Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Faytima Howard, Petitioner v. Macomb County, Michigan

Supreme Court briefOct 10, 2025

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Text

No.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

_________

F AYTIMA H OWARD,

MACOMB C OUNTY ,

_________

Petitioner,

Respondent.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To TheUnited States Court Of Appeals

For The Sixth Circuit

_________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

_________

D EBORAH J. L A F ETRA

Pacific Legal Foundation

3100 Clarendon Blvd.

Suite 1000

Arlington, VA 22201

CHRISTINA M. M ARTIN

Counsel of Record

Pacific Legal Foundation

4440 PGA Blvd., Suite 307

Palm Beach Gardens, FL

33410

(916) 330-4059

CMartin@pacificlegal.org

MATTHEW E. GRONDA

4800 Fashion Sq. Blvd.

Ste. 200

P HILIP L. ELLISON

Saginaw, MI 48604

Outside Legal Counsel,

PLC

530 West Saginaw St.

P.O. Box 107

Hemlock, MI 48626

Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Macomb County foreclosed and auctioned Faytima

Howard’s home to collect a property tax debt,

receiving substantially more than she owed. The

Takings Clause requires the government to pay for

the excess property taken. Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty.,

598 U.S. 631, 639 (2023). But the County kept all the

proceeds because Howard did not comply with

Michigan’s unusual claims process that very few

owners successfully navigate. See Mich. Comp. Laws

§ 211.78t. While Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S.

180, 189 (2019), expressly permits takings claimants

to pursue their cases in federal court without

exhausting state procedures, the Sixth Circuit

construed Nelson v. City of New York, 352 U.S. 103,

110 (1956), to mean that no taking occurred because

Howard erred in complying with the state’s

administrative claims process.

1. Does the government violate the Takings

Clause’s “categorical duty” to pay just compensation

for property taken in excess of the taxes, fees, and

penalties, per Tyler, by enacting a procedure that

leaves most former owners without their homes and

without compensation?

2. To the extent that Nelson v. City of New York

requires tax debtors to exhaust state remedies prior to

bringing a constitutional takings challenge in federal

court, should Nelson be overruled?

These questions also are presented in Beeman v.

Muskegon County Treasurer, No. 24-858; Koetter v.

Manistee County Treasurer, No. 24-1095; and McGee

v. Alger County Treasurer, No. 25-203.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Petitioner Faytima Howard was the plaintiffappellant in the proceedings below.

Respondent Macomb County, Michigan, was the

defendant-appellee in the proceedings below.

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES

These proceedings are directly related to the abovecaptioned case under Rule 14.1(b)(iii):

Howard v. Macomb County, No. 24-1665 (6th Cir.

Mar. 28, 2025)

Howard v. Macomb County, No. 1:23-cv-12595

(E.D. Mich. Aug. 6, 2024)

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Petition for a writ of certiorari ................................... 1

Opinions below ............................................................ 4

Jurisdiction ................................................................. 5

Statutory and constitutional provisions involved ..... 5

Statement of the case ................................................. 6

A. Michigan’s claim statute .............................. 6

B. Macomb County’s confiscation of

Howard’s property ........................................ 7

C. The Sixth Circuit permits confiscation of

Howard’s property based on Nelson v.

City of New York .......................................... 9

Reasons for granting the petition ............................ 11

The Court Should Settle Whether the

Government May Avoid Its Categorical Duty

to Pay Just Compensation by Burdening

Owners with an Unreasonable and

“Exclusive” Claims Process ............................ 11

A. Nelson v. City of New York ....................... 15

B. Nelson cannot be reconciled with the duty

to pay just compensation .......................... 17

C. Michigan’s statute statute cannot be

reconciled with the duty to pay just

compensation ............................................ 21

II. The Court Should Resolve the Conflict

Between Nelson’s Exhaustion Requirement

and the Court’s Disavowal of Exhaustion

Requirements in Other Takings Cases ......... 25

A. Takings decisions that rely on Nelson

conflict with this Court’s holdings in

Knick and Felder ....................................... 25

B. The lower courts conflict in their

application of Nelson ................................ 28

Conclusion ................................................................. 31

APPENDIX

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,

No. 24-1665, Opinion, filed March 28, 2025 ........ 1a

U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Michigan,

Northern Division, No. 1:23-cv-12595, Opinion and

Order Granting Thomas A. Fox’s Motion for Leave

to File Amicus Brief, Granting Defendant’s Motion

to Dismiss, and Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint,

filed August 6, 2024 ............................................ 18a

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,

No. 24-1665, Order Denying Petition for

Rehearing En Banc, filed May 19, 2025 ............ 29a

MCL § 211.78m (excerpts) ...................................... 30a

MCL § 211.78t (excerpts)........................................ 41a

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District

of Michigan, No. 2:23-cv-12595,

Class Action Amended Complaint,

filed October 13, 2023 ......................................... 52a

Excerpts of Transcript of Petition on Foreclosure

Proceeding, Howard v. Macomb County,

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,

No. 24-1665, held March 20, 2025...................... 62a

Macomb County Circuit Court, No. 2022-002098-CH,

Tax Foreclosure Judgment,

filed February 3, 2023 ........................................ 71a

Macomb County Circuit Court, No. 2021-002014-CH,

Tax Foreclosure Judgment,

filed February 8, 2022 ........................................ 78a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

In re Alger Cnty. Treasurer for

Foreclosure, Nos. 363804,

2024 WL 4174925 (Mich. Ct. App.

Sep. 12, 2024), petition pending sub

nom. McGee v. Alger County

Treasurer, No. 25-203 (U.S.) ............................... 23

Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v.

United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012) ....................... 11

Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v.

United States,

298 U.S. 349 (1936) ............................................. 18

Beeman v. Muskegon Cnty. Treasurer,

No. 24-858 (U.S.) ................................................. 10

Biesemeyer v. Mun. of Anchorage,

No. 3:23-CV-00185,

2024 WL 1480564

(D. Alaska Mar. 13, 2024) ................................... 30

Bigelow v. Ballerino,

111 Cal. 559 (1896) .............................................. 21

Bogie v. Town of Barnet,

129 Vt. 46 (1970).................................................. 20

Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash.,

538 U.S. 216 (2003) ............................................. 17

Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala.,

338 U.S. 294 (1949) ............................................. 27

Buckley v. Valeo,

424 U.S. 1 (1976) ................................................. 24

Bufkin v. Collins,

604 U.S. 369 (2025) ............................................. 18

Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid,

594 U.S. 139 (2021) ........................................ 17-18

Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co.,

135 U.S. 641 (1890) ......................... 3, 11-12, 17, 21

Chicago, B&Q Ry. Co. v.

People of State of Ill.,

200 U.S. 561 (1906) ......................................... 4, 19

City of Arlington v. FCC,

569 U.S. 290 (2013) ............................................... 1

Cocks v. Izard,

74 U.S. 559 (1868) ............................................... 20

Cont’l Oil Co. v. Bonanza Corp.,

706 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1983) ............................. 18

Davis v. Wechsler,

263 U.S. 22 (1923) ............................................... 27

Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am.

Railroads, 575 U.S. 43 (2015) ............................... 1

Elzea v. Nat’l Bank of Ga.,

570 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1978) ............................. 19

Felder v. Casey,

487 U.S. 131 (1988) ........................... 2-3, 25-28, 31

First English Evangelical Lutheran

Church of Glendale v.

Los Angeles Cnty.

482 U.S. 304 (1987) ............................................. 26

In Re: Franco,

No. 24-21084-ABA, 2025 WL 884067

(Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2025) ............................ 30

Fulton v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs,

148 F.4th 1224 (11th Cir. 2025) ...................... 4, 29

Grainger v. Ottawa Cnty.,

90 F.4th 507 (6th Cir. 2024) ................................ 22

vii

Hart v. City of Detroit,

416 Mich. 488 (1982) ........................................... 22

Hathon v. Mich.,

17 N.W.3d 686 (Mich. 2025) ........................... 30-31

Haverhill Bridge Proprietors v.

