Amicus Curiae Brief — Public Interest Legal Foundation, Petitioner v. Jocelyn Benson, in Her Official Capacity as Michigan Secretary of State, et al.

No. 25-437

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION,

Petitioner,

v.

JOCELYN BENSON, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY

AS MICHIGAN SECRETARY OF STATE, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of A ppeals for the Sixth Circuit

BRIEF OF CENTER FOR ELECTION

CONFIDENCE, INC. AS AMICUS CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

Phillip M. Gordon

Counsel of Record

Mark W. A ltman, III

A bbi White Harris

Naman, Howell, Smith

& Lee, PLLC

400 Austin Avenue,

Suite 800

Waco, TX 76701

(254) 755-4100

pgordon@namanhowell.com

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

131661

A

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

I.

T H E CON T IN U ED ERO SION OF

VOTER CONFIDENCE IN ELECTIONS

N ECE S SI TAT E S T H I S C OU RT ’ S

REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

II. BE YO N D R A T IO N A L I T Y: W H Y

“REASONABLE EFFORT” DEMANDS

EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

a.

The Statutor y Standa rd of a

Reasonable Effort Is Not Met by a

“Rational” and “Sensible” “Attempt”

at List Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

i.

The Common English Meanings

of the Words “Reasonable” and

“Effort” are Incompatible with the

Sixth Circuit’s “Rational” “Attempt”

Holding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

ii

Table of Contents

Page

ii. C i v i l R i ght s S t at ut e s w it h

Reasonableness Language Are

Uniformly Held to Require an

Effective Implementation, Not

Merely a “Rational” or “Sensible”

One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

b.

If Permitted to Stand, the Sixth

Circuit’s Standard Leads to Absurd

Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

III. INFORM ATIONA L STA NDING IS

ALIVE AND WELL, TRANSUNION

NOT WITHSTANDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

a.

Central to Purpose of the NVRA is

Transparency and Integrity Within the

Act of Voter Roll Maintenance, a Role

Most Analogous to FOIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

b.

Reliance on TransUnion by the Sixth

Circuit is Misplaced as TransUnion

Does Not Apply to Public-Disclosure

Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

iii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Bellows v. Farrell,

92 F.4th 50 (1st Cir. 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.,

594 U.S. 647 (2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 17

Campaign Legal Ctr. & Democracy 21 v. FEC,

952 F.3d 352 (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Campaign Legal Ctr. v. Scott,

49 F.4th 931 (5th Cir. 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Casillas v. Madison Ave. Assocs.,

926 F.3d 329 (7th Cir. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Common Cause Ind. v. Lawson,

937 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd.,

472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Democratic National Committee v.

Wisconsin State Legislature,

141 S. Ct. 28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 4

Evans v. Cornman,

398 U.S. 419 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

iv

Cited Authorities

Page

FCC v. AT&T Inc.,

562 U.S. 397 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Gozlon-Peretz v. United States,

498 U.S. 395 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Groff v. DeJoy,

600 U.S. 447 (2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst.,

584 U.S. 756 (2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Laufer v. Naranda Hotels, LLC,

60 F.4th 156 (4th Cir. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long,

682 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 16, 22

Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long,

752 F. Supp. 2d 697 (E.D. Va. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Pub. Int. Legal Found. v. Bellows,

92 F.4th 36 (1st Cir. 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 16

Pub. Int. Legal Found. v. Sec’y of Pa.,

136 F.4th 456 (3d Cir. 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 18

Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Benson,

136 F.4th 613 (6th Cir. 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8, 11

v

Cited Authorities

Page

Purcell v. Gonzalez,

549 U.S. 1 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Reichert v. National Credit Systems, Inc.,

531 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Republican Party v. Degraffenreid,

141 S. Ct. 732 (2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,

578 U.S. 330 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,

594 U.S. 413, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) . . . . . .2, 18, 19, 21

Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt.,

964 F.3d 990 (11th Cir. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,

535 U.S. 391 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 10

Statutes

5 U.S.C. § 552 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

vi

Cited Authorities

Page

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

38 U.S.C. § 4303(10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

38 U.S.C. § 4313 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

52 U.S.C. § 20501(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

52 U.S.C. § 20501(a)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

52 U.S.C. § 20501(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 4, 6, 8, 14

52 U.S.C. § 20501(b)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9

52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

vii

Cited Authorities

Page

52 U.S.C. § 20507(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

52 U.S.C. § 20507(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

52 U.S.C. § 20507(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

52 U.S.C. § 20507(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 15-17

52 U.S.C. § 20510(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 16, 17

52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Other Authorities

Martin Austermuhle, Data Errors Imperil

D.C.’s Participation In Group That Cleans

Up States’ Voter Rolls, DCist (Feb. 9, 2022),

https://tinyurl.com/2ktr496m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Comm’n Fed. Election Refor m, Buil din g

Confidence in U.S. Elections (Sept. 2005),

https://tinyurl.com/mdcef5h3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Susan Crabtree, Calif. Begins Removing 5

