Amicus Curiae Brief — Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al., Petitioners v. Rebecca Kelly Slaughter

No. 25-332

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

___________

DONALD J. TRUMP, P RESIDENT OF THE UNITED

STATES, ET AL.,

v.

Petitioners,

REBECCA KELLY SLAUGHTER, ET AL.,

___________

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to

the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

___________

BRIEF OF WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION

AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONERS

___________

October 14, 2025

CORY L. ANDREWS

Counsel of Record

ZAC MORGAN

WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION

2009 Massachusetts Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 588-0302

candrews@wlf.org

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the statutory removal protections for

members of the Federal Trade Commission violate

the separation of powers and, if so, whether Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935),

should be overruled.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ..................................... ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................. iv

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ........................ 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT................................. 1

ARGUMENT ........................................................... 4

I.

II.

The President’s Broad Removal Power

Is Confirmed by English History, the

Text and Structure of the Constitution,

and More Than 145 Years of Unbroken

Practice After the Founding......................... 4

A.

English History .................................. 4

B.

The Constitution ................................ 8

C.

Early American Practice ................. 10

D.

Shurtleff and Myers ......................... 12

The Court Erred, in Modern Times, by

Eroding the President’s Removal Power ... 15

A.

Humphrey’s Executor ....................... 15

B.

Later Developments ........................ 18

1. Morrison ....................................... 18

2. Free Enterprise Fund ................... 19

3. Seila Law ..................................... 20

C.

III.

The FTC ........................................... 22

Unified Control Fosters Accountability ..... 27

CONCLUSION ...................................................... 30

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES:

AMG Capital Management, LLC v. FTC,

593 U.S. 67 (2021) .............................................. 24

Arlington v. FCC,

569 U.S. 290 (2013) ............................................ 17

Clinton v. Jones,

520 U.S. 681 (1997) ...................................... 19, 20

Collins v. Yellen,

594 U.S. 220 (2021) ............................................ 21

Custom Commc’ns v. FTC,

142 F.4th 1060 (8th Cir. 2025) .......................... 29

Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB,

561 U.S. 477 (2010) .................. 1, 4, 10, 19–21, 29

FTC v. Henry Broch & Co.,

368 U.S. 360 (1962) ............................................ 24

FTC v. Microsoft,

681 F. Supp. 3d 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2023),

aff’d, 136 F.4th 954 (9th Cir. 2025) ................... 29

FTC v. Ruberoid Co.,

343 U.S. 470 (1952) ............................................ 28

Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,

295 U.S. 602 (1935) .......2–4, 15–20, 22, 23, 25–30

Kisor v. Wilkie,

588 U.S. 558 (2019) ...................................... 28, 29

Lucia v. SEC,

585 U.S. 237 (2018) .............................................. 1

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Morrison v. Olson,

487 U.S. 654 (1988) ...................................... 18, 19

Myers v. United States,

272 U.S. 52 (1926) .............3, 12, 13–15, 18, 21, 29

Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC,

482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ............................ 24

NLRB v. Noel Canning,

573 U.S. 513 (2014) ............................................ 28

Seila Law LLC v. CFPB,

591 U.S. 207 (2020) .................. 1, 4, 20–22, 25, 30

Shurtleff v. United States,

189 U.S. 311 (1903) ...................... 3, 12, 13, 15, 29

Trump v. United States,

603 U.S. 593 (2024) .............................................. 3

United States v. Morton Salt Co.,

338 U.S. 632 (1950) ............................................ 16

United States v. Rahimi,

602 U.S. 680 (2024) ............................................ 27

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:

U.S. Const. amend. XXII ...................................... 28

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 .................................... 8

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 13 ................................... 9

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 .................................... 8

U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 ...................................... 9

U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 .................................... 9

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ................................. 10

U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 ............................................. 2

U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, cl. 3 .................................. 10

U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, cl. 2 ............................. 8, 10

STATUTES:

Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13 William III ........ 6

Clayton Finality Act of 1959

73 Stat. 243 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 21 .................... 24

Customs Administrative Act

26 Stat. 131 (1890) ............................................. 13

Federal Trade Commission Act

15 U.S.C. § 41 ............................................... 16, 27

MISCELLANEOUS:

Peter Ackroyd, Foundation: The History of

England from its Earliest Beginnings to the

Tudors (2011) ....................................................... 5

Peter Ackroyd, Revolution: The History of

England from the Battle of the Boyne to the

Battle of Waterloo (2016) ...................................... 6

J. Howard Beales III et al., Back to the Future:

How Not to Write a Regulation, Am. Enter.

Inst. (June 2022) ................................................ 23

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws

of England (1765) ................................................. 6

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Stephen G. Calabresi et al., The Rise & Fall of

the Separation of Powers, 106 Nw. L. Rev. 527

(2012) .................................................................. 20

Stephen G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The

Unitary Executive in Historical Perspective, 31

Admin. & Reg. L. News 5 (2005) ....................... 15

Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash,

The President’s Power to Execute the Laws,

104 Yale L.J. 541 (1994) ................................ 9, 11

1 Winston S. Churchill, A History of the EnglishSpeaking Peoples: The Birth of Britain (1956).... 5

Daniel A. Crane, Debunking Humphrey’s

Executor, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1835

(2015) .................................................................. 24

Daniel A. Crane, FTC Independence After Seila

Law, Ctr. for the Study of the Admin. State,

CSAS Working Paper 22-02 (2022) ....... 22, 23, 25

Declaration of Independence .................................. 8

11 Documentary History of the First Federal

Congress, 1789-1791 (Charlene Bangs Bickford

et al. eds., 1992).............................................. 9, 12

Hayley Durudogen & Michael Sozan, What Is

Humphrey’s Executor and Why Should You

Care About It?, Ctr. for Am. Progress (Feb. 27,

2025) ................................................................... 27

The Federalist (1788) ............................ 1, 16, 20, 28

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, The

Federal Trade Commission Under Chair Lina

Khan: Undue Biden-Harris White House Influence and Sweeping Destruction of Agency

Norms (Majority Staff Report Oct. 31, 2024) .... 26

Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Duane

(Sep. 3, 1780) ........................................................ 9

Circular Letter from Thomas Jefferson

(Nov. 6, 1801)...................................................... 10

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward

Carrington (Aug. 4, 1787) .................................... 9

Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson

(June 30, 1789) ................................................... 12

F.W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of

England (1919) ................................................. 5–8

Mia McCathy, Capitol Agenda: No deal as the

shutdown marches toward Week Three, Politico

(Oct. 10, 2025) ........................................................

