Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Carl Culp, Petitioner v. Scott Caudill, in His Official Capacity as Chief of the Fort Wayne Police Department

No. ______

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

________

CARL CULP,

v.

Petitioner,

SCOTT CAUDILL, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF

THE FORT WAYNE POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Respondent.

________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

________

Sean M. Surrisi

Counsel of Record

WYLAND, HUMPHREY, CLEVENGER

& SURRISI, LLP

319 W. Jefferson Street

Plymouth, IN 46563

(574) 936-2169

sean@whwclaw.com

LEGAL PRINTERS LLC ! Washington, DC ! 202-747-2400 ! legalprinters.com

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., applies to a law

enforcement agency during the circumstance of the arrest or apprehension of a qualified individual with a

disability and, if so, what standards govern the law’s

application?

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner is Carl Culp (“Carl”). Petitioner was

plaintiff-appellant, and cross-appellee below.

Roberta Culp (“Roberta”) was also plaintiff-appellant, and cross-appellee below.

Respondent is Scott Caudill, in his official capacity as Chief of the Fort Wayne Police Department.

Respondent was defendant-appellee below.

Whitney Woods, and Stevan Schulien, were

also defendants-appellees, and cross-appellants below.

Steve Ealing, Bradley Griffin, Robert Wilcox,

Steve Reed in his official capacity as former Chief of

the Fort Wayne Police Department, Troy Hershberger, in his official capacity as Sheriff of the Allen

County Sheriff’s Department, and David Gladieux in

his official capacity as former Sheriff of the Allen

County Sheriff’s Department were also defendantsappellees below.

Pat Surine, Broc Hassenzahl, Rae CarpenterJackson, Michael Bodeker, Shawn Lawhorn, Brian

Jarboe, and Evan Gregory were also defendants below.

iii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court (N.D. Ind.):

Carl Culp and Roberta Culp v. Steve Reed, in

his official capacity as Chief of the Fort

Wayne Police Department, et al., No. 1:19-cv00106 (Sept. 9, 2021) (order granting partial

summary judgment); (Mar. 9, 2023)

(judgment on jury verdict); (June 15, 2023)

(order on all post-trial motions).

United States Court of Appeals (7th Cir.):

Carl Culp and Roberta Culp v. Scott Caudill,

in his official capacity as Chief of the Fort

Wayne Police Department, et al., No. 232397 (June 20, 2025) (panel opinion on

principal appeal).

Whitney Woods and Stevan Schulien v. Carl

Culp and Roberta Culp, No. 23-2398 (June

20, 2025) (panel opinion on cross-appeal).

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Question Presented.......................................................i

Parties to the Proceedings...........................................ii

Related Proceedings...................................................iii

Table of Authorities....................................................vi

Opinions Below............................................................1

Jurisdiction...................................................................1

Statutory Provisions Involved.....................................1

Introduction..................................................................2

Statement of the Case:

A. Factual background......................................4

B. Procedural background................................8

Reasons for Granting the Writ..................................11

I. The Question Presented is important

and recurring...............................................12

A. Across the nation, law enforcement

officers are first responders to

people with disabilities, particularly

mental health crisis situations,

every day...........................................12

B. Sheehan flagged the issue as an

important one demanding future

review...............................................13

II. The Circuits are squarely divided over

whether Title II of the ADA applies to

policing, and whether there is vicarious

liability under the statute more broadly...16

III. The decision below is wrong and cannot

be reconciled with this Court’s cases.......20

IV. This case is a suitable vehicle for

resolving these lingering questions..........24

Conclusion..................................................................27

Appendix.....................................................................1a

v

Table of Contents – continued:

Page

Appendix A Court of Appeals Opinion

(June 20, 2025).....................................2a

Appendix B District Court Order (Sept. 9, 2021)..14a

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Page

A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Sch., Indep. Sch. Dist.

No. 279, 145 S.Ct. 1647 (2025).................25, 26

Ariz. v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995)...............................25

Bahl v. County of Ramsey, 695 F.3d 778

(8th Cir. 2012).................................................18

Bd. of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.

Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)...........................12

Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 480 F.3d 1072

(11th Cir. 2007)...............................................17

Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644 (2020)..........23

City & Cnty. of San Francisco, Cal. v. Sheehan,

575 U.S. 600 (2015).................2, 3, 13-15, 24-26

Culp v. Caudill, 140 F.4th 938 (7th Cir. 2025).....1, 16

Culp v. Reed, 2021 WL 4133703 (N.D. Ind. 2021)......1

Delano-Pyle v. Vict. County, 302 F.3d 567

(5th Cir. 2002).................................................19

Duvall v. City of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124

(9th Cir. 2001).................................................19

Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 1999)...17

Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019).........18

Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2018)........16

Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795

(5th Cir. 2000).................................................17

Jones v. City of Detroit, 143 S.Ct. 84 (2022).............16

Jones v. City of Detroit, 20 F.4th 1117

(6th Cir. 2021)...........................................16, 19

King v. Hendricks County Commissioners,

954 F.3d 981 (7th Cir. 2020)...10, 11, 16, 18, 24

Liese v. Indian River Cty. Hosp. Dist.,

701 F.3d 334 (11th Cir. 2012).........................19

vii

Cases – continued:

Page

Muldrow v. St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024)...20, 21, 23

Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey,

524 U.S. 206 (1998).........................................15

Roell v. Hamilton County, 870 F.3d 471

(6th Cir. 2017).................................................18

Rosen v. Montgomery County, 1221 F.3d 154

(4th Cir. 1997)...........................................18, 19

Seremeth v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 673 F.3d 333

(4th Cir. 2012)...........................................16, 17

Sheehan v. City & County of San Francisco,

743 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2014).........................17