Mi l li o n In a c tive Vot ers o n It s Rol l s,

R e a l C l e a r Pol i t i c s (Ju n e 2 0 , 2 019),

https://tinyurl.com/ysb3tuwu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Dictionary.com . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

viii

Cited Authorities

Page

Elissa Slotkin wins Michigan Senate Seat,

Politico, https://www.politico.com/2024-election/

results/michigan/senate/ (Nov. 6, 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . 5

H.R. Rep. 103-9 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Nick Iannelli, Virginia discovers nearly 19,000

dead people on voter rolls, WTOP News

(Apr. 19, 2023), https://tinyurl.com/ms6y7w6c . . . . . 5

Oxford Languages Dictionary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:

The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012) . . . . . . . . . 2

Merriam-Webster Online . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8

Merriam-Webster Dictionary (8th ed. 2022) . . . . . . . . . 9

Mer r ia m-Webst er, https: // w w w.mer r ia mwebster.com/dictionary/ensure (last visited on

November 5, 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Pew Ctr. on the States, Inaccurate, Costly, and

Inefficient: Evidence That America’s Voter

Registration System Needs an Upgrade

(Feb. 2012), https://tinyurl.com/38favmjr . . . . . . . . . . 5

S. Rep. No. 101-140 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

S. Rep. No. 103-6 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 16

ix

Cited Authorities

Page

Statement of Interest, Judicial Watch, et al.,

v. The Illinois State Board of Elections, et

al., No. 1:24-cv-01867 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2025

(ECF No. 107) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The Center for Election Confidence, Inc. (“CEC”) is a

non-partisan, non-profit organization that promotes ethics,

integrity, and professionalism in the electoral process.1

CEC works to ensure that all citizens can vote freely within

an election system that maintains reasonable procedures,

prevents vote dilution and disenfranchisement, and instills

public confidence in election outcomes.

To advance these goals, CEC conducts, funds, and

publishes research analyzing the effectiveness of current

and proposed election methods. CEC serves as a resource

for lawyers, journalists, policymakers, courts, and others

interested in the electoral process. CEC also engages in

public-interest litigation to uphold the rule of law and

election integrity and files amicus briefs in cases where

its expertise and national perspective can illuminate the

issues under consideration.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion eviscerates the purpose

of the National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”) and

ignores a time-honored tenet of statutory construction

articulated by Justice Scalia: “a textually permissible

interpretation that furthers rather than obstructs [a]

1. No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in

part, and no person other than the amicus and its counsel made

any monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or

submission of this brief. Counsel for amicus provided notice and

sought the position of the parties and all parties have consented to

the filing of this brief.

2

document’s purpose should be favored.” 2 Congress

clearly articulated the broader purposes of the NVRA as

establishing procedures to increase voter participation,

protect election integrity, and ensure the accuracy of

voter rolls. 52 U.S.C. § 20501(b). Rather than interpreting

the “reasonable effort” requirement to further the

NVRA’s express purposes, the Sixth Circuit concentrates

myopically upon the protection it provides for states, at

the expense of the NVRA’s objectives.

The “reasonable effort” requirement is meant as part

shield for states, obviating extreme measures, and part

sword for its citizens to be secure in the knowledge that the

risk of their votes being diluted is minimized. This Court’s

interpretation of various federal civil rights statutes

provides precedent for anchoring “reasonable effort”

in detectable success. Therefore, to achieve Congress’s

express purposes, the NVRA must be interpreted to

require that states’ voter roll maintenance programs be

effective.

As to standing, informational standing remains

untouched by TransUnion and any decision that otherwise

thwarts Congress’ intent that registration information

be made available. To ensure electoral integrity through

citizen oversight, the NVRA, much like the Freedom of

Information Act (“FOIA”), clearly requires states to make

available for public inspection any information relating

to their voter roll maintenance programs. 52 U.S.C.

§ 20507(i)(1). The NVRA also provides a public right of

action allowing any citizen to challenge a state’s failure

to comply with this disclosure requirement. Id.; 52 U.S.C.

§ 20510(b). The twin pillars of oversight and effectiveness

2. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The

Interpretation of Legal Texts 63 (2012).

3

ensure state accountability and foster much-needed faith

in the electoral system.

ARGUMENT

I.

T H E CON TI N U ED ERO SION OF VO T ER

CONFIDENCE IN ELECTIONS NECESSITATES

THIS COURT’S REVIEW.

It has long been recognized that election integrity is

essential to the public’s confidence in elections. See, e.g.,

Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006). (“Confidence in

the integrity of our electoral processes is essential to the

functioning of our participatory democracy.”); 52 U.S.C.

§ 20501(a)(3), & (b)(3). “[E]lections enable self-governance

only when they include processes that giv[e] citizens

(including the losing candidates and their supporters)

confidence in the fairness of the election.” See Republican

Party v. Degraffenreid, 141 S. Ct. 732, 734 (2021) (Thomas,

J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citing Democratic

National Committee v. Wisconsin State Legislature,

141 S. Ct. 28, 31 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial

of application to vacate stay)). As part of that effort,

voters must trust that their registrations are accurately

recorded so they can cast their ballots without difficulty.

