substance abuse, and

incarceration.” The defense experts’ testimony revealed that

Defendant was first diagnosed with PTSD at age 8, when he was

involuntarily committed to John Umstead Hospital after

experiencing hallucinations and expressing suicidal ideations.

After his first hospitalization and throughout his childhood,

Defendant was repeatedly returned to his “dysfunctional, abusive

home environment.” Dr. Sapia testified that due to Defendant’s

traumatic childhood experiences and home environment, he

regularly suffers from a number of PTSD symptoms, including

nightmares, hypervigilance, depression, and paranoia. Dr. Corvin

testified that Defendant “continues to experience the

psychological aftermath of being raised in a way that most of us

can[ ] hardly imagine.”

Dr. Sapia further testified that when Defendant encountered Mr.

Dolby on the night of 10 March 2014, he “reacted to his

perception of an imminent threat to his well-being and that his

judgment, his thinking, his decision-making abilities were all

impaired by the PTSD, and that fear in essence took over.” Dr.

Sapia explained:

PTSD can be highly reactive. In a stressful situation, in a

situation where [Defendant] has sensed fear and danger

historically, he has been very anxious and very reactive,

very impulsive. Prone to react or respond when he is

anxious. And so my opinion is that his perception of the

situation was impacted by his PTSD, and the stress and the

fear and the emotion took over, which impaired his ability

to consider the situation, to reflect upon it, consider his

courses of action. That his response and his action was

reflective, not thoughtful. He reacted to his perception of

an imminent threat to his well-being. So again, it was a

reflexive, reactive action vs. something that was thoughtful

and considered.

Dr. Corvin testified to a similar psychiatric opinion:

[G]iven the evidence that I have looked at from a

psychiatric standpoint, ... up until the moment that the

victim bumped into him, [Defendant] was sort of in his

usual state of mind.... However, given his trauma history

at the moment,... it’s this sudden reflexive, impulsive act

based on a post-traumatic induced misinterpretation or

overinterpretation of what was probably a nothing event in

the lives of both of these individuals, but he misinterpreted

it as dangerous with tragic consequences.

In rebuttal, the State presented the testimony of Dr. Thomas

Owens, M.D., an expert in forensic psychiatry employed by

Central Regional Hospital who evaluated Defendant in an

inpatient psychiatric unit in May and June of 2019. Dr. Owens

prepared a .written report of his findings based on his evaluation

of Defendant, and prior to his testimony, the parties agreed to

redact certain portions of the report that were unfairly prejudicial

to Defendant.

During trial, the State sought to enter Dr. Owens’s redacted

report into evidence:

Q Okay. And I’m going to show you what I have marked

State’s Exhibit number 90. If you could look through that.

Let me know when you have had a chance to do that.

A Yeah, there is some modifications, but this is a copy of

the report I prepared for the court.

Q And State’s Exhibit number 90, is that a fair and accurate

version of your report as it exists here in court? Is that a

copy of your report?

A It’s a copy ofmy report. There is some information that was taken

out that I understand could have been prejudicial.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: Sustained. Motion to strike is allowed.

Ladies and gentlemen, you will disregard the last statement

of the witness.

(Emphasis added).

Defense counsel then asked to be heard outside the presence of

the jury and moved for a mistrial:

Your Honor, we’re going to ask for a mistrial. I think the

jury’s going to be given a copy of this report. It’s already

been marked as an exhibit. There are obviously lots of gaps

in that report, lots of spaces. Now the jury knows that the

reason that information was taken out is because it’s

prejudicial towards the defendant. . . . This is something

that I would think that an experienced witness who has

testified over 200 times would know better than to say, but

to look at the jury and say, I took out prejudicial

information against the defendant, I don’t see how you

correct that.

The trial court heard the arguments of the parties and denied

Defendant’s motion for a mistrial.

Defense counsel then moved, as an alternative remedy, that the

report not be admitted into evidence. The trial court agreed to

exclude the report:

THE COURT: All right. Defense motion is allowed.

Report’s excluded... due to the potential prejudicial effect.

All right. I think that in light of the court’s motion to strike,

limiting instruction, and excluding the written report, that

that’s a more than sufficient remedy for any prejudice that

may have occurred. Just to make that clear for the record.

