Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Michael Bernard Bell, Petitioner v. Florida
Supreme Court briefJul 10, 2025
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No. ___________
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
MICHAEL BELL
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
THIS IS A CAPITAL CASE
WITH AN EXECUTION SCHEDULED FOR
TUESDAY, JULY 15, 2025, AT 6:00 P.M.
ROBERT NORGARD*
Fla. Bar No. 322059
P.O. Box 811
Bartow, FL 33831
(863) 533-8556
Norgardlaw@verizon.net
office@norgardlaw.com
*Counsel of Record
RACHEL PAIGE ROEBUCK
Fla. Bar No. 118886
511 Columbia Dr., #11
Tampa, FL 33606
(904) 718-9382
rroebucklaw@gmail.com
CAPITAL CASE
QUESTION PRESENTED
After Michael Bell’s death warrant was signed, a key witness, Henry Edwards,
recanted his trial testimony and admitted that he had not witnessed Bell commit the
murders. Then, a second key witness, Charles Jones, recanted his trial testimony and
admitted that Bell did not confess to him and that he did not see Bell with the murder
weapon. Both witnesses said they lied at Bell’s trial, at the behest of the lead detective
and the prosecutor, due to coercion and threats and in exchange for undisclosed
leniency. Despite the extreme limitations of the 32-day warrant period, Bell found a
number of other trial witnesses who corroborated the recanting witnesses’ claims of
coercion and threats by law enforcement and some of these witnesses also changed
important parts of their trial testimony. Bell was granted an evidentiary hearing.
At the hearing, the State and judge warned the witnesses that they may be
prosecuted for perjury for saying anything that contradicted their trial testimony.
Predictably, the witnesses took the 5th. The judge also permitted the witnesses to assert
nearly blanket Fifth Amendment privileges when challenged about what they had
recently told Bell’s investigators. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s
finding that Bell did not prove that his case had been tainted by lying witnesses,
witnesses with credibility issues, and police and prosecutorial misconduct. This case
presents the following question:
Does the Petitioner’s execution violate the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution when the conduct of the government and the trial court
interfered with Petitioner’s ability to present evidence in warrant litigation?
i
STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS
Trial
Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, in and for Duval County, Florida
State of Florida v. Michael Bell, Case No. 1994-CF-9776
Guilty verdicts entered on March 9, 1995.
Death sentence imposed on June 2, 1995.
Direct Appeal
Bell v. State, 699 So. 2d 674, 676-79 (Fla. 1997).
Judgment entered July 17, 1997; Rehearing denied Sept. 17, 1997.
Denial of Initial Motion for Postconviction Relief
State of Florida v. Michael Bell, Case No. 1994-CF-9776
Denial entered on May 31, 2002.
Appeal of Denial of Initial Motion for Postconviction Relief
Bell v. State, 965 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 2007)
Judgment entered on June 7, 2007.
Denials of Successor Motions for Postconviction Relief
State of Florida v. Michael Bell, Case No. 1994-CF-9776
Denial entered on March 23, 2011.
State of Florida v. Michael Bell, Case No. 1994-CF-9776
Denial entered on March 10, 2017.
Appeals of Denials of Successor Motions for Postconviction Relief
Bell v. State, 91 So. 3d 782 (Fla. 2012) (Ineffective Assistance)
Judgment entered on April 26, 2012.
Bell v. State, 235 So. 3d 287 (Fla. 2018) (Hurst)
Judgment entered on January 29, 2018.
Bell v. State, 284 So. 3d 400 (Fla. 2019) (Buck v. Davis)
Denial entered on November 7, 2019.
Habeas Proceedings in the Middle District of Florida
Bell v. McDonough, No. 3:07-cv-860, 2009 WL 10698415
Judgment entered on January 15, 2009.
Bell v. Fla. Att’y Gen., No. 3:07-cv-860, 2016 WL 11048052
Judgment entered on April 5, 2016.
ii
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals Denials
Bell v. Fla. Att’y Gen., 461 F. App’x 843 (11th Cir. Circuit)
Judgment entered on February 7, 2012.
Bell v. Fla. Att’y Gen., No. 16-11791, 2017 WL 11622107 (11th Cir. 2017)
Judgment entered on June 19, 2017.
Denials of Certiorari
United States Supreme Court Case No. 07–6240
Michael Bernard Bell v. Florida
Denial entered: November 5, 2007.
United States Supreme Court Case No. 09-10782
Michael Bell v. Pam Bondi
Denial entered: August 16, 2013.
United States Supreme Court Case No. 13–8415
Michael Bell v. Pam Bondi
Denial entered: May 19, 2014.
United States Supreme Court Case No. 17-9361
Michael Bernard Bell v. Florida
Denial entered: January 29, 2018
United States Supreme Court Case No. 19-7503
Michael Bernard Bell v. Florida
Denial entered: November 7, 2019
Denial of Successive Motion for Postconviction Relief (Death Warrant)
State of Florida v. Michael Bell, Case No. 1994-CF-9776
Denial entered on June 24, 2025.
Denial of Emergency Motions to Reconsider (Death Warrant)
State of Florida v. Michael Bell, Case No. 1994-CF-9776
Denial entered on June 24, 2025.
