Amicus Curiae Brief — Kenneth J. Jouppi, Petitioner v. Alaska

No. 25-246

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

__________________

KENNETH JOHN JOUPPI,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF ALASKA,

Respondent.

__________________

On Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of Alaska

__________________

BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS AS AMICUS

CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

___________

Jeffrey L. Fisher

Co-Chair, Amicus Committee

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS

1660 L Street NW, 12th Floor

Washington, DC 20036

Hassan Ahmad

Counsel of Record

Matthew J. Glover

Larissa Davis

Logan Kirkpatrick

Noah C. Zimmermann

COVINGTON & BURLING LLP

850 Tenth Street NW

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 662-6000

hahmad@cov.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ............................1

INTRODUCTION

AND

SUMMARY

OF

ARGUMENT ........................................................2

ARGUMENT ...............................................................4

I.

II.

The Excessive Fines Clause Exists to Prevent

Governments from Using Forfeiture and

Monetary Sanctions as Instruments of

Unchecked Punishment. ......................................4

A.

The History of the Excessive Fines

Clause Reflects Concerns About

Governmental Abuse of Financial

Penalties. ......................................................5

B.

Modern Fine and Forfeiture Practices

Recreate the Abuses the Clause Was

Meant to Prevent. .......................................10

The Excessive Fines Clause Protects Against

Punishment

Based

on

Abstract

or

Hypothetical Offense Conduct Rather Than

Individual Culpability. ......................................14

A.

Individual Culpability Is a Bedrock

Principle of Our Criminal Justice

System. .......................................................14

B.

The Excessive Fines Clause Requires

Meaningful Proportionality Review. .........18

ii

C.

The

Alaska

Supreme

Court’s

Approach Conflicts with This Court’s

Precedent Connecting Individualized

Punishment with Individual Fault. ...........21

III. A Defendant-Specific Proportionality Rule Is

More Administrable and Better Reflects RealWorld Punishment. ............................................23

A.

Clear, Administrable Standards Are

Essential to Meaningful Eighth

Amendment Review. ..................................23

B.

An Abstract-Gravity Rule Is Also IllSuited to Assessing Impacts on a

Defendant’s Livelihood. ..............................26

CONCLUSION ..........................................................28

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Alexander v. United States,

509 U.S. 544 (1993) ............................................. 9

Austin v. United States,

509 U.S. 602 (1993) ............................................. 9

Carmona v. Ward,

439 U.S. 1091 (1979) ......................................... 14

Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet,

160 A.3d 153 (Pa. 2017) .................................... 20

Culley v. Marshall,

601 U.S. 377 (2024) ........................................... 10

Elfbrandt v. Russell,

384 U.S. 11 (1966) ............................................. 15

Elonis v. United States,

575 U.S. 723 (2015) ........................................... 16

Harjo v. City of Albuquerque,

326 F. Supp. 3d 1145 (D.N.M. 2018) ................ 10

Harmelin v. Michigan,

501 U.S. 957 (1991) ............................................. 9

Leonard v. Texas,

137 S. Ct. 847 (2017) ................................... 11, 13

iv

Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.,

446 U.S. 238 (1980) ....................................... 8, 10

Miller v. Alabama,

567 U.S. 460 (2012) ........................................... 17

Moore v. Texas,

581 U.S. 1 (2017) ............................................... 17

Morissette v. United States,

342 U.S. 246 (1952) ........................................... 16

One 1995 Toyota Pick-Up Truck v. District

of Columbia,

718 A.2d 558 (D.C. 1998) .................................. 20

Pimentel v. City of Los Angeles,

974 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2020) ............................. 20

Scales v. United States,

367 U.S. 203 (1961) ........................................... 14

Solem v. Helm,

463 U.S. 277 (1983) ............................................. 6

State v. Timbs,

169 N.E.3d 361 (Ind. 2021) ......................... 18, 19

Timbs v. Indiana,

586 U.S. 146 (2019) ............................... 2, 5–7, 19

United States v. $100,348.00 in U.S.

Currency,

354 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2004) ........................... 20

United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive,

506 U.S. 815 (1992) ........................................... 20

v

United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive,

954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992) ................................ 20

United States v. 427 & 429 Hall St.,

74 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 1996) ........................... 26

United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto

Parts,

971 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1992) ................................ 7

United States v. Bajakajian,

524 U.S. 321 (1998) ....... 2, 3, 9, 13, 14, 18, 22–24

United States v. Facteau,

145 S. Ct. 137 (2024) ......................................... 20

United States v. Facteau,

89 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2023) .................................. 20

United States v. James Daniel Good Real

Prop.,

510 U.S. 43 (1993) ............................................... 7

United States v. Levesque,

546 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2008) ................................. 5

United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,

513 U.S. 64 (1994) ............................................. 17

Yskamp v. DEA,

163 F.3d 767 (3d Cir. 1998) .............................. 20

Statutes

18 U.S.C.

§ 3553........................................................... 15, 17

§ 3582................................................................. 15

vi

18 U.S.C.

§ 3621................................................................. 15

§ 3624................................................................. 15

28 U.S.C. § 524 ......................................................... 9

Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 156 .................. 16

Act of Feb. 15, 1779, 1779 Vt. Acts &

Resolves 153 ...................................................... 16

Act of Feb. 1779, 1779 Vt. Acts & Resolves

99 ....................................................................... 16

Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M. Sess. 2, c. 2 (Eng.

1689) ................................................................ 5, 6

Pa. Frame of Govt., Laws Agreed Upon in

England, Art. XVIII (1682), in 5 Federal

and State Constitutions (Francis Thorpe

ed., 1909) ............................................................. 6

Legislative Materials

28 Cong. Rec. 2395 (1896) ........................................ 8

Federal Asset Forfeiture: Uses and Reforms:

Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,

Terrorism, Homeland Security, and

Investigations of the H. Comm. on the

Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) .......................... 13

Other Authorities

Jonathan Barth, Criminal Prosecution in

American History: Private or Public?, 67

S.D. L. Rev. 119 (2022) ....................................... 8

vii

Steven G. Calabresi, Sarah E. Agudo &

Kathryn L. Dore, State Bills of Rights in

1787 and 1791: What Individual Rights

Are Really Deeply Rooted in American

History and Tradition?, 85 S. Cal. L.

