Opposition Brief — Benjamin Adams, Petitioner v. Lloyd Arnold, Commissioner, Indiana Department of Correction, et al.

No. 25-31

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

____________________

BENJAMIN ADAMS,

Petitioner,

v.

LLOYD ARNOLD, et al.,

Respondents.

____________________________________

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit

____________________________________

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

____________________________________

Office of the

THEODORE E. ROKITA

Attorney General

Attorney General

IGC South, Fifth Floor

JAMES A. BARTA

302 W. Washington St.

Solicitor General

Indianapolis, IN 46204

Counsel of Record

(317) 232-0709

JENNA M. LORENCE

James.Barta@atg.in.gov Deputy Solicitor

General

Counsel for Respondents

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause requires prison officials to provide

a prisoner with more than notice and an opportunity to present his views before placing him in

restrictive housing.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ......................................... i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... iii

INTRODUCTION .......................................................1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................2

I. Restrictive Housing in Indiana Prisons ..........2

II. Adams’s Disciplinary History and

Administrative Placement in

Restrictive Housing ..........................................4

III. Proceedings Below ...........................................8

ARGUMENT .............................................................10

I. The Decision Below Accords with This

Court’s Decisions in Hewitt

and Wilkinson ................................................10

II. Any Conflict Is Underdeveloped and Stale ...17

III. This Case Does Not Warrant Review ...........20

CONCLUSION ..........................................................24

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Adams v. Sup’t,

No. 2:17-cv-00546-JMS-MD, 2018 WL

4077022 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 27, 2018) ..................... 5

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

563 U.S. 731 (2011)........................................... 22

Bell v. Wolfish,

441 U.S. 520 (1979)........................................... 19

Bills v. Henderson,

631 F.2d 1287 (6th Cir. 1980)........................... 19

Finley v. Huss,

102 F.4th 789 (6th Cir. 2024) ........................... 19

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal &

Corr. Complex,

442 U.S. 1 (1979)............................................... 20

Hewitt v. Helms,

459 U.S. 460 (1983)..............................1, 2, 10, 11

12, 13, 14

15, 17, 20

Jackson v. Anastasio,

--- F.4th ---, 2025 WL 2437947 (7th Cir.

Aug. 25, 2025) ................................................... 13

Jacoby v. Baldwin Cnty.,

835 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2016)......................... 19

Kalwasinski v. Morse,

201 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 1999) .............................. 17

iv

CASES [CONT’D]

Mathews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319 (1976)..................................... 12, 15

McCann v. Coughlin,

698 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1983) .............................. 17

Prieto v. Clarke,

780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015)............................. 23

Rapier v. Harris,

172 F.3d 999 (7th Cir. 1999)............................. 19

Sandin v. Conner,

515 U.S. 472 (1995)..........................14, 15, 16, 17

18, 21, 23, 24

Scott v. Albury,

156 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1998) .............................. 17

Spann v. Lombardi,

65 F.4th 987 (8th Cir. 2023) ................. 19, 20, 22

Stevenson v. Carroll,

495 F.3d 62 (3d Cir. 2007) ................................ 18

Stevenson v. Carroll,

No. 04-139-GMS, 2011 WL 6842955

(D. Del. Dec. 29, 2011) ...................................... 18

Wagner v. Hanks,

128 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1997)........................... 14

Walker v. Sumner,

14 F.3d 1415 (9th Cir. 1994)............................. 18

Westefer v. Neal,

682 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2012)................... 9, 12, 13

v

CASES [CONT’D]

Wilkinson v. Austin,

545 U.S. 209 (2005)........................1, 2, 10, 11, 12

13, 15, 16

17, 18, 20

Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539 (1974)............................. 1, 10, 11, 13

15, 17, 19

STATUTES

Ind. Code § 11-11-5-3 ......................................... 4, 15

Ind. Code § 11-11-5-4 ............................................... 4

Ind. Code § 35-50-6-5 ............................................... 4

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Ind. Dep’t of Corr., Administrative

Restrictive Status Housing, No. 02-01111 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021),

https://www.in.gov/idoc/files/policy-andprocedure/policies/02-01-111-ARSH-101-2021.pdf...................................................... 2, 14

Ind. Dep’t of Corr., Disciplinary Restrictive

Status Housing, No. 02-04-102 (eff. Feb.

1, 2023),

https://www.in.gov/idoc/files/policy-andprocedure/policies/02-04-102-DRSH-2-12023.pdf ........................................................... 3, 4

1

INTRODUCTION

When a prison places inmates in administrative

segregation, it need only provide informal, non-adversarial process. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209,

229 (2005); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 475 (1983).

Only if an inmate loses good credit time or his eligibility for parole does the Due Process Clause require

the more trial-like procedures laid out in Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). Never has this Court

held that Wolff’s procedures govern decisions about

segregating inmates from the general population.

