Amicus Curiae Brief — Julien P. Champagne, Petitioner v. Douglas A. Collins, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

No. 25-482

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

___________________________

JULIEN P. CHAMPAGNE,

v.

Petitioner,

DOUGLAS A. COLLINS,

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent.

___________________________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

___________________________

BRIEF OF MILITARY-VETERANS

ADVOCACY, INC. AS AMICUS CURIAE IN

SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

___________________________

John B. Wells

Brian Lewis

MILITARY-VETERANS

ADVOCACY, INC.

P.O. Box 5235

Slidell, LA 70469-5235

(985) 641-1855

JohnLawEsq@msn.com

Melanie L. Bostwick

Counsel of Record

Melanie R. Hallums

Anne W. Savin

ORRICK, HERRINGTON &

SUTCLIFFE LLP

2100 Pennsylvania

Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20037

(202) 339-8400

mbostwick@orrick.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... iii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ............................1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT .........................................................2

ARGUMENT ...............................................................3

I.

The Anglo-American Tradition Has Long

Benefited Military Veterans. ...............................3

A. Governments for centuries have

recognized a moral obligation to grant

veterans support and prerogatives. ................4

B. Keeping with historical tradition,

Congress enacted a comprehensive proveteran system for benefits

adjudication. ....................................................7

II. Considering Veterans’ Claims For

Compensation And Pension Together

Makes Sense In This Larger Statutory

Scheme And The Narrower Regulatory

Framework............................................................9

A. The Federal Circuit misconstrued the

duties imposed by 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.151(a)

and 3.152(b)(1). .............................................10

B. VA has long recognized the value in

concurrently processing overlapping

disability claims. ...........................................14

III. The Veterans Canon Reinforces The

Correct Interpretation Of The Statutory

Text. ....................................................................16

ii

A. This Court has endorsed the veterans

canon for more than 80 years. ......................17

B. The veterans canon applies with full

force here. ......................................................19

CONCLUSION ..........................................................25

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Arellano v. McDonough,

598 U.S. 1 (2023) ..................................................19

Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Buell,

480 U.S. 557 (1987) ..............................................22

Biden v. Nebraska,

600 U.S. 477 (2023) ........................................16, 19

Boone v. Lightner,

319 U.S. 561 (1943) ........................................16, 17

Champagne v. McDonough,

122 F.4th 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2024) ............................1

Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp.,

447 U.S. 191 (1980) ..............................................18

Comer v. Peake,

552 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ............................16

Ferraro v. Derwinski,

1 Vet. App. 326 (1991) .........................................15

Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp.,

328 U.S. 275 (1946) ..............................................18

Gomez v. Toledo,

446 U.S. 635 (1980) ..............................................22

iv

Henderson v. Shinseki,

562 U.S. 428 (2011) .................. 2, 16, 18, 19, 20, 24

John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States,

552 U.S. 130 (2008) ..............................................15

King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp.,

502 U.S. 215 (1991) .............................. 3, 16, 18, 19

Kisor v. McDonough,

995 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ............................23

Kisor v. Wilkie,

588 U.S. 558 (2019) ..............................................23

Lynch v. McDonough,

21 F.4th 776 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ................................8

Mathis v. Shulkin,

582 U.S. 941 (2017) ................................................2

McDonald v. Thompson,

305 U.S. 263 (1938) ..............................................22

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v.

Bruen,

597 U.S. 1 (2022) ....................................................3

Pelea v. Nicholson,

497 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ............................13

Plesha v. United States,

123 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Cal. 1953).........................3

v

Regan v. Taxation With Representation

of Washington,

461 U.S. 540 (1983) ..........................................4, 19

Rudisill v. McDonough,

601 U.S. 294 (2024) ........................................17, 19

Shinseki v. Sanders,

556 U.S. 396 (2009) .............................. 9, 16, 20, 23

Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith,

305 U.S. 424 (1939) ..............................................22

Splane v. West,

216 F.3d 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ............................13

Tcherepnin v. Knight,

389 U.S. 332 (1967) ..............................................22

United States v. Oregon,

366 U.S. 643 (1961) ........................................16, 23

United States v. Rodgers,

461 U.S. 677 (1983) ..............................................12

Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation

Survivors,

473 U.S. 305 (1985) .................................. 6, 7, 8, 20

West Virginia v. EPA,

597 U.S. 697 (2022) ..............................................13

Foreign Cases

Heydon’s Case (1584)

76 Eng. Rep. 637 ..................................................22

vi

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1254 ..........................................................9

38 U.S.C. § 101(14)....................................................11

38 U.S.C. § 101(15)....................................................11

38 U.S.C. § 501(a)(2) .................................................21

38 U.S.C. § 511(a)........................................................8

38 U.S.C. § 1110 ............................................ 10, 12, 24

38 U.S.C. §§ 1110-1176 ...............................................7

38 U.S.C. §§ 1116-1120 ...............................................8

38 U.S.C. § 1131 ........................................................24

38 U.S.C. § 1311 ..................................................10, 11

38 U.S.C. § 1513 ............................................ 10, 12, 24

38 U.S.C. § 1521 ............................................ 10, 12, 24

38 U.S.C. § 1541 ..................................................10, 11

38 U.S.C. § 3311 ..........................................................7

38 U.S.C. § 3710 ..........................................................7

38 U.S.C. § 3742 ..........................................................7

38 U.S.C. § 5101 ....................................................7, 24

38 U.S.C. § 5101(a)(1)(A) ..........................................21

vii

38 U.S.C. § 5102(b)......................................................8

38 U.S.C. § 5103 ..........................................................8

38 U.S.C. § 5103A .................................................8, 23

38 U.S.C. § 5103A(b) ...................................................8

38 U.S.C. § 5104A .......................................................8

38 U.S.C. § 5107(b)......................................................8

38 U.S.C. § 5109 ..........................................................8

38 U.S.C. § 5121 ..................................................10, 11

38 U.S.C. § 7105 ..........................................................9

38 U.S.C. § 7251 ........................................................21

38 U.S.C. § 7252 ........................................................21

38 U.S.C. § 7266 ..........................................................9

38 U.S.C. § 7292 ..........................................................9

Act of January 29, 1813, ch. 16, 2 Stat. 794,..............6

Act of July 3, 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-536,

ch. 863, 46 Stat. 1016 ............................................7

Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 166, 12 Stat. 566 .................6