Stanley v. City of Sanford,

145 S.Ct. 2058 (2025)................................20, 27

Tapia v. U.S., 564 U.S. 319 (2011)............................24

Winder v. Gallardo, 2025 WL 1727396 (2025).........26

Winder v. Gallardo, 118 F.4th 638 (5th Cir 2024)...26

Constitution, and Statutes:

U.S. Const. amend. IV...............................................17

28 U.S.C. § 1254...........................................................1

28 U.S.C. § 1291.........................................................10

28 U.S.C. § 1331...........................................................9

28 U.S.C. § 1367...........................................................9

42 U.S.C. § 1983.........................................................19

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) of 1990

ADA........................................i, 2, 3, 9-20, 23-27

Title I...............................................................20

Title II............................10, 11, 13-19, 21, 23-26

Section 202 of the ADA.....................................9

42 U.S.C. § 12131.......................................i, 1, 2

42 U.S.C. § 12132..............................1, 2, 15, 21

viii

Constitution, and Statutes – continued:

Page

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973

Rehabilitation Act.........................................8, 9

Section 504...............................................8, 9, 19

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.............21, 23

Miscellaneous:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56..................................................20, 24

Doris A. Fuller et al., Overlooked in the

Undercounted: The Role of Mental Illness in

Fatal Law Enforcement Encounters, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR. 1 (2015),

https://www.tac.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Overlooked-in-the-Undercounted.pdf (last accessed Aug. 16,

2025).................................................................12

H. Richard Lamb et al., The Police and Mental

Health, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1266 (2002)..12

Jamelia N. Morgan, Policing Under Disability Law,

73 STAN. L. REV. 1401 (2021)..........................13

Jones v. City of Detroit, Pet., p. i,

https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/21/211292/219001/20220321113553372

_Jones%20v%20City%20of%20Detroit%20Petition%20FINAL.pdf (last accessed Aug. 16,

2025).................................................................16

ix

Miscellaneous – continued:

Page

Winder v. Gallardo, Pet., p. i,

https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24975/351556/20250310111544523_

Winder%20v.%20Gallardo%20%20Cert%20Petition%20FILE.pdf (last accessed Aug. 18, 2025)......................................26

1

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App. A, pp.

2a-13a) is reported at 140 F.4th 938. The order of the

district court (App. B, pp. 14a-36a) is not published in

the Federal Supplement but is available at 2021 WL

4133703.

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals entered judgment on June

20, 2025. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

42 U.S.C. § 12132 provides:

“Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no

qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason

of such disability, be excluded from participation in or

be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”

42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) provides:

The term “qualified individual

with a disability” means an individual

with a disability who, with or without

reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation

barriers, or the provision of auxiliary

aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of

services or the participation in programs

or activities provided by a public entity.

2

INTRODUCTION

In City & Cnty. of San Francisco, Cal. v.

Sheehan the Court declined to decide the question of

whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., applies to law enforcement agencies during the arrest or apprehension

of a qualified individual with a disability, and the related question of whether such agencies may be held

vicariously liable for the conduct of their individual officers. 575 U.S. 600, 610 (2015). At that time, and to

this day, those questions continue to split the lower

courts.

This case involves Carl Culp, an overweight,

older man, with no legs who also suffered from mental

health disabilities. Carl was a married family man

who worked a well-paying administrative job while

managing his mental health conditions through medication. One day while visiting his mental healthcare

provider, the provider mistakenly believed Carl was a

suicide threat, and, unbeknownst to Carl, called the

City of Fort Wayne, Indiana Police Department to dispatch officers to detain Carl for an evaluation.

Once on the scene, without announcing the purpose of their interaction, the officers asked to speak

with Carl. When he declined their invitation, the officers grabbed his arm and said, “we don’t want to beat

the ass of a handicap man.” (D.Ct.Doc. 89-3, ¶ 10;

D.Ct.Doc. 89-1, pp. 5-6, 12-13). They then commenced

beating Carl and took him to the hospital.

As a result of the officers’ conduct, Carl suffered

physical injuries, property damage, and the exacerbation of his mental health conditions leading to the loss

of his job, a significant financial loss. He sued Fort

3

Wayne alleging violations of the ADA. The district

court granted summary judgment to Fort Wayne. The

Seventh Circuit affirmed.

In reaching its decision, the Seventh Circuit

acknowledged the open questions regarding the ADA’s

application to policing following Sheehan. However,

the court did not itself weigh in on the law’s application, rather, it merely assumed the law applied and

that vicarious liability was available. Assuming those

standards, the court held that Carl had not raised

facts sufficient to show a violation of the ADA by Fort

Wayne.

Carl contends that the Seventh Circuit is

wrong. When a police officer says, “we don’t want to

beat the ass of a handicap man” and then beats the

man, a reasonable jury could conclude that the beating was discrimination by reason of the handicap or

disability. To the extent that the ADA applies to policer officers’ on-the-street interactions with a qualified individual with a disability, such conduct is the

type of direct and intentional discrimination that is

plainly contemplated by the law’s text. The officers

also failed to reasonably accommodate both Carl’s

physical and mental health disabilities.

Unlike Sheehan or other cases, which have involved violent exigent circumstances, this case has

none of that. Moreover, the parties disagree about the

law’s application. This case is a suitable vehicle to finally decide these important issues for the nation.

* * *

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Factual background

1. Carl is a disabled paraplegic double amputee.

(D.Ct.Doc. 89-3, ¶ 2). His legs were amputated due to

complications from diabetes mellitus. (D.Ct.Doc. 1334, p. 2). He also suffers from hypertension and fulllength osteophytic degeneration of the spine, a condition that makes it difficult for him to ambulate. (Id.).

