Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Atlas Turner, Inc., Petitioner v. Donna B. Welch, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Melvin G. Welch, Deceased, et al.
Supreme Court briefAug 18, 2025
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. 25-
IN THE
pìéêÉãÉ=`çìêí=çÑ=íÜÉ=råáíÉÇ=pí~íÉë=
_______________
ATLAS TURNER, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
DONNA B. WELCH, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Melvin G. Welch, and
PETER D. PROTOPAPAS, in his capacity as Receiver for
Atlas Turner, Inc.,
Respondents.
_______________
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The Supreme Court Of South Carolina
_______________
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
_______________
CHRISTOPHER E. MILLS
Counsel of Record
SPERO LAW LLC
557 East Bay Street
#22251
Charleston, SC 29413
(843) 606-0640
cmills@spero.law
Counsel for Petitioner
QUESTION PRESENTED
The U.S. Constitution imposes due-process limits
on the jurisdiction of state and federal courts. Those
limits differ depending on the type of jurisdiction the
court seeks to exercise—either “in personam” jurisdiction over persons, or “in rem” jurisdiction over property. In the decision below, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that, where a trial court has specific
personal jurisdiction over a defendant, it also has in
rem jurisdiction over the defendant’s property, even if
that property is located beyond the territorial boundaries of South Carolina—conflating “in personam” and
“in rem” jurisdiction and deepening a lower-court
split.
The question presented is whether the Due Process Clause permits a court with specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant to exercise in rem jurisdiction over the defendant’s out-of-territory property.
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
In addition to the parties listed in the caption, the
following were parties to the proceedings below: Advance Auto Parts, Inc.; American Honda Motor Co.,
Inc.; Atlas Asbestos Co; Bahnson, Inc.; Covil Corporation; Daniel International Corporation; Davis Mechanical Contractors, Inc.; Ellington Insulation Company, Inc.; Fluor Constructors International f/k/a
Fluor Corporation; Fluor Constructors International,
Inc.; Fluor Daniel Services Corporation; Fluor Enterprises, Inc.; General Parts, Inc. individually and as
successor-in-interest to Carquest Corporation;
Goodrich Corporation f/k/a The B. F. Goodrich Company; The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company; Graybar Electric Company, Inc.; Honeywell International,
Inc. individually and as successor-in-interest to Allied
Signal, Inc., as successor to Bendix Corporation;
Morse Tec LLC f/k/a Borgwarner Morse Tec LLC, and
successor-by-merger to Borg-Warner Corporation; Occidental Chemical Corporation as successor to Durez
Corporation; O’reilly Automotive Stores, Inc.; Paramount Global f/k/a Viacomcbs Inc., f/k/a CBS Corporation, a Delaware corporation f/k/a Viacom, Inc., successor-by-merger to CBS Corporation, a Pennsylvania
corporation, f/k/a Westinghouse Electric Corporation;
Pneumo Abex LLC successor-in-interest to Abex Corporation; Redco Corporation f/k/a Crane Co.; Reinz
Wisconsin Gasket LLC f/k/a and/or successor to Reinz
Wisconsin Gasket Co. and Wisconsin Gasket Manufacturing Co., a wholly owned subsidiary of Dco LLC;
Rust Engineering & Construction, Inc.; Rust International Inc.; Southern Insulation, Inc.; Spirax Sarco,
Inc.; Union Carbide Corporation; Westrock MWV,
LLC individually and as successor-in-interest to
iii
Westvaco; ZF Active Safety US Inc. f/k/a KelseyHayes Company.
Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 29.6, counsel state
that Atlas Turner, Inc., is a wholly owned subsidiary
of Mazarin, Inc., a publicly traded company.
iv
RULE 14.1(b)(iii) STATEMENT
Welch v. Atlas Turner, Inc., No. 2023-001096
(S.C.) (judgment entered May 21, 2025)
Welch v. 3M Co., No. 2023-CP-40-03834 (S.C.
Ct. Common Pleas, 5th Cir.) (receivership order
entered June 20, 2023)
There are no additional proceedings in any court
that are directly related to this case.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED...........................................i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND RULE 29.6
STATEMENT ............................................................. ii
RULE 14.1(b)(iii) STATEMENT ................................ iv
TABLE OF APPENDICES .......................................vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................... viii
OPINIONS BELOW .................................................... 1
JURISDICTION .......................................................... 1
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED ...... 2
INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 2
STATEMENT .............................................................. 5
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ......... 9
I.
THE DECISION BELOW DEEPENS A SPLIT
REGARDING COURTS’ IN REM
JURISDICTION OVER EXTRATERRITORIAL
PROPERTY ....................................................... 11
A. Three State Supreme Courts Have
Maintained The Distinction
Between In Personam And In Rem
Jurisdiction .............................................. 11
B. Two Appellate Courts Have Upheld
Assertions Of In Rem Jurisdiction
Over Extraterritorial Property ................ 14
vi
II. THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME
COURT’S DECISION IS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF IN
REM JURISDICTION EMBODIED IN THIS
COURT’S PRECEDENTS .................................... 16
A. Unlike In Personam Jurisdiction
Over A Person, In Rem Jurisdiction
Over Property Is Territorially
Bounded .................................................... 17
B. The South Carolina Supreme Court
Conflated In Personam And In Rem
Jurisdiction .............................................. 20
III. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IMPLICATES
IMPORTANT FEDERALISM AND FOREIGNRELATIONS CONCERNS.................................... 25
A. The Extraterritorial Receivership
Order Impermissibly Injects South
Carolina Courts Into Foreign
Relations ................................................... 25
B. South Carolina’s Extraterritorial
Receivership Practices Have
Already Fostered International
Discord ...................................................... 27
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 32
vii
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
APPENDIX A: Opinion of the Supreme Court
of South Carolina (May 21, 2025)....................... 1a
APPENDIX B: Order of the South Carolina
Court of Common Pleas for the
Fifth Judicial Circuit on Plaintiffs’ Motion
to Appoint a Receiver (June 21, 2023) ............. 30a
APPENDIX C. Order of the Supreme Court
of South Carolina (Jan. 16, 2025) ..................... 39a
APPENDIX D: Constitutional Provisions
Involved ............................................................. 45a
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ............................. 45a
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 ............................... 45a
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10 ...................................... 45a
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. v. United
States,
289 U.S. 48 (1933) ................................................ 25
Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez,
955 N.E.2d 884 (Mass. 2011) ............................... 18
Booth v. Clark,
58 U.S. (17 How.) 322 (1854) ............... 8, 19, 22, 23
Boswell’s Lessee v. Otis,
50 U.S. (9 How.) 336 (1850) ................................. 17
Brown v. Brown,
281 P.2d 850 (Wash. 1955) .................................. 13
Buist v. Williams,
62 S.E. 859 (S.C. 1908) ........................................ 21
Chua v. Ekonomou,
1 F.4th 948 (11th Cir. 2021) ................................ 21
Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v.
Watkins,
934 F.2d 1180 (11th Cir. 1991) ...................... 14, 15
City of Jamestown v. Pa. Gas Co.,
1 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1924) ................................. 8, 23
Cox Broad. Corp v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469 (1975) ................................................ 1
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council,
530 U.S. 363 (2000) .............................................. 31
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am.,
481 U.S. 69 (1987) .......................................... 26, 28
ix
Daimler AG v. Bauman,
571 U.S. 117 (2014) .............................................. 27
Dorce v. City of N.Y.,
2 F.4th 82 (2d Cir. 2021) ...................................... 18
Fall v. Eastin,
215 U.S. 1 (1909) .................................................. 19
Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud.
Dist. Ct.,
592 U.S. 351 (2021) .............................................. 19
Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Org.,
606 U.S. 1 (2025) ............................................ 18, 25
Gammon v. Gammon,
684 P.2d 1081 (Mont. 1984) ........................... 12, 13
Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958) ........................................ 17, 19
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945) .............................................. 19
Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles Cnty.,
441 U.S. 434 (1979) .............................................. 27
In re Marriage of Kowalewski,
182 P.3d 959 (Wash. 2008) .................................. 13
Marshall v. Marshall,
547 U.S. 293 (2006) ........................................ 17, 18
Massie v. Watts,
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148 (1810) ................... 8, 22, 23
Moore v. Harper,
600 U.S. 1 (2023) .................................................... 1
Muller v. Dows,
94 U.S. 444 (1876) ...................................... 8, 20, 23
x
Penn Gen. Cas. Co. v. Pennsylvania ex
rel. Schnader,
294 U.S. 189 (1935) .............................................. 21
Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714 (1877) .............................. 17, 18, 20, 24
In re Plan of Arrangement or
Compromise of: Asbestos Corp. Ltd.,
No. 235-11-000008-259 (Canada
Super. Ct. July 30, 2025). .................................... 28
R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver,
171 F.3d 943 (4th Cir. 1999) ................................ 18
Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson,
326 U.S. 120 (1945) ................................................ 1
Republic Nat’l Bank of Miami v. United
States,
506 U.S. 80 (1992) ................................................ 18
Rush v. Savchuk,
444 U.S. 320 (1980) .......................................... 3, 24
SEC v. Peterson,
129 F.4th 599 (9th Cir. 2025) .............................. 21
SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd.,
927 F.3d 830 (5th Cir. 2019) ............................ 8, 21
Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977) ............ 3, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 32
State v. W. Union Fin. Servs., Inc.,
208 P.3d 218 (Ariz. 2009) ............................... 11, 12
Stewart v. Laberee,
185 F. 471 (9th Cir. 1911) .................................... 23
United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324 (1937) .............................................. 26
xi
United States v. Ross,
302 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1962) ................................. 23
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 (1980) .............................................. 25
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ........................................ 25
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ...................................... 25
Statute
15 U.S.C. § 1125 ........................................................ 18
Other Authorities
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure (4th ed. 2025) ................................ 17, 21
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner Atlas Turner, Inc., respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of
the Supreme Court of South Carolina.
OPINIONS BELOW
The South Carolina Supreme Court’s opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the order appointing the Receiver (Pet. App. 1a-29a) is published
at 916 S.E.2d 320. The Order of the South Carolina
Court of Common Pleas for the Fifth Judicial Circuit
appointing the Receiver (Pet. App. 30a-38a) is unpublished.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the South Carolina Supreme
Court was issued on May 21, 2025. Pet. App. 1a-29a.
This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257(a). While there will be “‘further proceedings in
the lower state courts to come,’” the South Carolina
Supreme Court’s decision “‘finally determined the federal issue present’” here—whether the Due Process
Clause permits a South Carolina court to exercise in
rem jurisdiction over Atlas Turner’s out-of-state property. Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1, 16 (2023) (quoting
Cox Broad. Corp v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 477 (1975)).
This Court has jurisdiction because that “‘federal issue, finally decided by the highest court in the State,
will survive and require decision regardless of the outcome of future state-court proceedings.’” Id.; see also
Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 480 (explaining that, in Radio
Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 127
(1945), a federal issue was held reviewable despite a
pending state accounting proceeding because
2
“[n]othing that could happen in the course of the accounting, short of settlement of the case, would foreclose or make unnecessary decision on the federal
question”).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Relevant constitutional provisions are reproduced
in the Appendix. Pet. App. 45a-46a.
INTRODUCTION
This Court’s review is warranted to resolve an important and longstanding disagreement among lower
courts regarding a court’s authority to exercise direct
control—i.e., in rem jurisdiction—over a defendant’s
property located outside the court’s territorial bounds.
The South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision that a
state trial court has exclusive in rem jurisdiction over
a defendant’s out-of-state property just because the
court found it has specific personal jurisdiction over
the defendant guts deeply rooted due-process protections and sets the stage for conflict among sovereigns—both within the United States and beyond.
A South Carolina trial court with jurisdiction over
all asbestos litigation in the State appointed a Receiver over petitioner Atlas Turner, Inc., a Canadian
corporation headquartered in Québec that has no
property in South Carolina and has never done business in the State. Like multiple other receiverships
established by the same trial court over foreign (both
U.S. and non-U.S.) corporations, the trial court
treated Atlas Turner’s contractual insurance rights in
connection with this asbestos personal-injury claim as
“assets” over which it could exercise in rem jurisdiction and appointed a South Carolina Receiver as an
arm of the court to “marshal” those assets. Pet. App.
38a. The South Carolina Supreme Court did not find
3
that Atlas Turner’s insurance rights were assets located in South Carolina but nevertheless upheld the
trial court’s extraterritorial assertion of in rem jurisdiction over Atlas Turner’s assets because the court
had found that it could exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Atlas Turner.
That holding deepens an existing conflict about
the territorial limits on in rem jurisdiction. At least
three state supreme courts have held that a court’s
personal jurisdiction over a defendant does not give
the court authority to exercise in rem jurisdiction over
the defendant’s out-of-state property. In the decision
below, the South Carolina Supreme Court took the opposite view, aligning itself with the Eleventh Circuit
to hold that a court’s specific personal jurisdiction
over a defendant confers in rem jurisdiction to reach
the defendant’s property wherever that property is located.
That disagreement is ripe for this Court’s resolution. This Court has long distinguished between jurisdiction over persons and jurisdiction over property.
See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 (1977). And
this Court has not hesitated to grant review to reject
assertions of judicial power that conflate in rem and
in personam jurisdiction, see, e.g., Rush v. Savchuk,
444 U.S. 320, 328 (1980), and to make clear that jurisdiction over property extends only to a court’s territorial limits, see Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 199. This Court
has not had the chance to clarify, however, that those
territorial limits on in rem jurisdiction remain intact
even where a court finds that it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The Court should take this
opportunity to resolve the lower courts’ division on
this fundamental and recurring jurisdictional question.
4
The issue is exceptionally important, as the territorial limits on courts’ in rem jurisdiction serve a critical constitutional role: ensuring that state courts do
not intrude on other States’ sovereign control over
property within their borders—a basic prerequisite to
the functioning of a federal system—or on the federal
government’s exclusive control over foreign affairs
and foreign commerce in cases, like this one, where
the in rem order extends to assets in another country.
By wresting away Atlas Turner’s authority over its
contractual insurance rights, the receivership upheld
by the South Carolina Supreme Court risks fomenting
friction in the United States’ diplomatic and commercial relations with Canada, an important American
ally and trading partner. In fact, the prospect of international strife has already come to pass in two
other cases where the same South Carolina trial court
imposed similar receiverships. A Canadian court condemned an order establishing a similar receivership
over a different Canadian corporation as “astonishing.” And an order purporting to establish a South
Carolina receivership over an English company led to
dueling orders from a U.K. court and the South Carolina courts about the receivership’s validity and the
legitimacy of each other’s decisions.