I’m not saying [the State] can’t ask [Dr. Owens] what his

opinions are. I’m not saying you can’t ask him what the

basis of them is. You just can’t put the report into evidence.

And he can refer to the report, and defense can ask him

about stuff that’s in the report, but the report itself is not

coming into evidence. And just to be clear, the reason for

that is the excisions that have been made from the report

in relation to what’s happened in court, that’s the problem.

So in light of that, out of abundance of caution, I’ve

allowed the defendant’s motion.

During his testimony, Dr. Owens opined that “in spite of . . .

[Defendant]’s long history of trauma,” he was not suffering from

PTSD in March of 2014. He further testified that he “saw no

evidence that [Defendant] lacked the [ability to e]ngage in

deliberative contemplation.”

On 11 October 2019, the jury returned its verdict finding

Defendant guilty of first-degree murder. The matter then

proceeded to the sentencing phase, and on 16 October 2019, the

jury returned its recommendation of life imprisonment without

parole. The trial court entered judgment upon the jury’s verdict

and sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without the

possibility of parole, served in the custody of the North Carolina

Division of Adult Correction. Defendant gave notice of appeal

in open court.

Amerson, 280 N.C. App. at 129.

Petitioner’s Grounds

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel

because (1) one of his two appointed trial attorneys changed repeatedly before trial, (2) his

attorneys failed to adequately review discovery, and (3) his attorney during opening statement

conceded his guilt without consent. (Docket Entry 1, Ground One.)

In Ground Two, titled “Prosecutorial Misconduct,” Petitioner claims the prosecutor

violated his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by (1) using prior convictions

from an “invalid plea” as an aggravating circumstance in seeking the death penalty, citing

N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(3); (2) eliciting “excluded prejudicial] information to the jury after

there was [a] mistrial concerning the same issue,” citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);

and (3) withholding exculpatory evidence “of [a] lady in silver/grey colored van who disturb [ed

the] scene of [the] incident before the police showed up,” citing Brady v. Maiyland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963). (Docket Entry 1, Ground Two; Docket Entry 3 at 4-7.)

In Ground Three, titled “Abuse of Discretion,” Petitioner contends the trial court

violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by (1) allowing the

prosecutor to use prior convictions from “an invalid plea” in seeking the death penalty, citing

Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447 (2005); (2) allowing the prosecutor to impeach its own expert witness

and present “excluded information,” citing Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997); and

(3) not giving an instruction on self-defense, to which Petitioner claims he was entitled, citing

Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). (Docket Entry 1, Ground Three; Docket Entry 3 at 7.)

In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

when his appellate counsel did not raise prosecutorial misconduct claims on appeal. (Docket

Entry 1, Ground Four.) As explained in greater detail below, none of these grounds or sub­

grounds warrants any relief.

Standard of Review

As a preliminary matter, to receive habeas relief, a petitioner must first exhaust his state

court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). This is

[b] ecause the exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the state

courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional

claims before those claims are presented to the federal courts .. .

state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to

resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round

of the State’s established appellate review process.

O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).1 In a two-tiered appellate system like North

Carolina’s, “one complete round” includes not only direct appeal to the state’s intermediate

appellate court, but also the opportunity to petition for discretionary review in the North

1 To satisfy exhaustion, a petitioner must have “fairly presented]” the substance of his

claims to each appropriate state court. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27,29 (2004). The claim must

have been presented as a federal-law violation, not merely a state-law violation. Duncan v. Henry,

513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995). Additionally, a petitioner must have explained how the alleged

events establish a violation of his constitutional rights. Mallory v. Smith, 27 F.3d 991, 994-95

(4th Cir. 1994).