Essex Cnty. Comm’rs,

103 Mass. 120 (1869) ........................................... 21

Horne v. Department of Agriculture,

576 U.S. 350 (2015) ............................................... 3

Hughes v. United States,

72 S. Ct. 163 (1951) ............................................... 8

Jackson v. Southfield Neighborhood

Revitalization Initiative,

No. 166320, __ Mich. ___,

2025 WL 1959046

(Mich. July 16, 2025) ........................................... 13

Jacobs v. United States,

290 U.S. 13 (1933) ............................................... 18

Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence,

262 U.S. 668 (1923) ............................................. 19

Kankakee Cnty. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,

106 U.S. 668 (1883) ............................................. 19

Kelly v. Okla. Tpk. Auth.,

269 P.2d 359 (Okla. 1954) ................................... 21

Kidd v. Pappas,

No. 22 C 7061, 2025 WL 1865983

(N.D. Ill. July 7, 2025) ......................................... 14

Knellinger v. Young,

134 F.4th 1034 (10th Cir. 2025) ..................... 28-29

Knick v. Township of Scott,

588 U.S. 180 (2019) ........................... 2-3, 25-29, 31

Koetter v. Manistee Cnty. Treasurer,

No. 24-1095 (U.S.) ........................................... 1, 10

viii

Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal.,

366 U.S. 36 (1961) ................................................. 8

Koontz v. St. Johns River Mgmt. Dist.,

570 U.S. 595 (2013) ............................................. 17

Lawson v. United States,

124 F.3d 198, 1997 WL 530540

(6th Cir. 1997)...................................................... 18

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,

544 U.S. 528 (2005) ............................................. 17

Magruder v. Drury,

235 U.S. 106 (1914) ............................................. 16

Maron v. Chief Fin. Officer of Fla.,

136 F.4th 1322 (11th Cir. 2025) .......................... 29

McDuffee v. Collins,

117 Ala. 487 (1898) .............................................. 20

McGee v. Alger Cnty. Treasurer,

No. 25-203 (U.S.) ............................................. 1, 10

Md. Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth. v.

Meadow-Croft, 243 Md. 515 (1966) ..................... 19

Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States,

148 U.S. 312 (1893) .......................................... 3, 18

In re Muskegon Cnty. Treasurer for Foreclosure,

348 Mich. App. 678 (2023), petition for writ of

certiorari pending sub nom. Beeman v.

Muskegon Cnty. Treasurer,

No. 24-858 (U.S.) ............................................. 1, 27

N.Y. and Presbyterian Hosp. v.

United States,

881 F.3d 877 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .............................. 19

Nelson v. City of New York,

352 U.S. 103 (1956) ................. 2-3, 9-10, 13, 15-17,

21, 25, 27-28, 30-31

O’Connor v. Eubanks,

83 F.4th 1018 (6th Cir. 2023) .............................. 22

OPV Partners, LLC v. City of Lansing,

No. 24-2035, 2025 WL 1898235

(6th Cir. July 9, 2025) ......................................... 30

Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla.,

457 U.S. 496 (1982) ............................................. 26

Phillips v. Washington Legal Found.,

524 U.S. 156 (1998) ............................................. 24

Rafaeli LLC v. Cnty. of Oakland,

505 Mich. 429 (2020) ....................................... 6, 22

Rockford Life Ins. Co. v. Ill. Dep’t of

Revenue, 482 U.S. 182 (1987) .............................. 19

S. Buffalo Ry. Co. v. Ahern,

344 U.S. 367 (1953) ............................................. 27

Sage v. Brooklyn,

89 N.Y. 189 (1882) ............................................... 21

San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.

City of San Diego,

450 U.S. 621 (1981) ............................................. 18

Schafer v. Kent Cnty.,

No. 164975, __ N.W.3d __,

2024 WL 3573500

(Mich. July 29, 2024) ........................................... 31

Schillinger v. United States,

155 U.S. 163 (1894) ............................................. 20

Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v.

United States,

261 U.S. 299 (1923) ............................................. 18

People ex rel. Seaman v. Hammond,

1 Doug. 276 (Mich. 1844)..................................... 20

Sharritt v. Henry,

No. 23 C 15838, 2024 WL 4524501

(N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2024) ....................................... 29

Slater v. Maxwell,

73 U.S. 268 (1867) ............................................... 20

State Hwy. Comm’r v. Kreger,

128 Va. 203 (1920) ............................................... 21

State v. Beackmo,

8 Blackf. 246 (Ind. 1846) ..................................... 20

State v. City of Lakeland,

154 Fla. 137 (1944) .............................................. 19

Sweet v. Rechel,

159 U.S. 380 (1895) ............................................. 19

Tafflin v. Levitt,

493 U.S. 455 (1990) ............................................. 16

Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v.

Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency,

535 U.S. 302 (2002) ....................................... 12, 17

Terrace v. Thompson,

263 U.S. 197 (1923) ............................................. 12

Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty.,

598 U.S. 631 (2023) ................ 1-2, 6, 10, 12, 16-17,

20, 23, 30

United States v. Carmack,

329 U.S. 230 (1946) ............................................. 17

United States v. Reynolds,

397 U.S. 14 (1970) ............................................... 24

United States v. Taylor,

104 U.S. 216 (1881) ............................................. 20

United States v. Thayer-West Point

Hotel Co., 329 U.S. 585 (1947) ............................ 23

United States v. Williams,

504 U.S. 36 (1992) ............................................... 16

United States v. Zolin,

491 U.S. 554 (1989) ............................................... 8

Watson Mem. Spiritual Temple of Christ

v. Korban, 387 So.3d 499 (La. 2024) ................... 20

Wayside Church v. Van Buren Cnty.,

Nos. 24-1598, 24-1676,

2025 WL 2829601

(6th Cir. Oct. 6, 2025) .......................................... 15

Wilkins v. United States,

598 U.S. 152 (2023) ............................................. 16

Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit,

242 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2001) ............................... 19

Williams v. Reed,

604 U.S. 168 (2025) ............................................. 27

Williamson Cnty. Regional Plan.

Commission v. Hamilton Bank,

473 U.S. 172 (1985) ........................................ 25-26

Wilson v. Hawaiʻi,

145 S. Ct. 18 (2024) ............................................. 26

Wright v. Rollyson,

No. 2:24-CV-00474, 2025 WL 835040

(S.D.W.V. Mar. 17, 2025) .................................... 29

Constitutions

U.S. Const. amend. ................................................... 11

U.S. Const. amend. V .......................5, 9, 18, 23, 26, 29

U.S. Const. amend. X .............................................. 5, 9

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ....................................... 5

Statutes

15 U.S.C. § 3051(6) ................................................... 24

15 U.S.C. § 3053(b)(1) ............................................... 26

15 U.S.C. § 3053(c)(1)-(2) .......................................... 26

15 U.S.C. § 3054(d)(1)-(2) ......................................... 28

xii

15 U.S.C. § 3054(j)(1)-(2) .......................................... 26

28 U.S.C. § 1254 .......................................................... 5

28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) ..................................................... 5

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ..................................... 2-3, 10, 26, 29

Ala. Code § 40-10-197(i)(1)(b) ..................................... 1

§ 40-10-197(e)(1)(v) ................................................ 1

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 42-18204(B) .................................... 1

§ 42-18231-36 ......................................................... 1

Ark. Code Ann. § 26-37-205(b) ................................. 13

2024 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 165 (H.B. 24-1056) ....... 12

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-157(f) ..................................... 13

Del. Code Ann. tit. 9, § 8779 ..................................... 12

Fla. Stat. § 197.582 ................................................... 13

Ga. Code Ann. § 48-4-5 ............................................. 12

§ 48-4-81(f) ........................................................... 12

Ch. XII, § 6 (1867) ............................................... 11

Haw. Cnty. Code § 19-45 .......................................... 13

Idaho Code § 31-808(2)(c) ......................................... 12

Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24-7(c) ........................................... 13

§ 6-1.1-24-7(e)(2) .................................................. 13

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-2803 ........................................ 12

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 91.5 ........................................ 13

§ 426.500 .............................................................. 13

36 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 943-C ................................ 12

2024 Mass. Legis. Serv. Ch. 140 § 93 (H.B. 4800) ... 12

Ch. 140 § 80 ......................................................... 12

MCL § 211.78 .............................................................. 6

§ 211.78g(1) ............................................................ 6

§ 211.78k(5)(b) ....................................................... 6

§ 211.78m(1) .......................................................... 6

§ 211.78m(2) .......................................................... 6

xiii

§ 211.78m(8) .......................................................... 7

§ 211.78m(8)(i) ..................................................... 14

§ 211.78m(16)(c)............................................... 7, 24

§ 211.78q(1) ............................................................ 8

§ 211.78t......................................1, 6, 10, 23, 27, 31

§ 211.78t(k) ............................................................ 7

§ 211.78t(2) ............................................................ 6

§ 211.78t(3)(i) ......................................................... 7

§ 211.78t(4) ...................................................... 7, 23

§ 211.78t(5) ............................................................ 7

§ 211.78t(9) ............................................................ 7

§ 211.78t(10) .......................................................... 7

§ 211.78t(12)(b) ........................................... 7, 23-24

§ 213.55(5)............................................................ 22

§ 213.58 ................................................................ 22

§ 567.2 .................................................................. 22

§ 567.224 .............................................................. 22

Md. Code Ann., Tax-Prop. § 14-8 ............................. 13

Gen. Laws of Minn., Ch. IV, § 3 (1862) .................... 11

Ch. VI (1864) ........................................................ 11

Minn. Gen. Stat. of 1866, ch. 81,

tit. II, § 35 (1867) ................................................. 11

Minn. Gen. Stat. of 1878, ch. 81,

tit. II, § 35 ............................................................ 11

Miss. Code Ann. § 27-41-77 ...................................... 13

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 140.230(2)....................................... 13