Act of September 29, 1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95.............5

Economy Act of 1933, ch. 3, 48 Stat. 8 .......................7

viii

Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944,

ch. 268, 58 Stat. 284 ..............................................7

World War Adjusted Compensation Act

of 1924, ch. 157, 43 Stat. 121 ................................6

Rules and Regulations

38 C.F.R. § 2.1026 (1938) ..........................................14

38 C.F.R. § 2.1026 (1944) ..........................................14

38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-3.1010................................................7

38 C.F.R. § 3.26 (1956) ..............................................14

38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) .................................................1, 8

38 C.F.R. § 3.103(d) .....................................................8

38 C.F.R. § 3.150(a) ...................................................13

38 C.F.R. § 3.150(b) ...................................................13

38 C.F.R. § 3.151 ..................................... 10, 15, 16, 21

38 C.F.R. § 3.151 (1963) ............................................15

38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a) ... 1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 24

38 C.F.R. § 3.151(c) ...................................................13

38 C.F.R. § 3.152 .................................................10, 11

38 C.F.R. § 3.152(b)(1) .................................. 10, 11, 12

38 C.F.R. § 3.152(c)(1) ...............................................13

ix

38 C.F.R. § 3.153 .......................................................13

38 C.F.R. § 3.155 .........................................................7

38 C.F.R. § 3.155(d)(2) ................................................8

38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) .....................................................8

38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c) .....................................................8

38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4) .................................................8

38 C.F.R. § 3.307 .........................................................8

38 C.F.R. § 3.309 .........................................................8

38 C.F.R. § 3.326 .........................................................8

38 C.F.R. § 3.328 .........................................................8

26 Fed. Reg. 1570 (Feb. 24, 1961).............................15

Other Authorities

Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive

Canons and Faithful Agency, 90

B.U. L. Rev. 109 (2010) ........................................22

Eric Hughes, Before Boone v. Lightner:

The Lost History of the Pro-Veteran

Canon, 42 Miss. Coll. L. Rev. 4 (2024) ..................5

Exec. Order No. 5398 (July 21, 1930),

https://tinyurl.com/4nx5u6hw ...............................7

x

Greater, Oxford English Dictionary,

https://tinyurl.com/4cupkedw (last

visited Nov. 3, 2025) ............................................12

H.R. Rep. No. 100-963 (1988) ...................................21

Henry de Bracton, 4 On the Laws and

Customs of England (approx. 1220-1240) .............4

Statutes of the Realm (1225-1713) ..........................4, 5

Terence McArdle, The veterans were

desperate; Gen. MacArthur ordered

U.S. troops to attack them, Wash.

Post (July 28, 2017) ...............................................6

U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, The

Origin of the VA Motto,

https://tinyurl.com/4ku2vez6 (last

visited Nov. 18, 2025) ............................................6

U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, VA

History (May 27, 2021),

https://tinyurl.com/yexhm4ab .............................20

Veterans Admin., Department of Veterans

Benefits Manual, M21-1, Adjudication

Procedure 21-1 (April 13, 1983),

https://tinyurl.com/863dc4ks ...............................15

Veterans’ Benefits in the United States:

A Report to the President (April

1956), https://tinyurl.com/3edjxmx8 ...................15

1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on

the Laws of England (1765) .........................5, 9, 22

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1

Military-Veterans Advocacy, Inc. (MVA) is a nonprofit organization that litigates and advocates on behalf of servicemembers and veterans. Established in

2012 in Slidell, Louisiana, MVA educates and trains

servicemembers and veterans concerning rights and

benefits, represents veterans contesting the improper

denial of benefits, and advocates for legislation to protect and expand servicemembers’ and veterans’ rights

and benefits.

The Federal Circuit’s decision in Champagne v.

McDonough, 122 F.4th 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2024), erodes

veterans’ rights to hard-earned benefits by affirming

a strained reading of 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a). That regulation obligates the Department of Veterans Affairs

(VA) to award “[t]he greater benefit” between compensation and pension when a disabled veteran applies

for either. The court of appeals, however, affirmed an

interpretation that allows VA to ignore that obligation and its duty to grant veterans “every benefit that

can be supported in law,” 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a). MVA

urges this Court to grant certiorari to restore the

plain meaning of § 3.151(a).

1 No counsel for a party authored the brief in whole or in

part. No party, counsel for a party, or any person other than amicus curiae and their counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief. The

parties were notified of MVA’s intent to file this brief on November 19, 2025. Although notice was provided less than 10 days

before the deadline for this brief, there is no prejudice to Respondent, which has already requested and received a 30-day extension for its brief in opposition.