Carolina Supreme Court. See id. Claims not raised in a petition to the state’s highest court are

non-exhausted and therefore generally procedurally barred from federal habeas review. Id. at

848. Moreover, failure to exhaust state law remedies will result in the claims being procedurally

barred from federal review if, upon return to the state courts, those courts would find that the

claims are procedurally barred. Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615,619 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Coleman

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.l (1991)). North Carolina General Statute § 15A-1419

imposes such a mandatory procedural bar for claims that could have been presented on appeal

or in a prior motion for appropriate relief. Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001);

N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419 2

Additionally, absent cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice, a federal habeas

court may not review constitutional claims when a state court has declined to consider their

merits on the basis of an adequate and independent state procedural rule. See Harris v. Reed,

489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989). A procedural rule is adequate if the state court regularly applies it,

2 One may overcome a procedural default by showing cause and prejudice arising from

the asserted constitutional error. McCarver v. Lee, 221 F.3d 583, 591-92 (4th Cir. 2000). To

show “cause,” a petitioner may make “a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was

not reasonably available to counsel.” Id. at 591 (citation omitted). To establish “prejudice,” a

petitioner must show “not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice,

but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with

error of constitutional dimensions.” Id. at 592 (citation omitted). One may also overcome

procedural default by demonstrating that the court’s failure to consider the claim will result in

a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Hedrick v. True, 443 F.3d 342,359 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation

omitted). This exception applies only to cases involving extraordinary instances “where a

constitutional violation has ‘probably resulted’ in the conviction of one who is ‘actually

innocent’ of the substantive offense.” Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393 (2004) (citing Murray

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,496 (1986)).

Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988), and is independent if it does not depend on a

federal constitutional determination, A.ke v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985).

Where it is clear that “claims presented to the state court were subject to summary

denial on procedural grounds under state law,” this factor supports the conclusion that the

denial “fairly appears” to rest on an adequate and independent state ground.

Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 740 (1991); Wilson v. Moore, 178 F.3d 266, 276 (4th Cir. 1999).3 When

claims or sub-claims set forth below are said to be subject to procedural default, the Court has

applied the standard set forth above.

Additionally, where a state trial court adjudicated a petitioner’s claims on their merits,

this Court must apply 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)’s highly deferential standard of review to such

claims. That statute precludes habeas relief in cases where a state court has considered a claim

on its merits unless the decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law as set out by the United States Supreme Court or the state court

decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. A state court decision is

“contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if it either arrives at “a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law” or “confronts facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite”

to that of the Supreme Court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A state decision

3 Again, the procedurally defaulted claim may only then be raised in a federal habeas

petition if the petitioner can first demonstrate cause and actual prejudice or that he is actually

innocent of the challenged conviction. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998); Trevino

v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911,1917 (2013) (“[One] may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim

by showing cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of federal law.”) (quoting

Martine^v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309,1316 (2012)).

“involves an unreasonable application” of Supreme Court law “if the state court identifies the

correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to

the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407. “Unreasonable” does not mean

just “incorrect” or “erroneous” and the Court must judge the reasonableness from an

objective standpoint. Id. at 409-11. State court factual findings are presumptively correct

unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). When claims or sub­

claims set forth below are addressed on the merits, the Court has applied the standard set forth

above.

Discussion

Ground One

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges he received ineffective assistance of counsel because

(1) one of his two appointed trial attorneys changed repeatedly before trial, (2) his attorneys

failed to adequately review discovery, and (3) his attorney during opening statement conceded

his guilt without consent. (Docket Entry 1, Ground One.) As explained in greater detail below,

none of these sub-grounds has merit.

To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must establish, first, that his

attorney’s performance fell below a reasonable standard for defense attorneys and, second,

that he was prejudiced by this performance. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 691 -

92 (1984). A petitioner bears the burden of affirmatively showing deficient performance. See

Spencer v. Murray, 18 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 1994). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must

show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Petitioner’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because one of his

two trial counsels repeatedly changed over five years is meritless and should be summarily

denied. Under North Carolina law, an indigent defendant in a capital case has a statutory right

to a second appointed counsel. See N.C.G.S. § 7A-450(bl); accord State v. Locklear, 322 N.C.

349, 357 (1988) (“An indigent defendant’s right to the appointment of additional counsel in

capital cases is statutory, not constitutional.”). Petitioner second counsel (Emilia Beskind)

remained the same since she had been appointed around five years before trial began and

Petitioner’s first counsel in the end (Stephen Freedman) had roughly a year and a half to

prepare for the jury trial. (Docket Entry 3 at 14,16; Docket Entry 12, Ex. 14.) Neither element

of Strickland is met here.