Equally critical, they must trust that registration systems

are properly maintained—that deceased and ineligible

registrants are promptly removed to prevent misuse of

their names, particularly as remote voting through mail

and drop boxes expands.

The bipartisan Carter-Baker Commission identified

this fundamental reality: “registration lists lie at the

4

root of most problems encountered in U.S. elections.” 3

Voter rolls containing “ineligible, duplicate, fictional, or

deceased voters” are “an invitation to fraud.” Id. While

election fraud remains “difficult to measure”—many

cases go undetected, uninvestigated, or unprosecuted—“it

occurs.” Id. at 45. And the stakes are high: “In close or

disputed elections, and there are many, a small amount

of fraud could make the margin of difference.” Id. at 18.

Beyond actual fraud, “the perception of possible fraud

contributes to low confidence in the system.” Id.; see also

Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 594 U.S. 647, 672

(2021). (“Fraud can also undermine public confidence in

the fairness of elections and the perceived legitimacy of

the announced outcome.”). The imperative for accurate

voter registration rolls cannot be overstated.

Congress fully understood this reality when it passed

the National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”) for the

purposes of (1) establishing procedures to increase voter

participation; (2) protect the integrity of elections; and

(3) ensure that the voter rolls are accurate. 52 U.S.C.

§ 20501(b). Yet many states have failed to devote adequate

resources and effort toward maintaining accurate, current

voter-registration lists. The evidence is stark. California

recently discovered 5 million inactive registrants who had

moved away or died.4 The District of Columbia’s rolls have

deteriorated so severely that 11 percent of ballots mailed

3. Comm’n Fed. Election Reform, Building Confidence in U.S.

Elections 10 (Sept. 2005), https://tinyurl.com/mdcef5h3.

4. Susan Crabtree, Calif. Begins Removing 5 Million Inactive

Voters on Its Rolls, Real Clear Politics (June 20, 2019), https://tinyurl.

com/ysb3tuwu

5

to registrants in 2020 were returned as undeliverable. 5

Virginia uncovered nearly 19,000 deceased registrants still

on its rolls.6 Nationwide, a 2012 Pew Center on the States

study revealed that 24 million voter registrations—one in

eight—were invalid or contained significant inaccuracies,

including 1.8 million registrations of deceased persons.7

Too many states, like Michigan, simply have not devoted

the proper resources—or, indeed, implemented any

semblance of a reasonable voter list maintenance system—

to make their roll-accuracy programs effective.

This is not simply theoretical. The 25,000 ineligible

voters identified by Petitioner were more than enough

to swing a statewide election. For example, the margin

of victory for Senator Elissa Slotkin over her challenger

Mike Rogers in 2024 was only 20,000 votes, well within the

25,000-voter margin identified by Petitioner. 8 The Sixth

Circuit’s standard, if left untouched, will only serve to

further erode voters’ faith in the electoral system, which

is exactly the sort of negative outcome the NVRA was

designed to prevent.

5. Ma r t i n Aust er mu h le, Dat a Er r o rs Imper il D.C.’s

Participation In Group That Cleans Up States’ Voter Rolls, DCist

(Feb. 9, 2022), https://tinyurl.com/2ktr496m.

6. Nick Iannelli, Virginia discovers nearly 19,000 dead people

on voter rolls, WTOP News (Apr. 19, 2023), https://tinyurl.com/

ms6y7w6c.

7. Inaccurate, Costly, and Inefficient: Evidence That America’s

Voter Registration System Needs an Upgrade, Pew Ctr. on the States

1 (Feb. 2012), https://tinyurl.com/38favmjr.

8. See Elissa Slotkin wins Michigan Senate Seat, Politico,

https://www.politico.com/2024-election/results/michigan/senate/

(Nov. 6, 2024).

6

II. BEYOND RATIONALITY: WHY “REASONABLE

EFFORT” DEMANDS EFFECTIVENESS.

a.

The Statutory Standard of a Reasonable Effort

Is Not Met by a “Rational” and “Sensible”

“Attempt” at List Maintenance.

The NVRA “has two main objectives: increasing

voter registration and removing ineligible persons from

the States’ voter registration rolls.” Husted v. A. Philip

Randolph Inst., 584 U.S. 756, 761 (2018); see also 52

U.S.C. § 20501(b). Likewise, the Help America Vote Act

(“HAVA”), requires states to create an election system

that “ensure[s]” that voter rolls are “accurate” and

“updated regularly.” 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(4). Congress, for

its part, stated that the purpose of the NVRA is, among

other goals, “to protect the integrity of the electoral

process” and “to ensure that accurate and current voter

registration rolls are maintained.” 52 U.S.C. § 20501(b).