Rev. 1451 (2012) .................................................. 6

Sara Cohbra & Becky Feldman, The Second

Look Movement: An Assessment of the

Nation’s Sentence Review Laws, The

Sentencing Project (2025) ................................. 15

Linda B. Deutschmann & Aaron Young,

Crime and Delinquency, in Social

Problems: A Case Study Approach

(Norman A. Dolch et al. eds., 2d ed.

2007) .................................................................... 8

Thomas Harvey et al., Municipal Courts

White Paper, ArchCity Defenders (2014) ......... 12

Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Proportioning

Crimes and Punishments in Cases

Heretofore Capital (1779), reprinted in 2

The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Julian

P. Boyd ed., 1950)................................................ 7

Walter Johnson, Ferguson’s Fortune 500

Company, The Atlantic (Apr. 26, 2015) ........... 12

Brian D. Kelly, Fighting Crime or Raising

Revenue?, Inst. for Just. (June 7, 2019) ........... 11

Lisa Knepper et al., Policing for Profit: The

Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture (4th ed.

2026) ...................................................... 10, 11, 13

viii

Mike Maciag, Addicted to Fines: A Special

Report, Governing (Aug. 16, 2019) ................... 11

Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability to

Pay, and the Original Meaning of the

Excessive Fines Clause, 40 Hastings

Const. L.Q. 833 (2013) ........................................ 5

Model Penal Code

§ 2.01 ................................................................. 15

§ 2.06 ................................................................. 15

Paul H. Robinson, 2 Criminal Law Defenses

(2026) ................................................................. 16

Ram Subramanian et al., Revenue Over

Public Safety: How Perverse Financial

Incentives Warp the Criminal Justice

System, Brennan Ctr. for Just. (July 6,

2022) ...................................................... 11, 12, 13

Aliza M. Tresser, Towing After Timbs: Why

Vehicle Impoundment Violates the

Excessive Fines Clause, 58 Colum. J.L. &

Soc. Probs. 1 (2024) ........................................... 26

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Annual Report of the

Attorney General of the United States 17

(1873) ................................................................... 8

U.S. Dep’t of Justice C.R. Div., Investigation

of the Ferguson Police Department (Mar.

4, 2015) .............................................................. 12

ix

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

§ 1B1.13 ............................................................. 15

§ 3E1.1 ............................................................... 15

§ 4A1.1 ............................................................... 15

§ 5K1.1 ............................................................... 15

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE*

The National Association of Criminal Defense

Lawyers (NACDL) is a nonprofit voluntary

professional bar association founded in 1958 that

works on behalf of criminal-defense attorneys to

ensure justice and due process for individuals accused

of crime or misconduct.

NACDL is the only

nationwide professional bar association for public

defenders and private criminal-defense lawyers. It

has a national membership of several thousand direct

members and approximately 40,000 affiliated

members, who include private criminal-defense

lawyers, public defenders, military-defense counsel,

law professors, and judges. NACDL is dedicated to

advancing

the

proper,

efficient,

and

just

administration of justice. The organization files

numerous amicus briefs each year in the United

States Supreme Court and other federal and state

courts, seeking to assist in cases that present issues of

broad importance to criminal defendants, criminaldefense lawyers, and the justice system as a whole.

This case presents a question of substantial

importance to NACDL members and their clients

because it concerns whether courts may impose severe

monetary punishments only when a defendant’s own

conduct and culpability warrant them, or may instead

base them on abstract assessments of offense gravity.

NACDL members routinely represent defendants

* Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amicus affirms that no counsel for a

party authored this brief in whole or in part, and that no person

other than amicus or its counsel made any monetary

contributions intended to fund the preparation or submission of

this brief.

2

facing forfeitures and other financial penalties, and so

have a particular interest in ensuring that the

Excessive Fines Clause remains a meaningful

constitutional constraint on punishment, grounded in

individualized

culpability

and

administrable

standards.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The question presented is whether the Excessive

Fines Clause permits a court to uphold the forfeiture

of a defendant’s property by measuring the gravity of

a broad class of offenses and the associated social

harms. It does not. The Clause requires courts to

conduct a proportionality inquiry anchored in the

defendant’s actual conduct, personal culpability, and

actual or intended harm. See United States v.

Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334, 338–39 (1998); Timbs

v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146, 151–53 (2019). Courts may

not substitute an abstract assessment of the

generalized social harms associated with other

commissions of the statutory offense.

Ken Jouppi’s case exemplifies the point. Jouppi, a

pilot and operator of an air-taxi service in Alaska,

loaded a customer’s luggage (which contained a single

visible six-pack of Budweiser) onto his plane headed

to a dry village. For that, he was charged, tried, and

convicted of the misdemeanor offense of knowingly

transporting an alcoholic beverage into a dry

community. In sentencing him, the trial court viewed

the quantity and circumstances as bearing on the

actual harm, while on appeal the Alaska Supreme

Court treated the broader harms of alcohol abuse in

rural Alaska as the relevant context. That court also

3

dismissed as irrelevant that Jouppi was a first-time

offender whose conduct was not part of any larger

pattern of criminal activity and held that remand for

individualized findings was unnecessary because such

findings could not change its conclusion.

That

abstract approach ultimately upheld the forfeiture of

Jouppi’s airplane over a passenger’s six-pack of beer.

That result cannot be squared with the Clause’s

history or this Court’s precedents. The Excessive

Fines Clause emerged from a long history of

governmental abuse of financial penalties. It was

designed in relevant part here to keep punishment

proportionate and to prevent the State from wielding

fines or forfeitures as unchecked instruments of power

or revenue. In Bajakajian, this Court applied that

principle by focusing on the harm the defendant

actually caused and his minimal culpability—not on

the worst conduct that the reporting statute might

reach. 524 U.S. at 338–39. The same individualized

focus follows from the broader constitutional principle

that punishment must reflect personal guilt.