This Court should grant review to make clear that
a court’s jurisdiction over property never extends beyond the court’s territorial limits—even where the
court has specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant. This bright-line rule is consistent with constitutional structure as well as relevant history and
tradition. And it will prevent state courts from interfering with property located in other States and from
entangling themselves in matters of foreign affairs
and foreign commerce entrusted by the Constitution
exclusively to the federal government.
5
STATEMENT
1. All asbestos litigation in South Carolina is currently assigned to a single trial-court judge, the Honorable Jean H. Toal, the former Chief Justice of the
South Carolina Supreme Court whom a successor
handpicked to oversee the State’s asbestos docket.
Chief Justice Toal has made the appointment of receivers over asbestos defendants the centerpiece of
her case-management strategy, deploying it time and
again with respect to both South Carolina corporations and out-of-state corporations and with respect to
both dissolved and active corporations. This case
arises from the trial court’s decision to appoint a receiver over Atlas Turner, an active corporation organized under the laws of Canada, with its principal
place of business in Québec. See Affidavit of Richard
Dufour, ¶ 4, Welch v. 3M Co., No. 2022-CP-40-03834
(S.C. Ct. Common Pleas, 5th Cir. May 15, 2023). Atlas
Turner has no property in South Carolina and has
never done business in the State. See id. ¶¶ 5-9.
This asbestos personal-injury action was filed by
plaintiff in South Carolina state court to recover for
the death of her husband and was assigned to Judge
Toal. Pet. App. 3a-4a. Atlas Turner was named as a
defendant and entered an appearance objecting to
personal jurisdiction. The trial court overruled that
objection. Pet. App. 4a. Atlas Turner subsequently
filed an answer and complied with discovery requests
to the extent it could—Atlas Turner terminated its asbestos business in the mid-1980s and has no employees familiar with that long-abandoned business—and
to the extent compatible with its legal obligations under the Québec Business Concerns Records Act, which
limits Québec companies’ ability to comply with discovery demands. See Pet. App. 4a-5a; Final Brief of
6
Appellant 2-3, Welch v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., No.
2023-001096 (S.C. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2024). Plaintiffs
moved to hold Atlas Turner in contempt and to strike
its pleadings for supposedly failing to participate in
discovery, and to appoint a receiver for Atlas Turner.
See Pet. App. 5a.
The trial court granted both motions, holding Atlas Turner in contempt and striking its pleadings, and
appointing a local lawyer, Peter Protopapas, as Receiver for Atlas Turner. See Pet. App. 5a, 30a-38a.
The Receivership Order purported to grant the Receiver broad powers over Atlas Turner’s contractual
insurance rights, including the powers to “fully administer all insurance assets of Atlas Turner, Inc.”; to
“obtain from any financial institution, bank, credit union, savings and loan or title, credit bureau or any
other third party, any financial records belonging to
or pertaining to the insurance assets of Atlas”; and to
“open any mail which is reasonably believed to contain
information relating to insurance assets addressed to
[Atlas Turner] and addressed to any business owned
by” Atlas Turner. Pet. App. 36a-37a.
The Atlas Turner Receivership Order represents
the twenty-fourth time the same South Carolina trial
court has appointed Mr. Protopapas as receiver for an
asbestos defendant over the past seven years. Several
other receiverships also involve foreign (U.S. and nonU.S.) corporations, including receiverships over Payne
& Keller Company, a dissolved Texas corporation,
Cape Intermediate Holdings Limited (“Cape”), an active English corporation, and Asbestos Corporation
Limited (“ACL”), an active Canadian corporation.1
1
The Cape receivership order refers to “Cape plc,” but the
South Carolina trial court later stated that it meant to refer to
7
2. Atlas Turner appealed the trial court’s orders
sanctioning it for contempt and appointing the Receiver. After briefing was completed, the South Carolina Court of Appeals requested certification of the appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, which accepted the case. Order, Welch v. Advance Auto Parts,
Inc., No. 2024-001180 (S.C. Aug. 20, 2024).
On May 21, 2025, the South Carolina Supreme
Court issued an opinion affirming the appointment of
the Receiver and upholding the Receiver’s authority
to exercise Atlas Turner’s contractual insurance
rights in connection with this case. The court held
that the trial court had authority under South Carolina law to appoint the Receiver as “an officer of the
court” to “marshal and collect—to receive—the assets
of the corporation.” Pet. App. 16a-21a. The Receiver,
the court held, is “a ‘hand of the court’” and “exercises
power and control over the defendant’s assets and
property specified in the appointment order,” “administer[ing] them at the court’s discretion for the benefit
of creditors and the debtor’s estate.” Pet. App. 17a.
Critically, the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected Atlas Turner’s argument that the “trial court
had no jurisdiction to appoint a Receiver because [Atlas Turner] neither owns nor possesses any property
within the borders of South Carolina.” Pet. App. 21a;
see also Final Brief of Appellant 6, Welch v. Advance
Cape Intermediate Holdings Limited; Cape plc has at all relevant times been a separate entity from Cape Intermediate Holdings Limited and is incorporated under the laws of the Bailiwick
of Jersey. See Order ¶¶ 1, 47, 64, 138-40, Cape Intermediate
Holdings Ltd. v. Protopapas, [2024] EWHC (Ch) 2999 (Eng.),
https://perma.cc/8UGC-J2Q5 (“Cape Order”). Atlas Turner currently shares a common corporate parent with ACL but the two
companies were unrelated during the periods at issue in the personal-injury lawsuits against each of them.
8
Auto Parts, Inc., No. 2023-001096 (S.C. Ct. App. Jan.
16, 2024) (arguing that a receiver’s jurisdiction is limited to the territorial jurisdiction of the court appointing him). Relying on precedent from this Court and
other federal courts, the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that, because the trial court found that it
“has personal jurisdiction” over Atlas Turner, “‘it is
immaterial that the res is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court.’” Pet. App. 22a-23a (quoting City
of Jamestown v. Pa. Gas Co., 1 F.2d 871, 878 (2d Cir.
1924)). To support this proposition, the South Carolina Supreme Court relied on Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S.
(6 Cranch) 148 (1810), which held that “an equity
court’s jurisdiction ‘is sustainable wherever the person be found, although lands not within the jurisdiction of that court may be affected by the decree.’” Pet.
App. 22a (quoting Massie, 10 U.S. at 160); see also Pet.
App. 22a-23a (citing Muller v. Dows, 94 U.S. 444, 449
(1876); Booth v. Clark, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 322, 332
(1854)). Based on Massie and other federal decisions,
the court concluded that “any Insurance Assets owned
by Atlas Turner that may cover [the decedent’s] injuries are properly within the Receivership estate,
meaning those Insurance Assets are within South
Carolina’s exclusive jurisdiction.” Pet. App. 26a-27a
(citing SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 927 F.3d 830,
840 (5th Cir. 2019)) (emphases added).2
2
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the Receiver’s powers over Atlas Turner’s contractual insurance rights
for purposes of this case, it held that “equity only allows insurance policies that have the potential to cover [the decedent’s] injuries to be included in this definition.” Pet. App. 27a. The South
Carolina Supreme Court thus appears to have vacated language
in the Receivership Order that purported to grant the Receiver
broader powers to control Atlas Turner’s corporate affairs. Pet.
App. 36a-37a.
9
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision
deepens a split among lower courts on the due-process
limits on in rem jurisdiction, is incompatible with this
Court’s precedent addressing the fundamental distinction between in rem and in personam jurisdiction,
and raises surpassingly important federalism and foreign-relations issues. This Court should grant the petition.
The South Carolina Supreme Court exacerbated
the existing division among lower courts on whether a
court with personal jurisdiction over a defendant can
therefore also exercise in rem jurisdiction over the defendant’s property located beyond the court’s territorial limits. At least three state supreme courts have
held that a court cannot exercise direct control over a
defendant’s property located outside the court’s territorial boundaries merely because the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The Eleventh
Circuit and the South Carolina Supreme Court have
reached the opposite conclusion, relying on personal
jurisdiction over the defendant to exercise in rem jurisdiction over the defendant’s extraterritorial property.
In siding with the Eleventh Circuit, the South
Carolina Supreme Court wrongly conflated in personam and in rem jurisdiction. This Court has long recognized the two as distinct types of jurisdiction, the
former over a person and the latter over property.
While this Court’s approach to in personam jurisdiction has evolved over time—abandoning a focus on
presence in favor of a focus on minimum contacts—it
has never wavered from the rule that a court’s in rem
jurisdiction does not extend extraterritorially. This
10
case provides the Court a valuable opportunity to clarify and confirm the continuing vitality of that bedrock
due-process rule.
The question presented is extremely important, as
it implicates grave federalism and foreign-policy concerns. Permitting a state court with specific personal
jurisdiction over a defendant to exercise in rem jurisdiction over all of the defendant’s property—wherever
located—would invite jurisdictional conflicts among
States seeking to exert control over the same property.
And, of course, exclusive jurisdiction cannot be
shared. The implications of the resulting jurisdictional conflict are especially pernicious in this case because Atlas Turner is a Canadian corporation. By
reaching beyond South Carolina’s borders—and beyond the borders of the United States—to control the
insurance rights of a Canadian company, the South
Carolina trial court risks injecting discord into the
United States-Canada relationship and fomenting retaliatory measures. Indeed, similar receivership orders issued by the same state trial court have already
led to sharply conflicting rulings from the South Carolina courts and from Canadian and English courts regarding the receiver’s supposed control over other foreign corporations.
Avoiding that type of State-fomented international strife is precisely why the Constitution bars
States from interfering with foreign affairs and foreign commerce and instead reserves those matters exclusively to the federal government. The territorial
limits on courts’ in rem jurisdiction reinforce that critical structural constraint and should be reaffirmed by
this Court.
11
I.
THE DECISION BELOW DEEPENS A SPLIT
REGARDING COURTS’ IN REM JURISDICTION
OVER EXTRATERRITORIAL PROPERTY.
The South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision
compounds an existing split regarding whether due
process permits a court with personal jurisdiction over
a defendant to exercise in rem jurisdiction over that
defendant’s out-of-territory property. This Court
should resolve that disagreement.
A. Three State Supreme Courts Have
Maintained The Distinction Between In
Personam And In Rem Jurisdiction.
The Arizona, Montana, and Washington Supreme
Courts have held that in personam jurisdiction over a
defendant does not permit a court to exercise in rem
jurisdiction over the defendant’s property located outside the court’s territory.
1. In State v. Western Union Financial Services,
Inc., 208 P.3d 218 (Ariz. 2009), the Arizona Supreme
Court held that it could not exercise jurisdiction over
Western Union money transfers sent from other
States to Mexico even though Western Union was subject to personal jurisdiction in Arizona. Id. at 219.
The State issued warrants to seize certain Western
Union wire transfers involving proceeds of “human
smuggling and narcotics trafficking” that often
stemmed from “activities in Arizona.” Id. The various
warrants gave the State authority “to seize person-toperson wire transfers” sent “from twenty-eight states
other than Arizona to twenty-six locations in” Mexico.
Id. Western Union moved to quash one of the warrants as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause.
12
Two key facts were undisputed: (1) Western Union was subject to the Arizona state court’s personal
jurisdiction, and (2) the warrant, which “authorize[d]
seizure of specific property,” was an exercise of “in rem
jurisdiction.” W. Union, 208 P.3d at 220, 222. The
question was therefore whether the state court could
“properly exercise in rem jurisdiction over Western
Union money transfers originating in other states and
directed to Sonora, Mexico.” Id. at 221.
The court held that it could not. “[A] necessary
prerequisite to in rem jurisdiction,” the court explained, “is the location of the subject property within
the forum state.” W. Union, 208 P.3d at 222. Because
the wire transfers from different States to a foreign
country were not “‘located’ in Arizona,” id. at 226, exercising in rem jurisdiction violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, id. at 227.
The trial court’s in personam jurisdiction over
Western Union made no difference. The court could
“issu[e] in personam orders to Western Union governing the disposition of wire transfers involving the proceeds of racketeering conducted in th[e] state.” W. Union, 208 P.3d at 220. But the fact that “Western Union
c[ould] be sued” in Arizona did not mean that the
seized property was “itself located in Arizona.” Id. at
223. And “the basic requirement” of “in rem jurisdiction,” the court held, is “the presence of property in the
forum state.” Id. at 222.
2. The Montana Supreme Court similarly held
that a state court cannot exercise direct control over a
defendant’s out-of-state property just because it has
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Gammon v.
Gammon, 684 P.2d 1081, 1085 (Mont. 1984). In Gammon, an Oregon court had purported to grant a wife
13
title to her husband’s land in Montana as part of divorce proceedings. But the Montana Supreme Court
later held that the Oregon court’s order was “void for
want of jurisdiction” insofar as the order “attempted
to directly transfer husband’s Montana real property
to wife.” Id. The court contrasted the invalid direct
attempt to control property with an order merely deciding the parties’ respective rights to the land, only
the latter of which would be permitted based on the
Oregon court’s personal jurisdiction over the parties.
Id. at 1085-87.
3. The Washington Supreme Court reached the
same conclusion. In In re Marriage of Kowalewski,
182 P.3d 959 (Wash. 2008), the court considered
whether the state court could “indirectly affect title”
to property located in Poland “by means of an in personam decree operating on the person over whom it
has jurisdiction.” Id. at 962. The court said yes, drawing a sharp distinction between direct and indirect assertions of authority over out-of-state property. Id.
The court explained: “[A] court in one state does
not have power directly to affect title to real property
located outside the state” because “jurisdiction in rem
(directly over the thing itself) exists only in the state
where the real property is located.” Kowalewski, 182
P.3d at 962 (discussing Brown v. Brown, 281 P.2d 850
(Wash. 1955)). But “a decree that declares the parties’
personal rights or equities” in certain property abroad
“is a valid in personam decree.” Id. at 964. The court
concluded that it could “exercise its coercive powers”
to enforce the personal decree and thus “accomplish
indirectly what it could not do directly.” Id. at 962.
14
B. Two Appellate Courts Have Upheld
Assertions Of In Rem Jurisdiction Over
Extraterritorial Property.
On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit and the
decision below have held that personal jurisdiction
over a defendant permits the court to exercise in rem
jurisdiction over the defendant’s property, wherever
that property is located.
1. In a decision on which the South Carolina Supreme Court relied, Pet. App. 24a, the Eleventh Circuit held that a court may appoint a receiver to “exercise authority over any assets located in foreign countries” based on the court’s “in personam jurisdiction
over” the defendants. Citronelle-Mobile Gathering,
Inc. v. Watkins, 934 F.2d 1180, 1187 (11th Cir. 1991).