Petitioner’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel

admitted his guilt without his consent is also meritless and should be summarily denied. During

a pretrial hearing around one month before trial began, Petitioner’s counsel discussed in open

court their strategy to admit not that Petitioner was guilty of any criminal offense, but to admit

that Petitioner had in fact shot the victim. During a pretrial hearing around one month before

trial began, Petitioner in open court acknowledged the defense strategy to admit that Petitioner

had shot the victim. (Docket Entry 12, Ex. 13.)

The trial court engaged in a colloquy with Petitioner, who stated in open court that he

understood and approved the strategy. (W. at 72-74.) When the trial court confirmed, “do you

still want your attorneys to use this strategy and to admit that you shot Mr. Dolby,” Petitioner

replied, “Yes, I do.” (W., Ex. 13 at 73.) Consistent with this strategy, Petitioner’s counsel during

opening statement told the jury “[Petitioner] shot Mr. Dolby” and was “responsible for his

death.” (Id., Ex. 14 at 2250.) But counsel, argued, “[Petitioner] is not guilty of first-degree

premeditated murder.” (Id.) Counsel said the defense will “ask you to hold [Petitioner]

responsible for what he did” and “ask you to find that he is not guilty of first-degree

premeditated murder.” (Id. at 2250.) Given the record establishing that Petitioner knew and

approved this defense strategy, and that counsel admitted he fatally shot the victim but never

that he was guilty of any charged offense, Petitioner fails to meet his burden here.

T .ast, Petitioner’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his

attorneys failed to adequately review discovery likewise should be summarily denied. Petitioner

cites the transcript from the pretrial motions hearings on August 1, 2019. As the transcript

indicates, defense counsel had just a few days previously received hundreds of pages of

discovery, including victim-impact evidence that would not be relevant until the capital

sentencing proceeding. (Id, Ex. 17 at 31-32,41-42.) Nevertheless, Petitioner’s trial began about

one month later. (Docket Entry 12, Ex. 3 at 2 (“The capital trial began on 3 September 2019

in Lee County Superior Court before the Honorable C. Winston Gilchrist.”).) There is no

reason to believe that this was inadequate time to review the discovery, that counsel failed to

adequately review discovery, or that (even assuming for the sake of argument that counsel

failed to adequately review discovery) Petitioner was somehow prejudiced as a result.

Ground Two

Next, in Ground Two, titled “Prosecutorial Misconduct,” Petitioner claims the

prosecutor violated his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by (1) using prior

convictions from an “invalid plea” as an aggravating circumstance in seeking the death penalty,

citing N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(3); (2) eliciting “excluded prejudic[al] information to the jury

after there was [a] mistrial concerning the same issue,” citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

(1966); and (3) withholding exculpatory evidence “o£ [a] lady in [a] silver/grey colored van

who disturb [ed the] scene of [the] incident before the police showed up,” citing Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). (Docket Entry 1, Ground Two; Docket Entry 3 at 4-7.) As

explained in greater detail below, none of these sub-claims warrants any relief.

1. Improper-Aggravating-Circumstance Claim

Petitioner first claims the prosecutor violated his rights by using prior convictions from

an “invalid plea” as an aggravating circumstance in seeking the death penalty, citing N.C.G.S.

§ 15A-2000(e)(3). Petitioner’s improper-aggravating-circumstance claim should be dismissed

for failure to state a cognizable claim for federal habeas relief. Petitioner does not challenge

his murder conviction in this claim, and he was not sentenced to death. Therefore, success on

this claim would not impact the fact or duration of his sentence to life imprisonment.

More specifically, in North Carolina, an adult convicted of first-degree murder “shall

be punished with death or... for life without parole[.]” N.C.G.S. § 14-17(a). “The State, in its

discretion, may elect to try a defendant capitally or noncapitally for first degree murder[.]”

N.C.G.S. § 15A-2004(a). At a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury is tasked with making

findings on submitted statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances, balancing those

circumstances, and recommending one of two mutually exclusive sentencing options: death

or life imprisonment. See generally N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000 (explaining North Carolina’s capital

sentencing procedure). Because of North Carolina’s capital sentencing scheme, statutory

aggravating circumstances are relevant only if the death penalty was imposed.