Mont. Code Ann. § 15-18-221 ................................... 13

2023 Neb. Laws L.B. 7 .............................................. 12

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-339. ............................................ 13

§ 105-374(q)(6) ..................................................... 13

§ 105-375(i) .......................................................... 13

xiv

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-38-71(A)-(C) .............................. 13

N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 1136(3) ............................ 1

§ 1197(4)................................................................. 1

2024 Ohio Laws File 81

(Am. Sub. H.B. 315) ............................................. 12

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5721.20 ................................ 13

72 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5860.205(f) ............................... 13

S.C. Code Ann. § 12-51-130 ...................................... 13

2024 S.D. Laws Ch. 38 (HB 109) .............................. 12

Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2702 ................................... 13

Tex. Tax Code § 34.03(a)(2) ...................................... 13

Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1351.1(7) ............................. 13

Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-39............................................ 13

§ 58.1-3967 ........................................................... 13

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 5061(b) ................................ 13

W. Va. Code § 11A-3-65 ............................................ 13

Code of Wash. § 367.5 (1881).................................... 11

Wash. Rev. Code § 84.64.080(10) ............................. 13

Wis. Stat. § 75.36(2m)(b) .......................................... 13

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-108(d)(iv)(C) ...................... 13

Other Authorities

Binion, Billy, She Underpaid a Property Tax Bill. So

the Government Seized Her Home, Sold It—and

Kept the $102,636 Profit,

Reason Magazine (July 26, 2024),

https://tinyurl.com/ytnxwa7z ................................ 23

2 Blackstone, Commentaries on the

Laws of England (1768) ...................................... 20

Clinton Township Tax Assessment Records,

https://tinyurl.com/wtxpjsdh ................................. 9

Distinguish, Black’s Law Dictionary

(11th ed. 2019) ..................................................... 17

Macomb County Tax Foreclosure Pleadings

(Feb. 3, 2023),

https://tinyurl.com/4256xb2a ............................... 8

Macomb County Treasurer,

Auction Rules and Regulations

(Sep. 16, 2024),

https://tinyurl.com/4czcrvfs ................................... 9

Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, Foreclosing

Governmental Unit Report of Real

Property Foreclosure Sales,

https://tinyurl.com/3hxkxtuy

(visited Oct. 8, 2025)............................................ 14

Nichols on Eminent Domain,

Vol. 3, Sec. 8.3 (3d ed. 1964) ................................. 21

Or. House Bill No. 2089 § 9 ...................................... 12

Pacific Legal Foundation, Confusing

Procedures Can Result in Shadow

Equity Theft: Michigan,

https://tinyurl.com/yhfuhkdm

(visited Oct. 8, 2025)............................................ 14

Zillow, 19790 Westchester Dr., Clinton

Township, MI, Home Details,

https://tinyurl.com/33mpumtp

(visited Oct. 1, 2025).............................................. 8

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The government violates the Takings Clause when it

confiscates more property than necessary to collect

delinquent property taxes, penalties, interest, and fees.

Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty., 598 U.S. 631, 639 (2023). Most

states sell tax-delinquent property, collect what is owed,

and then automatically remit surplus proceeds or

provide a simple and lenient procedure for owners to

recover the surplus. But five states feign compliance

with Tyler, regularly taking more than what is owed by

requiring owners to meet premature, pre-sale deadlines

to claim surplus proceeds.1 When owners do not strictly

comply with these uniquely demanding claims statutes,

the government confiscates the entire property, no

matter how large the proceeds or small the tax debt. For

most owners in these five states, Tyler’s promise

remains unfulfilled.

Michigan runs at the head of the pack. That state’s

courts uniformly refuse to hear takings lawsuits for just

compensation if former tax debtors fail to strictly comply

with its notice-of-claim statute. In re Muskegon Cnty.

Treasurer for Foreclosure, 348 Mich. App. 678 (2023),

petition for writ of certiorari pending sub nom. Beeman

v. Muskegon Cnty. Treasurer, No. 24-858 (U.S.); see also

Koetter v. Manistee Cnty. Treasurer, No. 24-1095 (U.S.);

McGee v. Alger Cnty. Treasurer, No. 25-203 (U.S.). With

the Sixth Circuit’s decision below in this case, federal

courts also refuse to consider former tax debtors’ takings

claims, leaving them homeless, without their surplus

1 See Ala. Code § 40-10-197(i)(1)(b), (e)(1)(v); Ariz. Rev. Stat.

§§ 42-18204(B), 42-18231-36; MCL § 211.78t; 257-261 20th Ave.,

Realty, LLC v. Roberto, 259 N.J. 417, 434 (2025) (describing new

process); N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law §§ 1136(3), 1197(4).

proceeds, and without any possibility of judicial review

in federal or state court.

Here, Faytima Howard suffered successive losses.

First, the suburban home that she shared with her

daughter and grandson was severely damaged by fire,

displacing the family. When the insurance company

balked at paying for necessary repairs, Howard’s

financial distress caused her to fall behind on her

property taxes. Ultimately, Macomb County foreclosed

on the home and auctioned it for $499,007 on September

6, 2023 (after this Court decided Tyler). App. 3a.

Because Howard did not comply with the claims statute,

the County kept hundreds of thousands of dollars in

proceeds for itself, an amount that greatly exceeded

Howard’s tax debt and related costs.

Howard filed her takings complaint, a proposed class

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other statutes,

against the County in federal court. App. 52a.

Although takings claimants proceeding under

Section 1983 are not required to exhaust state remedies,

Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S. 180, 189 (2019);

Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 142 (1988), the County

argued that Howard “does not have a takings claim

under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments because PA

256 [Michigan’s claim statute] provides a procedure to

recover surplus proceeds from a tax foreclosure sale.”

App. 22a. The district court, adopting the County’s

position, relied entirely on Nelson v. City of New York,

352 U.S. 103, 110 (1956), where this Court rejected a

takings claim by a former owner of property seized to

satisfy a tax debt because the owners missed a brief

opportunity during the foreclosure action to request

surplus proceeds from a future sale. App. 26a (Under

Nelson, “if the government provides a remedy—that is,

a process for that person to seek compensation—the

government does not unconstitutionally take.”).

The Sixth Circuit agreed, holding that Nelson

controls the result. App. 6a, 11a (“unlike the state laws

at issue in Knick, Michigan’s procedures for collecting

the surplus do not compensate the property owner for a

taking. They prevent a taking from happening in the

first place.”). Thousands of Michiganders have thus far

been deprived of their just compensation for failing to

comply with the state’s claim process and barred from

seeking relief in both federal and state courts, solely

because of this Court’s decision in Nelson.

To the extent that Nelson’s statements on the

Takings Clause are not deemed dicta, Howard asks the

Court to overturn it. Nelson’s takings language conflicts

with this Court’s takings decisions holding that the

government has an affirmative, “categorical duty” to

pay owners just compensation, Horne v. Department of

Agriculture, 576 U.S. 350, 358 (2015), with “reasonable,

certain, and adequate” procedures for remittance.

Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659

(1890); see also Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States,

148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893) (the power to take private

property is “inseparably connected” to the required

payment of just compensation as to be “parts of one and

the same principle.”). Nelson also cannot be squared

with this Court’s rejection of exhaustion requirements

for takings claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

in Knick, 588 U.S. at 189, or the holding in Felder, 487

U.S. at 142, that government cannot impose notice of

claim requirements to deny constitutional claims raised

via 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

This Court should grant the Petition to clarify that

the government bears the burden of remitting just

compensation to a known owner. The Eleventh Circuit,

in conflict with the Sixth Circuit below, recently

explained that, unlike other types of citizen claims

against the government, “[t]he Takings Clause

guarantees a legal damages-type remedy, and it is ‘selfexecuting’. These characteristics . . . make the Takings

Clause

constitutional

unicorn—no

other

constitutional guarantee expressly contains these two

features.” Fulton v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 148

F.4th 1224, 1240 (11th Cir. 2025). See also Chicago,

B&Q Ry. Co. v. People of State of Ill., 200 U.S. 561, 593

(1906) (government that takes property “must obey the

constitutional injunction to make or secure just

compensation to the owner.”).

The government’s

“categorical duty” to remit just compensation cannot be

conditioned on an owner’s successful completion of

bureaucratic hurdles. See Fulton, 148 F.4th at 1242

(“[I]f a legislative substitute for ‘just compensation’ is

not coextensive with the constitutionally prescribed

remedy of ‘just compensation,’ then the constitutionally

prescribed remedy remains directly available.”).

Nelson’s approval of such hurdles is irreconcileable with

takings jurisprudence.

This Court should grant the Petition to hold that a

state statute cannot impose burdens on property owners

that effectively restrict or undermine government’s

unqualified obligation to pay just compensation for a

taking.

