Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Kevin Salvador Golphin, Petitioner v. North Carolina
Supreme Court briefAug 15, 2025
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No. 25IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
___________
KEVIN SALVADOR GOLPHIN,
v.
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
___________
Petitioner,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the Supreme Court of North Carolina
___________
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
___________
August 15, 2025
EAMON P. JOYCE*
CHRISTINA PRUSAK CHIANESE
BRIANNA O. GALLO
BRIAN C. EARL
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
787 Seventh Avenue
New York, NY 10019
(212) 839-5300
ejoyce@sidley.com
Counsel for Petitioner
* Counsel of Record
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether North Carolina, in conflict with this Court’s
precedents and those of other states, has violated the
Eighth Amendment by creating a de facto mandatory
life-without-parole sentencing regime for juvenile
offenders by invariably considering the facts of the
juvenile’s crime to be dispositive.
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
All parties to the proceeding are listed in the caption.
The petitioner is not a corporation.
iii
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
This case arises from the following proceedings in
the North Carolina Superior Court, Cumberland
County, the North Carolina Court of Appeals, and the
North Carolina Supreme Court:
State v. Golphin,
No. 97CRS47312 (Super. Ct. Cumberland Cnty. Apr.
13, 2022);
State v. Golphin,
No. COA22-713 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2024),
petition for reh’g en banc denied (Mar. 12, 2024); and
State v. Golphin,
No. 441A98-5 (N.C. Mar. 19, 2025).
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED ..................................
i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ....................
ii
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES ................
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................
vi
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ......
1
OPINION AND ORDERS BELOW .....................
1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ....................
1
CONSTITUTIONAL
AND
STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED ..............................
1
INTRODUCTION ................................................
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.............................
4
A. Factual Background.................................
5
B. Proceedings Below ...................................
12
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ..
16
I. NORTH
CAROLINA’S
DE
FACTO
MANDATORY SENTENCING REGIME
CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT’S
EIGHTH
AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS APPLICATION BY
LOWER COURTS ........................................
16
A. North Carolina Now Allows The
Circumstances of A Juvenile’s Crime to
Dictate LWOP Sentencing .......................
18
B. Other Courts Have Properly Applied this
Court’s
Eighth
Amendment
Jurisprudence to Hold That Juveniles
May Not Be Sentenced Solely Based On
Their Crime ..............................................
24
v
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF JUVENILE
SENTENCING HEIGHTENS THE NEED
FOR REVIEW...............................................
28
CONCLUSION.....................................................
30
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: Opinion, State v. Golphin, 898
S.E.2d 37 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 6., 2024)............
1a
APPENDIX B: Order, State v. Golphin, No.
97CRS47312, 2022 WL 22905357 (Super. Ct.
Cumberland Cnty. Apr. 13, 2022) .................... 31a
APPENDIX C: Order Denying Reh’g En Banc,
State v. Golphin, No. 22-713 (N.C. Ct. App.
Mar. 12, 2024) ................................................... 38a
APPENDIX D: Order Denying Discretionary
Review, State v. Golphin, 912 S.E.2d 838 (N.C.
Mar. 19, 2025) (Mem.) ...................................... 40a
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).......
27
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S.
668 (1996) ..................................................
27
Commonwealth v. Schroat, 272 A.3d 523
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2022) .................................
26
Commonwealth v. Stewart, No. 139 MDA
2023, 2024 WL 3673509 (Pa. Super. Ct.
Aug. 6, 2024).............................................. 25, 26
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) .......
17
Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98
(2021) ....................................................
3, 18
Kitchen v. Whitmer, 486 F. Supp. 3d 1114
(E.D. Mich. 2020) ......................................
26
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460
(2012) ....................................2, 10, 16, 17, 28, 29
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190
(2016) .................................................. 12, 18, 23
People v. Hyatt, 891 N.W.2d 549 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on
other grounds sub nom. People v. Skinner,
917 N.W.2d 292 (Mich. 2018) ................... 26, 27
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005) ................................................ 2, 16, 17, 28
Sparks v. United States, No. W-11-CV-123,
2018 WL 1415775 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 19,
2018), aff’d, 941 F.3d 748 (5th Cir. 2019)
26
State v. Borlase, 912 S.E.2d 795 (N.C.
2025) .................................. 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24
State v. Davila, 462 P.3d 748 (Or. Ct. App.
2020) ..........................................................
26
vii
TABLE OF AUTORITIES – Continued
Page
State v. Kelliher, 873 S.E.2d 366 (N.C.
2022) ..................................................... 15, 19, 20
State v. Lovette, 763 S.E.2d 392 (N.C. 2014)
(Mem.), aff’g 758 S.E.2d 399 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2014)..................................................
24
State v. McCord, 912 S.E.2d 828 (N.C.
2025) ..........................................................
24
State v. Mullins, No. 20200149, 2025 WL
796220 (Utah Mar. 13, 2025) ....................
27
State v. Riley, 110 A.3d 1205 (Conn. 2015) .
26
State v. Sims, 912 S.E.2d 767 (N.C.
2025) .........................3, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24
State v. Tirado, 911 S.E.2d 51 (N.C.
2025) ................................................... 15, 20, 24
CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES
U.S. Const. amend. VIII ...............................
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) .......................................
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.19B(c) ..............
1
1
18
SCHOLARLY AUTHORITIES
Ben Finholt et al., Juvenile Life Without
Parole in North Carolina, 110 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 141 (2020) .........................
24
OTHER AUTHORITIES
The Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of
Youth, Juvenile Life Without Parole:
Unusual & Unequal, (Apr. 2024),
https://cfsy.org/wpcontent/uploads/JLWOP-UnusualUnequal-April-2024.pdf ............................
2
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner Kevin Salvador Golphin respectfully
seeks a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina.
OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW
The order of the North Carolina Supreme Court
denying the petition for discretionary review is
published at State v. Golphin, 912 S.E.2d 838 (N.C.
2025) (Mem.) and appears in the Appendix of this
Petition (“Pet. App.”) at 40a. The North Carolina Court
of Appeals’ opinion is reported at State v. Golphin, 898
S.E.2d 37 (N.C. Ct. App. 2024) and appears at
Pet. App. 1a. The North Carolina Court of Appeals’
order denying rehearing en banc is unpublished and
appears at Pet. App. 38a. The North Carolina Superior
Court’s decision resentencing petitioner to two
sentences of life without the possibility of parole is
unpublished and appears at Pet. App. 31a.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The North Carolina Supreme Court denied Mr.