As a child, Carl was subjected to abuse and neglect at

the hands of his parents, and later, after placement in

a juvenile residence by child protective services, he

was sexually and physically abused. (Id.). By the time

Carl was in early adulthood, he had developed a number of psychiatric symptoms, including generalized

tension, periods of depression and withdrawal, and

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”). (Id. at. Pp.

2-4).

Carl managed his disabilities and built a life including marriage to his wife, Roberta, fathering two

sons, and a successful career with Lincoln Financial

for more than twenty-one (21) years. (Id. at p. 3). Despite his successes, Carl continued to struggle with

disturbing memories of childhood trauma, so he

sought the care of a local psychiatrist who diagnosed

his PTSD and placed him on mood-stabilizing drugs

and an anti-depressant to assist with sleep. (Id.). The

psychiatrist started Carl on a regimen of periodic

med-check evaluations with a nurse practitioner.

(Id.).

2. On August 20, 2018, Carl went to his nurse

practitioner appointment in Fort Wayne, Indiana.

(D.Ct.Doc. 89-3, ¶ 3; D.Ct.Doc. 89-4, ¶ 2). The nurse

practitioner, Sara Glassley, asked Carl questions

5

about his mental health. (D.Ct.Doc. 89-3, ¶ 4). At some

point, Nurse Glassley mistakenly thought Carl was

suicidal and left the exam room. (Id.). Nurse Glassley

called the police to come detain Carl for a mental

health evaluation at the hospital. (D.Ct.Doc. 48-1, ¶¶

3, 18). Carl did not want to continue talking to Nurse

Glassley and left the clinic in his wheelchair.

(D.Ct.Doc. 89-3, ¶ 5). He wanted to go home. (Id.). It

was pouring rain that day when Carl exited the clinic.

(Id. at ¶ 22).

Roberta was waiting for Carl outside the clinic

in the driver’s seat of their car. (Id. at ¶ 6). She drove

Carl to the appointment, and she was going to drive

him home as Carl does not drive. (Id. at ¶ 6; D.Ct.Doc.

89-4, ¶ 3). Roberta noticed a Fort Wayne police officer

approaching the car. (Id.). Roberta got out of the car

and asked the officer what was going on. (Id. at ¶ 4).

The officer told her to get back into the car and she

did. (Id. at ¶ 5).

Carl only uses prosthetic legs for short transitions. (D.Ct.Doc. 89-3, ¶ 2). Still near the rear of the

car, he attached his prosthetic legs and put his wheelchair in the trunk. (Id. at ¶ 7). Carl teetered on his

prosthetic legs along the side of his car to reach the

passenger seat. (Id.). As Carl approached the passenger seat, he saw a Fort Wayne police officer approaching him who he believed was Officer Whitney Woods

and the officer said, “May I speak with you?” (Id. at ¶

8; D.Ct.Doc. 89-1, p. 4). Carl said, “No, thank you.”

(D.Ct.Doc. 89-3, ¶ 9). He proceeded to the passenger

seat where he attempted to sit down. (Id.; D.Ct.Doc.

89-1, p. 5). Carl got his left prosthetic leg in the car

when one of the officers grabbed his arm and said, “we

don’t want to beat the ass of a handicap man.”

6

(D.Ct.Doc. 89-3, ¶ 10; D.Ct.Doc. 89-1, pp. 5-6, 12-13).

The officers never asked Carl his name before taking

him out of the car. (D.Ct.Doc. 89-1, p. 12). The officers

never asked Carl what was going on. (Id.).

Video of the scene supports Carl’s assertion

that Officers Woods and Schulien did not communicate a command with Carl before beating him.

(D.Ct.Doc. 89-5, video excerpt of minutes 20:34-21:07

from Officer Woods’ car camera file name “Schulien

Remarks”). There is a conversation occurring before

other officers that eventually made it to the scene that

went as follows:

Officer Schulien: People get called

when it rains because a couple years ago

we got called to take a lady out just like

this INAUDIBLE It pools up. You can

see that there. I stepped in that shit.

Unknown Officer: So what what he

was a suicide threat is that what it was?

Officer Schulien: That’s what they

called it. We hadn’t had the opportunity

to actually talk to him yet.

Unknown Officer: Right.

Officer Schulien: He was getting ready

to come out and get in the car. He obviously wasn’t going to talk to us or listen

to us.

(D.Ct.Doc. 89-5, video excerpt of minutes 20:34-21:07

from Officer Woods’ car camera file name “Schulien

Remarks”).

7

3. Immediately and barely before Carl was partially seated in the passenger seat, without any warning, Officers Schulien and Woods started pulling

Carl’s hair and clothes. (D.Ct.Doc. 89-3, ¶ 11;

D.Ct.Doc. 89-1, p. 6). The officers commenced with

beating Carl, pulling on him, and hammer fisting him.

(D.Ct.Doc. 89-3, ¶ 12; D.Ct.Doc. 89-1, p. 11). It was Officer Schulien that hammer fisted Carl. (D.Ct.Doc. 897, p. 15). Officer Schulien also ripped a “purse” off of

Carl’s neck with such force as to break the strap.

(D.Ct.Doc. 89-1, p. 7; D.Ct.Doc. 89-7, p. 11). Roberta

witnessed the officers beating Carl. (D.Ct.Doc. 89-4,

¶¶ 4-6). The officers were yelling repeatedly “get out

of the fucking car.” (Doc. No. 89-3, ¶ 12). Carl has trouble transitioning out of the car because of his disability. (Id. at ¶ 13; D.Ct.Doc. 89-4; ¶ 9; D.Ct.Doc. 89-1,

pp. 6-7). The officers then pepper sprayed Carl without warning. (D.Ct.Doc. 89-3, ¶ 14). Roberta was also

hit with the spray. (Id.). Officer Woods tazed Carl. (Id.

at ¶ 15; Doc. No. 89-7, p. 14).