Here, Petitioner was tried capitally for first-degree murder and convicted. At his capital

sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor submitted as aggravating circumstances the facts that

Petitioner had prior convictions of violence against persons (i.e. armed robbery and assault

with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury). A^N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(3). The capital jury

found the existence of these aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, as well as

several mitigating circumstances, and found the death penalty was unwarranted. It ultimately

recommended a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, and Petitioner is in custody

based on a state judgment sentencing him to life. (Docket Entry 12, Exs. 1-2.)

The improper-aggravating-circumstance claim in Ground Two (and as explained below

as well, in Ground Three) should be dismissed. It does not challenge his murder conviction,

and Petitioner is not “in custody” based on a state judgment sentencing him to death. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Therefore, success on the claim would not necessarily spell speedier release,

the commutation of his sentence, or even imply that his life sentence may be invalid. As a

result, any alleged procedural or substantive error concerning using particular prior

convictions to support aggravating circumstances for his capital sentencing proceeding does

not raise any cognizable claim for federal habeas relief. Petitioner’s claim, having no bearing

on the fact of his murder conviction or duration of his life sentence, should be dismissed as

not cognizable in this § 2254 petition.

2. Evidentiary Claim

Petitioner next asserts that the prosecutor violated his rights by eliciting “excluded

prejudicial] information to the jury after there was [a] mistrial concerning the same issue,”

citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). This argument also lacks merit.

“[W]hen a petitioner’s claim rests solely upon an interpretation of state case law and

statutes, it is not cognizable on federal habeas review.” Torrence v. Lends, 60 F.4th 209,213 (4th

Cir. 2023) (citation omitted)). Generally, challenges to the admission of evidence in a state

criminal trial are not cognizable absent a violation of a specific federal constitutional provision

or error so serious it renders the entire trial fundamentally unfair, thereby violating the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,67-68 (1991);

accord Howard v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399, 415 n.18 (4th Cir. 1997) (“State court trial rulings

regarding the admission and exclusion of evidence are cognizable in federal habeas corpus

review only to the extent that they violate specific constitutional provisions or are so egregious

as to render the entire trial fundamentally unfair, thereby violating the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. ”) abrogated on other grounds by Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231

(2005); see also Richardson v. Kornegay, 3 F.4th 687, 696 (4th Cir. 2021) (“We do not generally

review state-court determinations of state-law questions, like the admissibility of evidence.”);

Barbe v. McBride, 521 F.3d 443,452 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e do not sit to review the admissibility

of evidence under state law unless erroneous evidentiary rulings were so extreme as to result

in a denial of a constitutionally fair proceeding.”). Whether evidence was properly admitted

under state law is “no part of a federal court’s habeas review of a state conviction.” McGuire,

502 U.S. at 67; see also Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465,490 (2023) (explaining that “a state prisoner

could never bring a pure statutory-error claim in federal habeas, because “federal habeas

corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.”) (citations omitted).

Here, under North Carolina law, the North Carolina Rules of Evidence govern the

admissibility of evidence in a state criminal trial, including the impeachment of witnesses and

admission of expert witness testimony. See, e.g., N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 607, 702. Petitioner’s

evidentiary claim in Ground Two challenges the admission of testimony by the State’s expert

rebuttal witness, Dr. Owens. (Docket Entry 1 Ground Two; Docket Entry 3 at 6.) Specifically,

he challenges the prosecutor’s elicitation of certain “excluded prejudice [sic] information to

the jury after there was a mistrial concerning the same use,” and the trial court’s alleged

improper allowance of the prosecutor to impeach Dr. Owens’ expert opinion. (Docket Entry

12, Ex. 15 at 3199; Id., Ex. 16 at 3309-11.)

These evidentiary claims are not cognizable.4 Insofar as Petitioner is challenging the

admissibility of expert opinion testimony, its admission, like the impeachment of witnesses, is

governed by state evidence law and does not involve any federal constitutional issues. See

McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67-68; see also N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rules 607, 702. Petitioner does not claim

the admission of Dr. Owens’ expert opinion testimony violated his Fourteenth Amendment

due process rights, but that it violated his Fifth Amendment rights, citing Miranda. Petitioner

identifies no rule prohibiting a party from impeaching its own witness. See N.C.G.S. § 8C-1,

Rule 607 (allowing such impeachment); Fed. R. Evid. 607 (same). And, in any event, Petitioner

misreads the transcript: Dr. Owens’ expert opinion in his report was that “there was no evidence

that [Petitioner] lacked the capacity to contemplate his situation at the time” of the shooting.