Golphin’s petition for discretionary review on March
19, 2025. Chief Justice Roberts extended the time to
file this Petition to August 16, 2025. This Court has
jurisdiction to review the decision of the North
Carolina Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
2
INTRODUCTION
North Carolina has gone rogue in imposing
sentences of life without parole on juvenile offenders
and failing to heed this Court’s Eighth Amendment
holdings, thus putting it significantly out of step with
state courts around the country.
Over the last two decades, scientific consensus and
constitutional consensus have converged—children
are different from adults, and especially so when it
comes to their moral culpability for even the most
heinous crimes. Crediting modern neuroscience, this
Court has repeatedly recognized that adolescents lack
the maturity and capacities of adults, are more
impetuous and reckless, are more easily influenced by
peers and environmental factors, and have an
immense capacity for change and reform. Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471, 476 (2012); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005). These insights
led this Court to restrict the punishments available for
juvenile offenders in a number of contexts, holding in
Miller that mandatory sentences of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”) for juvenile
offenders are unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. 567 U.S. at 489.
In the thirteen years since Miller, twenty-eight
states and the District of Columbia have banned
juvenile LWOP, while five additional states currently
have no juveniles serving such a sentence.1 Many more
states have rigorously applied Miller and its progeny,
ensuring that—consistent with this Court’s decisions
1 The Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth, Juvenile Life
Without Parole: Unusual & Unequal, at 5 (Apr. 2024),
https://cfsy.org/wp-content/uploads/JLWOP-Unusual-UnequalApril-2024.pdf.
3
affording juveniles significant protections under the
Eighth Amendment—life without parole is imposed on
only the rarest of juvenile offenders and only after
“considering an offender’s youth and attendant
characteristics . . . as a mitigating factor.” Jones v.
Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 106, 108–09 (2021).
North Carolina now has done the opposite. The
decision under review is one of a series of rulings that
have allowed a de facto mandatory sentencing scheme
to take hold. In North Carolina, appellate courts hold
that the fact that a juvenile offender committed
homicide—a fact, of course, inherent to even eligibility
for a life-without-parole sentence—is conclusive and
requires LWOP. As a justice on the North Carolina
Supreme Court recently summarized, that court has
“signal[ed] a shift in the Miller sentencing hearing
inquiry away from the circumstances of the offender
and his offense in favor of his offense only.” State v.
Sims, 912 S.E.2d 767, 786–87 (N.C. 2025) (Earls, J.,
concurring) (second emphasis added). Through these
decisions, North Carolina has effectively reinstated
the type of mandatory sentencing scheme that Miller
held is unconstitutional, failed to heed Miller and
Jones’s requirements that any sentencing scheme be
discretionary such that juvenile LWOP is imposed
“relatively rarely,” and established itself as an
extreme outlier among states with respect to Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence involving minors.
Mr. Golphin’s case is a prime example of the North
Carolina courts’ miscarriage of this Court’s edicts in
Miller and related cases. The court’s decision
resentencing Mr. Golphin to life without parole hinged
on the court’s determination that Mr. Golphin (like all
juvenile homicide offenders) committed a heinous
crime as a child. Viewing the crime alone as
dispositive, the court gave no meaningful
4
consideration to the uncontroverted evidence that, at
the time of the offense, Mr. Golphin was a traumatized
and impulsive child suffering from significant,
untreated mental and behavioral disorders linked to
physical and mental abuse at the hands of his parents,
or that, as the State and the resentencing court
conceded, Mr. Golphin has developed into a “more
stable,” thoughtful, “matured” adult and a “bright
young man” who has grown and rehabilitated himself
during his nearly thirty years in prison.
This issue is important and recurring. In 2025 alone,
the North Carolina Supreme Court approved juvenile
life without parole, or allowed such sentences to stand
by denying review, in all five cases involving such a
sentence that came before it, including Mr. Golphin’s.
North Carolina’s evisceration of the constitutional
protections owed to juvenile offenders warrants this
Court’s intervention.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This Petition arises from the 2022 resentencing of
Mr. Golphin to life without parole for a juvenile offense
from 1997. By the time of his resentencing as a 42year-old, Mr. Golphin had gone without a disciplinary
offense in prison for eight years, emerged from a
decade-plus stay in solitary confinement with a
commitment to educate himself and serve society, had
completed all the behavioral and anger management
coursework offered by the North Carolina prisons,
transformed himself from barely literate to an avid
reader with a GED, and was deeply remorseful about
the crimes he committed during a fast-moving,
physical traffic stop decades earlier as an emotionally
impaired teenager.
5
A. Factual Background
1. Kevin Golphin was born in 1979 into a vicious
cycle of horrific abuse that had started in utero. His
father “severely abused” Mr. Golphin’s mother, Sylvia,
during her pregnancy, T 211:9–19; E18–E20; E68;
E104. 2 After Kevin’s birth, his father abused him as a
baby and young toddler using belts and burning
cigarettes to discipline ordinary child behavior like
bed-wetting. E1; E18–E19. Sylvia and her children
eventually fled from Mr. Golphin’s father, but the cycle
of abuse continued. E1; E19–E20; E105. Sylvia became
Mr. Golphin’s tormentor, forcing him and his brother,
Tilmon, to strip their clothes as she used her fists,
shoes, belts, switches, and extension cords to beat
their naked bodies. E3; E436–E441; E466; T 213:21–
214:2. When Mr. Golphin was just nine years old, he
reported that Sylvia “was tying [him] to [a] bed [and]
beating [him],” E536, and that he “experienced
beatings ‘with clothes off . . . in private parts,’” E466.
Sylvia also became involved in abusive relationships
with men who beat her in front of her children,
encouraged her to beat her sons, and abused her
children themselves. E4–E5; E20; E471; T 212:9–
213:16.
When Kevin was eleven years old, Sylvia was
convicted of child abuse. E441–E442; T 214:16–215:8.
Child Protective Services found that Sylvia had
whipped then-eleven-year-old Tilmon with an
2 The record citations here follow the conventions of the North
Carolina appellate courts and the filings below. Evidence
admitted in the resentencing court was included in the Record on
Appeal in the North Carolina Supreme Court and cited as “E__.”
The Record on Appeal in the North Carolina Supreme Court also
includes the transcript from Mr. Golphin’s 1998 trial, which is
cited as “TT ___,” and the transcript from the 2022 resentencing
hearing, which is cited as “T __.”
6
electrical cord while naked to punish him for biking too
far from home. E438–E439. The beating broke skin
and caused multiple inches-long welts. E437–E438;
T 215:16–216:10. Child Protective Services also noted
that Sylvia had “almost choked [Tilmon] to death”
during a prior incident. E438.
Child Protective Services documented that Kevin
suffered similar, or potentially more extreme, abuse
and was “beaten more frequently” than Tilmon. E437;
E106; E68. However, the state authorities allowed
both children to remain under their mother’s care.
E441–E442; T 214:16–215:8.
