Amicus Curiae Brief — Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al., Petitioners v. Barbara, et al.

No. 25-365

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

____________

DONALD J. TRUMP,

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

BARBARA, et al.,

Respondents.

____________

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

____________

BRIEF OF U.S. REPRESENTATIVES

CLAUDIA TENNEY, ANDY BIGGS, CORY

MILLS, JOHN ROSE, AND BARRY MOORE AS

AMICI CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

____________

PHILIP J. VECCHIO

Counsel of Record

24 Huntswood Lane

East Greenbush, NY 12061

(518) 857-2897

PhilipJVecchioEsq@gmail.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

January 27, 2026

LEGAL PRINTERS LLC ! Washington, DC ! 202-747-2400 ! legalprinters.com

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... ii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................ 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................... 1

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 3

I.

The Citizenship Clause ratified the common

law principle of “subjection for protection” ........ 4

II.

“Peculiar”

exceptions

to

birthright

citizenship: ambassadors, invaders, and

Indians .............................................................. 10

III. The common law did not address illegal

immigrants because they “stand in a

peculiar

relation

to

the

National

Government, unknown to the common law”.... 11

IV. Illegal

immigrants

do

not

subject

themselves to and are not protected by the

United States, and are thus not entitled to

birthright citizenship ........................................ 13

V.

Respondents fail to address the Citizenship

Clause’s underlying principles ......................... 15

CONCLUSION.......................................................... 15

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (1608) ........................

4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)

................................................................................. 5

Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S.

99 (1830) ................................................................ 10

INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) ...... 3, 13

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v.

Bruen, 597 U.S. ___ (2022)...................................... 5

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) ................. 6

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.

833 (1992) .............................................................. 14

United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649

(1898) ............................... 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.......................................... 1

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1 ........ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10

Statutes

8 U.S.C. § 1401 ............................................................ 4

Executive Orders

Exec. Order No. 14160, 90 Fed. Reg. 8449 (Jan. 20,

2025) .................................................................... 1, 4

iii

Congressional Bills

Constitutional Citizenship Clarification Act of

2025, H.R. 4741, 119th Cong. § 1 (2025) ................ 1

Other Authorities

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of

England, Book I (1768) ............................... 9, 10, 14

Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth (M.J.

Tooley trans., Oxford, 1955) ................................... 8

Randolph Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: Young

statesman, 1901-1914 (1969) ................................ 14

Letter from John Cotton to Lord William Fiennes

(1636) ....................................................................... 7

Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan (1651).................. 8, 9

Magna Carta 1215 (British Library trans.) ....... 13, 16

Gage Raley, Could the Supreme Court Defy the

Legal Consensus and Uphold a Trump-Like

Executive Order on Birthright Citizenship? 17

Charleston L. Rev. 94 (2022) .................................. 7

1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1

Amici are United States Representatives Claudia

Tenney, Andy Biggs, Cory Mills, John Rose, and

Barry Moore. Congress has the “power to establish an

uniform Rule of Naturalization” under Article I of the

United States Constitution. An overinclusive reading

of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause,

extending birthright citizenship to those who are not

constitutionally entitled to it, would infringe upon

Congress’s power to set terms and conditions for

obtaining citizenship under the Naturalization

Clause. Amicus Tenney, for example, has recently

introduced naturalization legislation that directly

conflicts with Respondents’ overbroad interpretation

of birthright citizenship. Constitutional Citizenship

Clarification Act of 2025, H.R. 4741, 119th Cong. § 1

(2025). Amici thus have a strong interest in ensuring

that the outcome of this case does not interfere with

Congress’s constitutional authority to legislate

naturalization.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment states that “All persons born…in the

United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,

are citizens of the United States.” U.S. Const. amend.

XIV, § 1, cl. 1. The Executive Order at issue in this

case asserts that the children of foreign parents who

are unlawfully or temporarily present in the United

States at the time of birth are not “subject to the

jurisdiction thereof” for citizenship purposes. Exec.

1 No counsel for any party has authored this brief in whole or in

part, and no entity or person, aside from Amicus Tenney, made

any monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or

submission of this brief.

2

Order No. 14160, 90 Fed. Reg. 8449 (Jan. 20, 2025).