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision below (App. 1a-17a) is published at 133

F.4th 566 (6th Cir. 2025). The district court’s opinion

dismissing the claims raised here (App. 18a-28a) is

unpublished but available at 2024 WL 3680996 (E.D.

Mich. Aug. 6, 2024). The Sixth Circuit’s order denying

rehearing is at App. 29a.

JURISDICTION

On March 28, 2025, the Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals issued the decision at issue here. App. 1a. On

May 19, 2025, the court denied a timely petition for

rehearing and rehearing en banc. App. 29a. Justice

Kavanaugh granted a motion extending the time to file

this Petition to October 16, 2025. This Petition raises

federal questions under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. This

Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254.

28 U.S.C. § 2403(b), which allows a state to intervene

to defend the constitutionality of a state statute, may

apply.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

provides, “nor shall private property be taken for public

use, without just compensation.”

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution provides in part, “No state shall make or

enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall

any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law . . . .”

Relevant portions of the Michigan statutes are

reproduced at App. 30a-51a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Michigan’s claim statute

Three years before Tyler, the Michigan Supreme

Court held in Rafaeli LLC v. Cnty. of Oakland, 505

Mich. 429 (2020), that the government violated the

Michigan Constitution when it took property to collect a

tax debt and kept more than the taxes, penalties,

interest, and costs. In response, Michigan amended its

tax foreclosure statute. App. 6a. As relevant here, tax

foreclosures occur in February or March each year.

MCL § 211.78t.2 If a tax debt is not paid and the County

does not agree to a payment plan with the owner by

March 31, the foreclosing government unit (here, the

County) obtains fee simple title. MCL §§ 211.78k(5)(b),

211.78g(1). By July 1—while the owner usually retains

possession of the property, and weeks before the sale—

the owner must submit a notarized Form 5743 by

personal service acknowledged by the County or by

certified mail, return receipt requested, to notify the

County that she wants to be paid any future surplus

proceeds from the sale of her property.

MCL

§ 211.78t(2); App. 10a.

If the government declines the right of first refusal to

purchase the property, the County sells it at a public

auction several months after foreclosure.

MCL

§ 211.78m(1), (2). The following January, up to six

2 The Sixth Circuit described this process as “forfeiture.”

App.

3a. Under MCL § 211.78, “forfeited” or “forfeiture” means a

foreclosing governmental unit may seek a judgment of

foreclosure if the property is not redeemed, but the government

“does not acquire a right to possession or any other interest in

the property.” That is, “’[f]orfeiture’ simply permits defendants

to seek a judgment of foreclosure.” Rafaeli, LLC, 505 Mich. at

448.

months after the sale, the government calculates the

proceeds remaining after deducting all tax debts,

expenses, interest, and penalties, and mails notice to

those who filed Form 5743 that they must file a motion

in the original foreclosure action to recover the proceeds.

MCL § 211.78t(3)(i), (k), (4); App. 10a.

Once owners file a motion, the government approves

or disapproves the disbursement. MCL § 211.78t(5).

The court hearing on the motion determines the relative

priority of all claims, including any lienholders’ claims.

The statute grants first priority to the government’s 5%

cut of the purchase price in addition to the debt, interest,

and sale costs, MCL §§ 211.78t(12)(b), 211.78m(16)(c);

then other liens; and finally the remainder to former

owners who timely filed both Form 5743 and the motion

to recover the surplus. MCL § 211.78t(9). The

government pays the amounts ordered by the circuit

court. MCL § 211.78t(10). Prior to disbursement, the

county holds the tax debtors’ money for approximately

one year, accruing interest (MCL § 211.78m(8)) that the

statute authorizes the county to keep. See MCL

§ 211.78t(12)(b).

It all turns on Form 5743. If an owner fails to submit

a notarized Form 5743 by the proper delivery method,

long before the foreclosure sale, the statute cuts off the

owner’s right to any future claim or constitutional

challenge and the government keeps the windfall of the

owner’s equity.

B. Macomb County’s confiscation of Howard’s

property

Faytima Howard (f/k/a Faytima Leak) owned a

suburban home where she, her daughter, and her

grandson resided at 19790 Westchester Drive in Clinton

Township, Michigan. App. 19a. After a fire significantly

damaged ther home, and she encountered subsequent

difficulties obtaining money for repairs from her

insurance company,3 Howard fell behind on her

property taxes of approximately $10,000. App. 64a, 84a.

Macomb County obtained a foreclosure judgment

against the property on February 4, 2022. App. 78a,

84a.

Howard maintained title for another year,

however, by entering into a payment plan with the

County. See MCL 211.78q(1). On February 3, 2023, the

County obtained another foreclosure judgment, at

which point Howard owed $16,719 in property taxes for

2019 and 2020 (totalling $25,256, including interest and

fees).4 App. 77a. The County extended the redemption

period pursuant to a payment plan.5 App. 68a. When

Howard missed payments, the County cancelled the

plan. Ibid. On June 16, 2023, the County mailed a

notice to Howard that the County cancelled the

payment plan and that she must file Form 5743 by July

1, 2023, to claim any remaining proceeds from sale of

The

repairs

have

yet

completed.

https://tinyurl.com/33mpumtp (visited Oct. 1, 2025) (describing

unfinished interior, with photographs).

4 The February 3, 2023, foreclosure judgment against Howard

(then called Faytima Leak) is available at the Macomb County

website, Tax Foreclosure Pleadings at 224 (filed Feb. 3, 2023),

https://tinyurl.com/4256xb2a.

5 This information was presented by Macomb County during

oral argument at the Sixth Circuit and is consistent with

Petitioner’s understanding of events. Relevant excerpts of that

argument are presented in the appendix, and may be considered

by this Court. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 567 n.10

(1989) (noting transcript of hearing as part of the record);

Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 45 & 45 n.8 (1961)

(transcript is part of the “entire record”); Hughes v. United

States, 72 S. Ct. 163 (1951) (mem.) (refusing to strike transcripts

of oral argument from the proffered record).

the property. App. 68a. One week later, on June 23,

2023, the County took title to Howard’s home. One

week after that came the July 1, 2023 deadline to serve

Form 5743, the notice of intent to claim the surplus

proceeds. App. 10a. Howard did not submit the form.

On September 6, 2023, the County sold Howard’s home

at a public auction6 for $499,007, an amount that

greatly exceeded the tax debt and related costs.7 App.

4a.

The County kept the entire amount.

C. The Sixth Circuit permits confiscation of

Howard’s property based on Nelson v. City

of New York

Shortly after the foreclosure sale, Howard filed a civil

rights complaint in the District Court for the Eastern

District of Michigan. App. 52a. She alleged a takings

claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,

brought via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the County

violated her right to just compensation by confiscating

her surplus proceeds pursuant to the state claim

statute, MCL § 211.78t. App. 59a. She made a similar

“inverse condemnation” claim under state law. App.

6 Macomb County outsources its auction proceedings to Zeus

Auction, an online platform. See Macomb County Treasurer,

Auction

Rules

and

Regulations

(Sep.

16,

2024),

https://tinyurl.com/4czcrvfs.

7 The County disputes the final sale amount but concedes that

it sold for significantly more than the tax debt. See App. 68a

(guessing Howard lost around $60,000 more than her total debts

on the property); App. 65a (County’s attorney states the property

sold for “275,” which Petitioner construes as $275,000 based on

context and the city tax assessor’s publicly available records that

list the sale price as $275,001); see Clinton Township Tax

Assessment Records, https://tinyurl.com/wtxpjsdh.

60a.8 The district court dismissed her case, holding that

there was no taking because she failed to comply with

the state claim statute. App. 26a.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed based largely on language

in Nelson v. City of New York, 352 U.S. 103 (1956). App.

10a-11a. Nelson suggested that an owner loses the right

to be paid for the surplus value of property taken to pay

a debt if he misses a brief opportunity during a

foreclosure action to preserve that right. Although Tyler

distinguished Nelson (“Unlike in Nelson, Minnesota’s

scheme provides no opportunity for the taxpayer to

recover the excess value”), 598 U.S. at 644, the Sixth

Circuit construed Nelson as affirmed by Tyler and

binding: “The Supreme Court stood by Nelson in Tyler,

explaining that the Takings Clause permits each State

to ‘define the process through which an owner can claim

the surplus’ and to keep the surplus if the owners do not

comply.” App. 7a (quoting Tyler).

The Sixth Circuit also examined historical

procedures for returning surplus proceeds. Those

examples gave owners years after the sale to recover the

surplus proceeds.9 App. 8a-9a. Yet Michigan’s statute

8 Unlike Beeman v. Muskegon County Treasurer, No. 24-858,

Koetter v. Manistee County Treasurer, No. 24-1095, and McGee v.