In that case, the counterclaim-defendant (“defendant,” for simplicity) had sold crude oil to a Bahamian
company in violation of U.S. export regulations. Id. at
1183. A district court concluded that the defendant
had violated the law and ordered restitution. Id. at
1183-84. Compounding his problems, the defendant
then transferred “millions of dollars” to a Bahamian
corporation he owned. Id. at 1184. The court subsequently appointed a receiver over the defendant’s assets, including over his foreign corporation. Id.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the court’s
order was “an illegitimate expansion of in rem jurisdiction” because it gave “the receiver the right to immediate possession and control of [his] assets,” including in the Bahamas. Citronelle-Mobile, 934 F.2d at
1187. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. It held that,
“when a district court has in personam jurisdiction
over the defendant, [ ]the court may appoint a receiver
to enforce a judgment” and the receiver “may exercise
15
authority over any assets located in foreign countries.” Id. In the Eleventh Circuit’s view, the power
of the receiver over property in “another nation” was
“relatively clear.” Id.
2. In the decision below, the South Carolina Supreme Court similarly held the trial court could appoint a receiver to exercise “exclusive jurisdiction”
over Atlas Turner’s insurance rights located outside
the State—and outside the country. Pet. App. 26a.
Atlas Turner argued that the “trial court had no jurisdiction to appoint a Receiver because [Atlas Turner]
neither owns nor possesses any property within the
borders of South Carolina.” Pet. App. 21a. But the
court rejected that argument, holding, based on supposedly supportive decisions from this Court, that the
trial court’s finding of specific “personal jurisdiction”
made the location of Atlas Turner’s “Insurance Assets” “‘immaterial.’” Pet. App. 22a-23a. The court
therefore held that the Receiver “has the right and
duty to collect and accumulate” Atlas Turner’s insurance even if it is “outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.” Pet. App. 22a, 27a. Those insurance assets,
the court concluded, “are within South Carolina’s exclusive jurisdiction.” Pet. App. 26a.
As a result of this split in authority, the due-process limits on in rem jurisdiction are being applied unevenly across the country. South Carolina courts and
federal courts in the Eleventh Circuit purport to have
the power—even exclusive power—to act directly on
and control property beyond their territorial boundaries. Accordingly, a defendant amenable to specific
personal jurisdiction in South Carolina or in a federal
court within the Eleventh Circuit could have its property located outside of the court’s territorial jurisdiction wrested from its control by the appointment of a
16
receiver. By contrast, a defendant sued in Arizona,
Montana, or Washington would be subject to no such
threat of extraterritorial property exaction. Only this
Court can ensure that defendants’ property rights are
subject to uniform due-process rules that do not vary
based on the particular court in which suit is filed and
a receiver appointed.
II. THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT’S
DECISION
IS
INCOMPATIBLE
WITH
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF IN REM
JURISDICTION EMBODIED IN THIS COURT’S
PRECEDENTS.
The South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents, which have long
distinguished between in personam and in rem jurisdiction. The South Carolina Supreme Court collapsed
the two, allowing the trial court to exercise in rem jurisdiction over Atlas Turner’s insurance assets—
wherever those assets are located—based on the trial
court’s finding of specific personal jurisdiction over Atlas Turner.
While this Court has consistently held that in rem
jurisdiction is limited to property within a court’s territorial bounds, it has never clarified how International Shoe’s “fair play and substantial justice” standard—developed by this Court in cases about in personam jurisdiction—should be applied in the in rem setting. This may explain the South Carolina Supreme
Court’s conflation of these two distinct jurisdictional
doctrines. And it amplifies the need for this Court to
step in, as it has done repeatedly when confronted
with similarly flawed and overreaching theories of
personal jurisdiction. The Court should grant review
to reaffirm and clarify the territorial bounds on in rem
jurisdiction.
17
A. Unlike In Personam Jurisdiction Over
A Person, In Rem Jurisdiction Over
Property Is Territorially Bounded.
From its earliest decisions on the subject, this
Court has distinguished between jurisdiction over a
“‘person’” and jurisdiction over “‘property.’” Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 724 (1877) (quoting Boswell’s Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 336, 346 (1850)).
When a court’s jurisdiction “is based on its authority over the defendant’s person, the action and judgment are denominated ‘in personam,’” which is also
called “personal jurisdiction.” Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 199, 204 (1977) (emphasis added). A court
exercising in personam jurisdiction “can impose a personal obligation on the defendant in favor of the plaintiff.” Id. at 199.
Jurisdiction over property (or a res) is different.
When a court’s jurisdiction “is based on the court’s
power over property,” then “the action is called ‘in
rem’ or ‘quasi in rem.’” Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 199. Rather than imposing any “personal liability on the property owner,” the “effect of a judgment in such a case is
limited to the property that supports jurisdiction.” Id.
In rem jurisdiction “operates directly on the property,”
4A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1070 (4th ed. 2025), and a judgment “affects the interests of all persons in designated property,” Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958) (emphasis
added). In rem jurisdiction is necessarily “exclusive”
because the nature of such jurisdiction is to “control
the disposition of the property.” Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at
722-23; see Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 31112 (2006) (“when one court is exercising in rem jurisdiction over a res, a second court will not assume in
rem jurisdiction over the same res”). Indeed, because
18
in rem jurisdiction binds all the world and is exclusive, it is arguably a more coercive and dramatic assertion of judicial power than in personam jurisdiction.
In rem jurisdiction is not limited to the receivership context of this case. Other examples of in rem
proceedings include civil forfeitures, e.g., Republic
Nat’l Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 84
(1992); admiralty suits, e.g., R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v.
Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 963 (4th Cir. 1999); probate actions, e.g., Marshall, 547 U.S. at 311; foreclosure proceedings, Dorce v. City of N.Y., 2 F.4th 82, 98-99 (2d
Cir. 2021); quiet-title actions, e.g., Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884, 889 n.5 (Mass. 2011); and
trademark claims related to website domain names,
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A).3
The requirements for exercising each type of jurisdiction also differ. In Pennoyer, this Court held that
“no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory.” 95
U.S. at 722. That rule was rooted in the fact that the
“several States are of equal dignity and authority,”
and “every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.” Id.; see Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Org., 606
U.S. 1, 14 (2025) (the Fourteenth Amendment’s jurisdictional rules “emerged . . . as ‘a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective
States’”).
3
Quasi in rem jurisdiction, which was at issue in Shaffer, is
also based on jurisdiction over property but affects only “the interests of particular persons in designated property,” rather than
of all persons. 433 U.S. at 199 & n.17 (emphasis added).
19
But Pennoyer’s reasoning did not stand the test of
time as applied to personal jurisdiction. This Court
came to recognize that “the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than the
mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States on which
the rules of Pennoyer rest,” were “the central concern
of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.” Shaffer, 433
U.S. at 204; see Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 320 (1945) (exercise of personal jurisdiction must
adhere to “our traditional conception of fair play and
substantial justice”). A court thus has in personam
jurisdiction over a defendant that has purposeful
“minimum contacts” with that forum, where the claim
arises out of or relates to those contacts. Int’l Shoe,
326 U.S. at 316; see Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth
Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 359 (2021).
“No equally dramatic change has occurred in the
law governing jurisdiction in rem,” however. Shaffer,
433 U.S. at 205. A court’s authority in that context
remains limited to “property within its territory.” Id.
at 199. As the Court put it in Hanson: “The basis of”
in rem jurisdiction “is the presence of the subject property within the territorial jurisdiction of the forum
State.” 357 U.S. at 246.
The particular type of jurisdiction a court is exercising thus determines the extent to which the court
can exert direct control over property. A court acting
in rem can exert control “over property within its territory.” Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 199. A court exercising
in personam jurisdiction, by contrast, cannot “operate
directly upon the property,” but can “indirectly act
upon real estate” by its “authority over the person,”
which is “made effectual through the coercion of the
defendant.” Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 8, 10 (1909);
see Booth v. Clark, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 322, 332-33
20
(1854); Muller v. Dows, 94 U.S. 444, 449 (1876); Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723. In other words, a court with in
personam jurisdiction over a defendant can order that
defendant to transfer property located outside its territory—and can hold the defendant in contempt if he
fails to do so—but cannot directly transfer the property itself through court order or appointment of a receiver (a person who is an arm of the court and can
have no power broader than the court’s own power)
over the out-of-territory property. See Muller, 94 U.S.
at 449 (a court “having jurisdiction of the person” may
“decree a conveyance by him of land in another
State”).
The South Carolina Supreme Court ignored these
critical distinctions when it exercised direct control
over Atlas Turner’s out-of-state insurance rights.
B. The South Carolina Supreme Court
Conflated In Personam And In Rem
Jurisdiction.
1. The trial court’s Receivership Order over Atlas
Turner—which the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed in relevant part—is a purported exercise of in
rem jurisdiction over property located outside the
State. Atlas Turner is a Canadian corporation that is
headquartered in Québec, has never done business in
South Carolina, and has no property in South Carolina. See Affidavit of Richard Dufour, ¶ 4, Welch v. 3M
Co., No. 2022-CP-40-03834 (S.C. Ct. Common Pleas,
5th Cir. May 15, 2023). And neither the trial court
nor the South Carolina Supreme Court purported to
find that Atlas Turner’s contractual insurance rights
are located in South Carolina. Yet the trial court authorized the Receiver to “fully administer” Atlas
21
Turner’s insurance rights that pertain to plaintiff’s asbestos personal-injury claims against Atlas Turner.
Pet. App. 36a; see supra at 6.
The South Carolina Supreme Court recognized
that the Receivership Order was an exercise of in rem
jurisdiction. In affirming the Receiver’s control over
Atlas Turner’s contractual insurance rights, the court
relied on in rem cases, including case law “recognizing
that insurance policies and proceeds may be part of a
Receivership estate and placed in [a] state court’s exclusive in rem jurisdiction.” Pet. App. 26a (citing SEC
v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 927 F.3d 830, 840 (5th
Cir. 2019)).
On that particular point, the South Carolina Supreme Court was correct. It is well established that
“the appointment of a receiver is in the nature of a
proceeding in rem.” 12 Wright & Miller § 2985; see,
e.g., Penn Gen. Cas. Co. v. Pennsylvania ex rel.
Schnader, 294 U.S. 189, 195 (1935); SEC v. Peterson,
129 F.4th 599, 608 n.11, 612 (9th Cir. 2025); Chua v.
Ekonomou, 1 F.4th 948, 954 (11th Cir. 2021); see also
Buist v. Williams, 62 S.E. 859, 861 (S.C. 1908) (“The
administration of a receiver is a proceeding in rem,
which from its nature can be undertaken and accomplished only once with respect to the same property.”).
2. To justify the trial court’s receivership over
out-of-state property, the South Carolina Supreme
Court disregarded the territorial limits on in rem jurisdiction, impermissibly collapsing in personam and
in rem jurisdiction.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reasoned that
the trial court’s specific personal jurisdiction over a
corporate person, Atlas Turner, meant that it could
22
appoint a receiver with authority “to collect and accumulate” that corporation’s property, wherever that
property is located. Pet. App. 23a, 27a. The court
stated—and relied on cases correctly holding—that a
court with in personam jurisdiction can “order a party
. . . to convey and produce its property and assets, regardless of where they may be located.” Pet. App. 22a
(citing cases). But the trial court did not order Atlas
Turner to turn over its contractual insurance rights.
Instead, the court purported to exercise direct control
over Atlas Turner’s out-of-state insurance rights by
appointing a receiver to “fully administer all insurance assets of Atlas Turner.” Pet. App. 36a. The
South Carolina Supreme Court nevertheless upheld
the trial court’s extraterritorial projection of power,
declaring that Atlas Turner’s “Insurance Assets are
within South Carolina’s exclusive jurisdiction” simply
because the trial court found that it “ha[d] jurisdiction
over the defendant” (a conclusion that the South Carolina Supreme Court did not review). Pet. App. 23a,
27a. That conclusion is flatly at odds with this Court’s
precedent limiting a court’s in rem jurisdiction to
“property within its territory.” Shaffer, 433 U.S. at
199.
It is also at odds with the federal cases, from this
Court and other courts, on which the South Carolina
Supreme Court premised its holding. Those decisions
merely hold that a court can order a defendant over
whom it has personal jurisdiction to take actions with
respect to property located in a different State or country. See Booth, 58 U.S. at 332-33 (a court can act on
property “beyond the reach of the court” only by “compel[ing]” a defendant over whom it has personal jurisdiction); Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148, 160
(1810) (a court with in personam jurisdiction may enforce a decree against the person even if it affects
23
“lands not within the jurisdiction of that court”); Muller, 94 U.S. at 449 (similar).4
None of the cases holds that a court can exercise
direct control over property located outside its territorial bounds. In fact, many of the decisions explicitly
recognize that in rem jurisdiction is limited to property located within the court’s territory. See Booth, 58
U.S. at 334 (“the receiver’s right to the possession of
the debtor’s property is limited to the jurisdiction of
his appointment”); Massie, 10 U.S. at 158-59 (if the
case involved “a naked question of title”—an “in rem”
proceeding—“the jurisdiction of the [out-of-state
court] would not be sustained”); Muller, 94 U.S. at 449
(a court sitting in one state “cannot . . . deliver possession of land in another jurisdiction”).
By rejecting the South Carolina Supreme Court’s
flawed decision and resolving the split that decision
deepened, this Court would clarify that in rem and in
personam jurisdiction remain distinct sources of judicial power with distinct requirements. Uncertainty on
that issue might stem from Shaffer, which held that
“all assertions of state-court jurisdiction”—presumably including in rem jurisdiction—“must be evaluated
according to the standards [of fairness and substantial justice] set forth in International Shoe and its
progeny.” Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212 (emphasis added).
4
See also City of Jamestown v. Pa. Gas Co., 1 F.2d 871, 878 (2d
Cir. 1924) (a court acting in personam can order the defendant
to act as to a res “beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court”);
United States v. Ross, 302 F.2d 831, 834 (2d Cir. 1962) (“Personal
jurisdiction gave the court power to order Ross to transfer property whether that property was within or without the limits of
the court’s territorial jurisdiction.”); Stewart v. Laberee, 185 F.
471, 474 (9th Cir. 1911) (court could order defendant to turn over
out-of-state property to receiver).