Mr. Golphin’s childhood was also marred by
emotional abuse and neglect, instability, and a lack of
basic necessities such as shelter, electricity, and food.
E3–E6; E19; T 214:2–7, 231:6–18. By age eight,
Mr. Golphin had been identified as “learning disabled”
and “seriously emotionally disturbed,” and at age nine,
he was diagnosed with Oppositional Defiant Disorder,
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, depression,
and “low self-esteem.” E677–E678; E464–E468.
Although Mr. Golphin’s schools prescribed
interventions and offered support to address his
learning
and
behavioral
challenges,
Sylvia
stonewalled the schools’ efforts. She denied Kevin the
resources he desperately needed by refusing to sign
forms, return phone calls or attend meetings necessary
to implement a support program for him. In one
instance, after Sylvia repeatedly missed scheduled
meetings, a social worker summarized to a special
education coordinator, “We are dealing with an
abnormal situation in Mrs. Golphin. I suggest we stop
WASTING TIME and take this case to mediation so
that Kevin can get services.” E743. When school
systems and social workers took steps to override her
refusals to consent to the necessary supports for her
7
son, she moved him to a new location and school
district. E3–E4; E20–E21; E105; T 229:21–231:5;
E536; E743–E748; E752.
2. This abuse and neglect gravely impacted
Mr. Golphin’s mental and emotional health. At just
nine years old, he had suicidal ideations and homicidal
ideations directed at his mother, which resulted in his
hospitalization and months of in-patient psychological
treatment. E461.
Due to his consistent behavioral and emotional
issues, Mr. Golphin was admitted to a residential care
facility for troubled youth where he lived weekdays
from ages 10 to 12. E664. During that time, Kevin
thrived in the structured environment free from his
mother’s abuse, receiving positive reports for behavior
and academics. E114; E602; E607; E462; E739;
T 251:22–252:12, 306:10–307:24. He did so well that
he was discharged to return home, with directions for
his mother to obtain significant outpatient care for
him. E601; E608; E463; E469.
Again, however, Sylvia refused to allow her son to
get that care. Following his discharge, Kevin received
no outpatient treatment, despite his doctors’ clear,
detailed orders as to the extensive supports that would
be essential for his continued wellbeing. E463; E469;
E960; T 235:13–25, 255:18–256:7, 308:5–11; see also
E112–E114; T 161:24–163:3, 254:5–256:7, 260:3–
261:22, 307:25–308:11. Instead, Mr. Golphin returned
to the same chaotic, abusive, and horrific homelife.
Kevin instantly went from the extensive supports in a
warm and nurturing environment that his residential
care facility provided to nothing. Unsurprisingly,
without any outpatient care or emotional supports,
Mr. Golphin’s struggles and behavioral difficulties at
home and at school resumed and then intensified. See,
8
e.g., E68; T 154:14–24, 223:1–9. Mr. Golphin dropped
out of school at age 15. E69; E427.
3. On September 23, 1997, Mr. Golphin was a 17year-old traumatized and impulsive child suffering
from significant mental and behavioral disorders that
left him unable to “reason or think straight” under
stress due to his untreated conditions. T 210:8–20,
154:14–24,
156:19.
A
pediatric
psychologist
subsequently opined that Mr. Golphin had the
emotional and behavioral maturity of a much younger
boy at the time of the offense. T 167:3–7. While in that
already-fragile condition, Mr. Golphin was involved in
a traffic stop related to a failure to wear a seatbelt that
quickly escalated and led to Mr. Golphin committing
the crimes from which this Petition arises.
Earlier that day, Mr. Golphin and Tilmon entered a
South Carolina financial lending facility armed with a
rifle stolen from their grandfather with a looselyformed, absurd idea to steal a car, return to their
hometown of Richmond, Virginia, rob a grocery store,
travel to Florida, and then try to leave the country.
T 30:7–32:1, 345:8–19. They never intended to harm
anyone. T 326:22–327:3. After obtaining the keys for a
car from one of the lending facility employees at
gunpoint, the brothers proceeded north on Interstate95 in the stolen vehicle. T 30:7–32:1. Near
Fayetteville, North Carolina, State Trooper Edward
Lowry pulled over Mr. Golphin and Tilmon for a
routine seatbelt violation. TT 2356:1–21.
Mr. Golphin was removed from the car, patted down,
and placed unrestrained in the front seat of the patrol
car while Trooper Lowry wrote a ticket. TT 2356:22–
2358:7; T 337:25–338:2. In short order, however, the
ordinary traffic stop escalated dramatically. After
learning by radio that the car was stolen, Lowry
requested back-up, T 32:18–20, ordered Kevin from
9
the car at gunpoint, T 328:16–17, and slammed his
head against the hood of the car, T 328:24–329:3.
Lowry holstered his pistol and ordered Mr. Golphin to
place his hands behind his back. T 329:6–8. Kevin did
not move. T 329:21–23. As Mr. Golphin later testified,
at this point, he “had already shut down.” T 329:16–
23. In response, Lowry placed him in an armlock with
his hands on the back of Mr. Golphin’s neck and told
Mr. Golphin he “was going to break [his] neck.” TT
2361:14–17; T 329:21–330:8. When Mr. Golphin began
struggling to protect himself, Lowry “picked [Mr.
Golphin] up and then slammed him to the ground head
first.” TT 2362:9–12. Lowry then mounted
Mr. Golphin’s back while putting pressure on his neck.
TT 2362:6–2363:21, 2554:2–12. Mr. Golphin told
Lowry “he could not breathe.” TT 2554:13–20.
At that point, Cumberland County Sheriff’s Deputy
David Hathcock arrived. T 32:25, 44:20–45:2, 47:18–
22. He intercepted Tilmon, who was exiting the stolen
car, brought him towards Lowry and Mr. Golphin, and
pepper-sprayed Mr. Golphin in the eyes and face.
TT 2359:4–9; T 33:9–15. Tilmon broke free from
Hathcock, retrieved his grandfather’s rifle from the
stolen car, and opened fire, fatally striking both
officers while also hitting Mr. Golphin in the buttocks.
T 33:16–24, 50:3–15; TT 1932:19–1933:16. All of these
events—from Lowry ordering Mr. Golphin out of the
car at gunpoint and slamming his head against the
hood of the car to Tilmon firing the rifle—happened
within the span of just three or four minutes. T 49:22–
50:1.
Dazed, partially blinded, and wounded, Mr. Golphin
grabbed Trooper Lowry’s pistol and fired downward at
Lowry and, as he was backing away to the stolen car,
fired downward toward Hathcock, later testifying that
he was not thinking as he acted. T 330:18–331:25.
