Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Howard Griffith, Petitioner v. New York

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

FILED

JUN 2 3 2025

Howard Griffith,

Pro Se

Defendant/Petitioner,

VS.

New York State,

Represented by William J. Fitzpatrick,

District Attorney of the State of New York/County of Onondaga

Plaintiffs/Respondent

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

New York State Court of Appeals

Petition for Writ of Certiorari

Howard Griffith, Pro Se

2903 James Street, # 1R

Syracuse, NY 13206

315-726-2958

PRECEIVED

JUN 2 6 2025

QUESTION PRESENTED

If a defendant can demonstrate that the conviction for his/her sexually violent offense is

unconstitutional, should it be deemed to be a further violation of his/her constitutional rights if,

because he/she is a sex offender, the “Clean Slate Act” does not authorize him/her to have

his/her criminal record sealed?

I am trying to convince the New York State Court of Appeals that I should be given back my

right to take an appeal from my unconstitutional conviction for “Rape in the First Degree [ ]”

because I can't have my criminal record sealed in essence of the “Clean Slate Act” going into

effect, but the New York State Court of Appeals cannot consider this because a precedent hasn't

been established for it to be determined that it is a further violation of my constitutional rights

with regard to being subject to the conditions that need to be considered in this question.

LIST OF PARTIES

Howard Griffith, Pro Se

2903 James Street, # 1R,

Syracuse, NY 13206

Petitioner

People of the State of New York, County of Onondaga

505 South State Street, 4th Floor,

Syracuse, NY 13202

Respondent

RELATED CASES

“People v Griffith, CLA-2025-00015”

New York State Court of Appeals

April 15, 2025

“People v Griffith, KA 24-01886”

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division/Fourth Department

December 9, 2024

“People v Griffith, 2001-0883-1”

Onondaga County Court

January 29, 2002

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECISION BELOW: 1

JURISDICTION: 1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED: 1

b

STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 1-7

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT: 7-8

CONCLUSION: 8

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Exhibit A:

“People v Griffith, CLA-2025-00015”

ORDER DENYING LEAVE

April 15, 2025

Exhibit B:

“People v Griffith, CLA-2025-00015”

APPLICATION TO REQUEST LEAVE TO APPEAL

January 2, 2025

Exhibit C:

“People v Griffith, CLA-2025-00015”

OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL

February 11,2025

Exhibit D:

“People v Griffith, KA 24-01886”

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS

December 9,2024

Exhibit E:

CLEAN SLATE ACT

New York State Assembly

A.1029-C: “Section 1”

iii

Exhibit F:

CLEAN SLATE LAWS:

Utah, Connecticut, California, New York

Exhibit G:

“People v. Moss, 2025 NY Slip Op 01673: Effect of Prior Unchallenged Conviction on Sex

Offender Registration Act (SORA) Risk Level”

Published by New York Law Review in

New York Court of Appeals

Exhibit H:

People v Moss, No. 28

New York State Court of Appeals

March 20, 2025

OPINION

(uncorrected)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Statutes:

California Penal Code §§ 1203.425(a)(1)(A) and 1203.425(a)(l)(B)(i): 7

Connecticut General Statutes § 54-142a: “Title 54 ‘Criminal Procedure’ - Chapter 961a

‘Criminal Records’ - Section 54-142a: ‘Erasure of Criminal Records’ ”: 7

NY Correction Law § 168-a: “Sex Offender Registration Act: ‘Definitions’ ”: 1, 2

NY Criminal Procedure Law § 160.50: “Order Upon Termination of Criminal Action in Favor of

the Accused”: 4

NY Criminal Procedure Law § 160.57: “Automatic Sealing of Convictions”: 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7

NY Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10: “Motion to Vacate Judgment”: 1, 3

NY Criminal Procedure Law § 460.20: “Certificate Granting Leave to Appeal to Court of

Appeals”: 4

NY Criminal Procedure Law § 460.30: “Extension of Time for Taking Appeal”: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8

iv

NY Penal Law § 130.35(1): “Rape in the First Degree, by Forcible Compulsion”: i, 1

