Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Dimetri Alexander Smith, Petitioner v. United States

No. 25____

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

DIMETRI ALEXANDER SMITH,

ALSO KNOWN AS METRI,

v.

Petitioners,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Eighth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

William Breedlove

BREEDLOVE LEGAL LLC

622 19th Street

Moline, Illinois 61265

309.517.0704

william@breedlovelegal.com

LEGAL PRINTERS LLC ! Washington, DC ! 202-747-2400 ! legalprinters.com

QUESTION PRESENTED

In a prosecution for racketeering related offenses,

does the enterprise structure need to be distinct from

that inherent in the racketeering activity alleged?

i

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

District Court:

United States v. Najawun Marcus Quinn, Darion

Daquan Gardner, Austin Zachary Ruiz, Diemtir

Alexander Smith, and Olajuwan Hakeem Culbreath,

3:21-cr-00091

8th Circuit Court of Appeals:

United States v. Najawun Marcus Quinn, 23-2842

United States v. Dimetri Alexander Smith, 23-2885

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question Presented ..................................................... i

Related Proceedings ................................................... ii

Table of Authorities .................................................. iv

Opinions Below ...........................................................1

Jurisdiction..................................................................2

Statutory Provisions involved ....................................3

Statement of the Case .................................................4

Background .........................................................4

Procedural History .............................................5

Reasons for Granting the Petition..............................6

This Court should grant review to uniformly

define the relationship between an enterprise

and racketeering acts .........................................6

Conclusion .................................................................20

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Al-Rayes v. Willingham, 914 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir.

2019) ..........................................................................12

Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938

(2009) ........................................................... 7,11-18,19

United States v. Bergrin, 650 F.3d 257 (3d Cir.

2011) ..........................................................................12

United States v. Christensen, 828 F.3d 763 (9th Cir.

2015) ..........................................................................13

United States v. Combs, 1:24-cr-00542 (S.D. NY) ....11

United States v. Crenshaw, 359 F.3d 977 (8th Cir.

2004) ........................................................ 7,15,16,18,19

United States v. Devine, 40 F.4th 139 (4th Cir.

2022) ..........................................................................14

United States v. Gershman, 31 F.4th 80 (2d Cir.

2022) ..........................................................................14

United States v. Hosseini, 679 F.3d 544 (7th Cir.

2012) ..........................................................................13

United States v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011 (10th Cir.

2009) ..........................................................................12

United States v. Jones, 873 F.3d 482 (5th Cir.

2017) ..........................................................................13

iv

United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242 (4th Cir.

2019) ..........................................................................14

United States v. Quinn, 131 F.4th 846 (8th Cir.

2025) ............................................................................7

United States v. Rodriguez-Torres, 939 F.3d 16 (1st

Cir. 2019) ...................................................................11

United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576

(1981) .......................................................... 15,16,18,19

United States v. White et al., 3:23-cr-00043

(S.D. Ia.).....................................................................10

Statutes:

18 USC 1832 ..............................................................17

18 USC 1959 ................................................................3

18 USC 1961 ...........................................................3,17

28 USC 1254(1) ...........................................................2

28 USC 3231 ................................................................5

Other Sources:

5th Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal

Cases) 2.79 (2024)........................................................9

10th Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions

2.74.3 (2025) ................................................................9

Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal

Cases O75.1 (2024) ......................................................9

v

Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the

District Courts of the Eighth Circuit 6.18.1962D

(2023) ...........................................................................9

Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the

District Couts of the Ninth Circuit 18.9 (2022) ..........9

The William J. Bauer Pattern Criminal Jury

Instructions of the Seventh Circuit p. 827 (2023) .......8

Third Circuit Model Jury Instructions (Criminal)

6.18.1962C-2 (2024) ....................................................8

vi

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the 8th Circuit court of appeals, a

published decision, is reported at 131 F.4th 846.

1

JURISDICTION

The opinion of the appeals court was entered on

March 19, 2025. A petition for rehearing was denied

on April 29, 2025. A petition for writ of certiorari is

thus timely to this court filed on or before July 28,

2025. The Court’s jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to

28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

2

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

18 USC § 1959 defines enterprise as:

(2) “enterprise” includes any partnership,

corporation, association, or other legal entity, and

any union or group of individuals associated in fact

although not a legal entity, which is engaged in, or

the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign

commerce.