10
Expert psychologists explained during resentencing
proceedings that Mr. Golphin’s behavior was
consistent with the mental and emotional conditions
that afflicted him as a child: impaired impulse control,
disassociation, and a profound inability to regulate
responses under stress, and in particular, the stress of
a physical confrontation. T 175:15–24, 234:12–20,
273:5–274:2. Mr. Golphin’s mental conditions caused
“struggles related to the thinking and decision making
involved with weighing the consequences of actions in
the moment” and he was in constant “fight or
flight . . . mode” as a result of the trauma he endured.
T 154:14–24, 156:17–19, 175:15–24. The experts
further testified that, especially in fast-moving and
adrenaline-inducing situations such as this, Mr.
Golphin’s mental issues prevented rational thought. T
154:14–24,156:19, 175:15–24. Moreover, the experts
explained that, due to the bond that Kevin and Tilmon
formed during their hellish childhood, Mr. Golphin’s
mistaken belief that the initial shots were being fired
at, not by, Tilmon caused him to become “very
agitated” and further “exacerbated” his “fight or flight
instincts.” E117; T 275:20–277:2.
4. Still a teenager at the time of conviction,
Mr. Golphin was sentenced to death by a jury that had
not been instructed on the brain science regarding
juveniles’ capacity and the “distinctive attributes of
youth,” Miller, 567 U.S. at 472, or their relevance to
sentencing. That jury also did not hear any of the
extensive evidence of Mr. Golphin’s cognitive deficits,
mental illness, or significant developmental
limitations at the time of his offense that resulted from
his years of neglect and abuse.
5. Mr. Golphin initially struggled in prison. E117–
E118; E208; E425–E426; T 263:10–264:12, 309:22–25.
He attempted suicide within his first week there, and
11
consistent with his untreated mental health and
behavioral problems, he was defiant, disrespectful,
and angry. E117–E118; E425–E426; E208; T 263:16–
264:12, 309:22–25. In his first three years of
incarceration, Mr. Golphin was found guilty of 10
nonviolent disciplinary infractions. E208. In 2001, he
was placed in solitary confinement, where he
remained for the next decade. E377–E379. Solitary
confinement initially seemed to break Mr. Golphin:
from May 2001 through 2006, he was guilty of 17
disciplinary infractions. E208.
But even while still in solitary, things changed
dramatically. Mr. Golphin learned “a new way of
thinking” that “changed [his] life,” and decided to “take
accountability for [his] actions,” “own up” to his past,
and improve his life. T 311:2–7. Mr. Golphin became a
voracious reader, overcoming his childhood illiteracy,
and engaged in “a lot of self-introspection,” including a
regimen of writing, meditation, and prayer. T 310:11–
312:10; E119.
By the time he left solitary confinement in 2010, he
was a different person, and, by the time of his
resentencing proceeding in April 2022, Mr. Golphin
had undergone significant transformation and
rehabilitation. T 311:4–312:5. The State’s records
evidence that Mr. Golphin obtained a GED and sought
out and completed anger management and cognitive
behavioral therapy courses focused on conflict
resolution and coping skills. E434–35; T 312:11–
314:22. The State’s records further show that in the
eight years prior to his resentencing—from 2014
onward—Mr. Golphin was not found guilty of a
disciplinary infraction, despite being housed
throughout that period in a highly chaotic and
violence-prone general population dorm with 80 other
inmates. T 269:3–21; see also E208 (just five primarily
12
defiance-related infractions between 2006–2014). As a
result, Mr. Golphin had been in medium custody and
steadily employed for years before resentencing.
T 268:2–22, 315:10–16; E270–E297. And in that
environment, he had put the lessons from his
behavioral coursework provided by the North Carolina
Division of Prisons into action, focusing on
maintaining a “positive mental attitude,” a
cornerstone of the North Carolina Prisons’ Napoleon
Hill program, which helped him to resolve any conflict
“on a positive note.” T 313:24–314:10.
B. Proceedings Below
1. On April 11–13, 2022, the North Carolina
Superior Court held a three-day resentencing
proceeding.3 Mr. Golphin and three expert witnesses
testified. Pet. App. 31a. The experts included Dr. Peter
Duquette, then of UNC Health (currently of Duke
Health), whose professional experience includes
diagnosing mental and/or psychiatric disorders from
which children may suffer and evaluating how
childhood trauma may manifest in patients later in
life, and Dr. James Hilkey, the former Chief of
Psychology Services at Butner Federal Correctional
Institution. T 134:24–136:12, 137:1–7. Dr. Duquette
subjected Mr. Golphin to extensive psychological
testing. T 138:6–8.
Drs. Duquette and Hilkey testified that Mr. Golphin
had been substantially rehabilitated since his crimes
3 Following this Court’s decision in Roper, Mr. Golphin’s death
sentence was vacated and replaced with a mandatory lifewithout-parole sentence. Then, after this Court’s rulings in Miller
and in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 206–08 (2016)
(holding that Miller applies retroactively), Mr. Golphin was
granted a new sentencing proceeding. That 2022 sentencing
proceeding and its subsequent appeals give rise to this Petition.
13
in 1997. For example, based on his evaluation and
psychological testing, Dr. Duquette testified that
Mr. Golphin showed “significant” and “marked
difference[s]” from the evaluations at the time of his
offense. T 170:2–171:9. Dr. Duquette found that Mr.
Golphin was “able to self-regulate his behavior and
emotions,” and showed no signs of “emotional mood
swings or any types of behavioral impulse control”
issues. T 167:21–170:9; E70; E75.
Dr. Duquette also found no evidence that
Mr. Golphin still suffers from the mental and
emotional disorders he had as a juvenile and at the
time of the offense. Therefore, Dr. Duquette testified
that, as compared to when Mr. Golphin was 17, he is
“more able to control his impulses,” “more mature,”
and “more able to appreciate[] the consequences of his
actions.” T 167:21–170:1, 171:10–16, 176:19–177:6.
Similarly, based on his in-person evaluations of
Mr. Golphin and review of his records, Dr. Hilkey
testified that Mr. Golphin has “made a deliberate
effort to change [his behaviors]” and in fact has
experienced “substantial change” post-incarceration.
T 279:7–19; see also T 264:13–18, 266:11–267:8,
294:20–23. Dr. Hilkey testified that he is “impressed”
by the degree to which Mr. Golphin has altered his
behaviors and mindset in prison and has “hope for [Mr.
Golphin’s] future adjustment.” T 267:6–8, 269:23–
270:21. Dr. Hilkey also explained that he “hold[s] out
little hope for substantial change” for “[m]any people
that [he] ha[s] seen [throughout his career] . . . .
[T]here are people that are probably incorrigible and
hopeless. Mr. Golphin is not one of these people in my
opinion.” T 280:3–11. Dr. Hilkey concluded that “Mr.