The judgment below should thus be reversed.

First, history and modern practice show why courts

must enforce the Clause against financial sanctions

that governmental actors have incentives to impose

and retain. Second, the Clause’s proportionality

requirement is a specific application of the criminal

law’s bedrock rule that punishment must track the

individual offender’s conduct, intent, role, and actual

harm; the Alaska Supreme Court instead relied on

generalized social harms arising from other ways of

committing the offense. Third, a defendant-specific

inquiry is not only constitutionally required but

workable: courts can apply familiar, objective factors,

4

and must account for the real-world consequences of

forfeiting property used in a person’s livelihood. That

rule protects meaningful judicial review, fair plea

advice, and the constitutional line between

punishment for one’s own wrongdoing and

punishment for society’s broader problems.

ARGUMENT

The Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause

asks what this defendant did, how culpable he was,

what harm his conduct caused, and whether the

punishment imposed is grossly disproportionate to his

offense.

It does not permit courts to justify

punishment based on other ways the offense can be

committed and the social problems that arise from the

activity criminalized. By replacing individualized

proportionality review with an abstract assessment of

a statute’s social objectives, the Alaska Supreme

Court severed punishment from culpability. The

Clause’s history, this Court’s precedents, and the

practical realities of modern financial sanctions all

reinforce the same rule: punishment must reflect the

defendant’s own conduct, culpability, and harm, not

broader ills caused by others.

The judgment below should be reversed.

I. The Excessive Fines Clause Exists to Prevent

Governments from Using Forfeiture and

Monetary Sanctions as Instruments of

Unchecked Punishment.

The Excessive Fines Clause’s origins trace to the

longstanding Anglo-American demands that financial

punishment be proportionate and leave the wrongdoer

able to pursue his livelihood going forward. But

modern fine and forfeiture regimes, especially those

5

tied to governmental revenue, construct the

incentives for abuse that the Clause was designed to

check. Thorough judicial review is necessary to

enforce the Clause as an independent limit on

monetary sanctions.

A. The History of the Excessive Fines Clause

Reflects Concerns About Governmental

Abuse of Financial Penalties.

1. The prohibition on excessive fines reflects two

longstanding demands: the need for proportional

punishment and the need to leave wrongdoers a path

to pursuing their livelihoods after release from prison.

This case concerns only the former protection.1

The protection against disproportionate fines “has

been a constant shield throughout Anglo-American

history,” tracing back at least to Magna Carta’s

command that a free man be amerced “after the

manner of the fault” and “after the greatness thereof.”

Timbs, 586 U.S. at 151, 153 (cleaned up). Parliament

carried that principle forward in the English Bill of

Rights, which declared that “excessive Bail[] ought

not to be required[,] nor excessive Fines imposed[,] nor

A fine may be proportionate to the offense and yet

unconstitutional because it destroys the offender’s livelihood.

See United States v. Levesque, 546 F.3d 78, 83–84 (1st Cir. 2008)

(“[T]he notion that a forfeiture should not be so great as to

deprive a wrongdoer of his or her livelihood is deeply rooted in

the history of the Eighth Amendment.”); see also Nicholas M.

McLean, Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and the Original Meaning of

the Excessive Fines Clause, 40 Hastings Const. L.Q. 833, 835–38,

847–50 (2013). That distinct protection is not directly at issue

here, where the challenge rests on proportionality alone.

1

6

cruel[] and unusual[] Punishments inflicted.” Bill of

Rights, 1 W. & M. Sess. 2, c. 2 (Eng. 1689).

The American guarantee preserved that

protection. The Excessive Fines Clause was “based

directly” on Virginia’s Declaration of Rights, which

adopted the English Bill of Rights’ language verbatim.

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 n.10 (1983). As this

Court explained, “there can be no doubt that

[Virginia’s] Declaration of Rights guaranteed at least

the liberties and privileges of Englishmen.” Id.

(cleaned up).

Nor was that commitment limited to Virginia.

Pennsylvania had guaranteed decades before the

Founding that “[a]ll fines shall be moderate.” Pa.

Frame of Govt., Laws Agreed Upon in England, Art.

XVIII (1682), in 5 Federal and State Constitutions

3061 (Francis Thorpe ed., 1909). And by the time the

Eighth Amendment was drafted “[i]n 1787, the

constitutions of eight States—accounting for 70% of

the U.S. population—forbade excessive fines.” Timbs,

586 U.S. at 152 (citing Steven G. Calabresi, Sarah E.

Agudo & Kathryn L. Dore, State Bills of Rights in

1787 and 1791: What Individual Rights Are Really

Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 85

S. Cal. L. Rev. 1451, 1517 (2012)).

These provisions reflected more than a concern for

individual liberty. They also guarded the proper

relationship between citizens and government by

requiring punishment to be proportionate to the

offense. Thomas Jefferson described the principle in

1779: once a person has “suffer[ed] a punishment in

proportion to his offence,” he is entitled to protection

from “all greater pain”; the legislature must therefore

7

arrange crimes and punishments on a corresponding

scale. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Proportioning

Crimes and Punishments in Cases Heretofore Capital

(1779), reprinted in 2 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson

492–504 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). The Excessive

Fines Clause reflects the principle of proportionality

between offense and punishment that Jefferson

described.

2. The Clause also serves a structural anti-abuse

function. It prevents governments from turning

financial sanctions into instruments of unchecked

power—whether by imposing property penalties

broader than the underlying wrongdoing or by

benefiting directly from enforcement. Courts have

repeatedly recognized that danger. See, e.g., Timbs,

586 U.S. at 154 (explaining that “fines may be

employed ‘in a measure out of accord with the penal

goals of retribution and deterrence,’ for ‘fines are a

source of revenue,’ while other forms of punishment

‘cost a State money’” (citation omitted)); United States

v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 81

(1993) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part) (“[L]ike the majority, I am disturbed by the

breadth of new civil forfeiture statutes … which

subject[] to forfeiture all real property that is used, or

intended to be used, in the commission, or even the

facilitation, of a federal drug offense.”); United States

v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, 971 F.2d 896,

905 (2d Cir. 1992) (“We continue to be enormously

troubled by the government’s increasing and virtually

unchecked use of the civil forfeiture statutes and the

disregard for due process that is buried in those

statutes.”).