Timothy J. Muris, Rules Without Reason–The

Case of the FTC, 6 Regul. 20 (1982) .................. 23

Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision

of 1789, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 1021 (2006) ...... 11, 12

Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to William E.

Humphrey (Aug. 31, 1933)................................. 16

Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rebecca

Kelly Slaughter Regarding the Dismissal of

Appeals in Noncompete Rule Litigation

(Sep. 5, 2025) ...................................................... 25

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

30 Writings of George Washington (John C.

Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) ......................................... 10

Adam White, Is Humphrey’s Executor Headed for

Slaughter?, SCOTUSBlog (Oct. 2, 2025) .............. 27

William Yeatman & Keelyn Gallagher, The Rise

of Monetary Sanctions in Federal Agency

Adjudication, 76 Admin. L. Rev. 857 (2024) ..... 23

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE *

Washington Legal Foundation is a publicinterest law firm and policy center with supporters

nationwide. WLF promotes free enterprise, individual rights, limited government, and the rule of law. It

often appears as an amicus curiae to defend the

Constitution’s careful separation of powers. See, e.g.,

Lucia v. SEC, 585 U.S. 237 (2018); Free Enter. Fund

v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477

(2010). And WLF filed an early version of this brief

in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 591 U.S. 207 (2020).

Safeguarding the separation of powers is “the sacred maxim of free government.” The Federalist, No.

47 (Madison). The rise of administrative agencies,

those sprawling departments tasked by Congress

with faithfully helping to execute its laws, has long

threatened to combine the legislative and executive

powers in defiance of the Constitution.

WLF believes that unconstitutional restrictions

on the President’s removal power have unleashed an

unaccountable regulatory apparatus on the American citizenry. Restoring the President’s power to remove principal officers is thus crucial for democratic

accountability. “Without such power, the President

could not be held fully accountable for discharging

his own responsibilities; the buck would stop somewhere else.” Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 514.

No party’s counsel authored any part of this brief. No

person or entity, other than WLF and its counsel, helped pay

for the brief’s preparation or submission.

*

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Constitution vests “[t]he executive Power” in

the President alone—a grant that, from the Founding, has encompassed the unqualified authority to

remove those who exercise it on his behalf. Yet for 90

years, Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295

U.S. 602 (1935), has defied this textual command,

carving out a bizarre exception for “independent”

agencies like the Federal Trade Commission, whose

commissioners wield vast enforcement, rulemaking,

and investigative powers but may defy the Chief Executive with impunity.

Our nation’s English common-law traditions and

Constitution categorically condemn that anemic view

of executive power. A product of Depression-era expediency rather than principled interpretation, the

decision has eroded accountability, invited bureaucratic entrenchment, and mocked the separation of

powers. The time has come to jettison it, lest the

President’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be

faithfully executed,” U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, becomes

a hollow promise subject to congressional whim.

The President’s broad removal power has deep

roots in the English historical practice of a “mixed

regime,” where the Crown, the House of Lords, and

the House of Commons enjoyed distinct roles, each

balancing and checking one another. Both before and

after the American Revolution, the English (later

British) monarch enjoyed an absolute right to remove high officials at will. Save a narrow exception

for judges, the power to appoint conferred the power

to remove. Although they rejected many other royal

prerogatives, the Framers of our Constitution—

3

chastened by their experience with the feeble Articles of Confederation—retained a broad removal

power for the Chief Executive.

That choice is evident in Article II’s clauses vesting “the executive Power” in a single “President” who

must “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” It can also be seen in the overall structure of the

Constitution; in the practices of Presidents Washington, Adams, and Jefferson; and in key decisions taken by the First Congress. Drawing on many of these

sources, this Court confirmed—in Shurtleff v. United

States, 189 U.S. 311 (1903) and Myers v. United

States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)—the then-ubiquitous understanding that the President may remove principal officers at will.

Everything abruptly changed when this Court

decided Humphrey’s Executor. In a six-page opinion

that all but ignored the pertinent constitutional text,

structure, and history, the Court declared that Congress may grant for-cause removal protection to a

principal officer on a panel of purportedly neutral

“experts” who exercise “quasi legislative” and “quasi

judicial” powers. This effectively granted Congress

carte blanche to create a separate branch of government, one of independent boards and commissions,

whose principal officers are removable only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”

And this distortion of the separation of powers begat

others, culminating in “an Executive Branch that

cannibalizes itself,” Trump v. United States, 603

U.S. 593, 640 (2024)—a vast, unaccountable administrative state capable of binding the citizenry with

agency rules that carry the force and effect of law.

4

As Congress’s attempts to cut into the President’s removal power have become more brazen, this

Court has begun righting the ship in some recent decisions, insisting that “a single President” is “responsible for the actions of the Executive Branch.” Free

Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 496–97; Seila Law, 591

U.S. at 213. As this case illustrates, however, at

least some officers of the United States do not take

that constitutional structure seriously. And why

should they? Humphrey’s Executor insulates them

from accountability.

Unified control, in contrast, fosters true accountability. “Congress has plenary control over the salary, duties, and even existence of executive offices.