Golphin is unlikely to engage in violence in the future
even if placed in a similarly triggering scenario [to the
traffic stop at which he committed his crime.]” E122.
14
Dr. Hilkey did so based on many factors, including:
Mr. Golphin’s “maturation” with “self-directed efforts
of personal growth” and his “remorse and capacity to
appreciate the pain caused by his actions”; that
Mr. Golphin has “spent much of his time in prison
working through the underlying anger . . . that likely
contributed to his inability to avoid violent escalation”;
a prison disciplinary record showing Mr. Golphin “has
become skilled in avoiding conflict and escalation”; and
Mr. Golphin’s “self-motivated discipline and selfawareness,” including a desire to reintegrate into
society. See id.
Mr. Golphin testified that his resolve toward
personal development has resulted in “a lot of growth.”
T 309:8–10. In contrast to the 17-year-old who thought
he knew everything, Mr. Golphin testified that he
“know[s] enough to know that [he] do[esn’t] know
[any]thing at all.” T 309:8–310:2. He also testified that
he wants to take college courses in psychology and
sociology; his goal is to “pay it forward” by counseling
troubled youth. T 314:11–315:6, 317:16–318:2.
The State did not present any witness testimony or
other evidence at resentencing to rebut Mr. Golphin’s
growth in prison. Nor did the State present any
evidence regarding Mr. Golphin’s capacity for change
in the future, let alone any lack of such potential. To
the contrary, the State conceded that “it sure seems
like” Golphin “has matured,” T 358:3–5, “seems to be
more stable,” T 358:20–23, and that the “takeaway”
from Dr. Duquette’s testimony was that “Golphin was
more mature when he got older,” T 366:20–22. The
prosecutor praised Mr. Golphin’s testimony as
“refreshingly candid,” T 354:19–20, and characterized
Mr. Golphin as “more articulate than some lawyers”
and “a bright young man,” T 356:10–12. The court
made no adverse credibility findings.
15
2. The resentencing court nonetheless imposed two
consecutive
life-without-parole
sentences.
Pet. App. 37a. It concluded “that [d]efendant’s crimes
demonstrate his permanent incorrigibility.” Id.
(emphasis added). The North Carolina Court of
Appeals rejected Mr. Golphin’s Eighth Amendment
challenge and instead affirmed the life-without-parole
sentences based on the resentencing court’s view of
what Mr. Golphin’s “crimes [as a juvenile]
demonstrate[d].” Id. at 9a, 29a.4 Although the
appellate court stated that Mr. Golphin “may be
commended on the improvements he has made while
incarcerated,” id. at 26a, it found no Eighth
Amendment problem in disregarding the unique
circumstances of Mr. Golphin’s mental and emotional
state as a juvenile, the undisputed evidence of his
reformation while incarcerated, and his continued
capacity for growth and change. The North Carolina
Supreme Court denied discretionary review. Id. at
40a.
Contemporaneous with the denial of Mr. Golphin’s
petition, the North Carolina Supreme Court issued a
series of decisions upholding life-without-parole
sentences by treating the crimes of conviction as
dispositive. See State v. Tirado, 911 S.E.2d 51, 71
(N.C. 2025); Sims, 912 S.E.2d at 786; State v. Borlase,
912 S.E.2d 795, 805 (N.C. 2025). As a concurring
4
The North Carolina Court of Appeals also rejected Mr.
Golphin’s argument that, irrespective of Miller, the resentencing
court’s decision violated the North Carolina Constitution’s
protections. Pet. App. 13a–14a. The North Carolina Supreme
Court had held the state constitution “offers protections distinct
from, and . . . broader than, those provided under the Eighth
Amendment.” State v. Kelliher, 873 S.E.2d 366, 382 (N.C. 2022).
As discussed below, the North Carolina Supreme Court has
subsequently jettisoned Kelliher’s interpretation of the state
constitution.
16
justice summarized in Sims, “the majority signals a
shift in the Miller sentencing hearing inquiry away
from the circumstances of the offender and his offense
in favor of his offense only. . . . [T]he majority distills
the Miller sentencing inquiry to a singular focus on the
facts of the crime.” 912 S.E.2d at 786–87 (Earls, J.,
concurring).
Mr. Golphin now seeks certiorari.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I. NORTH CAROLINA’S DE FACTO MANDATORY SENTENCING REGIME CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT’S EIGHTH
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS
APPLICATION BY LOWER COURTS.
In a series of recent decisions, North Carolina has
declared that juvenile offenders may be sentenced to
die in prison based solely on the crime committed and,
moreover, that cursory nods to the offender’s youth are
sufficient to satisfy the Eighth Amendment. North
Carolina’s offense-centric approach to juvenile
sentencing conflicts with this Court’s Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence and with other courts’
applications of those rules.
This Court has repeatedly held that, under the
Eighth Amendment, children are “constitutionally
different from adults for purposes of sentencing” and,
thus, may not be sentenced to the harshest
punishments based solely on the facts of their crimes.
See Miller, 567 U.S. at 471; Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. In
Roper, for example, the Court concluded that a
categorical ban on the death penalty for juvenile
offenders was necessary under the Eighth Amendment
because there is an “unacceptable likelihood” that a
sentencer would allow “the brutality or cold-blooded
17
nature of any particular crime” to “overpower
mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of
course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective
immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity
should require a sentence less severe than death.” 543
U.S. at 573. And in Graham v. Florida, the Court
banned sentencing juvenile offenders to LWOP for
non-homicide offenses, explaining that, while “[a]
juvenile is not absolved of responsibility for his
actions, . . . his transgression ‘is not as morally
reprehensible as that of an adult.’” 560 U.S. 48, 68
(2010).
In Miller, the Court held that mandatory LWOP
sentences for juvenile offenders violate the Eighth
Amendment. 567 U.S. at 479–80. The Court
recognized that “‘youth is more than a chronological
fact,’” and is instead “a time of immaturity,
irresponsibility, ‘impetuousness[,] and recklessness.’”
Id. at 476. But youth’s “‘signature qualities’ are all
‘transient,’” which means that sentencing must be
different than it is for adults. Id.
Most pertinent here, Miller emphasized that none of
the distinctive attributes of youth are “crime-specific.”
Id. at 473. Thus, even when a juvenile commits a
heinous crime, sentencers are “require[d] . . . to take
into account how children are different, and how those
differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing
them to a lifetime in prison.” Id. at 480 (emphasis
added). And, while this Court stopped short of
categorically banning LWOP sentences for juvenile
homicide offenders, it stated that given “children’s
diminished culpability and heightened capacity for
change, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing
juveniles to this harshest possible penalty [of LWOP]
will be uncommon.” Id. at 479.
