Petition for Writ of Certiorari — James Synnott, Petitioner v. Paul Burgermeister, et al.

Supreme Court briefMay 13, 2024

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Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

may 1 3 2024

OFFICE of the clerk

No.

In The

Supreme (Court of tije ®tniteb States

James Synnott

Petitioner,

Paul Burgermeister

and Ian Northrup,

et al

Respondents.

On Petition for A Writ of Certiorari to

the United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

James Synnott

John Doe / JS

Pro Se

25W150 Brandywine Ct.

Naperville, IL 60540

(630) 369-8571

j asynnott@gmail.com

pECEWED’

AUG 14 2025

-SUPREME^URT1^

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

It is bedrock law that the federal courts have a

“virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise” the

jurisdiction they possess. Mata v. Lynch, 576 U.S. 143,

150 (2015). Lack of adherence to that obligation has

plagued this petitioner through state and federal

courts adversely impacting petitioner, petitioner’s

child, petitioner’s family, and those similarly situated

in compounding fashion.

This Court, while recognizing the use of

pseudonyms in Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988), Roe

v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), et cetera, has yet to give

clear directions as to its proper applications—

pertinently given the current age of online court

records, search engines, and children’s privacy. This

Court has recognized privacy rights under the First,

Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. Inter alia,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 5 and 17; statutes

such as 18 U.S.C. §3509(d); and Children's Online

Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277

(1998) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506

(2003)) (restricting collection, use, and disclosure of

children’s personal information by websites); and

juvenile offender protections aim to safeguard

children’s privacy. Therefore, the questions presented

are:

•

Whether using pseudonyms for parents and

children—incases

involving

children,

especially with sensitive information—is

appropriate and outweighs the presumption of

public right of access, as held by the Second,

Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, or is possible and

must be considered and weighed fully,

including denial’s adverse effect on meritorious

claims (e.g. silencing, or degrading pro se cases,

even on further review) beyond general

anonymity disapproval, as the Fourth Circuit

held, and be applies to adult children’s sensitive

childhood information, as the Fifth Circuit has

retroactively allowed; or whether such

information and children must be disclosed, as

held by districts in the Eighth, Ninth, and

Eleventh

Circuits,

despite

intra-circuit

protections for children and parents with

pseudonyms.

Regarding children's claims and rights, Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c), representation, and the

interplay with parents' claims and rights—including

circuit conflicts—the questions presented are:

•

Whether children have the right to be

represented by their pro se non-attorney

parent(s) in their claims, and reciprocally,

whether those parent(s) have the right to

represent their children's claims, along with

their own and intertwined claims without

counsel—as permitted by the Second, Fifth,

and Tenth Circuits for certain claims (e.g.,

SSI)— or whether such representation is

barred, as held by the Third, Fourth, Sixth,

Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. If they

cannot secure counsel, whether courts should,

per Rule 17(c), actively recruit or appoint

attorneys—since children’s claims requiring

adjudication mandate trained legal assistance

to fully protect their rights, as held by the

Second Circuit—or whether claims and cases

iii

may be routinely dismissed in other circuits

while ignoring Rule 17(c), without first

recruiting counsel.

Whether the proper

procedure for parents appearing is as next

friends or otherwise; and whether courts

(federal or state) can appoint a Guardian ad

Litem without assessing parental fitness,

thereby intruding between parent and child

and potentially undermining the fundamental

rights both parties hold and protections

parent(s) provide(s). Whether there is any

right to an attorney where the court has

constructed rules, precedents, or practices

precluding pro se meaningful access to the

courts unless represented, such as in class

actions, representing one’s child regarding

fundamental and civil rights, or on appeal.

Whether children can pursue §1983 claims

seeking redress for the wrongful, unwarranted

state interference with their relationships with

their parents—either absent state action

against the children themselves, or not—as

they have a right to family integrity under,

inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment

substantive due process, which was violated

and hence pleads a valid due process claim

under section §1983, as the Ninth Circuit has

held; or as the Sixth Circuit will not, unless a

deliberate act with a culpable state of mind

directed at the plaintiffs family relationship or

a decision traditionally within the ambit of the

family (evident in this case). And conversely,

whether a parent can pursue such claims for

loss of companionship with their children,

where circuits have recognized §1983 claims

under, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment

substantive due process right to companionship

with one’s children—as the Ninth and Tenth

Circuits will, even for adult children; as the

First and Seventh Circuits will but with added

limits, particularly for adult children, to

governmental action directly aimed at the

parent-child relationship; as the D.C. Circuit

will for minors regardless of custody standing;

as the Third Circuit will for minors, allowing

flexibility depending upon facts; and as the

Eleventh Circuit will for minors.

In constitutional-tort cases as in other cases, “a

man [is] responsible for the natural consequences of

his actions” Monroe v Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).

The questions presented are:

•

Whether evidence of and the determination of

causation for an area of damages is a question

for the jury and, if challenged, whether due

process requires that it be addressed with the

procedural protections of a summary judgment

motion, or be excluded on the eve of trial.

Further, whether a fair trial was thwarted by,

inter alia, a partial remote trial when plaintiff

and all plaintiffs witnesses were unable to

attend due to a national health threat

(pandemic) and personal or household

comorbidities (i.e. instead of continuance to

accommodate in person appearances), as well

as attorney conduct, and court errors and

rulings.

Regarding claims, abstentions, and rights to

meaningful access to courts and jury trials—including

circuit conflicts—the questions presented are:

•

Whether it is permissible for a court to dismiss

the claims, complaint or case of a pro se non

prisoner plaintiff under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2),

who has paid the filing fee, before summons or

appearance of defendants—as the Seventh

Circuit has held it is not, as have the Eighth

and Eleventh Circuits—or whether it is

permissible as the Sixth Circuit have held; and

whether it is permissible without full prior

notice of all issues to be addressed before

dismissal.

•

Whether abstentions are being applied

contrary to this Court’s precedent by multiple

circuits,

particularly

whether

Younger

abstention should be applied broadly as in the

Fifth Circuit or strictly according to Sprint

Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69

(2013); whether the domestic relations

exception should be interpreted broadly as in

the Second, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits; or

narrowly as in the Seventh and Eighth

Circuits; or whether a new “comity abstention”

is a valid abstention used by the Seventh and

Eighth, among other, circuits when, for

example, the Younger or domestic relations

abstentions do not fit cleanly.

•

Whether a district court can and therefore

should declare a state order void, whether

interlocutory or not, according to state law and

requirements, or whether a district court

should merely not afford preclusive effect to

state orders that are constitutionally defective,

such as on due process grounds, as is already

this Court’s precedent.

This Court held, "Rule 4 (a)(2) permits a notice of

appeal from a nonfinal decision to operate as a notice

of appeal from the final judgment only when a district

court announces a decision that would be appealable

if immediately followed by the entry of judgment."

FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Ins. Co.,

498 U.S. 269, 276 (1991). It further held, “If the court

has not yet decided the issue that the appellant seeks

to appeal, then the Rule does not come into play.”

Manrique v. United States, 581 U.S. 116, 124 (2017).

FirsTier sowed the seeds for confusion in the courts of

appeals; writing for the Tenth Circuit in In re Woolsey,

696 F.3d 1266, 1271 (10th Cir. 2012), then-judge

Gorsuch characterized FirsTier’s discussion of Rule

4(a)(2)’s limits as “cryptic and arguably tangential,”

and he noted that the opinion is “open to many

different understandings.” The questions presented

are:

•

Whether a case is final and appealable under

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, absent

a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) ruling,

when the district court says it is done despite

outstanding matters/claims it had explicitly

stated previously were not dismissed; or

whether it is not final and appealable as the

Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits held where

there are outstanding claims; or as the Seventh

Circuit has held in cases involving both or a

pattern of avoiding finality and jurisdictional

vii

evaluation1; and further whether Rule 54(b)

means circuits are obligated to direct and insist

that district courts either hear outstanding

issues or issue a 54(b) ruling so a party does not

have to waive unresolved issues or otherwise

artificially manufacture appealability by

dismissing claims; or if not, whether the issue

is waived as some circuits have held.

•

Whether notice is saved under Rule 4 if

premature applies only to decisions that resolve

all outstanding issues in the district court that

can be saved by entry of final decisions, as held

by the Eighth and Federal Circuits; or as the

First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth,

Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have held

that Rule 4(a)(2) will also save notices filed

after decisions that could have been certified for

an intermediate appeal under Rule 54(b) or

that are allowable under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b); or

as broadly as the Second, and Third Circuits,

where nearly any notice on any decision can be

saved by subsequent judgment.

Regarding liberal construction of pro se filings in

appellate courts and pro se appellate policies,

practices, and procedures, (and in districts where

applicable), the questions presented are:

•

Whether liberal construction applies to appeal

filings and briefs of pro se litigants, implying

that if a brief is filed on time and contains

1 see inter alia Hayes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 1332,1333 (7th

Cir. 1983) at 1336 (Posner, J., dissenting), as noted in Positano

Place at Naples I Condominium Association v. Empire Indemnity

Insurance Co., 84 F.4th 1241 (11th Cir. 2023) at 1254)

viii

arguments with supporting citations, it should

not be rejected (without allowing for

amendment) nor the appeal dismissed

(particularly if denying representation) as the

Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and

Eleventh Circuits have held; or whether it is

strict on brief requirements as the Seventh

Circuit is doing without leave to amend.

Whether it is permissible for district clerks to

refuse filings requested under seal from a pro

se litigant, where they had previously accepted

them, resulting in adverse orders that will not

be revisited or revised. And further whether

circuit clerks’ pro se department should refuse

motions requested to be under seal, require

separate requests for leave and advise Article

III judges to deny underlying relief without the

full motion allowed to be before them, when

circuit precedent indicates it would have been

granted, resulting in such denial, where the

other motions department would not do so to

attorneys and where similar important motions

are reported to be granted for attorneys but not

for pro se litigants.

Whether geography should determine fair

access to the right of appeal, apparent in the

deep divide among circuits’ rules, procedures,

and treatment regarding pro se appeals

ranging from simpler briefing requirements of

the Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, or

simplified rules of the Fourth and Eighth

Circuits, or strict briefing requirements such as

those of the Seventh Circuit, and the Second

Circuit, which erects additional barriers to pro

se litigants. And further whether the policies,

practices, and procedures, not only of the

district court, but those of the Seventh Circuit,

particularly its pro se staff department or

similar programs, such as here, refusing to

accept full motions for pro se litigants, but not

for attorneys, followed by recommendations to

Article III judges to deny underlying relief that

circuit precedent indicates would grant;

dismissing appeals contrary to circuit

precedent; or dismissing considerably more

appeals percentage-wise than the average of

other circuits either facially or as applied to this

plaintiff, and similar pro se litigants, violate

the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal

Protection Clauses, and/or the Article III

separation of powers and judicial nondelegation

doctrine, thereby denying meaningful access to

the courts and further violating the First and

Seventh Amendments.

This Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has

expressed a consistent special concern for

discrimination against children. See Pickett v. Brown,

462 U.S. 1, 7 (1983); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102,

116 (1996) (“Choices about marriage, family life, and

the upbringing of children are among associational

rights this Court has ranked as of basic importance in

our society, rights sheltered by the Fourteenth

Amendment against the State’s unwarranted

usurpation, disregard, or disrespect.”) The questions

presented are:

•

Whether children have the constitutional right

to equal and joint custody, care, and

companionship (including equal time) in the

custody and care of, and companionship with,

both of their divorced or unmarried parents;

and reciprocally, whether those parents have

the constitutionally protected right to equal

and joint custody, care, and companionship

(including equal time) of their children, or at

least the presumption, absent any serious

wrongdoing. Whether the standard of proof to

overcome such rights, or presumption, is clear

and convincing, or one more stringent; and

whether strict scrutiny applies.

Finally,

whether the provisions of the child custody

statutes of Illinois or as amended violate the

First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, or

Fourteenth Amendments,

and

whether

geography should continue to determine

whether these fundamental rights are

recognized and protected.

•

Whether, in light of, inter alia, the framework

and reasoning set forth in Dobbs v. Jackson

Women's Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215

(2022) the Court should address whether there

is a proper understanding of the Privileges or

Immunity Clause. Whether the fundamental

rights of children and parents are protected

under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment, further whether

the Court should resolve its own intra-court

split regarding fundamental rights of parents

and children, e.g., regarding the “biology plus”

factor.

In Kay v Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991), this Court held

that a pro se attorney should not be awarded attorney

fees as part of the costs under 42 § USC 1988. Kay,

note 8, recognized the intent of such fees. Note 5 did

not consider circuits that had granted attorney fees to

pro se non-attorneys such as the D.C., Second, and

Fifth Circuits. McLean v. Int’l Harvester Co., 902 F.2d

372, 374-76 (5th Cir. 1990); Holly v. Acree, 72 F.R.D.

115 (D.D.C. 1976), affd sub nom. Holly v. Chasen, 569

F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Deep-rooted tradition

supported attorney fees “when the losing party has

“acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for

oppressive reasons...”” Alyeska pipeline Serv. Co v

Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-58 (1975). The

questions presented are:

•

Whether Kay’s dicta should be read as rejecting

the traditional exceptions, per Alyeska, and as

held by the D.C., Fifth, and Second Circuits, for

pro se non-attorney litigants—especially in

fundamental civil rights cases where their or

case status, social biases, civil rights issues, or

type of remedies sought hinder access to

counsel. And whether those prevailing pro se

litigants who sought representation diligently,

albeit unsuccessfully (and/or where courts did

not recruit or appoint counsel), should qualify

for fee awards to secure necessary appellate

representation, or, in the alternative, if no

appeal and not allowed fees directly, that

amount typically awarded for fees if

represented, for or to a District/Circuit pro se

fund.

In Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 487 (1935), this

Court held that additurs were impermissible as

unconstitutional. The question presented is:

xii

•

Whether remittitur violates, inter alia, the

Seventh Amendment.

There is no price this petitioner would not have

paid if he could to have kept his daughter from all of

this—for her to have a loving full relationship with

both sides of her family, to see her, for her to be

unscarred, to be whole and safe—to come home...

Please do not hold the following against the other

questions’ need for resolution; it is raised as this court

has not taken up cases that have tried to address

issues on these matters:

The deep-rooted tradition of child support was to

indemnify the local parish for the necessary costs of

children fallen into their care, for which both parents

were liable and, to the extent unable, then the

extended families of the parents. 18 & 43 Eliz.

Inability to pay full indemnity costs is the root of

percentage-of-income models.

Blackstone stated: “every man has, or ought to

have, by the laws of society, a power over his own

property and, as Grotius very well distinguishes,

natural right obliges to give a necessary maintenance

to children; but what is more than that they have no

other right to, than as it is given them by the favour

of their parents, or the positive constitutions of the

municipal law.” Further, “thought it unjust to oblige

the parent, against his will, to provide them with

superfluities, and other indulgences of fortune;

imagining they might trust to the impulse of nature,

if the children were deserving of such favours.”

xiii

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of

England, Book 1, at 448, 449 (1773).

At the Legislative House Committee Hearing on

Illinois HB 4113 the state representative Lindsay

Parkhurst overseeing the hearing enquired whether

changing the law to a rebuttable presumption of equal

parenting time (“50 50 presumption”) would cost the

state federal funding, particularly what effect “would

have on families that require food stamps or public aid

assistance?” To which the witness acknowledged

“Certainly the state of Illinois gets federal funding

and individuals obviously get state aid.” The federal

funding is “premised upon the amount of individuals

in the state with the child more than half the time.

There is very real potential for this state to lose

federal funding - Millions, possibly hundreds of

millions of dollars.”

The bill died in session.

Therefore, the questions presented are:

•

Whether in light of inter alia National

Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius

567 U.S. 519 (2012), and the Fifth Amendment,

42 U.S. Code Chapter 7 Subchapter IV Part D—

for example, the incentives under 42 U.S.C.

§658a—violates the constitution both in

regards to states’ rights and in turn coercing

the violation of the citizens’ rights - to deny

children and parents significant and equal

visitation and joint custody under threat of loss

of significant federal funds to the state.

•

Whether the Constitution limits the state

legislative or judicial branches in prying into

the financials of parents, and particularly

grandparents, for setting or amending child

xiv

support, where the state is not paying support

or seeking reimbursement, the state itself

would not pay more - the parents are already

splitting at least basic necessary costs

including medical, etc., (also consider where the

party invoking state action for higher support

is significantly above the poverty level, and

additionally, evidence of ulterior motives — e.g.

threat to grandparents).

Whether the

Constitution limits where such prospective

discovery or resulting support intrudes upon

individuals’ rights to privacy, control of one’s

own finances and expenditures on their

children (where ready alternatives are

apparent: e.g. joint custody and equal

parenting time); and whether the disclosure

itself, as such ready alternatives are apparent,

is impermissible to be required as it introduces

unavoidable hazards: inter alia, prevents

parties from safeguarding rights, where such

information

undoubtedly

will

identify

prospective financial gain or vulnerability,

improperly exposes and introduces risks

incentivizing ulterior motivations for, and

actions to, restricting access to one’s child by a

party, state, or judge and provides access to

private information which is available to be

used to retaliate and harm the targeted parent

and/or that parent’s extended family. Whether

all divorced or nonmarried parents and

children should face the state-introduced

hazards, intrusions, and further risks to their

respective rights? How far is too far?

Finally, given, inter alia, the holding in Beacon

Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 511 (1959), the

question presented is:

•

Whether a writ of mandamus should be issued

to one or more of the lower courts.

xvi

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED..........................

TABLE OF CONTENTS................................

PARTIES AND PROCEEDINGS..................

CITATIONS....................................................

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI...

OPINIONS BELOW.......... ...........................

JURISDICTION.............................................

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED............................

STATEMENT OF THE CASE......................

A. Facts and Procedural History.............

1. A Child Suffering, A Father’s

Plight..............................................

2. Summation of Complaints.............

3. District Proceedings.......................

4. Circuit Proceedings........................

B. Fundamental Rights of Children to

Their Parents and Parents to Their

Children..............................................

1. Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right

- Abbreviated Common Law and

Legislative History at the

xvi

xxii

xvii

Founding of The Nation Through

1868.....................................................

2. Gender-Based Stereotypes.............

3. Precedent Unequivocally

Establishes States May Not

Punish Children Based on

Matters Beyond Their Control......

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE

PETITION............................................................

A. Significant Issues of National

Importance...............................................

1. The Constitutional Challenge to

the Statutes................................. 16

2. The States Are Divided as to the

Treatment and Protections Given

These Fundamental Rights in

Statutes, and the Courts’

Interpretations of Them and

Rights Involved.................................

3. This Court Emphasizes the

Primacy of the Parent-Child

Relationship.......................................

4. This Court Should Identify

Grounds for the Parties’ Rights

That Are Consistent with the

Original Public Meaning of the

Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities

Clause.................................................

5. In Light of Framework Reasoning

Set Forth In Dobbs V. Jackson

Women's Health Org., 597 U.S.

xviii

215 (2022) this Court Should

Address Not Only Privileges And

Immunities Clause But the

Internal Conflict within This

Court Regarding Fundamental

Rights of Children and Their

Parents................................................

6. Outstanding Declaratory

Injunctive Relief Regarding

Sheriff is of Significant

Importance.........................................

B. Seventh Circuit’s Decision Sanctifies

and Furthers Conflicts of Authority...

1. Circuits Are Divided on

Application of Younger....................

2. Circuits Are Divided on Domestic

Relations Doctrine............................

3. Circuits Are Ignoring Sprint

Creating New Abstention to Use

Where Younger, or Domestic

Relations, Abstentions Do Not Fit

Creating a New Split.......................

4. Circuits Are Divided on

Application of 1915(e)(2).................

5. Circuits Are Divided on Ability to

Sustain Claims Regarding

Interfering with Children’s Right

to Companionship with Parent(s);

and Conversely Parents with

Their Children and to Protect

Children e.g. Rule 17................. 26

xix

6. Circuits Are Divided Regarding

Finality and Appealability.............

7. Access To the Courts and Ruling

on Merits Should Not Depend

Upon Geography - Circuits Are

Divided Regarding Liberal

Interpretation of Pro Se Briefs on

Appeal and There Are Conflicts

Between Circuits on Procedures

Adversely Impacting

Fundamental Rights, Meaningful

Access to Federal Courts - Ruling

on Merits...........................................

8. Policies and Practices of the

Circuits Derived to Handle

Increasing Caseloads Since

Middle of Last Century Are

Manifesting Unintended Results

Compromising the Federal

Judiciary.............................................

C. The Decisions Are Wrong.....................

1. District’s Holdings Clearly

Conflict with the Seventh Circuit

and This Court’s Precedents..........

2. Seventh Circuit’s Decisions Are

Wrong..................................................

D. The Questions Presented Warrant

This Court’s Review...............................

CONCLUSION....................................................

APPENDIX..........................................................

PARTIES and PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner, initially proceeded under pseudonym

on behalf of himself, his child, and those similarly

situated in (Doe I Synnott: Suppressed v Suppressed;

Doe v McCumber et al; Doe v Zaruba et al) Synnott v.

Burgermeister et al., No. 16-CV-9098, U.S. District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois; was the

petitioner I plaintiff in In re J., a Minor, State of

Illinois DuPage County and Appellate Court Second

District cases; and the appellant I appellee in cross

appeal of (Doe v McCumber et al.; Doe V Burgermeister

et al.; Pseudonym denied without allowing motion to

be before the court, see App.l6a) J. Synnott v. P.

Burgermeister et al No. 22-1104, 22-1270, 22-1893,

22-2447 (collectively consolidated into No. 22-1104 on

August 18, 2022, see App.l3a), United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: Judgment entered

January 10, 2024, and rehearing denied on February

13, 2024. As in the state county court so also is there

no final order for the district court (see: A. Facts and

Procedural History, A.3. District Proceedings, and

Appendix).