2

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT

Building on a centuries-long Anglo-American tradition of compensating veterans for their sacrifices,

Congress over the last century created a comprehensively pro-claimant veterans’ benefits system. A veteran’s application under 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a) triggers

a constellation of VA duties to claimants, including to

assist and to maximize benefits. In this comprehensive congressional scheme, VA must evaluate a disabled veteran’s eligibility for disability compensation

and disability pension when the veteran applies for

either form of benefit.

Indeed, for more than a half-century, VA did just

that. But the Federal Circuit below endorsed VA’s rejection of this long-standing interpretation. In doing

so, the Federal Circuit ignored the regulation’s plain

mandate that the “greater benefit will be awarded” to

a disabled veteran and misunderstood § 3.151(a)’s

distinctive role in the regulatory context. VA adopted,

and the Federal Circuit validated, a reinterpretation

of § 3.151(a) that does “nothing to assist, and much to

impair, the interests of those the law says the agency

is supposed to serve.” Mathis v. Shulkin, 582 U.S. 941,

941 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). It did this despite the simple principle—

known as the veterans canon—that Congress intends

to benefit veterans when it legislates veterans’ benefits.

The veterans canon provides that “provisions for

benefits to members of the Armed Services are to be

construed in the beneficiaries’ favor.” Henderson v.

3

Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 441 (2011) (quoting King v. St.

Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 220-21 n.9 (1991)). This

approach effectuates Congress’s intent to help veterans through the very legislation enacted for their benefit. The long history of this Court’s application of this

and other canons as traditional tools of statutory and

regulatory interpretation illustrates its proper role

and continued vitality.

ARGUMENT

I.

The Anglo-American Tradition Has Long

Benefited Military Veterans.

While the United States is the most “generous”

“country in the world … in the treatment of its service

men and veterans,” veterans’ benefits long predate its

existence. Plesha v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 593,

594 (N.D. Cal. 1953), rev’d on other grounds, 227 F.2d

624 (9th Cir. 1955). English common and statutory

law recognized veteran prerogatives as early as the

13th century. 2 Congress built upon these antecedents

in erecting the uniquely pro-claimant veterans’ benefits system that exists today.

2 England is not the original wellspring of veterans’ benefits, which existed in antiquity. See Pet. 22-23. MVA focuses on

English law given this Court’s emphasis on “English practices

that ‘prevailed up to the period immediately before and after the

framing of the Constitution.’” New York State Rifle & Pistol

Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 34 (2022) (citation omitted).

4

A. Governments

for

centuries

have

recognized a moral obligation to grant

veterans support and prerogatives.

While the United States “has a long standing policy of compensating veterans for their past contributions by providing them with numerous advantages,”

Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 551 (1983), it was not the first to

favor veterans by law. For centuries before the United

States was founded, England provided military veterans with benefits and privileges.

Upon assuming the English throne, King Henry

VI granted allowances to his father King Henry V’s

“Lords and Captains … which have indented with the

gracious King Henry … in all his Wars,” whether they

“be in Life” or already “commanded to God.” Statutes

of the Realm (1225-1713), 1 Hen. VI, Item V (1422). In

turn, King Henry VII gave soldiers serving “beyond

the Sea” in France and sailors “on the Sea” immunity

“in all the King’s Courts and other Courts” from legal

proceedings and most financial obligations while in

military service. Id., 7 Hen. VII, c. 2 (1491); see id., 4

Hen. VII, c. 4 (1488-89) (same); see also Henry de

Bracton, 4 On the Laws and Customs of England 7379 (approx. 1220-1240) (describing common-law traditions of essoin (or excuse for non-appearance in

court), including in “the service of the lord king” and

after “the summons of the army”).

In awarding pensions to soldiers who defended

England against the Spanish Armada, Queen Elizabeth I recognized their dual purposes: Soldiers “at

their return [should] be relieved and rewarded … that

5

they may reap the Fruit of their good deserving, and

others may be encouraged to perform the like Endeavors.” 3 Statutes of the Realm, supra, 35 Eliz. c. 4 (159293); id., 43 Eliz. c. 3 (1601) (same). She required every

parish to pay weekly support to those who “lost their

Limbs or disabled their Bodies … in the defense and

service of her Majesty and the State.” Id., 35 Eliz. c. 4

(1592-93); see id., 39 Eliz. c. 21 (1597-98) (raising

taxes as “the said former Act has not provided sufficiently for the Relief of the Soldiers and Mariners”).

When Queen Elizabeth forbade begging, she exempted Soldiers from “ask[ing] & receiv[ing] such Relief as shall be necessary in & for [their] passage”

upon being “landed” or “discharged” from service. Id.,

39 Eliz. c. 3 (1597-98). By these early enactments, Sir

William Blackstone later observed, soldiers were “in

some cases put in a much better” “condition than any

other subjects.” 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries

on the Laws of England 404 (1765) (“Blackstone”).

English colonists brought this solicitude for veterans across the Atlantic Ocean, with the Plymouth Colony, the Massachusetts Bay Company, and the

Colony of Virginia granting veterans’ benefits as early

as the 17th century. Eric Hughes, Before Boone v.

Lightner: The Lost History of the Pro-Veteran Canon,

42 Miss. Coll. L. Rev. 4, 8-9 (2024). A newly independent United States continued the tradition, with the

First Session of the First Congress guaranteeing Revolutionary War pensions. Act of September 29, 1789,

ch. 24, § 1, 1 Stat. 95 (assuring federal payment of

3 Spelling has been modernized.

6

state pensions granted to veterans wounded and disabled “during the late war”). After each subsequent

conflict, Congress again passed legislation to compensate each conflict’s veterans. Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of

Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 309 (1985); see,

e.g., Act of January 29, 1813, ch. 16, §§ 10-11, 2 Stat.