18
In Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court explained
that “Miller . . . established that the penological
justifications for life without parole collapse in light of
‘the distinctive attributes of youth,’” and that such
sentences must be reserved for only the “rare” juvenile
homicide offender. 577 U.S. 190, 208 (2016) (quoting
Miller, 567 U.S. at 472). The Court reiterated “Miller’s
central intuition—that children who commit even
heinous crimes are capable of change.” Id. at 212.
Most recently, in Jones, this Court reaffirmed Miller
and Montgomery. 593 U.S. at 118. The Court
reiterated that “Miller mandated . . . ‘that a sentencer
. . . consider[] an offender’s youth and attendant
characteristics . . . before imposing’ a life-withoutparole sentence.” Id. at 106 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S.
at 483). It explained that a discretionary sentencing
regime is necessary to ensure that sentencers afford
“individualized ‘consideration’ to, among other things,
the defendant’s ‘chronological age and its hallmark
features.’” Id. at 109, 115 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at
477).
While many courts across the country have properly
applied this Court’s Eighth Amendment holdings,
North Carolina has recently made itself an extreme
outlier, essentially reverting to a pre-Miller regime.
A. North Carolina Now Allows The
Circumstances of A Juvenile’s Crime to
Dictate LWOP Sentencing.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, while
nominally reciting the considerations set forth in a
facially discretionary scheme that the state’s
legislature enacted post-Miller,5 has in practice been
implementing an overly-punitive appraisal that
5 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.19B(c).
19
“shift[s] . . . the Miller sentencing hearing inquiry
away from the circumstances of the offender . . . . to a
singular focus on the facts of the crime.” Sims, 912
S.E.2d at 786–87 (Earls, J., concurring). This
sentencing scheme “revives the mandatory sentencing
approach that Miller rejected.” Id. at 787; see also
Borlase, 912 S.E.2d at 814 (Earls, J., dissenting)
(stating that the majority’s treatment of this Court’s
decisions in Miller and Jones “leaves defendants with
less protection than . . . the Constitution guarantees”);
id. at 818 (majority endorsed the sentencing court’s
“crabbed view of what Miller commands us to do”).
The North Carolina Supreme Court’s approach to
the Eighth Amendment now allows the crime to
invariably eclipse developmental science, undisputed
facts of rehabilitation (as here), and the rule against
reflexively condemning children to die in prison.
Contrary to this Court’s directives, North Carolina has
made life-without-parole sentences on juvenile
offenders presumptive, not rare. This leaves North
Carolina standing virtually alone among its fellow
states post-Miller and warrants review.
The North Carolina Supreme Court’s departure from
the fundamental precept of Miller and its progeny—
that juveniles are entitled to individualized sentencing
based upon the circumstances of their youth and not
merely their crime—has emerged as a backlash to the
North Carolina Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in
State v. Kelliher, 873 S.E.2d 366 (N.C. 2022). Over a
vigorous dissent, the Kelliher majority had held that
the North Carolina Constitution “offers protections
distinct from, and . . . broader than, those provided
under the Eighth Amendment,” id. at 382, and, as a
result of those broader protections, “unless the trial
court expressly finds that a juvenile homicide offender
is one of those ‘exceedingly rare’ juveniles who cannot
20
be rehabilitated, he or she cannot be sentenced to life
without parole,” id. at 387; see also id. at 394–96
(Newby, C.J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of
“judicial activism” and decrying its interpretation of
the North Carolina constitution).
After two of the justices from Kelliher’s majority
were replaced on the court, the North Carolina
Supreme Court has issued decisions not only
effectively overruling Kelliher’s state constitutional
holdings, but also gutting the Eighth Amendment
protections for juvenile offenders recognized by this
Court.
In January 2025, the North Carolina Supreme Court
disavowed Kelliher, instead “lockstep[ping] [the
court’s] application of [the North Carolina State
Constitution] with that of the Eighth Amendment.”
Tirado, 911 S.E.2d at 54.6 Post-Tirado, the North
Carolina Supreme Court proceeded to undo the
protections of the Eighth Amendment for juvenile
offenders, drawing itself into conflict with this Court’s
Miller line of cases and decisions of other state courts.
Specifically, in March 2025, the North Carolina
Supreme Court rejected Eighth Amendment-based
challenges to crime-based LWOP sentences in Sims,
912 S.E.2d at 786, and Borlase, 912 S.E.2d at 809. In
Sims, the North Carolina Supreme Court concluded
that the sentencing court’s discussion of the details of
6 See id. at 59–60, 70–71 (holding State Constitution, at most,
offered protections equal to those under the Eighth Amendment);
see also id. at 76–77 (Earls, J., concurring in the result only)
(criticizing the majority for declaring that North Carolina
Constitution provides less protection for juvenile criminal
defendants than the Eighth Amendment when defendant
conceded that the sentencing did not violate the state
constitutional rule of Kelliher).
21
the crime were a sufficient basis for turning aside an
Eighth Amendment challenge. 912 S.E.2d at 779. As
Justice Earls summarized, the majority devoted “over
ten paragraphs” to the crime while providing only “two
sentences” of analysis on mitigation factors the
legislature enacted to implement Miller, rendering the
individualized sentencing inquiry effectively illusory.
Id. at 787 (Earls, J., concurring).
Justice Earls, as noted, warned that allowing
LWOP sentences to hinge on the offense in this way,
the majority’s approach “revives the mandatory
sentencing approach that Miller rejected.” Id. She
explained that for a juvenile to be eligible for LWOP in
North Carolina, “the juvenile must have been
convicted of killing another person intentionally and
in the first degree.” Id. “Every juvenile convicted of
intentionally killing another person has by definition
committed a heinous crime. It eliminates the exercise
of discretion, then, to make the sentencing decision
entirely dependent on whether the crime was
heinous.” Id. In sum, this approach “signals a shift in
the Miller sentencing hearing inquiry away from the
circumstances of the offender and his offense in favor
of his offense only. . . . [T]he majority distills the Miller
sentencing inquiry to a singular focus on the facts of
the crime.” Id. at 786–87.
Similarly, the same day, in Borlase, the North
Carolina Supreme Court upheld a juvenile offender’s
LWOP sentence “in light of the crimes committed by
defendant.” 912 S.E.2d at 809. The court brushed by
evidence that the defendant had intellectual
disabilities, suffered a history of abuse, and had
documented mental health challenges. See id. at 808–
09. Again, Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, in
dissent criticized the North Carolina Supreme Court’s
new crime-focused approach to the constitutionality of
22
juvenile LWOP sentences as endorsing a “crabbed
view of what Miller commands us to do.” Id. at 818
(Earls, J., dissenting). The dissenters stated that the
majority’s approach to Miller and Jones “leaves
defendants with less protection than . . . the
Constitution guarantees,” and expects the appellate
courts to simply “trust . . . the sentencing court
considered characteristics of the juvenile because they
had [facial statutory] discretion to so consider those
characteristics.” Id. at 814; see also id. at 813
(criticizing the majority’s “exceedingly deferential
standard” as having “no support in federal
constitutional law”).