Respondents are Governor of Illinois J.B. Pritzker

(previously Bruce Rauner), Attorney General of

Illinois Kwame Raoul (previously Lisa Madigan),

Sean McCumber, Juli Gumina, Sullivan Taylor &

Gumina

(STG),

Jane Doe

(Elizabeth

Ceh

Cunningham, a/k/a Elizabeth Tengerstrom since

2024: Respondent I Defendant in In re J., a Minor,

State of Illinois, County and appeal cases), Sheriff

Deputy Ian Northrup (also Appellant in the Seventh

Circuit

Cross-appeal),

Sheriff Deputy

Paul

Burgermeister (also Appellant in the Seventh Circuit

Cross-appeal), Sheriff John Zaruba (current Sheriff:

James Mendrick), Sheriff of DuPage County, Dan

Cronin, DuPage County, DuPage County Judge Linda

Davenport, DuPage County Judge Thomas Else,

DuPage County Judge Thomas Dudgeon, DuPage

County Chief Judge Kathryn Cresswell, DuPage

County Supervising Judge Blanche Fawell, and

DuPage County Supervising Judge John Demling.

Respondents were appellees in the cross appeal in the

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit (also appellants as noted) and defendants /

respondents in the U.S. District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois in the same case and

respective numbers above. 2

Motion for leave to file a petition for writ of

certiorari under seal with redacted copies for the

public record, 24M69, was denied by this Court on

March 24, 2025.

2 Additional defendants / respondents were identified during

discovery (not allowed: see R131, R133, R138 rejected without

response), they are: Sheriff Deputy Taylor, Sheriff Officer Ruff,

Sheriff Officer Moore; Sheriff Officer Rominelli, Robin Miller,

Robin Miller P.C., David Sterba, Paula Gomora, Ann Burke,

Judiciary Inquiry Board, Chief Pete Hojnicki, Highland Police

Department, Chief Mathew Walsh I O’Connell, Tinley Park

Police, Tinley Park, Chief James Kveton, St. John, St John Police

Department, Will County States Attorney James Glascow, Will

County, and as yet unidentified individuals.

xxii

CITATIONS

Page

Caselaw

Abdul-Alim Amin v. Universal Life Ins.

Co., 706 F.2d 638, 640 n.l (5th Cir.

1983)...........................................................

Adams ex rel. D.J.W. v. Astrue, 659 F.3d

1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2011)............

Allen v. Allen, 48 F.3d 259, 261 (7th Cir.

1995).................................................... 24

Alyeska pipeline Serv. Co v Wilderness

Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-58

(1975)..........................................................

Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689,

701, (1992).......................................... 24,

Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 756 (7th

Cir. 2011)...................................................

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)..........

26,

30,

Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359

U.S. 500, 511 (1959)..........................

xiv,

Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n. 1

(9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)................... 31

Bryan v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 455, 458 (7th

Cir.1987)............................................. 25

xxiii

Burlington Northern R. Co. v.

Department of Revenue of State of

Wash., 934 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1991)..

Butera v. District of Columbia 235 F.3d

637, 641 (D.C. Cir. 2001).................. 27

Butler v. Leen, 4 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 1993)

(per curiam)........................................ 26

Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382,

394, (1979)........................................... 15

Cabot v. Cabot, 697 A.2d 644, 649 (Vt.

1997).....................................................

Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89

(1979).....................................................

Cassens v. Cassens, 430 F. Supp.2d 830,

836-37 (S.D. Ill. 2006)...................... 24

Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v.

Moore 446F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2006).......

Chambers v. Sanders, 63 F.4th 1092 (6th

Cir. 2023)...................................................

Christensen v. C.I.R., 786 F.2d 1382,

1384-85 (9th Cir.1986)......................

City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S.

378, 390 (1989)................................... 23

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95

101 (1983)............................................ 23

Clark v. Ocean Brand Tuna, 974 F.2d 48,

50 (6th Cir. 1992)................................ 26

Cooper v Daley 07CV02144 verdict dkt.

no 399................................................... 8

xxiv

Correa v. White, 518 F.3d 516, 518 (7th

Cir. 2008)............................................. 30

Daves v. Dallas Cnty., 64 F.4th 616, 62333 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc)............ 24

Dennis v. Sparks, 499 U.S. 24, 27

(1980)....................................................

Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 487

(1935)....................................................

Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org.,

___ U.S.

, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2242,

213 L.Ed.2d 545 (2022).................... viii,

Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist.,

658 F.3d 710, 724 (7th Cir. 2011).. 28

Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908).......

Finnegan v. Myers, No. 3: 08-CV-503

(N.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2016)................

FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors

Mortgage Insurance Co., 498 U.S. 269,

276 (1991)............................................ v, 28

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181

(1962)....................................................

Franz v. United States 707 F.2d 582 (D.C.

Cir. 1983).................................

Friedlander v. Friedlander, 149 F.3d 739,

740 (7th Cir. 1998)......................... .

Goss Graphics Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus.,

Inc., 267 F.3d 624, 627 (7th Cir.

2001)...........................................................

XXV

Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount

Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982).............

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,

496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)...

Grissom v. Scott, 934 F.2d 656, 657 (5th

Cir.1991)....................................................

Harris v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 413, 417 (5th

Cir. 2000)...................................................

Hayes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 1332,

1333 (7th Cir. 1983).........................

Herrick v. Collins, 914 F.2d 228, 230

(11th Cir. 1990).........................................

Holly v. Acree, 72F.R.D. 115 (D.D.C.

1976)....................................................

Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 310, 318

(1988)................

i, 23

Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557

(1941).................................................... 37

In re Funkhouser, 873 F.2d 1076, 1077

(8th Cir. 1989)....................................

In re Marriage of Dobey, 258 Ill.App.3d

874, 876 (1994)................................... 18

In re Woolsey, 696 F.3d 1266, 1271 (10th

Cir. 2012)...................................................

James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 241 (4th

Cir. 1993)...................................................

J.B. v. Woodard, 997 F.3d 714, 722 (7th

Cir. 2021).................................................

24,

xxvi

Jonathan R. v. Justice, 41 F.4th 316,

334(4th Cir. 2022)...............................

Karimovas v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843, 844

(7th Cir. 2013).................................... 36

Kay v. Ehler, 499 U.S. 432, 438

(1991)....................................................

viii

Kelson v. City of Springfield 767 F.2d

651, 653 (9th Cir. 1985)....................

Kirby v. Roth, No. 10-3697 (8th Cir. May

2, 2011)................................................ 30

Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461

(1981).................................................... 15

Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667 (2d

Cir. 1985).............................................

Lakics v Zaruba et al 09-CV-6929.............

Lannan v. Maul, 979 F.2d 627, 630-31

(8th Cir. 1992).................................... 24

Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581,

587 (3d Cir. 1999).............................. 30

Lehr v Robertson, 463 US 248, 269 (1983)

(White, J. dissenting)........................ 22

Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).

LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d

88, 93 (2d Cir. 1995).......................... 31

Lozoya v. Gracia, 1993 WL 850565 (N.

Mex. Jan. 1993)........................................

Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S.

545, 550 (1990)...................................

xxvii

Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 105-06

(2d Cir. 2002).....................................

Manrique v. United States, 581 U.S. 116,

124 (2017)........................................... v

Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United

States, 320 U.S. 1, 47 (1943)............

Mata v. Lynch, 576 U.S. 143, 150 (2015)..

May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533

(1953)....................................................

McCottrel v. E.E.O.C., 726 F.2d 350, 351

(7th Cir. 1984)....................................

McCracken v. Phillips, No. 96-1164, 1997

U.S. App. LEXIS 61, at *2 (10th Cir.

Jan. 2, 1997).............................................

McCurdy v. Dodd F.3d 820, 830 (3d Cir.

2003).................................................... 27

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S.

742, 808 (2010) (Thomas, J.,

concurring)...........................................

21,

McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601,

604 (6th Cir. 1997)............................ 26

McLaughlin v. Cotner, 193 F.3d 410, 415

(6th Cir. 1999).................................... 23

McLean v. Int’l Harvester Co., et al., 902

F.2d 372, 374-76 (5th Cir. 1990).... x

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215, 230

(1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).......

xxviii

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399

(1923)..........................................................

19,

Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,

157-160 (1989) (White, J., dissenting)..

Miller v. Special Weapons, L.L.C., 369

F.3d 1033, 1035 (8th Cir. 2004)............

Mitchell-Angel v. Cronin, No. 95-7937,

1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 4416 (2d Cir.

Mar. 8, 1996).............................................

M. L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116

(1996)..........................................................

viii

Monroe v Pape, U.S. 167, 187 (1961)........

Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494,

503 (1977) (plurality opinion)........

Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Schs., 418

F.3d 395, 401 (4th Cir. 2005)................

National Federation of Independent

Business v. Sebelius 567 U.S. 519

(2012)..........................................................

xii

N. L.R.B. v. Detroit Newspapers, 185 F.3d

602, 606 (6th Cir. 2009).........................

Nowicki v. Cooper, 56 F.3d 782, 784 (7th

Cir. 1995)....................................................

Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S. Ct.

1197 (1989)................................................

Ortiz v. Burgos 807 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir.

1986)..........................................................

xxix

Osei-Afriyie ex rel. Osei-Afriyie v. Med.

Coll, of Penn., 937 F.2d 876, 883 (3d

Cir. 1991)............................................

Outlaw v. Airtech Air Conditioning &

Heating, Inc., 412 F.3d 156, 161—62

(D.C. Cir. 2005).................................. 29

Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).

Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 7 (1983).......

viii,

Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,

534-35 (1925)......................................

Positano Place at Naples I Condominium

Association v. Empire Indemnity

Insurance Co., 84 F.4th 1241 (11th

Cir. 2023)............................................ vi

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,

166 (1944)...........................................

Robertson v. Hecksei, 420 F.3d 1254, 1259

(11th Cir. 2005).................................. 27

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124 (1973).....

Russ v. Watts 414 F.3d 783, 791 (7th Cir.

2005)....................................................... 27

Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537

F.3d 185, 188-89 (2d Cir. 2008)......... 28

Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 582 U.S. 47,

70 n.24 (2017)........................................ 14,

Sinclair v. City of Seattle, 61 F.4th 674

(9th Cir. 2023).................................... 27

XXX

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541

(1942).................................................... 20

Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411

(9th Cir. 1987).................................... 27

Smith v Organization of Foster Families

for Equal. & Reform, 431 US 816, 845

(1977).................................................... 11

Smith v. Smith, 1985 WL 327994 (Tex.

July 1985)..................................................

Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S.

69, 77 (2013)....................................... v, 23,

25,

35,

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)..... 19

Streeter v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., 2005 WL

4357633 (Conn. Super. Nov. 10, 2005).

Sw. Boston Senior Servs. v. Whatley, 396

F. Supp. 2d 50, 57 (D. Mass. 2005)......

Trinia Jones et al v DuPage County

Sheriff et al 17-CV-01076................

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68—69

(2000)....................................................

Trujillo v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Santa

Fe Cnty., 768 F.2d 1186, 1188 (10th

Cir. 1985)............................................. 27

Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 447

(2011)....................................... ............

United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542

(1875).................................................... 22

xxxi

U.S. v. Faulk, 181 Fed.Appx. 882, 883

(11th Cir. 2006)..................................

U.S. v. Skyles 165 Fed.Appx. 807, 809

(11th Cir. 2006)..................................

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,

533 (1996)............................................ 15

Wallace v. Kern, 520 F.2d 400 (2d Cir.

1975).....................................................

Wartman v. Branch 7, 510 F.2d 130, 134

(7th Cir.1975)................. ...................

25,

Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,

406 U.S. 164, 172, 175(1972)...........

Word v. Remiek, 58 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Ark.