U.C.A. 77-40a-101 (4)(c)(iii)(D): “Title 77 ‘Utah Code of Criminal Procedure’ - Chapter 40a

‘Expungement’ - Part 1 ‘General Provisions’ Per Utah Code 77-40a-101: ‘Clean slate eligible

case’ 7

Court Reporters:

People v Montgomery, 24 N.Y.2d 130, 134 (N.Y. 1969): 5

People v. Moss, 2025 NY Slip Op 01673, [* 1] (2025): 8

People v Rivera, 39 N.Y.2d 519, 521-522 (N.Y. 1976): 5, 6

People v Syville, 15 N.Y.3d 391, 400 (N.Y. 2010): 2,3, 4, 6

People v. Thomas, 47 N.Y.2d 37, 42 (N.Y. 1979): 2, 3, 5

Quill Corp, v North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992): 8

United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512-513 (1954): 5

Treatises:

“Clean Slate Act” (S.7551-A/A.1029-C): i, 2, 7

“People v. Moss, 2025 NY Slip Op 01673: Effect of Prior Unchallenged Conviction on Sex

Offender Registration Act (SORA) Risk Level”: 8

United States Constitution:

4th Amendment of the United States Constitution: 2

5th Amendment of the United States Constitution: 1, 2,3, 7

6th Amendment of the United States Constitution: 2

14th Amendment of the United States Constitution: 1,2,3, 7

v

I, Howard Griffith, request that the Court grant certiorari so the decision below can be reviewed.

DECISION BELOW

The decision below, of the New York State Court of Appeals, is published as 2025 NY Slip Op

97354(U) and is reproduced at “Exhibit A”.

JURISDICTION

The decision below was entered on April 15, 2025. My first petition was taken on June 23, 2025.

Rule 14.5 applies. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

• 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution: “No person shall be deprived of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law.”

•

14th Amendment of the United States Constitution: “No state shall make or enforce any

law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall

any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

(1) I was convicted of “Rape in the First Degree, NY Penal Law § 130.35(1)” for “People v

Griffith, 2001-0883-1” in the Onondaga County Court, and the judgment was rendered on

January 29, 2002. “Rape 1st [ ]” is listed as a “sexually violent offense” pursuant to NY

Correction Law § 168-a.11 completed my sentence for my conviction on August 10, 2011.

(2) I pursued Motionfs] to Vacate Judgment, pursuant to NY [C]riminal [P]rocedure [L]aw §

440.10, between 2006 and 2022, to challenge my conviction under which the Onondaga County

Court determined that the Motionfs] could not be used as a substitute for a direct appeal. I

demonstrated in these Motionfs] that my conviction was unconstitutional because I was provided

] New York Correction Law Article 168, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

1

with ineffective assistance of counsel during the time of my judgment of conviction and that it

was a violation of my 4th, 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendment Rights of the U.S. Constitution.

(3) On November 16, 2023, Kathy Hochul signed the “Clean Slate Act” (S.7551-A/A.1029-C)

which was to bring CPL § 160.57 into effect on November 16, 2024. Section 1 of A.1029-C with

regard to the bill that was passed in the New York State Assembly in 2023, regarding the “Clean

Slate Act”, demonstrated that the legislative intent for CPL § 160.57 was to establish a “Clean

Slate” for defendants with criminal records, via the “automatic sealing of convictions”, after a

period of time of good behavior, to curb discrimination from defendants in enabling them to

obtain jobs, (see “Exhibit E”) However, CPL § 160.57(l)(b)(v) demonstrates that a sex offender

is not provided with these liberties, with regard to the “automatic sealing of convictions”,

because it provides that the automatic sealing [ ] does not apply to convictions that are defined as

“sex offenses” or “sexually violent offenses” under Correction Law § 168-a. (see “Exhibit F”)

(4) On November 18, 2024,1 pursued a Motion for Extension of Time to Take an Appeal on the

Common Law of Writ of Error Coram Nobis to the Supreme Court of the State of New York,

Appellate Division/Fourth Department, to request that I be provided with an extension of time to

take an appeal from my judgment of conviction with regard to “People v Griffith, 2001-0883-1”.