Only Presidential oversight can counter its influence.” Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 500. This Court

should abandon the unconstitutional limit on the

President’s removal power that Humphrey’s Executor

created out of thin air.

ARGUMENT

I.

The President’s Broad Removal Power Is

Confirmed by English History, the Text and

Structure of the Constitution, and More

Than 145 Years of Unbroken Practice After

the Founding.

A. English History

“Will no one rid me of this turbulent priest?” Four

knights immortalized this howl of protest by taking

King Henry II’s feverish rant seriously. They took

their leave, rode to the Norman coast, and crossed

the Channel. They found the Archbishop of Canter-

5

bury, Thomas Becket, in his cathedral, and they

hacked him to pieces. 1 Winston S. Churchill, A History of the English-Speaking Peoples: The Birth of

Britain 210–11 (1956).

Becket had once been the King’s friend and

counselor. After Henry had him appointed archbishop in 1162, however, he promptly went rogue. The

Church of that day was a power apart—a body with

its own lands and privileges, its own laws and

courts—and Becket became its champion. He denied

the Crown’s authority, undermined royal policy at

every turn, and excommunicated clerics loyal to the

King. Henry could do very little about any of it except shout and sputter. When at last, in 1170, his

knights mistook one of Henry’s many tirades as a

command and removed Becket by cutting him down,

the scandal shook the kingdom to its core. History

would hail Becket as a martyr and a saint, and Henry would spend years atoning for the bloody sacrilege

he had brought about. Peter Ackroyd, Foundation:

The History of England from its Earliest Beginnings

to the Tudors 132–34 (2011); 1 Churchill, supra, at

210–11.

But this colorful episode is a historical aberration, the rare exception that proves the rule. For centuries, England’s high officials—its chancellors,

councilors, ministers, and (once Henry VIII had his

way) even its bishops—all served at the king’s

pleasure. Their powers were the king’s powers. F.W.

Maitland, The Constitutional History of England 389

(1919). They were, as Maitland explained, “royal

prerogatives” that “the king might lawfully exercise

himself were he capable of discharging personally

the vast business of government.” Id. An untram-

6

meled power of appointment and removal was itself

one such prerogative. Id.

Some of these prerogatives were stripped away

just as the American colonies were getting underway. After the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the

Crown lost, for all time, the power to suspend a law.

Id. at 388. No sovereign has vetoed a bill from the

throne since Queen Anne did so in 1708. Id. at 398.

And when Anne died in 1714, the Crown’s power to

remove a judge “during good behaviour” died with

her. Id. at 312–13; see Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 &

13 William III c. 2, § 3. Royal authority withered further under George I and George II, Hanoverians who

cared little about England or its affairs. Maitland,

supra, at 395; Peter Ackroyd, Revolution: The History of England from the Battle of the Boyne to the Battle of Waterloo 80–81, 93–94, 123–24 (2016). Although George III took some interest in governing, by

his day the king no longer attended cabinet meetings. Maitland, supra, at 395.

Yet the king remained formidable. He retained

his say in foreign affairs. He could still create new

offices, albeit only with what money Parliament

might supply. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries

on the Laws of England 262 (1765). Above all, his

power to appoint and remove officers stood unscathed. Maitland, supra, at 388–89. The king,

Blackstone wrote in 1765, was still “the fountain of

honour, of office, and of privilege.” Blackstone, supra, at 261. It was for the king alone, then, to decide

“in what capacities, with what privileges, and under

what distinctions his people [we]re best qualified to

serve and to act under him.” Id. at 263.

7

The power to appoint came with the power to

remove. Writing in the early twentieth century,

Maitland vividly described the abiding scope of—and

justification for—the Crown’s appointment and removal power:

I think it well to notice separately that almost all those who have any governmental or

judicial powers of any high order are appointed by the queen; if their powers are of a

judicial kind, they generally hold office during good behaviour; if their powers are not

judicial, they generally hold office merely

during the queen’s good pleasure and no reason need be assigned for dismissing them. I

think it well to notice this separately, for it is

these powers of appointment and dismissal

which give to our scheme of government the

requisite unity. The privy councillors hold

their places during good pleasure, [and] so do

those high officers of state who form the ministry. It is not usual to remove [such officers]

. . . . But the legal power is absolute; and it is

just because the legal power is absolute that

our system of party government is possible.

I mention this power of appointing and dismissing the high officers of state by itself because it is so very important, but of course

the king has a very general power of appointing not only those whom we speak of as collectively forming the ministry, but all or almost all of those who hold public offices of

first-rate importance.

8

Maitland, supra, at 428–29. The British monarch enjoyed the unquestioned power to appoint and dismiss

high officials and ministers at pleasure and without

cause. This sweeping authority extended over the

holder of nearly every key public office—save judges

who served for life during good behavior. Id.

B. The Constitution.

The Declaration of Independence accuses

George III of committing “every act which may define a Tyrant.” Declaration of Independence ¶ 30. At

times the document seems to rail against a despot

whose writ ran no further than Thomas Jefferson’s

imagination. See id. ¶¶ 3–29. No matter how overwrought Jefferson’s accusations may be, his view of

the King’s despotism played on the minds of the men

who assembled for the Constitutional Convention in

1787. The charter they crafted wrests many royal

prerogatives from the grasp of our chief executive. In

line with the British practice by that time, he may

not remove judges. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, cl. 2. Nor

may he declare war or create offices; those powers

belong to Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 11, 18.

And he may not make treaties or appoint senior officers by himself; he needs the Senate’s approval.

U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

Yet while the American concept of the separation

of powers has its roots in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English constitutionalism, the British

monarchy was not the Framers’ only reference point.