8

The Clause’s structural solution to that concern is

rooted in historical experience. In early England,

crimes were violations of the “King’s Peace,” and

“[f]ines were paid to the king, who made a profit from

providing justice.” Linda B. Deutschmann & Aaron

Young, Crime and Delinquency, in Social Problems: A

Case Study Approach 69–70 (Norman A. Dolch et al.

eds., 2d ed. 2007).

The Founders distrusted

concentrated prosecutorial power, and that distrust

“gradually evolved” to include concerns about feebased enforcement. See Jonathan Barth, Criminal

Prosecution in American History: Private or Public?,

67 S.D. L. Rev. 119, 149–72 (2022). By the latter half

of the nineteenth century, the public had become

particularly leery of a system that “induce[d]

[prosecutors] to earn fees by multiplying frivolous

prosecutions and technical violations of the laws,” 28

Cong. Rec. 2395 (1896), prompting calls to Congress

for federal prosecutors be “wholly paid by salaries”

instead, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Annual Report of the

Attorney General of the United States 17 (1873). See

also 28 Cong. Rec. 2396 (1896) (predicting that ending

the fee system would eliminate “the great and

constantly increasing number of frivolous and

unwarranted prosecutions set on foot by greedy and

avaricious officials and professional prosecutors and

informers to get fees”). This Court has recognized the

same constitutional danger: an enforcement officer

who “stands to profit economically from [the]

enforcement of the [law]” labors under an

impermissible financial bias. Marshall v. Jerrico,

Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249–50 (1980).

to

As Justice Scalia explained, “There is good reason

be concerned that fines, uniquely of all

9

punishments, will be imposed in a measure out of

accord with the penal goals of retribution and

deterrence. Imprisonment, corporal punishment, and

even capital punishment cost a State money; fines are

a source of revenue.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.

957, 978 n.9 (1991) (Scalia, J., announcing judgment).

When the government stands to financially benefit

from a punishment, “it makes sense to scrutinize

governmental action more closely.” Id.

That is true for both civil and criminal forfeiture.

At the federal level, for example, the Department of

Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund receives deposits from

civil and criminal forfeitures alike, ensuring that the

revenue incentive operates identically regardless of

the proceeding’s label.

28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4)(A)

(“There shall be deposited in the Fund … all amounts

from the forfeiture of property under any law enforced

or administered by the Department of Justice[.]”).

The Excessive Fines Clause protects against those

incentives just the same, as it prohibits extracting

payments “as punishment for some offense,”

regardless of whether the proceeding carrying that

label is civil or criminal. Austin v. United States, 509

U.S. 602, 610 (1993) (“[T]he question is not … whether

forfeiture … is civil or criminal, but rather whether it

is punishment.”); see also Alexander v. United States,

509 U.S. 544, 558–59 (1993) (holding that in personam

criminal forfeiture “is clearly a form of monetary

punishment no different, for Eighth Amendment

purposes, from a traditional ‘fine’” and remanding for

proportionality review under the Excessive Fines

Clause).

Thus, the “touchstone” remains “the

principle of proportionality.” Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at

334.

10

B. Modern Fine and Forfeiture Practices

Recreate the Abuses the Clause Was

Meant to Prevent.

The modern landscape demonstrates the need for

the Excessive Fines Clause’s protections. Fine-andforfeiture regimes create powerful incentives for

governments to expand financial sanctions, reviving

in practice the revenue-driven model that the

Framers rejected. “[T]here is a ‘realistic possibility’

that forfeiture officials’ judgment ‘will be distorted by

the prospect of institutional gain’—the more revenues

they raise, the more revenues they can spend.” Harjo

v. City of Albuquerque, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1151

(D.N.M. 2018) (quoting Marshall, 446 U.S. at 251); see

also Culley v. Marshall, 601 U.S. 377, 396 (2024)

(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (noting that “law

enforcement agencies have become increasingly

dependent on the money they raise from civil

forfeitures”).

The numbers bear out those incentives: Fine-andforfeiture systems funnel proceeds directly to the

agencies that enforce them. Only six States and the

District of Columbia direct civil-forfeiture proceeds to

neutral funds. Lisa Knepper et al., Policing for Profit:

The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture 13 (4th ed. 2026),

https://perma.cc/DQ72-DWBW. In 32 other States

and the Federal Government, law-enforcementcontrolled funds receive between 90% and 100% of

those proceeds. Id. In the remaining 12 States, law

enforcement gets 45% to 80%. Id. In fiscal years 2017

and 2018, fines and forfeitures provided over half of

general-fund revenues in 80 jurisdictions, provided

over 20% of general-fund revenues in another 284

jurisdictions, and accounted for more than 10% of

11

general-fund revenues in nearly 600 other

jurisdictions. Mike Maciag, Addicted to Fines: A

Special Report, Governing (Aug. 16, 2019),

https://perma.cc/S7CA-SXV8;

see

also

Ram

Subramanian et al., Revenue Over Public Safety: How

Perverse Financial Incentives Warp the Criminal

Justice System 12 & n.119, Brennan Ctr. for Just.

(July 6, 2022), https://perma.cc/7322-P3CU.

In some jurisdictions, seized assets have dwarfed

the offices they fund. For example, fines amounted to

1,507% of the prosecutor’s budget in Reeves County,

Texas and 205% in Hill County, Texas.