Foundationally, the NVRA—much like other civil

rights statutes—is about results. To put it another way,

pretend NVRA compliance is a marathon. Congress

mandated that every runner (state) must at least finish

the race (an effective voter list maintenance program)

to get a medal (be compliant with the law). Instead, the

Sixth Circuit decided that all Michigan (and by extension,

every other state) needs to do to get a finisher’s medal is

to put on its shoes. It is a preposterous result that leaves

the NVRA an effective nullity.

7

i.

The Common English Meanings of the

Words “Reasonable” and “Effort” are

Incompatible with the Sixth Circuit’s

“Rational” “Attempt” Holding.

Nothing in law should be read in a vacuum. The

clause in question here, analyzed by the Circuit Court,

is found at 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4), which states that “[i]n

the administration of voter registration for elections

for Federal office, each State shall—conduct a general

program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the

names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible

voters. . . .” There are two words of import in this clause

that deserve a non-superficial look: reasonable and effort.

Initially, terms should be given their plain and ordinary

meaning. FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 403 (2011).

The word “reasonable” 9 can be defined as “not extreme

or excessive.”10 Interestingly, the definition of “effort”

varies significantly between dictionaries. According to the

Sixth Circuit’s chosen definition “effort” means “a serious

attempt.” Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Benson,

136 F.4th 613, 625-626 (6th Cir. 2025). However, there

are other just as valid definitions that are less permissive

than “a serious attempt.” See, e.g., Effort, Dictionary.

com (“an earnest or strenuous attempt; something done

by exertion or hard work”); Effort, Oxford Languages

Dictionary (“a vigorous or determined attempt.”).

9. The word “reasonable” is also given its ordinary meaning.

U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002).

10. Reasonable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://w w w.

merriam-webster.com /dictionary/reasonable (last visited

November 5, 2025).

8

With a slight change in dictionaries, the statute

seemingly requires much more of Michigan than the

Sixth Circuit’s “rational” “attempt” finding. See Public

Interest Legal Foundation v. Benson, 136 F.4th at 625.

Therefore, even when looking at the clause found in

§ 20507(a)(4) in isolation, Sixth Circuit’s rationality test

does not properly interpret the statutes requirements.

Putting aside the dictionary definition, the Circuit

Court did not finish the job of interpreting the statute.

See Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Benson, 136 F.4th

at 625-26 (noting that since the court “applies the statute

as written” its “analysis ends.”). What of the rest of the

statute? The Court has repeatedly said that provisions

of a statute like the NVRA do not exist in isolation. “In

determining the meaning of [a] statute, [the Court] look[s]

not only to the particular statutory language, but to the

design of the statute as a whole and to its object and

policy.” Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395,

407 (1991) (emphasis added). The “object and policy” of

the statute when read “as a whole” is an effective list

maintenance program.

One need not divine what Congress had in mind

because Congress told us. The “policy” of the NVRA

is encouraging voter registration and proper list

maintenance to “protect the integrity of the election

process” and “to ensure that accurate and current voter

registration rolls are maintained.” Id. at § 20501(a)-(b). The

use of the word “ensure” carries significant weight here.

“Ensure” means “to make sure, certain, safe” or to “make

certain that (something) shall occur or be the case.” See

Ensure, Merriam-Webster Online11 and Ensure, Oxford

11. Ensure, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/ensure (last visited on November 5, 2025).

9

Languages Dictionary; see also Ensure, MerriamWebster Dictionary at 243 (8th ed. 2022) (“Guarantee”).

The Fourth Circuit understood this. See Project Vote/

Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long, 682 F.3d 331, 339 (4th Cir.

2012) (“State officials labor under a duty of accountability

to the public in ensuring that voter lists include eligible

voters and exclude ineligible ones in the most accurate

manner possible.”) (emphasis added). The plain meaning

of the actual words used in the statute and of the policy the

statute is meant to promote both point toward the Sixth

Circuit’s decision being an a-textual outlier.

What of the remainder of the statue? On that score, the

NVRA has several provisions dedicated to procedures the

State must follow when conducting list maintenance—both

to ensure the lists are properly maintained and to protect

properly registered voters from overly aggressive actions.

See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(2), (3), (4), and (5) (containing

protections such as the terms by which a registrant may

be removed, providing information about registration

requirements, and notification provision); id. at § 20507(b),

(c), (d), and (e) (timing requirements for removal, a 90-day

pre-election black-out period for removals, and procedures

for curing an improper removal). There would simply be

no reason to include the detailed guidance and protections

contained within the NVRA if “reasonable effort” only

meant a rational attempt. The entirety of the statute points

toward rigorous enforcement, not merely trying.

In sum, the law requires that Michigan must conduct

a vigorous program to eliminate non-eligible voters from

their voter rolls. “Reasonable” simply adds the sensible

modification that the effort needs to be neither extreme

nor perfect. To put it another way, “reasonable” simply

10

means that a State need not boil the ocean to eliminate

every possible improper registration. Acting “reasonably”

does not in any way diminish the requirement that

Michigan’s program be effective, quite the opposite.12

ii.