794, 795-96 (granting disability benefits to veterans

of the War of 1812 and pensions to their widows and

orphans); Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 166, § 1, 12 Stat.

566 (granting benefits for illness, injury, or death incurred by Union veterans during the Civil War).

In 1865, President Abraham Lincoln, seeking to

heal a divided nation with his second inaugural address, invoked this historic duty to reconcile veterans

of the Civil War. He asked the country “to bind up the

nation’s wounds, to care for him who shall have borne

the battle and for his widow, and his orphan,” “[w]ith

malice toward none.” U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,

The Origin of the VA Motto, https://tinyurl.com/4ku2vez6 (last visited Nov. 18, 2025).

Those words remain emblazoned on VA’s headquarters, a “solemn reminder of VA’s commitment to care

for those injured in our nation’s defense and the families of those killed in its service.” Id.

World War I and the Great Depression placed tremendous burdens on veterans, due in part to deferred

bonuses promised in the war’s aftermath. World War

Adjusted Compensation Act of 1924, ch. 157, § 501, 43

Stat. 121, 125-26; Terence McArdle, The veterans

were desperate; Gen. MacArthur ordered U.S. troops

to attack them, Wash. Post (July 28, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/qpqubwx. To remediate these hardships,

7

Congress in 1930 authorized the President to “consolidate and coordinate governmental activities affecting

war veterans.” Act of July 3, 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-536,

ch. 863 (title), 46 Stat. 1016. A few weeks later, President Herbert Hoover signed an executive order establishing the Veterans’ Administration as an

independent federal agency. Exec. Order No. 5398

(July 21, 1930), https://tinyurl.com/4nx5u6hw.

Through this new agency, Congress would launch a

new era in veterans’ benefits.

B. Keeping with historical tradition,

Congress enacted a comprehensive proveteran

system

for

benefits

adjudication.

This new era marked the modern capstone of the

Anglo-American tradition. Congress created VA to administer a new, unequivocally pro-claimant system of

generous veterans’ benefits. See, e.g., Economy Act of

1933, ch. 3, § 1(a), 48 Stat. 8 (authorizing a pension

for “active military or naval” personnel disabled in

service); Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (also

known as the G.I. Bill), ch. 268, 58 Stat. 284-92 (establishing hospitals and mortgage and tuition assistance for veterans). The benefits are comprehensive,

including medical care, tuition, housing loans, disability payments, and burial benefits. See Nat’l Ass’n of

Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. at 309-11; 38 U.S.C.

§§ 1110-1176, 3311, 3710, 3742. This system favors

veterans at every turn. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-3.1010.

To initiate a claim, a veteran files an application

with VA. 38 U.S.C. § 5101; 38 C.F.R. § 3.155. Federal

law directs VA to “decide all questions of law and fact

8

necessary to a decision by [VA] under a law that affects the provision of benefits … to veterans.” 38

U.S.C. § 511(a). To that end, VA must notify the

claimant of any additional information required to

complete the application before rendering an adverse

decision. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5102(b), 5103; see 38 C.F.R.

§ 3.159(b). VA also must assist the claimant in obtaining supporting evidence. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R.

§ 3.159(c).

A veteran may support a disability claim with private medical records. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(b); 38 C.F.R.

§ 3.326. VA may also schedule a medical examination

at no cost to the veteran. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.159(c)(4),

3.326. In complex cases, a veteran may seek an independent opinion from an outside expert. 38 U.S.C.

§ 5109; 38 C.F.R. § 3.328. Congress has enacted presumptions of service-connection for a variety of injuries and diseases to further ease a claimant’s burden

of proof. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1116-1120; 38 C.F.R.

§§ 3.307, 3.309.

The veteran is entitled to a non-adversarial hearing. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(d); Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. at 309-10. VA must award benefits if

the assembled evidence supports the claim or is in

“approximate balance”; only when evidence “persuasively favors” the government may VA deny the claim.

38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); Lynch v. McDonough, 21 F.4th

776, 781-82 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (en banc). Once VA

makes a “finding favorable to the claimant,” it binds

all VA adjudicators unless rebutted with clear and

convincing evidence. 38 U.S.C. § 5104A. VA must

“grant[] every benefit that can be supported in law.”

38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(d)(2)

9

(requiring adjudication of even “ancillary benefits”). A

claimant who disagrees with VA’s decision may appeal first to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, then the

Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, the Federal

Circuit, and finally this Court. 38 U.S.C. §§ 7105,

7266, 7292; 28 U.S.C. § 1254.

Congress manifests its “special solicitude for the

veterans’ cause” through the benevolent adjudication

of these benefits. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396,

412 (2009). The statutory scheme favors veterans at

every stage—as Blackstone put it, “put[ting them] in

a much better” “condition than any other” citizen.

1 Blackstone at 404. Veterans’ benefits regulations—

promulgated by the agency Congress created for the

sole purpose of implementing and administering its

pro-veteran legislation—must be read in harmony

with this self-evident congressional purpose.

II. Considering

Veterans’

Claims

For

Compensation And Pension Together Makes

Sense In This Larger Statutory Scheme And

The Narrower Regulatory Framework.

The regulation governing the disability compensation that Mr. Champagne first sought in 1987—38

C.F.R. § 3.151(a)—is unambiguous and consistent

with both the Anglo-American tradition and this selfevident congressional purpose. Section 3.151(a) requires that, when a veteran eligible for both applies

for disability compensation or disability pension, VA

must consider both benefits and award “[t]he

greater.” Indeed, for years VA interpreted § 3.151(a)

to require that dual evaluation, consistent with the

10

regulation’s plain language, our legal tradition, and

Congress’s manifest beneficence toward veterans.