Petitioners and fellow Amici have ably and

persuasively argued that children of legal-buttemporary visitors to this Nation are not entitled to

birthright citizenship. This brief focuses narrowly on

the issue of illegal immigrants and birthright

citizenship, highlighting how Respondents’ argument

with regard to illegal immigrants is unpersuasive.

Respondents assert that this Court’s decision

in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649

(1898), supports their claim that the children of illegal

immigrants are entitled to birthright citizenship. This

brief asserts that Wong Kim Ark supports the

opposite conclusion: that children of illegal

immigrants have no right to citizenship at birth.

Respondents’ superficial analysis misses the mark

because it glosses over Wong Kim Ark’s detailed

examination of the underlying principles of birthright

citizenship.

Wong Kim Ark held that the Citizenship Clause

must be interpreted in light of the common law

tradition that it codified. Id. at 654. The ancient

tradition of birthright citizenship dates back to

medieval England, where it was assumed that those

who lived under the “protection” of the King’s peace

would in turn be loyal and obedient subjects. Id. at

655. Children born to such individuals were

considered natural-born subjects. Id. Though

“subjects” are now called “citizens,” the principles of

birthright citizenship are still rooted in idea that

people will develop a patriotic affinity towards a

nation that protects their rights and interests.

With this history in mind, Wong Kim Ark

identified several exceptions to birthright citizenship.

Ambassadors, invaders, and certain Native

Americans are not covered by the Citizenship Clause

3

due to considerations of protection, allegiance, and

obedience. Id. at 680-81. After discussing these

exclusions, Wong Kim Ark concluded that the purpose

of the Citizenship Clause’s term “subject to the

jurisdiction” language was to incorporate “by the

fewest and fittest words” the common law’s

limitations on birthright citizenship. Id. at 682.

Based on these well-established principles and

exceptions, the children of illegal immigrants are not

entitled to birthright citizenship. Illegal immigrants

do not live under the “protection” of the United States

government, but rather live under the ever-present

threat of deportation if the government becomes

aware of their mere presence within its borders. And

by definition, illegal immigrants do not exhibit

“obedience” to the United States (in fact, this Court

has pointed out that illegal immigration “plainly

constitute[s] a continuing crime”). INS v. LopezMendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1047 n.3 (1984). Finally,

illegal immigrants demonstrate a lack of “allegiance”

when they refuse to recognize or respect the United

States’ sovereign right to protect its territory from

foreign intrusion.

Because the Citizenship Clause does not extend to

the children of illegal immigrants, and because

federal law providing statutory citizenship at birth

mirrors the Citizenship Clause’s “jurisdiction”

language, the Court should reverse and hold that the

children of illegal immigrants are not entitled to

citizenship at birth.

ARGUMENT

The Executive Order at issue in this case

essentially limits birthright citizenship to children

born in the United States to citizens and permanent

residents. Exec. Order No. 14160, 90 Fed. Reg. 8449

4

(Jan. 20, 2025). Citing the Fourteenth Amendment’s

Citizenship Clause and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)’s limitation

of birthright citizenship to those who are “subject to

the jurisdiction” of the United States at birth, the

Executive Order excludes children of nonimmigrants

and illegal immigrants from birthright citizenship. Id.

This Amici brief focuses solely on the question of

whether illegal immigrants are entitled to birthright

citizenship, and explains why this Court’s ruling in

Wong Kim Ark strongly supports the Petitioner’s

position regarding illegal immigrants and birthright

citizenship.

This Brief will first discuss how Wong Kim Ark

held that the Citizen Clause ratified common law

principles regarding birthright citizenship. It will

then discuss the Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377

(1608), a landmark English case that Wong Kim Ark

relied on to determine what those common law

principles were, showing that the concept of

“subjection for protection” determines who is a citizen

at birth. The Brief will then explain that exclusions to

birthright citizenship are not limited to the specific

exceptions identified in Calvin’s Case and Wong Kim

Ark, but instead are determined by how common law

principles apply to a class of individuals in question.

It will discuss how illegal immigrants neither subject

themselves to nor are protected by the United States

government, and are thus not entitled to citizenship

at birth under the principles incorporated by the

Fourteenth Amendment.