Appeal of Successive Denial of Motion for Postconviction Relief (Death Warrant)
Bell v. State, No. SC2025-0891 (Fla. July 8, 2025).
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
QUESTION PRESENTED ............................................................................................ i
STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS ........................................................... ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................. iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................ vi
OPINION BELOW ....................................................................................................... 1
JURISDICTION ........................................................................................................... 1
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED ........................................................ 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...................................................................................... 3
I.
The Guilt Phase .................................................................................................... 3
II.
The Penalty Phase ............................................................................................... 4
III.
Procedural History .............................................................................................. 4
IV.
Evidence Developed Under Warrant Relevant to this Petition ........................... 5
V.
A.
Henry Edwards ...................................................................................... 6
B.
Charles Jones ......................................................................................... 8
C.
Ericka Williams ...................................................................................... 9
D.
Ned Pryor ............................................................................................. 11
E.
Dale George .......................................................................................... 12
F.
Paula Goins .......................................................................................... 12
The Florida Supreme Court Ruling ................................................................... 13
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................... 14
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ......................................................... 15
iv
I.
THE PROSECUTION AND THE TRIAL COURT ACTIVELY IMPAIRED
EVIDENCE PRESENTATION THUS PREVENTING THE SUCCESS OF
A COMPELLING RECANTATION CLAIM ...................................................... 15
A.
The Specter of Perjury, introduced by the State and magnified by
the Trial Court, Deprived Bell of Crucial Evidence .............................. 15
B.
The Refusal of the Trial Judge to Cabin the Witnesses’ Use of Fifth
Amendment Privilege Deprived Bell of the Opportunity to Develop
a Complete Record ................................................................................. 19
C.
Executing Mr. Bell Without a Full and Complete Opportunity to
Prove that False Testimony Contributed to his Convictions and
Death Sentence Would Raise Serious Constitutional Issues ................ 22
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 24
INDEX OF APPENDICES
Opinion of the Florida Supreme Court
Rendered on July 8, 2025 ...................................................................................... 1-54a
Sworn Affidavit of Henry Edwards ......................................................................... 1-3b
Sworn Affidavit of Charles Jones ............................................................................ 1-3c
Transcript of June 23, 2025, Evidentiary Hearing .............................................. 1-326d
1995 Trial Testimony of Ericka Williams .............................................................. 1-20e
1995 Trial Testimony of Ned Pryor ........................................................................ 1-24f
1995 Trial Testimony of Dale George .................................................................... 1-23g
1995 Trial Testimony of Paula Goins .................................................................... 1-27h
1995 Trial Testimony of Henry Edwards ............................................................... 1-18i
1995 Trial Testimony of Charles Jones .................................................................. 1-14j
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page No.
Federal Cases
Bell v. Florida,
552 U.S. 1011 (2007) ……………………………………………..……………
5
Bell v. Fla. Att’y Gen.,
461 F. App’x 843 (11th Cir. 2012) …………………………………………..…………… 5
Bell v. Fla. Att’y Gen.,
No. 16-11791, 2017 WL 11622107 (11th Cir. 2017) ……………………..……………
5
Bell v. Fla. Att’y Gen.,
No. 3:07-cv 860, 2016 WL 11048052 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2016) …………..…………… 5
Bell v. McDonough,
No. 3:07-cv-860, 2009 WL 10698415 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2009) ……………………… 5
Buck v. Davis,
580 U.S. 100 (2017) ……………………………………………..……………
5
Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963) ……………………………………………..……………
1
Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284 (1973) ……………………………………………..……………
15
Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399 (1986) ……………………………………………..……………
15
Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262 (1976) ……………………………………………..……………
15
Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032 (1983) ……………………………………………..……………
1
Mitchell v. United States,
526 U.S. 314 (1999) ……………………………………………..………
21
Nezowy v. United States,
723 F.2d 1120 (3d Cir. 1983) ……………………………………………..……………
vi
1
United States v. Allmon,
594 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2010) ……………………………………………..……………
21
United States v. Beckford,
964 F.Supp. 993 (E.D. Va. 1997) ……………………………………………..……………
15
United States v. Howard,
No. 18-CR-667, 2024 WL 2019412 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 2024) ………………………… 20
United States v. Juan,
704 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2013) ……………………………………………..…………… 16
United States v. Morrison,
535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976) ……………………………………………..……………
16
United States v. Thomas,
488 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1973) ……………………………………………..……………
18
United States v. Thompson,
561 F. Supp. 2d 938 (N.D. Ill. 2008) ………………………………..……………
20
United States v. Thornton,
733 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ……………………………………………..……………
19
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,
458 U.S. 858 (1982) ……………………………………………..……………
18
United States v. Vavages,
151 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 1998) ………………………………………..……………
16, 18
United States v. Whittington,
783 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1986) ……………………………………………..…………… 21
Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14 (1967) ……………………………………………..……………
16
Webb v. Texas,
409 U.S. 95 (1972) ……………………………………………..……………
16
Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976) ……………………………………………..……………
vii
15
State Cases
Bell v. State,
699 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1997) ……………………………………………..…………… 3, 4, 5
Bell v. State,
91 So. 3d 782 (Fla. 2012) ……………………………………………..……………
5
Bell v. State,
235 So. 3d 287 (Fla. 2018) ……………………………………………..……………
5
Bell v. State,
284 So. 3d 400 (Fla. 2019) ……………………………………………..……………
5
Sheppard v. State,
338 So. 3d 803 (Fla. 2022) ……………………………………………..……………
17
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Regulations
U.S. CONST. amend. VI ……………………………………………………...
passim
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ……………………………………………….…….…...
passim
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ………………………………………………………...
passim
28 U.S.C. §1257 ………………………………………………………………….….……...
1
18 U.S.C. § 3593 ………………………………………………………………….…...
10, 17
Florida Statutes § 837.021 …………………………………………………………..…...