A. The Federal Circuit misconstrued the

duties imposed by 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.151(a)

and 3.152(b)(1).

Among the generous resources available to veterans are the disability benefits governed by 38 C.F.R.

§ 3.151 that Mr. Champagne applied for in 1987:

(a) service-connected disability compensation; and

(b) pensions for those who are (i) at least 65 years old

or (ii) permanently and totally disabled from a nonservice-connected disability. 4 See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110

(service-connected disability), 1513 (age-related pension), 1521 (“non-service-connected disability”). Section § 3.152 governs similar benefits for family

members of deceased veterans, including dependency

and indemnity compensation (DIC), death pensions,

and accrued benefits. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1311 (DIC),

1541 (death pensions), 5121 (accrued benefits).

The Federal Circuit’s decision denying Mr. Champagne’s claim relied in part on the “overall regulatory

scheme” as embodied in these two regulations. Pet.

App. 13a. Because § 3.151(a) uses the permissive

“may be considered” and § 3.152(b)(1) the mandatory

“will be considered” to define VA’s obligation to weigh

alternative benefits, the Federal Circuit concluded

4 In 1987, Mr. Champagne, then only 52 years old, would

have been ineligible for an age-related pension under 38 U.S.C.

§ 1513. CAFC App. 25. His entitlement to disability compensation rather than pension thus turned exclusively on whether his

disability was service-connected, which VA has conceded it was.

Pet. 12; Pet. App. 5a.

11

the regulations obligated VA to consider all available

benefits for family members while denying the same

latitude to veterans. Pet. App. 12a-13a. In other

words, the Federal Circuit authorized VA to treat

family members more favorably than the veterans

whose service is the source of their family’s entitlement.

The Federal Circuit’s erroneous decision misunderstands both the text and context of these regulations. As the Federal Circuit noted, § 3.152(b)(1)

mandates that a DIC application “will also be considered” as an application for death pensions and accrued benefits and vice versa. 38 C.F.R. § 3.152(b)(1);

Pet. App. 13a. This makes sense because every benefit

available under § 3.152 shares a prerequisite: the

death of the veteran. VA awards survivors DIC if the

veteran’s death is service-connected, 38 U.S.C.

§ 101(14); see 38 U.S.C. § 1311, and a pension if it is

not, 38 U.S.C. § 101(15); see 38 U.S.C. § 1541. VA also

awards survivors accrued benefits—those due but not

paid to a veteran before her death. 38 U.S.C. § 5121.

Unquestionably, then, any application making the

threshold showing of the veteran’s death is eligible for

at least one of these benefits. Treating an application

for one as an application for all enhances VA efficiency and accelerates survivors’ receipt of benefits.

Unlike § 3.152, the veterans’ benefits awarded

under § 3.151(a) do not share a single common prerequisite, rendering § 3.152(b)(1) an imperfect analogue

and the Federal Circuit’s reasoning flawed. Contra

Pet. App. 13a (recognizing differences only in the regulations’ language, not in their function). Service-connected disability compensation and non-service-

12

connected disability pension share an obvious prerequisite—disability. Compare 38 U.S.C. § 1110, with 38

U.S.C. § 1521. But another benefit is available under

§ 3.151(a) that does not depend on a disability—a pension for veterans aged 65 or older. 38 U.S.C. § 1513.

In other words, a disabled applicant will qualify for

one of two benefits—compensation or pension—while

an able-bodied applicant will qualify for only pension.

The “compulsory language” of § 3.152(b)(1) upon

which the Federal Circuit’s opinion depends therefore

has no place in § 3.151(a). Pet. App. 13a.

Section 3.151(a) must be read with these differences in mind:

A claim by a veteran for compensation may

be considered to be a claim for pension; and

a claim by a veteran for pension may be considered to be a claim for compensation. The

greater benefit will be awarded, unless the

claimant specifically elects the lesser benefit.

38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a). The “may be considered” language reflects the simple fact that different applicants trigger different duties under the regulation.

VA need only consider an able-bodied applicant for a

pension. But for disabled applicants, VA can only satisfy its duty to award the “greater” of compensation or

pension by comparing those benefits. Greater, Oxford

English Dictionary, https://tinyurl.com/4cupkedw

(last visited Nov. 3, 2025) (“The comparative of

great”). “May” thus allows VA to award the “greater

benefit” without a redundant application. See United

States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706 (1983) (discretion

13

implied by “may” “can be defeated by … obvious inferences from the [regulation’s] structure and purpose”).

“May” does not, as the Federal Circuit’s decision suggests, invite VA “to provide more favorable treatment

for veterans’ [survivors] than it provide[s] for veterans, who are the primary focus of the veterans’ benefits legislation,” Pelea v. Nicholson, 497 F.3d 1290,

1292 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

Section 3.151(a)’s placement in a larger mandatory scheme reinforces this understanding. West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 721 (2022). Upon request,

“the appropriate application form will be furnished”

by VA. 38 C.F.R. § 3.150(a). When a veteran dies, “the

appropriate application form will be forwarded to” dependents. Id. § 3.150(b). When an application “encompasses a request for more than one determination of

entitlement, each specific entitlement will be adjudicated and ... considered a separate issue.” Id.

§ 3.151(c). VA “will issue a decision” as to each. Id.

And, as with a veteran’s disability compensation or

disability pension claim, applications for benefits

with common eligibility requirements “will be considered” interchangeably. See, e.g., id. §§ 3.152(c)(1),

3.153. Even within § 3.151(a), “will” follows “may”:

“The greater benefit will be awarded.” Id. § 3.151(a).