Civil Rights Statutes with Reasonableness

Language Are Uniformly Held to Require

an Effective Implementation, Not Merely

a “Rational” or “Sensible” One.

A useful analogue to the proper standard with which

to view the NVRA is the Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”). The ADA “prohibits an employer from

discriminating against an ‘individual with a disability’

who, with ‘reasonable accommodation,’ can perform

the essential functions of the job.” US Airways, Inc.

v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 393 (2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§§ 12112(a) and (b)).

Importantly, “in ordinary English the word ‘reasonable’

does not mean ‘effective.’ It is the word ‘accommodation,’

not the word ‘reasonable,’ that conveys the need for

effectiveness.” Barnett, 535 U.S at 400. This highlights

yet another error by the court below as that court

focused almost entirely on the meaning and implications

of “reasonable,” giving only passing mention to “effort.”

12. As recently noted by the Department of Justice, “the

statutory language and history make clear that the duty to

. . . make[]a reasonable effort [under the NVRA] includes

an obligation to take affirmative steps to effectuate the list

maintenance requirements.” Therefore, “the list maintenance

program also should be effective to achieve the goals set out by

Congress.” See Statement of Interest, Judicial Watch, et al., v.

The Illinois State Board of Elections, et al., No. 1:24-cv-01867 at

7 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2025 (ECF No. 107).

11

See Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Benson, 136

F.4th at 625-626 (6th Cir. 2025). As in the ADA, it is

in the word “effort,” as properly read in harmony with

goals and policies of the statute, where the effectiveness

requirement of the NVRA arises.

The ADA is not alone in showing that civil rights laws

with a reasonableness standard mandate something more

than mere “rational” or “sensible” actions. Take Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In Groff v. DeJoy, 600

U.S. 447, 473 (2023), a unanimous Court stated, while

rejecting an earlier “de minimis” standard, that “Title

VII requires that an employer reasonably accommodate

an employee’s practice of religion, not merely that it assess

the reasonableness of a particular possible accommodation

or accommodations.” In other words, “an employer must

show that the burden of granting an accommodation

would result in substantial increased costs in relation to

the conduct of its particular business.” Groff, 600 U.S. at

470. A showing of something barely more than mere de

minimis cost is not enough. Id. at 468.

Another example can be found in the Uniformed

Ser vices Employ ment and Reemploy ment Rights

Act of 1994 (“USERRA”). The USERRA prohibits

discrimination on account of an employee’s military

service. 38 U.S.C. § 4313. The statute requires employers

to take “reasonable efforts” to rehire, train, and requalify

former employees after military service. Id. Pursuant to

the USERRA, “reasonable efforts” are “actions, including

training provided by an employer, that do not place an

undue hardship13 on the employer.” Id. § 4303(10). This

13. The lack of a “undue burden” or “undue hardship”

exception or defense in the NVRA militates in favor of it being a

12

reasonable-efforts standard does not permit the employer

to fail to adequately requalify service members for any

reason other than significant difficulty or expense. This

is akin to the NVRA’s requirement that a state put forth

a serious effort to obtain results. Other statutes with

a reasonableness standard similarly require results

rather than mere rational or sensible attempts. See, e.g.,

Reichert v. National Credit Systems, Inc., 531 F.3d 1002

(9th Cir. 2008) (holding that, in the context of the Fair

Debt Collection Practices Act, “a showing of procedures

reasonably adapted to avoid any such error must require

more than a mere assertion to that effect.” (internal quotes

omitted)).

b.

If Permitted to Stand, the Sixth Circuit’s

Standard Leads to Absurd Results.

Should the everyone-gets-a-medal, “rational” and

“sensible,” give-it-the-old-college-try standard be

adopted, it would gut the NVRA and could lead to all sorts

of absurd mischief.14 This can be shown by (1) the impact

it would have on the NVRA itself; and (2) what impact the

“rational” and “sensible” “attempt” would have if it were

applied to other similarly situated statutes.

more stringent standard than the ADA, Title VII, or USERRA. If

it wanted, Congress could have placed an “undue burden” standard

in the NVRA to give states a relief valve for compliance; it instead

chose not to do so.

14. Couple this with the Sixth Circuit’s standing holding, and

the very real and practical consequence is to render the NVRA

dead as there would be (1) no way to enforce its provisions as no

one would have standing; and (2) a standard so deferential to the

state as to make any attempted enforcement a waste of time.

13

Starting w ith the N VRA, Michigan would be

permitted to maintain hundreds of thousands of deceased

voters on rolls for decades, so long as they did so after

making a “rational” “attempt” to identify deceased voters;

there would be no recourse.

If the Sixth Circuit’s “rational” “attempt” standard

were applied to the ADA, employers could deny workplace

modifications for disabled employees—such as modified

schedules or assistive technology—merely by showing

they attempted some accommodation, even if that

accommodation were wholly ineffective and the employee

remained unable to perform essential job functions.

Courts would be required to accept as compliant any

employer effort that was “within the bounds of rationality,”

regardless of whether disabled employees actually

received meaningful access to employment.