The Articles of Confederation, which created a meager executive power and assigned it to Congress, had

been tried and found wanting. The lack of a strong,

unitary executive was, Jefferson exclaimed, “the

9

source of more evil than we have ever experienced

from any other cause.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson

to Edward Carrington (Aug. 4, 1787), https://perma.

cc/53HP-7VPL. “Nothing is so embarrassing nor so

mischievous in a great assembly as the details of execution,” he cried. Id. Hamilton agreed. The lack of a

“proper executive” led, he wrote, to a “want of method and energy.” Letter from Alexander Hamilton to

James Duane (Sep. 3, 1780), https://perma.cc/YRS84SAP. “Responsibility” was too “diffused.” Id.

Resolved to remedy this structural defect, the

Framers only incrementally trimmed the executive

bough. First, they roundly vested “the executive

Power” in a single “President.” U.S. Const. art. II,

§ 1, cl. 1. Then, when they wanted to revoke some

prerogative or other, they did so openly and in plain

words. The President may not “provide and maintain

a Navy”; he may not grant anyone a “Title of Nobility”; and so on. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 13; art. I,

§ 9, cl. 8. The Framers wanted to reduce the President’s authority to a point, but no further. See Steven

G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541,

596 n.212 (1994). “All the powers properly belonging

to the executive department of the government are

given,” as Fisher Ames put it to the First Congress,

“and such only taken away as are expressly excepted.” 11 Documentary History of the First Federal

Congress, 1789-1790, at 979 (statement of Fisher

Ames) (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992)

[hereafter DHFFC].

“Our Constitution was adopted to enable the

people to govern themselves” which requires that “a

President chosen by the entire Nation oversee the

10

execution of the laws.” Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at

499. True, the Constitution requires the President to

rely on Congress to erect and fund offices, see Myers,

272 U.S. at 128–30, and on the Senate to approve

principal officers, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. But it

also commands the President, and the President

alone, to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, cl. 3. And although it

says that judges “shall hold their offices during good

behavior,” U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, cl. 2., it extends

no like protection to executive officials. A careful

balance has obviously been struck. The President

answers to Congress, but the government answers to

the President. And so an officer must, in Washington’s words, “assist the supreme Magistrate in discharging the duties of his trust.” 30 Writings of

George Washington 334 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed.,

1939).

C. Early American Practice.

When Jefferson became President, he circulated

among his heads of departments a letter setting

Washington’s administration as his standard. Washington had required his officers to keep him “always

in accurate possession of all facts and proceedings.”

Circular Letter from Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 6,

1801), https://perma.cc/GJ9T-JPN3. He had “formed

a central point for the different [executive] branches,

preserved a unity of object and action among them,”

and “met himself the due responsibility for whatever

was done.” Id.

Jefferson contrasted this approach with “Mr.

Adams’s administration,” in which the President,

during “his long and habitual absences,” let the Ex-

11

ecutive Branch be “parceled out” among “four independent heads, drawing sometimes in opposite directions.” Id. “That the former is preferable to the latter

course,” declared Jefferson, “cannot be doubted.” Id.

Washington—and Jefferson—clearly believed that

the President may guide, command, and, when necessary, remove government officials. Indeed, although no law granted the President a removal power, Washington, Adams, and Jefferson each dismissed many officers. See Saikrishna Prakash, New

Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 Cornell L. Rev.

1021, 1066 (2006). Jefferson alone fired 124 of them.

Id.

The conduct of these early Presidents was not

challenged by the other branches. On the contrary,

the First Congress had endorsed the notion that the

President enjoys an unfettered removal power. When

Madison moved the House to establish a Department

of Foreign Affairs, “the head of which” was to be an

officer “removable by the President,” a debate erupted about the removal power.

A few representatives argued that removal required an impeachment trial in the Senate. Calabresi & Prakash, supra, 104 Yale L.J. at 642–43; Prakash, supra, 91 Cornell L. Rev. at 1035. Others argued that at least the Senate’s approval was necessary. Calabresi & Prakash, supra, 104 Yale L.J. at

643; Prakash, supra, 91 Cornell L. Rev. at 1036–37.

Still others believed that, although the President

should be allowed to remove officials at will, his

power to do so came not from the Constitution but

from Congress. Prakash, supra, 91 Cornell L. Rev. at

1038–39. Madison, for his part, contended that “the

lowest officers, the middle grade, and the highest” all

12

“depend, as they ought, on the President.” 11

DHFFC, supra, at 925 (statement of James Madison). And because he in turn depends on the “community,” the “chain of dependence” terminates in

“the people.” Id. In other words, an unqualified removal power ensures that voters may hold the President to account for his officers’ actions.

Madison’s view won out. After a month-long discussion, majorities in both the House and Senate ultimately affirmed that the President held an inherent removal power under the vesting clause. During

this pivotal debate and legislative action known as

the Decision of 1789, Congress passed several bills

that, while containing no removal clauses, nonetheless addressed who would manage the papers of a

removed officer. See Prakash, supra, 91 Cornell L.

Rev. at 1023 & nn. 7–9. Legislators on both sides of

the debate memorialized their understanding in

their private letters. The votes, one senator wrote,

turned on “whether the President had a constitutional right to remove; not on the expediency of it.”

Id. at 1065–66. Madison told Jefferson that his colleagues had adopted the position “most consonant” to

“the text of the Constitution” and “the requisite responsibility and harmony in the Executive Department.” Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 30, 1789), https://perma.cc/LB3RBDKH.

D. Shurtleff and Myers.

Not until the twentieth century did this Court

squarely consider the President’s removal power.

When at last it did so, it too sided with Madison.

13

The Court first considered the question of statutory restrictions on the President’s removal power in

Shurtleff v. United States (1903). Congress had created an “office of general appraiser of merchandise,”

whose occupant could be removed by the President

“for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in

office.” 189 U.S. at 313 (quoting the Customs Administrative Act, ch. 407, § 12, 26 Stat. 131, 136 (1890)).

When President McKinley removed Ferdinand

Shurtleff from this office in 1899, Shurtleff sued,

contending that the statute’s text precluded McKinley’s removing him for reasons not explicitly set out

by Congress. Id. at 315–16.