App. 2001)

............................

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373374 (1886)............................................

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).....

23,

35,

U.S. Constitution & Amendments

Article III.........................................................

First Amendment.........................................

Fourth Amendment.......................................

Fifth Amendment.........................................

29,

33,

7, 27,

xii,

33,

xxxii

Seventh Amendment.................................

Ninth Amendment.....................................

Fourteenth Amendment.............................

8, 9,

14,

20,

21,

Rules

Supreme Court Rule 34.7...........................

Federal Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 2...............

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4...............

Fed. R. Civ. P. 5...............

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)..............

36,

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a)............. 8

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12..............

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15..............

8, 25

Fed. R. Civ. P. 17............... i, ii,

26,

28,

35,

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).............. vii, 9,

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2)............ vii,

Fed. R. App. P. 31 (c), (d).......... 37

xxxiii

Fed. R. App. P. 42..........................................

Fed. R. App. P. 25(a)(4)................................

Fed. R. App. P. 28.........................................

Fed. R. App. P. 31 (c),(d)..............................

Fed. R. App. P. 42.........................................

Circuit Rules

7th Cir. R. 26.1(b)...........................................

2d Cir. R. 27(j)................................................

2d Cir. R. 34............................. .......................

Federal Statutes

15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2003)....................

18 U.S.C. §3509(d)........................................

i, 10

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)........................................

vii

28 U.S.C. § 1915.............................................

iv, 7,

25,

26,

42 U.S.C. § 1983.............................................

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995

(PLRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997e et seq.

State Statutes

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-403.01(A)

(2012)....................................................

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.13(2)(c)(2)

(2009)..........................................................

xxxiv

Idaho Code Ann. § 32-717B(4).....................

Illinois Statutes..............................................

App.

La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 132.........................

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 665(a).....................

Historical Statutes

18 Eliz. I, c. 3 (Poor Act, 1576)....................

43 Eliz. I, c. 2 (Poor Laws of, 1601),

(1733)..........................................................

Ill. Rev. Code § 1 (1827)................................

La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 234, 274 (1838)...

Va. Acts 1684, ch. 4.......................................

12,

13,

12,

Other Authorities

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United Kingdom, n.p, 1684...................

Akhil R. Amar, Foreword: The Document

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Argys Luara M., et al., Measuring

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XXXV

Lynne M. Casper eds.. Mahwah, NJ:

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12,

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11,

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Comanor, William S. & Phillips, Llad,

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Epstein, Richard A., Further Thoughts on

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Epstein, Richard A., Of Citizens and

Persons: Reconstructing the Privileges

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xxxvi

Fourteenth Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J.L.

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Fabricius, William V., Ph.D., Expert

Report on Child Custody and

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16,

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1705, 1724 (2023)............................... 25

Goldschmidt, Jona, How Are Courts

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33,

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2009-2010 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 163,

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558..............................................................

Lammon, Bryan, Cumulative Finality, 52

Ga. L. Rev. 767, 795-802 (2018)..... 29

Lammon, Bryan, Final Decisions & Final

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59 (2023).............................................. 29

Landsman, Stephan, The Growing

Challenge of Pro Se Litigation, 13

xxxvii

Lewis & Clark L Rev 439 (2009)

warning of “legitimacy”..........................

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Rts. J. 955 (2009)............................... 33

Pether, Penelope J., "Sorcerers’

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33,

xxxviii

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Pew Research Center, A Tale of two

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http s ://w ww .pewresearch. org/socialtrends/2011/06/15/a-tale-of-twofathers/................................................ 17

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Posner, Richard A., Exit Interview with

Adam Liptak, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11,

2017....................................................... 10

Posner, Richard A., Reforming the

Federal Judiciary: My Former Court

Needs to Overhaul Its Staff Attorney

Program and Begin Televising Its

Oral Arguments (2017)...........................

Ressler, Jayne, Privacy, Plaintiffs, and

Pseudonyms: The Anonymous Doe

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Richman, William M. & Reynolds,

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United States Courts of Appeals in

Crisis 91-111 (2013).......................... 33

9, 34

xxxix

Sampson, Robert J., Urban Black

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The Statutes of the Realm: Printed by

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Tribe, Laurence H., American

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Upton, W.S. & Jennings, N.R., Civil Code

of the State of Louisiana (E. Johns &

Co. ed., 1838)...................................... 14

U.S. Courts, Judicial Business Data

Table B-l (2023)

https://www.uscourts.gov/data-tablenumbers/b-1..............................................

U.S. Courts, Judicial Business Data

Table B-5A

https://www.uscourts.gov/data-tablenumbers/b-5a............................................

William M. Richman & William L.

Reynolds, Injustice on Appeal: The

United States Courts of Appeals in

Crisis (2013)..............................................

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

OPINIONS BELOW

Circuit: 2024 WL 108784 (App.2a); 2023 WL

7893920 (App.lla); 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 3401

(App.l8a).

District: 2022 WL 3444961 (App.20a); 2022 WL

1604107 (App.27a); 2021 WL 6091755 (App.33a); 2019

WL 4201574 (App.49a). State: Unreported.

JURISDICTION

The Seventh Circuit, inter alia, issued judgment

on January 10, 2024, and denied rehearing on

February 13, 2024. This Court has jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. §1254(1). Alternatively, jurisdiction is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1651.

CONSTITUTIONAL

AND

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

STATUTORY

Reproduced in appendix.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Facts and Procedural History

1. A Child Suffering, A Father’s Plight

Shortly after Father’s sister was killed in the car

he had given her, Mother cheated on Father, as he was

“no longer any fun.” That man actively sought to

eliminate Father’s involvement with the child,

emailing intentions. Soon Mother mirrored that aim,

jealous of time child was with Father.

Father was primary caregiver during weekdays

and with child most weekends until Mother, under

false pretenses of a short-term stay in Indiana and

reconciliation, obtained concessions from Father.

Despite reservations and boundary violations, Father

felt obligated to accommodate Mother for their child's

sake (relationship was off and on — Mother's erratic

behavior exasperating Father’s efforts to balance their

child's needs and navigate then believed Mother’s

perinatal mental health issues).

Shortly, however, the child was kept from Father

for several months without explanation. Christmas

Father saw their child again. While at child’s doctor,

Mother’s employer, for an ear infection, looking for

frequency, Father discovered in the medical records,

the child was seriously harmed.1 When Father

inquired about the records, Mother took off with their

child without explanation.

Father (Plaintiff) was forced to obtain an

emergency order of protection. Police refused to

enforce it. Mother went into hiding, absconding with

their child for 8+ months... Mother’s attorney had

order thrown out on standing not merits (contrary to

this court’s precedents). There was no explanation

nor proper investigation.

Following a forced impermissible compromise by

Judge to obtain Joint custody harmful events to the

1 Also concealed, discovered years later, other significant

indications of harm including that relative to suspect incidents,

and actions of Mother’s then husband.

child occurred, mostly hidden from Father and often

coinciding with significant visitation interference.

Visitation interference, causing fear of the worst, was

significant (one phase over 100 days), plus vacations,

and virtually all telephone contact. Father, left

without options, matters escalating, petitioned the

court for redress. Remains unheard.

Child was harmed by alienating behaviors, such as

being denied her last name, witnessing threats and

attacks on Father, and being used to facilitate

Mother’s aims, e.g. uninvited entry into Father’s home

during her court-ordered time with father.2 Mother

frequently made extreme, false accusations to restrict

Father’s involvement. This was the pattern of

defendant(s), to muddy the waters with outlandish

acts and claims, to divert attention from actual facts

and harms, obscure the truth of the matters, and to

co-opt others to act on Mother’s behalf against father,

e.g. falsely accusing him of kidnapping - getting him

banned from child’s school for a year despite having

picked up their child on court ordered schedule

following both court order and school procedures. One

among many, many others.

Over Father’s objection a GAL was inserted to the

case on motion drafted by STG, filed by Mother. GAL

escalated matters for the worse, made no record on

matters directed to “investigate,” such as suspect

incidents, extensive visitation interference, child not

allowed to use her name, etc., specifically avoiding

2 Despite numerous violations, police and state attorneys refused

to act when Mother denied visitation or entered Father’s home

uninvited to take the child. A simple ticket could have curtailed

behaviors, potentially prevented much harm to the child.

any adverse finding against Mother even on first-hand

knowledge of visitation interference, and made

suggestions overt to secure STG involvement.3

Mother solicited child’s active participation and

controlling child’s words to GAL. STG able to delay,

supplanted pending matters (2009 still outstanding)

with motions of improper purpose, replete with

verifiable mischaracterizations and manufactured

basis, and either used their influence or found the

court receptive.

In efforts to thwart Plaintiff s efforts to protect and

see his child and intimidate plaintiff into submission

(to give up his child) or induce his failure - defendants

retaliated in escalating fashion:

2/23/2012, Gumina attempted to extort Plaintiff

into dropping all pending matters or she would file for

sole custody, i.e. give up child, or they will take child.

Mother infuriated by child’s potential Europe

vacation with her father, retaliated, STG had GAL file

an Emergency motion.4 Judge seized opportunity to

retaliate for not acquiescing to its recent pressure to

give up joint custody and let him be done with it,

ramped up that pressure regardless of the harm to the

child or fundamental rights (mocked them in open

3 E.g. GAL suggested settlement: addressed no issues for child’s

benefit, reduced visitation, and no schedule for make-up

visitation for denials mandated by court orders under constant

attack through Mother’s version of “where’s the baby”.

4 Father falsely accused of e.g. violating non-existent order,

making unilateral decisions verifiably made by Mother (her

emails, texts), and culpable for alleged incident that occurred

while the child was with the Mother not Father (little to no

contact - timeframe).

court) — terminated visitation without such relief

requested without full hearing despite saying “I’m not

saying he’s doing anything wrong” “I believe he’s

operating in from the best possible motivation about

what he believes is in the best interest of his [child].”

Visitation held hostage as Father failed to acquiesce

to severing joint custody.5

Matters Father raised remained pending for years,

e.g. visitation interference, yet the Court heard

Mother’s suspect petitions including to sever custody

- Judge Dudgeon made good on his promise decade

earlier, severed joint custody making findings, absent

full hearing, on statements directly impeached,

eviscerating father’s reputation and child parent

relationship conflicting the overwhelming evidence.

Significantly court delegated its judicial power to

decide, including to unidentified third parties not

within its jurisdiction, e.g. visitation, rendering order

void on its face. Moreover, Fraud was pervasively

involved in procuring multiple orders in addition to

overt due process issues. GAL impeached, admitted

her statements were false, and the alleged issues were

caused by Mother, not Father. Asking representation

about addressing constitutionality — routinely

withdrew. The last, “I have no interest in changing

the law.” Stranded, motion to reconsider filed staying

order. STG (frequently miswrote orders) wrote order

prohibiting visitation and escalated.

5 "temporarily" terminating visitation impermissible retaliation

for not doing so and to coerce settlement (see Goss Graphics Sys.,

Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 267 F.3d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 2001) citing

Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.1985)) i.e. pressure by court

to give up joint custody.

1/31/2014, Gumina attempted to extort Father to

relinquish his standing as Minor’s father and allow

Defendant’s husband to “adopt minor” as “solution for

all of this to go away.” Court ruled on wrong motion

to reconsider (technically remains unheard).