Carl feared for his life. (D.Ct.Doc. 89-3, ¶ 15).

Carl tried to grab onto the steering wheel. (Id.). The

officers beat Carl’s arm off of the steering wheel. (Id.

at ¶ 16). Officer Schulien handcuffed Carl’s left arm

and repeatedly yanked on the handcuff. (Id.;

D.Ct.Doc. 89-7, p. 16). Carl feared falling to the

ground out of the car. (D.Ct.Doc. 89-3, ¶ 17). One of

the reasons Carl did not get out of the car is that

standing up is problematic. (D.Ct.Doc. 89-1, p. 6).

Carl’s trip in his prosthetics from the trunk to the passenger seat had caused him pain. (Id.). After dragging

Carl out of the car, the officers sat on his back and

shoved his face in the mud and water. (Id. at p. 10).

Carl yelled, “I can’t breathe.” (D.Ct.Doc. 89-3, ¶ 22;

D.Ct.Doc. 89-5; D.Ct.Doc. 89-6, p. 7).

8

The officers handcuffed Carl’s hands behind his

back so tightly that he lost feeling in his left hand and

then sat him up on a curb. (D.Ct.Doc. 89-3, ¶ 23). The

officers refused to loosen the cuffs for Carl. (Id.). While

Carl was in handcuffs, both Fort Wayne and Allen

County officers were present. (D.Ct.Doc. 89-2, p. 4).

The officers wouldn’t rinse Carl’s eyes and face clean

of the pepper spray even though he asked, and he complained multiple times for help. (D.Ct.Doc. 89-3, ¶ 24).

At the time when Carl was out of the car and on the

ground, Officer Jarboe of Allen County felt there was

no kind of dangerous situation for himself or any others. (D.Ct.Doc. 89-9, p. 12). And, Officer Jarboe testified that his presence at the scene was enough to keep

Carl from leaving. (Id.).

Carl told the officers his prosthetic legs weren’t

meant to get wet. (D.Ct.Doc. 89-3, ¶ 26). The officers

paid no attention. (Id.). The officers damaged and mishandled Carl’s prosthetic legs. (Id.).

4. Carl was then transported by ambulance to

the hospital for an involuntary mental health detention. (D.Ct.Doc. 48-1, ¶ 48).

B.

Procedural background

1. Carl and Roberta filed their Complaint and

Jury Demand in the district court, against the Fort

Wayne Police Chief and various officers (collectively

“the City Defendants”), and the Allen County Sheriff

and various officers (collectively “the County Defendants”), seeking damages for injuries arising from their

encounter with the police. (D.Ct.Doc. 1., pp. 1-21). The

Complaint advanced the following claims for: 1) use of

excessive force; 2) violation of Section 504 of the Reha-

9

bilitation Act and Section 202 of the ADA for discrimination on the basis of disability and for failure to reasonably accommodate; and 3) supplemental Indiana

law claims. (Id. at pp. 12-20). The district court had

original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, over all

federal questions, and under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), over

all supplemental state law claims. (App.Ct.Doc. 15, p.

1).

Both the City Defendants and the County Defendants filed motions for summary judgment against

the Culps. (D.Ct.Doc. 46, 48). In response to the motions, Carl, in part, designated expert testimony of a

board certified psychiatrist/neurologist providing that

the police officers’ conduct severely exacerbated Carl’s

PTSD causing him to lose his job with Lincoln Financial. (D.Ct.Doc. 133-4, pp. 2-6). Additionally, Carl designated expert testimony of a Ph.D. board certified vocational expert providing that due to the loss of his job

Carl would lose approximately $428,898 to $571,864

over his remaining work life (six (6) to eight (8) years

until he reached age sixty-five (65)). (D.Ct.Doc. 133-1,

pp. 2-8).

The district court: 1) granted the County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety; 2) granted the City Defendants summary judgment on all claims under the Rehabilitation Act and

the ADA; 3) granted summary judgment to some of the

City Officers on all claims of excessive force/failure to

intervene; 4) granted the City Defendants summary

judgment on Roberta’s excessive force claims; 5) denied summary judgment as to City Officers Woods and

Schulien on Carl’s excessive force claims; and 6) denied summary judgment as to City Officers Woods and

10

Schulien on both Carl’s and Roberta’s Indiana law

claims. (D.Ct.Doc. 102).

2. The case was tried to a jury over the course

of four (4) days, with the jury reaching a verdict in favor of City Officers Woods and Schulien as to all of

Carl’s claims, a verdict in favor of City Officer

Schulien as to all of Roberta’s claims, a verdict in favor

of City Officer Woods as to Roberta’s assault claim,

and a verdict in favor of Roberta as to her battery

claim against City Officer Woods, for being pepper

sprayed, awarding Roberta $1.00 in damages.

(D.Ct.Doc. 193-200).

3. Thereafter, Carl appealed the district court’s

grant of summary judgment on his Rehabilitation Act

and ADA claims to the Seventh Circuit. (D.Ct.Doc.

231; App.Ct.Doc. 15). The Seventh Circuit had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 for review of a final decision. (App.Ct.Doc. 15, pp. 1-2).

The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the

question of whether Title II applies to law enforcement investigations and arrest, and if so to what extent, is an open question in the Supreme Court and in

the circuit, and is one that has divided its sister circuits. (App. A., p. 8a). The court noted that it had previously considered the question in King v. Hendricks

County Commissioners, 954 F.3d 981 (7th Cir. 2020)

(with Barrett, J. a member of the panel). (App. A., p.

8a).

In King, the court assumed, without deciding,

that “Title II applies to officers’ interactions, that the

governmental unit can be held vicariously liable for

the actions of individual officers, and that deliberate

indifference is the appropriate standard by which to

11

analyze the institutional defendants’ conduct.” (Id. at

p. 9a). Also in King, the court had determined that in

order to prevail on a Title II claim that the plaintiff

must show that but for the disability that he would

have been able to access the services or benefits desired. (Id.).