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Peckham

disagreed. President McKinley could remove

Shurtleff for reasons not specified by statute, the

Court held, though Shurtleff was “entitled to notice

and a hearing” if the President sought to remove him

for one of the statutory causes. Id. at 314. Because

Congress never specified a term of office for the General Appraiser, Justice Peckham explained, construing the statute to preclude Shurtleff’s removal for

reasons beyond those named in the statute would

effectively be to grant him life tenure on good behavior. Id. at 316. And while the statute’s for-cause removal clause might give an executive officer the

right to defend himself against allegations of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,” in

no way could it cabin the President’s power to remove an executive officer at will. Id. at 317.

Twenty-three years later, in Myers v. United

States (1926), this Court again considered the limits,

if any, of the President’s removal power. President

Wilson had tapped Frank Myers as postmaster in

14

Portland, securing Senate consent as required. 272

U.S. at 106. But when Wilson later demanded Myers’s resignation without consulting the senators, he

flouted a Reconstruction-era statute that insisted on

Senate approval for such ousters. Id. at 107–08. Myers sued for back pay, contending that his removal

was invalid under federal law. Once again, this

Court disagreed.

While the President holds all “executive power,”

Myers explained, he “alone and unaided could not

execute the laws.” Id. at 117. He must “execute them

by the assistance of subordinates,” and, to do so effectively, he must be able to remove “those for whom

he cannot continue to be responsible.” Id. The Framers could not have

intended, without express provision, to give

to Congress or the Senate, in case of political

or other differences, the means of thwarting

the executive in the exercise of his great

powers and in the bearing of his great responsibility by fastening upon him, as subordinate executive officers, men who by their

inefficient service under him, by their lack of

loyalty to the service, or by their different

views of policy might make his taking care

that the laws be faithfully executed most difficult or impossible.

Id. at 131 (summarizing arguments Madison put to

the First Congress). The President must, in other

words, have the power “to secure that unitary and

uniform execution of the laws which article 2 of the

Constitution evidently contemplated in vesting general executive power in the President alone.” Id. at

15

135. He must, in short, “have the power to remove.”

Id.

Following Myers, Congress didn’t even bother to

include removal restrictions when creating the Federal Power Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal Communications Commission. See Stephen G. Calbresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive in Historical

Perspective, 31 Admin. & Reg. L. News 5, 6 (2005).

That no one regarded these commissions as being

“independent” of the Executive Branch is “underscored by the fact that Presidents Cleveland, Wilson,

Hoover, and Franklin Roosevelt did not hesitate to

direct commission policies and to intervene in commission matters.” Id.

Shurtleff and Myers got it right. The President

enjoys inherent authority to remove executive officers at will, consistent with the Framers’ view of a

unitary executive revealed in the Constitution they

adopted. Any attempt to cut back on this power risks

undermining the Executive Branch’s ability to faithfully execute the laws—along with the peoples’ ability to hold a singular President accountable for his

administration’s actions.

II. The Court Erred, in Modern Times, by

Eroding the President’s Removal Power.

A.

Humphrey’s Executor.

The story so far has been about the federal government as it was designed by the Framers—the

government described in grade-school textbooks. In

that tripartite system, one branch makes the law,

16

another administers it, and a third applies it to cases

and controversies. The plan never worked perfectly,

of course. The lines between the powers are at times

too obscure, and the humans tasked with finding

them often too fallible or corrupt.

It is impossible to pinpoint exactly when this

venerable model began to drift off course, but the

New Deal saw a “rapid expansion of the administrative process,” United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338

U.S. 632, 644 (1950), including the creation of the

FTC itself. As Hamilton observed, “there is in the

nature of sovereign power, an impatience of control,

that disposes those who are invested with the exercise of it, to look with an evil eye upon all external

attempts to restrain or direct its operations.” The

Federalist, No. 15.

A pivotal moment came when FTC Commissioner William Humphrey ignored a letter from FDR removing him from his post. Humphrey just kept

showing up for work every day. Before long, however, eternity’s power of removal achieved what FDR’s

had not, so Humphrey’s estate sued the government

for unpaid wages.

According to the FTC Act, the President may

remove a commissioner for only “inefficiency, neglect

of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 15 U.S.C. § 41.

FDR’s only qualm with Humphrey had been his

want of enthusiasm for the New Deal. “I do not feel,”

he told Humphrey, “that your mind and my mind go

along together on either the policies or the administering of the Federal Trade Commission, and, frankly, I think it is best for the people of this country

that I should have your full confidence.” Letter from

17

Franklin D. Roosevelt to William E. Humphrey (Aug.

31, 1933) (quoted in Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S.

at 619). This Court disagreed.

Even judged by the standards of its own time,

Humphrey’s Executor was strangely inattentive to

constitutional first principles. To justify its new limit

on the President’s removal power, the Court transformed the FTC’s defects into virtues. The FTC’s duties, the Court declared, “are neither political nor executive, but predominantly quasi judicial and quasi

legislative.” 295 U.S. at 624. Congress just wanted to

create a “nonpartisan” “body of experts” and, thanks

to these good intentions, the FTC was valid precisely

because Congress made it “independent of executive

authority.” Id. at 624–25.

Ultimately, Humphrey’s Executor ushered in the

founding of a new branch of government. In that

fourth branch—in the FTC, the SEC, the FCC, the

CFTC, the NLRB, and on and on—unelected regulators wield the executive power (among others). They

apply the law in accord with their own policies, their

own maxims, and their own prerogatives. See Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 314 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,

dissenting) (“The collection of agencies housed outside the traditional executive departments . . . is routinely described as the ‘headless fourth branch of

government,’ reflecting not only the scope of their

authority but their practical independence.”) And

when their aims conflict with the Executive Branch’s

aims, they need not yield. They are, like Becket’s

Church, a power apart.