(Docket Entry 12, Ex. 15 at 3199) (emphasis added). Consistently, the prosecutor during

rebuttal elicited Dr. Owens’ testimony that, in his expert opinion, he saw no evidence that

Petitioner at the time of the shooting lacked the ability to “[e]ngage in deliberative

4 Petitioner’s bare citation to the Fifth Amendment and Miranda are misplaced, as the

cited transcript pages refer to statements Petitioner voluntarily made to Dr. Owens. (Docket

Entry 12, Ex. 15 at 3199; Id., Ex. 16 at 3309, 3314-15.)

contemplation.” (Docket Entry 12, Ex. 16 at 3255.) The evidentiary claims should be

dismissed as not presenting any federal law claim cognizable on federal habeas review.

Beyond this, the State makes a persuasive argument that this sub-ground has been

procedurally defaulted, because Petitioner never raised the matter on direct appeal at all, or in

his MAR or amended MAR in adequate federal terms, and if he were to return to state court

now to try to do so, the matter would be procedurally defaulted. (Docket Entry 12 at 14-15.)

Finally, even if this sub-ground is viewed as a cognizable habeas claim that has been properly

exhausted in state court (which it is not), Petitioner has not attempted to demonstrate, much

less shown, how the state court’s rejection of his evidentiary claims would have been an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See, eg., Harrington v. Richter, 562

U.S. 86, 102-03 (2011) (explaining deferential standard of federal habeas review of merits

adjudications by state courts). For all these reasons, this sub-ground lacks merit.

3. Brady

Petitioner’s last sub-ground in Ground Two asserts that the State improperly withheld

exculpatory evidence “of [a] lady in [a] silver/grey colored van who disturb [ed the] scene of

[the] incident before the police showed up,” citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). This

sub-ground also lacks merit.

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), and its progeny, the failure by the

prosecution to disclose “evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process

where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith

or bad faith of the prosecution.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432 (1995) (citation omitted);

see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,154-55 (1972). As such, a Brady violation occurs if

evidence is (1) favorable to the accused (either exculpatory or impeaching), (2) suppressed by

the prosecution (willfully or inadvertently), and (3) material (prejudicial). Banks v. Dretke, 540

U.S. 668, 691 (2004); see also Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 299-300 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation

omitted).

Petitioner cannot establish a Brad): violation. First, he fails to identify any particular

evidence the prosecution allegedly withheld. Second, he fails to allege, much less show, how

such unidentified evidence would have been favorable, that it had been suppressed by the

State, or that it was material to his defense. Given that the defense strategy was to admit that

Petitioner fatally shot the victim but assert his mental disability rendered him unable to act

with premeditation and deliberation required for first-degree murder, Petitioner fails to explain

in any non-conclusory manner how evidence about a lady in a silver van disturbing the crime

scene could have had any impact on the jury’s verdict. He fails to satisfy his burden for the

Brady sub-claim.

Ground Three

In Ground Three, titled “Abuse of Discretion,” Petitioner contends the trial court

violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by (1) allowing the

prosecutor to use prior convictions from “an invalid plea” in seeking the death penalty, citing

Bellv. Cone, 543 U.S. 447 (2005); (2) allowing the prosecutor to impeach its own expert witness

and present “excluded information,” citing Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997); and

(3) not giving an instruction on self-defense, to which Petitioner claims he was entided, citing

Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). (Docket Entry 1, Ground Three; Docket Entry 3 at 7.)