I.

The Citizenship Clause ratified the

common law principle of “subjection for

protection”

Like the Second Amendment and the right to bear

arms, the Fourteenth Amendment’s birthright

5

citizenship clause “was not intended to lay down a

novel principle but rather codified a right inherited

from our English ancestors.” New York State Rifle &

Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. ___ (2022);

see also Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 676 (stating that

the Citizenship Clause is “declaratory in form”

because it ratifies birthright citizenship principles

“existing before its adoption”). Under the centuriesold principles of the English common law, Americans

of African descent should have received citizenship at

birth. Because black Americans were wrongfully

denied birthright citizenship, the Fourteenth

Amendment enshrined our common law tradition in

the Constitution to ensure that states adhered to its

principles. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 676.

With this context in mind, Wong Kim Ark held that

the term “subject to the jurisdiction” in the

Fourteenth Amendment “must be interpreted in the

light of the common law, the principles and history of

which were familiarly known to the framers of the

constitution.” Id. at 654. This approach resembles the

one taken by this Court in more recent cases like

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).

Like Heller, Wong Kim Ark considered the

contemporary understanding of the Amendment’s

text at the time of ratification, as well as the common

law history that influenced that understanding.

Wong Kim Ark identified a 1608 English ruling

called Calvin’s Case as “the leading case” regarding

citizenship at birth. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 656.

The Court stated that Calvin’s Case “clearly, though

quaintly” sets forth the “fundamental principle” of

birthright citizenship under the common law. Id.

Calvin’s Case is one of the earliest and most

influential common law cases concerning birthright

6

citizenship, and the historical context of the decision

helps shed light on the doctrine’s logic.

Calvin’s Case reflects nascent ideas of social

contract theory that were beginning to take shape at

the time that case was decided. 2 It clearly echoes Jean

Bodin, the 16th century political philosopher who is

“rightly considered the father of the modern theory of

Sovereignty” and whose theories would go on to

influence Enlightenment thinkers like Hobbes and

Locke. Bodin’s theory of citizenship is reflected in

Calvin’s Case’s discussion of subjecthood at birth.

Bodin posited that a citizen is one who trades

absolute but untenable anarchic freedom for a more

limited but sustainable ordered liberty. 3 Bodin

asserted that “anyone who did not wish to abandon

part of his liberty, and live under the laws and

commands of another, lost it altogether” through

death or enslavement. Jean Bodin, Six Books of the

Commonwealth 18 (M.J. Tooley trans., Oxford, 1955).

The relationship between a citizen and sovereign,

Bodin argued, was the product of a contractual

bargain: subjection for protection.

Bodin asserted that it is “the submission and

obedience of a free subject to his prince, and the

2 For a more in-depth discussion of the Western shift from an

Aristotelian concept of citizenship to a Bodinian one, see Gage

Raley, Could the Supreme Court Defy the Legal Consensus and

Uphold a Trump-Like Executive Order on Birthright

Citizenship? 17 Charleston L. Rev. 94, 103-05 (2022).

3 The term “ordered liberty” is often employed by the Supreme

Court in unenumerated rights cases to describe historical

freedoms that are compatible with (or even necessary to

maintain) an orderly society. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302

U.S. 319, 325 (1937). One of the earliest American uses of that

term appears in a letter by Puritan leader John Cotton citing

Bodin’s theory of sovereignty. Letter from John Cotton to Lord

William Fiennes (1636).

7

tuition, protection, and jurisdiction exercised by the

prince over his subject that makes the citizen. This is

the essential distinction between the citizen and the

foreigner. All other differences are accidental and

circumstantial.” Id. at 21.

If Bodin’s ideas on social contract and citizenship

sound familiar to modern Americans, it is because

they are echoed in the famous “state of nature”

passage in Hobbes’ Leviathan. Hobbes wrote that

people will voluntarily submit to a powerful protector

to avoid experiencing a “nasty, brutish, and short” life

in the state of nature. Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan

62 (1651). An effective Leviathan is a dominant

authority figure whose protective hand inspires

loyalty, and whose threat of punishment instills

obedience.