18

B.

Later Developments.

1. Morrison

Since Humphrey’s Executor, this Court has considered the President’s removal power several times.

In Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), the Court

held that the Ethics in Government Act, which

placed good-cause restrictions on the Attorney General’s power to remove an independent counsel, did

not impermissibly infringe the President’s removal

power, id. at 685–93, 695–96.

Whereas FTC Commissioners are principal officers, the independent counsel was an inferior officer,

id. at 691. Still, note the sharp incongruity between

Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison. Humphrey’s Executor stood its curtailment of executive power largely on the fact that an FTC commissioner has only

quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers. Humphrey’s Executor distinguished Myers on the ground

that it involved “an executive officer restricted to the

performance of executive functions.” 295 U.S. at 627.

Officers who wield purely executive power, Humphrey’s Executor said, would remain “subject to the exclusive and illimitable power of removal by the Chief

Executive.” Id. Yet Morrison involved a prosecutor

wielding purely executive power. How, then, could

she enjoy good-cause protection?

The answer is that Morrison simply swept the

rationale of Humphrey’s Executor “into the dustbin.”

487 U.S. at 725 (Scalia, J., dissenting). “Our present

considered view,” the Court said in Morrison, is that

“rigid categories” do not matter, and that the removal power simply “ensure[s] that Congress does not

19

interfere with the President’s exercise of the ‘executive power’ and his constitutionally appointed [‘takecare’] duty.” Id. at 689–90.

In other words, Morrison would come out wrong

under the rule in Humphrey’s Executor. And, one

could argue, Humphrey’s Executor, which involved

powerful principal officers, would come out wrong

under the rule in Morrison. That can’t be right—and

it exposes the Court’s failure to police the sharp division between the Legislative and Executive Branches mandated by the text, structure, and history of

Article II.

2. Free Enterprise Fund

This Court at last began to restore the President’s removal power (and with it, the separation of

powers) in Free Enterprise Fund (2010), which held

that Congress may not create multi-level good-cause

protections. If a principal officer enjoys good-cause

protection, then the inferior officers answerable to

her must be removable at will. Although it does not

reexamine Humphrey’s Executor or Morrison, 561

U.S. at 483, Free Enterprise Fund often breaks

sharply with those decisions.

“The President cannot ‘take Care that the Laws

be faithfully executed’ if he cannot oversee the faithfulness of the officers who execute them.” Id. at 484.

That is, the “President cannot delegate ultimate responsibility or the active obligation to supervise that

goes with it, because Article II makes a single President responsible for the actions of the Executive

Branch.” Id. at 496-97 (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520

20

U.S. 681, 712-13 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in

judgment)).

Indeed, “[t]he diffusion of power carries with it a

diffusion of accountability.” Id. at 497. “Without a

clear and effective chain of command, the public

cannot determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall.” Id. at 498 (quoting The Federalist No. 70 (Hamilton)). The Constitution, Free Enterprise Fund reminds us, “requires

that a President chosen by the entire Nation oversee

the execution of the laws.” Id. at 499. “In its pursuit

of a ‘workable government,’ Congress cannot reduce

the Chief Magistrate to a cajoler-in-chief.” Id. at 502.

Each of these passages is in serious tension with

Humphrey’s Executor. Several of them flatly contradict it. And Free Enterprise Fund offers no reason

why its logic reaches double-layer for-cause removal

but not single-layer for-cause removal. Although this

Court “drew the line at two levels of for-cause removal restrictions, this constitutional problem persists with only one level of restrictions.” Stephen G.

Calabresi et al., The Rise & Fall of the Separation of

Powers, 106 Nw. L. Rev. 527, 541 n.57 (2012).

3. Seila Law

More recently, in Seila Law (2020), the Court

held that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s leadership by a single director—removable only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance—violates

the separation of powers. Seila Law doubled down on

the lessons of Free Enterprise Fund, quoting from it

21

liberally at times, while echoing the same unmistakable tune throughout.

“The entire ‘executive Power’ belongs to the President alone.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 213. “The President’s power to remove—and thus supervise—those

who wield executive power on his behalf follows from

the text of Article II, was settled by the first Congress, and was confirmed in the landmark decision

Myers v. United States.” Id. at 204 (citation omitted).

The President’s removal power, Seila Law insists, “has long been confirmed by history and precedent. It ‘was discussed extensively in Congress when

the first executive departments were created’ in

1789.” Id. at 214 (quoting Free Enterprise Fund, 561

U.S. at 492). At bottom, Seila Law embraces the

general rule that the President possesses ‘the authority to remove those who assist him in carrying

out his duties.’” Id. at 215 (quoting Free Enterprise

Fund, 561 U.S. at 513–14).

That rule resolves this case. “New Presidents

always inherit thousands of Executive Branch officials whom they did not select. It is the power to supervise—and, if need be, remove—subordinate officials that allows a new President to shape his administration and respond to the electoral will that

propelled him to office.” Collins v. Yellen, 594 U.S.

220, 277–78 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part).

Otherwise, there would be “wholly unaccountable

government agent[s]” who “assert[] the power to

make decisions affecting individual lives, liberty,

and property,” yet are not accountable to “those who

govern.” Id. at 278.

22

C.

The FTC.

Humphrey’s Executor blessed the creation of independent agencies governed by panels of experts.

Spreading control among several board members or

commissioners, the Court reasoned, made these novel agencies’ autonomy not only tolerable, but desirable. 295 U.S. at 624 (the FTC’s “members are called

upon to exercise the trained judgment of a body of

experts . . . informed by experience”). Justice Sutherland’s opinion suggested that by eliminating the

President’s influence over these “quasi judicial” and

“quasi legislative” agencies, they would be politically

independent. Id.