24
This Court has never had occasion to explain how that
standard applies to in rem jurisdiction. The fact that
both kinds of jurisdiction—over persons and over
property—are subject to the same due-process standard might lead courts to conclude incorrectly that the
two strands of jurisdiction are interchangeable. In reality, the minimum-contacts test as applied to in rem
jurisdiction incorporates the traditional territorial
rule that this Court has always applied, which limits
in rem jurisdiction to “property within [the court’s]
territory.” Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
This is not the first time a lower court has “constructed an ingenious jurisdictional theory” involving
alleged in rem authority over insurance in an effort to
project judicial power beyond the court’s territorial
bounds. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 328 (1980).
In Rush, this Court granted review to clarify that a
court cannot exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction to establish authority over an out-of-state defendant by attaching his insurance rights based on in-state activity
by the insurer. Id. This case presents the inverse of
Rush—there, this Court rejected an attempt to use
quasi in rem jurisdiction to obtain personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant; here, the South
Carolina Supreme Court approved the use of in personam jurisdiction to obtain in rem jurisdiction over outof-state assets. Both extraterritorial assertions of judicial power equally violate due-process limits on jurisdiction.
As it did in Rush, the Court should grant review
to clarify that the South Carolina Supreme Court’s
similarly flawed analysis, empowering a Receiver to
commandeer a defendant’s out-of-state insurance
25
rights based on the trial court’s purported specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant, stretches in rem
jurisdiction too far.
III. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IMPLICATES
IMPORTANT FEDERALISM AND FOREIGNRELATIONS CONCERNS.
If left undisturbed, the South Carolina Supreme
Court’s decision will invite further extraterritorial assertions of in rem jurisdiction that infringe on the sovereignty of other States or, as in this case, other nations. In fact, the trial court’s receivership practices
have already resulted in conflicting orders from U.S.
and foreign courts.
A. The
Extraterritorial
Receivership
Order Impermissibly Injects South
Carolina
Courts
Into
Foreign
Relations.
As this Court recently reiterated, due-process limits on state courts’ jurisdiction serve “‘the principles of
interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution.’”
Fuld, 606 U.S. at 14 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980)). The
Fourteenth Amendment ensures that “‘the States,
through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.’” Id. (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292). Those concerns are amplified when a state court purports to exercise authority over property in a foreign country. The federal government has “exclusive authority ‘[i]n international
relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and
trade.’” Id. at 15 (quoting Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. v.
United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933)); see also U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
26
The South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision sustaining the transnational Receivership Order powerfully illustrates the perils of States’ interference with
foreign relations. In vesting the Receiver with authority to exercise Atlas Turner’s contractual insurance
rights, Pet. App. 36a-37a, the Receivership Order
overrides the insurance-related corporate powers and
rights that the Canadian government granted to Atlas
Turner’s board and officers under a Canadian charter.
The South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision upholding that cross-border intrusion risks impairing relations between the United States and an essential ally
and trading partner.
Indeed, it is a settled principle that corporations’
internal affairs and governance are determined by the
law of the jurisdiction in which they are incorporated.
See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69,
89-90 (1987) (corporations are a “product of state law,”
“organized under, and governed by, the law of a single
jurisdiction, traditionally the corporate law of the
State of its incorporation”).
In derogation of that principle, the South Carolina
Receivership Order wrests control of Atlas Turner’s
contractual insurance rights from its Canadian board
and officers, placing them in the hands of a South Carolina receiver and overriding the Canadian government’s authority over Atlas Turner’s corporate governance. But the Constitution bars state courts from
“sit[ting] in judgment upon the acts” of the Canadian
government in granting a charter and corporate powers to Atlas Turner. United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324, 327 (1937).
The international consequences of the South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision extend beyond diplomatic relations between Canada and the United
27
States to commercial ties between Canadian and U.S.
companies. Under the South Carolina Supreme
Court’s decision, a foreign company exporting goods to
that State risks appointment of a South Carolina receiver over its foreign property—a prospect certain to
stifle foreign commerce with the United States. And
“[i]f other States followed [the South Carolina Supreme Court’s] example,” Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles Cnty., 441 U.S. 434, 450-51 (1979), foreign companies might find themselves subject to competing
and conflicting state-court orders purporting to grant
receivers similar authority. Those conflicting orders
“would plainly prevent this Nation from ‘speaking
with one voice’ in regulating foreign commerce.” Id.
at 451. They would also create a risk of reprisal
against U.S. companies exporting goods to Canada.
“Such retaliation of necessity would be directed at
American [companies] in general, not just [those]” in
South Carolina. Id. at 450. If Canada responded in
kind, “the Nation as a whole would suffer.” Id.
Those concerns all stem, in this case, from the
state courts’ “unacceptably grasping” view of their jurisdiction. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138
(2014). By reaching beyond South Carolina’s territorial bounds, the South Carolina courts disregarded
the Framers’ constitutional design and this Court’s
decisions reaffirming that States have no role in regulating foreign relations or foreign commerce.
B. South
Carolina’s
Extraterritorial
Receivership Practices Have Already
Fostered International Discord.
The concerns that the Atlas Turner receivership
will generate international strife and reprisals are far
28
from hypothetical: The South Carolina courts’ transnational receivership practices have already fomented
international tension.
In 2023, the same South Carolina trial court appointed the same South Carolina attorney as receiver
for another Canadian corporation, ACL, and for an
English corporation, Cape Intermediate Holdings
Limited, which had both been named as asbestos personal-injury defendants in South Carolina. ACL
eventually pursued insolvency proceedings in Canada
based in part on the South Carolina receivership. In
granting a motion to stay all proceedings against
ACL, a Canadian court remarked that the South Carolina trial court’s order “is astonishing in the eyes of a
court rooted in Canadian . . . judicial culture” and had
“seriously compromised” ACL’s “defense of the lawsuits” filed against it in the United States. In re Plan
of Arrangement or Compromise of: Asbestos Corp.
Ltd., No. 235-11-000008-259, ¶ 23 (Canada Super. Ct.
July 30, 2025).
For its part, the English corporation, Cape, responded by filing suit in the United Kingdom to enjoin
the South Carolina attorney from acting as its receiver. The High Court of Justice of England and
Wales issued an injunction to “prevent[ ] the receiver,
even in South Carolina, from acting or purporting to
act for or on behalf of ” Cape. Cape Order ¶¶ 136-37
(emphasis added).
The U.K. court’s injunction order began from the
fundamental premise—also recognized in U.S. law—
that “the law of the country of incorporation governs
the capacity of a corporation to enter into transactions
and all matters relevant to the internal governance of
the corporation.” Cape Order ¶ 93; see CTS Corp., 481
29
U.S. at 89-90. The U.K. court recognized that a foreign court could take certain actions with respect to
an English corporation if that corporation has “sufficient connection with the foreign jurisdiction.” Cape
Order ¶ 94. But the court concluded it was “quite
clear” the South Carolina trial court lacked authority
to appoint a receiver over Cape, which had no property
and had conducted no business in South Carolina. Id.
¶ 98. The “consequence” of the U.K. court’s conclusion
that “the receivership is not capable of recognition in
this jurisdiction” was “that the receiver’s acts should
not be recognized for English law purposes.” Id.
¶ 100. The South Carolina receiver was therefore
committing a tort by “purporting to act as agent of
[Cape] without authority recognised in English law.”
Id. ¶ 112.
The U.K. court’s remedy analysis is particularly
telling. In deciding whether to grant Cape an injunction, the court analyzed the harms at issue and the
foreign-policy implications of its decision. The court
concluded that the receiver had “extensive powers”
that posed “real” risks to Cape, which would have “serious and unjustified” “consequences.” Cape Order
¶¶ 114-15. Among them: The receivership created
“two centres of power”; the receiver’s acts were “potentially damaging to the reputation of” Cape and its affiliates; the receiver’s appointment could trigger a “default” affecting Cape’s financing; and the receiver’s
acts “may lead to substantial new liability claims inside and outside South Carolina and worldwide”—not
to mention the risk that the receiver “will take unpredicted and unpredictable steps which could disrupt
the affairs of” Cape. Id. ¶ 113.
The U.K. court concluded that those harms “entitled [Cape] to relief which will help protect it from the
30
effects of that conduct”—namely, an injunction. Cape
Order ¶¶ 120, 126. The U.K. court “presumed” that
the receiver’s “appointment is lawful and effective under South Carolina law,” but nevertheless declared
that the receiver’s appointment was “‘contrary to accepted principles of international law,’” id. ¶¶ 128,
132, and that his conduct “with the object of marshalling assets in some sort of less than complete insolvency proceedings, falls into the very limited category
. . . in which considerations of comity give way to the
protection of private international law and national
interests,” id. ¶ 135. While the court noted that it
does not “sit as some sort of appellate court from the
South Carolina judge” and regretted creating “a clash
between two court systems,” it concluded that an injunction—applicable worldwide, including in South
Carolina—was the only way to “successfully deal[ ]
with” the “threats posed by the receiver.” Id. ¶¶ 6,
135-37.
In response, the South Carolina Supreme Court
intensified the international clash. Rather than respecting the U.K. court’s judgment, the South Carolina Supreme Court doubled down on the State’s receivership authority. When the receiver sought homestate relief from the U.K. court’s order, the South Carolina Supreme Court described the U.K. court’s order
as “shocking and indefensible” because it “intervene[d] in and threaten[ed] the participants in matters properly pending in the courts of South Carolina.”
Pet. App. 43a. While the South Carolina Supreme
Court denied the receiver’s request to stay the U.K.
court’s order, it made clear its view that “all proceedings in these matters will continue in the ordinary
course in the [trial] court and this Court” notwithstanding the U.K. court’s injunction. Pet. App. 43a.
And although the Cape receivership is not at issue in
31
this case, the South Carolina Supreme Court went out
of its way to comment on the U.K. court’s order in the
decision below, calling it “[s]hocking to American
eyes” and dismissing it as “brutum fulmen (an empty
noise).” Pet. App. 25a.
As the Canadian court’s order as to ACL foretells,
the receivership here over another Canadian corporation risks creating a similar international conflict.
The Receivership Order upheld by the South Carolina
Supreme Court disregarded Canada’s grant of powers
to Atlas Turner’s Canadian board and officers, creating two competing centers of power and exposing Atlas Turner to the risk of significant reputational and
financial harm. The order is therefore just as much of
an affront to a foreign nation’s sovereignty as the order imposing a South Carolina receivership on ACL
was to Canadian sovereignty and the order imposing
a receivership on Cape was to U.K. sovereignty. The
experiences and views of two of “this country’s” most
important “allies and trading partners”—which carry
substantial weight—thus confirm that the South Carolina Receivership Order is likely to interfere with
U.S. foreign policy. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 382-83 (2000).
It is to avoid exactly these types of unseemly conflicts that state courts’ in rem jurisdiction, including
in the receivership setting, extends only to property
within the courts’ territorial bounds. This Court
should grant the petition to reaffirm that constitutional limit and put an end to both the lower courts’
disagreement on this issue and the foreign-policy difficulties it has generated.
32
CONCLUSION
Despite this Court’s precedent confining in rem jurisdiction to “property within [the court’s] territory,”
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 199, lower courts have not uniformly distinguished between in rem and in personam
jurisdiction, leading to opinions—such as the decision
below—in which courts have evaded the territorial
limits on in rem jurisdiction by relying on inapposite
concepts of in personam jurisdiction. To eradicate this
division and the resulting inter-sovereign conflicts it
has fostered, the Court should grant the petition.
Respectfully submitted.
CHRISTOPHER E. MILLS
Counsel of Record
SPERO LAW LLC
557 East Bay Street
#22251
Charleston, SC 29413
(843) 606-0640
cmills@spero.law
Counsel for Petitioner
August 18, 2025
APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
APPENDIX A: Opinion of the Supreme Court
of South Carolina (May 21, 2025)....................... 1a
APPENDIX B: Order of the South Carolina
Court of Common Pleas for the
Fifth Judicial Circuit on Plaintiffs’ Motion
to Appoint a Receiver (June 21, 2023) ............. 30a
APPENDIX C: Order of the Supreme Court
of South Carolina (Jan. 16, 2025) ..................... 39a
APPENDIX D: Constitutional Provisions
Involved ............................................................. 45a
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ............................. 45a
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 ............................... 45a
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10 ...................................... 45a
1a
APPENDIX A
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
Donna B. Welch, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Melvin G. Welch, deceased,
Respondent,
v.
Advance Auto Parts, Inc., American Honda Motor Co.,
Inc., Atlas Asbestos Co, Atlas Turner, Inc. as successor to Atlas Asbestos Co, a foreign company, Bahnson,
Inc., Covil Corporation, Daniel International Corporation, Davis Mechanical Contractors, Inc., Ellington Insulation Company, Inc., Fluor Constructors International f/k/a Fluor Corporation, Fluor Constructors International, Inc., Fluor Daniel Services Corporation,
Fluor Enterprises, Inc., General Parts, Inc. individually and as successor-in-interest to Carquest Corporation; Goodrich Corporation f/k/a The B. F. Goodrich
Company, The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company,
Graybar Electric Company, Inc., Honeywell International, Inc. individually and as successor-in-interest to
Allied Signal, Inc., as successor to Bendix Corporation, Morse Tec LLC f/k/a Borgwarner Morse Tec LLC,
and successor-by-merger to Borg-Warner Corporation, Occidental Chemical Corporation as successor to
Durez Corporation; O’reilly Automotive Stores, Inc.,
Paramount Global f/k/a Viacomcbs Inc., f/k/a CBS
Corporation, a Delaware corporation f/k/a Viacom,
Inc., successor-by-merger to CBS Corporation, a Pennsylvania corporation, f/k/a Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Pneumo Abex LLC successor-in-interest to
Abex Corporation, Redco Corporation f/k/a Crane Co.,
2a
Reinz Wisconsin Gasket LLC f/k/a and/or successor to
Reinz Wisconsin Gasket Co. and Wisconsin Gasket
Manufacturing Co., a wholly owned subsidiary of Dco
LLC, Rust Engineering & Construction, Inc., Rust International Inc., Southern Insulation, Inc., Spirax
Sarco, Inc., Union Carbide Corporation, Westrock
MWV, LLC individually and as successor-in-interest
to Westvaco, ZF Active Safety US Inc. f/k/a KelseyHayes Company, Defendants,
of which Atlas Turner, Inc. is the Appellant,
and
Donna B. Welch, individually and Personal Representative of the Estate of Melvin G. Welch, deceased,
and
Peter D. Protopapas, Duly Appointed Received for Atlas Turner, Inc., are Respondents.