Here, as it did in King, the court assumed Title

II’s application without deciding the question. (Id.).

The court held that, even if the ADA applies to the police officers’ conduct, Carl could not survive summary

judgment on his claims for lack of evidence demonstrating a violation. (Id.). In reaching its decision, the

Seventh Circuit only analyzed Carl’s reasonable accommodations claim with respect to his physical disabilities foregoing any analysis of such claims with respect to his mental health disabilities; moreover, the

court did not provide any analysis of Carl’s claim for

direct discrimination. (Id. at pp. 6a-11a).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

More than a decade ago, the Court recognized

that the issue of whether Title II of the ADA applies

to a law enforcement agency during the circumstance

of the arrest or apprehension of a qualified individual

with a disability and, if so, what standards govern the

law’s application, was an important undecided question that had divided the lower courts. This petition is

a suitable vehicle for finally resolving this clear split

on a recurring issue of critical importance whose time

has come.

12

I.

The Question Presented is important and

recurring.

A.

Across the nation, law enforcement

officers are first responders to people with disabilities, particularly

mental health crisis situations,

every day.

Police officers have a legal obligation to respond

to calls and to provide services 24 hours a day, seven

days a week. “The police are typically the first and often the sole community resource called on to respond

to urgent situations involving persons with mental illness.”1 Though fewer than four in every one hundred

adults in the United States have a severe mental illness, these individuals make approximately one in

every ten calls for police assistance.2

The legal obligation the ADA places on public

agencies has helped speed the creation and use of police practices that are saving lives and preventing the

injury of people with disabilities. Cf., Bd. of Trustees

of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,

375 (2001) (Kennedy, J. concurring) (“One of the undoubted achievements of statutes designed to assist

those with impairments is that citizens have an incentive, flowing from a legal duty, to develop a better understanding, a more decent perspective, for accepting

persons with impairments or disabilities into the

1 H. Richard Lamb et al., The Police and Mental Health, 53 PSY-

CHIATRIC SERVS. 1266, 1266 (2002).

2 Doris A. Fuller et al., Overlooked in the Undercounted: The Role

of Mental Illness in Fatal Law Enforcement Encounters, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR. 1 (2015), https://www.tac.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Overlooked-in-the-Undercounted.pdf (last

accessed Aug. 16, 2025).

13

larger society.”). With this in mind, legal scholars

have recognized that, “[e]xamining the policing of disabled people and the limits of Title II liability in the

policing context is timely and important.”3 Beyond

just legal scholarship, this Court highlighted the importance of this undecided issue a decade ago.

B.

Sheehan flagged the issue as an important one demanding future review.

1. The case of City & Cnty. of San Francisco,

Cal. v. Sheehan involved Teresa Sheehan, a woman

with schizoaffective disorder who lived in a group

home in San Francisco for people dealing with mental

illness. 575 U.S. 600, 603 (2015). A social worker at

the facility was concerned Ms. Sheehan was in a mental health crisis and called the San Francisco police for

assistance to detain her for temporary evaluation and

treatment. Id. The police officers’ interaction with Ms.

Sheehan soon escalated with Ms. Sheehan drawing a

5-inch kitchen knife and the officers ultimately pepper

spraying and shooting her multiple times. Id. at 60306.

2. Ms. Sheehan sued San Francisco alleging violations of the ADA for subduing her in a manner that

did not reasonably accommodate her disability. Id. at

606. The district court granted summary judgment to

San Francisco holding that officers making an arrest

are not required “to first determine whether their actions would comply with the ADA before protecting

themselves and others.” Id. Then, the Ninth Circuit

reversed, holding that because the ADA covers “public

3 Jamelia N. Morgan, Policing Under Disability Law, 73 STAN. L.

REV. 1401, 1410 (2021).

14

services, programs, or activities,” the ADA’s accommodation requirement should be read “to encompass anything a public entity does”. Id. at 607. The Ninth Circuit noted “that exigent circumstances inform the reasonableness analysis under the ADA,” but concluded

that it was for a jury to decide whether San Francisco

should have accommodated Sheehan in some manner.

Id.

3. This Court granted San Francisco’s petition

for certiorari with one of the questions presented being whether Title II of the ADA “requires law enforcement officers to provide accommodations to an armed,

violent, and mentally ill suspect in the course of bringing the suspect into custody.” 575 U.S. 600, 608 (2015).

In its petition, San Francisco argued, as it had before

the Ninth Circuit, that “Title II does not apply to an

officer’s on-the-street response to reported disturbances or other similar incidents, whether or not those

calls involve subjects with mental disabilities, prior to

the officer’s securing the scene and ensuring that

there is no threat to human life.” Id. at 608. However,

once certiorari was granted, in its merits briefing, San

Francisco pivoted, effectively conceding that the ADA

applies to on-the-street police encounters but asserting that Sheehan didn’t qualify for the ADA’s protections because she posed a direct threat to the officers.

Id. at 608-609. San Francisco never made those arguments in its briefing before the Ninth Circuit. Id. at

609.

This Court declined to decide the question due

to San Francisco’s pivot, while noting that deciding Title II of the ADA’s application:

15

to arrests is an important question that

would benefit from briefing and an adversary presentation. But San Francisco,

the United States as amicus curiae, and

Sheehan all argue (or at least accept)

that § 12132 applies to arrests. No one

argues the contrary view. As a result, we

do not think it would be prudent to decide the question in this case.

Our decision not to decide whether

the ADA applies to arrests is reinforced

by the parties’ failure to address a related question: whether a public entity

can be liable for damages under Title II

for an arrest made by its police officers.