Applying the Sixth Circuit’s “rational” and “sensible”

standard to Title VII, employers could deny religious

accommodations—such as schedule modifications for

Sabbath observance—merely by showing they considered

the request and made some reasoned decision, even if the

actual burden were minimal and the employee were forced

to choose between their job and their faith.

A similar cascade of problems would result if this

were applied to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

(“FDCPA”) context. The FDCPA contains a “bone fide

error” defense if an unintentional error resulting in a

violation occurred “notwithstanding the maintenance of

procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such error.” 15

U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (emphasis added). Grafting the Sixth

Circuit’s standard on to this language would mean a debt

14

collector need only have a rational procedure, irrespective

of whether it successfully prevents such violations.

One last example to drive the point home. The Age

Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) provides

that it is not unlawful for an employer to act “where the

differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than

age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). Now, imagine this were a mere

rationality standard, allowing differentiation through the

use of any reasoned factor. It would gut the very existence

of the statute and the policy Congress was attempting to

implement. So, too, with the NVRA. This Court should

grant certiorari to ensure that the NVRA is not a dead

letter and to prevent the spread of the Circuit Court’s

wayward reasoning.

III. INFORMATIONAL STANDING IS ALIVE AND

WELL, TRANSUNION NOT WITHSTANDING.

a.

Central to Purpose of the NVRA is Transparency

and Integrity Within the Act of Voter Roll

Maintenance, a Role Most Analogous to FOIA.

The plain text of the NVRA creates a private right

of action giving any person standing to challenge a

state’s failure to comply. Congress mandated disclosure

provisions to serve two complementary goals: protecting

electoral integrity and ensuring accurate voter rolls. 52

U.S.C. § 20501(b). The famous maxim that “sunlight is the

best disinfectant” is inherent in the statutory structure of

the NVRA. The statute itself requires that state election

officials maintain records of their voter-roll maintenance

programs for “at least 2 years” and those officials “shall

make available for public inspection . . . all records

15

concerning the implementation of programs and activities

conducted. . . .” 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1) (emphasis added).

Congress itself highlighted the foundational importance

of the principles of transparency and integrity to the

NVRA’s overall effectiveness during its debates on the bill.

An important goal of this bill, to open the

registration process, must be balanced with the

need to maintain the integrity of the election

process by updating the voting rolls on a

continual basis. The maintenance of accurate

and up-to-date voter registration lists is the

hallmark of a national system seeking to

prevent voter fraud.

S. Rep. No. 103-6, at 18 (1993).

Congress similarly denoted that its use of the term

“shall” was intentional: “The records must be made

available for public inspection, and, where available,

photocopying at reasonable costs.” Id. at p. 35; see

also H.R. Rep. 103-9, at 19 (1993). Congress designed

enforcement around public access. By requiring states to

maintain comprehensive records and make them publicly

available without restriction, Congress indicated that

compliance would be monitored through citizen oversight

rather than solely through government enforcement. In

short, Congress did not mince words. The very text of the

statute “evinces Congress’s belief that public inspection

. . . is necessary to accomplish the objectives behind the

NVRA.” See Pub. Int. Legal Found. v. Bellows, 92 F.4th

36, 54 (1st Cir. 2024).

Further, Congress did not intend to restrict who

had a right to pursue enforcement of these foundational

16

principles. See 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1) (use of the word

public); 52 U.S.C. § 20510(b) (creating a private right of

action for violations); S. Rep. No. 101-140, at 13 (1989)

(“[A]n effective national voter registration program

must also include a private civil enforcement . . . [which]

can encourage action to assure that reasonable effort is

undertaken to achieve its objectives in all States and,

indeed, it may be essential to the success of such a program

in some areas.”) (cited in Bellows, 92 F.4th at 54).

Most analogous to this arena is perhaps the most wellknown, so-called “sunshine” law, the Freedom of Information

Act (“FOIA”). See 5 U.S.C. § 552. FOIA, like the NVRA,

provides a right for the public to access information. Compare

5 U.S.C. § 552. (“Each agency shall make available to the

public information . . . ”); with 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1). (“Each

State shall . . . make available for public inspection . . . all

records concerning the implementation of programs and

activities . . . ”). Both the NVRA and FOIA are designed to

promote transparency in government. See 5 U.S.C. § 552; 52

U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1); S. Rep. No. 103-6, at 18 (1993); Project

Vote/Voting for Am., Inc., 682 F.3d at 339 (“Without . . .

transparency, public confidence in the essential workings

of democracy will suffer.”). Both FOIA and the NVRA

allow public access to relevant information. Compare 5

U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (“Each agency, upon request for

records . . . shall make the records promptly available to

any person”) with 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1) (“Each State

shall . . . make available for public inspection . . . all records

concerning the implementation of programs and activities

. . . ”). Both FOIA and the NVRA require the Government

to maintain and disclose records. Just as FOIA requires

records be made available upon request, the NVRA

requires that the States maintain “all records” available

17

for public inspection. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)-(2)

with 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1). Both FOIA and the NVRA

created a method of enforcement through a private right

of action. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) with 52 U.S.C.