Leaving aside the tremendous influence Congress exerts over federal agencies, Sutherland’s reasoning hinges on an FTC that exercises real expertise—but no real executive power—and is insulated

from partisan pressures to ensure impartial enforcement of the law. How does that rationale hold

up nearly a century later?

Let’s start with expertise. “Historically, FTC

Commissioners have not been leading experts in

their fields when appointed and have not stayed at

the Commission long enough to acquire expertise.”

Daniel A. Crane, FTC Independence after Seila Law,

Ctr. for the Study of the Admin. State, CSAS Working Paper 22-02, at 19, https://perma.cc/W3UUDC7Q. In fact, the FTC has very little substantive

expertise in the countless industries it regulates. No

matter how credentialed they may be, the Commissioners’ backgrounds rarely impart “special

knowledge concerning the problems and operation of

care labeling, funerals, food marketing, or any other

23

activity or particular industry.” Timothy J. Muris,

Rules Without Reason—The Case of the FTC, 6 Regul. 20, 22 (Sept./Oct. 1982).

FTC bureaucrats lack “the regular contact and

communication with entities in a specific industry

that facilitates deep understanding of what practices, or remedies, are appropriate.” J. Howard Beales

III, et al., Back to the Future: How Not to Write a

Regulation, Am. Enter. Inst., at 4 (June 2022),

http://bit.ly/46ZhUKK. In other words, when the

FTC relies on its own expertise, it relies “on the experiences with a particular industry that the commissioners and the staff are likely to share with any

ordinary citizen.” Muris, supra, at 22. Above all, the

agency lacks any special expertise that would justify

setting it loose on the American economy without

scrupulous accountability.

Nor is that all. Today’s FTC “is neither primarily

legislative nor adjudicatory but instead acts primarily as an executive law enforcement agency.” Crane,

FTC Independence, supra, at 18. Three years after

Humphrey’s Executor was decided, Congress extended the FTC’s regulatory reach to all “unfair or deceptive acts or practices,” backed by civil penalties and

enforceable by the Department of Justice. See William Yeatman & Keelyn Gallagher, The Rise of Monetary Sanctions in Federal Agency Adjudication, 76

Admin. L. Rev. 857, 867 (2024). No longer merely

advisory and subject to de novo review in federal

court, the FTC’s in-house adjudications are now

“self-executing.” Id.

Next, in the Finality Act of 1959, Congress made

FTC orders final upon expiration of the 60-day peri-

24

od for seeking review. 73 Stat. 243 (1959), 15 U.S.C.

§ 21. The penalties Congress imposed for violating

an FTC final order were so severe that this Court

later invited the agency to reform its procedures for

entering orders. See FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 368

U.S. 360, 367–68 (1962). Backed by monetary sanctions, the FTC can now unilaterally issue final decisions awarding legal and equitable relief in its own

administrative adjudications.

There’s more. Although nothing in the FTC Act

grants the FTC substantive rulemaking authority

over trade practices (the agency did not promulgate

such a rule until 1965), the D.C. Circuit decided in

1973 that the agency enjoyed that broad authority

anyway. Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482

F.2d 672, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Daniel A.

Crane, Debunking Humprey’s Executor, 83 Geo.

Wash. L. Rev. 1835, 1860–62 (2015). Today’s FTC

thus promulgates binding rules, with the force and

effect of law, touching virtually every sector of the

economy.

In 1973 and 1975, Congress gave the FTC added

authority to seek monetary penalties from violators

directly in federal court, but only after an administrative proceeding. See AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC v.

FTC, 593 U.S. 67, 72–73 (2021). Before long, the

Commission “fell into the habit of obtaining effective

monetary relief without administrative action by suing in federal district court seeking asset freezes and

mandatory injunctions.” Crane, 83 Geo. Wash. L.

Rev. at 1865. It took this Court’s intervention for the

FTC to end that ultra vires practice. AMG Cap.

Mgmt., 593 U.S. at 75–78. Perhaps the FTC enjoys

“broader rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicatory

25

powers than the Humphrey’s Court appreciated.”

Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 219 n. 4. In fact, it’s not even

a close call.

Is the FTC strictly nonpartisan? “The FTC has

been anything but a non-partisan and independent

agency.” Crane, FTC Independence, at 18. This reality is now an accepted truism throughout the administrative state where, in most multi-member agencies, an equal number of commissioners are appointed from each political party and the tie-breaking

chair is named by the President.

The Respondent here, Rebecca Slaughter, is

hardly immune from political grandstanding: “President Trump has,” she wrote recently, “at every turn,

thrown workers under the bus to ingratiate himself

with corporations and their billionaire CEOs.” Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rebecca Kelly

Slaughter Regarding the Dismissal of Appeals in

Noncompete Rule Litigation (Sep. 5, 2025),

https://perma.cc/344X-9WE8 (“[T]he Trump-Vance

FTC decides to throw in the towel on years of work

by the agency to protect workers from draconian

noncompete agreements.”). Although Slaughter was

engaging in rank partisan blame-shifting, she wasn’t

breaking any new ground in doing so.

Indeed, a 2024 report on Lina Khan’s recent tenure as FTC Chair reveals an agency so entwined

with White House directives that it functioned less

as a separate agency than as an extension of the

Oval Office. Senior FTC officials, including Khan’s

chief of staff (a Biden campaign fundraiser) and policy director (borrowed from the White House Counsel’s office) routinely consulted with White House

26

aides on FTC enforcement priorities, from merger

reviews to antitrust probes. H. Comm. on Oversight

& Accountability, The Federal Trade Commission

Under Chair Lina Khan: Undue Biden-Harris White

House Influence and Sweeping Destruction of Agency

Norms, at 12–14 (Majority Staff Report Oct. 31,

2024). This frenzy of West Wing coordination with

the FTC peaked in the investigation of Amazon,

when FTC career staff were pressed to expand the

inquiry to match the administration’s political goals,

despite career analysts’ reluctance to proceed on

shaky legal and evidentiary grounds. Id. at 18–20.