Only public entities are subject to Title

II, see, e.g., Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 208 (1998),

and the parties agree that such an entity

can be held vicariously liable for money

damages for the purposeful or deliberately indifferent conduct of its employees. But we have never decided whether

that is correct, and we decline to do so

here, in the absence of adversarial briefing.

Sheehan, 575 U.S. at 610 (cleaned up). Thus, the

Court dismissed the ADA question as improvidently

granted. Id.

4. More than a decade ago, in Sheehan, the

Court highlighted the Question Presented, and the

corresponding question of whether there is vicarious

liability under Title II as important undecided issues.

16

Today, those questions are no less important, but they

remain undecided. The questions continue to be recurring in courts at all levels. See e.g., Culp v. Caudill,

140 F.4th 938 (7th Cir. 2025) (the decision in this case,

which follows the earlier decision also raising the

question of the ADA’s application to policing in King,

954 F.3d 981; and Jones v. City of Detroit, 20 F.4th

1117, 1118 (6th Cir. 2021), cert. denied by, 143 S.Ct.

84 (2022) (presenting the question of “[w]hether a public entity can be vicariously liable under a theory of

respondeat superior for its employees’ violation of Title

II of the [ADA]” in Petition for Writ of Certiorari).4

II.

The Circuits are squarely divided over

whether Title II of the ADA applies to policing, and whether there is vicarious liability under the statute more broadly.

The questions of whether Title II of the ADA

applies to police apprehensions, and, if so, whether police agencies may be held vicariously liable for the conduct of individual officers, have split the circuit courts.

Moreover, the vicarious liability question extends beyond policing to all contexts.

1. Five courts (the Third, Fourth, Ninth, Tenth,

and Eleventh Circuits) have found Title II to apply to

policing. See, Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 180 (3d

Cir. 2018) (“[P]olice officers may violate the ADA

when making an arrest by failing to provide reasonable accommodations for a qualified arrestee’s disability, thus subjecting him to discrimination.”); Seremeth

Jones Pet., p. i, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/21/211292/219001/20220321113553372_Jones%20v%20C

ity%20of%20Detroit%20Petition%20FINAL.pdf (last accessed

Aug. 16, 2025).

4

17

v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 673 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir.

2012) (holding that Title II applies to police interrogations); Sheehan v. City & County of San Francisco, 743

F.3d 1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he ADA . . . applies to arrests, though we agree with the Eleventh

and Fourth Circuits that exigent circumstances inform the reasonableness analysis under the ADA, just

as they inform the distinct reasonableness analysis

under the Fourth Amendment.”), cert. dismissed in

part, rev’d in part, 575 U.S. 600 (2015); Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1221 (10th Cir. 1999) (“This

court need not decide whether this case is better analyzed under a wrongful-arrest or reasonable-accommodation-during-arrest theory. . . . [T]he first does not

apply to the facts of this case, and Gohier has expressly declined to invoke the second. Accordingly,

this court merely clarifies that a broad rule categorically excluding arrests from the scope of Title II . . . is

not the law.”); Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 480 F.3d

1072, 1085 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The exigent circumstances presented by criminal activity and the already

onerous tasks of police on the scene go more to the reasonableness of the requested ADA modification than

whether the ADA applies in the first instance.”).

One court (the Fifth Circuit) has found Title II

not to apply to policing at the point of initial arrest or

apprehension. See, Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795,

801 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Title II does not apply to an officer’s on-the-street responses to reported disturbances or other similar incidents, whether or not those

calls involve subjects with mental disabilities, prior to

the officer’s securing the scene and ensuring that

there is no threat to human life.”).

18

Last, four courts (the First, Sixth, Seventh, and

Eighth Circuits) have not decided whether Title II applies to policing. See, Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1,

17 (1st Cir. 2019) (“For present purposes, it is sufficient for us to assume, favorably to Gray, that Title II

of the ADA applies to ad hoc police encounters (such

as the encounter here) and that exigent circumstances

may shed light on the reasonableness of an officer’s

actions.”); Roell v. Hamilton County, 870 F.3d 471, 489

(6th Cir. 2017) (declining to decide whether Title II

applies in the context of arrests); King, 954 F.3d 981,

989 (7th Cir. 2020) (assuming without deciding that

Title II applies to the officers’ interactions); Bahl v.

County of Ramsey, 695 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 2012)

(explaining that “[e]ven if the ADA applied to [a] traffic stop,” there was no duty to accommodate given “the

exigencies of the traffic stop”).

2. With respect to vicarious liability, similar to

their stances regarding the application of Title II to

policing, in the same cases, the First and Seventh Circuits assumed that vicarious liability applies without

deciding the issue. See, Gray, 917 F.3d at 17 (1st Cir.

2019); King, 954 F.3d at 989 (7th Cir. 2020).

Three courts (the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits) have decided that government agencies do have

respondeat superior liability for their individual staff

members’ conduct that violates Title II. See, Rosen v.

Montgomery County, 1221 F.3d 154, 157 fn. 3 (4th Cir.

1997) (“[W]e reject the County’s first argument that

there is no respondeat superior liability under the

ADA and that the County can only be held for a policy

of discrimination. Under the ADA and similar statutes, liability may be imposed on a principal for the

19

statutory violations of its agent.”) (emphasis in original); Delano-Pyle v. Vict. County, 302 F.3d 567, 575

(5th Cir. 2002) (“A plain reading of the ADA evidences

that Congress intended to impose an affirmative duty

on public entities to create policies or procedures to

prevent discrimination based on disability. Thus, although it is true that for claims asserted under § 1983,

an official policy must be identified, the same rule cannot be reconciled with Congress’s legislative objectives

in enacting the ADA”.) (cleaned up); Duvall v. City of

Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e apply the doctrine of respondeat superior to claims

brought directly under [Title II], in part because the

historical justification for exempting municipalities

from respondeat superior liability does not apply to the

[statute], and in part because the doctrine ‘would be

entirely consistent with the policy of that statute,

which is to eliminate discrimination against the handicapped.’”).