VA cannot satisfy the “will” if it reads “may” to avoid

comparing benefits in the first instance. See Splane v.

West, 216 F.3d 1058, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2000). These imperatives demonstrate that § 3.151(a)’s “may” authorizes VA to undertake a necessary comparison of

benefits without a second application. It does not give

VA discretion to disregard its duty to maximize a disabled veteran’s benefits or to treat survivors better

than veterans.

14

B. VA has long recognized the value in

concurrently processing overlapping

disability claims.

For more than half a century, VA adhered to this

interpretation. In 1938, VA’s predecessor enacted a

regulation mandating that a completed application

“will be considered” and “adjudicated” for “all disability compensation or disability pension benefits for

which the veteran may be eligible by reason of active

service.” 38 C.F.R. § 2.1026 (1938). While there were

periods when service-connected and non-service-connected compensation and pensions required separate

forms, see, e.g., 38 C.F.R. § 2.1026 (1944), a single

form, when in use, constituted an application for both

disability compensation and pension, 38 C.F.R. § 3.26

(1956).

By the mid-1950s, a compensation or pension application explicitly “constitute[d] a formal claim for

both benefits,” rendering unnecessary “a separate

claim for either.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.26 (1956). The regulation expressly recognized, as its modern counterpart

implicitly does, that such a claim need not “be processed or adjudicated for compensation and pension

routinely and in all instances” because it will “be readily apparent whether the veteran is claiming either

compensation or pension, or both benefits.” Id. But

when a claim was made for either disability benefit,

“all disabilities, both service connected and nonservice connected, will be evaluated and the greater

benefit awarded.” Id. VA’s duty was clear.

15

Section 3.151(a) was “simplifi[ed]” in 1961, with

“mindfulness of the [regulation’s] direct, personal impact.” See President’s Commission on Veterans’ Pensions, Veterans’ Benefits in the United States: A Report

to the President 409 (April 1956), https://tinyurl.com/3edjxmx8; 26 Fed. Reg. 1570 (Feb. 24,

1961). The regulation’s stated purpose remained the

same: VA will consider awarding compensation and

pension to any potentially eligible disabled veteran.

Whatever the label, “[t]he greater benefit will be

awarded.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.151 (1963); see 38 C.F.R.

§ 3.151(a) (same); see also John R. Sand & Gravel Co.

v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 135-36 (2008) (where

statutory changes are “slight[]” and the words “mean

about the same thing,” the effect remains unchanged).

Section 3.151(a)’s evolution reflects changes in syntax, not substance.

This interpretation survived into the 1990s. VA

advised staff that, “[i]f there is any doubt as to which

benefit is sought, both [compensation and pension]

phases of the claim will be adjudicated.” Veterans Admin., Department of Veterans Benefits Manual, M211, Adjudication Procedure 21-1 (April 13, 1983),

https://tinyurl.com/863dc4ks. “Irrespective of the

items completed or the words used by the veteran, if

potential entitlement to either benefit exists, the

claim should be processed accordingly.” Id. The failure to “process[ claims] accordingly,” id., breached

VA’s duty “to ensure that each veteran is informed of

all benefits to which he is entitled,” Ferraro v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 326, 333 (1991).

For more than 50 years, VA understood § 3.151 to

require evaluation of eligibility for both disability

16

compensation and disability pension when a disabled

applicant like Mr. Champagne applied for either.

“The agency’s track record” is “particularly probative

in this context” where it has discarded a “longstanding” interpretation in favor of a “dubious” new one.

Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 519 (2023) (Barrett,

J., concurring). The correct interpretation of § 3.151

was VA’s first, and this Court should restore it.

III. The Veterans Canon Reinforces The Correct

Interpretation Of The Statutory Text.

The veterans canon bolsters 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a)’s

mandate that disabled veterans receive “the greater

benefit” to which they are entitled. As the Court has

explained, this 82-year-old canon of construction reflects Congress’s intent to benefit veterans by enacting veterans’ benefits laws. “‘The solicitude of

Congress for veterans is of long standing.’ And that

solicitude is plainly reflected in … laws that ‘place a

thumb on the scale in the veteran’s favor in the course

of administrative and judicial review of VA decisions.’” Henderson, 562 U.S. at 440 (first quoting

United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 647 (1961);

then quoting Sanders, 556 U.S. at 416 (Souter, J., dissenting)). Since at least 1943, Congress has legislated

against this default presumption. King, 502 U.S. at

220-21 n.9. And Congress has done so with the obvious intention of remediating burdens on “those who

have been obliged to drop their own affairs to take up

the burdens of the nation.” Boone v. Lightner, 319

U.S. 561, 575 (1943). In this sense, the veterans canon

echoes the substantive canon that remedial laws

should be construed broadly rather than become a

“trap for the unwary.” Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362,

17

1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The VA disability compensation system is not meant to be a trap for the unwary,

or a stratagem to deny compensation to a veteran who

has a valid claim, but who may be unaware of the various forms of compensation available to him.”). This

Court should thus make clear that the canon remains

a vital tool of statutory and regulatory construction.

A. This Court has endorsed the veterans

canon for more than 80 years.

As the Court reaffirmed just two Terms ago, the

veterans canon is an important interpretive tool to determine the best reading where the plain text of a veterans’ benefit statute or regulation is uncertain.