Outstanding matters required leave to appeal,

immediately

requested,

refused

until

August/September of 2014, yet proved inadequate

wording.

Gumina expanded threats to Father’s family, his

elderly parents, to “ruin” them specifically “leave

[them] with nothing left for retirement” if they did not

make Father give up. 9/17/2014, McCumber (STG)

assault/battery of plaintiff in court room day he was

to file appeal notice (Judge Davenport protected

attorney). STG started sending aggressive process

server to Plaintiffs house, initially copy of order, then

multiple times on efforts to obtain information on

plaintiffs elderly parents’ assets. Then despite order

that should have prevented it, sent him again, this

time with the Sheriff - 1/2/2015 incident. STG

conspired with and to send sheriff deputies which

entered his home absent warrant, without ringing

door bell, without knocking or announcing, calling his

name, threatening family in the house at gunpoint,

interrogating plaintiff on matters of the state case,

refusing to leave, and threatening arrest for indefinite

period of time until they could prove who was on title

of house.

Father’s family saw this as making good on their

threat and showing that they could do it, and more,

with the police.

Father’s fear for his family appeared to be

interpreted as guilt - New Judge Else took an

immediate otherwise unexplainable reproach against

him, chance at a fresh start ruined. He struggled to

keep up, had to ask for extensions, never quit, yet all

he did, took all he had, was getting too slow, speech

and writing often riddled approaching incoherent if

pressed.

July 2016, Judge Else unsealed case in retaliation

for Plaintiff obtaining order allowing ordering of

transcripts.6 Judge Else undermined appeal refusing

to hear motion showing receipts paid for record

submission to appellate court. STG dropped efforts on

plaintiffs parents after appellate court dismissed

appeal as inter alia, no final order 8/15/2015. STG

held their influence. Judge would not set hearings,

thus no visitation or final order, nor give clean 304

ruling. No relief, no way forward. No visitation even

when, on record, finding supervised visitation was not

even necessary or called for, that the parents should

work it out - Mother’s response “No.”

Gumina (STG) made clear she was never going to

let Plaintiff see his child again: “No” “Never going to

happen.” Gumina: “This is fun” stated to S.A. in court

room.

2. Summation of Complaints

Sought remedy in federal court regarding inter alia

due process and equal protection violations,

deprivation of fundamental rights, First Amendment

6 another Judge, Em. motion - visitation; Judge Else told court

reporters not allowed.

retaliation,

gender

discrimination,

Fourth

Amendment violations (illegal entry, search seizure,

failure knock announce, excessive force...), Monell,

abuse of process, conspiracy, TIED, etc. seeking in

addition to damages fees and costs where applicable,

meaningful reforms inter alia, within sheriff

department and constitutional challenge to state

custody statutes via declaratory injunctive relief.

(1983, 1985, 1988, Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123,

(1908), et cetera.)

District Proceedings

Significant Claims were dismissed improperly

before summons or appearance under 1915(e),

without guidance of counsel, on matters not raised to

defend that precedents hold do not apply, conflicting

rule 12. Requests for time to obtain, recruitment or

appointment of attorney denied. Amendments, even

per 15c, denied... Defendants thwarted discovery and

Plaintiffs motions to compel were denied beyond

depositions of two deputies S.A. Roberts refused to

allow to proceed. [DR52,DR56].

While prevailing at trial to limited extent allowed,

area damages evidence improperly severely restricted

via improper form (due process issue) at eve trail

(DR124, 1st: $250,000 + $100,000 punitive); Rejected

plaintiffs posttrial motion without response then

partially allowed [DR131, DR133,DR138] remittitur

order [DR 169] despite defendants providing no

supporting argument and court supplied case within

district same amount yet involved less damaging

repercussions (Cooper v Daley 07CV02144 verdict dkt.

no. 399; Seventh Amendment issue); Experts

disclosed before 90 days denied, rubberstamping prior

damages order, rule 54(b) request denied; 2nd trial: ($0

+$85,000 punitive DR250).

Numerous issues

regarding 2nd trial should have either rendered

mistrial or mandated new trial, post-trial motions

rejected (e.g. DR255 — inter alia 1 second late; DR307

- no response). District Clerk began to refuse to

accept filings requested under seal where they had

before, resulting in adverse orders...7

No Finality issue remains.8

Declaratory

Injunctive relief re sheriff department outstanding,

not dismissed, not allowed to be heard in front of jury

on first trial — court disinclined to add back Monell,

Seventh Amendment issues aside. Court mistakenly

assumed it was previously dismissed on 1/3/2017

[DR280 last paragraph].

District case is Not Final per Rule 54(b) see

Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1,

47 (1943). Rule 4 does not permit early appeal it only

allows at times premature notice to become effective

when a notice of appeal should be filed at a later date

avoiding some problems. It does not give the appellate

court jurisdiction until that point. See e.g. Griggs v.

1 E.g. DR307, DR316, DR319, CR10

8 Significant barrier to appellate representation - many

unwilling unless represented trial level or could show order

stating to effect of “I am dismissing” not: vague “it was

dismissed” with prior clear statement on record it was not

dismissed. DR14, DR18, DR303:6-7; amended complaint drafted

to comply instructions of paragraph(s), e.g. (1.) pg2, DR26 or face

dismissal.

Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58,

(1982).

Circuit Proceedings

Plaintiff filed multiple notices (repeatedly raised

finality issue - no action). Court denied motion to

proceed under pseudonym and seal et al without

motion allowed to be filed and before the court.9

Result - relentless panic - his child was going to be

exposed — Posner’s comments10 — Clear only chance to

protect her, the case, thus her and those like her, was

if represented.

He doubled down to obtain an

attorney. Work compromised by significant health

issues of his family and himself, etc.

Upon last denial of extension precluding all

reviewing attorneys, sought to have one recruited.

Failing, panic went through the roof, coupled with

Sheriff department camping outside the front of the

house before and on due dates, ([CR57] escalated

since) compromised what would have been filed. Brief,

timely filed, well cited, was rejected without allowing

amendment. Plaintiff promptly filed amended brief

believed to meet rules, also rejected. Appellate court

affirmed; denied time for or appointment of attorney,

and rehearing petitions.

9 clerk staff insisted would not take the unredacted motion until

after an order permitted it [CR5, CR10]; conflicts FRAP 25(a)(4)),

18 U.S.C. §3509(d).

10 Liptak, Adam. “An Exit Interview With Richard Posner,

Judicial Provocateur” The New York Times 11 sept., 2017;

Posner, R. A. (2017).

B. Fundamental Rights of Children to Their

Parents and Parents to Their Children

“The liberty interest in family privacy has its

source, and its contours are ordinarily to be

sought, not in state law, but in intrinsic human

rights, as they have been understood in "this

Nation's history and tradition." Moore v. City of

East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). Cf. also

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 47, 230 (1976) (STEVENS,

J., dissenting). Smith v Organization of Foster

Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845

(1977) (declaring the right of children to maintain

uninterrupted the "emotional attachments that derive

from the intimacy of daily association" with the

parent).

1. Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right Abbreviated

Common

Law

and

Legislative History at the Founding of

The Nation Through 1868

By common law, natural law, nurture, and custom,

children’s natural guardian was their biological

parents, ultimately the father. Blackstone1 447.

“The main end and design of marriage therefore

being to ascertain and fix upon some certain person,

to whom the care, the protection, the maintenance,

and the education of the children should belong”

Blackstone Bl at 443 (genetic testing resolves

ambiguity, and constitutional protections)

Paternal authority was essentially unassailable.

Benjamin Franklin as per common custom and law

had guardianship and custody of his natural child

(last colonial governor of New Jersey).

Until turn of 20th century, laws enacted were

largely limited to facilitating parental authority

(albeit Paternal) for example regarding Father’s right

to appoint guardians after death of the father which

could be the mother. Only where obligations fell upon

the parish or local townships, i.e. the poor or

abandoned, did the government have authority to

involve itself out of necessity, by default. E.g. the poor

laws of 1601,1733, etc. Blackstone book 4 at 65. These

laws were concerned with the indemnification of that

locality for the expense to the degree possible within

the means of both parents, wed or not, and their

extended families if necessary and reciprocal laws for

children to take care of parents (18,43 Elizabeth). The

rights of women were enveloped into marriage or

protected by the father (e.g. Roman law - father had

power to declare divorce of his daughter).

“By marriage, the husband and wife are one person

in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the

woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least

is incorporated and consolidated into that of the

husband; under whose wing, protection, and cover,

she performs everything; and is therefore called in our

law-French a feme-covert... under the protection and

influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and her

condition during her marriage is called her coverture.”

1 Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law of England

442 (3d ed. 1768).

Illinois once a county of Virginia, a French

territory before that, shared the well-established

deep-rooted customs and laws regarding children and

their fathers including natural children and reputed

fathers. Virginia pertinently on children born out of

wedlock i.e. [natural] child:

“Reputed Fathers of [natural]-Children, if

Servants, how to be dealt withal:

Whereas by the present Law of this Country,

the punishment of a reputed Father of a

[natural]- Child, is the keeping of the Child,

and saving the Parish harmless; and if it

should happen the reputed Father to be a

Servant, who can no ways accomplish the

penalty of that act: Be it therefore Enacted by

the Authority aforesaid, That where any

[natural]- Child is gotten by a Servant, the

Parish shall take care to keep the Child,

during the time the reputed Father hath to

serve by Indenture or Custom, and that after

the said reputed Father is Free, he shall make

Satisfaction to the parish.”11

Illinois upon statehood, similarly passed law

January 23, 1827 that when the courts were involved,

as typically among the states, upon suspicion or risk

of the county being financially encumbered by a child

not from wedlock, set a maximum support obligation

bond to indemnify the county, to which reputed

“father,.... Shall be permitted to take charge and have

the control of his child.. .”12 Louisiana similarly rooted

11 A complete collection of all the laws of Virginia now in force ...

copied from the Assembly records. [By J. P.]. United Kingdom,

n.p, 1684

Lockwood, Samuel

Drake, and Smith, Theophilus

Washington. The Revised Code of Laws of Illinois: Enacted by

the Fifth General Assembly, at Their Session Held at Vandalia,

Commencing on the Fourth Day of December, 1826, and Ending

the Nineteenth of February, 1827: Published in Pursuance of

Law. United Kingdom, Robert Blackwell, Printer to the

State, 1827.

upon Roman law articulated in French code, in

practice more detailed:

“ART. 234.-A child remains under the authority

of his father and mother, until his majority or

emancipation. In case of difference between the

parents, the authority of the father prevails.”

“ART. 274.-The father is of right the tutor of his

natural child acknowledged by him. The

mother is of right the tutrix of her natural child

not acknowledged by the father. The natural

child acknowledged by both, has for tutor, first

the father, in default of him, the mother.”13

Therein lies the objectionable, “in case of

difference” or “first,” by the 1868 enactment of

Fourteenth Amendment, equal protection would call

not for evisceration of one in favor of the other nor the

diminishing of fundamental rights or lessoning of

rights, but bringing both sexes in parity with equal

standing - joint custody & equal parenting time Preserving the children’s fundamental rights to both

parents in the process.