Appellate Case No. 2023-001096
________________
Appeals From Richland County
Jean Hoefer Toal, Circuit Court Judge
________________
Opinion No. 28284
Heard February 11, 2025—Filed May 21, 2025
________________
AFFIRMED IN PART AND
REVERSED IN PART
________________
Stephen Lynwood Brown, Russell Grainger Hines,
and James D. Gandy, III, all of Clement Rivers, LLP,
of Charleston, for Appellant Atlas Turner, Inc.
Theile Branham McVey, of Kassel McVey, of Columbia; Aaron Daniel Chapman and Ka’Leya Q. Hardin,
3a
both of Dallas, TX; Charles William Branham, III, of
Dean Omar Branham Shirley, LLP, of Dallas, TX; and
Todd Barnes, of Indianapolis, IN, all for Respondent
Donna B. Welch.
Jonathan M. Robinson and Shanon N. Peake, both of
Smith Robinson Holler DuBose Morgan, LLC, of Columbia; George Murrell Smith, Jr., of Smith Robinson
Holler DuBose Morgan, LLC, of Sumter; and John
Kenneth Chandler and Brian Montgomery Barnwell,
both of Rikard & Protopapas, LLC, of Columbia, all
for Respondent Peter Demos Protopapas.
________________
JUSTICE HILL: In this appeal from an asbestos
case, Atlas Turner, Inc. (Atlas Turner) challenges the
order of the trial court imposing discovery sanctions
and appointing a Receiver. Given Atlas Turner’s conspicuous misconduct, we conclude the sanctions were
plainly justified and the appointment of the Receiver
was also within the trial court’s discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the order granting sanctions, and we
affirm the portion of the Receivership order appointing the Receiver over Atlas Turner’s Insurance Assets.
However, because the trial court erred in giving the
Receiver authority beyond that necessary to investigate and collect Atlas Turner’s Insurance Assets, we
reverse the Receivership order in part.
I. Facts
Melvin G. Welch, of Abbeville, South Carolina,
died in 2023 of mesothelioma caused by his exposure
to asbestos. His widow and personal representative,
Respondent Donna B. Welch, sued Atlas Turner and
others she alleges caused his death. Atlas Turner is a
still active Canadian company that produced and sold
asbestos insulation. Atlas Turner’s customer lists reveal it shipped asbestos insulation to South Carolina.
4a
It is alleged Welch was likely exposed to Atlas
Turner’s asbestos products while he worked in Greenwood, South Carolina.
Respondent’s lawsuit was brought in Richland
County and assigned to the Honorable Jean H. Toal,
who presides over the South Carolina asbestos docket.
Cases on the docket are subject to standard mandatory discovery procedures and scheduling orders so
they may be timely resolved.
Atlas Turner moved to dismiss the claims against
it on the ground that South Carolina lacked personal
jurisdiction over it. After the trial court denied Atlas
Turner’s motion, it ordered that Atlas Turner participate in discovery. Atlas Turner ignored deposition notices served upon it pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), SCRCP,
which requires a corporation to designate a representative to appear and be questioned according to the
rule. The trial court warned Atlas Turner that if it did
not cooperate with the Rule 30(b)(6) notices and answer other pending discovery, it would be sanctioned
and possibly held in contempt.
Atlas Turner refused to respond to any discovery,
even jurisdictional discovery (discovery limited to unearthing facts about the extent of Atlas Turner’s activities and contacts with South Carolina) ordered by
the trial court. It claimed it would not produce a Rule
30(b)(6) witness at the scheduled deposition time “or
ever.” It maintained it had no witness available because none of its employees had knowledge of the company’s activities during the relevant period covered by
the complaint. It alternatively argued that the Québec
Business Concerns Records Act (QBCRA) prohibited
it from responding to a South Carolina Court order for
discovery. Specifically, Atlas Turner asserted that
complying with the order would entail disclosing the
5a
contents of the company’s records and such disclosures were prohibited by the QBCRA (a topic we will
return to later in this opinion).
The trial court held Atlas Turner in contempt for
its “willful and intentional” refusal to comply with
court ordered discovery. As a sanction, the trial court
struck Atlas Turner’s answer, placing it in default.
The trial court later appointed a Receiver over “the
Insurance Assets” of Atlas Turner.
We certified Atlas Turner’s appeal pursuant to
Rule 204(b), SCACR.
II. Discovery Sanctions
We first take up the propriety of the discovery
sanctions. Imposing sanctions for violating discovery
rules is guided by the trial court’s discretion, meaning
we will not disturb the sanctions unless no reasonable
evidence supports them or they were imposed contrary to the correct law. Innovative Waste Mgmt., Inc.
v. Crest Energy Partners GP, LLC, 445 S.C. 19, 28, 911
S.E.2d 406, 410 (2025); Dunn v. Dunn, 298 S.C. 499,
502, 381 S.E.2d 734, 735 (1989).
Atlas Turner asks us to reverse the trial court’s
sanction of striking its answer. This issue need not detain us long, for the record overflows with examples of
Atlas Turner’s cavalier disdain of the elementary
rules of civil procedure. Fortune may favor the bold,
but a party that persists in a bold refusal to comply
with basic ordered discovery may soon realize it is the
architect of its own misfortune. So it is here.
Atlas Turner disputes that its refusal to attend
the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition was willful. It says it
could not comply because it had no witness who knows
what the company did forty odd years ago. It further
6a
claims the QBCRA forbids it from producing documents requested in the Rule 30(b)(6) notice and other
discovery and also prevents it from allowing anyone to
review its corporate records to prepare themselves to
be a Rule 30(b)(6) designee. Both claims are untenable.
A. Rule 30(b)(6), SCRCP
Rule 30(b)(6) depositions are often vital to any litigation involving companies, the government, or other
organizations. The whole idea behind Rule 30(b)(6) is
to allow a party the opportunity to discover relevant
facts about an organization by questioning the organization’s designated representative under oath. The
rule allows a party to name the organization as the
deponent “and describe with reasonable particularity
the matters on which examination is requested.” Rule
30(b)(6), SCRCP. The organization then has the duty
to designate one or more persons who will testify on
its behalf and “the matters on which he will testify.”
Id. The designee(s) “shall testify as to matters known
or reasonably available to the organization.” Id.
Our Rule 30(b)(6) tracks the federal rule, which
was adopted in 1970 to stop the childish game-playing
that often plagued parties seeking to find facts from
corporations. Before the rule change, a party had to
identify by name the specific corporate employee it
wished to depose about relevant matters. What ensued was a guessing game resembling “Marco Polo,”
where the requesting party often knew nothing about
the labyrinths of the company’s personnel structure or
labor division. And the company had no duty to prepare the witness for the deposition. 8A Charles Alan
Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2103 (3d ed. April 2025 Update). The purpose of the new Rule was to “curb the ‘bandying’ by
7a
which officers or managing agents of a corporation are
deposed in turn but each disclaims knowledge of facts
that are clearly known to persons in the organization
and thereby to it.” Committee Note to 1970 Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).
This history underscores that Rule 30(b)(6) gives
an organization the privilege of selecting the person
who will speak for it on the designated matters, but
also imposes a duty to prepare the speaker. See 7
James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice
§ 30.25[3] (3d ed. 2021) (“[T]he organization has an affirmative duty to prepare the designated deponents so
that they can give full, complete, and non-evasive answers to questions regarding the relevant subject matter.”).
This duty does not end, as Atlas Turner seems to
think, with the end of the designees’ personal, firsthand knowledge of the noticed matters. Instead, the
organization must endeavor in good faith to prepare
its designee to testify on matters not only known to
him, but on those topics within the notice that are, as
the rule puts it, “reasonably available” to the organization. Rule 30(b)(6), SCRCP; Moore, supra, at
§ 30.25[3] (“Thus, the rule requires a good faith effort
to find out the relevant facts, which may mean collecting information, reviewing documents, and interviewing employees with personal knowledge.”); 8A Wright
and Miller, supra, at § 2103 (in a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, “unlike all other depositions, there is an implicit obligation to prepare the witness[, and a]s specified in the rule, this preparation is not limited to matters of which the witness has personal knowledge, but
extends to all information reasonably available to the
responding organization”). Many courts have so inter-
8a
preted the rule. See, e.g., Brazos River Auth. v. GE Ionics, Inc., 469 F.3d 416, 433 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding defendant violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) by failing to
prepare designee as to issues beyond designee’s personal knowledge but within corporate knowledge of
organization: the company had duty to “prepare the
designee to the extent matters are reasonably available, whether from documents, past employees, or
other sources”); Bigsby v. Barclays Cap. Real Estate,
Inc., 329 F.R.D. 78, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (same); Crawford v. George & Lynch, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 3d 546, 554
(D. Del. 2013) (“The duty of preparation goes beyond
the designee’s personal knowledge and matters in
which the designee was personally involved. If necessary, the deponent must use documents, past employees, or other resources to obtain responsive information.” (citation omitted)).
We find it telling that when Atlas Turner argued
South Carolina had no personal jurisdiction over it, it
relied on an affidavit of Richard Dufour, Canadian
counsel for Atlas Turner. In his affidavit, Mr. Dufour
declares Atlas Turner has never been registered or authorized to do business in South Carolina; never had
offices, employees, or agents in the State; and never
owned any bank accounts or real property here. As its
counsel, Mr. Dufour is an agent of Atlas Turner. Given
that he made these statements of “facts” in his affidavit “based upon” his “personal knowledge, information
and belief,” it is curious how he gained access to these
facts if, as Atlas Turner contends, the historical facts
of their corporate conduct are unknown to anyone. In
a later affidavit, Mr. Dufour states:
Atlas Turner, Inc. has no former employees
competent to testify to the topics listed on the
30(b)(6) Notices of Deposition in this case, and
9a
for the most part Atlas Turner, Inc. does not
even maintain or possess the records that
would be necessary to educate a witness to be
able to testify to matters contained in the
30(b)(6) Notices of deposition.
We know of no reason why Mr. Dufour could not
have been designated as the Rule 30(b)(6) corporate
representative. See Moore, supra, at 30.25[3] (“There
is no rule that would prevent corporate counsel . . .
from serving as a Rule 30(b)(6) deponent.”).
B. The QBCRA
The second reason Atlas Turner gives as to why it
could not produce a Rule 30(b)(6) designee is that the
QBCRA protects it from disclosing the contents of
company records in response to a discovery request
from any court outside of the province of Québec. As
relevant here, the QBCRA provides:
[N]o person shall, pursuant to or under any
requirement issued by any legislative, judicial
or administrative authority outside Québec,
remove or cause to be removed, or send or
cause to be sent, from any place in Québec to
a place outside Québec, any document or résumé or digest of any document relating to
any [business] concern.
QBCRA, Que.Rev.Stat. ch 278, §§ 1(b), 2 (1964). The
QBCRA is a local law known as a “blocking statute.”
The argument that a foreign blocking statute, such as
the QBCRA, is an insuperable barrier to discovery in
American courts has been rejected by the United
States Supreme Court. Société Nationale Industrielle
Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482
U.S. 522, 544 n.29 (1987) (“It is well settled that
[blocking] statutes do not deprive an American court
10a
of the power to order a party subject to its jurisdiction
to produce evidence even though the act of production
may violate that statute.”). Many courts have addressed whether the QBCRA furnishes a valid excuse
for a Québec company to resist discovery ordered by
foreign courts. Almost all have answered that question with a resounding “No.” See, e.g., Am. Indus. Contracting, Inc. v. Johns–Manville Corp., 326 F. Supp.
879, 880–81 (W.D. Pa. 1971). A number of these rulings were in asbestos cases, several of which featured
Atlas Turner making the exact QBCRA-based arguments it recycles here. See Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v.
W.R. Grace & Co., 143 F.R.D. 628, 644–46, 644 n.24
(D.S.C. 1992) (rejecting identical QBCRA theories
presented by Atlas Turner); see also Lyons v. Bell Asbestos Mines, Ltd., 119 F.R.D. 384, 387–89 (D.S.C.
1988) (finding company did not show it would be violating the QBCRA by producing documents and answering interrogatories, and noting even if the
QBCRA did apply and “assuming the applicability of
comity and other principles of international law to the
present discovery dispute, those principles do not compel blind obedience to the legislative enactments of
foreign jurisdictions”).
We are mindful of comity concerns raised by the
QBCRA. The Court in Société Nationale noted factors
informing a comity analysis include the specificity of
the discovery sought, its importance to the litigation,
whether the information sought originated in the
United States, whether there is an alternative way to
secure the information, and what effect the ruling
would have on important interests of the respective
sovereigns. Société Nationale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28.
Any comity concerns with the QBCRA are slight. Québec is not a sovereign nation, only a province of one.
And the Supreme Court of Canada, the sovereign of
11a
which Québec is a part, has held that, as a constitutional matter, the QBCRA does not bar discovery of a
Québec company’s records sought by a party located
in another Canadian province. Hunt v. Lac d’Amiante
du Québec Ltée, 4 S.C.R. 289 (1993). Indeed, the court
went so far as to say the QBCRA lacks “minimum
standards of order and fairness” and is therefore
“counter to comity.” Id.
We can dispatch any lingering comity worries by
considering the Société Nationale factors. The discovery sought here included not only the Rule 30(b)(6) notice but standard mandatory discovery in South Carolina asbestos cases. The information sought was important and specific. It was not indigenous to Canada,
for many of the facts related to Atlas Turner’s role in
Mr. Welch’s asbestos exposure occurred in this state,
a state where Atlas Turner chose to do business. See
Société Nationale, 482 U.S. at 540 n.25 (“Petitioners
made a voluntary decision to market their products in
the United States . . . they are subject to the same legal constraints, including the burdens associated with
American judicial procedures, as their American competitors.”). No alternative source for these facts has
been suggested, except for Atlas Turner’s inappropriate proposal that Respondent’s counsel could search
for them in “repositories” of asbestos data compiled by
other plaintiffs from other cases. Finally, ordering discovery despite the QBCRA would not undermine an
important national interest of Canada, for that country’s own supreme court has downgraded the QBCRA
and left it all but toothless. On the other hand, were
we to allow the QBCRA to block the discovery here, it
would “represent an extraordinary exercise of legislative jurisdiction” by a local foreign province over
South Carolina’s courts. Id. at 544 n.29.
12a
Our rejection of the QBCRA as a legitimate block
on the discovery sought is further justified by Atlas
Turner’s failure to show how our rejection hampers its
ability to respond. Atlas Turner tells us that, if it were
to educate a witness from its corporate records (records it also denies even exist), then it would violate
the QBCRA. This argument cannot survive the scrutiny of reason. If Atlas Turner’s interpretation of the
QBCRA were correct, one wonders how it conducted
business in the United States and around the world
for so many decades.