The first two sub-grounds overlap with sub-grounds set forth above and found to

warrant no relief. Consequently, they fail for reasons already set forth above. More specifically,

Petitioner’s improper-aggravating-circumstance claim fails because, as explained in greater

detail above, Petitioner does not challenge his murder conviction in this claim, and he was not

sentenced to death. Therefore, success on this claim would not impact the fact or duration of

his sentence to life imprisonment. This sub-ground is therefore non-cognizable. Second,

Petitioner’s evidentiary claim that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to impeach

its own expert witness (again, Dr. Owen) and present “excluded information” fails because it

is non-cognizable as it relates solely to an interpretation of state law, is subject to procedural

default, and is substantively without merit.

Third, Petitioner’s instructional claim that the trial court violated his rights by not

giving a self-defense instruction requires an interpretation of state law defining the offense of

first-degree murder and self-defense as it developed in North Carolina. Instructional claims

generally are not cognizable on federal habeas review unless they violate a defendant’s

Fourteenth Amendment due process right to hold the State to its burden to proving each

essential element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456

U.S. 107, 119-21, n.21 (1982) (explaining that the prosecution’s constitutional duty to negate

affirmative defenses may depend on the manner in which the State defines the charged crime);

Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 235 (1987) (observing that it is a matter of state law whether the

prosecution must prove the absence of self-defense when it is properly raised by the

defendant). Petitioner does not make such a claim here, much less a persuasive one. This sub­

ground should therefore be dismissed as not cognizable, presenting no valid federal-law claim.

Petitioner’s allegation regarding the trial court’s failure to charge self-defense is a state court

error, which this Court cannot review. See Lee v. Warden Perry Corr. Inst., C/A No. 8:18-cv-

01921-HMH-JDA, 2019 WL 920882, at *9 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2019) (“Petitioner’s allegation

regarding the trial court’s failure to charge self defense is a state court error, which this Court

cannot review.”).

Beyond this, the State makes a persuasive argument that this sub-ground has been

procedurally defaulted, because Petitioner never raised the matter on direct appeal at all, or in

his MAR or amended MAR in adequate federal terms, and if he were to return to state court

now to try to do so, the matter would be procedurally defaulted. (Docket Entry 12 at 16-17.)

Finally, even assuming the state court viewed this as a federal law claim and adjudicated it on

the merits, Petitioner has not alleged, much less shown, how the state court’s rejection of his

instructional claim would have been an unreasonable application of clearly established federal

law. For all these reasons, this sub-ground lacks merit.

Ground Four

In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

when his appellate counsel did not raise prosecutorial misconduct claims on appeal. (Docket

Entry 1, Ground Four.) Petitioner procedurally defaulted his appellate ineffective assistance

of counsel claim. Petitioner did not raise any such claim to any appropriate state court. Further,

he cannot now raise this appellate ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a subsequent MAR.

As a result, Ground Four is procedurally defaulted, precluding habeas review.5 Beyond this,

5 Petitioner has not made a showing sufficient to overcome procedural default as to

this or any of his other procedurally defaulted sub-grounds.

appellate counsel had no obligation to raise Petitioner’s meritless prosecutorial conduct

allegations on appeal. For the reasons set forth above, the Petition should be denied.

Motion for the Appointment of Counsel

Petitioner also requests the appointment of counsel. (Docket Entry 8.) There is no

constitutional right to appointed counsel to mount a collateral challenge. See Pennsylvania v.

Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); United States v. Williamson, 706 F.3d 405, 416 (4th Cir. 2013);

FLunt v. Nuth, 57 F.3d 1327,1340 (4th Cir. 1995). Although there are certain circumstances in

which the Court can appoint counsel in post-conviction matters, Petitioner has failed to show

that good cause or the interests of justice warrant the appointment of counsel.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner’s grounds and sub-grounds warrant no

relief. Neither discovery, nor a hearing, nor the appointment of counsel are warranted here.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for the appointment of

counsel (Docket Entry 8) is DENIED.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Respondent’s motion for summary

judgment (Docket Entry 11) be GRANTED, that the Petition (Docket Entry 1) be

DENIED, and that Judgment be entered dismissing this action.