Consistent with and within days of these decisions, 7
the North Carolina Supreme Court denied review of
the resentencing decision in Mr. Golphin’s case, which
if nothing else presaged where the North Carolina
Supreme Court ultimately landed with respect to its
treatment of the crime itself. The resentencing court
imposed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, two lifewithout-parole sentences on the basis that
Mr. Golphin’s “crimes demonstrate his permanent
incorrigibility.” Pet. App. 37a (emphasis added)
(cataloging the facts of the offense, without mentioning
the physical confrontation initiated by Trooper Lowry
or its rapid escalation, including threats of severe
physical violence against Mr. Golphin, that left the
then-emotionally and behaviorally compromised Mr.
Golphin vulnerable to his acute fight or flight instinct);
see id. at 27a–29a (similar from Court of Appeals). The
courts
treated
the
crimes
as
dispositive,
notwithstanding that the resentencing record
contained
unrefuted,
extensive
evidence
of
7 The Court’s order denying review was dated March 19—two
days before Sims and Borlase—but was not issued to the parties
by the clerk’s office under March 24.
23
Mr. Golphin’s childhood trauma, his fragile emotional
state at the time of his offense particularly where he
was subjected to physical confrontation and being
pinned down as he had during his abusive childhood,
and the undisputed record of his growth,
rehabilitation, and remorse in the many years since
his crime. See supra pp. 5–12. Indeed, the State
conceded that Mr. Golphin had, in fact, “matured,”
T 358:4–5, and the resentencing court acknowledged
that Mr. Golphin’s “conduct in prison has improved
since 2014.” Pet. App. 36a; see also id. at 26a (Court of
Appeals: “commend[ing Mr. Golphin] on the
improvements he has made while incarcerated”).
The crime-centric juvenile sentencing regime that
the North Carolina Supreme Court has endorsed,
which the lower courts had applied in Mr. Golphin’s
case, conflicts with this Court’s Eighth Amendment
holdings. By allowing life-without-parole sentences for
juvenile offenders to hinge on no more than the crime
itself, North Carolina has converted Miller’s
protections into a box-checking exercise. While this
Court recognized in Jones the significance of
sentencing courts’ discretion in issuing juvenile
LWOP, 593 U.S. at 114–16, North Carolina’s current
juvenile sentencing scheme cannot be considered truly
discretionary if the underlying crime is all that the
sentencer really needs to consider to impose life
without parole. Rather, it reverts to the mandatory
sentencing scheme that Miller rejected as
unconstitutional. Sims, 912 S.E.2d at 787 (Earls, J.,
concurring); supra pp. 19, 21.
North Carolina’s new sentencing regime conflicts
with this Court’s holdings and upends this Court’s
recognition that life without parole must be reserved
for the “rare” juvenile homicide offender. E.g.,
Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 208. Indeed, the North
24
Carolina Supreme Court explicitly stated that
sentencing courts are “not required . . . to ensure rarity
of [juvenile LWOP] sentence[s].” Sims, 912 S.E.2d at
779; Borlase, 912 S.E.2d at 805. Consistent with this,
the North Carolina Supreme Court has upheld lifewithout-parole sentences in every single case for every
single offender that it has considered post-Kelliher.
See Sims, 912 S.E.2d at 786; Borlase, 911 S.E.2d at
809; Tirado, 911 S.E.2d at 71; Pet. App. 9a, 29a, 40a;
State v. McCord, 912 S.E.2d 828 (N.C. 2025). 8
B. Other Courts Have Properly Applied this
Court’s
Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence to Hold That Juveniles May
Not Be Sentenced Solely Based On Their
Crime.
In stark contrast to North Carolina, courts across
the country have given effect to this Court’s
requirement that sentencers afford individualized
consideration of an offender’s youth and attendant
circumstances before sentencing a juvenile to LWOP.
Appellate
courts
in
Pennsylvania,
Oregon,
Connecticut, Michigan, and Utah have squarely
rejected that the Eighth Amendment permits courts to
do what North Carolina did here: hinge a sentence on
the crime the juvenile committed.
8 Pre-Kelliher, the North Carolina Supreme Court had upheld
juvenile life-without-parole sentences in just one of the eleven
such cases that came before it post-Miller. State v. Lovette, 763
S.E.2d 392 (N.C. 2014) (Mem.), aff’g 758 S.E.2d 399, 410 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2014); see also Ben Finholt et al., Juvenile Life Without
Parole in North Carolina, 110 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 141, 157
(2020) (noting that juvenile LWOP sentencing in North Carolina
declined significantly post-Miller, with just twelve juvenile
offenders sentenced to LWOP between 2010 and 2018, versus 52
juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP between 2000 and 2009).
25
Post-Jones, Pennsylvania appellate courts have
explicitly overturned juvenile LWOP sentences as
violative of the Eighth Amendment’s protections and
this Court’s precedent where courts rest sentences on
the crimes committed without adequately accounting
for the mitigating qualities of youth. Last year, for
example, the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated an
LWOP sentence because the sentencing court’s
“rationale for the LWOP resentence [wa]s
predominately based upon the level of violence the
court attributed to [the juvenile’s] actions toward the
victim.” Commonwealth v. Stewart, No. 139 MDA
2023, 2024 WL 3673509, at *8 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 6,
2024). The appellate court concluded that the
sentencing court had not “adequately take[n] into
account the mitigating qualities of [the offender’s]
youth at the time he committed the crime . . . [or]
properly consider[ed] the significant rehabilitative
steps [the offender] has made over the past 13½ years
in prison.” Id. at *9. The appellate court noted that
“[a]lthough the [sentencing] court stated that it had to
consider the fact that [the offender] ‘seems to be doing
well in prison[,]’” and the sentencing court listed
multiple indicia of that, “the court immediately
followed those statements with the conclusion that ‘the
level of violence justifies a sentence of life in prison.’”
Id. at *10.
The appellate court concluded that this “directly
contradicts the Supreme Court’s edict that ‘children
who commit even heinous crimes are capable of
change,’” id. (quoting Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 212),
and held that the sentencing court had violated Jones
by not “apply[ing] a discretionary ‘procedure [that]
ensures the sentencer affords individualized
consideration to, among other things, the defendant’s
chronological age and its hallmark features,” id.
26
(quoting 593 U.S. at 109); see also Commonwealth v.