Alger County Treasurer, No. 25-203, Howard did not raise a due

process challenge to the statute. App. 13a (Sixth Circuit noting

that she “should have” done so).

9 The court inaccurately described two statutes as giving a

short claim opportunity.

The 1866 Minnesota mortgage

foreclosure law provided that even if the former owner failed to

claim within three months, “the district judge may direct the

same to be put out at interest . . . for the benefit of the defendant,

his representatives or assigns, to be paid to them.” Minn. Gen.

Stat. of 1866, ch. 81, tit. II, § 35 (1867); see also Minn. Gen. Stat.

of 1878, ch. 81, tit. II, § 35 (same). Other Minnesota laws from

requires owners to navigate the process and make the

initial claim with the County before the sale and then

make a second claim in court after the sale.

Nonetheless, the court held there was no taking because

Howard failed to comply with Michigan’s statutory

claim process.

The court denied Howard’s petition seeking

rehearing or rehearing en banc on May 19, 2025.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE

PETITION

The Court Should Settle Whether the

Government May Avoid Its Categorical Duty

to Pay Just Compensation by Burdening

Owners

with

Unreasonable

and

“Exclusive” Claims Process

Under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, the

government has a “categorical duty” to pay just

compensation when it takes private property for a public

use. Horne, 576 U.S. at 358; Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n

v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 31 (2012); Tahoe-Sierra

Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S.

302, 323 (2002).

The government satisfies its

categorical duty to pay for taking private property only

that time—including tax sale laws—put no deadline on owners

to recover their money. See, e.g, General Laws of Minn., Ch. XII,

§ 6 (1867); General Laws of Minn., Ch. IV, § 3 (1862); General

Laws of Minn., Ch. VI (1864). The cited 1881 Washington statute

only required owners to “file with the [state court] clerk a waiver

of all objections” to “the sale” in order to accelerate the return of

surplus proceeds. The same statute provides that even if the

owner didn’t file the waiver, once the court certifies the

regularity of the sale, “such proceeds shall be paid [to the

judgment debtor] of course.” Code of Wash. § 367.5 (1881)

(emphasis added).

with a “reasonable, certain, and adequate provision for

obtaining compensation.” Cherokee Nation, 135 U.S. at

659. An “adequate” legal remedy “must be as complete,

practical and efficient as that which equity could afford.”

Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 214 (1923).

The categorical duty to pay just compensation

applies when the government seizes private property to

pay a tax debt. Tyler, 598 U.S. at 639. While the

government “ha[s] the power” to sell property to recover

unpaid property taxes, it violates the Takings Clause if

the government “confiscate[s] more property than was

due.” Ibid. The government must pay for any excess

property taken. Ibid.

After Tyler, most states using confiscatory tax

foreclosures revised their statutes to resemble other

debt collection laws—giving owners a reasonable period

after the sale of seized property to recover any proceeds

remaining after the debts are paid.10 Indeed, most

states already automatically remitted surplus proceeds

to owners11 or gave them years after sale to recover their

10 See, e.g., 2024 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 165 (H.B. 24-1056); 36

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 943-C; 2024 Mass. Legis. Serv. Ch. 140

§§ 80, 93 (H.B. 4800); 2023 Neb. Laws L.B. 727; 2024 Ohio Laws

File 81 (Am. Sub. H.B. 315); 2025 Or. House Bill No. 2089 § 9;

2024 S.D. Laws Ch. 38 (HB 1090).

11 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 9, § 8779; Ga. Code Ann. §§ 484-5, -81(f) (court ”shall” distribute funds if a judicial foreclosure;

if administrative foreclosure, then at least five years to claim

surplus); Idaho Code § 31-808(2)(c); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-2803;

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 426.500, 91.517 (depending on local entity,

either the money “shall” be paid to owner, or owners have two

years to apply); Md. Code Ann., Tax-Prop. § 14-818; Mont. Code

Ann. § 15-18-221; N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 105-374(q)(6), 105-375(i), 1339.70; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 5061(b); Wis. Stat. § 75.36(2m)(b).

money.12 But Alabama, Arizona, Michigan, New Jersey,

and New York rely on Nelson to give owners an unusual

and short claim window that occurs before the sale and

long before the money is available to collect. Supra n.1.

In other words, they require owners to claim just

compensation before the taking.

Cf. Jackson v.

Southfield Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative, No.

166320, __ Mich. ___, 2025 WL 1959046, at *5 (Mich.

July 16, 2025) (“Where a public foreclosure sale occurs,

the government commits a taking only if it retains any

surplus proceeds received from the sale of the

property.”); id. at *14 (Welch, J., concurring) (“a taking

[that] occurs only as to excess proceeds []would not be

possible if the takings claim occurred as soon as a taxforeclosure judgment becomes final. This is because the

‘excess proceeds’ are not determined until after the

judgment of foreclosure is issued.”).

12 See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 26-37-205(b) (two years to claim);

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-157(f) (ninety days before being treated as

unclaimed property, which is held indefinitely for the owner);

Fla. Stat. § 197.582 (120 days to make claim before money is

treated as unclaimed property, held for the owner); Haw. Cnty.

Code § 19-45 (two years to claim); Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24-7(c), (e)(2)

(three years); Miss. Code Ann. § 27-41-77 (two years); Mo. Rev.

Stat. § 140.230(2) (ordinarily one to three years); N.M. Stat. Ann.

§ 7-38-71(A)-(C) (two years and then treated as unclaimed

property, held for the owner); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5721.20

(three years); 72 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5860.205(f) (three years); S.C.

Code Ann. § 12-51-130 (five years); Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2702

(court orders payment to former owner and unclaimed money is

held by state unclaimed property fund for benefit of owner); Tex.

Tax Code § 34.03(a)(2) (two years); Utah Code Ann. § 59-21351.1(7) (held indefinitely for owner as unclaimed property for

owner); Va. Code Ann. §§ 58.1-3967, -3970 (two years, but local

government may allow longer); Wash. Rev. Code § 84.64.080(10)

(three years); W. Va. Code § 11A-3-65 (two years); Wyo. Stat.

Ann. § 39-13-108(d)(iv)(C) (two years or longer).

The result is predictable:

all but the most

sophisticated owners miss this counterintuitive

deadline. In Michigan, the claim statute has stopped

around 95% of owners—100% in some counties—from

collecting the surplus proceeds from the sale of their

foreclosed properties.13 State records document a

widespread problem as counties confiscate millions of

dollars. The most recent report of tax foreclosure sales

(2022) reveals that thirty Michigan counties remitted

not one penny of surplus proceeds to former owners,

while retaining windfalls for themselves. Typical

examples are Branch County, which confiscated

$337,397.87; Clinton County, which kept $209,809.90;

and Livingston County, which kept $290,453.13. Some

counties confiscated much more, such as Barry County,

which remitted nothing and kept $993,750.34, and

Oakland County which remitted $991,021 and kept

$2,592,366.14 Respondent Macomb County remitted

$39,855 and kept $1,067,130, according to the report.

Supra n.14 at 47. Compounding the injustice, those who

lose their property to tax foreclosure tend to be

vulnerable and more likely to be elderly or ill. Kidd v.

Pappas, No. 22 C 7061, 2025 WL 1865983 (N.D. Ill. July

7, 2025) (class members who lost property to tax

13 Oakland County took tax debtors’ surplus proceeds from 187

out of 196 foreclosed properties in 2022. Pacific Legal

Foundation, Confusing Procedures Can Result in Shadow Equity

Theft: Michigan, https://tinyurl.com/yhfuhkdm (visited Oct. 8,

2025).

14 Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, Foreclosing Governmental Unit

Report of Real Property Foreclosure Sales (compilation of county

reports of 2022 foreclosures), https://tinyurl.com/3hxkxtuy

(visited Oct. 8, 2025). Counties submit these reports pursuant to

MCL § 211.78m(8)(i). The amount remitted to former owners is

recorded in column xi and the amount kept by the county in

column xii.

foreclosure were overwhelmingly “not sophisticated

parties” and can’t afford to hire a lawyer); Wayside

Church v. Van Buren Cnty., Nos. 24-1598, 24-1676, 2025

WL 2829601, at *12 (6th Cir. Oct. 6, 2025) (Kethledge,

J., concurring) (Michigan counties, with “complete lack

of remorse,” “exploited” legal traps to “prey upon” many

“lower-income or elderly” former homeowners, with

“catastrophic” results).

This Court’s decision in Nelson is the reason why

federal and state courts authorize these confiscations,

even though they violate the government’s categorical

duty to pay for what it takes with a reasonable, certain,

and adequate process, the modern and traditional duty

of debt collectors, and the traditional rule against

accidental waiver of constitutional rights.

Nelson v. City of New York

In Nelson, the property owners failed to pay their

water bills on two properties because of a bookkeeper’s

misconduct. Nelson, 352 U.S. at 105, 108. To satisfy the

debts, the City of New York foreclosed, kept one

property, and sold the other, retaining a windfall for the

public. Id. at 105-06. The bookkeeper “concealed” the

debt and foreclosure action from the owners. Id. at 107.