Judge Toal gave Atlas Turner extensive opportunities to express its positions, such as they were, and
be heard. She listened closely. She understood and explored its arguments. She also understood that its
overbearing position was a grotesque distortion of elementary discovery principles. She said: “Enough.”
We agree. In selecting the appropriate sanctions,
the trial court must consider the nature of the discovery refused, the discovery stage of the case, willfulness, and prejudice. Historic Charleston Holdings,
LLC v. Mallon, 381 S.C. 417, 435, 673 S.E.2d 448, 457
(2009). The sanction of striking a party’s pleadings is
extreme, but it is a specific response our rules endorse.
Rule 37(b)(2)(C), SCRCP. Such a sanction is “harsh
medicine,” reserved for episodes of discovery misconduct displaying bad faith, willful disobedience, or a
callous indifference to the rights of other parties and
the discovery process. Davis v. Parkview Apartments,
409 S.C. 266, 282, 762 S.E.2d 535, 544 (2014); Rickerson v. Karl, 412 S.C. 215, 221, 770 S.E.2d 767, 770 (Ct.
App. 2015). Any sanction imposed must be sufficient
to vindicate the important rights the discovery rules
guarantee and the essential tools they provide to allow lawyers to prepare their clients’ cases for trial.
13a
Atlas Turner claims the trial court exceeded its
sanctioning discretion because it only considered its
willful misconduct. But Atlas Turner was emphatic
that it did not intend to comply with repeated discovery orders issued by the trial court. The trial court did
not need to spell out what all involved knew: that the
nature of the discovery at issue was the very right to
discovery itself, in all its stages. See Scott v. Greenville
Hous. Auth., 353 S.C. 639, 652, 579 S.E.2d 151, 158
(Ct. App. 2003) (“Discovery is the quintessence of
preparation for trial and, when discovery rights are
trampled, prejudice must be presumed.”).
Striking the pleadings of a party who refuses to
abide by the basic governing rules was, under the circumstances here, a measured act of discretion. Atlas
Turner was consistent in its campaign to stymie any
discovery about them. Our civil procedure is guided by
rules whose prime directive is to “secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” Rule 1, SCRCP; see also In re Anonymous Member of S.C. Bar, 346 S.C. 177, 193, 552 S.E.2d 10, 18
(2001) (“The primary objective of discovery is to ensure that lawsuits are decided by what the facts reveal, not by what facts are concealed.” (quoting In re
Alford Chevrolet–Geo, 997 S.W.2d 173, 180 (Tex.
1999))); id. (“[T]he discovery process is designed to
‘make a trial less a game of blind man’s bluff and more
a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed
to the fullest practicable extent.’ ” (quoting United
States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682
(1958))). A party can foul out of the process. See Innovative Waste, 445 S.C. at 22, 911 S.E.2d at 407 (“[I]n
discovery, time does eventually run out on bad behavior.”).
14a
III. Personal Jurisdiction
The trial court found Atlas Turner placed its products into the stream of commerce with the knowledge
or expectation that the products would be sold and
used by consumers in South Carolina. World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98
(1980) (“The forum State does not exceed its powers
under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products
into the stream of commerce with the expectation that
they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
State.”); Hammond v. Butler, Means, Evins & Brown,
300 S.C. 458, 462, 388 S.E.2d 796, 798 (1990) (“[A]t
the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, the plaintiff
need only make a prima facie showing [of personal jurisdiction] by pleadings and affidavits.”). According to
Respondent’s prima facie showing, Mr. Welch was exposed to asbestos in 1965 to 1967, and Atlas Turner
sold asbestos-containing pipe insulation and spray insulation to a Charlotte based wholesaler installer who
supplied South Carolina companies in 1967, as well as
to a Greenville based installer from 1968 to 1973. Evidence also indicated (1) the asbestos-containing pipe
insulation sold by Atlas Turner matched the description of the pipe insulation installed at the plant where
Mr. Welch worked in South Carolina and (2) Atlas’s
spray insulation was also used at the plant where Mr.
Welch worked.
Persons and companies that choose to do business
in South Carolina receive in return the benefit and
protection of our laws and our legal system. Our laws
allow them the confidence to enter contracts here that
they are assured will be enforced impartially by our
courts and that their economic rights will be pro-
15a
tected. These legal benefits and protections are essential to the formation of reliable markets and an appealing business environment. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 367 (2021).
Anyone entering and profiting from a business market
in South Carolina that our laws and courts helped foster has fair warning that any wrongs he commits here
will be subject to the remedies of those same courts.
He also has notice that should he create harm to the
citizens of this state, it would be reasonable and fair
that our citizens could sue him here, rather than having to travel to pursue him elsewhere. Due process, at
least as far as personal jurisdiction is concerned, has
always considered this exchange fair, the balance
true. Id. at 355 (“When a company . . . serves a market
for a product in a State and that product causes injury
in the State to one of its residents, the State’s courts
may entertain the resulting suit.”). Some parties, after enjoying the benefits on their side of the scale, seek
to trick the balance. When brought into the courts of
the state in which they selected to transact business—
for injuries done to the citizens and workers of that
state by their conduct—these parties respond with
shock and surprise. And uninformed (but not uninterested) observers decry that such a reckoning with justice is “bad for business.”
The trial court found Respondent had produced
enough evidence at the pretrial stage to show Atlas
Turner chose to do business here and conducted business to a point where it should have known it would
be held to account for any injury its business caused
here. Atlas Turner has not appealed the trial court’s
ruling denying its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Respondent asks us to declare Atlas Turner has abandoned and waived this issue. At-
16a
las Turner claims it has “reserved” the personal jurisdiction issue, maintaining that it could not appeal the
issue because the ruling was interlocutory. It is settled law that we may consider the otherwise interlocutory ruling denying a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction when it is joined with other appealable matters. QZO, Inc. v. Moyer, 358 S.C. 246,
252, 594 S.E.2d 541, 545 (Ct. App. 2004). Nevertheless, we will not address the issue now, and nothing in
this opinion may be construed as affecting the merits
of any later appeal of the personal jurisdiction issue.
IV. Appointment of Receiver
Atlas Turner next contends the trial court abused
its discretion in appointing a Receiver. “[T]he power of
appointment of a receiver should be resorted to only
in exceptional circumstances[.]” First Carolinas Joint
Stock Land Bank of Columbia v. Knotts, 191 S.C. 384,
402, 1 S.E.2d 797, 805 (1939).
The equitable right to have a Receiver appointed
is “an ancient one.” Pelzer v. Hughes, 27 S.C. 408, 416,
3 S.E. 781, 785 (1887). Its roots reach back to Elizabethan times when English courts appointed Receivers
to manage and preserve the assets of a debtor’s estate
when there was a risk the debtor was purposefully diminishing it. 1 Ralph Ewing Clark, Clark on Receivers
§ 4 (3d ed. 1959).
A Receiver is an officer of the court, appointed to
marshal and collect—to receive—the assets of the corporation. In that sense, the Receiver stands in the corporation’s shoes. In re Am. Slicing Mach. Co., 125 S.C.
214, 218, 118 S.E. 303, 304 (1923). Receiverships were
more common before the Great Depression and the expansion of the federal bankruptcy laws, but they can
still be a useful equitable tool. Digit. Media Sols., LLC
17a
v. S. Univ. of Ohio, LLC, 59 F.4th 772, 777–78 (6th
Cir. 2023). The effect of appointing a Receiver means
that the Receiver, as a “hand of the court,” exercises
power and control over the defendant’s assets and
property specified in the appointment order and administers them at the court’s discretion for the benefit
of creditors and the debtor’s estate. Allen v. Cooley, 53
S.C. 414, 446, 31 S.E. 634, 646 (1898). Title, though,
remains in the defendant’s name. A Receiver must administer the estate in compliance with the appointing
order and “in accordance with the laws of this State.”
Rule 66(a), SCRCP.
A. Appointment of Receiver under S.C. Code
Ann. § 15-65-10(5) (2005)
Our law allows appointment of a Receiver in several circumstances, including “[i]n such other cases as
are provided by law or may be in accordance with the
existing practice, except as otherwise provided in this
Code.” § 15-65-10(5). At common law, an equity court
had the inherent power to appoint a Receiver before
judgment. 1 Clark, supra, at § 149. A Receiver may
only be appointed before judgment in the rarest of
cases, when “there is the strongest reason to believe
that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded in
his complaint, and there is danger that the property
will be materially injured before the case can be determined.” Richland County v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 422
S.C. 292, 313, 811 S.E.2d 758, 769 (2018) (quoting
Pelzer, 27 S.C. at 416, 3 S.E. at 785). This extreme
power may only be used in extreme cases, such as
where a defendant’s conduct demonstrates it is fraudulently concealing or disposing of assets that may be
responsive to a later judgment. 1 Clark, supra, at
§ 181. The Receiver may then collect the defendant’s
assets and administer property. Id. at § 163. We have
18a
followed this general rule and upheld the appointment of a Receiver before judgment where the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that the defendant intends to fraudulently avoid or defeat the plaintiff’s recovery. See Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co. v.
Hunter, 84 S.C. 214, 220–21, 66 S.E. 177, 179 (1909)
(“[W]hen a debtor is trying to defeat his creditors by
an act or course of conduct which indicates moral
fraud—a conscious intent to defeat, delay, or hinder
his creditors in the collection of their debts—then a
court of equity will grant any relief within its jurisdiction appropriate and effective to protect creditors
against the fraud without requiring the creditor to run
the risk of losing his debt from the delay of obtaining
judgment and a return of nulla bona on the execution.”). As this Court explained:
When a business man, merchant, or manufacturer or farmer disposes of large resources,
and then, professing to have nothing, leaves
his debts unpaid, and sets his creditors at
arm’s length by refusing to give any account
of his property or to take any interest in the
satisfaction of their claims, the court is warranted in drawing the inference that there
has been a fraudulent disposition of the property.
Id. at 223, 66 S.E. at 180.
We would not be inclined to affirm a trial court’s
appointment of a Receiver before judgment except in
the rarest case. Because Receiver appointment is an
equitable remedy and equity follows the law, one holding a tort, contract, or other legal claim generally has
no right before judgment to a debtor’s property. See
Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491, 497–501
19a
(1923) (explaining an unsecured contract claim is insufficient to warrant appointment of Receiver before
judgment); 12 Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § § 2983 (3d
ed. April 2025 Update) (stating party seeking Receivership against defendant must show he has some legally recognized right to defendant’s property “that
amounts to more than a mere claim against defendant”). We decline to upset the trial court’s discretionary decision here, for this is that rare instance when
equity’s aid may be called upon before the legal claims
have been reduced to judgment. Atlas Turner’s strident and outspoken refusal to comply with the trial
court’s orders convinces us it will continue to act in
bad faith as the case against it progresses. It is not
lost upon us that Atlas Turner has long experience as
a defendant in asbestos cases. We note too that when
faced with lawsuits—for allegedly causing serious injury and death to American workers and citizens related to the pernicious products it sold for profit even
after the lethal risk these products posed was
known—its tactic has been to claim that, if the courts
exerted jurisdiction over them, it would offend the
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” due process guarantees. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). When that ploy fails,
Atlas Turner’s version of due process is to refuse to
abide by court orders requiring it to answer basic information. It is alleged Atlas Turner has come into our
state, turned profits by selling its hazardous wares in
our state, and inflicted grievous harm on citizens in
our state. Then, when the shadow of the courthouse
door falls upon it, it insists it was never here, and if a
court asks anything else about it, it responds: we have
nobody who knows anything. Atlas Turner seems to
20a
claim its corporate form allows it to “both be and not
be.” Robert H. Jackson, What Price “Due Process”?, 5
N.Y. L. Rev. 435, 438 (1927).
We conclude Atlas Turner’s conduct justified the
appointment of a Receiver before judgment. First, Atlas Turner’s contemptuous disregard of the court’s discovery orders and other conduct demonstrates it is
seeking to evade its responsibilities as a civil litigant.
There is evidence that Atlas Turner’s corporate policy
for responding to asbestos lawsuits is to adopt a “minimum defense posture” and incur default judgments.
Atlas Turner followed that policy here. Second, Atlas
Turner represented to the trial court that it had no
Insurance Assets relevant to these cases. However,
there is evidence Atlas Turner was involved in a
transaction that may have compromised some of its
potential insurance coverage. The record further discloses that Atlas Turner has refused to tender its policies to certain insurers for defense and indemnity.
See Aviation Supply Corp. v. R.S.B.I. Aerospace, Inc.,
999 F.2d 314, 317 (8th Cir. 1993) (affirming appointment of Receiver where defendant refused to cooperate in discovery and provided inaccurate financial information: “Faced with this pattern of willful nondisclosure and false disclosure, followed by transfer to
avoid a tenacious judgment creditor, the district court
was well within its discretion in turning to a drastic
remedy such as a receiver”).
The evidence supports the finding that Atlas
Turner engaged in moral fraud against the trial court,
the state of South Carolina, and Respondent. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 84 S.C. at 220–21, 66 S.E.
at 179; 12 Wright & Miller, supra, at § 2983 (“actors
that courts have considered relevant to establishing
21a
the requisite need for a receivership include . . . fraudulent conduct on the part of defendant . . . .”).
B. Jurisdiction to Appoint a Receiver
Atlas Turner also says the trial court had no jurisdiction to appoint a Receiver because it neither owns
nor possesses any property within the borders of
South Carolina. Consequently, according to Atlas
Turner, a South Carolina Receiver is powerless to control any of its property. The order appointed a Receiver over Atlas Turner’s Insurance Assets. Atlas
Turner has not explained where it contends these assets are located, other than its general claim that all
property it owns rests outside the borders of this state.
Atlas Turner points to Pollock v. Carolina Interstate Building & Loan Ass’n, 48 S.C. 65, 25 S.E. 977
(1896), and claims a Receiver has no power to affect
property outside South Carolina. This distorts Pollock, for there the court only held an order of a North
Carolina court appointing a Receiver over a North
Carolina company did not affect the validity of service
of a lawsuit filed here on the company’s South Carolina registered agent. Id. at 74–76, 25 S.E. at 980. Atlas Turner’s recourse to Booth v. Clark, 58 U.S. 322
(1854), fares no better, for there it was held only that
a Receiver appointed by a state court had no absolute
right to sue in a foreign jurisdiction. 58 U.S. at 338.
This aspect of Booth has been supplanted by various
federal statutes and rules. See 2 Ralph Ewing Clark,
Clark on Receivers § 591 (3d ed. 1959); Mentink v.
World Time Corp. of Am., 131 F.R.D. 210, 211 (S.D.