The FTC’s 2023 noncompete ban, adopted over

bipartisan economic criticism warning of severe

market distortions, proceeded on a sharply divided

partisan vote that brushed aside hard data as mere

“corporate influence.” Id. at 25–28. Meanwhile, merger challenges like Microsoft-Activision racked up

seven losses in eight cases by mid-2024, including

several appellate reversals for agency overreach. Id.

at 30–33. Internal memos by career staff pleading

for restraint went unheeded. Id. All this just happened to seamlessly align with Biden-era priorities

and well-documented White House direction and input.

Such partisan political entanglements reveal not

the detached salon of expert collaboration Humphrey’s Executor promised, but a highly politicized apparatus advancing transient agendas—precisely the

kind of mischief at-will removal is meant to check.

Yet the FTC Act and this Court’s precedent in

Humphrey’s Executor insist that Commissioners can

be removed for only “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or

malfeasance in office.” 15 U.S.C. § 41.

27

In sum, the “last nine decades have brought significant changes to the FTC from the time of

Humphrey’s Executor, in terms of both its formal

powers and its increasingly energetic—even ideological or partisan—approach to wielding them.” Adam

White, Is Humphrey’s Executor headed for Slaughter?, SCOTUSBlog (Oct. 2, 2025), https://perma.cc/

ZBS3-EGEC. The shifting sand on which Humphrey’s Executor stands no longer can sustain it.

III.

Unified Control Fosters Accountability.

Some commentators insist that the White

House’s present occupant is too volatile and politically charged to be allowed to decide who runs the

agencies of the government he oversees. See, e.g.,

Hayley Durudogen & Michael Sozan, What Is

Humphrey’s Executor and Why Should You Care

About It?, Ctr. for Am. Progress (Feb. 27, 2025),

https://shorturl.at/vjMrQ. But current personalities

cannot alter the meaning of the Constitution, which

is “fixed at the time of its ratification” and perpetual

unless and until amended. United States v. Rahimi,

602 U.S. 680, 737 (2024) (Barrett, J., concurring). If

the Constitution’s meaning were to change from

President-to-President (or Congress-to-Congress),

we’d have something governing us, but it wouldn’t be

the stability the President’s critics crave (nor what

the Constitution demands).

Above all, the Founders were not naive about

human nature. “[T]here is a degree of depravity in

mankind,” Madison insisted, “which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust.” The

Federalist No. 55. The Framers did not believe in

fantasies about politically neutral Presidents any

28

more than they believed in fantasies about politically

neutral panels of government experts. “Ambition,”

they steadfastly maintained, “must be made to counteract ambition.” The Federalist No. 51 (Madison).

No surprise, then, that the Constitution never

blesses arming an agency with an amorphous blend

of “quasi” powers, much less an array of plenary executive powers. As Justice Jackson quipped, “the

mere retreat to the qualifying ‘quasi’ is implicit with

confession that all recognized classifications have

broken down.” FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470,

487-88 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). The separation of powers is no academic shibboleth. No President should be able to avoid responsibility before the

voters by pointing to subterfuge from an unaccountable bureaucracy.

Nor would restoring the proper meaning of Article II render Congress a feckless branch. Congress

holds the power of the purse and can withhold appropriations in response to perceived Executive

slights—as it is doing at the time of this brief’s filing.

See Mia McCathy, Capitol Agenda: No deal as the

shutdown marches toward Week Three, Politico (Oct.

10, 2025), https://politi.co/42yqBua. Congress also

controls which appointments must be subject to Senate confirmation, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, and the

President cannot bulldoze the advice-and-consent

appointment process through gamesmanship, NLRB

v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014). And unlike

FDR, modern Presidents cannot hold office beyond

two terms. U.S. Const. amend. XXII.

As it did with Auer deference, this Court could

always grant Humphrey’s Executor a “stay of execu-

29

tion,” piling on so many caveats, distinctions, and

qualifiers that it leaves the Court’s precedent “zombified.” Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558, 592 (2019)

(Gorsuch, J., concurring). But no one should discount

the ways that accountability to the Executive may

help to ensure vigorous, robust, and lawful execution.

As shown above, those appointed to independent

agencies aren’t exactly models of self-restraint or

rule adherence themselves. President Biden was

committed to aggressive FTC enforcement, and to

that end he placed Lina Khan as Chair. But Khan

was uninterested in the niceties—due process, fair

notice, faithful application—of implementing the

President’s agenda. This resulted in a series of setbacks for the Biden administration. E.g., FTC v. Microsoft, 681 F. Supp. 3d 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2023), aff’d,

136 F.4th 954 (9th Cir. 2025); Custom Commc’ns v.

FTC, 142 F.4th 1060 (8th Cir. 2025). The President

might have benefited from removing Khan as Chair

and replacing her. Perhaps a more pragmatic FTC

Chair could have advanced his policy goals more effectively. But President Biden was hamstrung from

even considering that option, out of fidelity to the

wrongly decided Humphrey’s Executor.

***

None of the Founders would recognize the anemic view of executive power that Respondent urges

here. It unavoidably collides with the executive power of the Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause.

Washington, Jefferson, and Madison would all reject

it as unconstitutional. So would the First Congress

and the Shurtleff and Myers Courts. In sum, there

30

can be no doubt what the constitutional history, text,

and structure all tell us: the removal protections

built around the FTC’s commissioners gravely distort our founding charter. These sources confirm—

along with Free Enterprise Fund and Seila Law—

that the President may remove a principal officer at

will, which means that Humphrey’s Executor is intolerably wrong. This Court should say so at long

last.

CONCLUSION

The judgment should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

October 14, 2025

CORY L. ANDREWS

Counsel of Record

ZAC MORGAN

WASHINGTON LEGAL

FOUNDATION

2009 Mass. Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 588-0302

candrews@wlf.org