Two courts (the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits)

have held that vicarious liability does not apply to Title II or to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See,

Jones v. City of Detroit, 20 F.4th 1117, 1118 (6th Cir.

2021) (Holding that city police department was not liable for its officer’s alleged failure to provide a reasonable accommodation when transporting disabled individual following arrest “[b]ecause vicarious liability is

not available for claims under Title II”.); Liese v. Indian River Cty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 350 (11th

Cir. 2012) (finding no vicarious liability under the Rehabilitation Act, and that only an official of the government organization “who enjoys substantial supervisory authority” at a “key decision point” in the process could be held liable).

20

This Court’s intervention is necessary to resolve this split in authority.

III.

The decision below is wrong and cannot

be reconciled with this Court’s cases.

Certiorari is also warranted because the Seventh Circuit panel’s decision below is wrong on the

merits and at odds with this Court’s cases. The panel

failed to follow the plain text of the ADA and this

Court’s guidance for interpretation of the statute and

guidance for what conduct may constitute actionable

discrimination. Additionally, the panel granting summary judgment on the application of “assume[d]” law

directly contradicts the requirements of Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a).

1. On June 20, 2025, the same day the panel issued its decision below, this Court issued its decision

in Stanley v. City of Sanford, 145 S.Ct. 2058 (2025).

Stanley addressed the question of whether a retired

employee is a “qualified individual” under Title I of

the ADA. Id. at 2062-63. In holding that a retired employee is not a “qualified individual”, the Court conducted an analysis of the statute’s text. Id. at 2063-68.

Broadly, the Court reminded courts that an application of “pure textualism” and the Court’s precedents is

a proper way to interpret the ADA. Id. at 2067, 206368. Justice Gorsuch, writing for the Court, further

called back to another recent civil rights precedent,

noting that “‘[d]iscriminate against’ just means treat

worse”. Id. at 2070 (citing, Muldrow v. St. Louis, 601

U.S. 346, 355 (2024)).

Muldrow, a case from the prior term, involved

a claim by a female police officer who asserted sex discrimination against the city for transferring her to a

21

different shift, allegedly in violation of Title VII. 601

U.S. at 350. The lower courts rejected Muldrow’s claim

on the ground that the transfer did not cause her a

“significant” employment disadvantage. Id. In reversing the lower court, this Court, again, simply noted

that to discriminate against just means to treat worse,

“here based on sex” and “neither that phrase nor any

other says anything about how much worse.” Id. at

355. The Court provided that nothing in the statute

distinguishes between “significant” and “not-so-significant” discrimination, with only the former being actionable. Id. To the contrary, the lower court’s decision

imposed a new requirement that was more than is required by “the law as written.” Id.

2. Here, the Seventh Circuit’s decision departs

from the text of Title II. Carl argued below that he advanced a claim for “direct and intentional discrimination” against the Fort Wayne police for violation of 42

U.S.C. § 12132, which prohibits a “qualified individual

with a disability” from being “subjected to discrimination by” a “public entity” “by reason of such disability”.

(App.Ct.Doc. 15, pp. 35-40). Carl based that claim

upon the officers stating, at least twice, “we don’t want

to beat the ass of a handicap man.” (App.Ct.Doc. 15, p.

36). Regarding the statement, Carl argued:

That shows the officers knew of his disability. Moreover, it shows the officers’

mockery and direct discrimination of

Carl. “Handicap” with that connotation

can be seen as a derogatory comment.

Taking the words “we don’t want to beat

the ass of a handicap man” applying

them to a factually similar situation

22

shows how a reasonable juror could interpret the situation. Imagine instead

two white officers walk up to a person of

color and say, “we don’t want to beat the

ass of [insert racial epithet]” and then

proceed to beat the person. A reasonable

juror could conclude that the officer took

note of the person’s distinguishing characteristic and commenced beating that

person because of the color of their skin

or race. The same conclusion can be

made in Carl’s situation. The officers

noted his disability and then intentionally acted upon it.

...

Moreover, it would appear to establish a

but for causal chain between his disability and the use of force against him. The

officers beat the ass of a handicapped

man, after making statements that they

would.

(App.Ct.Doc. 15, pp. 36-37, 39).

The Seventh Circuit diminished Carl’s argument, providing:

There is no evidence that the actions of

the police were even related to Carl’s disability, nor is there evidence that but for

the disability the actions by the officers

would have been different. The only connection that the Culps identified was the

statement by the officer for Carl to comply and that they did not want to beat a

23

handicapped man. That at best establishes their awareness of his disability.

(App. A, p. 10a). The Seventh Circuit’s position invades the province of the jury and improperly weighs

Carl’s evidence presented on summary judgment. This

departs from the text of the statute, which merely requires a showing of “discrimination” “by reason of”

“disability” to state an actionable claim. Again, discrimination just means to “treat worse” regardless of

degree. Further, this Court has noted that “[o]ften,

events have multiple but-for causes.” Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644, 656 (2020). Like the lower

courts in Muldrow, the Seventh Circuit has layered on

additional requirements for a Title II discrimination

claim that are not supported by the text.5 The officers’

statement is evidence of discrimination, which a jury

could find to be a but for cause of Carl’s beating or itself actionable harm.6 By discounting Carl’s proffered

evidence of discrimination, the Seventh Circuit allowed itself to avoid deciding the Question Presented,

asserting that “because the issue as to the applicabil-

5 While the Seventh Circuit counts itself in the camp of undecided

circuits who assume that the ADA could apply to policing, its decisions functionally place it in the camp of circuits holding that

the ADA does not apply. If the facts that Carl alleges do not support a claim for direct and intentional discrimination by reason

of disability, it is hard to envision any set of actionable facts.