This Court’s decisions resolve this case.

Benjamin Adams was administratively placed in

restrictive housing for two years because he had “poor

adjustment” and “recent negative adjustment,” represented a “threat to facility security,” and had committed eight different conduct violations in one year. Pet.

App. 4a–5a. Adams does not dispute that he received

sufficient process in connection with the prison’s decision to segregate him administratively. Yet he still

challenges the administrative segregation, arguing

that he should have received Wolff’s procedures in

connection with one of the underlying conduct violations punishable by disciplinary segregation.

The case does not warrant certiorari. Under this

Court’s decisions in Hewitt and Wilkinson, Adams received all the process due before being segregated in

restrictive housing. That conclusion does not change

depending on the label attached to the segregation.

Any disagreement among the circuits on whether different process is due for prisoners facing disciplinary

or administrative segregation is out-of-date or undeveloped at best.

2

Regardless, this case is a poor vehicle to address

any lingering questions about disciplinary segregation. Adams was not subject to disciplinary segregation—rather, he was administratively placed in department-wide restrictive housing. And the fact that

he faced the possibility of disciplinary segregation for

a conduct violation did not affect the prison’s decision

to segregate him administratively. What mattered

was the existence of multiple conduct violations.

Lastly, the sparse record in this case could make it

difficult to assess issues that Adams argues should

impact the process due.

The petition should be denied.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. Restrictive Housing in Indiana Prisons

To preserve prison order, discipline, and security,

prisons sometimes place inmates in more secure

units. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 473 (1983).

The policies governing these restrictive placements

and conditions inmates face in more restrictive placements vary from State to State and facility to facility.

Compare Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 462–65, with Wilkinson

v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 213–17 (2005); see also Pet.

App. 5a–6a.

In Indiana, prison administrators can place an inmate in restrictive housing for both administrative

and disciplinary reasons. In determining whether to

segregate an inmate administratively, the Indiana

Department of Correction considers “threat to self,

others, property, [] security[,] and/or orderly operation of the facility.” Ind. Dep’t of Corr., Administrative

Restrictive Status Housing, No. 02-01-111, § V.A (eff.

Oct. 1, 2021), https://www.in.gov/idoc/files/policy-and-

3

procedure/policies/02-01-111-ARSH-10-1-2021.pdf

(ARSH). Reasons to place an inmate in restrictive

housing include a history of “assaultive behavior,”

gang affiliations, or pending charges. Id. §§ V.A, V.B.

An inmate may be placed in restrictive housing at facility level or on a Department-wide basis. Id. Any

classification must be periodically reviewed. Id.

§§ VII.A, VII.B. Indiana also authorizes prison administrators to place offenders in restrictive housing

for a fixed period of time as a disciplinary measure for

violating a prison rule. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., Disciplinary Restrictive Status Housing, No. 02-04-102, § IV

(eff. Feb. 1, 2023), https://www.in.gov/idoc/files/policyand-procedure/policies/02-04-102-DRSH-2-1-2023.pdf

(DRSH).

Under the Department’s policies, some differences

exist between disciplinary and administrative segregation. For example, inmates in disciplinary segregation have greater limits on the clothing and personal

items they may retain, compare Ind. Dep’t of Corr.,

DRSH, § VIII.B, C, with Ind. Dep’t of Corr., ARSH,

§ IX.C, D. Those in disciplinary segregation may access a more limited commissary than those in administrative segregation. Compare Ind. Dep’t of Corr.,

DRSH, § VIII.O, with Ind. Dep’t of Corr., ARSH,

§ IX.M. But inmates in both types of segregation still

receive many of the same privileges. For example,

“[i]ncarcerated individual[s] held on disciplinary restrictive status housing . . . [to be] provided the same

program services and privileges as inmates in administrative restrictive status housing.” Ind. Dep’t of

Corr., DRSH, § VIII.Q. Both groups are “given the

same opportunity to make telephone calls.” Id.

§ VIII.J. Both “receive the same meal provided the

4

general population.” Id. § VIII.G. They are “provided

the same program services and privileges,” including

“educational services, commissary services, independent studies, library services, self-help, social services,

behavioral health services, religious guidance, and

recreational programs.” Id. § VIII.Q. And in either instance, prisoners may be segregated for up to 23 hours

per day. Ind. Code § 11-11-5-4. 1

Under these policies, when an inmate is placed in

restrictive housing for disciplinary reasons, there is

no automatic change to his earned good time credits

or transfer to another credit class. Rather, after a disciplinary hearing, the prison may impose sanctions

that could include disciplinary segregation or “extra

work,” “restitution,” or “deprivation” of “good time

credit under IC 35-50-6-5.” Ind. Code § 11-11-5-3.