Calvin’s Case (decided in 1608) is a clear product

of its time, comfortably situated between Bodin’s Six

Livres (published in 1576) and Hobbes’ Leviathan

(published in 1651) Calvin’s Case uses language

almost identical to Bodin’s when it held that “ligeance

join[s] together the Soveraign and all his subjects . . .

for as the subject oweth to the King his true and

faithful ligeance and obedience, so the Sovereign is to

govern and protect his subjects.” Calvin’s Case, 77

Eng. Rep. at 382. Calvin’s Case also foreshadowed The

Leviathan when it stated that “power and protection

draweth ligeance.” Id. at 388.

A key assumption that Calvin’s Case adopts is that

“protectio

trahit

subjectionem,

et

subjectio

protectionem” (a Latin maxim meaning “protection

draws subjection, and subjection protection”). Id. at

382. Subjecthood is seen as a naturally-occurring,

mutually-beneficial relationship between a king and

his subjects. It acknowledges that people will

organically develop a loyalty and submit to a king that

8

protects their interests, and that a king will be moved

to protect loyal and obedient subjects.

Calvin’s Case employs the phrase “ligeance and

obedience” frequently. It pairs those two words

together to capture a subject’s recognition of his

sovereign’s comprehensive right to rule. A subject’s

ligeance acknowledges the sovereign’s right to rule as

opposed to rival sovereigns, 4 and a subject’s obedience

acknowledges the sovereign’s right to rule over the

subject himself. 5

Calvin’s Case held that “[w]hosoever is born within

the King’s power or protection, is no alien.” Id. at 407.

As Blackstone later explained, a “natural allegiance”

begins developing in “all men born within the king’s

dominions immediately upon their birth. For,

immediately upon their birth, they are under the

king’s protection; at a time too, when (during their

infancy) they are incapable of protecting themselves.

Natural allegiance is therefore a debt of gratitude.”

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of

England, Book I 369 (1768).

Calvin’s Case held that “when an alien that is in

amity cometh into England, … as long as he is within

England, he is within the King’s protection; therefore

so long as he is here, he oweth unto the King a local

obedience or ligeance.” Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at

383. In other words, if an alien recognized and

respected the king’s sovereignty and right to rule in

See Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 386 (stating that “the

subjects of England are bound by their ligeance to go with the

King in his wars” against challengers to his sovereignty). See

also William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England,

Book I 367 (1768) (stating that a subject’s “allegiance … bear[s]

faith to his sovereign lord, in opposition to all men”).

5 Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 393 (stating that subjects are

“bound to obey” the king).

4

9

opposition to rival sovereigns (ligeance) and to himself

(obedience), that alien would enjoy the king’s

protection. Children of such aliens who “are born

under the obedience, power, faith, ligealty, or ligeance

of the King, are natural subjects, and no aliens.” Id.

Calvin’s Case was clear that it was the parents’

fealty, not the location of birth, that was decisive

factor when it came to natural-born subjecthood. The

court observed that “ligeance is a quality of the mind,

and not confined within any place.” Id. at 388.

Calvin’s Case also made clear that jus soli is a

misnomer, as the court observed that it is not “the soil,

but ligeantia and obedientia that make the subject

born.” Id. at 384. It is not enough that “the place of his

birth be within the King's dominion”; “the parents

[must] be under the actual obedience of the King” as

well, because “any place within the King’s dominions

without obedience can never produce a natural

subject.” Id. at 399.

Wong Kim Ark endorsed the common law

principles of birthright citizenship as laid out in

Calvin’s Case. In that case, this Court recognized that

the “fundamental principle of the common law with

regard” to birthright citizenship is “expressed in the

maxim protectio trahit subjectionem, et subjectio

protectionem” (the phrase from Calvin’s Case meaning

“subjection draws protection, and protection

subjection”). Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 655. This

Court found that those “born within the allegiance,

the obedience, or the power, or, as would be said at

this day, within the jurisdiction, of the King” were

natural-born subjects under the common law. Id. This

Court concluded that “the Fourteenth Amendment

affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of

citizenship by birth within the territory, in the

allegiance and under the protection of the country,

10

including all children here born of resident aliens.” Id.

at 693.

II.