18 USC § 1961 defines enterprise as

“(4) “enterprise” includes any individual,

partnership, corporation, association, or other legal

entity, and any union or group of individuals

associated in fact although not a legal entity;

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Background

This case is one of many percolating throughout the

federal courts that revolve around the Department of

Justice’s pointing of RICO statutes at “street gangs”,

which in many cases, and certainly this one, are

devoid of much, if anything, in the way of structure.

The street gang in question here was called, among

other things, the Savage Life Boys (SLB) and it was

largely men who grew up together in the same

neighborhoods.

Like many similar cases, the sole real issue in this

case was whether or not an enterprise existed. In fact,

at trial, undersigned counsel repeatedly advised the

jury that it was indeed his client engaged in the

violent activities and shootings.

The evidence at trial included confirmation from

alleged members that there was no initiation and no

rules. One witness contrasted their experience in SLB

with other gangs, such as the Gangsters Disciples,

because they were part of both. The acknowledgement

that the Gangsters Disciples had literature, rules, a

code of conduct and other indicia of an organization

was contrasted repeatedly with any sort of similar

situation in SLB.

Multiple cooperating witnesses who had plead guilty

to offenses relating to the SLB clarified that point.

The evidence also showed that all of the activities

were sporadic and unplanned; crimes of convenience.

4

The evidence was that a person who calls themselves

savage life can do whatever they want. One SLB

member indicated that in 27 years no one had ever

ordered him to do anything, and he’d never ordered

anyone else to do anything.

The racketeering acts themselves in this case where

all simple violence; there was no complexity to any

activity they engaged in.

The defendants requested an instruction that

included the following element in the definition of the

word enterprise “a structure distinct from that

inherent in the racketeering activity alleged.”

The request for that instruction was denied. Because

of the simple and brutish nature of the racketeering

activities and the complete lack of structure of the

enterprise, a reasonable juror could have concluded

that the structure of the enterprise was not distinct

from that inherent in the activities engaged in.

Procedural History

The district court held jurisdiction pursuant to 28

USC 3231. The federal court of appeals of the Eighth

Circuit had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 USC 1291.

5

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This Court should grant review to define the

relationship between an enterprise and

racketeering acts

Proving that there is an “enterprise” is an element of

numerous statutes imposing criminal liability. In

some cases, such as the case here, the underlying acts

are not in any reasonable question and the only

question the jury needs to deliberate upon is whether

or not there was an enterprise. In case after case, the

argument in the trial court and on appeal is whether

there was an enterprise, or whether there were just

criminal acts. With the recent emphasis the

Department of Justice has placed on qualifying socalled “Street Gangs” as an enterprise for

racketeering purposes, that debate becomes largely

about the interaction between structure of the

enterprise and the alleged racketeering acts.

While this Court has provided guidance, courts

continue to struggle with the definition of the word.

Not only are there circuit splits, there are splits

within districts and, in at least one case where

thirteen defendants were divided into multiple trials,

splits on the definition within different trials on the

same indictment.

That uncertainty harms all sides of the equation.

Prosecutors, rightly wary of overcharging, may not

proceed on all the cases that they should because they

err on the side of caution. Defense attorneys may

advise defendants to go to trial and lose critical

deductions for acceptance of responsibility to argue

6

about the issue. When cases do go to trial, trial courts

and their staff must expend weeks or months of trial

time on prosecutors plodding through sprawling

indictments, for the entire case to turn on a word or

two in instructions defining enterprise that, in any

conviction, is argued on appeal for years.

If this court provides a full definition of the word all

of those harms cease; prosecutors can pursue—or not

pursue—cases based on a concrete definition, defense

counsel can properly advise their clients about the

definition they face, and trial courts will have a

definition they can deploy without appellate

attorneys and courts second guessing definitions of

enterprise, instead all but leaving those issues to

future Anders briefs instead of oral arguments and

published opinions.