The owners later moved to vacate the judgment, arguing

violations of procedural due process and equal

protection. Id. at 106, 109. Nelson rejected these claims,

holding “the City cannot be charged with responsibility

for the misconduct of the bookkeeper in whom

appellants misplaced their confidence nor for the

carelessness of the managing trustee in over-looking

notices of arrearages.” Id. at 108.

The Court also addressed the petitioners’ belated

argument that the City took property without just

compensation.15

Id. at 109.

“New York City’s

ordinance . . . permitted the owner to recover the

surplus but required that the owner have ‘filed a timely

answer in [the] foreclosure proceeding, asserting his

property had a value substantially exceeding the tax

due.’ ” Tyler, 598 U.S. at 644 (quoting Nelson, 352 U.S.

at 110). Because the owners “did not take advantage of

this procedure,” Nelson says, “they forfeited their right

to the surplus.” Tyler, 598 U.S. at 644; see Nelson, 352

U.S. at 110. To protect their property right in the excess

value of the property, the owners would have had to

stake their claim before foreclosure and before there was

any money to claim. Ibid. Because the owners missed

that narrow window, Nelson states there was no taking.

Ibid.

Thus, Nelson apparently endorsed New York City’s

claim exhaustion requirement and established a

principle that a valid takings claim can be extinguished

if an owner fails to pursue even the narrowest state

remedy. Tyler “readily distinguished” Nelson. Tyler,

598 U.S. at 643. A case is distinguished “to minimize

These comments should be considered dicta because the

takings claim was raised solely in a reply brief before this Court

(see Nelson, 352 U.S. at 110 (noting “belated” takings argument));

it was neither pressed nor passed upon in the lower court; and

was unnecessary to resolution of the questions presented.

Magruder v. Drury, 235 U.S. 106, 113 (1914); United States v.

Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 41 (1992). The Court is also wary of

“endow[ing] a fleeting statement with lasting significance,”

Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152, 161 (2023), particularly

when that statement operates to bar litigants from court. Id. at

165. As Justice Scalia noted, “dicta, when repeatedly used as the

point of departure for analysis, have a regrettable tendency to

acquire the practical status of legal rules.” Tafflin v. Levitt, 493

U.S. 455, 469 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). This “regrettable

tendency” is plainly evident here.

the case’s precedential effect or to show that it is

inapplicable.” Distinguish, Black’s Law Dictionary

(11th ed. 2019). Tyler avoided the question presented

here: whether Nelson is binding and, if so, whether it

should be overturned.

B. Nelson cannot be reconciled with the duty

to pay just compensation

This Court has repeatedly expressed the principle

that just compensation must be paid for a taking of

property, stressing in different ways the mandatory

nature of the constitutional obligation. See, e.g., Cedar

Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139, 147 (2021) (“the

Takings Clause imposes a clear and categorical

obligation to provide the owner with just compensation.”); Horne, 576 U.S. at 358 (“The Government has

a categorical duty to pay just compensation when it

takes your car, just as when it takes your home.”);

Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 323 (“When the government

physically takes possession of an interest in property for

some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to

compensate the former owner”); Brown v. Legal Found.

of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 233 (2003) (same); Koontz

v. St. Johns River Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 613 (2013)

(government “must pay just compensation” when it

takes money); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S.

528, 538 (2005) (“where government requires an owner

to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her

property—however minor—it must provide just

compensation”); United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S.

230, 242 (1946) (noting “obligation to pay just

compensation”).

The government’s obligation to compensate within a

reasonable time after it takes property is not an “empty

formality, subject to modification at the government’s

pleasure.” Cedar Point, 594 U.S. at 158. As Justice

Brennan explained, “the just compensation requirement in the Fifth Amendment is not precatory: once

there is a ‘taking,’ compensation must be awarded.” San

Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,

654 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf. Cont’l Oil Co.

v. Bonanza Corp., 706 F.2d 1365, 1372 (5th Cir. 1983)

(defining “categorical duty” as one that incurs criminal

or civil penalties if not done). This has long been the

rule and no state law can undermine it. “The just

compensation clause may not be evaded or impaired by

any form of legislation.” Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v.

United States, 298 U.S. 349, 368 (1936). “It does not rest

with the public, taking the property, through . . . the

legislature, . . . to say what shall be the rule of

compensation. The constitution has declared that just

compensation shall be paid . . . .” Monongahela Nav.

Co., 148 U.S. at 327 (emphasis added).16 This Court

explained in Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16

(1933), that “the form of the [just compensation] remedy

did not qualify the right. It rested upon the Fifth

Amendment. Statutory recognition was not necessary.

A promise to pay was not necessary. Such a promise

was implied because of the duty to pay imposed by the

Amendment.” The government’s obligation to pay just

compensation is “comprehensive,” entitling owners to

interest payments even when interest is not explicitly

commanded by statute. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v.

United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306 (1923).

16 The nature of a categorical duty is one that “shall” be done.

Lawson v. United States, 124 F.3d 198, 1997 WL 530540, *3 (6th

Cir. 1997). “Shall” is a mandatory command. Bufkin v. Collins,

604 U.S. 369, 379 (2025). And that command appears in the Fifth

Amendment itself: “nor shall private property be taken for a

public use, without just compensation.”

The government thus secures its obligation to pay

just compensation by pledging its full faith and credit.

Chicago, B&Q Ry. Co., 200 U.S. at 593 (“secure”); Joslin

Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 677 (1923)

(pledge “public faith and credit”); Sweet v. Rechel, 159

U.S. 380, 401 (1895) (same).17 “Secure means “to assure

of payment” and “make certain the payment of a debt or

discharge of an obligation.” N.Y. and Presbyterian Hosp.

v. United States, 881 F.3d 877, 885 (Fed. Cir. 2018)

(citations omitted); Elzea v. Nat’l Bank of Ga., 570 F.2d

1248, 1250 n.6 (5th Cir. 1978) (“secure” means “to

guarantee or make certain the payment of a debt or

discharge of an obligation.”). To pledge the faith of a

government “means, of course, that payment shall be

made.-.-.-.” Kankakee Cnty. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 106

U.S. 668, 670 (1883). In short, a state’s “full faith and

credit” “guarantees” payment of legal obligations.

Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 242 F.3d 315,

320 (5th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added); see also Md.

Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth. v. Meadow-Croft, 243 Md. 515,

522 (1966) (“The generally accepted meaning of a pledge

of the faith and credit of a political entity is that the

governmental body is unconditionally liable for the

payment of the debt, if sufficient money is not otherwise

made available.”) (emphasis added). As Justice Harlan

phrased it, the constitutional obligation to pay just

compensation is a “covenant between the government

17 See State v. City of Lakeland, 154 Fla. 137, 139 (1944) (pledge

of faith “express[es] an undertaking by the city to be irrevocably

obligated, in good faith, to use such of its resources and taxing

power as may be authorized or required by law for the full and

prompt payment of the principal and interest of the obligation as

it becomes due”). The purpose of pledging full faith and credit is

to minimize the intended recipient’s risk of loss. Rockford Life

Ins. Co. v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 482 U.S. 182, 184-85 (1987).

and every citizen whose property is appropriated by it

for public use.” Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S.

163, 177 (1894) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also State v.

Beackmo, 8 Blackf. 246, 250 (Ind. 1846) (payment of just

compensation is a “sacred obligation” to be “carefully

guarded and most scrupulously observed”). For this

reason, some courts describe the actual payment of just

compensation as a “ministerial, non-discretionary

duty.” Watson Mem. Spiritual Temple of Christ v.

Korban, 387 So.3d 499, 512 (La. 2024).

There is no plausible debt collection exception to the

government’s categorical duty to pay just compensation.

See Tyler, 598 U.S. at 639-40. Quite the opposite. For

centuries, the law has imposed on debt collectors a duty

to fairly sell confiscated property and refund any

surplus. See, e.g., 2 Blackstone, Commentaries on the

Laws of England 453 (1768) (“bound by an implied

contract in law . . . when sold, to render back the

overplus.”); Cocks v. Izard, 74 U.S. 559, 562 (1868);

United States v. Taylor, 104 U.S. 216, 221-22 (1881) (the

government had a duty to hold surplus proceeds

“indefinite[ly]” as “trustee” for the taxpayer); Slater v.

Maxwell, 73 U.S. 268, 276 (1867) (duty to fairly sell

property); People ex rel. Seaman v. Hammond, 1 Doug.

276, 280-81 (Mich. 1844) (owner is “at all times” entitled

to receive surplus funds); McDuffee v. Collins, 117 Ala.

487, 492 (1898) (tax collector bore the “duty of seeking

the owner and paying him the balance” or holding it in

trust); Bogie v. Town of Barnet, 129 Vt. 46, 52 (1970)

(government “must suffer the restraints of fiduciary

duty” when selling property to collect taxes).