“Peculiar”

exceptions

to

birthright

citizenship: ambassadors, invaders, and

Indians

To illustrate the importance of a parent’s

allegiance and obedience as opposed to location of

birth, Calvin’s Case provided two exceptions to the

rule. First, it noted that “if any of the King’s

ambassadors in foreign nations, have children there

of their wives, being English women, by the common

laws of England they are natural-born subjects, and

yet they are born out-of the King’s dominions.”

Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 399. Second, it observed

that “if enemies should come into any of the King’s

dominions and surprise any castle or fort, and possess

the same by hostility, and have issue there, that issue

is no subject to the King, though he be born within his

dominions, for that he was not born under the King’s

ligeance or obedience.” Id. These two illustrative

examples came to be known as the ambassadors and

invaders exceptions to natural-born subjecthood.

There is no indication that Calvin’s Case intended

to provide a comprehensive list of all possible

situations where someone could be born within the

King’s territory but not be considered a natural-born

subject. Rather, the court was simply providing, in the

words of Justice Story, “some exceptions which are

founded upon peculiar reasons and which indeed

illustrate and confirm the general doctrine.” Inglis v.

Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 99, 155

(1830) (Story, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).

When Wong Kim Ark held that the Fourteenth

Amendment’s “subject to the jurisdiction” language

11

was intended “to exclude, by the fewest and fittest

words … the two classes of cases” (ambassadors and

invaders) excluded by the common law, it also

recognized that those “standing in a peculiar relation

to the National Government, unknown to the common

law” could still be excluded under common law

principles. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 682. This Court

noted that “children of members of the Indian tribes”

are excluded from birthright citizenship under the

common law’s principle of allegiance, even though the

English common law never specifically addressed the

status of their citizenship at birth. Id.

III. The common law did not address illegal

immigrants because they “stand in a

peculiar

relation

to

the

National

Government, unknown to the common law”

Like Native Americans, illegal immigrants

“stand[] in a peculiar relation to the National

Government, unknown to the common law.” Going

back to the original Magna Carta, England essentially

had an open borders policy. Clause 41 of the 1215

Magna Carta expressly granted foreign merchants

from peaceful nations the right to enter, stay, and

travel in England. Magna Carta 1215, cl. 41 (British

Library trans.). Clause 42 further declared that “it

shall be lawful for any man to leave and return to our

kingdom unharmed and without fear, by land or

water, preserving his allegiance to us, except in time

of war,” with only narrow exceptions for prisoners and

outlaws, as well as persons (including merchants)

from a nation at war with England. Id. at cl. 42. A

local allegiance, meaning acknowledgement of the

king’s sovereignty over the English realm, was

12

assumed of foreigners during peacetime, 6 and they

were thus permitted to enter freely.

That liberal immigration policy continued through

Blackstone’s time, who wrote that “[g]reat tenderness

is shown by our laws, not only to foreigners in distress

… but with regard also to the admissions of strangers

who come spontaneously.” William Blackstone,

Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book I 259

(1768). Blackstone wrote that only a “subject of a

nation at war” with England was prohibited from

“com[ing] into the realm.” Id. at 260. Border control

was still in its infancy even in Blackstone’s time, as

he observed that “passports under the king’s sign

manual, or licenses from his ambassadors abroad, are

now more usually obtained.” Id. England did not

impose immigration controls and mandatory

registration until the passage of the Aliens Act 1905,

which, in the words of Winston Churchill, marked a

change from “the old tolerant and generous practice of

free entry and asylum to which this country has so

long adhered.” Randolph Churchill, Winston S.

Churchill: Young statesman, 1901-1914 355 (1969).

The closest thing to an illegal immigrant in

common law England was a person hailing from a

nation at war with England. If such a foreign enemy

entered England in defiance of a wartime border

closure and had a child, that child would fall under

the invader exception to natural-born subjecthood.

England had no concept of illegal immigration

neatly analogous to today’s concept. The common law

thus had no occasion to address illegal immigration

and birthright citizenship. The lack of a historical

6 See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. at 655 (stating that allegiance was

“predicable of aliens in amity so long as they were within the

kingdom”).

13

exclusion for illegal immigrants cannot be taken as a

principled affirmation of their right to birthright

citizenship.