See

Subramanian, supra, at 9; see also Leonard v. Texas,

137 S. Ct. 847, 848 (2017) (Thomas, J., statement

respecting the denial of certiorari) (“[C]ivil forfeiture

has in recent decades become widespread and highly

profitable.… This system—where police can seize

property with limited judicial oversight and retain it

for their own use—has led to egregious and wellchronicled abuses.”); Brian D. Kelly, Fighting Crime

or Raising Revenue? 15–16, Inst. for Just. (June 7,

2019),

https://perma.cc/8UML-GGAB

(finding

increased forfeiture activity when local budgets are

strained).

Because

forfeiture

proceeds

are

often

discretionary, they can fund initiatives never

approved through the ordinary appropriations

process. “[F]unds obtained through forfeiture are

often discretionary for agencies, giving them wide

berth to spend as they please. This self-funding,

where agencies can acquire and spend funds outside

the normal legislative appropriations process,

subverts the legislature’s power of the purse.”

Knepper, supra, at 12. One police chief put it plainly:

12

forfeiture money is “kind of like pennies from

heaven—it gets you a toy or something that you need.”

Subramanian, supra, at 10 n.93 (quoting Chief

Kenneth M. Burton of Columbia, Missouri).

The incentive is strongest where municipalities

cannot readily raise revenue through taxation.

Missouri has required a citywide referendum for

municipal tax increases since 1980, while fines and

fees remain within municipal discretion. Walter

Johnson, Ferguson’s Fortune 500 Company, The

Atlantic (Apr. 26, 2015). For example, Ferguson,

Missouri collected only $68,000 annually in property

taxes from the local headquarters of a Fortune 500

company, while making fine revenue “a top priority

for law enforcement” and setting revenue targets

based on budgetary need rather than public safety.

U.S. Dep’t of Justice C.R. Div., Investigation of the

Ferguson Police Department 2, 9–15 (Mar. 4, 2015).

Reliance on fines can also track poverty: in the St.

Louis area, municipalities relied on fines more heavily

as their wealth declined. Thomas Harvey et al.,

Municipal Courts White Paper 9–12, ArchCity

Defenders (2014), https://perma.cc/PW5Y-L8CX.

These political and economic incentives are

difficult to correct through ordinary political

processes.

Tax increases provoke organized

opposition; people exposed to criminal fines and

forfeitures are a diffuse constituency, and many are

disenfranchised by the convictions that expose them

to punishment. Legislatures can therefore raise

revenue

through

monetary

sanctions

at

comparatively little political cost.

13

The costs extend beyond the people who pay.

Revenue-driven

enforcement

can

distort

governmental priorities, undermine public safety, and

erode confidence in the justice system.

See

Subramanian, supra, at 13 n.151 (citing study that

found a statistically significant negative correlation

between the share of revenue generated by fines, fees,

and forfeitures and clearance rates for violent and

property crimes); see also Knepper, supra, at 7

(“[N]early half of forfeitures” in surveyed states “occur

without anyone—let alone the owner—being

convicted of a crime. And available data suggest

many forfeitures stem from opportunistic seizures

rather than deliberate investigations aimed at rooting

out criminal activity.”). Courts, legislators, and

commentators have repeatedly documented these

abuses. See, e.g., Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 848 (Thomas,

J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari);

Federal Asset Forfeiture: Uses and Reforms: Hearing

Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland

Security, and Investigations of the H. Comm. on the

Judiciary, 114th Cong. 1, 3 (2015) (statement of

Chairman James Sensenbrenner) (describing the

government’s “seiz[ure] [of] billions of dollars of cash

and property from Americans, often without charging

them with a crime”).

None of this denies that the harms these statutes

target are real, or that legislatures may weigh those

harms in setting penalties. But that does not justify

imposing a fine based on others’ conduct. The Eighth

Amendment exists to ensure that the penalty imposed

on a defendant remains proportionate to “the gravity

of the defendant’s offense,” not to the conduct of

others. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337 (emphasis added).

14

Courts are charged with enforcing those proportional

limits, but the Alaska Supreme Court failed to

perform that judicial task here.

II. The Excessive Fines Clause Protects Against

Punishment

Based

on

Abstract

or

Hypothetical Offense Conduct Rather Than

Individual Culpability.

A product of its history, the Excessive Fines Clause

demands a focus on the object of punishment: the

defendant’s own conduct and own culpability. The

Alaska Supreme Court’s reliance on conduct and

harms caused by others cannot satisfy that defendantspecific command.

A. Individual Culpability Is a Bedrock

Principle of Our Criminal Justice System.

The Excessive Fines Clause flows from the

principle that “[t]he amount of [a] forfeiture must bear

some relationship to the gravity of [a defendant’s]

offense.”

Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334.

That

proportionality principle underlies nearly every

aspect of our criminal justice system, from sentencing

factors and mitigation to affirmative defenses and

scienter. Across decades, doctrines, and defendants,

this Court has consistently reaffirmed the

“fundamental premise … that individuals are

accountable only for their own criminal acts”—and

that punishment must reflect an individualized

inquiry into the “personal guilt” of the offender. See

Carmona v. Ward, 439 U.S. 1091, 1096 (1979)

(Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari);

Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224–25 (1961)

(“In our jurisprudence guilt is personal,” and

15

punishment must bear a “substantial” “relationship”

to “the concept of personal guilt.”).

At the foundation of that inquiry is the defendant’s

specific, voluntary conduct. See Model Penal Code

§ 2.01(1) (“A person is not guilty of an offense unless

his liability is based on conduct that includes a

voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of

which he is physically capable.”). Imposing criminal

sanctions based on the criminal conduct of others

(absent a specific legal relationship giving rise to

vicarious liability, see id. § 2.06) is anathema to

foundational notions of justice. See Elfbrandt v.

Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 17–19 (1966) (A law that “rests

on the doctrine of ‘guilt by association’” and is not

“narrowly drawn to define and punish specific

conduct” “cannot stand”). Punishment must instead

be tailored to the defendant’s actual role and behavior.