The matter was titled “People v Griffith, KA 24-01886”. I demonstrated how the Onondaga .

County Court would not authorize me to challenge my conviction in a Motion to Vacate

Judgment [ ]. I used “People v Syville, 15 NY3d 391 (N.Y. 2010)” to support my argument in

that, with regard to how the New York State Court of Appeals acknowledged that coram nobis

was significantly restricted by the adoption of the Criminal Procedure Law, the Court of Appeals

acknowledged that the ancient writ “continues to be available to alleviate a constitutional wrong

when a defendant has no other procedural recourse” (id. at 400) I also referred to “People v

2

Thomas, 47 N.Y.2d 37, 42 (N.Y. 1979)” to support that I be granted an extension of time to take

an appeal. “People v Syville, id.” considered an argument for a defendant who claimed that,

because his constitutional rights were violated, coram nobis should be considered to exceed the

statute of limitations of CPL § 460.30 for an extension of time to take an appeal to be extended

more than one year after his judgment was imposed. I supported that, because my constitutional

rights are being violated, I should be given back my right to take an appeal, in demonstrating:

“Obviously, when considering CPL § 160.57, in considering whether or not defendants’ criminal

records should be able to be sealed, lawmakers have considered that defendants who were

convicted of sex offenses, sexually violent offenses, and Class A felonies deserve more

discrimination than defendants who were convicted of different types of offenses. However,

when considering CPL § 160.57, in considering that Defendant was convicted of a ‘sexually

violent offense’, he should not have to be subject to more discrimination than defendants who

were convicted of offenses other than sex offenses, sexually violent offenses, or Class A felonies

because he should never have been convicted of that offense. Therefore, CPL § 160.57 going

into effect violates Defendant's 5th and 14th Amendment Rights of the United States

Constitution and his Rights to the New York State Constitution with regard to §§ 6 and 11 of

Article I because, unlike other defendants, it keeps him in a position where he may have to be

subject to discrimination that he doesn't deserve.” (see page 2 of “Exhibit B”) I established that,

in my case, coram nobis should be considered to alleviate the constitutional wrong because it

will enable me to be taken out of the position where I may have to be subject to discrimination

that I don’t deserve and that the action is the only procedural recourse because the Onondaga

County Court determined that I could not make my argument in a CPL § 440.10 motion. I

supported that coram nobis would be able to be used to give me back my right to take a direct

3

appeal from my judgment of conviction, and I demonstrated that overturning my conviction, via

direct appeal, would result in my conviction being able to be sealed, pursuant to CPL §

160.50(3), and that CPL § 160.57(1 )(b)(v) would no longer apply to the grounds under which I

would be able to obtain my “Clean Slate” to curb the chances under which I may be subject to

discrimination. I also argued that my conviction was unconstitutional by demonstrating that the

indictment for my conviction was fatally flawed on its face and that my counsel was ineffective

for not moving to dismiss it on those grounds. I also objected to how I had not been apprised of

my right to appeal. The People didn't respond to my motion [ ] after it was taken to the Appellate

Division/Fourth Department.

(5) The Appellate Division/Fourth Department denied my Motion for Writ of Error Coram Nobis

in an order dated December 9, 2024, without providing any reason for denial, (see “Exhibit D”)

(6) I pursued an Application to Request Leave to Appeal, pursuant to CPL § 460.20, dated

January 2, 2025, to the New York State Court of Appeals from the Order for “People v Griffith,

KA 24-01886”. The matter was titled “People v Griffith, CLA-2025-00015”. I demonstrated that

the Court of Appeals only considered “two exceptions” in “People v Syville, id.” to consider that

coram nobis could be used to authorize an extension of time to take an appeal for a defendant to

exceed the one year statute of limitations provided in CPL § 460.30.1 supported that, because

my cause for taking my action did not fall into one of those “two exceptions”, the Appellate