IV. Illegal

immigrants

do

not

subject

themselves to and are not protected by the

United States, and are thus not entitled to

birthright citizenship

Because the common law had no opportunity to

confront illegal immigration and birthright

citizenship, the Court should determine whether the

principles behind the already-identified exclusions

apply. The question becomes, to paraphrase Wong

Kim Ark, whether subjection and protection are

“predicable of [unlawful] aliens … so long as they [are]

within” the United States. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at

655. The answer is very obviously “no,” as that

reciprocal bond is completely severed when it comes

to illegal immigrants.

Regarding “ligeance and obedience,” illegal

immigration demonstrates a lack of allegiance

through its refusal to recognize the United States’

sovereign right to prohibit foreign intrusion. And

unlike one-and-done crimes, unlawful immigration is

an ongoing act of defiance and disobedience, as this

Court has held that an unlawful immigrant’s very

presence on American soil “plainly constitute[s] a

continuing crime.” INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S.

1032, 1047 n.3 (1984). By definition, illegal

immigrants refuse to “subject” themselves to the

United States’ sovereignty over its jurisdiction.

Regarding protection, the government refuses to

provide unlawful immigrants with the most basic

protection of all: the right to live within the nation’s

borders and under its protection. Though unlawful

immigrants are entitled to baseline constitutional

14

protections like equal protection and due process, it

would strain credulity to claim that they are

“protected” by the sovereign in the common law’s

relational sense of the word. They are subject to

deportation if the government becomes aware of their

mere presence in U.S. territory, something a

protective English king would not do to loyal and

obedient subjects. The most basic protection a king

provided to his subjects was the right to dwell

securely in his realm, 7 and this is a protection that is

not extended to illegal immigrants.

Illegal immigrants living under fear of deportation

might even view the American government as a

persecutor rather than a protector. And instead of the

“debt of gratitude” Blackstone spoke about, the

children of illegal immigrants may develop a grudge

of resentment towards the United States as they grow

up living with their family under the looming shadow

of immigration law.

Extending birthright citizenship to illegal

immigrants also runs the risk of straining the

allegiance of other citizens. Though “[p]eople

understand that some of the Constitution’s language

is hard to fathom,” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.

Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866 (1992), if the Court holds

that children of illegal immigrants, born on U.S. soil

in defiance of the voters’ wishes as expressed through

immigration law, are entitled to compete against

voters at the ballot box, this could be seen by many

citizens as a grave betrayal by their sovereign. If, as

Calvin’s Case held, “power and protection draweth

7 This right was enshrined in the Magna Carta, which provided

due process protections against exile and established a right of

reentry into the kingdom after travel abroad. Magna Carta 1215,

cls. 39 & 42 (British Library trans.).

15

ligeance,” Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 388, we can

conversely assume that weakness and dereliction

corrode it.

The extension of birthright citizenship to the

children of illegal immigrants is clearly inconsistent

with the principles espoused in Wong Kim Ark. All

three elements identified in that decision—allegiance,

obedience, and protection—are absent when it comes

to the relationship between illegal immigrants and

the United States government.

V.

Respondents fail to address the Citizenship

Clause’s underlying principles

Respondents argue that, because illegal

immigrants do not fall under the ambassadors,

invaders, and Indians exceptions, they are entitled to

birthright citizenship. Their argument presumes that

Wong Kim Ark’s illustrative counter-examples have

calcified into three fixed exceptions. This confuses

dicta for doctrine.

Wong Kim Ark thoroughly discussed and endorsed

the principle of protection and subjection, and

explained how the three exceptions are based on that

principle. The Court also discussed why the extension

of citizenship to Wong Kim Ark was consistent with

common law principles, rather than mechanically

holding that he did not fall under one of the three

previously-identified exceptions. Respondents fail to

follow Wong Kim Ark’s methodology and show how

they are entitled to birthright citizenship under the

principles discussed in that case.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Amici urge the Court to

rule in favor of Petitioners and reverse.

16

Respectfully submitted,

PHILIP J. VECCHIO

Counsel of Record

24 Huntswood Lane

East Greenbush, NY 12061

(518) 857-2897

PhilipJVecchioEsq@gmail.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

January 27, 2026