17
viii
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Florida Supreme Court [App. 1a–54a] is reported at Bell v.
State, No. SC2025-0891 (Fla. July 8, 2025).
JURISDICTION
The Florida Supreme Court issued its judgment affirming Petitioner’s death
sentence on July 8, 2025. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1257.
While the Florida Supreme Court rejected Bell's claim based on state-law procedural
limits on postconviction relief [App. 19a], the opinion also says that Bell did not avoid
the bar because he did not sufficiently prove reasonable diligence [App. 21a], which
is a necessary component of any Brady1 claim. Thus, the court's reliance on state law
depended on the merits of Bell's federal claims. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1040-41 (1983) (holding that state court decisions are independent only if the state
court “make[s] clear by a plain statement” that its resolution of the state-law question
does not depend on its resolution of the federal question.). This leaves Bell free to
petition this Court as to that claim as well as the claim he makes here – that the fact
development process below was unconstitutionally hampered by the specter of
perjury and improper Fifth Amendment invocations violating Bell's due process
rights and making his death sentence unreliable. See also Nezowy v. United States,
723 F.2d 1120, 1128 (3d Cir. 1983) (“The privilege against self-incrimination
protected by the Fifth Amendment is, of course, of constitutional magnitude.”).
1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
1
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides I relevant part
the “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right… to be confronted
with the witnesses against him… and to have the assistance of counsel in his defense.”
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant
part that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.”
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
relevant part that the United States as well as any state shall not deprive “any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The trial evidence that put Michael Bell on death row consisted largely of
eyewitnesses (Henry Edwards, Dale George, and Ned Pryor) who testified that Bell
was the shooter, and other witnesses (Charles Jones, Paula Goins, Ericka Williams)
who testified that Bell confessed. The State did call other witnesses at trial, including
other eyewitnesses from the scene, but only Edwards, George, and Pryor positively
identified Bell as the shooter.
Since Bell’s death warrant was signed on June 13, 2025, two key witnesses
against Bell recanted their 1995 trial testimony. The recanting witnesses as well as
several other trial witnesses implicated the prosecutor George Bateh and lead Detective
William Bolena in misconduct relating to their testimony. At an evidentiary hearing on
June 23, 2025, Bell was unable to fully develop this evidence due to the witnesses’ fear
of being prosecuted for perjury for disavowing any prior testimony. Witness after
witness was permitted to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege and refuse to answer
crucial questions, sabotaging Bell’s last opportunity to bring to light new evidence prior
to his execution.
I.
Guilt Phase
In June 1993, Theodore Wright killed Bell’s brother, Lamar, in self-defense. Bell
v. State, 699 So. 2d 674, 675 (Fla. 1997). The State’s theory was that Bell planned to kill
Wright out of revenge. Id. To effectuate this, Bell, through his girlfriend, purchased a
firearm and ammunition. Id. On December 9, 1993, the night after the firearm
purchase, witnesses testified that Bell spotted Wright’s car. He left the area and quickly
3
returned with two friends and the now-loaded firearm. Id. Bell did not know that Wright
had previously sold the car to Wright’s half-brother, Jimmy West. Id. When West left
the lounge with Tamecka Smith and another female and got into the car, witnesses said
Bell approached them and shot West and Smith several times. The other female ducked
down and escaped injury. Id. After shooting West and Smith, witnesses said Bell shot
bullets toward the front of the liquor lounge, where multiple people had been waiting to
go inside. Id. Witnesses testified that Bell confessed to the murder. Id.
II.
Penalty Phase
A security guard testified for the State that several people were in the line of fire
when the shots were fired into the parking lot. Id. The State introduced a copy of a
record showing that appellant was convicted of armed robbery in 1990. Id. Also during
the penalty phase, Bell’s mother testified for the defense that she and Bell had received
death threats from Wright and West. The trial court followed the jury’s unanimous
death recommendation, finding three aggravating circumstances (Bell had been
convicted of a prior violent felony; that he had knowingly created a great risk of death
to many persons; and that the killings were committed in cold, calculated, and
premeditated manner) and one mitigating circumstance (the death of his brother
caused an extreme mental or emotional disturbance). Id. at 676.
III.
Procedural History
Bell’s direct appeal was denied which raised the following claims: (1) the trial
court violated his right to act as his own counsel, (2) evidence of the cold, calculated,
and premeditated aggravating factor was insufficient, (3) the jury instructions were
4
unconstitutionally vague, and (4) the trial court failed to properly consider mitigation.