II. Adams’s Disciplinary History and Administrative Placement in Restrictive Housing

In 2004, an Indiana trial court sentenced Benjamin Adams to 30 years’ imprisonment for attempted

1 Adams claimed that “[o]n disciplinary [segregation] offenders

are not allowed commissary items and some basic hygiene

items,” and that the food and drink portions are smaller “compared to general population.” D. Ct. Dkt. 189 ¶ 53. The district

court accepted these descriptions as true, Pet. App. 41a, as did

the Court of Appeals, Pet. App. 9a–10a. However, the policy in

place at the time Adams was placed in restrictive housing mirrored current Department policy, which allows “limited access to

the restrictive status housing gender neutral commissary list to

order personal hygiene items,” Ind. Dep’t of Corr., DRSH,

§ VIII.O, and requires that all incarcerated persons “receive the

same meal provided the general population,” id. § VIII.G.

5

murder and another four years’ imprisonment for involuntary manslaughter. Pet. App. 2a. During Adams’s incarceration, prison officials administratively

assigned him to restrictive housing for 730 days due

to “multiple violations” of prison rules. Id. at 4a–5a,

9a. This petition arises from Adams’s claim that he

received insufficient process in proceedings concerning one of the multiple violations supporting his administrative placement in restrictive housing.

In February 2017, an inmate in Adams’s prison assaulted another inmate and fractured the victim’s

arm. Pet. App. 3a; Adams v. Sup’t, No. 2:17-cv-00546JMS-MD, 2018 WL 4077022, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 27,

2018). A prison investigator determined the assault

was linked to gang activity. Pet. App. 3a; see Adams,

2018 WL 4077022, at *1 (“the injured offender” was

“victimized . . . and extorted over the course of several

months”). He concluded that Adams, a member of a

gang known to coordinate with the attacker’s gang,

had “ordered the assault because the victim had

stopped paying protection money.” Pet. App. 3a.

The prison investigator charged Adams with offense A-100 for engaging in criminal gang activity,

which the Court of Appeals denoted the “assault

charge” or “assault conviction.” Pet. App. 4a. A prison

hearing officer found Adams guilty, resolving the

charge based on the written statements submitted,

including statements from both the investigator and

Adams. Id. The hearing officer denied Adams’s requests to call witnesses and for video surveillance. Id.

As a sanction, the hearing officer ordered Adams “to

spend one year in disciplinary segregation,” revoked

6

“365 days of his earned good time credits,” and demoted Adams from “credit-earning class 1 to class 3.”

Id. Adams administratively appealed. Id. at 6a.

In March 2017, while Adams’s appeal was pending, a prison counselor reclassified Adams to department-wide restrictive housing for two years. Pet. App.

4a–5a. The counselor’s “decision was not attributable

to any single incident but rather to the aggregation of

multiple violations”—eight over a single year. Id. Although the eight violations included the assault conviction, the violations also included “multiple offenses

involving the possession of a cell phone, wireless device, or electrical device; staff/offender provocation;

and attempting to engage in drug trafficking.” Id. at

5a. In reclassifying Adams, the counselor cited “poor

adjustment,” “disciplinary,” “threat to facility security,” “recent negative adjustment,” and “departmental needs.” Id.

Meanwhile, proceedings over the assault charge

continued. Initially, Adams’s administrative appeal

was unsuccessful. Pet. App. 6a. After Adams filed a

habeas petition in federal court, however, the final

prison review officer “vacated all sanctions imposed”

and “designated the matter for rehearing.” Id. On rehearing, the prison investigator charged Adams with

conspiracy to commit assault. Id. A new disciplinary

hearing officer considered the amended charge. Id.

Although the hearing officer denied Adams’s request

to call multiple witnesses, the hearing officer considered written materials, including statements from

Adams and another inmate involved in the assault.

Id. Once again, the hearing officer found Adams

7

guilty and imposed nearly the same sanctions as before. Id. at 6a–7a. Adams again appealed and filed a

habeas petition in federal court, arguing that “his requests for his live witness testimony and other evidence had been denied in violation of his right to due

process.” Id. at 7a.

In February 2018, while Adams’s petition was

pending, he resolved an ongoing dispute with prison

officials over a 2016 drug-trafficking charge—one of

the eight charges supporting the prison counselor’s

March 2017 decision to place Adams in departmentwide restrictive housing for two years. Pet. App. 7a.

Adams agreed to plead guilty to a lesser offense in exchange for facing “no additional time in disciplinary

segregation on that charge.” Id. Still, Adams had

seven other violations on his record, including for the

assault. Id. So Adams was again placed in department-wide administrative restrictive housing. Id.

In August 2018, a federal court granted Adams’s

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Pet. App. 8a. The

court concluded that, because Adams had lost good

time credit, “certain procedural protections, including

the opportunity to present evidence to an impartial

decisionmaker and the right to call witnesses,” were

required. Id. The court ordered vacatur of two of the

three sanctions imposed on Adams—loss of 360 days

of good time credit and the demotion of credit-earning

class—but did not disturb the sanction of one year in

disciplinary segregation. Id. at 8a–9a.