In this case, the defendants asked for instructions

based on 8th Circuit precedent in Crenshaw, an 8th

Circuit case that has not been overturned. In line with

that, defendant asked for a three-element definition:

1) a common purpose shared by the individual

associates 2) continuity of structure and personnel;

and 3) a structure distinct from that inherent in the

racketeering activity alleged. That definition is the

definition from the 8th Circuit in Crenshaw. United

States v. Crenshaw, 359 F.3d 977, 991 (8th Cir. 2004).

The trial court declined to give the third element, and

the 8th Circuit affirmed. United States v. Quinn, 131

F.4th 846, 856 (8th Cir. 2025)(citing Boyle v. United

States, 556 U.S. 938, 947 (2009))

7

While not carrying the force of law, the model jury

instructions across the federal courts demonstrate the

inconsistency in crafting an instruction on this

definition.

In the Third Circuit, an enterprise has four elements

1) purpose and longevity sufficient for the members of

the group to pursue its purpose, 2) an ongoing

organization, formal or informal, with some sort of

framework for carrying our its objectives, 3) a

relationship among the members of the group and

that the members of the group functioned as a

continuing unit to achieve a common purpose, and

4)the enterprise existed separate and apart from the

alleged pattern of racketeering activity. Third Circuit

Model Jury Instructions (Criminal) 6.18.1962C-2

(2024)

In the Seventh Circuit, the instructions provide no

elements at all and, instead, merely suggest that the

jury “may consider whether it has an ongoing

organization or structure, either formal or informal,

and whether the various members of the group

functioned as a continuing unit.” The William J.

Bauer Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions of the

Seventh Circuit p. 827 (2023)

In the Eighth Circuit, where this case arose,

instructions indicate that persons must have joined

for the purpose of engaging in a common course of

conduct, having a common purpose, and function as a

continuing unit, and that the association had a

structure distinct from that necessary to conduct the

8

pattern of racketeering activity. Manual of Model

Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts of

the Eighth Circuit 6.18.1962D (2023)

The Ninth Circuit has three elements: 1) associated

for a common purpose of engaging in a course of

conduct, 2) that the association of these people was an

ongoing formal or informal organization and 3) the

group was engaged in or had an effect upon interstate

or foreign commerce. Manual of Model Criminal Jury

Instructions for the District Couts of the Ninth Circuit

18.9 (2022)

The Tenth Circuit model instructions indicate that

the group of people must have 1) a common purpose;

and 2) an ongoing organization, either formal or

informal; and 3) personnel who function as a

continuing unit. 10th Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury

Instructions 2.74.3 (2025).

The Eleventh Circuit copies the language of the

statute, and indicates that the enterprise must be

separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering

activity in which the defendant allegedly engaged.

The enterprise must be proven to have been an

ongoing organization, formal or informal, that

functioned as a continuing unit. Eleventh Circuit

Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal Cases O75.1

(2024) The instructions are similar in the Fifth

Circuit. 5th Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions

(Criminal Cases) 2.79 (2024).

The model jury instructions are split; the 3rd Circuit

has a four-element test that requires the enterprise

be separate and apart from the racketeering; the 11th

9

Circuit also contains ‘separate and apart’ language.

The 7th Circuit provides no elements and requires no

separation. The 8th Circuit requires a structure

distinct from the racketeering activity. In the 9th

Circuit and 10th Circuit there is a three-element test,

with no mention of separation.

Model Jury Instructions don’t care the force of law,

but these discrepancies play out and exist in jury

instructions given in district courts in cases wholly

within the Southern District of Iowa, as well. In this

case, the “distinct” instruction wasn’t given. However,

in another RICO case undersigned was counsel for,

the element “an ascertainable structure distinct from

that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity”

was given over the governments objection. United

States v. White et al., 3:23-cr-00043, Final Jury

Instructions as to Don Christopher White, Jr,

Raheem Jacques Houston, Deaguise Ramont Hall,

Devell Carl Lewis, and Simmeon Terrell Hall., R.Doc

615 (S.D. Ia.)(2024), 49a. After giving the instruction,

the court corrected itself post-trial and indicated that

it shouldn’t have given that instruction and, in two

later trials under the same indictment, did not give

that part of the instruction to other defendants on the

same indictment. United States v. White et al., 3:23cr-00043, Final Jury Instructions as to Kylea Dapri

Cartwright Jr., R.Doc 1141 (S.D. Ia.)(2025) 51a . That

is to say, the confusion caused by the definition of

enterprise does not just lead to a split where

defendants in different circuits get different

definitions—but defendants defending against the

same indictment get different instructions on

different days in the same court.