The individual’s conduct before and after an

offense matters as well. Criminal history, remorse,

and restitution are staples of criminal sentencing. See

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines §§ 3E1.1, §4A1.1, 5K1.1.

Substantial assistance can merit express departures

from what would otherwise be a statutory minimum

penalty. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). And post-conviction

conduct can likewise affect the sentence a defendant

actually serves—through institutional good time

credits, program completion, second-look policies, and

similar programs.

See id. §§ 3582(c)(1)(A),

3621(e)(2)(B), 3624(b); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

§ 1B1.13; see also Sara Cohbra & Becky Feldman, The

Second Look Movement: An Assessment of the Nation’s

Sentence Review Laws, The Sentencing Project (2025),

https://perma.cc/VAY5-JDBR. These considerations

reflect the ordinary judgment that punishment should

16

respond to the individual before the court, not merely

to the category of offense.

Other circumstances may further reduce or

increase personal blameworthiness. Defenses such as

entrapment, self-defense, duress, and necessity bear

directly on culpability and therefore on the

punishment an offense warrants.

See Paul H.

Robinson, 2 Criminal Law Defenses §§ 124, 132–34,

177, 209 (2026). Such factors directly impact a

defendant’s degree of personal culpability and the

concomitant measure of punishment that it warrants.

See, e.g., Act of Feb. 15, 1779, 1779 Vt. Acts & Resolves

153–54 (carveout for punishment for manslaughter

“in the just and necessary defence of … life, or the life

of any other”).

Intent is another central measure of culpability.

Criminal law generally requires proof of a guilty

mind. See Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 734

(2015) (In general, “a guilty mind is ‘a necessary

element in the indictment and proof of every crime.’”

(citation omitted)). The notion that punishment

mirrors intent stems from the “intense individualism”

of the Founding Era, see Morissette v. United States,

342 U.S. 246, 251–52 (1952), when legislatures

recognized that the motivation for a crime often is just

as important a measure of culpability as the crime

itself. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 156,

170 (recognizing exception to forfeiture requirement

for accidents or mistakes); Act of Feb. 1779, 1779 Vt.

Acts & Resolves 99 (penalty reduced in light of

subjective belief of a legal right to act). Today, that

concept is so engrained in our jurisprudence that

courts will typically “interpret[] criminal statutes to

include broadly applicable scienter requirements,

17

even where the statute by its terms does not contain

them.” United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513

U.S. 64, 70 (1994).

Beyond

conduct

and

intent,

individual

characteristics likewise bear on culpability. This

Court has recognized that disabilities in areas of

reasoning, judgment, and impulse control are “factors

which may call for a less severe penalty.” Moore v.

Texas, 581 U.S. 1, 12 (2017). Relatedly, juvenile

offenders exhibit “diminished culpability” such that

“they are less deserving of the most severe

punishments.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471

(2012). More generally, a sentencing court must be

able to consider the offender’s history and

characteristics and any mitigating circumstances.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (directing sentencing courts

to consider of “the history and characteristics of the

defendant”).

Throughout these precedents, the principle is the

same: punishment must be calibrated to the

individual’s degree of personal culpability. Assessing

personal culpability requires consideration of a range

of penologically significant factors, including specific

offense conduct, mitigating circumstances, pre- and

post-conviction conduct, intent, and individual

characteristics such as age, personal history, and

diminished capacity. American jurisprudence reflects

a long recognition that each of those considerations is

highly relevant to a defendant’s degree of criminal

responsibility and, by extension, the punishment that

might equitably be imposed on them in response. A

proportionality

inquiry

that

excludes

those

considerations and instead relies on the conduct of

others is punishment by abstraction.

18

B. The Excessive Fines Clause Requires

Meaningful Proportionality Review.

This Court’s decision in Bajakajian provides a

vital measurement to assess the constitutionality of

monetary punishments. There, the Court recognized

that

the

Clause

prohibits

fines

“grossly

disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s

offense.” Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998).

Critically, the Court did not consider the “offense” at

issue in the abstract.

The defendant, Hosep

Bajakajian, was stopped at the airport while

attempting to leave the United States while lawfully

carrying $357,144 in currency, and was subsequently

convicted of failing to report that money to U.S.

customs agents. Id. at 325–26. While the Court

recognized that such currency-reporting requirements

might theoretically encompass major violations by

“tax evaders, drug kingpins, or money launderers,” it

nonetheless focused on “[t]he harm that respondent

caused” through his specific misconduct. Id. at 338–

39 (emphasis added).

The Court noted that

Bajakajian’s hesitation to disclose money to

authorities stemmed from “cultural differences” and a

“distrust for the Government” stemming from his

heritage as a member of the Armenian minority in

Syria. Id. at 326. Finding that he had exhibited only

“a minimal level of culpability,” the Court held that

forfeiture of the entire amount would be

unconstitutionally excessive relative to the measure

of his personal fault. Id. at 337–39; see also State v.

Timbs (Timbs II), 169 N.E.3d 361, 373 (Ind. 2021)

(recognizing, on remand from this Court’s decision in

Timbs v. Indiana, that Bajakajian “did not impute to

the defendant the offenses of others and rather

19

considered what specific harms his specific acts had

caused”).

That focus on individual culpability was employed

more recently in Timbs v. Indiana. See 586 U.S. 146

(2019). In that case, the State of Indiana seized Tyson

Timbs’s Land Rover following his convictions of

dealing in a controlled substance and conspiracy to

commit theft. Id. at 148–49. The trial court found

that the forfeiture had been “grossly excessive” under

the Excessive Fines Clause but the Indiana Supreme

Court reversed, concluding that the Clause did not

apply to the States. Id. This Court reversed,

concluding that the Clause is incorporated against the

States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at

149–50.

In reaching that holding, the Court

emphasized that the Excessive Fines Clause is

historically rooted in the principle that a person

should be fined only “after the manner of [his] fault.”