Fla. 1990); 28 U.S.C. § 754 (2018). Although a Receiver’s right to sue in another state is not squarely
before us, that issue is controlled by the law of the foreign state, the full faith and credit clause, and comity.
22a
See 65 Am. Jur. 2d Receivers § 260 (Jan. 2025 Update); 2 Clark, supra, at § 591. We have allowed a foreign Receiver to sue in South Carolina. Wilson v.
Keels, 54 S.C. 545, 553–56, 32 S.E. 702, 704–06 (1899).
We hope Atlas Turner does not believe a court exercising its equity powers cannot order a party over
whom it has personal jurisdiction to convey and produce its property and assets, regardless of where they
may be located. Equity can compel one over whom it
has personal jurisdiction to do an act even though that
act may affect property outside the court’s territorial
jurisdiction. That equity may force just such a thing
has been a basic principle recognized for centuries.
See Penn v. Lord Baltimore (1750) 1 Ves. Sr. 444 (ordering specific performance of contract even through
order affected lands in Pennsylvania and Maryland).
Chief Justice Marshall, relying on Penn, held that, in
contract cases, an equity court’s jurisdiction “is sustainable wherever the person be found, although
lands not within the jurisdiction of that court may be
affected by the decree.” Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. 148,
158–63 (1810) (holding Kentucky federal court had jurisdiction to compel defendant over whom it had personal jurisdiction to convey land located in Ohio); Muller v. Dows, 94 U.S. 444, 449 (1876) (“It is here undoubtedly a recognized doctrine that a court of equity,
sitting in a State and having jurisdiction of the person, may decree a conveyance by him of land in another State, and may enforce the decree by process
against the defendant.”); Booth, 58 U.S. at 332 (“Although the property of a defendant is beyond the reach
of the court, so that it can neither be sequestered nor
taken in execution, the court does not lose its jurisdiction in relation to that property, provided the person
of the defendant is within the jurisdiction. By the ordinary course of proceeding, the defendant may be
23a
compelled either to bring the property in dispute, or
to which the defendant claims an equitable title,
within the jurisdiction of the court . . . .”). Because equity has jurisdiction over the defendant, “it is immaterial that the res is beyond the territorial jurisdiction
of the court.” City of Jamestown v. Pennsylvania Gas
Co., 1 F.2d 871, 878 (2d Cir. 1924) (New York federal
district court had power to order defendant to cut off
its gas supply located in Pennsylvania).
Atlas Turner mistakes not only equity’s power,
but the Receiver’s role. The Receiver stands in the
companies’ shoes. He may do whatever the corporation could do in relation to its property, for it is in his
possession subject to the control of the court. We doubt
a company or individual would claim it had no right
to funds it owned on deposit at a bank simply because
the bank is located in another jurisdiction. No one
would dispute a holder of an asset such as an insurance policy has the power and the right to invoke the
policy’s benefits, regardless of where the policy “resides.” And nothing would prevent a state court that
has personal jurisdiction over the company from compelling the company to do whatever was necessary to
bring the benefits of the policy to litigation in this
state. See Rule 66(b), SCRCP (stating a Receiver
“shall . . . have general power and authority to sue for
and collect the debts, demands and rent belonging to
the debtor . . .”); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws § 53 cmt. a (1971) (“A state which has judicial
jurisdiction over a person is not limited to the issuance
through its courts of a money judgment against him.
The state may likewise order the person to do, or to
refrain from doing, one or more acts. And the power of
the state to make such an order is not affected by the
fact that the acts called for are to be done in another
state.”). In one well-known case, a Receiver appointed
24a
by a New York court for a California defendant, over
whom it had personal jurisdiction, was authorized to
retrieve a thoroughbred racehorse from California
and ship it to Kentucky. Madden v. Rosseter, 187
N.Y.S. 462, 462–63 (N.Y. 1921).
In like manner, courts have required defendants
over whom they have jurisdiction to transfer foreign
stock the defendant owns to a Receiver. See United
States v. Ross, 302 F.2d 831, 834 (2d Cir. 1962) (defendant ordered to turn over stock located in Bahamas
to Receiver in New York: “Personal jurisdiction gave
the court power to order [the defendant] to transfer
property whether that property was within or without
the limits of the court’s territorial jurisdiction”); Stewart v. Laberee, 185 F. 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1911) (“A court
may control by its receivership property beyond its
territorial jurisdiction when it has jurisdiction of the
parties, and it may restrain them from interfering
with the receiver’s possession of such property.”); Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Watkins, 934 F.2d
1180, 1188 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[I]t is undisputed that
the district court has in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant, thus the receiver could be empowered to
reach foreign assets.”). We therefore affirm the trial
court’s appointment of a Receiver for Atlas Turner’s
Insurance Assets.
We take a moment to discuss Atlas Turner’s conduct in these cases and how it affects Receivership. Its
conduct fits the strategy we earlier mentioned: to
shun the civil process of South Carolina’s courts to the
point of being declared in default and then fight the
enforceability of the default judgment on what it perceives to be friendlier soil. That is in fact what an English company has done in another South Carolina asbestos case where the trial court appointed a Receiver.
25a
And an English court has gone along, ruling as a matter of private international law that the defaulting
company did not submit to jurisdiction in South Carolina and English law will only enforce foreign judgments against a corporate defendant if the company
has established a “fixed place of business” in the foreign forum. Cape Intermediate Holdings Ltd. And
Cape PLC v. Protopapas [2024] EWHC 2999 (Ch), 13–
14, 49–51. The English Court went so far as to issue
an injunction against the Receiver, purporting to bar
him from action even in South Carolina. Id. at 72.
The English court reasoned that English law may
restrain a foreign court to prevent “injustice.” Id. at
69–70. It quoted a decree that gave as an example a
foreign court whose standard for personal jurisdiction
was so wide as to be against accepted international
law principles. Id. at 70. The English court then proceeded to note that the powers given to the Receiver
stretched worldwide. Id. It reasoned that the English
company could not risk fighting its case in South Carolina because it would then be submitting to jurisdiction here. Id. at 70–71.
Shocking to American eyes, the English court enjoined the Receiver “from acting or purporting to act
for or on behalf of” the English company in default,
even in a South Carolina court. Id. at 61, 72.
We appreciate that the laws of different countries
may differ, even countries that have a special relationship with each other. Our respect and spirit of comity—not to mention our duty to follow the law—does
not permit us to enjoin a court of another sovereign
nation from interfering with our rulings on the propriety of a Receivership. As it would with any court, such
a ruling by us would be in the words of Lord Scarman,
a brutum fulmen (an empty noise).
26a
C. Scope of Receiver’s Authority
It is common knowledge that the asbestos industry knew of the dangers of their product as early as
the 1930s. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493
F.2d 1076, 1083–86 (5th Cir. 1973). In early asbestos
cases, some asbestos companies claimed they did not
know of the dangers until 1965, the year Dr. Irving J.
Selikoff published his landmark work on asbestos related diseases. Id. (discussing when the dangers of asbestos became widely known, including the publication of Dr. Selikoff’s studies). Mr. Welch was allegedly
exposed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, well after
the wide release of Dr. Selikoff’s findings. Lung cancer
and mesothelioma are particularly horrendous diseases. Atlas Turner is in default. If there are Insurance Assets available to compensate Respondent for
Mr. Welch’s medical costs, lost income, pain, and suffering as a result of Atlas Turner’s corporate misconduct, justice requires that they be brought to bear. We
hold any Insurance Assets owned by Atlas Turner
that may cover Mr. Welch’s injuries are properly
within the Receivership estate, meaning those Insurance Assets are within South Carolina’s exclusive jurisdiction. See Palmer v. State of Texas, 212 U.S. 118,
125 (1909) (“If a court of competent jurisdiction, Federal or state, has taken possession of property, or by
its procedure has obtained jurisdiction over the same,
such property is withdrawn from the jurisdiction of
the courts of the other authority as effectually as if the
property had been entirely removed to the territory of
another sovereignty.”); SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank,
Ltd., 927 F.3d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 2019) (recognizing
that insurance policies and proceeds may be part of a
Receivership estate and placed in the state court’s exclusive in rem jurisdiction).
27a
Further, it is well established that a Receiver has
the right and duty to collect and accumulate the property and assets of the defendant specified in the appointment order, including its rights and claims. 1
Clark, supra, at § 163; 2 Clark, supra, at § 365. This
includes rights under an insurance policy the defendant has purchased. We hold the trial court properly
gave the Receiver power to pursue claims in South
Carolina’s jurisdiction to bring the Insurance Assets
to bear in covering Mr. Welch’s injuries. However, we
hold that power does not properly extend to reach
every claim relating to Atlas Turner’s assets and business activities. Stanford Int’l Bank, 927 F.3d at 841.
As such, we find it appropriate to shrink the scope
of the Receivership order. See Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U.S. 124, 161 (1971) (“The remedial powers of an
equity court must be adequate to the task, but they
are not unlimited.”). The trial court defined Insurance
Assets as:
[A]ny insurance policy, proceeds of insurance
policies, claims related to those policies, information relating to those insurance policies,
including, but not limited to mail, files of
counsel, or other information which is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence about those insurance policies or any other assets which are related to,
touch or are otherwise relevant to such insurance.
We find equity only allows insurance policies that
have the potential to cover Mr. Welch’s injuries to be
included in this definition, and we reverse and vacate
the portion of this definition that allows the Receiver
to have power over “any other assets which are related
to, touch or are otherwise relevant to such insurance.”
28a
The Receivership order does not grant the Receiver
entry into the Atlas Turner boardroom or some vague
right to “take over” operation of the company.
Finally, we note Atlas Turner retains the right to
post a bond to lift the Receiver appointment order.
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-65-50 (2005).
V. Conclusion
As can be seen, Atlas Turner’s arguments
throughout this case have been contrary to longstanding legal principles. It persists in repeating long debunked theories that no thinking court would accept.
This causes us to repeat once again what no one
should have to be told: that a lawsuit “is not a children’s game, but a serious effort on the part of adult
human beings to administer justice[.]” Griffin v. Cap.
Cash, 310 S.C. 288, 292, 423 S.E.2d 143, 146 (Ct. App.
1992) (quoting United States v. A.H. Fischer Lumber
Co., 162 F.2d 872, 873 (4th Cir. 1947)).
No matter what manner of injury compensation
system a society chooses to be governed by, there will
be those who say it does too much, and those who say
it does too little. Some will point to its excesses, others
to its limitations. Unwelcome outcomes become sensationalized, often unmoored from objective facts that
were critical to the outcome but inconvenient to the
shaping of soundbites or op-ed pieces.
We are aware there are many cases on the asbestos docket in South Carolina. The docket of this Court
and the court of appeals have seen a radical increase
in appeals by asbestos defendants. Almost all of these
appeals were properly dismissed as premature and
obviously interlocutory. We have yet to see an asbestos case where the trial court has exercised personal
jurisdiction over a defendant that did not meet the
29a
level of minimum contacts with our state that due process demands. If we were to see one, we would not hesitate to hold that the South Carolina courts lack jurisdiction.
Likewise, we emphasize that while equity allows
the appointment of a Receiver before judgment in this
unusual case, it is an extraordinary remedy reserved
for the most extraordinary cases. It is not to be used
in the typical default case. This case is atypical and
extraordinary where Atlas Turner’s behavior warrants the relief ordered by the veteran trial judge who
gave Atlas Turner many chances to comply and follow
the rules like every other litigant. If Atlas Turner disagreed with the trial courts’ pre-trial personal jurisdiction ruling, it had the usual recourse, including
raising the issue again at trial. Mid-State Distribs.,
Inc. v. Century Importers, Inc., 310 S.C. 330, 335, 426
S.E.2d 777, 780–81 (1993). Instead, Atlas Turner
acted as if a ruling against them granted it license to
ignore its responsibilities. Such conduct has consequences.
It is unfortunate that Atlas Turner has refused to
abide by or honor its responsibilities under our process of civil law. When Atlas Turner defied the rule of
law, the trial court not only followed it but enforced it
by responding with remedies the law has long recognized. It is these rulings that we uphold today.
We therefore affirm the discovery sanctions
against Atlas Turner, and we affirm in part and reverse in part the order appointing the Receiver.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN
PART.
KITTREDGE, C.J., FEW, JAMES, JJ., and Acting
Justice Paula H. Thomas, concur.
30a
APPENDIX B
STATE OF
SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE COURT OF
COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF
RICHLAND
FOR THE FIFTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
MELVIN G. WELCH
and DONNA B.
WELCH
Plaintiffs,
v.
3M COMPANY
f/k/a MINNESOTA
MINING AND
MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, et al.
C/A NO.
2022-CP-40-03834
Defendants.
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
TO APPOINT A RECEIVER
This order follows the Court’s order finding Atlas
Turner Inc. f/k/a Atlas Asbestos Company (“Atlas”) in
contempt of court and this Court’s entry of an order
striking Atlas’ pleadings. Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Appoint a Receiver over Atlas Turner,
Inc. f/k/a Atlas Asbestos Company, Ltd (“Atlas”).
31a
BACKGROUND
For the reasons set for below, the Court grants
Plaintiffs motion to appoint a receiver over the Insurance Assets1 of Atlas. Peter Protopapas is appointed
as receiver over those Insurance Assets and the Court
expects anyone or any entity having information or
materials which are reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence to cooperate with
this Court’s Receiver in locating and marshalling
those assets.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 11, 2023, this Court found Atlas to be in
contempt of Court. The Court based its contempt order on Atlas’ flat refusal to comply with this Court’s
orders to produce documents, a witness or otherwise
participate in discovery. As part of this Court’s order
on contempt, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to brief the
issue of the sanction requested.
On May 11, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their brief requesting that this Court strike Atlas’ pleadings. Atlas’
response was filed on May 15, 2023 and Plaintiffs’ reply was filed on May 18, 2023. After considering the
briefing of the parties, this Court determined that
striking Atlas’ answer was the appropriate sanction
for contempt of this Court’s orders.
Now, having struck Atlas’ answer, Atlas is in default.2
1
2
This term is defined below.
The process of actually entering default judgment is merely
a ministerial process. In the absence of an answer, default is
nothing more than that ministerial act. Stark Truss Co., Inc. v.
Superior Const. Corp. 360 S.C. 503 (Ct. App. 2004)
32a
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Appointment of a Receiver is Appropriate and
Warranted
The South Carolina receivership statute provides
in relevant part that a receiver may be appointed in
cases in accordance with “existing practice.” S.C. Code
Ann. 15-65-10(5).3
Historically, receivers are appointed by courts sitting in equity in order to ensure a fair result. First
Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank of Columbia v.