10

More recently, in a well-covered trial in the Southern

District of New York where the jury seemingly did not

find the existence of an enterprise based upon the not

guilty verdict, the enterprise instruction was wholly

different from all of the above suggestions, and

different than any of the holdings discussed below.

That court required that the “enterprise must be

formally or practically separate from the defendant

himself.” United States v. Sean Combs, 1:24-cr-00542,

Jury Charge, R. Doc 424 (S.D. NY)(2025) 55a.

The courts of appeal themselves also have differences

in how the Boyle decision has affected their defining

of enterprise.

The 1st Circuit explicitly denies the need for decision

making, despite citing to the quote in Boyle that

makes it clear that decisions are needed, but they

need not be made in a hierarchical way. United States

v. Rodriguez-Torres, 939 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir.

2019)(“The group need not have some decision

making framework or mechanism for controlling the

members. See Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938,

948 (holding that a RICO enterprise ‘need not have a

hierarchical structure or a ‘chain of command’;

decisions may be made on an ad hoc basis and by any

number of methods — by majority vote, consensus, a

show of strength, etc.’). Instead the group must have

‘[1] a purpose, [2] relationships among those

associated with the enterprise, and [3] longevity

sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the

enterprise's purpose.’”)

The 10th Circuit has also decided that there is no

longer a need for a means of decision making post11

Boyle. United States v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011,

1021 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Simply put, after Boyle, an

association-in-fact enterprise need have no formal

hierarchy or means for decision-making, and no

purpose or economic significance beyond or

independent of the group's pattern of racketeering

activity.”) That contradicts Boyle, which does not say

that there is no need for means for decision making,

it actually implies that decisions must be made, but

they can be made in a number of less than

sophisticated ways. Boyle at 948 (“decisions may be

made on an ad hoc basis and by any number of

methods—by majority vote, consensus, a show of

strength, etc.”) One presumes this Court would not

have defined how decisions might be made were

decision making not a necessary part of the

enterprise.

The 11th Circuit has concluded that enterprise

requires only three elements. Al-Rayes v. Willingham,

914 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2019)(“In keeping with

that general definition, an association-in-fact

enterprise may be “formal or informal,” and requires

only “three ‘structural features’: (1) a ‘purpose,’ (2)

‘relationships among those associated with the

enterprise,’ and (3) ‘longevity sufficient to permit

these associates to pursue the enterprise's purpose.’ ”)

That court interpreted Boyle to make an enterprise

out of a married couple.

The 3rd Circuit takes the same position as the 10th

and 11th Circuits. United States v. Bergrin, 650 F.3d

257, 269 (3d Cir. 2011), as amended (Apr. 20,

2011)(“The indictment also alleges facts that satisfy

the Boyle requirements: purpose, relationships

12

among the members (though, again, relatively loose

and informal), and longevity sufficient to enable the

BLE to pursue its goals of, inter alia, making money

and protecting its own members and criminal

schemes.”)

The 7th Circuit has also determined that there are

but three elements of an enterprise. United States v.

Hosseini, 679 F.3d 544, 557 (7th Cir. 2012)(“In Boyle

the Court held that an ‘association-in-fact enterprise’

has just three elements: ‘a purpose,’ ‘relationships

among those associated with the enterprise,’ and

‘longevity sufficient to permit these associates to

pursue the enterprise's purpose.’”)