6 Compare, Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 364-65 (Kavanaugh, J. concurring) (“Suppose that an employer says to an employee in the Columbus office: ‘We are transferring you to the Cincinnati office

because you are black. But your compensation will not change.’

Does that violate Title VII? Of course it does. . . The discrimination is harm.”).

24

ity to law enforcement actions ultimately does not impact the outcome.” (App. A., p. 8a). That is not so. For

this reason, the Seventh Circuit’s decision is wrong.

3. Additionally, Carl contends that the Seventh

Circuit’s decision is wrong because it violates the plain

terms of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The rule sets forth the

well-known standard that, “[t]he court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

(emphasis added). The court granted Fort Wayne

summary judgment through application of “assume[d]” law and that is not the standard. One needs

to know the actual legal standard to assess what facts

are material and whether the entry of summary judgment is appropriate.

IV.

This case is a suitable vehicle for resolving

these lingering questions.

This Court has noted that, “when we interpret

a statute, we cannot allow the perfect to be the enemy

of the merely excellent.” Tapia v. U.S., 564 U.S. 319,

328 (2011). The same could be said when considering

whether a certworthy case is a suitable vehicle for review. By no means is this case a perfect vehicle but it

is close to excellent.

1. The Question Presented was cleanly presented and is outcome determinative. Unlike in

Sheehan, here, adversarial positions have been taken

by the parties. Yes, in part, Fort Wayne briefed under

the Seventh Circuit’s “assume[d]” standards for the

application of Title II to policing previously set forth

in King, however, Fort Wayne never accepted that

25

version of the law. The Fort Wayne Police Chief’s answer to contention interrogatories asking what supports his affirmative defense that Carl had failed to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted was answered, in part, by his position that, “[t]he ADA . . .

do[es] not apply to law enforcement investigations and

arrests.” (App.Ct.Doc. 24, pp. 25-26). Additionally,

Fort Wayne argued below against vicarious liability

under Title II, contending that “[i]n order to succeed

on the ADA claim, the plaintiff must prove that an official who had authority to address the alleged discrimination and had authority to institute corrective

measures had actual knowledge of the discrimination

and failed to adequately respond.” (App.Ct.Doc. 20,

pp. 25-26).

2. The time is now. The Question Presented no

longer represents a frontier legal issue. See e.g., Ariz.

v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 fn. 1 (1995) (“We have in many

instances recognized that when frontier legal problems are presented, periods of ‘percolation’ in, and diverse opinions from, state and federal appellate courts

may yield a better informed and more enduring final

pronouncement by this Court.”). The circuit courts

have been weighing in on the Question Presented

since 1999. It has been a decade since this Court put

a spotlight on the issue in Sheehan. One need look no

further than the decision below in this case to understand that the Court’s failure to definitively decide

this issue continues to keep cases from being decided

on any real legal standard.

Beyond just the policing context, Justices

Thomas and Kavanaugh recently noted the need to

address the standards for proper application of Title

II in a future case, providing that “[w]hether federal

26

courts are applying the correct legal standard under”

the ADA, a “widely utilized federal statute[ ] is an issue of national importance”. A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Sch.,

Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 279, 145 S.Ct. 1647, 1661 (2025)

(Thomas, J. concurring).

3. In Carl’s view, the only thing keeping this

case from perfect vehicle status is the Seventh Circuit

deciding it on “assume[d]” law. For all the reasons discussed above, the case remains an excellent vehicle

worthy of the Court’s grant of certiorari. If the Court

does not grant review in this case, it risks being unable to address the Question Presented for lack of another good vehicle, and could find itself waiting yet another decade. The next case, too, is unlikely to be perfect. The facts of this case make it better than most

that one could conceive of to truly address the nub of

the legal questions. Unlike in Sheehan or in the recently denied Winder7 case, there are no exigent circumstances clouding the analysis. Carl was undisputedly unarmed and only passively resisted the officers.

Additionally, Carl has both qualifying mental health

and physical disabilities. Again, it is an excellent vehicle and perfect should not be the enemy of the excellent.

7 Winder v. Gallardo, 118 F.4th 638 (5th Cir 2024), cert. denied

by, 2025 WL 1727396 (June 23, 2025) (presenting the question of

whether “Title II of the ADA applies when law-enforcement officers face exigent circumstances during their encounters with individuals with disabilities.”). Winder Pet., p. i, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24975/351556/20250310111544523_Winder%20v.%20

Gallardo%20-%20Cert%20Petition%20FILE.pdf (last accessed

Aug. 18, 2025).

27

However, to the extent the Court has any reservations, Carl urges the Court not to deny the petition. Alternatively, the Court should grant the petition, vacate the Seventh Circuit’s decision, and remand the case with direction to rehear the case, on

“actual” not “assume[d]” law, in light of the Court’s

contemporaneously issued opinion in Stanley, admonishing courts to interpret the ADA through the application of “pure textualism”. Granting, vacating, and

remanding would allow for a resolution of the case for

Carl, his more than 25 million fellow citizens of the

circuit, and the hundreds of law enforcement agencies

therein. Also, it would potentially set this case up for

a return trip, as a then-perfect vehicle, for this Court’s

review in the not too distant future.

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant this petition for a writ

of certiorari and decide the case on the merits. Alternatively, the Court should grant this petition, vacate

the Seventh Circuit’s decision, and remand for further

consideration in light of Stanley.

Respectfully submitted,

Sean M. Surrisi

Counsel of Record

WYLAND, HUMPHREY, CLEVENGER

& SURRISI, LLP

319 W. Jefferson Street

Plymouth, IN 46563

(574) 936-2169

sean@whwclaw.com