“Ordinarily, we have reiterated, "extension, rather

than nullification, is the proper course." Califano v.

Westcott, 443 U.S., 76, 89, (1979)..” Sessions v.

Morales-Santana, 582 U.S. 47, 1699 n.24 (2017).

2. Gender-Based Stereotypes

For close to a half century, this Court has viewed

with suspicion laws that rely on "overbroad

13 Upton, W. S., Jennings, N. R. (1838). Civil Code of the State of

Louisiana. United States: E. Johns & Company.

generalizations about the different talents, capacities,

or preferences of males and females." United States v.

Virginia, 518 U.S., 515, 533, (1996). No "important

[governmental] interest" is served by laws grounded in the obsolescing view that "unwed fathers [are]

invariably less qualified and entitled than mothers" to

take responsibility for nonmarital children. Caban v.

Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382, 394, (1979).

“Prescribing one rule for mothers, another for

fathers - is of the same genre as the classifications

declared unconstitutional in Reed, Frontiero,

Wiesenfeld, Goldfarb, and Westcott. As in those cases,

heightened scrutiny is in order. Successful defense of

legislation that differentiates on the basis of gender,

we have reiterated, requires an "exceedingly

persuasive justification." Virginia, 518 U.S., at 531,

116 S.Ct. 2264; Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455,

461, (1981))” Sessions supra at 1678, 1690.

While courts and legislatures learned to largely

obscure their language to hide intent, the laws are

inherently invidious discrimination in their intention

and application against fathers and their children —

“an evil eye and an unequal hand” Yick Wo v. Hopkins,

118 U.S. 356, 373-374, (1886).

3. Precedent

Unequivocally

Establishes States May Not Punish

Children Based on Matters Beyond

Their Control

The Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has

expressed a consistent special concern for

discrimination against children. See Pickett v. Brown,

462 U.S. 1, 7 (1983) (noting explicitly “a special

concern for discrimination against non-marital

children”); Where laws function to place children in a

distinct, disadvantaged class based on the conduct of

their parents or other adults, these principles are

violated. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406

U.S. 164, 172, 175 (1972) (stating that condemning a

child for the actions of his parents is “illogical and

unjust”); see Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968)

(holding that it is invidious to discriminate against

non-marital children for the actions of their parents

over which they have no control).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

A. Significant Issues of National Importance

1. The Constitutional Challenge to the

Statutes

The constitutional challenge to the statutes is of

significant national public importance and a

significant public health issue negatively affecting

35% of the population see e.g. expert report of Dr.

Fabricius

among

others.

(R131-1)

Beyond

incentivizing divorce, and lower marriage and birth

rates; Studies found that mothers receive primary

residential custody in the great majority of cases, 68—

88%.14 29% fathers see their children four or less

times per month. 21% only several times per year,

14 Argys L, Peters E, Cook S, Garasky S, Nepomnyaschy L,

Sorensen E. Measuring contact between children and

nonresident fathers. In: Hofferth SL, Casper LM, editors.

Handbook of measurement issues in family research. Mahwah,

NJ: Erlbaum; 2007. pp. 375-398

and 27% no visits at all. The percentage of children

living apart from their fathers has more than doubled

since 1960 to 27%.15 This is more than three times the

share of children around the world who do so. U.S.

has the world’s highest rate of children living in

single-parent households.16 Dr. Fabricius detailed the

conclusive overwhelming negative effects on children

that were denied significant time and joint custody of

their fathers - strongly advocating that children have

a need for both parents and the presumption of equal

time and joint legal custody. There are

intergenerational effects of deprivation of fathers and

alienation. (See expert reports).

No other resulting action by the court could

effectively reduce future criminal activity and

resulting caseloads of both state and federal courts to

degree within the next quarter century as here.

Majority of criminal acts come from those raised in

or with peers within immediate communities with

high rates of single-family homes particularly female

head of household (absentee fathers). Sampson on

crime, violent crime, and homicide - stating “the

results are unequivocal. The effect of families headed

by females is in all cases - significant and positive.”

Regardless of race and income17. Comanor similarly

found male youths from single mother households

encounter the criminal justice system most (mothers

with other men I stepfathers indicated make matters

15 Pew Research Center, June 15, 2011

16 Pew Research Center, December 12, 2019

17 Sampson RJ. Urban black violence: the effect of male

joblessness and family disruption. American Journal of

Sociology. 1987;93(2):348-382. (p368)

worse). All other factors including family income are

much less significant.18

2. The States Are Divided as to the

Treatment and Protections Given

These Fundamental Rights in Statutes,

and the Courts’ Interpretations of

Them and Rights Involved.

Beyond statutes the courts themselves are actively

undermining the fundamental rights in many states.

Some, like Illinois, allow, yet retain hostility against.

As an Illinois appellate court stated, “we view joint

custody as most extraordinary and counsel skepticism

when trial courts hear promises from newly divorcing

parents that they can surmount the manifest

difficulties of a joint-custody order.” In re Marriage of

Dobey, 258 Ill.App.3d 874, 876 (1994). Some states

have an explicit preference against joint legal custody.

Word v. Remick, 58 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Ark. App. 2001)

(“Joint custody or equally divided custody of minor

children is not favored in Arkansas unless

circumstances clearly warrant such action.”). Courts

effectively promote more directly for mothers solely to

decide if joint custody can exist - if children and

fathers can retain fundamental rights. Cabot v.

Cabot, 697 A.2d 644, 649 (Vt. 1997) (“The meaning of

§ 665(a) is plain: where the parents cannot agree, the

court must award primary (or sole) parental rights

and responsibilities to one parent.”)

See 112a.

18 Comanor WS and Phillips L (2002) The impact of income and

family structure on delinquency. Journal of Applied Economics

5: 209-232 (p225)

Generally, it is forgone conclusion, if one is to lose,

which gender it will be...

Conversely, Rebuttable presumption decision

making jointly: Florida FLA. STAT § 61.13(2)(c)(2)

(2009)., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717B(4)„ Louisiana

CC132, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, D.C.,

Wisconsin, and Utah. Joint legal and physical custody

presumption ARIZ. REV. STAT § 25-403.01(A) (Ariz.

Laws 2012, Ch. 309 (effective Jan. 1, 2013)).

See e.g. J. Herbie DiFonzo, From the Rule of One

to Shared Parenting: Custody Presumptions in Law

and Policy, 52 Fam. Ct. Rev. 214 (2014).

3. This Court Emphasizes the Primacy

of the Parent-Child Relationship

This right is one of the most fundamental

liberty interests anyone can have. See, e.g., Pierce

v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer

v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Troxel v.

Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000) (also indicating

strict scrutiny Justice Thomas concurring at 80).

In keeping with deeply rooted “Western

civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad

parental authority over minor children,” the law

necessarily “rests on a presumption that parents

possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience,

and capacity for judgment for making life’s difficult

decisions.” Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).

As Justice White explained in Stanley v. Illinois,

405 U.S. 645 (1972) (state may not separate the

parent from the child, even temporarily, without

according them due process of law to protect their

liberty interests):

"The Court has frequently emphasized the

importance of the family. The rights to

conceive and to raise one's children have been

deemed 'essential,' Meyer supra, 'basic civil

rights of man,' Skinner v. Oklahoma, ex rel.

Williamson 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and

'[r]ights far more precious . . . than property

rights,' May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533

(1953). 'It is cardinal with us that the custody,

care and nurture of the child reside first in the

parents, whose primary function and freedom

include preparation for obligations the state

can neither supply nor hinder.' [We have long

held that there exists a "private realm of

family life which the state cannot enter."]

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166

(1944). The integrity of the family unit has

found protection in the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment, Meyer v.

Nebraska, supra, at 399, the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, at

541, and the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v.

Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965)

(Goldberg, J., concurring)." Id., at 651. [33]

Yet there is another... The first...

4. This Court Should Identify Grounds

for the Parties’ Rights that are

Consistent with the Original Public

Meaning

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

Immunities Clause.

Privileges

and

The Privileges or Immunities Clause contains

what should be the Fourteenth Amendment’s primary

mechanism for limiting state infringement of

substantive rights. See McDonald v. City of Chicago,

561 U.S. 742, 808 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in

part and concurring in the judgment). Indeed, the

clause is most appropriately read “as a guarantor of

substantive rights against all state action.” Richard

A. Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons: Reconstructing

the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 334, 345 (2005).

There is now an established cross-ideological

scholarly consensus, and an emerging judicial

recognition,

that

Slaughter-House

“blatantly”

misinterpreted the Privileges or Immunities Clause.19

There is consensus that interpreting the Privileges

or Immunities Clause according to its original

meaning would benefit Fourteenth Amendment

jurisprudence.20

19 Alan Gura et al., The Tell-Tale Privileges or Immunities

Clause, 2009 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 163, 181—84 (2009); see also

McDonald, 561 U.S. at 805 (Thomas, J., concurring); Laurence

H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1320-31 (3d ed. 2000);

Curtis, supra; Richard A. Epstein, Further Thoughts on the

Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

1 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 1096, 1098 (2005). “Virtually no serious

modern scholar—left, right, or center—thinks [that SlaughterHouse] is a plausible reading of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.”

Akhil R. Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114

Harv. L. Rev. 26, 123 n.327 (2000).

20 Charles Black Jr., A New Birth of Freedom: Human Rights,

Named and Unnamed 55 (1997). Slaughter-House arguably

5. In Light of Framework Reasoning

Set Forth In Dobbs V. Jackson Women's

Health Org., 597 U.S. 215 (2022) this

Court Should Address Not Only

Privileges And Immunities Clause but

the Internal Conflict within This Court

Regarding Fundamental Rights of

Children and Their Parents

The “biology plus” cases undermine the deeprooted historical understanding and common sense.

The facts in this case squarely give rise to address yet

would not control to deny relief requested. Father

“either had an interest protected by the Constitution

or he did not” Justice White (dissent) Lehr v

Robertson, 463 US 248 at 269

For instance, take Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491

U.S. 110, 157-160 (1989) (WHITE, J., dissenting)

majority fails when replace one gender of party with

that of the other... Could a woman married to a man

take the child from another woman because her

husband had an affair? That was a heartbalm claim,

and should have remained such. Modern advances

give rise to answers that could not be known before.

Adults are responsible for the consequences, not the

children, and for all but the evilest of deeds, even a

wrongdoer’s rights do not entirely disappear. The ship

that sailed can return to port or the party can swim

out to meet it, and if they do, who is right to say they

allowed Jim Crow to reign in the South for nearly a century. See

McDonald, 561 U.S. at 855-58 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing

United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)); Eric Foner, A

Short History of Reconstruction 223-25 (1990).

should drown rather than be taken on board. Should

the child(ren) be made to watch?

6. Outstanding Declaratory Injunctive

Relief Regarding

Sheriff is

Significant Importance

Case facts make reforms necessary,21 possible,

precluded to other victims as falls within City of Los

Angeles v Lyons 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) exceptions

inter alia continuing, present adverse effects, did

nothing wrong to initiate the involvement of the

deputies see Id at 103, City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378, (1989); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305

(1988), and Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011); R:7,

R131, R16, R23, R254, R304.