The prison took another look at the assault charge

and charged Adams for a third time. Pet. App. 9a.

This time, the disciplinary hearing officer allowed Ad-

8

ams to call witnesses (though not every witness he requested). Id. After considering their testimony, the

hearing officer again found Adams guilty. Id. Adams

again pursued an administrative appeal, and ultimately, the warden “dismissed the conduct report and

expunged the sanctions on the ground that the allegations against Adams were too vague.” Id. That determination brought “the matter to a close.” Id.

III. Proceedings Below

While Adams was still pursuing internal appeals

over the third assault conviction, Adams filed this suit

in federal court. Pet. App. 10a. He raised a variety of

claims for prospective relief and damages. Id. Most

relevant here, Adams challenged his 730-day administrative segregation on the ground that prison officials violated his “Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by not allowing him to present live witnesses and other evidence at the first two disciplinary

hearings on the assault charge.” Id.; see id. at 22a

(Rovner, J., dissenting in part) (“His claim, as I understand it, is focused on the assault finding as a

predicate for the reclassification decision.”).

The district court granted summary judgment to

the defendant prison officials. Pet. App. 35a. On the

due-process claim, the district court presumed that

Adams’s administrative placement in segregated

housing triggered the Due Process Clause’s protections. Id. at 52a. A “reasonable jury,” the court stated,

“might conclude that [Adams] was deprived of a protected liberty interest.” Id. But the court determined

there was no due-process violation because “Adams

was provided a hearing before his placement in segregation” and the “opportunity to present his views”—

9

the very type of “informal due process” required for

placing an inmate in segregated housing. Id.

A divided panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Pet. App. 30a. The majority agreed with the district

court that inmates “facing transfer to disciplinary

segregation” are “entitled only to ‘informal, nonadversarial due process,’” leaving “substantial discretion

and flexibility in the hands of the prison administrators.” Id. at 31a (quoting Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d

679, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2012)). All that due process ordinarily requires is an opportunity for the inmate to

present his views, which Adams received. Id. at 31a–

32a. The majority rejected the argument that Adams

was entitled to call live witnesses at the disciplinary

hearings because he faced the “potential loss of good

time credit.” Pet. App. 32a. Even if that was a potential disciplinary sanction, the majority explained,

“Adams’s good time credits were restored.” Id. “The

only issue, therefore, is whether he should have received more process for his transfer to a more restrictive prison setting.” Id. “He should not have.” Id.

Judge Rovner dissented. She conceded that a prisoner is not “necessarily . . . entitled to witness testimony” before being placed in restrictive housing, either for disciplinary or administrative reasons. Pet.

App. 22a–23a. In her view, however, Adams should

have been afforded the opportunity “to present witness testimony” in his first two disciplinary hearings

because he was “exposed to the loss of good time credits.” Id. at 23a. Judge Rovner would have held that,

“where a prisoner has been reclassified to department-wide restrictive housing based in part on a prior

disciplinary finding rendered at a hearing where the

10

prisoner was in fact exposed to the loss of good time

credits, he may assert a due process challenge . . . on

the ground that he was not permitted to present witness testimony . . . against the disciplinary charge.”

Id.

ARGUMENT

I. The Decision Below Accords with This

Court’s Decisions in Hewitt and Wilkinson

This Court has “repeatedly said both that prison

officials have broad administrative and discretionary

authority over the institutions they manage and that

lawfully incarcerated persons retain only a narrow

range of protected liberty interests.” Hewitt v. Helms,

459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983). Consequently, due process

for them will look different than for “free citizens in

an open society.” Id. at 472 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560 (1974)). “Prisoners held in lawful confinement have their liberty curtailed by definition, so the procedural protections to which they are

entitled are more limited than in cases where the

right at stake is the right to be free from confinement

at all.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 225 (2005).

A. In determining the level of process due prisoners, this Court has distinguished between actions that

affect the length of incarceration and those that affect

only the conditions of confinement. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), this Court held that prisoners facing the revocation of good-time credits as a disciplinary sanction are entitled to prior written notice

of the charges, an opportunity to call witnesses and

present documentary evidence (absent an adequate

justification for denying the request), and a written

explanation of the decision. See id. at 563–66. But this

11

Court has since clarified that Wolff’s “more formal,

adversary-type procedures” were designed for situations in which a State revokes an inmate’s parole or

good-time credits for specific misbehavior. Wilkinson,

545 U.S. at 228. Less formal, less adversarial procedures govern decisions to place inmates in restrictive

housing. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 474.