Bell v. State, 699 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1997). Bell’s initial postconviction relief motion –
which raised inter alia claims that trial testimony had been false and coerced – was
denied by the trial and appellate court after an evidentiary hearing where several
witnesses denied the allegations. Bell v. Florida, 552 U.S. 1011 (2007).
Bell filed several successive postconviction motions. Bell v. State, 91 So. 3d 782
(Fla. 2012) (ineffective assistance); Bell v. State, 235 So. 3d 287 (Fla. 2018) (Hurst); Bell
v. State, 284 So. 3d 400 (Fla. 2019) (affirming summary denial of successive motion
alleging that comments made during Bell’s jury trial improperly injected racial animus
into the proceedings in violation of Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100 (2017)).
Bell filed multiple unsuccessful habeas petitions. Bell v. McDonough, No. 3:07cv-860, 2009 WL 10698415 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2009); Bell v. Fla. Att’y Gen., 461 F. App’x
843 (11th Cir. 2012); Bell v. Fla. Att’y Gen., No. 3:07-cv 860, 2016 WL 11048052 (M.D.
Fla. Apr. 5, 2016); Bell v. Fla. Att’y Gen., No. 16-11791, 2017 WL 11622107 (11th Cir.
2017).
IV.
Evidence Developed Under Warrant Relevant to this Petition2
The day the death warrant was signed, Bell’s attorneys were alerted that two
trial witnesses had potential new information.
2 Counsel expects a separate petition to be filed originating from federal court which
will address the merits of the Brady and newly discovered evidence claims raised below.
This Petition only contains facts relevant to the instant constitutional claims of
improper government interference with Bell’s opportunity to present evidence at his
warrant-stage evidentiary hearing.
5
On June 18th and 19th, 2025, two key trial witnesses – Henry Edwards
(“Edwards”) and Charles Jones (“Jones”) – recanted their trial testimony. [App. 1b-3b,
1c-3c] Henry Edwards stated that that he never actually witnessed the shooting but
instead was fed information about Bell by Detective Bolena and lied at Bell’s trial in
exchange for undisclosed favorable treatment. [App. 1b-3b] Charles Jones stated that
Bell never confessed to him, that he never saw Bell with the supposed murder weapon,
that he was coached by prosecutor George Bateh, and that he lied at Bell’s trial in
exchange for help with his own criminal charges. [App. 1c-3c]
At the June 23, 2025, evidentiary hearing, after being advised by the State and
the court that recanting may result in perjury charges, five of the six witnesses, after
consulting with attorneys appointed by the court, invoked their Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination and refused to answer numerous, legitimate questions
relevant to these proceedings.
A. Henry Edwards
At trial, Edwards testified that he knew Bell, had seen him 35 times prior to
identifying him, and that while he was outside in the parking lot he witnessed Bell
commit the murders [App. 4i-10i]. His trial testimony about the circumstances of
telling law enforcement this is as follows: While he was in Duval County jail, Bolena
came to see him about the incident and he told Bolena everything he said at trial
[App. 11i]. He then told the State Attorney’s Office the same thing [App. 11i]. He
didn’t ask Bolena for any help or leniency and the State made him no promises [App.
12i, 14i]. He claimed that pending charges he had were dropped after “they”
6
investigated and determined he was “innocent” [App. 10i].
Prior to the June 23, 2025, hearing, Edwards signed a sworn affidavit
providing detailed information regarding police and prosecutorial misconduct and
recanting his eyewitness trial testimony [App. 1b-3b].
At the evidentiary hearing, when Edwards was questioned regarding his
affidavit, he made numerous statements disavowing the affidavit [App. 74d-89d].
Edwards’ disavowal of his affidavit was based on repeated claims that the affidavit
was untrue, that he thought the investigators were making a movie, that he just went
along with what they said, and that he did not read it. [App. 74d-89d]
When further questioned about his disavowal, Edwards pleaded the Fifth to
the following:
1. Whether he was inside and Bolena told him to say he was outside [App.
78d-79d]
2. If he could actually identify the perpetrator [App. 81d-85d]
(This was after he admitted he didn’t know Bell as well as he claimed he
did at trial.)
3. If Bolena took him on furloughs from jail to visit his wife
[App. 89d-90d]
4. If he had contact with the surviving female victim who told him facts about
the shooting [App. 90d-91d]
5. If he was threatened by Bolena [App. 91d]
Because of his invocations, the defense was unable to fully confront Edwards
about his disavowals, which impaired Bell’s ability to show the disavowal was not
credible. Additionally, the questions regarding his ability to identify the perpetrator,
if in fact he was outside like he claimed at trial, were important because at the
evidentiary hearing, Edwards testified that he didn’t know Bell and might have seen
7
him one time prior to trial [App. 80d-81d], contrary to his trial testimony that Bell
was well known to him in an eyewitness identification case.
It should be noted that although Edwards said the facts stated in the affidavit
were lies, the furloughs from Duval County jail that he detailed in the affidavit were
testified to by his ex-wife Cathy Robertson [App. 231d-234d]. And Edwards’ close
working relationship with Bolena – which he detailed in the affidavit then later
denied on the stand – was testified to by Robertson [App. 231d-234d] and Glory
Mitchell [App. 240d-242d].