Rudisill v. McDonough, 601 U.S. 294, 314 (2024). Indeed, this Court has recognized the veterans canon for

more than 80 years—thereby predating most modern

veterans’ benefits legislation. In Boone v. Lightner, for

example, the Court considered the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940, a federal law providing

protections for active-duty servicemembers. 319 U.S.

at 564-65. Although the Court ultimately rejected the

servicemember’s attempt to delay civil litigation as

among the “few cases” putting the Act to “unworthy

use,” the Court explained that the legislation “is always to be liberally construed to protect those who

have been obliged to drop their own affairs to take up

the burdens of the nation.” Id. at 575.

A few years later, when discussing the Selective

Training and Service Act of 1940, the Court reiterated

this pro-veteran approach to statutory construction:

“This legislation is to be liberally construed for the

benefit of those who left private life to serve their

18

country in its hour of great need.” Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285

(1946). Although here, too, the Court rejected the veteran’s claim of an increase in seniority, it nonetheless

stated that it must “construe the separate provisions

of the Act as parts of an organic whole and give each

as liberal a construction for the benefit of the veteran

as a harmonious interplay of the separate provisions

permits.” Id. Likewise, the Court explained decades

later that the Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment

Assistance Act of 1974 “is to be liberally construed for

the benefit of the returning veteran.” Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 447 U.S. 191, 195-96 (1980) (deeming

the steel industry’s supplemental unemployment benefits plan to be a perquisite of seniority that must be

afforded to returning veterans).

More recently, the Court reaffirmed the canon’s

vitality in construing the Veterans’ Reemployment

Rights Act to prohibit tour-of-duty length limits on

veterans’ reemployment rights. The Court noted that,

if the meaning of the text was unclear, it “would ultimately read [an uncertain] provision in [the veteran]’s

favor under the canon that provisions for benefits to

members of the Armed Services are to be construed in

the beneficiaries’ favor.” King, 502 U.S. at 220-21 n.9.

The Court further held that it “will presume congressional understanding of such interpretive principles.”

Id.

The Court relied on the veterans canon again in

Henderson v. Shinseki, explaining that it has “long

applied ‘the canon that provisions for benefits to

members of the Armed Services are to be construed in

the beneficiaries’ favor.’” 562 U.S. at 441 (quoting

19

King, 502 U.S. at 220-21 n.9). In Henderson, the Court

concluded that Congress did not intend the deadline

for filing a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals

for Veterans Claims to be jurisdictional. “Particularly

in light of this canon, we do not find any clear indication that the 120-day limit was intended to carry the

harsh consequences that accompany the jurisdiction

tag.” Id.

And just last year the Court recognized that the

veterans canon remained a viable interpretive tool.

Rudisill, 601 U.S. at 314. Although that case was resolved “based on statutory text alone,” id., the availability and utility of the veterans canon endures. See

Arellano v. McDonough, 598 U.S. 1, 14 (2023) (“If the

text and structure favored [the veteran], the nature of

the subject matter would garnish an already solid argument.”).

The veterans canon does not “serve a value that

the judiciary has chosen to specially protect,” Biden v.

Nebraska, 600 U.S. at 509 (Barrett, J., concurring),

but rather serves Congress’s “long standing policy of

compensating veterans for their past contributions by

providing them with numerous advantages,” Regan,

461 U.S. at 551.

B. The veterans canon applies with full

force here.

Against this common-law backdrop, Congress has

enacted legislation to ameliorate the burdens of military service. See King, 502 U.S. at 221 n.9 (presuming

that Congress legislates with the pro-veteran “interpretive principle[]” in mind). Indeed, this Court has

20

underscored Congress’s intent to help veterans. “[W]e

recognize that Congress has expressed special solicitude for the veterans’ cause. A veteran, after all, has

performed an especially important service for the Nation, often at the risk of his or her own life.” Sanders,

556 U.S. at 412 (citation omitted). “And Congress has

made clear that the VA is not an ordinary agency. Rather, the VA has a statutory duty to help the veteran

develop his or her benefits claim.” Id.

Throughout its history, this country has prioritized repaying the debt owed to those who risk their

lives and livelihoods to protect the American public.

Dating back to the Revolutionary War, the government has provided medical care and benefits to our

veterans. See U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, VA History (May 27, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/yexhm4ab.

This has included compensation and pensions for veterans with disabilities, as well as hospital and medical care. Id.; see supra, § I.A.

In evaluating whether and how benefits should be

awarded to veterans, Congress has created a veterans

benefits system “designed to function throughout

with a high degree of informality and solicitude for

the claimant.” Henderson, 562 U.S. at 431 (quoting

Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. at 311).

Rather than opposing veterans’ claims, “VA is

charged with the responsibility of assisting veterans

in developing evidence that supports their claims, and

in evaluating that evidence, the VA must give the veteran the benefit of any doubt.” Id. at 440.

Congress reiterated its intent to provide a cooperative pro-veteran benefits process when it enacted the

21

Veterans Judicial Review Act, which authorized federal judicial review only of decisions adverse to veterans. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. §§ 7251, 7252. The House

Report explained: “Congress has designed and fully

intends to maintain a beneficial non-adversarial system of veterans benefits. This is particularly true of

service-connected disability compensation….” H.R.

Rep. No. 100-963, at 13 (1988). Congress further

stated that it “expects VA to fully and sympathetically

develop the veteran’s claim to its optimum before deciding it on the merits” and “to resolve all issues by

giving the claimant the benefit of any reasonable

doubt.” Id.