In Hewitt, this Court held the decision to put a

prisoner in “administrative segregation” pending an

investigation for misconduct did not require a “Wolff

hearing.” 459 U.S. at 476. The Court explained that

prisoners, who are already in an “extremely restrictive environment,” do not have a weighty liberty interest in avoiding transfer “to an even more confined

situation.” Id. at 473. “[A]dministrative segregation is

the sort of confinement that inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their incarceration.” Id. at 468. The Court also observed that

prison officials must have the ability to separate an

inmate from the general population for security and

safety reasons even if the inmate has “committed no

misconduct.” Id. at 474. That balancing of interests

led the Court to hold that prison officials need not provide trial-type procedures before “confin[ing] an inmate feared to be a threat to institutional security.”

Id.

In Wilkinson, this Court held that Hewitt’s logic

applied equally to the decision to confine inmates to a

Supermax prison “more restrictive than any other

form of incarceration in Ohio,” including “in its administrative control units.” 545 U.S. at 214. Prisoners

assigned to Supermax facilities were “deprived of al-

12

most any environmental or sensory stimuli and of almost all human contact” and lost parole eligibility. Id.

at 214–15. Yet applying Mathews v. Eldridge, 424

U.S. 319 (1976), the Court explained that prisoners

have only a “limited” interest in avoiding these conditions of confinement. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 225. The

Court further explained that there would be little

value in requiring more than notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 226. Those procedural protections have always been the “most important.” Id.

Finally, the Court stressed that important state

interests militated against requiring more process.

“In the context of prison management,” the Court explained, the “dominant consideration” must be the

State’s need to provide safety and security. Wilkinson,

545 U.S. at 227. In a prison setting, “the State’s first

obligation must be to ensure the safety of guards and

prison personnel, the public, and the prisoners themselves.” Id. (citing Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 473). And given

the “brutal reality of prison gangs,” prisons must be

able to combat the threat by separating inmates from

others. Id. Requiring prison officials to let inmates

“call witnesses or provide other attributes of an adversary hearing” could easily defeat efforts to control

individual prisoners and prisons themselves. Id. at

228. The Court thus held that giving an inmate “notice of the factual basis leading to consideration for

[supermax] placement and a fair opportunity for rebuttal” was sufficient process. Id. at 225–26.

As the Seventh Circuit perceived, Hewitt and Wilkinson resolve this case. Pet. App. 31a (citing Westefer

v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2012)). Before

being placed in restrictive housing, Adams received

13

notice and an opportunity to be heard. Pet. App. 31a–

32a. That is “exactly the process” that the inmate in

Hewitt received before being placed in restricted housing and that the inmates in Wilkinson received before

Ohio placed them in a Supermax facility with even

more restrictive conditions of confinement. Jackson v.

Anastasio, --- F.4th ---, 2025 WL 2437947, at *21 (7th

Cir. Aug. 25, 2025) (Scudder, J., concurring). As

“Hewitt and Wilkinson” together establish, the more

trial-like procedures required for disciplinary proceedings that “affect[] the length of confinement” are

not constitutionally required “in the transfer-placement context.” Westefer, 682 F.3d at 685 n.2.

B. Adams concedes that prisoners facing “administrative segregation” are entitled to no more than notice and an opportunity to be heard. Pet. 26–27. He

instead argues that Wolff’s “more rigorous standard

governs disciplinary segregation.” Id. But Adams

“seeks to draw from the Due Process Clause more

than it can provide.” Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466–67. Wolff

governs decisions “to revoke good-time credits for specific, serious misbehavior.” Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at

228. It does not govern decisions about segregating

prisoners for administrative or disciplinary reasons.

Even the dissent below did not adopt Adams’s proposed rule. See Pet. App. 22a (Rovner, J., dissenting

in part) (“To be clear, I am not proposing to hold that

when the sole penalty that a prisoner faces in a disciplinary hearing is assignment to segregation . . . he

necessarily is entitled to witness testimony.”).

Adams contends that “administrative segregation”

and “disciplinary segregation” have “different purposes and different consequences.” Pet. 28. That is not

14

universally true. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,

486 (1995) (“disciplinary segregation, with insignificant exceptions, mirrored those conditions imposed

upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody”); Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173,

1175 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that, at the time of the

decision, the “facilities and conditions” for certain Indiana prisoners subject to administrative and disciplinary segregation were “the same”).

Nor are the purposes of each type as different as

Adams supposes. Adams himself was in administrative segregation because he accrued “multiple violations” of prison rules. Pet. App. 5a. That placement

certainly served to help preserve prison order and security. But as this Court has recognized, administratively segregating an inmate can provides the inmate

with an incentive to improve “future behavior” as

well. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 226. Indiana, for example, permits administrative segregation for “[r]egulation of an offender’s behavior which was not within

acceptable limits.” Ind. Dep’t of Corr., ARSH, § II.

Strict delineations between putative purposes

make little sense in the prison context because “[t]he

punishment of incarcerated prisoners . . . serves different aims” than punishments for non-prisoners.

Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 485. For example, if a prisoner

regularly causes disruptions with other inmates and

the prison decides to place him in restrictive housing,

is that a punishment for his disruptions or a simple

acknowledgment that prisons are often short staffed

and must separate offenders that require additional

attention? If prisons are motivated in part by administrative concerns and in part by hope that the inmate

15

will correct his poor behavior, why does it make any

sense for the governing standard to depend on

whether the prison’s action is administrative enough?

Confining Wolff to revocations of good-time credits

avoids entangling federal courts in the “day-to-day

management of prisons.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482.

Nor does the label attached to the segregation

matter as much as Adams supposes. Adams claims

that administrative segregation does not carry a

“stigma” or affect “parole opportunities.” Pet. 28

(quoting Hewitt, 549 U.S. at 473). Again, the truth of

that assertion varies from prison to prison. In Indiana, when an inmate is placed in restrictive housing

for disciplinary reasons, there is no automatic change

to his earned good-time credits or transfer to another

credit class. Rather, the loss of good time credits or

changes to an inmate’s credit-earning class are separate sanctions that can be imposed as discipline. See

Ind. Code § 11-11-5-3(10). Adams cites no evidence

that the label affixed to the possible consequences he

faced on the assault charge carried any collateral consequences. In deciding to place Adams in administrative segregation, prison officials did not cite the sanctions imposed for the assault but the fact of the violation itself. See Pet. App. 5a, 7a. And now that the assault conviction and all sanctions have been vacated,

there are no longer any continuing consequences.

C. Regardless, any differences between administrative and disciplinary segregation do not affect the

analysis under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319

(1976). Whatever the reason for their segregation,

prisoners still have only a “limited,” state-created liberty interest. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 225. “‘[L]awful

16

incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal

or limitation of many privileges and rights,’” and

“[d]iscipline by prison officials in response to a wide

range of misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law.”

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485 (internal citation omitted).

That is true even if discipline for misconduct may, but

does not “inevitably,” affect parole. Id. at 487.

It is likewise wrong to suggest that the value of

additional procedures is “much higher” because decisions about disciplinary segregation supposedly turn

on the “truth or falsity of specific allegations” while

decisions about administrative segregation do not.

Contra Pet. 29. In Wilkinson, Ohio made decisions

about whether to place inmates in Supermax based on

criteria such as “recent violence, escape attempts,”

and “gang membership”—all of which depend on the

truth or falsity of specific allegations. 545 U.S. at 216.

Yet this Court rejected arguments that there would

be significant value in providing inmates with more

than notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at

225–26. That logic applies with equal force here. And

the value of additional process is questionable—particularly for gang members being disciplined for ordering assaults—since fellow prisoners might have

competing incentives to testify for or against gang

members.

Equally important, powerful state interests in

prison security and managing “scarce resources” militate against allowing prisoners to call live witnesses

before being assigned to restrictive housing. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 227–28. Whatever the reason for

segregation, there are inherent challenges associated

17

with ensuring that witnesses to prison misconduct

can testify “without fear of reprisal.” Id. And requiring prison officials to follow “elaborate procedural

safeguards” before segregating a “prisoner [who] has

engaged in disruptive behavior” could defeat officials’

efforts to deter misconduct while segregating inmates

who could pose a threat to others. Id. Those state interests, which must be the “dominant consideration”

in the prison context, undercut any argument that

more trial-like procedures are required. Id. at 227.

II. Any Conflict Is Underdeveloped and Stale

Notwithstanding this Court’s clear guidance in

Hewitt and Wilkinson, Adams argues the circuits are

split as to whether Wolff procedures are required for

inmates facing disciplinary segregation. Pet. 16. But

the putative circuit conflict is not as fresh or developed as he asserts. The cases cited have been overtaken by subsequent decisions, addressed the rights

of pretrial detainees (who have different due process

rights), or offered only nonbinding dicta.

Adams argues that the Second Circuit holds that

prisoners facing disciplinary segregation must have

the ability to call witnesses. Pet. 16. But any discussion of the degree of process afforded in Kalwasinski

v. Morse, 201 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam),

was dicta because the inmate was provided with all

the procedures required by Wolff. See Kalwasinski,

201 F.3d at 107–10. It is true that, in an earlier case,

the Second Circuit held that a prisoner who “may be

confined to his quarters” or placed in segregated housing “for at least fourteen days” must be afforded the

procedures required by Wolff. McCann v. Coughlin,

698 F.2d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 1983). But of course, this

18

Court rejected that position in Sandin. See Scott v. Albury, 156 F.3d 283, 287 (2d Cir. 1998). And Adams

does not cite any Second Circuit case decided after

Wilkinson that requires Wolff’s procedures before an

inmate can be segregated for disciplinary reasons.