Id. at 151. On remand, the Indiana Supreme Court

applied that principle to conclude that the forfeiture

of Timbs’s SUV was grossly disproportionate to “the

gravity of the underlying offenses and the owner’s

culpability for the property’s criminal use.” Timbs II,

169 N.E.3d at 367. Those distinctly offender-specific

considerations illustrate what has always been

implicit in this Court’s precedent: the Excessive Fines

Clause guarantees every defendant the right to

challenge his fine as grossly disproportional as

applied to him based on a case-by-case assessment of

the factors bearing on his culpability, rather than the

abstract harms associated with the broader category

of offense.

The overwhelming majority of courts applying

Bajakajian have (correctly) interpreted it to require

20

this individualized culpability assessment. Federal

courts of appeals have emphasized that a

proportionality determination must be made “on a

case-by-case basis” and that “[t]he culpability of the

offender should be examined specifically, rather than

examining the gravity of the crime in the abstract.”

United States v. $100,348.00 in U.S. Currency, 354

F.3d 1110, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted);

accord Pimentel v. City of Los Angeles, 974 F.3d 917,

923 (9th Cir. 2020) (“It is critical … that the court

review the specific actions of the violator rather than

by taking an abstract view of the violation.”); United

States v. Facteau, 89 F.4th 1, 45 (1st Cir. 2023)

(Courts must focus on “the culpability of the

individual defendant”), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 137

(2024); Yskamp v. DEA, 163 F.3d 767, 773 (3d Cir.

1998) (similar). State courts have resoundingly

reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., One 1995

Toyota Pick-Up Truck v. District of Columbia, 718

A.2d 558, 565 (D.C. 1998) (noting that “the

[Bajakajian] Court placed its primary emphasis on

the culpability of Bajakajian himself rather than on

the severity of the crime in the abstract);

Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d 153, 189

(Pa. 2017) (excessiveness standard is “defendantculpability focused, rather than centered on the

severity of the crime in the abstract.”). To impose

punitive violations in the abstract without

consideration of individual culpability would be

tantamount, these courts have reasoned, to “placing

full responsibility for the ‘war on drugs’ on the

shoulders of every individual claimant.” United

States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 37 (2d

Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 815 (1992). The Excessive

Fines Clause—and our country’s longstanding

21

tradition of personal accountability for criminal

misconduct in which it is rooted—demands greater

tailoring.

C. The Alaska Supreme Court’s Approach

Conflicts with This Court’s Precedent

Connecting Individualized Punishment

with Individual Fault.

The Alaska Supreme Court’s decision focused on

the broad scope of Mr. Jouppi’s offense, divorced from

his individualized conduct. The court acknowledged

that Jouppi’s offense was a misdemeanor but treated

the circumstances of his violation as “not particularly

relevant,” including whether his conduct was part of a

broader pattern of criminal activity. App. 26a. Rather

than tailor punishment to personal culpability based

on Jouppi’s characteristics, mitigating circumstances,

and conduct before, during, and after the offense, the

court zoomed out to a stratospheric level of

abstraction. It noted that Jouppi, solely by virtue of

his violation, fell within the “class of persons targeted

by the statute.” App. 20a (emphasis added). It

overlooked the (de minimis) harm caused by Jouppi’s

specific conduct in favor of highlighting the general

consequences of “[a]lcohol abuse in rural Alaska,”

App. 24a—a consideration many steps removed from

almost transporting a customer with a single visible

six-pack of beer. Finally, it held that remand was

unnecessary because “any” findings by the trial court

would not alter its conclusion that the forfeiture was

not grossly disproportional. App. 25a (emphasis

added). Those features reveal a purely categorical

inquiry, not the case-specific assessment Bajakajian

requires.

22

By minimizing the “relevan[ce]” of individualized

culpability determinations, see App. 26a, the decision

below conflicts with this Court’s jurisprudence

specifically interpreting the Excessive Fines Clause.

Like Bajakajian and Timbs, Jouppi’s offense conduct

was exceedingly minor relative to the scope of

behavior covered by his statute of violation. Yet

rather than faithfully apply Bajakajian’s defendantspecific proportionality analysis (which considered,

among other things, the defendant’s unique cultural

background and specific misconduct), the Alaska

Supreme Court eschewed customized assessments in

favor of an abstract review of the means-end fit

between the underlying statute and the conduct of

others and broad societal ills it seeks to address. In

doing so, it paid minimal attention to the actual

characteristics of the offender and circumstances of

the offense—the foundational components of

culpability.

Compare App. 26a (finding it “not

particularly relevant whether Jouppi’s offense was

part of a larger pattern of criminal activity”), with

Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337 n.12 (finding it “highly

relevant” that defendant’s offense is “unrelated to any

other crime”).

If condoned here, the Alaska Supreme Court’s

approach would allow the State to justify an otherwise

excessive forfeiture solely by identifying a serious

problem and placing the defendant within the

statute’s target class.

That is consideration of

legislative purpose to the exclusion of all else, not

proportionality review. Such an approach cannot be

squared with the Excessive Fines Clause, which

requires a court to ask what this defendant did, how

culpable he was, what harm his conduct caused, and

23

whether the punishment imposed is grossly

disproportionate to his offense. Because the decision

below refused to conduct any meaningful

individualized inquiry here, it should be reversed.

Moreover, the court’s exclusive reliance on broad

social consequences is incompatible with the

constitutional

premise

that

individuals

are

accountable only for their own criminal acts. The key

question is the gravity of Jouppi’s offense and his

culpability, not the gravity of alcohol abuse

throughout rural Alaska.

III. A Defendant-Specific Proportionality Rule

Is More Administrable and Better Reflects

Real-World Punishment.

A defendant-specific rule is not only compelled by

the Excessive Fines Clause’s text, history, and

precedent; it also is both more principled and more

workable.

A. Clear, Administrable Standards Are

Essential

to

Meaningful

Eighth

Amendment Review.

Any judgment about the gravity of an offense “will

be inherently imprecise,” but that imprecision does

not authorize courts to abandon constitutional

criteria. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336. It instead

underscores the need for a disciplined inquiry

grounded in facts courts routinely evaluate in

criminal cases. A defendant-specific review supplies

that discipline: it asks what the defendant did, what

he intended, what role he played, what harm resulted,

and what other circumstances bear on the sanction.