Congress authorized VA to promulgate regulations to administer its remedial statutory scheme. As

relevant here, Congress expressly directed VA to enact regulations regarding the claims forms for veterans to apply for benefits. “The Secretary has authority

to prescribe all rules and regulations which are necessary or appropriate to carry out the laws administered by [VA] and are consistent with those laws,

including … the forms of application by claimants under such laws.” 38 U.S.C. § 501(a)(2); see 38 U.S.C.

§ 5101(a)(1)(A). Under this rulemaking authority, VA

promulgated 38 C.F.R. § 3.151, which lays out VA’s

claims process for disability benefits.

Here, Congress enacted legislation to remediate

veterans’ service-connected disabilities and financial

hardship, and VA enacted a regulation to facilitate

the claims process. This Court has recognized that

such remedial laws should be construed broadly.

22

The Court has traditionally been “guided by the

familiar canon of statutory construction that remedial

legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate

its purposes.” Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336

(1967) (“The Securities Exchange Act … falls into the

category of remedial legislation” because a central

purpose “is to protect investors.”). 5 The Court has

broadly construed many other statutes that aimed to

confer benefits or remedy an existing process. See,

e.g., Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557,

562 (1987) (Federal Employers’ Liability Act is a

“broad remedial statute” which must be given a liberal construction); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635,

638-39 (1980) (Section 1983 is “remedial legislation

[that] is to be construed generously to further its primary purpose”) (citation omitted); Socony-Vacuum

Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 431 (1939) (“[R]emedial legislation for the benefit and protection of seamen has been liberally construed to attain that end,”

given “the special circumstances attending their calling.”); McDonald v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 263, 266

5 The remedial canon also dates to the common law of England. In ruling on the validity of real property leases, the Court

of the Exchequer weighed the “mischief” a Henrician statute was

designed to “suppress”—that soon-to-be dissolved religious orders “made long and unreasonable leases” to deprive the Crown

of rents—and “constru[ed]” that act to “advance the remedy, and

to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the

mischief.” Heydon’s Case (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638-39. Blackstone likewise instructed that remedial statutes be interpreted

in light of “the old law, the mischief, and the remedy.” 1 Blackstone at 87. Early American courts also “invoked the canon that

remedial statutes should be broadly construed.” Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. Rev.

109, 154 & n.216 (2010) (citing cases).

23

(1938) (“[T]he [Motor Carrier] Act is remedial and to

be construed liberally ….”).

If remedial statutes for motorists and investors

are entitled to liberal interpretation, then certainly

those intended to compensate veterans’ sacrifices and

encourage future military service are entitled to liberality as well. See, e.g., Oregon, 366 U.S. at 647 (“The

solicitude of Congress for veterans is of long standing.”); Sanders, 556 U.S. at 412 (“[W]e recognize that

Congress has expressed special solicitude for the veterans’ cause.”). And the broad construction of remedial legislation extends to the regulations

promulgated by VA to implement veterans’ benefits

laws. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558, 628 (2019)

(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“When we interpret a regulation, we typically … ‘begin our interpretation of the

regulation with its text’ and, if the text is unclear, we

‘turn to other canons of interpretation ….’”); Kisor v.

McDonough, 995 F.3d 1347, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2021)

(O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en

banc) (explaining that remedial purpose canon applies to “remedial regulations”).

This case demonstrates the importance of (and

need for) the veterans canon to effectuate Congress’s

unwavering intent to help veterans. In a system with

special solicitude for veteran-claimants—and an

agency under a specific statutory duty to assist them,

38 U.S.C. § 5103A—it is reasonable that the claims

process should help, rather than hinder, veterans.

Here, Congress provided for two categories of disability-related payments to veterans: (1) disability compensation to veterans with service-connected

disabilities and (2) disability pensions to low-income

24

veterans with non-service-connected disabilities. 6 See

38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 1521, 5101. It was obvious

from Mr. Champagne’s application that he was at

least eligible for disability pension. Where VA erred

was in failing to evaluate whether his disability was

service-connected, rendering him eligible for the more

generous disability compensation. Congress did not

intend an “arguably ambiguous” application form for

these benefits to impede the meritorious claims of

poor and disabled veterans like Mr. Champagne’s, but

that is precisely what happened here when VA abdicated its duty under § 3.151(a). Pet. App. 9a n.2.

Consistent with Congress’s long-standing intent

to alleviate the financial burdens of disabled veterans, VA enacted a regulation that requires the agency

to evaluate disability claims for both pension and

compensation eligibility to ensure that each veteran

receives the greater available amount. See 38 C.F.R.

§ 3.151(a). But instead of applying the best (and proveteran) reading of that regulation, VA reflexively

awarded Mr. Champagne a disability pension without

considering whether his disability was service-connected, rendering him eligible for more generous disability compensation. These are the “harsh

consequences” that the veterans canon is meant to

check. Henderson, 562 U.S. at 441.

6 As noted earlier, supra 10 & n.4, although 38 U.S.C. § 1513

authorizes pensions for low-income veterans aged 65 or older regardless of disability, Mr. Champagne was not eligible for agerelated pension in 1987.

25

The Court should reaffirm that the veterans

canon remains an essential tool for ensuring that veterans benefits statutes and regulations in fact benefit

veterans.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant

the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

John B. Wells

Brian Lewis

MILITARY-VETERANS

ADVOCACY, INC.

P.O. Box 5235

Slidell, LA 70469-5235

(985) 641-1855

JohnLawEsq@msn.com

November 19, 2025

Melanie L. Bostwick

Counsel of Record

Melanie R. Hallums

Anne W. Savin

ORRICK, HERRINGTON &

SUTCLIFFE LLP

2100 Pennsylvania

Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20037

(202) 339-8400

mbostwick@orrick.com