The 9th Circuit as well has reduced Boyle to a three

element test. United States v. Christensen, 828 F.3d

763, 780 (9th Cir. 2015)(“An associated-in-fact

enterprise is “a group of persons associated together

for a common purpose of engaging in a course of

conduct.” Such an enterprise has three elements: (1)

a common purpose, (2) an ongoing organization, and

(3) a continuing unit.)(citations omitted)

The 5th Circuit takes the three-element view of the

structural features, but is silent on what other

features may be necessary. United States v. Jones,

873 F.3d 482, 490 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he very concept

of an association in fact is expansive, but it must have

at least three structural features: a purpose,

relationships among those associated with the

enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these

associates to pursue the enterprise's purpose.”)

13

The 2nd Circuit has made it clear that because of the

expansiveness of Boyle, it makes more sense to say

what isn’t needed than what is needed to constitute

an enterprise. United States v. Gershman, 31 F.4th

80, 96 (2d Cir. 2022)(“Because of the expansive nature

of an association-in-fact enterprise, it may help to

think of the concept by what qualities are

unnecessary. The group need not have a name. Nor

must it ‘have a hierarchical structure or a ‘chain of

command.’ Its members ‘need not have fixed roles.’

And the group need not continually commit crimes—

its associates may ‘engage in spurts of activity

punctuated by periods of quiescence.’ ”)(citing Boyle).

The 4th Circuit, however, still requires four elements,

includes an identifiable structure, and suggests those

things that Boyle says are not necessary may never

the less provide further proof. United States v. Devine,

40 F.4th 139, 149 (4th Cir. 2022)(“The ‘hallmark

concepts’ that identify RICO enterprises are

continuity, unity, shared purpose and identifiable

structure. And while an enterprise need not have a

“hierarchical structure or a chain of command,’ Boyle

v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 948, 129 S.Ct. 2237,

173 L.Ed.2d 1265 (2009), the presence of those

characteristics ‘provides additional evidence of a

functioning enterprise,’ United States v. Mathis, 932

F.3d 242, 259 (4th Cir. 2019).”)

In the cited cases the 1st and 10th Circuits have read

Boyle to mean there is no need for decision making.

The 3rd, 5th, 7th, 9th and 11th all require only the

three elements, and don’t necessarily discuss the

relationship between the structure and the other

activities. The 4th Circuit, requires an identifiable

14

structure, which seems directly afoul of the

suggestion in Boyle that the word “ascertainable” will

be superfluous, redundant, and misleading. The 2nd

Circuit defines instead what isn’t an enterprise,

knocking out possible verbiage in instructions rather

than affirmatively supplying it.

Boyle only defined the structure of the enterprise

itself—giving it three characteristics that it must

have, as noted and now adopted by the circuit courts

in various measure, with splits between them on

other aspects. But the three elements that the circuits

have pulled from Boyle do not define what the

structure must be vis-à-vis the racketeering activity.

Prior to Boyle, the 8th Circuit held in Crenshaw, that

it must be a structure distinct from that inherent in

the racketeering activity. That case has not been

overturned, and there is nothing in Boyle that

contradicts that holding—and, the 3rd, 8th and 11th

circuit Model instructions still require some version

of that concept, even if the courts themselves don’t

always do so. On that issue, citing Turkette, the Boyle

court reminds that proof of the racketeering activity

does not necessarily establish an enterprise, but in

particular cases the evidence used to show a pattern

of racketeering activity and the evidence used to show

an enterprise may coalesce—not the actual elements

themselves, but the evidence used to prove them.

Boyle at 947.

Defendants below did not ask that the structure be

defined in a way that contradicts Boyle—instead, the

simple ask was that the structure of the enterprise be

distinct from that inherent in the racketeering

15

activity. The evidence itself could still coalesce, as

Turkette and Boyle suggest, but requiring the

structure be distinct—not beyond, but merely

distinct—prevents the elements from coalescing.

Boyle suggests in dicta that “a group that does

nothing but engage in extortion through oldfashioned, unsophisticated, and brutal means may

fall squarely within the [definition]”. Boyle at 948.

But even such an old fashioned protection racket has

distinction—there is the group, the extortion itself

and, as Boyle notes, the means of doing so. Notably,

Boyle says may, indicating that it may also not fall

within the definition depending on the circumstances.