B. Charles Jones
At trial Jones testified that Bell tried to sell him an AK-47 after the murders
and confessed to him [App. 5j-8j] His trial testimony as to the circumstances of telling
law enforcement this was as follows: While Jones was in custody on federal charges
Bolena contacted him about an AK-47 and Jones told Bolena and the State Attorney’s
Office what he testified to in trial [App. 8j-9j]. Jones testified that although it was
possible testifying could help him in his federal case he did not think his testimony
would net him any benefit and that he was not hoping for any benefit from it [App.
3j-5j, 9j-11j]. After trial, prosecutor Bateh assisted Jones in obtaining a downward
departure for his federal sentence [App. 1c-3c].
Before the June 23, 2025, hearing, Jones signed a sworn affidavit in which he
recanted his trial testimony against Bell. It also provided details regarding police and
prosecutorial misconduct [App. 1c-3c].
At the June 23, 2025, hearing, the trial court allowed Jones to take the Fifth
8
to virtually every question regarding the affidavit. [App. 54d-69d] Jones did, however,
answer one very significant question:
Q Okay. I want you to look at this. I'm holding it up where you can see
it. Let me know. I affirm under the penalty for perjury that I have read
the foregoing and the facts contained therein and true. They are true.
Did you —- you signed that, right?
A Yes.
[App. 66d]
When asked a follow up to this question, he again took the Fifth [App. 66d67d]. The State did not cross-examine Jones at all [App. 69d-70d], not even on the
matter of him acknowledging he signed the affidavit under penalty of perjury and
that the facts contained therein were true.
C. Ericka Williams
At trial, Williams testified that she was Bell’s girlfriend, that she purchased
an AK-47 for him and that he made incriminating statements to her. Her trial
testimony as to the circumstances of her telling law enforcement about the
incriminating statements is as follows: she filed a police report about an AK-47 being
stolen, a Detective Johnson came to her home to talk to her about the police report,
and she told him everything about the case [App. 17e].
At the June 23, 2025, hearing, Williams presented a much different picture
regarding how she came to tell law enforcement incriminating evidence about Bell.
The first thing that happened was Bolena left a card on her door which said he needed
to talk to her about a “matter of life an death”. [App. 203d]. After getting the card,
9
someone from law enforcement showed up at her home and said she had to come
downtown right now. After getting a neighbor to watch her sick child, she went
downtown [App. 203d]. Her initial reluctance to this was that she was “petrified”
[App. 204d].
Once downtown, she was put in an interrogation room where she was kept for
12 to 14 hours [App. 204d]. During this period, she had contact with two officers who
would come in and out of the room [App. 204d-206d]. The two officers screamed at
her and threatened to take her children away. When asked what the officers said or
did to finally get her to talk, she pleaded the Fifth [App. 206d].
Williams also pleaded the Fifth when asked the following questions:
1. If Bolena used scare tactics with her [App. 199d]
2. If the two officers threatened to do anything to her if she did not talk to
them [App. 205d]
3. If anybody told her that she could go to jail for ten years
[App. 205d]
4. If anyone threatened her with being charged with accessory after the fact
[App. 205d]
5. If there were any threats during the 12-14 hour time when she was with
law enforcement [App. 205d-206d]
6. If she was reminded at a later time that they would take her children from
her [App. 205d-206d]
7. If she was told what could happen to her if she changed her statement [App.
205d-206d]
8. If she was afraid she would be charged with perjury
[App. 206d]
9. If she was afraid she could be charged as an accessory
[App. 205d]
It should be stated that when Williams was cross-examined by the State, she
could not recall if she had told the truth at trial or at the 2002 postconviction hearing
[App. 207d-208d].
10
D. Ned Pryor
At trial, Pryor testified that he was good friends with Bell [App. 15f], the day
before the murders Bell showed him an AK-47 [App. 12f-13f], that he witnessed Bell
commit the murders [App. 11f-15f], and that Bell made statements to him [App. 15f].
His trial testimony as to the circumstances of his telling these things to law
enforcement was as follows: he was arrested in October 1994 for criminal mischief,
Bolena came to ask him questions about the Moncrief murders and he told Bolena
and the State Attorney’s Office the same things he testified to at trial [App. 16f-17f].
Pryor said at trial that he did not receive any help or lenient treatment for his
testimony [App. 3f-5f, 17f].
At the June 23, 2025, hearing, Pryor said that he did not see Bell with a gun
the night of the murders [App. 213d] contrary to his trial testimony [App. 11f-15f].
Pryor also testified that he was not there the night of the murders [App. 213d-214d]
contrary to his trial testimony [App. 11f-15f]. When follow up questions were posed
to Pryor about these matters, he took the Fifth [App. 214d]. Because Pryor pleaded
the Fifth, Bell was precluded from further developing his record.
E. Dale George
At trial, George testified that he was a close friend of Bell [App. 5g], that he
was with Bell at the time of the murders and that he fled the scene with Bell [App.
5g-12g].
His trial testimony as to the circumstances of him providing law enforcement
with this information was as follows: he lied to Bolena at first and said he knew
11
nothing about the case, but after being arrested for being an accessory to the murders
two months later he told Bolena and the State Attorney’s Office what he knew [App.
14g-15g].