By contrast, an abstract-gravity inquiry invites courts

to select among hypothetical harms and policy

24

judgments that provide no consistent measure of the

punishment’s severity.

Courts can apply a nonexclusive set of familiar

factors: the defendant’s actual conduct; mens rea;

whether the conduct was completed or attempted; the

quantity involved; the defendant’s role; actual or

intended harm; prior record; any connection to

broader criminal activity; the applicable statutory fine

range; other sanctions imposed; and the forfeiture’s

effect on the defendant’s livelihood. These factors do

not create a rigid formula. Rather, they ensure that

the proportionality judgment remains anchored to the

offender and offense before the court, as the Clause

requires.

Jouppi’s case shows why those factors matter;

properly applied, they would not lead to the illogical

analysis undertaken by the Alaska Supreme Court.

The Alaska Supreme Court concluded that “only one

instance” of a passenger carrying six beers into a dry

village, “unconnected to other criminal activity,” is

“more serious than” removing $357,144 from the

United States without the federal government’s

knowledge—even though neither case involved proof

of “a nefarious purpose.” App. 19a–20a; Bajakajian,

524 U.S. at 337–38. But unlike Bajakajian, where the

Court found the harm “minimal,” the State’s theory

here depended on harm that was entirely

hypothetical. See App. 24a. The hypothetical harm

also “caused no loss to the public fisc”; to the extent

any financial consequence exists, it arose only because

the State chose to prosecute and seek forfeiture.

Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 339.

25

An abstract-gravity rule like the one applied by the

Alaska Supreme Court also undermines the

protections afforded to defendants in the criminal

justice system. Defense counsel must advise clients

about plea offers and the likely consequences of

conviction.

That advice becomes unreliable if

forfeiture exposure depends on broad social harms

that the defendant did not admit, the jury did not find,

and the defendant’s conduct did not cause.

A

defendant-specific rule, by contrast, lets counsel and

courts assess consequences using facts tied to the

charged conduct and the defendant’s culpability.

This case is illustrative. The state trial court judge

concluded that harm was minimal because the beer on

Mr. Jouppi’s airplane was of such a small quantity

that it could have been for the passenger’s sole

consumption or that of the passenger’s family. App.

46a–47a. The Alaska Supreme Court nevertheless

upheld the constitutionality of the forfeiture of

Jouppi's airplane “as a matter of law” by looking

beyond the facts of his offense and focusing on the

generalized harms from alcohol abuse—crime, death,

and public-health costs—across rural Alaska. App.

2a, 24a. The difference is not a mere disagreement

about a marginal fact; it is the predictable

consequence of two fundamentally different methods.

One examines the offense proved.

The other

substitutes the conduct of others and generalized

social ills.

Without a defendant-specific rule,

forfeiture exposure becomes unpredictable and plea

advice becomes guesswork.

26

B. An Abstract-Gravity Rule Is Also IllSuited to Assessing Impacts on a

Defendant’s Livelihood.

Individualized review also allows courts to

consider the actual consequences that a monetary

punishment will have for a particular defendant.

Though not at issue in this case because the Jouppi

challenges only the gross disproportionality of the

forfeiture of his plane, a large fine or forfeiture may

also threaten a defendant’s livelihood.

For example, forfeited property can itself be a

livelihood asset.

Courts have recognized that

property may support the defendant’s primary source

of income. See e.g., United States v. 427 & 429 Hall

St., 74 F.3d 1165, 1172 (11th Cir. 1996) (recognizing

that “the legitimate businesses that [the defendant]

ran off the property … were his primary source of

livelihood”). The same is true of vehicles, equipment,

and other property used in a person’s occupation.

Losing such an asset can eliminate work, force highcost borrowing, or destabilize a household in ways the

asset’s nominal market value does not capture. Aliza

M. Tresser, Towing After Timbs: Why Vehicle

Impoundment Violates the Excessive Fines Clause, 58

Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 1, 3 (2024) (discussing “a

woman who would lose her job if she did not get her

car back in time to go to work but who did not have

the nearly $900 it would cost; a father who

desperately needed to pick up his children; a small

business owner whose business relied on his thenimpounded truck and who took out a payday loan with

50% interest to retrieve the truck after losing four

days of income from the tow”).

27

A forfeiture in the form of a money judgment can

also be so large that it puts the defendant perpetually

in debt for the rest of his life, no matter how much

money he might ever obtain by any legal means in the

future. As a result, the defendant can lose any ability

to earn a living ever again

Courts cannot assess a forfeiture’s effect on a

defendant’s livelihood accurately without considering

the property’s function in the defendant’s life and

other individualized aspects of the defendant’s

financial situation. The Court should not sanction a

method of assessing the gross disproportionality that

diverges from the individualistic way the Eighth

Amendment requires fines to be tested to avoid

destroying a defendant’s livelihood.

* * *

The Excessive Fines Clause requires courts to

evaluate the conduct that gave rise to the sanction,

the defendant’s culpability, the actual or intended

harm, and the punishment’s real-world effect on the

particular defendant.

That rule preserves the

judiciary’s historical role as a check on legislative and

executive overreach and ensures that the Excessive

Fines Clause remains a constitutional limit, not a

paper tiger that allows the imposition of punishment

based solely on society’s broader ills.

28

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, this Court should reverse the

judgment of the Supreme Court of Alaska.

Respectfully submitted,

Hassan Ahmad

Counsel of Record

Matthew J. Glover

Larissa Davis

Logan Kirkpatrick

Noah C. Zimmermann

COVINGTON & BURLING LLP

850 Tenth Street NW

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 662-6000

hahmad@cov.com

Jeffrey L. Fisher

Co-Chair, Amicus Committee

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS

1660 L Street NW, 12th Floor

Washington, DC 20036

September 10, 2026

Counsel for Amicus Curiae