In none of these cases does the burden shift from the

government to citizens defending their property rights.

Instead, the unbroken line of cases from early in the

nation’s history until the current decade highlights the

requirement that compensation be paid for a taking.

Nelson is an aberration that unaccountably shifts the

covenantal obligation of government to pay just

compensation to the former property owners to comply

with any claims process that self-interested states may

devise.

C. Michigan’s statute cannot be reconciled

with the duty to pay just compensation

To conform to the requirements of the Takings

Clause, just compensation and the process to provide it

must be “reasonable, certain, and adequate.” Cherokee

Nation, 135 U.S. at 659; Sage v. Brooklyn, 89 N.Y. 189,

195 (1882) (process must be “sure, sufficient and

convenient”); State Hwy. Comm’r v. Kreger, 128 Va. 203,

212-13 (1920) (valid statute ensures an owner will

“receive with reasonable certainty and without unnecessary or unreasonable delay the just compensation to

which he is entitled”). Courts historically forbid

government from shifting the government’s “categorical

duty” to pay onto the person whose property was taken.

In a takings case, “[i]t is not incumbent upon [the owner]

to demand that the authorities shall respect his rights;

the duty is [the government’s] to work no unlawful

invasion of them.” Bigelow v. Ballerino, 111 Cal. 559,

564-65 (1896). See also Kelly v. Okla. Tpk. Auth., 269

P.2d 359, 363 (Okla. 1954) (“[T]he owner has an

absolute right to the condemnation money, and the

condemnor has neither right nor authority to impose

any condition or obligation upon the owner’s right.”),

citing Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 3, Sec. 8.3 (3d

ed. 1964); Haverhill Bridge Proprietors v. Essex Cnty.

Comm’rs, 103 Mass. 120, 124-25 (1869) (rejecting

government’s effort to make procedural opportunities a

stand-in for reasonable compensation).

Michigan’s process for paying just compensation in

the usual eminent domain context complies with that

traditional duty: the government deposits an estimated

amount of just compensation in escrow, “held for the

benefit of the owners,” MCL § 213.55(5), until the court

orders payment. MCL § 213.58. When owners can’t be

found or fail to demand the money within one year, the

State of Michigan holds it “indefinitely” for them. See

O’Connor v. Eubanks, 83 F.4th 1018, 1021 (6th Cir.

2023) (describing how unclaimed money statute

requires holding property for the owner indefinitely);

MCL §§ 567.224, 567.234 (money held for an owner by a

court but not claimed within one year is administered

pursuant to unclaimed money statute). And when

government takes property without invoking eminent

domain, property owners have six years to bring an

inverse condemnation claim seeking just compensation

under the Michigan Constitution’s Takings Clause and

three years under the federal Takings Clause. Hart v.

City of Detroit, 416 Mich. 488, 503 (1982); Grainger v.

Ottawa Cnty., 90 F.4th 507, 510 (6th Cir. 2024).

By contrast, tax debtors like Howard must act within

ninety-two days of foreclosure—weeks before the sale

and before the taking is complete under Rafaeli, 505

Mich. at 474—to preserve their inchoate, future right to

collect any just compensation.18 This is long before most

owners realize what is happening, as reflected in the

overwhelming failure rate. And the government still

confiscates just compensation owed to those few owners

who timely submit the notarized form but fail to

perfectly comply with every requirement, like the type

Howard herself was given a grand total of two weeks to

submit the notarized form after the County cancelled her

payment plan. App. 10a, 68a.

of mail used. See In re Alger Cnty. Treasurer for

Foreclosure, Nos. 363803, 363804, 2024 WL 4174925, at

*4 (Mich. Ct. App. Sep. 12, 2024) (owner’s claim denied

for sending Form 5743 via trackable Priority Mail

Express instead of return receipt requested), petition

pending sub nom. McGee v. Alger Cnty. Treasurer, No.

25-203 (U.S.); MCL § 211.78t(4); Billy Binion, She

Underpaid a Property Tax Bill. So the Government

Seized Her Home, Sold It—and Kept the $102,636 Profit,

Reason Magazine (July 26, 2024) (describing MCL

§ 211.78t as a “byzantine debt collection statute that

sends homeowners on a wild goose chase should they

want to get their equity back”).19 Government cannot

“make[] an exception only for itself ” to avoid paying just

compensation. Tyler, 598 U.S. at 645.

Moreover, the statute in all cases fails to provide an

“adequate” remedy of just compensation, because it

awards claimants less than they are constitutionally

due. The statute allows counties to retain interest

earned on the principal for the year the county holds the

money, MCL § 211.78t(12)(b), instead of remitting it to

owners, contrary to the Just Compensation Clause.

United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., 329 U.S.

585, 588 (1947) (federal statute prohibiting recovery of

interest on unpaid claims could not apply in

condemnation actions because the Fifth Amendment

entitles a property owner to receive, as part of just

compensation, interest from the date of the taking to the

date of payment).20 Additionally, the counties take five

19 https://tinyurl.com/ytnxwa7z.

Despite statutory authority to keep interest on foreclosure

proceeds, MCL § 211.78t(12)(b), Macomb County states that it

voluntarily allows those few individuals who successfully claim

surplus proceeds to recover the interest on their principal. App.

percent of the sale price, on top of all taxes, penalties,

interest, fees, and expenses, even if the county

purchased the property. MCL § 211.78m(16)(c). The

statute calls this five percent deduction a “commission,”

but the real estate agent’s fee is already deducted under

MCL § 211.78m(16)(c). Moreover, Macomb County, like

most Michigan counties, contracts with a private

company to administer the statute.21 Hence, owners

who successfully navigate the statute recover at most

only ninety-five percent of surplus proceeds and may be

deprived of the accrued interest. Cf. Phillips v.

Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 170 (1998)

(“The government may not seize rents received by the

owner of a building simply because it can prove that the

costs incurred in collecting the rents exceed the amount

collected.”). This is not just compensation. “ ‘[J]ust

compensation’ means the full monetary equivalent of

the property taken.” United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S.

14, 16 (1970).

65a-66a (Macomb County counsel’s assertion before the Sixth

Circuit).

21Macomb County and one other Michigan county outsource the

auctions to SRI Services, which uses the Zeus online auction

platform. See supra n.6. Most Michigan counties outsource the

notice and auction tasks to Title Check, a company that charges

buyers a ten percent commission. See Garcia v. Title Check, LLC,

No. 22-1574, 2023 WL 2787298, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 5, 2023).

II. The Court Should Resolve the Conflict

Between Nelson’s Exhaustion Requirement

and the Court’s Disavowal of Exhaustion

Requirements in Other Takings Cases

An owner who is denied just compensation for a

taking may bring a constitutional takings claim in

federal or state court without first exhausting state

administrative or judicial remedies. Knick, 588 U.S. at

189; Felder, 487 U.S. at 142. But several federal and

state courts, including the court below, construe Nelson

to mean that owners must exhaust a state claim process

for just compensation after a tax foreclosure—even

though the process itself always results in less than just

compensation. These courts allow the government to

use procedural hurdles to evade its duty to pay just

compensation. Other jurisdictions hold fast to Knick

and Felder, creating a split of authority. This Court

should grant review to settle the conflict.

A. Takings decisions that rely on Nelson

conflict with this Court’s holdings in

Knick and Felder

Nelson’s reasoning is most analogous to Williamson

County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton

Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985). The Court in

Williamson County held that a plaintiff does not have a

ripe federal takings claim if a claimant failed to “seek

compensation through the procedures the State has

provided for doing so.” Ibid. Unless the claimant sought

and was denied such compensation in a state court

action, there was no ripened federal taking. Id. at 19496. But Williamson County proved unworkable and

unjust, often barring takings claims from both federal

and state courts. See Knick, 588 U.S. at 185.

That is largely why this Court overruled Williamson

County, holding instead that as soon as “government

takes private property without paying for it, that

government has violated the Fifth Amendment—just as

the Takings Clause says—without regard to subsequent

state court proceedings.” Knick, 588 U.S. at 189. Knick

restored the traditional understanding that merely

offering a process is not the same as timely paying just

compensation. See Wilson v. Hawaii, 145 S. Ct. 18, 20

(2024) (Thomas, J., statement on denial of cert.) (“[T]he

availability of state-law compensation remedies cannot

delay or undo the accrual of a takings claim.”) (citing

Knick, 588 U.S. at 193-94). In short, “a property owner

acquires an irrevocable right to just compensation

immediately upon a taking.” Knick, 588 U.S. at 192

(citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of

Glendale v. Los Angeles Cnty. 482 U.S. 304, 315, 318

(1987) (emphasis added).

Knick realigned this Court’s takings jurisprudence

with principles expressed in Patsy v. Board of Regents of

Florida, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), and Felder, 487 U.S. at

142, which held that plaintiffs need not exhaust state

administrative remedies before asserting civil rights

claims under Section 1983. In Felder, a Wisconsin

statute required arrestees to file an administrative

notice of claim within 120 days of the government’s

violation of their rights. Id. at 136. The claim

requirement was designed to “minimize governmental

liability” and stood out “rather starkly, from rules

uniformly applicable to all suits.” Id. at 145. The noticeof-claim statute imposed an “exhaustion requirement on

persons who choose to assert their federal right in state

courts,” id. at 146, and therefore Section 1983

preempted it. Id. at 149 (noting congressional intent to

provide judicial fora for constitutional claims).

Wisconsin’s notice-of-claim statute did not involve

lengthy or expensive administrative proceedings. Still,

it forced claimants “to seek satisfaction from those

alleged to have caused the injury in the first place.”

Ibid. The Court held that failure to follow the claim

statute could not bar relief for the federal constitutional

claim brought in Wisconsin state court. Ibid.22 That

holding was consistent with this Court’s precedents that

“[p]eculiarities of local law may not gnaw at rights

rooted in federal legislation.” S. Buffalo Ry. Co. v.

Ahern, 344 U.S. 367, 372 (1953). See also Brown v.

Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 299 (1949) (this Court

will “protect federally created rights from dismissal

because of over-exacting local requirements for

meticulous pleadings”); Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22,

25 (1923) (“it is necessary to see that local practice shall

not be allowed to put unreasonable obstacles in the way”

of assertion of federal rights in state courts). Felder’s

bottom line is that states “may no more condition the

federal right to recover for violations of civil rights than

bar that right altogether.” Felder, 487 U.S. at 144.

In conflict with Knick and Felder, state and federal

courts rely on Nelson to hold that the 92-day notice-ofclaim deadline in MCL § 211.78t is mandatory and

failure to comply defeats any takings claim. Compare

App. 12a (Nelson “tells us everything we need to know”)

and In re Muskegon County Treasurer for Foreclosure,

348 Mich. App. at 688 (“[O]ur Legislature’s own words

could hardly be clearer: Section 78t ‘is the exclusive

mechanism for a claimant to claim and receive any

22 Cf. Williams v. Reed, 604 U.S. 168, 170 (2025) (states may

not employ an “exclusive” statutory process requirement that

effectively immunizes state officials from lawsuits brought under

42 U.S.C. § 1983).

applicable remaining proceeds under the laws of this

state.’”), with Felder, 487 U.S. at 140 (notice-of-claim

statutes “are neither universally familiar nor in any

sense indispensable prerequisites to litigation”)

(emphasis added). The court below does not hold that

the claims are nonjusticiable because Howard missed

the deadline; it holds that, per Nelson, missing the

notice of claim deadline means there was no taking.

App. 11a (“Michigan’s procedures for collecting the

surplus do not compensate the property owner for a

taking. They prevent a taking from happening in the

first place.”). The court construed Knick as “guarantee[ing]” only that a plaintiff can bring a takings claim

if she first “follow[s] the . . . procedures for claiming the

surplus, only to be denied it.” Ibid. Nelson’s approval of

such procedures cannot be reconciled with Knick and

Felder. The Court should grant review to hold it was

unpersuasive dicta or to overrule it.

B. The lower courts conflict in their

application of Nelson

The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits follow Knick, not

Nelson, in holding that no exhaustion of state remedies

is necessary to bring a federal takings claim under

analogous circumstances, where an owner wants to

recover her own money. In Knellinger v. Young, the

Tenth Circuit considered whether owners of unclaimed

property held in custody by the state must file a claim

for the property before filing a lawsuit alleging a taking

of interest accrued on the money while in custody. The

court held that property owners “need not file administrative claims with Colorado before they may sue for

just compensation. The moment a state takes private

property for public use without just compensation, a

property owner has an actionable claim under the

Takings Clause.” 134 F.4th 1034, 1038, 1044 n.4 (10th

Cir. 2025) (analyzing Knick).

The Eleventh Circuit also followed Knick in a case

involving a property owner’s challenge to the state’s

retention of accrued interest on unclaimed property: “It

made no difference that state law provided a ‘procedure

that [could] subsequently result in just compensation,’

because ‘it is the existence of the Fifth Amendment right

that allows the owner to proceed directly to federal court

under § 1983.’ ” Maron v. Chief Fin. Officer of Fla., 136

F.4th 1322, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 2025) (citing Knick, 588

U.S. at 191). Therefore, “[e]ven if a plaintiff later

compensated by state law remedies would have no

further claim, that would be ‘because the taking has

been remedied by compensation, not because there was

no taking in the first place.’ ” Ibid. (citation omitted); see

also Sharritt v. Henry, No. 23 C 15838, 2024 WL

4524501, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2024) (a procedure

“cannot both be the proper procedure that former

owners can exercise to receive compensation . . . and a

gatekeeping mechanism that prevents those who lost

their land from receiving compensation.”). Similarly, in

Fulton the Eleventh Circuit held that a property owner

could still bring a takings claim in federal court even

though he did not comply with Georgia’s twelve-month

notice of claim deadline. Fulton, 148 F.4th at 1236. See

also id. at 1240 (“A guaranteed remedy is a guaranteed

remedy only if it’s accessible.”).

In conflict with the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, the

Sixth Circuit, Michigan courts, and several federal

district courts construe Nelson to mean that an owner’s

failure to strictly comply with the state administrative

and court process defeats a claim for just compensation.

App. 11a; Wright v. Rollyson, No. 2:24-CV-00474, 2025

WL 835040, at *3 (S.D.W.V. Mar. 17, 2025) (Tyler and

Nelson mean “[t]here is no Takings Clause violation

when a sovereign’s statutory scheme provides an

opportunity for the taxpayer to recover the excess

value.”) (cleaned up); In Re: Franco, No. 24-21084-ABA,

2025 WL 884067, at *7 (Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2025)

(statute “complies with both Tyler and Nelson” even

though it gives tax-lienholders a windfall from the

owner because she failed to request a judicial sale before

the foreclosure judgment was final); Biesemeyer v. Mun.

of Anchorage, No. 3:23-CV-00185, 2024 WL 1480564, at

*7 (D. Alaska Mar. 13, 2024) (Alaska’s six-month claim

process “meets the low threshold implied by Tyler and

Nelson,” and therefore takings and due process claims

seeking $243,235 in excess proceeds must be dismissed).

The decision below is now infecting takings law

outside the tax foreclosure context, with the Sixth

Circuit recently holding that an owner who did not

exhaust administrative remedies before challenging an

uncompensated taking “‘forfeited’ its takings claim

when it chose not to follow that [state] procedure.” OPV

Partners, LLC v. City of Lansing, No. 24-2035, 2025 WL

1898235, at *3 (6th Cir. July 9, 2025) (relying on

Howard to bar a takings challenge to rental property

regulations).

The Sixth Circuit followed the lead of Michigan state

courts. In addition to the decisions presently on petition

before this Court, see supra at 1, the Michigan Supreme

Court recently relied on Nelson to add exhaustion

requirements to takings claims. In Hathon v. Michigan,

the state’s high court dismissed as unripe a takings

claim based on government’s retention of surplus

proceeds that was filed two years before the claims

statute here was adopted. 17 N.W.3d 686, 686-87 (Mich.

2025) (following Nelson). Although the state has held

the owners’ private property for seven years—without

compensation—the court ordered the owners to comply

with MCL § 211.78t by filing Form 5743 within eleven

days before pursuing their constitutional claims seeking

just compensation. Ibid. Hathon and the court below

thus mimic the exhaustion rationale that this Court

rejected in Knick and Felder. See also Schafer v. Kent

Cnty., No. 164975, __ N.W.3d __, 2024 WL 3573500, at

*6, *16 n.94, *17 (Mich. July 29, 2024) (explaining

Hathon’s procedural history, and holding that the claim

provisions of MCL § 211.78t are fully retroactive). The

Court should grant review to settle this conflict among

the lower courts and resolve the conflict between Nelson,

Knick, and Felder.

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant the petition.

Respectfully submitted,

D EBORAH J. L A F ETRA

Pacific Legal Foundation

3100 Clarendon Blvd.

Suite 1000

Arlington, VA 22201

MATTHEW E. GRONDA

4800 Fashion Sq. Blvd.

Ste. 200

Saginaw, MI 48604

CHRISTINA M. M ARTIN

Counsel of Record

Pacific Legal Foundation

4440 PGA Blvd., Suite 307

Palm Beach Gardens, FL

33410

(916) 330-4059

CMartin@pacificlegal.org

PHILLIP L. ELLISON

Outside Legal Counsel

PLC

530 West Saginaw St.

P.O. Box 107

Hemlock, MI 48626

Counsel for Petitioner

O CTOBER 2025

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