Crenshaw, while pre-dating Boyle, nevertheless

adroitly defines the difference between when the

brutal extortion described in Boyle’s dicta meets the

definition of enterprise and when it does not. That is

because Boyle does not collapse the enterprise and the

racketeering activity in the way the Circuits have

since interpreted it—in fact, it does quite the opposite.

It notes that the concept of “beyond that inherent” can

be interpreted in at least two ways, one of which is

correct and one which isn’t. Boyle at 947. While Boyle

states it is incorrect to say that enterprise may never

be inferred from the evidence showing the pattern of

racketeering activity, it does not say that the

enterprises structure itself need not be distinct from

the activities; instead, it states that the evidence used

to prove them may coalesce, not that the two elements

may coalesce.

In Boyle, the defendant requested that the

relationship between the enterprise structure and the

16

activities be something “beyond” and “hierarchical.”

This Court declined that expansion. The defendants

below in this case ask for something different—we ask

merely that it be distinct from that inherent in the

activity. Where the word “beyond” would imply that it

is greater, or more complex or even hierarchical, the

modifier “distinct” does not. In fact, the enterprise

could be far less sophisticated than the actual

racketeering activities themselves.

For example, “Theft of Trade Secrets” is a potential

racketeering activity. 18 USC 1961(1), and 18 USC

1832. That racketeering activity itself under section

(a)(2) may require an incredibly complex computer

hacking scheme in order to download the relevant

information; but that does not constitute

racketeering. However, if the final piece of the puzzle

is the need to have a security guard allow the hacker

into the facility to plug a USB drive into a computer?

That need—the access that security guard provides—

creates a structure distinct from the racketeering

activity, but not beyond the racketeering activity.

That is, the security guard’s action and role allowing

the hacker access is a structural relationship between

the two that is not inherent in the racketeering

activity of theft of trade secrets, because there are

potentially ways to do it remotely or the hacker could

have tried to gain access without the guard’s

assistance. Once the guard helps the hacker —a very

simple task, uncomplex, with no hierarchy of any

kind—they have created a structure between them.

That structure is distinct from theft of trade secrets,

and so they have opened themselves up to RICO

liability that comports both with the definitions

17

provided by Boyle and the definition provided by

Crenshaw, assuming the other Boyle elements also

exist in this scenario. The guard could also allow

access to someone for good old fashioned vanilla and

non-RICO criminal activity, in which case the

structure still exists, but without the racketeering

activity there would be no RICO-type criminal

exposure.

Requiring the structure be distinct from the

racketeering activity is what makes for a separate

crime. Stealing trade secrets is a crime, distinct in

and of itself. Stealing trade secrets on two occasions

with a security guard who lets you into the facility?

That creates a structure for committing the crime of

theft of trade secrets that is distinct from the crime of

theft of trade secrets—it is not more complex, it is not

more hierarchical, it is not beyond the structure

inherent in the activities themselves. Rather, it is a

structure that is merely distinct from the

racketeering activity.

Ultimately, Boyle only defined what the structure

must have—it made no mention of how the structure

must be related to the racketeering activities, just

that the same evidence may be used to show both

elements. The 8th Circuit, in Crenshaw, indicates

that the structure must be distinct from the activities.

That in no way violates the rule laid out in Boyle, it

compliments it. Further, the Crenshaw holding, and

thus the requested instruction, is merely another way

to say that an enterprise “is an entity separate and

apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages.”

United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).

18

This court should grant certiorari to synthesize its

holdings in Boyle and Turkette with the rule laid out

in Crenshaw. The instruction requested in the trial

court ensures that the holding in Boyle is not taken

beyond its intent, and prevents collapsing elements of

the events while still allowing the evidence to show

them to coalesce—again, accomplishing the directive

in Turkette that “[t]he existence of an enterprise at all

times remain[] a separate element which must be

proved by the Government.” Id. at 583.

19

CONCLUSION

The writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

William Lester Breedlove

Attorney for Dimetri Smith

Breedlove Legal, LLC

622 19th Street

Moline, Illinois 61265

william@breedlovelegal.com

309.517.0704

20