At the June 23, 2025, hearing, George was questioned regarding the
circumstances of his statement to Bolena. George pleaded the Fifth to the following
questions:
1. If
Bolena
“clotheslined”
him
when
he
was
[App. 228d-229d]
2. If Bolena threatened him [App. 229d]
3. If he was afraid of the victim’s family [App. 228d-229d]
4. If he was afraid of the State pulling his plea offer [App. 230d]
5. If he was afraid of perjury charges [App. 230d]
handcuffed
Had the trial court required George to answer these questions, additional and
significant evidence regarding a pattern of police misconduct would have been
developed.
F. Paula Goins
The final witness relevant to this Petition, Paula Goins, did not invoke the
Fifth Amendment privilege nor was she warned about perjury. She did, however,
testify about police and prosecutorial misconduct. Consistent with other witnesses,
she said that Detective Bolena fed her testimony, told her what to say at trial, and
physically intimidated her during interrogation. [App. 179d-185d, 191d] Detective
Bolena also threatened her with losing her home, job, and child custody if she did not
testify. [App. 180d-185d] She said, contrary to her trial testimony that Bell had
confessed directly to her [App. 7h-19h, 24h-26h] and said “I got him”, that what
12
actually happened was that she merely overheard Bell talking to Williams, and what
Bell actually said was “we got him” [App. 180d, 191d-192d] (Emphasis supplied.)
V.
The Florida Supreme Court Ruling
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge’s finding that the limited
testimony Bell did manage to obtain from the witnesses was not enough to prove any
newly discovered evidence of either false trial testimony or misconduct. [App. 18a]
13
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
State courts are the principal forum for rectifying constitutional errors in state
capital convictions and sentences. So, the process such state courts provide cannot be
structured to arbitrarily deny capital defendants the right to an opportunity to present
full and complete evidence.
Generally, claims should not fail for lack of proof when prosecutors and state
court judges work to actively prevent fact development by applying pressure to defense
witnesses. Specifically, in the instant case, it was improper for the State and the trial
court to interfere with Bell’s right to present evidence by threatening defense witnesses
with perjury, especially in a case where there are credible allegations that much of the
original trial testimony was coerced lies. The trial court erred further in allowing
witnesses to plead the Fifth to critical questions, including questions that had nothing
to do with any potential criminal misconduct of their own and questions on topics about
which they had already volunteered answers.
Interference of this magnitude is a violation of the heightened reliability and due
process guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States. Because Bell’s warrant-stage litigation was designed for him to fail,
his execution cannot constitutionally be carried out.
14
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I.
THE PROSECUTION AND THE TRIAL COURT ACTIVELY IMPAIRED
EVIDENCE PRESENTATION THUS PREVENTING THE SUCCESS OF A
COMPELLING RECANTATION CLAIM
In capital cases, the government is required to abide by two ”fundamental,
constitutional principles”. United States v. Beckford, 964 F.Supp. 993, 999 (E.D. Va.
1997). The first is heightened reliability because the sentence of death is final, and
therefore qualitatively different from other punishments. See Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410-11 (1986).
The second is that it is absolutely necessary to present the sentencer with as much
information as possible to ensure that the sentence imposed is individualized. See Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976).
The process below marred by the threat of perjury – from both the State and the
trial court – and the witnesses’ ensuing rampant abuse of the Fifth Amendment
privilege to avoid testifying impaired Bell’s Fourteenth Amendment due process right
to fairly present a defense and the distorted testimony such threats produced
undermined the heightened reliability and procedural safeguards required under the
Eighth Amendment.
a. The Specter of Perjury, introduced by the State and magnified by the Trial
Court, Deprived Bell of Crucial Evidence
“Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses
in his own defense.” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). “The Supreme
Court has expressly recognized that a party's right to present his own witnesses in
15
order to establish a defense is a fundamental element of due process.” Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967); U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV. The government may not
substantially interfere with the testimony of defense witnesses. See United States v.
Juan, 704 F.3d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir. 2013).
Although the Florida Supreme Court correctly recognized that in many
circumstances, warning a witness about the possibility and consequences of perjury
charges is warranted [App’x 51a], it is improper to “combine[] a standard admonition
against perjury … with an unambiguous statement of [the questioner's] belief that [the
witness] would be lying” if he testified as anticipated. United States v. Vavages, 151
F.3d 1185, 1185 (9th Cir. 1998).
Due process can be violated where judicial action (Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95
(1972)) or prosecutorial action (United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976))
leads to interference with the right to present the testimony of witnesses, and in Bell’s
case we have both the judge and the State presenting as a united front. The State and
judge both conflated telling lies with testifying differently than they did before, giving
the witnesses the wrong idea about what would be perjurious and thus improperly
broadcasting a “belief that [the witness] would be lying” if they testified as anticipated.
United States v. Vavages, 151 F.3d 1185, 1185 (9th Cir. 1998).
The State said in open court that charging Bell’s witnesses with perjury was a
“possibility if they come on the stand and they say that their prior testimony was a lie.”