The situation in the Ninth Circuit is similar. In

Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415 (9th Cir. 1994), the

Ninth Circuit concluded that a prisoner “confined in

disciplinary segregation” was entitled to Wolff’s procedures. Id. at 1419. But the Ninth Circuit reached

that result by relying on Wolff’s footnote 19, id., which

noted that Nebraska used the same procedures to revoke good-time credits and to impose disciplinary confinement, 418 U.S. at 571–72 n.19. And in Sandin,

this Court clarified that Wolff’s footnote 19 is “dicta”

and that “discipline in segregated confinement” does

not automatically “present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably

create a liberty interest.” 515 U.S. at 485–86. Adams

cites no Ninth Circuit decision postdating Sandin or

Wilkinson adopting his preferred rule.

The Third Circuit decision that Adams cites does

not address the due-process rights of convicted prisoners at all. Rather, it addressed the rights of “pretrial detainees in restricted housing.” Stevenson v.

Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 71 (3d Cir. 2007). True, the court

commented that the process required for a housing assignment “varies depending on the reason for the

transfer, with greater process accorded to prisoners

who are confined for disciplinary infractions.” Id. at

70. But the court remanded to the district court to “determine whether sufficient process has been afforded.” Id. at 71. The district court then decided that

19

the pretrial detainee, who had been moved to restrictive housing for participating in a riot, “received the

minimal procedural due process protections” required. Stevenson v. Carroll, No. 04-139-GMS, 2011

WL 6842955, at *12 (D. Del. Dec. 29, 2011), aff’d, 474

F. App’x 845 (3d Cir. 2012).

In the same way, Jacoby v. Baldwin County, 835

F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2016), is inapplicable. That decision, too, addressed the rights of pretrial detainees.

See id. at 1345. And the court held that pretrial detainees were entitled “to the due process protections

enshrined in Wolff before being placed in disciplinary

segregation” because disciplinary segregation would

amount to “punishment” under Bell v. Wolfish, 441

U.S. 520 (1979). Jacoby, 835 F.3d at 1344. That ruling

regarding pretrial detainees, who are “not under a

sentence of confinement,” does not resolve the process

due inmates, who are under such a conviction. Rapier

v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1004–05 (7th Cir. 1999).

Consider next the Sixth Circuit. In Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287 (6th Cir. 1980), the court held that

“transfer to administrative segregation entitles inmates to the procedures set forth in Wolff” where the

“transfer is in response to a determination of guilt of

a specific infraction.” Bills, 631 F.3d at 1296. But the

Sixth Circuit later clarified that an inmate whose

placement in “administrative segregation is triggered

by the outcome of a formal disciplinary proceeding”—

as Adams’s placement was—need not receive Wolff’s

protections. Finley v. Huss, 102 F.4th 789, 816 (6th

Cir. 2024). Notice, an opportunity to be heard, and

“periodic review” of the placement suffices. Id. at 816–

17. That is what Adams received here.

20

Lastly, the Eighth Circuit did not squarely hold

that detainees facing disciplinary segregation need

not receive the processes outlined in Wolff. Rather, in

Spann v. Lombardi, 65 F.4th 987 (8th Cir. 2023), the

court resolved a due-process claim brought by an inmate transferred to administrative segregation on

qualified-immunity grounds. The court held that, in

“view of Wilkinson, Hewitt, and Greenholtz [v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442

U.S. 1 (1979)], a reasonable official could have believed” that notice and an opportunity to be heard are

sufficient process for an inmate facing “transfer to administrative segregation.” Spann, 65 F.4th at 992–93.

Although there may not be perfect uniformity in

the language that the various circuits have used, it is

simply incorrect that there is a “well developed,”

“deeply entrenched” circuit split regarding the process due prisoners facing segregation. Contra Pet. 16.

III.

This Case Does Not Warrant Review

This case does not warrant review regardless.

A. First, this case does not cleanly present the question presented. Throughout the petition, Adams

states that he was “subjected to disciplinary segregation.” Pet. 22; see id. at 4, 30. That is incorrect. He was

“reclassified into Department-Wide Restrictive Housing (i.e., long-term segregation) due to an aggregation

of many conduct violations.” D. Ct. Dkt. 202-1 at 1 ¶ 5;

see Pet. App. 4a–5a, 7a, 9a. Moreover, Adams did not

challenge the sanctions imposed for the assault

charge, which included one year in disciplinary segregation. Instead, Adams challenged his administrative

classification in 2017 and 2019. Pet. App. 9a; see Pet.

App. 22a (Rovner, J., dissenting in part) (“His claim,

21

as I understand it, is focused on the assault finding as

a predicate for the reclassification decision that assigned him to department-wide restrictive housing.”).

The Seventh Circuit addressed the process due prisoners facing disciplinary segregation only because

Adams argued that “more process” might have affected “one of the eight underlying violations” supporting the administrative reclassification to restrictive housing. Pet. App. 32a (majority opinion).