B. Seventh Circuit’s Decision Sanctifies and

Furthers Conflicts of Authority

1. Circuits Are Divided on Application

of Younger

Younger Abstention applications conflict with this

Court’s ruling in Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571

U.S. 69, 77 (2013). See e.g. broad application Wallace

v. Kern, 520 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1975). Fifth Circuit has

treated the Court’s Younger holdings as mere dicta

and has commanded district courts to apply Younger

21 17-CV-01076 Trinia Jones et al v DuPage County Sheriff et al

Unarmed black 17-year-old shot and killed in his home by a

sheriff deputy - training, practice and policy (defendant LN.

admits

training

and

practice);

weaponization

police/government, etc.

more sweepingly. Daves v. Dallas Cnty., 64 F.4th 616,

623—33 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc). Seventh Circuit

acknowledges (but creates own) e.g. J.B. v Woodard,

997 F.3d 714, 722 (7th Cir. 2021).

2. Circuits Are Divided on Domestic

Relations Doctrine

Those courts tending to interpret the exception

broadly referred to Ankenbrandt’s “reaffirmance” of

the exception See, e.g., McLaughlin u. Cotner, 193

F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 1999); Mitchell-Angel v.

Cronin, No. 95-7937, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 4416 (2d

Cir. Mar. 8, 1996); Allen v. Allen, 48 F.3d 259, 261 (7th

Cir. 1995); Sw. Boston Senior Servs. v. Whatley, 396 F.

Supp. 2d 50, 57 (D. Mass. 2005) re dismissals of suits

in contract: See, e.g., McLaughlin, 193 F.3d at 411,

413); Cassens v. Cassens, 430 F. Supp. 2d 830, 836—37

(S.D. Ill. 2006)). RE Tort cases: in McCracken v.

Phillips, No. 96-1164, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 61, at *2

(10th Cir. Jan. 2, 1997),.

Conversely, circuits interpret the exception

narrowly characterized Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504

U.S. 689, 701 (1992) as substantially limiting its scope

and held that various claims arising out of a domestic

relations dispute did not fall within the exception See,

e.g., Lannan v. Maul, 979 F.2d 627, 630—31 (8th Cir.

1992). Friedlander v. Friedlander, 149 F.3d 739, 740

(7th Cir. 1998), Judge Posner held that a claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress involving a

threat to reveal to a daughter her father’s real identity

did not fall within the exception; J.B. v. Woodard,

supra.

3. Circuits

Are

Ignoring

Sprint

Creating New Abstention to Use Where

Younger, or Domestic

Relations,

Abstentions Do Not Fit Creating a New

Split

Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs 571 U.S.

69, 77 (2013) emphasized federal courts’ “unflagging”

obligation to exercise jurisdiction and limited

Younger’s application to three categories of federal

lawsuits.

Evident in J.B. v. Woodard, supra; See John

Harland Giammatteo, The New Comity Abstention,

111 Calif. L. Rev. 1705 (2023). Circuits that have

addressed new comity abstention issues vary in the

degree and scope of the doctrine’s adoption. The

Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have most

expansively used the new comity abstention. In line

with its decision in Jonathan R. v. Justice, the Fourth

Circuit is least likely to abstain. Ninth and Eleventh

are in-between, accepting the doctrine’s premises in

certain contexts but rejecting them in others. Id 1724

(see citations within).

4. Circuits Are Divided on Application

of 1915(e)(2)

Dismissal impermissible as is inconsistent with

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(a) and 15(a) in

Bryan v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 455, 458 (7th Cir.1987).

Seventh Circuit has not overruled Bryan nor

Wartman stating "there is authority that a paid case

cannot be dismissed, no matter how manifestly

frivolous, before the summons is issued." Citing E.g.,

Butler v. Leen, 4 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam),

Wartman v. Branch 7, 510 F.2d 130, 134 (7th

Cir.1975) (concurring opinion) in Nowicki v. Cooper,

56 F.3d 782, 784 (7th Cir.1995), “claims dismissed

pursuant 1915(e) should be allowed to proceed if

plaintiff pays filing fee” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d

742, 756 (7th Cir. 2011).

Sixth Circuit says it is permissible, McGore v.

Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)

overruling Clark v. Ocean Brand Tuna, 974 F.2d 48,

50 (6th Cir. 1992).

Other Circuits did not allow dismissal prior to

summons as well Grissom v. Scott, 934 F.2d 656, 657

(5th Cir. 1991); Herrick v. Collins, 914 F.2d 228, 230

(11th Cir.1990); In re Funkhouser, 873 F.2d 1076,

1077 (8th Cir. 1989).

Pro se civil rights cases risk judges losing

neutrality and taking sides, especially if major actions

are taken without ensuring notice and prior response.

Unrepresented, pro se litigants face greater

challenges on appeal to obtain an attorney.

5. Circuits Are Divided on Ability to

Sustain Claims Regarding Interfering

with

Children’s

Right

Companionship with Parent(s); and

Conversely

Parents

with

Their

Children and To Protect Children e.g.

Rule 17.

Ninth Circuit ruled that children can file a 1983

claim for wrongful state interference with their

parental relationships, as the right to family integrity

under the Fourteenth Amendment includes protection

from unwarranted state actions affecting familial

bonds.22. Compare Sixth Circuit that will not unless

deliberate act with culpable state of mind directed at

the family relationship or a decision traditionally

within the ambit of the family.23

Conversely whether a parent can for that of their

children as Ninth Circuit24 and Tenth circuit (under

First Amendment association)25 will even for adult

children; First Circuit26, and Seventh Circuit27 will

but adds limits particularly for adult children to

governmental action directly aimed at the parent

child relationship (as was here), D.C. Circuit28 will for

minors regardless of custody standing, and Third

Circuit29 will for minors allowing flexibility depending

upon facts and Eleventh Circuit30 will for minors.

Blackstone notes the reciprocal obligations of parent

and child depending upon stage in life indicating a

historical framework, lifetime.31

22 Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1987)

23 Chambers v. Sanders, 63 F.4th 1092 (6th Cir. 2023)

24 Sinclair v. City of Seattle, 61 F.4th 674 (9th Cir.); Kelson v. City

of Springfield 767 F.2d 651, 653 (9th Cir.1985).

25 Trujillo v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Santa Fe Cnty., 768 F.2d

1186, 1188 (10th Cir. 1985)

26 Ortiz v. Burgos 807 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 1986)

27 Russ v. Watts 414 F.3d 783, 791 (7th Cir. 2005)

28 Franz v. United States 707 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Butera v.

District of Columbia 235 F.3d 637, 641 (D.C. Cir. 2001)

29 McCurdy v. Dodd F.3d 820, 830 (3d Cir. 2003)

30 Robertson v. Hecksei, 420 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 2005)

31 Blackstone ; Eliz., statutes indemnifying local parish

Courts often ignore Rule 17(c) and children’s rights

in pro se cases, leading to conflicts over parental

control absent fitness inquiry and frequent case

dismissals. Some circuits allow limited pro se cases,

representation or formal appointment is precarious,

e.g. Harris v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2000),

Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 105-06 (2d Cir.

2002), Adams ex rel. D.J.W. v. Astrue, 659 F.3d 1297,

1300 (10th Cir. 2011); most do not Myers v. Loudoun

Cnty. Pub. Schs., 418 F.3d 395, 401 (4th Cir. 2005)

(collecting cases). Despite circuits holding OseiAfriyie ex rel. Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll, of Penn., 937

F.2d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 1991) (observing that parties'

failure to bring to the district court's attention the

absence of counsel to represent minor children did not

waive the issue; "the parent cannot waive this right")

cases

widely

dismissed

without

recruiting

representation.32

There are conflicts applying e.g. rule 17 in regards

to parents’ ability to proceed under pseudonym to

protect their children compare: Sealed Plaintiff v.

Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 188-89 (2d Cir. 2008);

James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 241 (4th Cir. 1993);

Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 710,

724 (7th Cir. 2011), many do not33

6. Circuits Are Divided

Finality and Appealability

Regarding

32Ressler, J. Privacy, Plaintiffs, and Pseudonyms: The

Anonymous Doe Plaintiff in the Information Age 53 U. Kan. L.

Rev. 195 (2004-2005) note 230

Circuits “have made a hash of Finality”34 District

“might believe that it is done with an action despite

not having resolved all the claims...” Usually as Fifth,

Sixth, and Eighth Circuits held, it is not final. Note261, Seventh, talks out of both ends, not final, yet

buried in caselaw, is final, perhaps on circuit’s whim

whenever the district throws up its hands says, done,

refusing to finish. “It’s as if the judge had said midway

through the case, “I am tired of this case so I’m

entering a judgement terminating it.”” Chase

Manhattan. After FirsTier, circuits deeply divided:

three approaches to cumulative finality.35

Eighth and Federal Circuits held narrowly that

appeals only from decisions that resolve all

outstanding issues in the district court can be saved

by the entry of a final judgment. See, e.g., Miller v.

Special Weapons, L.L.C., 369 F.3d 1033,1035 (8th Cir.

2004).

Most circuits (First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,

Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits) held that

Rule 4(a)(2) will also save notices filed after decisions

that could have been certified for an intermediate

appeal under Rule 54(b). See, e.g., Outlaw v. Airtech

Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 412 F.3d 156, 16162 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Roberts, J.).

34 Bryan Lammon, Manufactured Finality, 69 Vill.L Rev.271;

Lammon, Bryan, Final Decisions & Final Judgments (August 23,

2023). 22 Journal of Appellate Practice & Process 59

35 See Lammon, Bryan (2018) "Cumulative Finality," Georgia

Law Review: Vol. 52: No. 3, Article 3., at 795-802. See e.g. notes

194-204 for cases for each circuit, see also split re common law vs

Rule 4(a)2

Second, Third Circuits, hold broadly: nearly any

district court decision, no matter how interlocutory,

can be saved by a subsequent judgment. See, e.g. Lazy

Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 587 (3d Cir.

1999).

7. Access to the Courts and Ruling on

Merits Should Not Depend upon

Geography - Circuits Are Divided

Regarding Liberal Interpretation of

Pro Se Briefs on Appeal and There Are

Conflicts

Between

Circuits

Procedures

Adversely

Impacting

Fundamental

Rights,

Meaningful

Access to Federal Courts - Ruling on

Merits.

Fifth Circuit holds “[s]ince the plaintiff [was] pro

se, and since his brief, “liberally construed”

articulated a reversible error, it would not dismiss the

appeal as it would otherwise Abdul-Alim Amin v.

Universal Life Ins. Co., 706 F.2d 638, 640 n.l (5th Cir.

1983).

Ninth Circuit held dismissal inappropriate, FRAP

28 errors, “no reason to treat pro se appellate briefs

any less liberally than pro se pleadings.” “This court

recognizes that it has a duty to ensure that pro se

litigants do not lose their right to a hearing on the

merits of their claim ...” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) citing above

and (McCottrel v. E.E.O.C., 726 F.2d 350, 351 (7th

Cir. 1984) (pro se litigants held to lower standard of

brief-writing than attorneys)

Eighth, Seventh, and Second Circuits: “We decline

to dismiss Kirby's appeal, because he is proceeding pro

se and his brief makes a discernable argument. See

LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir.