16
[App. 22d] (Emphasis supplied.) Perjury is lying under oath. See § 837.021, Florida
Statutes.3
The judge appointed the witnesses lawyers to advise them about the
consequences for perjury but also exacerbated the State’s pressure on the witnesses to
lock into their previous testimony by warning them all individually that they could be
exposed to perjury not for false testimony but instead for any testimony “contradictory”
to or “different” than their prior testimony. See App. 26d [Judge to Edwards]: “Okay. So
you heard a lot of talk about perjury, and so I just want to advise you that, you know,
you're being called here as a witness. You'll be put under oath. The expectation of
everybody is that you're going to come up here on the stand and testify on the record,
and that testimony may be different than testimony you've given in the past.”; [App.
31d-32d] [Judge to Jones]: “you'd be asked questions and that [] testimony might
possibly contradict other sworn testimony you've given previously.”; [App. 154d] [Judge
to Williams]: “you could be perhaps giving answers that might contradict the answers
you gave previously under oath, which could potentially implicate charges of perjury” ;
[App. 160d] [Judge to Pryor]: “could be asked things that might potentially contradict
prior sworn testimony”; [App. 166d] [Judge to George]: “the questions you would be
asked today would implicate previously sworn testimony that you have given, and it
Compounding this error, what the State asserted is a legally incorrect theory of
prosecution for perjury in Florida. Lies told at Bell’s 1995 trial, even though in a capital
case, would not be actionable in 2025 because it would be subject to Florida’s pre-1997
statute of limitations (up to three years) which would have already expired. See
Sheppard v. State, 338 So. 3d 803, 825 n. 6 (Fla. 2022).
17
3
could have perjury implications”. (Emphasis supplied.) It does not require much of an
“interpretative gloss” on the warning from the State and judge here to conclude that if
the witnesses did anything but affirmed their prior testimony, they would be
prosecuted. Vavages, 151 F.3d at 1190.
The witnesses here were reasonably expected to repeat in court what they told
Bell’s investigators and thus provide testimony favorable to Bell. The only reason they
did not do that was the threat of perjury. Had the recanters and the other supportive
witnesses not been dissuaded by the perjury threat, there is reason to believe that the
trial court would have found two separate and distinct recantations credible and
granted Bell’s motion for a new trial or at least a new penalty phase. So, Bell was
harmed by the prevention of testimony that would have bolstered his case. See United
States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872 (1982) (due process is offended where
the defendant is wrongfully denied testimony that “would have been favorable and
material.”); United States v. Thomas, 488 F.2d 334, 336 (6th Cir. 1973) (reversing
conviction where the government's conduct “substantially interfered with any free and
unhampered determination the witness might have made as to whether to testify and
if so as to the content of such testimony”).
The State could have challenged any witness who testified favorably for Bell
through the traditional means of cross-examination and the presentation of contrary
evidence. Instead, this meddling with defense witness testimony distorted the judicial
fact-finding process and the pressure brought to bear on these witnesses interfered with
the voluntariness of their choice and infringed Bell's constitutional right to have freely18
given testimony and to mount a fair and complete defense during warrant litigation in
order to ensure the reliability of his convictions and his death sentence prior to his
execution.
b. The Refusal of the Trial Judge to Cabin the Witnesses’ Use of Fifth
Amendment Privilege Deprived Bell of the Opportunity to Develop a
Complete Record
The witnesses’ near blanket invocations of the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination was improper and the judge interfered with Bell’s ability to prove his
claim by permitting it. A witness must invoke the privilege question by question, so the
trial court can determine as to each question whether the answer would endanger the
witness's rights. See United States v. Thornton, 733 F.2d 121, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1984). An
exception to this requirement exists only if there is a reasonable basis to believe that
answering any relevant questions may endanger the witness. Id. at 126. Here, however,
the record does not demonstrate, nor were the witnesses even required to allege, such
danger.
The recanting witnesses’ sworn affidavits stated they had lied about Bell at trial
but also asserted allegations of police and prosecutorial misconduct in the case. After
the witnesses were locked into their prior testimonies under threat of perjury, Bell
attempted to prove the veracity of some of the other statements in the recantations
about how the State and police investigating Bell’s case had threatened and coerced
witnesses. Bell asked Henry Edwards, Charles Jones, Ericka Williams, Ned Pryor, and
Dale George, about such misconduct but they were all permitted to refuse to answer.
19
Jones took the Fifth every time he was asked whether the lead detective or the
prosecutor coerced, coached, or threatened him [App. 59d-64d]; Edwards took the Fifth
regarding his assertion in his sworn affidavit that he received furloughs from jail in
exchange for his trial testimony against Bell [App. 89d-90d], whether he was allowed to
confer with other witnesses about his trial testimony [App. 91d], and whether he was
threatened by Detective Bolena [App. 91d]; Williams took the Fifth when asked what
police said or did to finally get her to talk and whether she was subject to any more
serious threats other than losing custody of her children [App. 199d-206d]; George took
the Fifth when questioned at the evidentiary hearing about his statement to
investigators that the lead detective in Bell’s case had threatened him and physically
assaulted him when he was interviewed about the murders [App. 227d-230d].