Knotts, 191 S.C. 384 (1939). Indeed, “[t]he right to
have a receiver appointed is an ancient one . . . .”
Pelzer v. Hughes, 27 S.C. 408 (1887) But where, as
here, Atlas’ has been struck, and thus only a ministerial action being left for Atlas to be in judgment, a receiver to take possession of and, to the extent necessary, litigate Atlas’ insurance assets is exactly the
type of historical circumstances, the Court’s of this
state have found appropriate. Specifically, where, as
here, a debtor, solvent or otherwise,
is trying to defeat his creditors by an act or
course of conduct which indicates moral frauda conscious intent to defeat, delay or hinder
creditors in the collection of debts-then a court
will grant any relief within its jurisdiction appropriate and effective to protect creditors
3
A receiver is also available to carry a judgment into effect,
which is the practical result of the coming default following the
unopposed striking of Atlas’ answer. Atlas further argues that
there is no evidence of its insolvency, yet it refuses to comply with
this Court’s orders to discovery that and many other issues. The
Court does not believe it is appropriate for Atlas to use this refusal as a sword. Regardless, other elements of the receivership
statute are satisfied and thus, this argument is unavailing.
33a
against the fraud without requiring the creditor to run the risk of losing his debt from the
delay of obtaining judgment and return of
nulla bona on the execution.
Virginia Carolina Chemical v. Hunter, 84 S.C. 214
(1909).
Here it is exactly the moral fraud of Atlas’ personal jurisdiction claims, exposed by decades of opinions dismissing those very assertions and Atlas continued refusal to participate in this that warrants the
appointment of a receiver.
Thus, where there is active wrongdoing and illegal
refusal to comply with this Court’s orders, the appointment of a receiver is appropriate.
As Plaintiffs have requested, a receiver appointed
here would have the authority to administer “any insurance assets” including “any claims related to the
actions or failure to act of Atlas’s insurance carriers.”
This Court’s view of the scope of a receiver’s authority
is not unique. The United States Supreme Court recognized in Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. 473 (1893) that
“[t]he whole property of the corporation [is] within the
jurisdiction of the court which appointed the receiver,
including all its rights of action, except so far as
already lawfully disposed of under orders of that
court, [and] remains in its custody, to be administered
and distributed by it.” Id. at 480 (emphasis added).
That the South Carolina receivership references
“property within this state” is not a limitation on the
Receiver’s authority in this case. Instead, the statutory reference is consistent with principles of comity,
which deter a state court from reaching beyond a
state’s borders and asserting jurisdiction over such
property located in another jurisdiction. These same
34a
principles of comity support a state court’s authority
to vest a statutory receiver to assert an insolvent corporation’s rights of action. See e.g. Hirson v. United
Stores Corp. 263 A.D. 646, 34 N.Y.S.2d 122 (App. Div.
1st Dep. 1942), aff’d 43 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. App. Ct.
1942) (holding that title to choses in action held by a
receiver appointed pursuant to Delaware law would
be afforded “full faith and credit”). That is the authority given to be given the receiver here.
That authority includes the insurance assets of
Atlas. Even assuming Atlas’ interpretation of §15-6510 is correct, to the extent they exist, Atlas’ Insurance
Assets4 would be intended to protect the lives, interests and property within South Carolina. The result is
that the insuring assets are subject to the laws of
South Carolina, including the duly appointed Receiver.
S.C. Code Ann §38-61-10 states that
[a]ll contracts of insurance on property, lives,
or interests in this state are considered to be
made in the State and all contracts of insurance the applications for which are taken
within this State are considered to have been
made within this State and are subject to the
laws of this State.
4
For purpose of clarity, this Court defines “Insurance Assets”
as any insurance policy, proceeds of insurance policies, claims relating to such insurance policies, including but not limited to,
claims relating to any breaches of duty relating to those policies,
information relating to those insurance policies including, but
not limited to mail, files of counsel, or other information which is
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence about those insurance policies or any other assets which
are related to, touch or are otherwise relevant to such insurance.
35a
In interpreting §38-61-10, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that “[i]t is immaterial where the
contract was entered into. Further there is no requirement that the policyholders or insurers be citizens of
South Carolina. What is solely relevant is where the
property, lives, or interests insured are located.” Sangamo Weston v. Nat’l Sur. Corp., 307 S.C. 143, 149,
414 S.E.2d 127, 130 (1992)(Toal, C.J.). The result is
that “South Carolina substantive law governs [the insuring assets of Atlas]” Id.5 Thus the appointment of
a receiver over those assets is appropriate.
B. Due Process has not and will not be violated
Atlas continues to ignore the jurisprudence of this
state which directly addresses its due process argument. Atlas ignores, again, the teachings of the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Sangamo.
Just as here, Sangamo argued that §38-61-10 was
“unconstitutional.” Id. at 131. The South Carolina Supreme Court there opined that
insuring property, lives and interests in South
Carolina constitutes a significant contact with
this state. South Carolina has a substantial
interest in who bears the liability for operations conducted in this state which result in
injury to South Carolina property and citizens. Although the parties are not residents of
this state, both parties availed themselves of
5
As more fully set forth above, the funds at issue appear to be
the proceeds from settlements involving insurance contracts designed to protect lives, interests and property within the state
and thus would also be governed by substantive South Carolina
law.
36a
the law of South Carolina when they respectively provided or received insurance on interests located in this state.
Id. Atlas sold its poison throughout the United States
well knowing that it would end up in the workplaces
of working men and women throughout the nation, including sales, specifically to South Carolina. Therefore, under the statutory scheme of this state and its
interpreting precedent, whatever insuring assets of
Atlas exist and related claims are subject to the substantive law of South Carolina and nothing about that
result is violative of due process.
POWERS OF THE RECEIVER
As set forth above, the powers afforded to the receiver here are all related to the insurance assets of
Atlas. Therefore, this Court hereby orders that Peter
Protopapas be and hereby is appointed Receiver in
this case with the power and authority fully administer all insurance assets of Atlas Turner, Inc. and any
subsidiaries, accept service on behalf of Atlas, engage
counsel on behalf of Atlas and take any and all steps
necessary to protect the interests of Atlas whatever
they may be. This order includes the right and obligation to administer any insurance or indemnification
assets of Atlas as well as any claims related to the actions or failure to act of Atlas insurance carriers or
other entities, including, but not limited to the officers, directors and/or shareholders of Atlas against
which the Atlas may have claims.
In addition to the powers of the Receiver set forth
herein, the Receiver shall have the following rights,
powers and authority, insofar as they are related to
the discovery of and recovery of insurance assets, to:
37a
1) open any mail which is reasonably believed to contain information relating to insurance assets addressed to the defendant and addressed to any business owned by the Atlas; redirect the delivery of any
such mail addressed to the Atlas or any business of
the Atlas, so that such mail may come directly to the
receiver; 2) endorse and cash all checks and negotiable
instruments payable to Atlas relating to insurance assets; 3) obtain from any financial institution, bank,
credit union, savings and loan or title, credit bureau
or any other third party, any financial records belonging to or pertaining to the insurance assets of Atlas;
4) hire any person necessary to accomplish any right
or power under this Order; and 5) take all action necessary to gain access to all storage facilities, safetydeposit boxes, real property, and leased premises
wherein any property of Atlas may be situated, and to
review and obtain copies of all documents related to
insurance assets of Atlas.
The Court expects the Receiver to investigate the
existence of all insurance or indemnifications coverages or claims relating thereto which are potentially
available to Atlas. The Receiver will provide potential
insurers or indemnifiers with lists of work sites, contractors, and insurance brokers and agents to facilitate the insurers’ searches for coverage (specifically
including coverage provided to any related or subsidiary companies of Atlas or any entity for whom Atlas
did work or supplied materials or licensed products or
the use thereof as an “additional insured” under coverage written to another entity). The Court expects all
insurers or indemnifiers to comply with subpoenas issued by this Court and its Receiver in effectuating
these thorough searches.
38a
This Court notes that under the Barton doctrine,
suit against the Receiver outside of this Court is expressly prohibited.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the appointment of a
receiver for Atlas to marshal all of the available insurance assets, including claims related thereto and any
other property subject to this receivership of Atlas and
its subsidiaries, successors, and assigns, is appropriate. Peter Protopapas is hereby appointed the receiver
over Atlas consistent with this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
39a
APPENDIX C
The Supreme Court of South Carolina
John A. Tibbs and Margaret B. Tibbs, Plaintiffs,
v.
3M Company, et al., Defendants,
and
Cape PLC, individually and as successor in interest to
Cape Asbestos Company Limited, by and through its
duly appointed Receiver Peter D. Protopapas, ThirdParty Plaintiff, Respondent,
v.
Anglo American PLC, individually and as successor in
interest to Anglo American Corporation of South Africa LTD., et al., Third-Party Defendants,
Of which Mohed Altrad, Altrad Investment Authority
SAS, Charter Consolidated Ltd., ESAB Corporation,
and Central Mining & Investment Corporation Ltd.
are the Petitioners.
Appellate Case No. 2024-000916
AND
John A. Tibbs and Margaret B. Tibbs, Plaintiffs,
v.
3M Company, et al., Defendants,
and
Cape PLC, individually and as successor in interest to
Cape Asbestos Company Limited, by and through its
40a
duly appointed Receiver Peter D. Protopapas, ThirdParty Plaintiff, Respondent,
v.
Anglo American PLC, individually and as successor in
interest to Anglo American Corporation of South Africa LTD., et al., Third-Party Defendants,
Of which Charter Consolidated Ltd., ESAB Corporation, and Central Mining & Investment Corporation
Ltd. are the Petitioners.
Appellate Case No. 2024-001423
AND
John A. Tibbs and Margaret B. Tibbs, Plaintiffs,
v.
3M Company, et al., Defendants,
and
Cape PLC, individually and as successor in interest to
Cape Asbestos Company Limited, by and through its
duly appointed Receiver Peter D. Protopapas, ThirdParty Plaintiff, Respondent,
v.
Anglo American PLC, individually and as successor in
interest to Anglo American Corporation of South Africa LTD., et al., Third-Party Defendants,
Of which Mohed Altrad and Altrad Investment Authority S.A.S. are the Petitioners.
Appellate Case No. 2024-001499
AND
John A. Tibbs and Margaret B. Tibbs, Plaintiffs,
v.
41a
3M Company, et al., Defendants,
and
Cape PLC, individually and as successor in interest to
Cape Asbestos Company Limited, by and through its
duly appointed Receiver Peter D. Protopapas, ThirdParty Plaintiff, Respondent,
v.
Anglo American PLC, individually and as successor in
interest to Anglo American Corporation of South Africa LTD., et al., Third-Party Defendants,
Of which ArranCo US, LLC, Hawk Bidco US Inc.,
Sparrows Offshore, LLC, Mohed Altrad, Altrad Investment Authority SAS, Charter Consolidated Ltd.,
ESAB Corporation, and Central Mining & Investment
Corporation Ltd. are the Petitioners.
Appellate Case No. 2024-002114
AND
John A. Tibbs and Margaret B. Tibbs, Plaintiffs,
v.
3M Company, et al., Defendants,
and
Cape PLC, individually and as successor in interest to
Cape Asbestos Company Limited, by and through its
duly appointed Receiver Peter D. Protopapas, ThirdParty Plaintiff, Respondent,
v.
Anglo American PLC, individually and as successor in
interest to Anglo American Corporation of South Africa LTD., et al., Third-Party Defendants,
42a
Of which Mohed Altrad and Altrad Investment Authority S.A.S. are the Petitioners.
Appellate Case No. 2024-002116
AND
John A. Tibbs and Margaret B. Tibbs, Plaintiffs,
v.
3M Company, et al., Defendants,
and
Cape PLC, individually and as successor in interest to
Cape Asbestos Company Limited, by and through its
duly appointed Receiver Peter D. Protopapas, ThirdParty Plaintiff, Respondent,
v.
Anglo American PLC, individually and as successor in
interest to Anglo American Corporation of South Africa LTD., et al., Third-Party Defendants,
Of which Charter Consolidated Ltd., ESAB Corporation, and Central Mining & Investment Corporation
Ltd. are the Petitioners.
Appellate Case No. 2024-002117
________________
ORDER
________________
Peter D. Protopapas, Receiver for Cape PLC, individually and as successor in interest to Cape Asbestos
Company Limited, has filed a motion for a writ of supersedeas and a temporary restraining order and a
motion to stay the filing deadlines pending resolution
of the motion for a writ of supersedeas.
43a
The basis for the supersedeas request is an order
issued by Justice Mann of the High Court of Justice
Business and Property Courts of England and Wales
Business List (CHD) (the English Court Order), which
declares the March 16, 2023 order issued by the South
Carolina Fifth Judicial Circuit Court appointing the
Receiver “is not recognised and has no legal effect in
England and Wales and worldwide.” The Order further restrains the Receiver’s actions on behalf of Cape
Intermediate Holdings Limited “in England and
Wales . . . in the South Carolina Court and worldwide.” (Emphasis added). The English Court Order
threatens the Receiver, as well as any person who
knows of and disobeys the Order or does anything that
helps or permits any person to whom the Order applies to breach the terms of the Order, with contempt
of court, imprisonment, fines, or seizure of assets.
Any attempt by a foreign court to intervene in and
threaten the participants in matters properly pending
in the courts of South Carolina would be shocking and
indefensible. The dispute giving rise to the English
Court’s attempt to intervene in these matters involves
the appropriate reach of the Receiver appointed by the
South Carolina Circuit Court—an issue this Court
will hear during its February term of court and resolve after oral argument.
As an independent judiciary in a sovereign independent state, we are well-equipped to decide the issues presented to us. In the interim, all parties shall
comply with all scheduling orders and rules, and all
proceedings in these matters will continue in the ordinary course in the circuit court and this Court.
Having addressed the underlying and legitimate
concerns of the parties related to the English Court
44a
Order, we conclude there is no reason for a writ of supersedeas to be issued in these matters. Therefore, we
deny the Receiver’s emergency motion for supersedeas
and motion to stay the filing deadlines.
___/s/ John Kittredge_______ C.J.
___/s/ John Cannon Few____ J.
___/s/ George James, Jr.____ J.
___/s/ D. Hill_______________ J.
Verdin, J., not participating
Columbia, South Carolina
January _16_, 2025
45a
APPENDIX D
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
The Congress shall have Power * * * To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal;
coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but
gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts;
pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any
Title of Nobility.
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it’s inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all
Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or
Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the
United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to
the Revision and Controul of the Congress.
46a
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,
lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War
in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or
engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.