1995) (appellate courts do not generally hold pro se

litigants rigidly to formal briefing standards set forth

in Rule 28); cf. McCottrell v. EEOC, 726 F.2d 350, 351

(7th Cir. 1984) (appellate court may dismiss pro se

appeal where brief submitted "contains no identifiable

argument").” Kirby v. Roth, No. 10-3697 (8th Cir. May

2, 2011). McCottrell supra pro se brief not rejected

despite unsupported argument; Correa v. White, 518

F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 2008) (“dismissal too harsh

sanction for not having adequate explanations as to

error in argument section and omitted legal citations

- given leave to amend). LoSacco v. City of

Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1995) (appellate

courts do not generally hold pro se litigants rigidly to

formal briefing standards set forth in Rule 28)). Thus,

as pro se pleadings are liberally construed,

particularly where civil rights claims are involved.

Christensen v. C.I.R., 786 F.2d 1382, 1384-85 (9th

Cir.1986); Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n. 1

(9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). Defendants suggest no

reason to treat pro se appellate briefs any less

liberally than pro se pleadings.” Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Department 901 F.2d 696, 698-99 (9th Cir.

1990) at 699.

Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have rules and

provide informal brief requirements and forms for pro

se litigants36

36 See Leary, Marie. Analysis of Briefing Requirements in the

United States Courts of Appeals: Report to the Judicial

The Eighth and Fourth Circuit have simplified pro

se rules to ensure access to the courts. The Seventh

has not. Second Circuit has developed a number of

local rules governing all pro se cases - Local Rule 27(j)

erects additional barriers to entry by requiring a

precise statement of issues for appeal as an initial

filing requirement, and Local Rule 34 reduces pro se

oral arguments to just five minutes—well less than

the standard ten to fifteen minutes afforded to

represented parties. 2D CIR. R. 27(j); 2D CIR. R. 34.

8. Policies and Practices of the

Circuits Derived to Handle Increasing

Caseloads Since Middle of Last

Century Are Manifesting Unintended

Results Compromising the Federal

Judiciary

Many litigants' cases (disproportionately pro se's)

are being denied First Amendment right to seek

redress. Seventh Circuit cause for concern, litigants

twice as likely to get dismissed on procedural grounds

in Seventh Circuit (50.10%) than would from Eighth

Circuit (25.82%), essentially same for Fourth (26.49%)

(most other courts, circuits averaging at 33.78%

excluding Seventh). See table bl 2023. Further

investigation shows percentage of dismissal by

Default alone (excluding FRAP 42, cert of

appealability jurisdictional defects et al) is nearly half

of all procedural for the Seventh Circuit - again shows

twice Fourth Circuit, 5.6 time higher than Eighth

Circuit (roughly twice most other circuits; Eleventh,

Conference Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules. Federal

Judicial Center, 2004

the other outlier). B-5A Table 2023. Seventh Circuit

has been competing for top placement in a category

none should.37

Legal scholars have been vocal about the

seriousness of the situation pointing to what is

occurring as more than a serious threat to meaningful

access to the courts, it amounts to being

unconstitutional, a violation: of Article III, separation

of powers, judicial non-delegation doctrine as well as

Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection

clauses, First Amendment right to seek redress...38

https://www.uscourts.gov/data-table-numbers/b-l;

https://www.uscourts.gov/data-table-numbers/b-5a

38Pether, Penelope J., "Sorcerers’ Apprentices: How Judicial

Clerks and Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law" (2006).

Working Paper Series. 62 document the phenomenon of the de

facto delegation of the vast majority of Article III judicial power

to judicial clerks and staff attorneys, demonstrating that these

newly-graduated lawyers disproportionately decide cases

against “have-nots.”

Penelope Pether, Constitutional Solipsism: Toward a Thick

Doctrine of Article III Duty; or Why the Federal Circuits'

Nonprecedential

Status

Rules

Are

(Profoundly)

Unconstitutional, 17 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 955 (2009);

William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Injustice on Appeal:

The United States Courts of Appeals in Crisis (2013). Judges

began to rely more on what the authors call “additional decision

makers”—particularly law clerks and staff attorneys—to assist

in performing their official responsibilities pg. 91-111; See also

luliano, Jason, The Judicial Nondelegation Doctrine (June 21,

2023). Alabama Law Review, 2024, Forthcoming, University of

Utah College of Law Research Paper No. 558, noting 8th & 11th

Circuit’s assertion that “delegating a judicial function violates

Article III of the U.S. Constitution.” contains numerous splits

among states and circuits Id.

Circuits have held lower courts to task for same

issue that is admitted themselves to be doing.39

Including “rubber stamping”40

The Decisions Are Wrong

District’s Holdings Clearly

Conflict with the Seventh Circuit

and This Court’s Precedents

The district’s holdings from the get go are wrong.

The use of abstentions conflicts squarely with this

On pro se litigation throughout US legal system see: Stephan

Landsman, The Growing Challenge of Pro Se Litigation, 13

Lewis & Clark L Rev 439 (2009) warning of “legitimacy”.

Also: Jona Goldschmidt, “How Are Courts Handling Pro Se

Litigants?” 82 Judicature, no. 1, July-Aug. 1998. and Levy, M.

(2018). Empirical patterns of pro se litigation in federal district

courts. University of Chicago Law Review. 85. 1819-1867 noting

2-4% success rates pro se plaintiffs' have compared to 50% (or

more) if represented, "testing the market" fails notably for cases

with declaratory injunctive relief — most difficult to obtain

representation even for those with the best and most compelling

basis. Id.

39 U.S. v. Faulk, 181 Fed.Appx. 882, 883 (11th Cir. 2006); U.S. v.

Skyles 165 Fed.Appx. 807, 809 (11th Cir. 2006) (“delegating a

judicial function is a violation of Article HI of the U.S.

Constitution”); Posner supra pg. 6, 138; N.L.R.B. v. Detroit

Newspapers, 185 F.3d 602, 606 (6th Cir. 2009) (no “discretion to

delegate an Article HI responsibility to an Article II judge.”).

40 “district court's ‘rubber stamp’ of the master's order is an

inexcusable abdication of judicial responsibility and a violation

of article HI of the Constitution.” Burlington Northern R. Co. v.

Department of Revenue of State of Wash., 934 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir.

1991).

court’s precedents of inter alia Sprint and

Ankenbrandt. Plaintiff squarely stated not asking

court to issue impermissible custody decree.

Addressed abstentions not initially raised by the court

to defend in [DR16] motion e.g. re Younger pgs. 14-17

— district court’s refusal to acknowledge this Court’s

controlling cases squarely on the matters and correct

its holding show they are clearly wrong. So too

dismissal valid claims, refusal time for attorney, to

amend and to recruit/appoint an attorney e.g. rule 17

if one could not be found. E.g. Dennis v. Sparks, 499

U.S. 24, 27 (1980) (parties who conspire with immune

officials suable under § 1983 and “judicial immunity”

does not negate accountability,” other remedies

available where damages are precluded).

The improper premature action of the court acted

as a functional equivalent to denial of access to

representation. Rubberstamping prior improper

removal of area of damages did the same again —

removed money attorneys were interested in. Juries

have recognized significant emotional damages

associated with forced familial separations.41

Seventh Circuit precedent, its own abstention,

younger based comity, would not apply. Plaintiff was

clearly barred from any relief or pursuit of it in state

court see inter alia DR12, DR16, DR18 order, DR303,

41 See Lozoya v. Gracia, 1993 WL 850565 (N. Mex. Jan. 1993) ($6

million to mother for lost custody); Streeter v. Exec. Jet Mgmt.,

2005 WL 4357633 (Conn. Super. Nov. 10, 2005) ($27 million jury

award for mother separated from her child for 22 months); Smith

v. Smith, 1985 WL 327994 (Tex. July 1985) ($7 million to mother

for pain and suffering associated with loss of society with her

children, who were abducted by another relative); $31.35 Million

Finnegan v. Myers, No. 3: 08-CV-503 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2016).

also DR22-3 -DR26). Order R14 pg. 4 regarding count

9 also improperly, before discovery, dismissed Monell.

Clear pattern and practice amounting to policy — e.g.

Lakics v Zaruba et al 09-CV-6929 (weaponizing the

department for personal and political agendas

originating with the Sheriff himself.) — S.A, listed on

that case, refused to disclose.

Court denied Seventh Amendment right to a jury

trial on factual issues common to both the legal and

equitable claims. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,

359 U.S. 500 (1959); Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494

U.S. 545 (1990).

Ignoring Sprint, Younger exceptions were clearly

squarely here and raised - unless plaintiff shows that

he is the victim of official bad faith or harassment, or

that the state is acting pursuant to a patently

unconstitutional state statute, Younger precludes a

federal court from enjoining a pending state court

proceeding. Younger, 401 U.S. at 49, 53.

Error to hold length as basis to dismiss amended

complaint see Kadmovas v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843, 844

(7th Cir. 2013) ("some [claims] require more

explanation than others to establish their

plausibility" (citations omitted) thus improper to be

considered a failure to comply with FRCP 8(a); length,

“because it contains a large number of distinct

charges” as “brevity must be calibrated to the number

of claims and to their character” is complying with

rule 8(a)(2)).

The court started off on the wrong foot, inducing

further errors of law that likely would have been

avoided.

Seventh Circuit recently held “claims

dismissed pursuant 1915(e) should be allowed to

proceed if plaintiff pays filing fee” Arnett v. Webster,

658 F.3d 742, 756 (7th Cir. 2011). Here plaintiff paid.

Claims affecting his child improperly dismissed

without properly considering e.g. Rulel7(c) or given

chance to defend.

2. Seventh

Wrong

Circuit’s

Decisions

Are

This honorable court should take this case as the

orders have so far departed from the accepted and

usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned

such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an

exercise of this Court’s supervisory power, conflicting

with the Fifth Amendment due process. Dismissal of

briefs clearly conflict Seventh Circuit precedent.

Principles From the Rules’ earliest days, this

Court has sought to administer them based on sound

judicial policy—“to promote the ends of justice, not to

defeat them.” Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557

(1941). “Circuits orders, policies and procedures

orderly rules of procedure do not require sacrifice of

the rules of fundamental justice.” Ibid.

“It is too late in the day and entirely contrary to

the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for

decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of

such mere technicalities.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.

178, 181 (1962).

Defendants’ brief was nonconforming given chance

to amend CR16/18. Fed. R. App. P. 31 (c) or (d) were

followed but not pro se... Inter alia Rule 2 and the

importance of ruling on merits and the issues of

national importance should have compelled ruling on

merits.

D. The Questions Presented Warrant This

Court’s Review

The questions are important, and, as the splits,

intolerable. The case is a good vehicle to resolve the

conflicts as the facts are emblematic of how the legal

issues generally arise, deepens acknowledged and

entrenched conflicts, the issues are important and

reoccurring, of exceptional national importance, and

uniquely situated to allow addressing where often not.

Somethings are clear — Do not: Steal from children,

steal children, help those that do, incentivize those

that would. Decisions are not only wrong, but in direct

conflict with this court. Further deliberation is

unnecessary given the clear precedents and circuit

splits. If the court finds additional arguments are

needed, it should remand the case for a thorough

review. Otherwise, the court has enough information

from the briefing and amicus to decide key issues

affecting pro se litigants and families, ensuring

meaningful access to the courts and a ruling on the

merits.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ James Synnott

/s/ John Doe

/s/JS

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.