What criminal liability would a witness to police misconduct conceivably be
subject to? Reaching, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that all of the witnesses properly
invoked the Fifth because they were at least at risk of being prosecuted for perjury if
they did not invoke the privilege [App. 13a-14a]. This badly misapprehends the
intersection between the Fifth Amendment and perjury. Indeed, “ ‘I might lie’ isn't a
basis for asserting the Fifth Amendment.” United States v. Howard, No. 18-CR-667,
2024 WL 2019412, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 2024). A witness cannot avoid testifying based
on the possibility that he might perjure himself. That is, the possibility of committing a
future crime – a new act of perjury – is not enough. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson,
561 F. Supp. 2d 938, 958 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“[N]o one has the constitutional right not to
testify on the ground that she will lie and thus be subjected to a perjury prosecution.”);
20
United States v. Whittington, 783 F.2d 1210, 1218 (5th Cir. 1986) (same). See also
United States v. Allmon, 594 F.3d 981, 987 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment
confers no right upon a witness to avoid testifying simply because he refuses, for one
reason or another, to do so truthfully.”). So, the witnesses should have been required to
testify – under penalty of perjury – to the truth. And the trial court should have been
able to receive that truth, whatever it was, and decide Bell’s death warrant claims based
on that and not a skewed version of the facts.
Additionally, several witnesses volunteered answers thus waiving their right to
assert privilege on those same topics. Despite Jones and Edwards both admitting to
signing the oaths contained in their sworn recantations swearing the contents were
true, and especially despite Edwards repeated and specific disavowals, they were both
allowed to plead the Fifth. Williams, despite voluntarily answering questions about
police threats, was permitted to take the Fifth as to follow up questions. [App. 203d206d] Pryor, despite testifying that he was not there the night of the murders [App.
213d-214d] contrary to his trial testimony that he witnessed Bell commit the murders
[App. 11f-15f], was permitted to take the Fifth to follow up questions. Once the
witnesses chose to talk about certain things, they should not have been given continued
license to use the privilege as a shield after such admissions. A witness “may not testify
voluntarily about a subject and then invoke the privilege against self-incrimination
when questioned about the details.” Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 321 (1999).
When the witness testifies, “[t]he privilege is waived for the matters to which the
witness testifies.” Id.
21
c. Executing Mr. Bell Without a Full and Complete Opportunity to Prove
that False Testimony Contributed to his Convictions and Death Sentence
Would Raise Serious Constitutional Issues
To hear the State tell it – Bell has had more than his fair share of due process
because he’s been accusing trial witnesses of lying and accusing the police and
prosecutor of misconduct in this case for over two decades without proof. However, in
June of 2025, witnesses finally began admitting he was right all along. But the State
made sure that finality would prevail over any reasoned determination of the truth by
announcing in open court that perjury charges could result from any change in previous
testimony. The trial court repeated this conflation of true perjury (lying) with
contradicting former testimony to the witnesses. Unsurprisingly, this worked to shut
the witnesses down. The recanting witnesses backtracked. And hardly any of the
witnesses admitted to the misconduct they had described to Bell’s investigators just
days earlier.
The Florida Supreme Court’s adoption of the trial court’s reasoning, resting as it
does on the quantity and quality of substantive evidence presented by Bell on June 23,
2025, was skewed because the fact development process itself was hampered. Had Bell’s
witnesses answered questions about the false testimony, coercion, threats, undisclosed
promises, and police brutality they told Bell’s investigators about, the trial court would
have had a full record on which to make a reliable determination about the substantive
points Bell was trying to prove but also about the credibility of his witnesses – good or
bad. Instead, Bell’s last chance to prove what he's known for twenty years was decided
on incomplete evidence.
22
This Court cannot overlook the fact that what is aggravating enough to warrant
a death sentence despite the presence of mitigation, or what is mitigating enough to
extend mercy despite the presence of substantial aggravation, is different for every
juror. The prejudicial impact of potential false testimony placing Bell at the scene and
the murder weapon in his hand, as well as the value of evidence of police or prosecutorial
misconduct, cannot be diminished.
If Edwards had said in 1995, like he did two weeks ago to Bell’s investigators,
that he actually didn’t see Bell commit the murders, and if Jones had told Bell’s jury
that he didn’t actually hear Bell confess and didn’t see him later with the murder
weapon, and if the jury was told that in order to get the other witnesses to testify against
Bell police and the prosecutor had to coerce and threaten them, individual jurors, or the
jury as a whole, could have evaluated the credibility of the witnesses and the
aggravation in the case much differently when assessing his guilt but especially when
deciding whether he should put to death.
Michael Bell's death sentence, very likely imposed after such a tainted jury
verdict, and definitely affirmed in a warrant-stage litigation so lacking in process that
it offends due process and heightened reliability requirements cannot constitutionally
be carried out. This Court should grant certiorari to remedy the egregious violation, to
prevent its recurrence, and to ensure reliability in capital sentencing.
23
CONCLUSION
This Court should grant the petition for a writ of certiorari; stay the execution
and order further briefing, and / or remand this case.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Robert Norgard
ROBERT NORGARD*
Fla. Bar No. 322059
P.O. Box 811
Bartow, FL 33831
(863) 533-8556
Norgardlaw@verizon.net
office@norgardlaw.com
*Counsel of Record
/s/ Rachel Paige Roebuck
RACHEL PAIGE ROEBUCK
Fla. Bar No. 118886
511 Columbia Drive, #11
Tampa, FL 33606
(904) 718-9382
rroebucklaw@gmail.com
Dated: July 10, 2025.
24
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.