B. Second and relatedly, the alleged due-process

violation was harmless. Adams argues that he was

entitled to call witnesses during the disciplinary hearing on the assault charge because he faced disciplinary segregation as a sanction. Pet. 29–30. But there

is no evidence that the specific sanctions imposed impacted the decision to segregate Adams administratively. The important consideration for the prison was

that Adams had “been found guilty” of multiple violations. Pet. App. 4a–5a, 7a. As the dissent below conceded, “the assault conviction is relevant less for what

particular types of discipline were imposed at the assault hearing than for the underlying finding that Adams had participated in the assault on another prisoner.” Id. at 20a (Rovner, J., dissenting in part).

Adams speculates that he might have been “absolved” of misconduct had he been permitted to call

witnesses. Pet. 4. But prisoners do not have an unqualified right to call witnesses in disciplinary proceedings to defend against charges of misconduct. If

Adams had been placed in restrictive housing for 30

days, there would be no question that he received all

the process due. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486–47. That

is true even if the “misconduct record” were to affect

22

his ability to obtain early release. Id. Any argument

that Adams should have received more process during

the disciplinary proceeding because higher sanctions

were on the table confuses the process due a prisoner

before imposition of a particular sanction (e.g., loss of

good-credit time) with the process due a prisoner before a finding of misconduct.

Nor is it clear that Adams would avoided administrative segregation in the absence of a misconduct

finding on the assault charge. Initially, the prison administratively segregated him for two years because

he had eight underlying violations, including one for

drug trafficking. Pet. App. 4a–5a. Then, when Adams

resolved the drug-trafficking charge by pleading to a

lesser violation, the prison determined that administrative segregation was still appropriate because he

had committed seven violations. Id. at 7a. Despite the

dissent’s contrary suggestion, see id. at 18a (Rovner,

J., dissenting in part), it is speculative that a hearing

officer would have found Adams not guilty and that

the prison would have released a prisoner with six violations (instead of seven) into the general population. This Court should not review a harmless error.

And even if the error was not harmless, review

would make no difference to the ultimate outcome of

this case. All sanctions imposed in the disciplinary

proceeding were vacated, Pet. App. 9a, so the only

claim that is not moot is Adams’s damages claim. To

recover from the defendant prison officials, Adams

would have to establish that his alleged due-process

rights were clearly established. See Ashcroft v. alKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). But no decision from

this Court establishes “beyond debate” that prisoners

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facing disciplinary segregation are entitled to call witnesses. Id. at 741–42; see Spann, 65 F.4th at 992–93.

Nor does any Seventh Circuit decision. Adams concedes that circuit precedent is against him. Pet. 20.

C. Third, Adams overstates the case’s importance.

He argues that disciplinary confinement is a common

tool, citing a study that found many inmates had

spent “the previous 15 days in solitary confinement.”

Pet. 24 (internal citation omitted). But this Court has

squarely rejected the argument that due process requires trial-like hearings for shorter periods of confinement. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486–47. And Adams does not say how many prisoners segregated for

disciplinary reasons would have a protected interest.

Adams stresses the nature of solitary confinement.

Pet. 22–25. But concerns about “prison conditions”

are more the stuff of an “Eighth Amendment claim”

than a “Due Process claim.” Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d

245, 251 (4th Cir. 2015). And the record here “does not

make clear” the precise conditions of confinement to

which Adams was subject. Pet. App. 5a; see pp. 6–8,

supra. Further, Adams himself concedes that prison

policies “vary widely.” Pet. 24. So any decision in this

case is unlikely to “resolve” the precise degree of process due all inmates facing segregation for disciplinary reasons. Contra Pet. 30. Instead, adopting Adams’s rule will recreate the problem Sandin tried to

solve: involving “federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons, often squandering judicial resources with little offsetting benefit to anyone,” 515

U.S. at 482, as judges attempt to determine whether

24

a given sanction was administrative or disciplinary.

There is no need to reopen that Pandora’s box.

D. The sparse factual record may make this case

a poor vehicle as well. Adams’s due-process arguments presuppose that segregation for disciplinary

reasons necessarily carries a stigma or affects parole

chances in a way that administrative segregation

does not. Pet. 28–29. That assumption is incorrect for

the reasons stated above. See pp. 13–15, supra. As the

Court of Appeals noted, however, details about how

Adams was confined and the applicable policies are

lacking. Pet. App. 5a–6a. Thus, to the extent that

those details are potentially relevant, this case is far

from an ideal one to address the question presented.

CONCLUSION

The petition should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Office of the

THEODORE E. ROKITA

Attorney General

Attorney General

IGC South, Fifth Floor

JAMES A. BARTA

302 W. Washington St.

Solicitor General

Indianapolis, IN 46204

Counsel of Record

(317) 232-0709

JENNA M. LORENCE

James.Barta@atg.in.gov Deputy Solicitor

General

SEPTEMBER 2025