_____ /s/ Joe L. Webster_______

United States Magistrate Judge

June 5, 2024

Durham, North Carolina

Bupreme Court of M^ortlj Carolina

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

V

PIERRE ALEXANDER AMERSON

From N.C. Court of Appeals

( 20-836 )

From Lee

( 14CRS50705 )

O_S.DE R

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Defendant on the 24th of February 2023 in this matter for a writ of

certioran to review the order of the Superior Court, Lee County, the following order was entered and is hereby

certified to the Superior Court of that County:

"Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 4th of April 2023."

s/ Allen, J,

For the Court

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 24th of February 2023 by Defendant to

Appoint Counsel:

1

"Motion Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 4th of April 2023."

s/Allen, J.

For the Court

WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, this the 10th day of April 2023.

?O|

to I

Grant E. Buckner

Clerk, Supreme Court of North Carolina

M. C. HackneyL-*---Assistant Cleiy, Supreme Court Of North Carolina

——————-——

Case l:23-cv-00579-TDS-JLW Document 3 Filed 08/02/23 Page 40 of 73

No. 45PA18-2

ELEVEN-A DISTRICT

■!

Supreme Court of iBortlj Carolina

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

V

PIERRE ALEXANDER AMERSON

From N.C. Court of Appeals

( 20-836)

From Lee

(14CRS50705 )

O-BJDER

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 19th of November 2021 by Defendant in this matter for

discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following

order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 4th of May 2022."

s/ Berger, J.

For the Court

WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, this the 9th day of May 2022.

aw

Grant E. Buckner

Supj e Court of North Carolina

mA

.... C. Hackne

Assistant Cl

Supreme Court Of North Carolina

Copy to:

North Carolina Court of Appeals

Mr. Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant Attorney General, For State of N.C. - (By Email)

Mr. Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, For Amerson, Pierre Alexander - (By Email)

Ms. Katy Dickinson-Schultz, Assistant Appellate Defender, For Amerson, Pierre Alexander - (By Email)

Hon. Suzanne Matthews, District Attorney

Hon. Susie K. Thomas, Clerk

West Publishing - (By Email)

Lexis-Nexis - (By Email)

Case l:23-cv-00579-TDS-JLW ‘'Document 3

Filed 08/02/23

Page 43 of 73

■

Copy to:

North .Carolina Court of Appeals

Mr. Daniel P. O'Brien, Special Deputy Attorney General, For State of N.C. - (By Email)

Mr. Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, For Amerson, Pierre Alexander - (By Email)

Ms. Katy Dickinson-Schultz, Assistant Appellate Defender, For Amerson, Pierre Alexander - (By Email)

Mr. Pierre Alexander Amerson, For Amerson, Pierre Alexander

The Honorable District Attorney

The Honorable Clerk of Superior Court, Lee County

West Publishing - (By Email)

Lexis-Nexis - (By Email)

Case l:23-cv-00579-TDS-JLW Document 3 Filed 08/02/23 Page 44 of 73

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

LEE

~

.

------------------------------ bounty

————

In The General Court Of Justice

□District [x] Superior Court Division

NOIte. The AOC-CR-645 (Optional Form For Criminal Judgment (District Court)) and

other criminalJudgment forms are available for use in district court cases. For

_______ superior court cases, other criminalJudgment forms are available for use.

STATE VERSUS

.

Name Oi Defendant

JUDGMENT/ORDER OR

OTHER DISPOSITION

PIERRE AMERSON

Date Of Birth

Sex

Hace

_______ B_______ _______ M

Attorney For State

MIKE BEAM

___ _ . _

[□^7^

- --------------

Oflensefs)

Attorney For Defendant

_ _________

Retained

zppornted Crt Rptr initials

JW

DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR APPROPRIATE RELIEF FILED 08/31/2022, INCLUDING THE "ATTACHMENT" FILED

10/17/2022 IS WITHOUT SUPPORT IN FACT Ofc LAW, AND IS THEREFORE DENIED IN THE ENTIRETY.

SO ORDERED, THIS 25TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2022.

, ' V'

Date

> - V:C|

SIGNATURE OF JUDGE

, Name Or Presiding Judge (type or printj

10/25/2022

HON C WINSTON GILCHRIST

AOC-CR-305. Rev. 2/21

© 2021 Administrative Office of the Courts

|~

Signature Of Presidfng J,

re.

Materiel opposite unmarked squares Is to be disregarded as surplusage

'

Case l:23-cv-00579-TDS-JLW Documents Filed 08/02/23 Page41 of 73