Schroat, 272 A.3d 523, 530 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2022)
(overturning a juvenile LWOP sentence after finding
that the sentencing court’s “opinion reflects a lack of
consideration for Appellant’s youth, history, and
rehabilitative needs in favor of an inordinate focus on
the heinous act he committed as a minor”).
Appellate courts in Oregon and Connecticut have
issued similar decisions. In State v. Davilla, the
Oregon Court of Appeals found that the sentencing
court had violated the Eighth Amendment because it
“focused almost exclusively on the nature of the crimes
to justify the imposition of a” de facto life sentence. 462
P.3d 748, 752 (Or. Ct. App. 2020). Similarly, in State
v. Riley, the Supreme Court of Connecticut found a
sentencing court had violated Miller because its
LWOP sentence turned on the “innocence of the
victims and the choice made by the defendant to
commit these senseless crimes.” 110 A.3d 1205, 1217
(Conn. 2015); see also, e.g., Kitchen v. Whitmer, 486 F.
Supp. 3d 1114, 1120 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (finding the
sentencing court “did not account for [the offender]’s
youth in the way Miller contemplates” where the judge
“focused primarily on the seriousness of the offense,
stating that this was ‘one of the most heinous crimes’
he had tried”); Sparks v. United States, No. W-11-CV123, 2018 WL 1415775, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2018)
(“no matter how heinous their crime” juveniles should
receive a lesser sentence unless “the record as a whole”
indicates otherwise) (emphasis added)), aff’d, 941 F.3d
748 (5th Cir. 2019).
Moreover, appellate courts in Michigan have
recognized that a sentencer’s cursory reference to
youth and its attendant circumstances is insufficient
to satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s requirements
under Miller. In People v. Hyatt, the Michigan Court
27
of Appeals held the individualized sentencing the
Eighth Amendment requires is not satisfied by simply
running through the checklist of factors of “youth”
identified by this Court: “[s]entencing courts are to do
more than pay mere lip service to the demands of
Miller. . . . [T]he fact that a vile offense occurred is not
enough, by itself, to warrant imposition of a lifewithout-parole sentence. 891 N.W.2d 549, 574–75
(Mich. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on
other grounds sub nom. People v. Skinner, 917 N.W.2d
292 (Mich. 2018).9
Further, the Supreme Court of Utah has recognized
that, even when a court purports to apply a facially
discretionary sentencing scheme, the court fails to
sufficiently consider youth under the Eighth
Amendment if it sentences a juvenile to LWOP despite
finding that the juvenile offender “can change or that
their crime was the result of mere transient
immaturity.” State v. Mullins, No. 20200149, 2025 WL
796220, at *16 (Utah Mar. 13, 2025).
Allowing the Eighth Amendment to be satisfied by
merely referencing youth or claiming to apply a
discretionary sentencing scheme wrongly reduces the
constitutional protections to form over substance. Cf.,
e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668,
679 (1996) (“Determining constitutional claims on the
basis of . . . formal distinctions, which can be
manipulated largely at the will of the government . . . ,
is an enterprise that we have consistently eschewed.”);
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986) (holding
9 Skinner was among the cases that held, pre-Jones, that trial
courts need not make a finding of fact regarding a juvenile
offender’s incorrigibility. 917 N.W.2d at 309. Thus, Skinner and
the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision in Hyatt remain good law
post-Jones.
28
that if general assertions were sufficient, “the Equal
Protection Clause ‘would be but a vain and illusory
requirement’”). What the Constitution demands is not
performative compliance, but real application.
II. THE
IMPORTANCE
OF
JUVENILE
SENTENCING HEIGHTENS THE NEED
FOR REVIEW.
The conflict between the North Carolina Supreme
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and the
holdings of this Court and other state lower courts
would be enough to merit review in any number of
contexts, but the gravity of the question strengthens
the need for the Court to grant this Petition.
This Court has been clear that the protections
afforded to all citizens by the Eighth Amendment
“flow[] from the basic ‘precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to [the] offense.’” Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
Accordingly, the failure of courts to adhere to the basic
requirements of the Eighth Amendment, “even [with
respect to those] convicted of heinous crimes,” amounts
to a violation of the fundamental “duty of the
government to respect the dignity of all persons.” Id.
The societal interest in ensuring that children, who
“are constitutionally different from adults for purposes
of sentencing,” are not treated as if they were adults
when they committed their crimes is more imperative.
Miller, 567 U.S. at 471.
Mr. Golphin is emblematic of the grave risk of doing
otherwise. He is serving two life-without-parole
sentences for crimes that caused his victims’ families
and communities great pain, and for which he has
expressed deep remorse. But Mr. Golphin committed
those crimes without premeditation as a severely
traumatized, emotionally stunted 17-year-old in the
29
final rash moments of what had been a fast-moving,
high stress traffic stop that escalated through the use
of significant physical force, triggering Mr. Golphin’s
intensely ingrained flight or fight response and lack of
impulse control resulting from his childhood marked
by severe abuse. There is now clear and unequivocal
evidence that his shockingly impulsive crime was the
product of youth—deeply-impaired youth whom the
State had failed to protect—and that he has changed,
matured, and rehabilitated in his decades of
incarceration. Yet, because the North Carolina
Supreme Court has now repeatedly endorsed an
approach where a juvenile’s crime itself predetermines
the imposition of life without parole, Mr. Golphin will
continue to be defined and punished for a horrible
mistake marked by “immaturity, irresponsibility,
‘impetuousness[,] and recklessness,’” the cardinal
“transient” properties of youth, and despite a roughly
30-year record that demonstrates that he has the
“capacity for change” and indeed has changed. Miller,
567 U.S. at 476, 479; see T 358:4–5; Pet. App. 26a
(Court of Appeals: “commend[ing Mr. Golphin] on the
improvements he has made while incarcerated”); id. at
36a (resentencing court: “Defendant’s conduct in
prison has improved since 2014”).
Without this Court’s intervention, the North
Carolina courts will continue to erode the
constitutional protections that are owed to juvenile
offenders. This Court need not disturb any State’s
ability to impose juvenile life without parole in narrow,
constitutionally compliant circumstances. But it
should not allow a state to disregard the manner in
which youth offenders are different from adults simply
by pointing to the fact that the juvenile offenders
standing before them necessarily committed a heinous
crime.
30
CONCLUSION
The Court should grant the petition.
Respectfully submitted,
EAMON P. JOYCE*
CHRISTINA PRUSAK CHIANESE
BRIANNA O. GALLO
BRIAN C. EARL
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
787 Seventh Avenue
New York, NY 10019
(212) 839-5300
ejoyce@sidley.com
Counsel for Petitioner
August 15, 2025
* Counsel of Record
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.