Division was satisfied with denying my Motion [ ]. I demonstrated that my argument for the

Court of Appeals would be that, in essence of the “two exceptions” considered in “People v

Syville, id.” that could be considered for a defendant to obtain an extension of time to take an

appeal to exceed one year, the Court of Appeals should consider a “third exception”: “If a new

law going into effect causes a defendant to suffer a further violation of his/her constitutional

4

rights based on his/her unconstitutional conviction, an extension of time to take an appeal should

be able to exceed one year if there is no other procedural recourse.” {see page 4 of “Exhibit B”) I

showed the Court of Appeals how I used People v Thomas, 47 N.Y.2d 37, 42 (N.Y. 1979) to

support my argument, showing how I had referenced: “We there held that, upon a showing that a

defendant had not been informed of his right to appeal and had a genuine appealable issue, he

was entitled to ‘be resentenced so that his time to appeal will run anew ’ (People v Montgomery,

supra, p 134; see, also, People v Rivera, 39N.Y.2d 519, 525). ” (id. at 42) (see page 3 of

“Exhibit B”) I explained to the Court of Appeals how “People v Rivera, id. at 521-522 (N.Y.

1976)” demonstrated that coram nobis was considered and that Rivera’s cause to demonstrate

that he had not been apprised of his right to appeal his 1953 conviction was that he later had a

conviction for a second offense in which being a “second offender” caused him to have a

sentence which was exceeding the sentence that he could have had if he had not been initially

convicted.2 (see United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512-513 [1954]: “Although the term has

been served, the results of the conviction may persist. Subsequent convictions may carry heavier

penalties, civil rights may be affected. ’’) I used “People v Rivera, id.” to support the argument

that a “new cause” should be able to be considered to establish a precedent which extends the

statute of limitations to be authorized to raise claims that are authorized to be raised pursuant to

CPL § 460.30.1 also claimed that the Appellate Division did not consider whether or not CPL §

160.57 going into effect has caused a violation of my constitutional rights and established that, in

an appeal from the Appellate Division’s order, it would also need to be considered by the Court

of Appeals whether or not CPL § 160.57 going into effect may be deemed to have caused a

violation of my constitutional rights, (see pages 4-5 of “Exhibit B”) I demonstrated that, with the

2 The [C]riminal [P]rocedure [L]aw was not effective until 1970.

5

Court of Appeals ruling in my favor in an appeal, my motion for writ of error coram nobis could

be remitted to the Appellate Division/Fourth Department.

(7) The People responded to my application [ ] on February 11, 2025 and considered that my

argument was “conceivably a question of law” with regard to how I used “People v Syville, id.”

and “People v Rivera, id.” to support that the power of writ of error coram nobis should be

expanded in New York, (see page 2 of “Exhibit C”) Due process required that, with the Appellate

Division not providing a reason for denying my Motion [ ], in order for leave to have been

granted, the Judge reviewing my application [ ] would have had to have determined if my

remedies were exhausted to support my argument. This would have required the Court of

Appeals to determine that it was supported that my conviction was unconstitutional. That would

have been required, being with regard to how I [c]laimed that the Appellate Division did not

consider whether or not CPL § 160.57 going into effect has caused a violation of my

constitutional rights. In order for that [c]laim to have been correct, the Appellate Division could

not have determined that my conviction wasn’t unconstitutional. If it had been determined that

my conviction wasn't unconstitutional, that would have satisfied the cause for the Appellate

Division to deny my Motion [ ], and my suggestion for what the case actually was to satisfy the

cause for denial, being with regard to how my cause for taking my action did not fall into one of

those “two exceptions”, could not have been considered as a remedy. The People never objected

to my argument that my conviction was unconstitutional. The People only tried to support that

the Appellate Division was correct to deny my Motion [ ] because I failed to avail myself of CPL

§ 460.30. With regard to how CPL § 160.57 “does not allow for a blanket sealing for all

convictions,” the only objection that the People made to any of my arguments was to support that

nothing about how CPL § 160.57 went into effect was unconstitutional. The People claimed that

6

it was “otherwise a remarkable grant of clemency.” (see page 2 of “Exhibit C”) The rest of the

People’s objections were claims of how taking my action was a continuing, belated effort to try

to overturn my conviction, how granting relief would amount to a judicial repeal of CPL §

460.30, and how my argument was not properly before the court given the posture of the case.