§ 20510(b).

In attempting to differentiate FOIA and the NVRA,

the Third Circuit, in Public Interest Legal Foundation v.

Secretary Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, alleges that

the NVRA is “broader” than FOIA as it has a purpose

beyond mere transparency. See Pub. Int. Legal Found.

v. Sec’y of Pa., 136 F.4th 456, 463 (3d Cir. 2025). For

the purposes here, this would be a distinction without a

difference—if it is even true. The NVRA has, arguably,

the “narrower,” purpose of encouraging voting while

maintaining election integrity, while FOIA encompasses

“each agency” of the federal government. 5 U.S.C. § 552.

Yet, within the NVRA, Congress also deliberately created

a method by which the public may seek information, like

the foundational rights contained within FOIA. See 52

U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1). Further, it must not be forgotten

that the NVRA is of abnormal import as it deals with the

fundamental right to vote, making effective state compliance

with the NVRA’s public disclosure requirements all the

more vital. As this Court has repeatedly held, “the right

to vote, as the citizen’s link to his laws and government, is

protective of all fundamental rights and privileges.” Evans

v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970).15

15. It should not be forgotten that the people harmed

by a lack of proper enforcement are the voters themselves.

“[F]raudulent votes dilute the right of citizens to cast ballots

that carry appropriate weight” and “can affect the outcome of a

close election.” Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 594 U.S.

647, 672 (2021).

18

Congress could have restricted those entitled to

information to a limited set of those who “need to know,”

and yet it did not. Congress could have required that the

information be restrained by the rules of discovery, and

yet it did not. Congress could have limited requests only

to those individuals seeking their own information, and

yet it did not. In short, Congress created a mechanism

by which any person could seek all records related to the

voter rolls, and then gave those persons a private cause of

action to enforce that right. To put it another way ubi jus

ibi remedium—where there is a right, there is a remedy.

For sections of the NVRA relevant to this case, and cases

like it, Congress has determined that the NVRA should

join other public-disclosure statutes (FOIA, NVRA,

Federal Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”), Federal

Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), etc.) in that the public

is entitled to certain government information, the denial of

which is a harm that the Court has the power to redress.

b.

Reliance on TransUnion by the Sixth Circuit

is Misplaced as TransUnion Does Not Apply to

Public-Disclosure Cases.

The opinion of the Sixth Circuit in this case relies on

Campaign Legal Center v. Scott out of the Fifth Circuit

and Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Secretary

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania out of the Third Circuit,

which in turn cites to Scott, and each of which cite the

source of their underlying error as TransUnion, the 2021

opinion of this Court. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,

594 U.S. 413 (2021); Campaign Legal Ctr. v. Scott, 49

F.4th 931, 939 (5th Cir. 2022); Pub. Int. Legal Found.

v. Sec’y of Pa., 136 F.4th 456 (3d Cir. 2025). Indeed, the

Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ reliance on TransUnion is

19

misplaced because this Court explicitly distinguished

TransUnion from cases involving “informational injury”

or the failure to receive required information. TransUnion

LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 441 (2021) (“The plaintiffs

did not allege that they failed to receive any required

information. They argued only that they received it in the

wrong format. Therefore, Akins and Public Citizen do

not control here. In addition, those cases involved denial

of information subject to public-disclosure or sunshine

laws that entitle all members of the public to certain

information. This case does not involve such a publicdisclosure law.” (emphasis added)).

Furthermore, even if TransUnion were not explicitly

distinguished from cases of this type, the “downstream

effect” requirement touted by the lower courts in this case

are not found in the relevant caselaw related to publicdisclosure laws. The Court made brief references to such

a requirement in Casillas v. Madison Avenue Assocs., Inc.

and Trichell v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., two

cases where the information allegations mentioned are

ancillary to the purpose of the statute and which similarly

did not involve public-disclosure laws but instead related

to statutory procedural requirements applicable only to

private entities. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594

U.S. 413, 442 (2021). (“The plaintiffs did not allege that

they failed to receive any required information . . . only

that they received it in the wrong format. . . . This case

does not involve such a public-disclosure law.”); Trichell v.

Midland Credit Mgmt., 964 F.3d 990, 1004 (11th Cir. 2020).

(“[T]he FDCPA is not a public disclosure law at all. The

provisions at issue here create no substantive entitlement

to receive information from debt collectors.”); Casillas v.

Madison Ave. Assocs., 926 F.3d 329, 338 (7th Cir. 2019)

20

(“Casillas, of course, did not allege that she sought and was

denied information pursuant to a sunshine law. Indeed,

she did not seek information at all.”). The existence of a

so-called “downstream effect” in that context makes sense

as a company’s violation of a statute may or may not cause

harm in the same way that a drunk driver may cause an

accident or a spill on the floor may cause a shopper to slip.