(8) Without stating why, on April 15, 2025, the Court of Appeals denied my application [ ], as,

until it can be determined that CPL § 160.57 going into effect has caused a violation of my

constitutional rights, it cannot be considered if a “third exception” can be considered for writ of

error coram nobis, (see “Exhibit A”)

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I need the United States Supreme Court to determine that, with a defendant demonstrating that

the conviction for his/her sexually violent offense is unconstitutional, it should be deemed to be a

further violation of his/her constitutional rights if, because he/she is a sex offender, the “Clean

Slate Act” does not authorize him/her to have his/her criminal record sealed. This “further

violation” would be deemed to be a violation of the defendant's 5th and 14th Amendment Rights

of the United States Constitution and could only be the case if he/she was convicted before the

“Clean Slate Act” was effective. The Supreme Court should be interested in considering this

because “Clean Slate” laws have recently gone into effect in several states around the country,

and most of those states don't authorize defendants who have been convicted of sex offenses to

have their criminal records sealed, unlike other defendants.3 This will establish a precedent

supporting that, if it is intended for a sex offender to have the unconstitutional conviction for

3 see subsection (4)(c)(iii)(D) Per Utah Code 77-40a-101; Subsections (e)(1) and (e)(2)(B) of

Sec. 54-142a of the Connecticut General Statutes (Formerly Sec 54-90) with regard to “Criminal

Records ‘Erasure’ ” (Chapter 961a, Part I); California Penal Code §§ 1203.425(a)(1)(A) and

1203,425(a)(l)(B)(i); and “Clean Slate Laws” in other states, including: Colorado, Delaware,

Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Virginia, (see “Exhibit F”)

7

his/her sex offense challenged, the remedy will be able to be considered in cases for sex

offenders in all states that have “Clean Slate” laws that deprive them of their liberties to have

their criminal records sealed.4 With the Supreme Court making this determination, it will be able

to be taken back to the New York State Court of Appeals to reconsider my application to request

leave to appeal for “People v Griffith, CLA-2025-00015”. The People considering my argument

“conceivably a question of law” preserves my argument in New York.

CONCLUSION

I respectfully request the United States Supreme Court to grant a writ of certiorari.

Dated: July 7, 2025

Howard Griffith, Pro Se

2903 James Street, # 1R

Syracuse, NY 13206

315-726-2958

4 Substantive due process “centrally concerns the fundamentalfairness ofgovernmental

activity, ” Quill Corp, v North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992); see “People v. Moss, 2025 NY

Slip Op 01673: Effect of Prior Unchallenged Conviction on Sex Offender Registration Act

(SORA) Risk Level”: “This case highlights the critical importance of challenging a prior

conviction directly and using the proper legal channels. Legal practitioners should advise clients

to challenge all prior convictions directly, rather than collaterally, ifsuch challenges are

available and could affect a future SORA determination. ” Published by The New York Law

Review in New York Court of Appeals (see page 3 of “Exhibit G”) People v Moss, id. at [* 1]:

“Defendant has been convicted of a series ofsex crimes... The prior conviction's

constitutionality was not reviewed on direct appeal in the 2006 action, because defendant did not

timely file a notice of appeal and the Appellate Division then denied defendant's pro se motion to

take a late appeal under CPL 460.30... defendant had putforth substantial evidence that his

2006 guilty plea was unconstitutionally coerced... The People countered that the resentencing

court had not overturned defendant's 2006 conviction, and that the override must be applied

because the conviction remains on defendant's criminal record... We... now affirm. ” decided

March 20, 2025 (see pages 2-5 of “Exhibit H”)

8