The harm from the government’s failure to meet the

requirements of a public-disclosure law like FOIA or the

NVRA is inherent within the failure itself. The failure to

disclose information is itself the harm where Congress

has stated that the right to public disclosure has value

and has subsequently given the public the right to seek

judicial redress to remedy such a failure.

It would be far more logical to continue the longstanding holdings of Public Citizen and Akins. In Public

Citizen, the Court held that denial of records under

FACA constitutes “a sufficiently distinct injury to provide

standing to sue.” 491 U.S. at 449. The Court rejected any

requirement beyond showing that plaintiffs “sought and

were denied specific agency records,” applying the same

standard used under FOIA. Id. The plaintiffs sought

records “to monitor [the ABA Committee’s] workings

and participate more effectively in the judicial selection

process”—objectives accomplished through speech. Id.

Significantly, the Court imposed no requirement that

plaintiffs demonstrate a nexus between their injury and

Congress’s purpose in enacting FACA, which had nothing

to do with judicial nominations.

Akins extended this principle to campaign-finance

information under FECA. 524 U.S. at 21. Voters sought

21

disclosure of AIPAC’s spending to “evaluate candidates

for public office” and “evaluate the role that AIPAC’s

financial assistance might play in a specific election.” Id.

The Court emphasized that plaintiffs wanted information

to “communicate it” to “others”—using it for advocacy

regardless of how it might affect their own voting

decisions. Id. The injury consisted of being unable to

obtain what plaintiffs alleged was statutorily mandated

public information, which impaired their ability to engage

in protected speech activities.

This Court has consistently held that plaintiffs

have standing to enforce statutory rights even absent

a common-law analogue. When the government has an

obligation to provide information and refuses to do so,

“the violation of a procedural right granted by statute [is]

sufficient . . . to constitute injury in fact,” and “a plaintiff

. . . need not allege any additional harm beyond the one

Congress has identified.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S.

330, 342 (2016) (citing Public Citizen and Akins). Both

decisions establish that when Congress mandates public

disclosure, denial of that information constitutes concrete

harm without regard to whether the requester’s intended

use aligns with the statute’s purpose.

The First and Fourth Circuits have applied these

principles by assessing informational injuries under the

generally applicable standing framework rather than

through TransUnion’s narrower lens. See Bellows v.

Farrell, 92 F.4th 50–51 (1st Cir. 2024) (not assessing

plaintiff ’s standing under TransUnion); Laufer v.

Naranda Hotels, LLC, 60 F.4th 156, 170–72 (4th Cir. 2023)

(“[W]e are satisfied that TransUnion most assuredly did

not overrule . . . Public Citizen and Akins. As such, those

22

precedents must continue to be followed where they are

applicable, unless and until the Supreme Court decides

otherwise.”) and (“Public Citizen and Akins are clear

that a plaintiff need not show a use for the information

being sought in order to establish an injury in fact. . . .”);

Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long, 752 F. Supp. 2d

697, 701 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“With regard to the injury prong,

the actual or threatened injury required for standing may

exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the

invasion of which creates standing.” (cleaned up), aff’d,

682 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2012)). Further, the D.C. Circuit

has recognized that plaintiffs suffer injury when denied

disclosures that “would further their efforts to defend

and implement” their policy objectives. Campaign Legal

Ctr. & Democracy 21 v. FEC, 952 F.3d 352, 356 (2020).

Standing is also conferred on an organization merely

through the fact that the organization is “[compelled] to

devote resources” to combatting the effects of that law

that are harmful to the organization’s mission. Common

Cause Ind. v. Lawson, 937 F.3d 944, 950 (7th Cir. 2019)

(quoting Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d

949, 951 (7th Cir. 2007)).

This case parallels these precedents precisely. Like

the Public Citizen plaintiffs seeking to monitor judicial

selections, Petitioner seeks to monitor Michigan’s voterroll maintenance and participate more effectively in

protecting electoral integrity. The denial of statutorily

required public records that supply information essential

to Petitioner’s advocacy constitutes a distinct injury to

those objectives. This outcome aligns with the fundamental

purpose of sunshine statutes: enabling public scrutiny of

potential government misfeasance through subsequent

speech and petitioning. Reality and history tell us that

disclosure serves no function if records remain unused.

23

Like in the parallel instance of FOIA, or any of the

other myriad public-disclosure statutes, the purpose

of the statute is facially obvious, as is the harm of the

government flouting its obligations to inform its citizenry.

In the NVRA, Congress outlined both the purpose of

the statute, and then provided mechanisms by which

individuals and organizations could enforce their rights

and hold the States to task.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should overturn

the Sixth Circuit’s decision below and permit Petitioner to

exercise its right under the NVRA to enforce the public

disclosure of the voter list maintenance records the that

law requires Michigan and other states to maintain.

Respectfully submitted,

Phillip M. Gordon

Counsel of Record

Mark W. A ltman, III

A bbi White Harris

Naman, Howell, Smith

& Lee, PLLC

400 Austin Avenue,

Suite 800

Waco, TX 76701

(254) 755-4100

pgordon@namanhowell.com

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae