Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Mohammad Nauman Chaudhri, Mohammad Rehan Chaudhri, & Zahida Aman, Petitioners v. United States

No. 25In the

Supreme Court of the United States

MOHAMMAD NAUMAN CHAUDHRI, MOHAMMAD

REHAN CHAUDHRI, AND ZAHIDA AMAN,

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Jose Garza Badillo

Law Office of

Jose Garza Badillo

327 C Street, Suite 306

San Diego, CA 92101

Colby J. Ryan

Law Offices of

Colby J. Ryan

401 B Street, Suite 2010

San Diego, CA 92101

Barry J. Pollack

Counsel of Record

Harris St. Laurent &

Wechsler LLP

1775 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW,

Suite 650

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 617-5971

bpollack@hs-law.com

Counsel for Petitioners

383537

A

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

When applying the plain language of a broadly

worded federal criminal statue would intrude on an area

historically left to the states, must a court apply the plain

language without consideration of the context in which the

statute was enacted or the presumption that if Congress

intends to usurp authority previously left to the states it

must say so explicitly?

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Pet it ione r s Moh a m m a d Nau m a n Ch aud h r i ,

Mohammad Rehan Chaudhri, and Zahida Aman were

defendants in the district court and the appellants in the

court of appeals.

Respondent the United States was the prosecution in

the district court and the appellee in the court of appeals.

There are no corporate parties involved in this case.

iii

RULE 14.1(B)(III) STATEMENT

This case arises from the following proceedings in

the United States District Court for the Eastern District

of Virginia and the United States Court of Appeals for

the Fourth Circuit.

United States v. Chaudhri, et al., Nos. 23-4054,

23-4077, 23-4078 (4th Cir. final judgment Apr. 8, 2025)

United States v. Aman, et al., No. 19-CR-00085

(E.D. Va. final judgment Jan. 24, 2023)

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

RULE 14.1(b)(iii) STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

TABLE OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI . . . . . . . .1

OPINIONS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

RELEVENT STATUTORY PROVISION . . . . . . . . . . . 1

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

A. Legal Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

B. Factual and Procedural Background . . . . . . . . . 6

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION . . . . . 8

v

Table of Contents

Page

I.

I ncon si st ent met ho d s of st at ut or y

interpretation amongst the circuits led,

and will continue to lead, to inconsistent

application of the law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

II. The question presented is important and

frequently recurring, and this case is a

good vehicle for resolving the issue . . . . . . . . . . 13

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

vi

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

A P P E N DI X A — O P I N ION O F T H E

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR T H E FOU RT H CI RCU I T,

FILED APRIL 8, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a

A P P E N DI X B — O P I N ION O F T H E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR T H E E A S T ER N DI S T RIC T OF

V I R GI N I A , R IC H MON D DI V I S ION,

FILED AUGUST 16, 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39a

APPENDIX C — ORDER OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FOURTH CIRCUIT, FILED MAY 6, 2025 . . . . . 84a

APPENDIX D — RELEVANT STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86a

vii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc.,

951 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Bond v. United States,

572 U.S. 844 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 10

Carr v. United States,

560 U.S. 438 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

FCC v. AT&T Inc.,

562 U.S. 397 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Fischer v. United States,

603 U.S. 480 (2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Fletcher v. Williams,

No. 22-CV-1371, 2023 WL 6307494

(10th Cir. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Foster v. United States,

303 U.S. 118 (1938) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, Inc.,

986 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Hewitt v. United States,

605 U.S.__, 145 S. Ct. 2165 (2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Jones v. United States,

529 U.S. 848 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

viii

Cited Authorities

Page

Moore v. Sims,

442 U.S. 415 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Muchira v. Al-Rawaf,

850 F.3d 605 (4th Cir. 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Robertson v. Baldwin,

165 U.S. 275 (1897) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,

519 U.S. 337 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency,

598 U.S. 651 (2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 11

United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,

310 U.S. 534 (1940) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

United States v. Bass,

404 U.S. 336 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 11

United States v. Kozminski,

487 U.S. 931 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 11, 12

United States v. Toviave,

761 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5, 8, 9, 13

United States Forest Service v.

Cowpasture River Preservation Assn.,

590 U.S. 604 (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

ix

Cited Authorities

Page

Wooden v. United States,

595 U.S. 360 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Yates v. United States,

574 U.S. 528 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 9

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. amend. XIII . . . . . . . . . 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 13

Statutes and Rules

18 U.S.C. § 371 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

18 U.S.C. § 1519 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

18 U.S.C. § 1589 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3, 7, 8

18 U.S.C. § 1592 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Other Authorities

Joyc e E. Mc Con nel l , Beyond Met aphor :

Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude,

and the T hi r t eenth A mendment , 4

Yale J.L. & Feminism 207, 207 n.2 (1992)

(citing 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 215 (1865)) . . . . . . . . . . .12

1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Pet it ione r s Moh a m m a d Nau m a n Ch aud h r i ,

Mohammad Rehan Chaudhr i, and Zahida A man

(collectively, the “Petitioners”) respectfully petition for a

writ of certiorari to review the judgment and opinion of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit is reported at United States v.

Chaudhri, 134 F.4th 166 (4th Cir. 2025), and is reproduced

in the Appendix to this Petition (“Pet. App.”) 1a-38a. A

petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc sought on

an issue unrelated to the issue raised in this Petition was

denied by an order dated May 6, 2025, which is reproduced

at Pet. App. 84a-85a. The relevant proceedings in the

district court are unpublished and are reproduced at Pet.

App. 39a-83a.

JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit issued its opinion on April 8, 2025. Pet. App.

1a-38a. A petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc

was denied by the Fourth Circuit on May 6, 2025. Pet.

App. at 84-85a. This Court has jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1254(1).

RELEVENT STATUTORY PROVISION

The relevant statutory provision is 18 U.S.C. § 1589,

which is reproduced at Pet. App. 86-87a.

2

INTRODUCTION

“ Whether a statutory term is unambiguous is

determined not only by reference to the language itself,

but also by the specific context in which that language

is used, and the broader context of the statute as a

whole.” See Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 528–29

(2015) (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341

(1997) (cleaned up). “Part of a fair reading of statutory

text is recognizing that ‘Congress legislates against the

backdrop’ of certain unexpressed presumptions.” Bond

v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 857 (2014). This Petition

raises an important question of how a broadly worded

federal criminal statute must be interpreted if looking

only to the dictionary definition of the words would cause

the statute to intrude on an area historically left to the

states, yet the statutory language does not evince a clear

intent by Congress to do so.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 1589, the forced labor statute, is a

part of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”),

“passed to implement the Thirteenth Amendment against

slavery or involuntary servitude.” See Muchira v. AlRawaf, 850 F.3d 605, 617 (4th Cir. 2017), as amended

(Mar. 3, 2017). In considering the statute’s application to

domestic abuse by a family member to coerce domestic

labor from another family member, the Fourth and Sixth

Circuits have employed different methods of statutory

interpretation and reached different results. The Sixth

Circuit, recognizing that such an application would intrude

on a field traditionally left to the states to police, looked

beyond the statutory language to the context in which

the statute was passed, to implement the Thirteenth

Amendment. On that basis, the Sixth Circuit determined

3

the statute was not intended to apply to the conduct

at issue, since that conduct was not proscribed by the

Thirteenth Amendment. The Fourth Circuit below, on the

other hand, relied solely on the broad statutory language

and on that basis determined the statute applied to the

conduct at issue. Unlike the Sixth Circuit, the Fourth

Circuit engaged in no analysis of whether the conduct at

issue was proscribed by the Thirteenth Amendment. This

Court should grant the petition to resolve the conflict.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Legal Background

Title 18 U.S.C. § 1589, a part of the TVPA, 114 Stat.

1466, was passed by Congress on October 28, 2000.

As both the Fourth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit have

acknowledged, it was “passed to implement the Thirteenth

Amendment against slavery or involuntary servitude.” See

Muchira, 850 F.3d at 617; United States v. Toviave, 761

F.3d 623, 629 (6th Cir. 2014).

Title 18 U.S.C. § 1589 states, in relevant part:

Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor

or services of a person by any one of, or by any

combination of, the following means—

(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical

restraint, or threats of physical restraint to that

person or another person;

(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious

harm to that person or another person;

4

(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law

or legal process; or

(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended

to cause the person to believe that, if that person did

not perform such labor or services, that person or

another person would suffer serious harm or physical

restraint,

shall be punished as provided under subsection (d).

In Toviave, an adult caused four children to be brought

from Togo to the United States to live with him. Three

of the children were relatives of his (one was his sister

and the other two were distant cousins). He did not have

a biological relationship with the fourth child, who was

nephew to his then-girlfriend. See Toviave, 761 F.3d at

624. Toviave was physically abusive to the four children

and demanded the children perform domestic chores. See

id. His girlfriend left at some point, leaving him with the

four children. See id. The Sixth Circuit found beating the

children “deplorable,” but that domestic child abuse is a

field traditionally left to the states. See id. While household

work is “labor or services” and it was obtained by the

defendant through force and threats of force, the Sixth

Circuit held that the TVPA did not intend to transform

domestic child abuse into a federal crime merely because

labor was involved. See id. (“The mere fact that Toviave

made the children complete chores does not convert

Toviave’s conduct—what essentially amounts to child

abuse—into a federal crime.”).

The Sixth Circuit’s analysis followed well-trod

ground, by recognizing statutory context: “[p]art of a fair

5

reading of statutory text is recognizing that ‘Congress

legislates against the backdrop’ of certain unexpressed

presumptions.” See id. at 628 (citing Bond, 572 U.S. at

857); see also Foster v. United States, 303 U.S. 118, 120

(1938) (“Courts should construe laws in harmony with

the legislative intent and seek to carry out the legislative

purpose.”). In determining the appropriate reach of

the statute in context, the Sixth Circuit looked to this

Court’s precedent relating to the scope of the Thirteenth

Amendment, which the TVPA was enacted to enforce.

“[T]he Supreme Court has long recognized that the

Thirteenth Amendment ‘was not intended to apply to

exceptional cases well established in the common law

at the time of the Thirteenth Amendment, such as the

right of parents and guardians to the custody of their

minor children or wards.’” Toviave, 761 F.3d at 626 (citing

United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944 (1988)

quoting Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897)).

The Sixth Circuit relied on the cannon that absent clear

congressional intent, laws should not be read to federalize

traditional areas of state law and that “[t]he forced labor

statute could not have been intended to overturn this

longstanding parental right.” Toviave, 761 F.3d at 626;

see also Fletcher v. Williams, No. 22-CV-1371, 2023 WL

6307494, at *2-3 (10th Cir. Sept. 28, 2023) (“Plaintiffs

cannot use a federal statute enacted to implement the

federal Thirteenth Amendment to criminalize behavior

the Amendment plainly permits. . . .”); Gonzalez v.

CoreCivic, Inc., 986 F.3d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 2021) (“we

do not construe criminal statutes like larceny or battery

to reflexively apply to the parent-child relationship, but

rather read them in light of parents’ well-established

rights over their own children”) (citing Kozminski, 487

U.S. at 944).

6

The Fourth Circuit in the present case, however,

took a vastly different approach. It looked to the common

dictionary meanings of “whoever,” “person,” and “labor

or services” and held that absent an explicit statutory

exception, those broad terms should be given those

dictionary meanings. Pet. App. 12a. The Fourth Circuit

acknowledged that “interpreting the plain language of

the statute [requires the Court to] look to the specific

context in which the language is used, and the broader

context of the statute as a whole.” But because it found

the terms used in the statute unambiguous, it declined

to consider the reach of the Thirteenth Amendment.

For the same reason, it also gave no consideration to the

fact that relying solely on the dictionary definition of the

terms used in the statute would result in overriding the

usual constitutional balance between federal and state law,

despite the statute’s lack of language evidencing a clear

congressional intent to do so. Pet. App. 12a-13a (citing

Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc., 951 F.3d 1269, 1276-77 (11th

Cir. 2020) (finding TVPA applied to labor performed by

alien detainee at federal immigration detention facility:

because the statutory language of the TVPA is plain and

unambiguous and no limiting principle is evident from the

text, “we need go no further”)).

B. Factual and Procedural Background

Mohammad Nauman Chaudhri and Mohammad

Rehan Chaudhri are the adult sons of Zahida Aman. Pet.

App. 2a. The three of them were the defendants below

and are the Petitioners here. In 2001, Salman Chaudhri,

another of Ms. Aman’s sons, entered an arranged

7

marriage to M.B. in Pakistan. Pet. App. 3a.1 Shortly

after the marriage, M.B. moved to Midlothian, Virgina

to live with her husband and in-laws. Pet. App. 3a-4a.

After her arrival in the family home, Ms. Aman assigned

M.B. household chores such as making meals and house

cleaning. Pet. App. 4a-5a. Petitioners verbally threatened

and physically assaulted M.B. starting in about 2003.

Pet. App. 6a-8a. By 2005, Mr. Salman Chaudhri, who did

his medical residency and then accepted positions as a

physician out of state, was no longer living full time in the

family home, but returned periodically. Pet. App. 5a. The

chores assigned by Ms. Aman and the other Petitioners

to M.B. expanded over time, both in the number of hours

worked each day and in the intensity of the physical nature

of the work. These chores included painting, significant

repair work, and yard work. Pet. App. 5a-6a. This period

of household work lasted until a couple of years after the

birth of her and Salman Chaudhri’s fourth child in 2008,

although the abuse continued. Pet. App. 6a. In 2016, M.B.’s

brother came to see her. Pet. App. 9a. He testified that

he thought his sister looked to be in poor health and he

witnessed Nauman Chaudhri slap her; he called the police

and removed M.B. and her children from the home. Pet.

App. 9a.

Petitioners were charged in federal court. Pet. App.

9a. They were each convicted of one count of conspiracy

under 18 U.S.C. § 371 to engage in forced labor, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 1589. Pet. App. 9a. Petitioners Mohammad

Rehan Chaudhri and Zahida Aman were both convicted

1. The Fourth Circuit used only initials to identify Mr.

Salman Chaudhri’s wife, and we adopt the same practice for this

petition.

8

of one substantive count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1589.

Zahida Aman was also convicted of one substantive count

of document servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1592. Pet.

App. 9a. Each moved under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure for a judgment of acquittal, arguing,

among other things, that the court should, following the

reasoning in Toviave, hold that 18 U.S.C. § 1589 does

not reach the conduct proven at trial. Pet. App. 39a-40a,

54a-62a. The district court denied these motions. Pet.

App. 62a.

On appeal, Petitioners argued the district court erred

in holding that 18 U.S.C § 1589 reaches the domestic

labor of a family member obtained by domestic abuse

by another family member, citing the Sixth Circuit’s

holding in Toviave, 761 F.3d at 623. Petitioners argued

that like the court in Toviave, the court should analyze

the broad language of the statute in context, noting that

the TVPA was not intended to proscribe conduct that

was not prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. The

Fourth Circuit rejected this argument based on the plain

language of 18 U.S.C § 1589, declining to assess whether

the conduct proven at trial is proscribed by the Thirteenth

Amendment.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I.

Inconsistent methods of statutory interpretation

amongst the circuits led, and will continue to lead,

to inconsistent application of the law.

The courts of appeals in Toviave and below employed

different methods of statutory interpretation and

unsurprisingly reached holdings that conflict. It is a

9

general rule of statutory construction that if the words of

a statute are clear and unambiguous, the court need not

inquire any further. See, e.g., Carr v. United States, 560

U.S. 438, 458 (2010) (“We have stated time and again that

courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute

what it means and means in a statute what it says there.

When the statutory language is plain, the sole function

of the courts—at least where the disposition required by

the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its

terms”). The Fourth Circuit understood this to mean that

it should look to the dictionary definitions of the words

“whoever,” “person,” and “labor or services” and end its

inquiry. Pet. App. 11a-12a. While it acknowledged that

ambiguity is determined in context, the Fourth Circuit

looked only to see if the text of the statute contained an

explicit limitation to its broad language. Pet. App. 12a.

The Sixth Circuit in Toviave, on the other hand,

followed a process under which dictionary definitions

are the start, but not the end, of the determination of

whether a federal criminal statute using broad terms

unambiguously proscribes all conduct that could fall

within the scope of those terms. See, e.g., Yates, 574 U.S.

at 528–29 (“Although dictionary definitions of the words

‘tangible’ and ‘object’ bear consideration in determining

the meaning of ‘tangible object’ in § 1519, they are not

dispositive. Whether a statutory term is unambiguous ‘is

determined [not only] by reference to the language itself,

[but also by] the specific context in which that language is

used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.’”);

Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency, 598 U.S.

651, 676 (2023) (“construing statutory language is not

merely an exercise in ascertaining the outer limits of a

10

word’s definitional possibilities”) (quoting FCC v. AT&T

Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 407 (2011)) (cleaned up).

In Bond this Court instructed that “[p]art of a fair

reading of statutory text is recognizing that ‘Congress

legislates against the backdrop’ of certain unexpressed

presumptions.” Id. at 857; see also United States v. Am.

Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (“[E]ven when

the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but

merely an unreasonable one ‘plainly at variance with the

policy of the legislation as a whole this Court has followed

that purpose, rather than the literal words.’”); Hewitt

v. United States, 605 U.S.__, __, 145 S. Ct. 2165, 2178

(2025) (rejecting an interpretation of statutory language

of the First Step Act that would run “headlong into the

animating aims of the First Step Act”); Wooden v. United

States, 595 U.S. 360, 370 (2022) (assessing whether a

statute applies to a given set of facts requires not only

interpreting the statutory language, but “may also involve

keeping an eye on [the statute’s] history and purpose”).

As Bond recognized, “it is incumbent upon the federal

courts to be certain of Congress’ intent before finding

that federal law overrides the usual constitutional balance

of federal and state powers.” See Bond, 572 U.S. at 858

(cleaned up); Fischer v. United States, 603 U.S. 480, 501

(2024) (Jackson J., concurring) (“Discerning the rule’s [or

statute’s] purpose is critical when a court is called upon

to interpret” it.). The consideration of this admonition

formed the basis of the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Toviave.

Congress has traditionally been reluctant to define as

a federal crime, conduct readily denounced as criminal by

the states. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349

11

(1971). In recognition of that fact, this Court has avoided

reading criminal statutes as making “traditionally local

criminal conduct . . . a matter for federal enforcement.”

See Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000).

This Court has “cautioned, as well, that unless Congress

conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to

have significantly changed the federal-state balance in

the prosecution of crimes.” See Jones, 529 U.S. at 858

(quoting Bass, 404 U.S. at 349) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Sackett, 598 U.S. at 679 (“[T]his Court

‘require[s] Congress to enact exceedingly clear language if

it wishes to significantly alter the balance between federal

and state power and the power of the Government over

private property.”) (quoting United States Forest Service

v. Cowpasture River Preservation Assn., 590 U.S. 604,

621-22 (2020)). “Family relations are a traditional area of

state concern.” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979)

(federal courts should defer to state court in case involving

child abuse).

The TVPA established criminal liability for conduct

that is prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. “The

primary purpose of the [Thirteenth] Amendment was to

abolish the institution of African slavery as it had existed

in the United States at the time of the Civil War, but the

Amendment was not limited to that purpose; the phrase

‘involuntary servitude’ was intended to extend ‘to cover

those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery

which in practical operation would tend to produce like

undesirable results.’” Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 942. “[T]he

Thirteenth Amendment was not intended to apply to

‘exceptional cases well established in the common law

at the time of the Thirteenth Amendment, such as ‘the

right of parents and guardians to the custody of their

12

minor children or wards, or laws preventing sailors who

contracted to work on vessels from deserting their ships.”

Id. at 944 (cleaned up). Even though ordinary meaning of

“involuntary servitude” would encompass the military

draft, jury service or roadwork, and those examples were

not explicitly carved out of the Amendment’s text, this

Court found the Thirteenth Amendment was not intended

to reach that type of compulsory labor. See id.

The Thirteenth Amendment likewise did not prohibit

family domestic abuse, and it was the specific intent of the

drafters that it would not. See Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond

Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and

the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 Yale J.L. & Feminism

207 (1992) at 1 n.2 (citing 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 215 (1865)

(statement of Rep. White expressing concerns that the

law would alter the traditional relationship of husband

and wife).

The Sixth Circuit’s holding considered the purpose

of the forced labor statute to prohibit that proscribed by

the Thirteenth Amendment and Kozminski’s discussion

of the reach of the Thirteenth Amendment. The Sixth

Circuit also considered the importance of not reading a

federal criminal statute to upset the balance of federalstate spheres of law enforcement in the absence of clear

statutory language mandating such a result.

The Fourth Circuit’s exclusive reliance on the

dictionary definition of the words did neither. Because

the Fourth Circuit found that the common use meanings

of “whoever,” “person,” and “labor or services” applied

absent an explicit statutory exception, it found that the

conduct proven at trial fell within the ambit of the statutory

13

language. It declined to look at the context in which the

TVPA was passed and determine whether the conduct at

issue was proscribed by the Thirteenth Amendment or to

consider the presumption against Congress intruding on

fields historically left to the states. Pet. App. 12a-13a. The

approaches undertaken by the Fourth and Sixth Circuits

are plainly in conflict. 2

The Petition should be granted so this Court can

resolve that conflict.

II. The question presented is important and frequently

recurring, and this case is a good vehicle for

resolving the issue.

Establishing a uniform approach throughout the

circuits to the interpretation of broadly worded federal

criminal statutes that by their terms alone appear to

encompass conduct historically left to the states, but

that do not express an intention to override the preexisting federal-state balance, achieves several purposes:

applying laws consistently, ensuring that laws are made

by Congress, and maintaining the appropriate balance

between federal and state criminal law enforcement. The

issue of how to interpret broadly worded federal criminal

2. The only ground on which the Fourth Circuit distinguished

Toviave was the age of the victims, noting that “women are not

children.” Pet. App. 14a. Had it reached the issue of whether

the conduct proven was conduct proscribed by the Thirteenth

Amendment, this distinction would have been irrelevant. As noted

above, the Thirteenth Amendment did not proscribe any family

domestic abuse, regardless of whether it was perpetrated against

an adult or against a child.

14

statutes is frequently re-occurring and of significant

importance.

This case is the right vehicle for resolving these

issues. The case arises on direct appeal. The opinion

below is unambiguous with respect to the issue raised

in this Petition. The opinion below creates a clear circuit

split in the appropriate method of interpretation of a

broadly worded federal criminal statute. There are no

jurisdictional problems, no preservation issues, and no

factual disputes as to the questions presented. The record

is not voluminous.

15

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the

petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Barry J. Pollack

Counsel of Record

Harris St. Laurent &

Wechsler LLP

1775 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW,

Suite 650

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 617-5971

bpollack@hs-law.com

Jose Garza Badillo

Law Office of

Jose Garza Badillo

327 C Street, Suite 306

San Diego, CA 92101

Colby J. Ryan

Law Offices of

Colby J. Ryan

401 B Street, Suite 2010

San Diego, CA 92101

Counsel for Petitioners

August 4, 2025

APPENDIX

i

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

A P P E N DI X A — O P I N ION O F T H E

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR T H E FOU RT H CI RCU I T,

FILED APRIL 8, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a

A P P E N DI X B — O P I N ION O F T H E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR T H E E A S T ER N DI S T RIC T OF

V I R GI N I A , R IC H MON D DI V I S ION,

FILED AUGUST 16, 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39a

APPENDIX C — ORDER OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FOURTH CIRCUIT, FILED MAY 6, 2025 . . . . . 84a

APPENDIX D — RELEVANT STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86a

1a

Appendix

A UNITED STATES

APPENDIX A — OPINION

OF THE

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT,

FILED APRIL 8, 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4054

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MOHAMMAD NAUMAN CHAUDHRI,

a/k/a NAUMAN CHAUDHRI,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 23-4077

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MOHAMMAD REHAN CHAUDHRI,

a/k/a REHAN CHAUDHRI,

Defendant-Appellant.

2a

Appendix A

No. 23-4078

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ZAHIDA AMAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. John A. Gibney,

Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:19-cr-00085-JAG-2; 3:19-cr00085-JAG-3; 3:19-cr-00085-JAG-1)

Argued: November 1, 2024

Decided: April 8, 2025

Before GREGORY, THACKER, and BERNER, Circuit

Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Thacker wrote the

opinion, in which Judge Gregory and Judge Berner joined.

Judge Berner wrote a concurring opinion, in which Judge

Thacker joined.

THACKER, Circuit Judge:

Zahida Aman and her adult sons, Nauman Chaudhri

and Rehan Chaudhri (collectively, “Appellants”), each

appeal their convictions for their roles in a forced labor

3a

Appendix A

conspiracy. Appellants argue their convictions should be

vacated because (1) the statute does not apply to the type

of familial relationship present here; (2) the Government

improperly struck jurors on the basis of race; (3) the

district court admitted unduly prejudicial evidence of

abuse after the conspiracy ended; and (4) the district

court improperly instructed the jury. We conclude that the

federal statute is clearly applicable, the Government did

not improperly strike jurors, and that the district court

did not otherwise reversibly err.

Therefore, we affirm Appellants’ convictions.

I.

M.B., the victim of Appellants’ forced labor conspiracy,

is originally from Pakistan. In 2001, Aman and M.B.’s

mother arranged M.B.’s marriage to Aman’s son, Salman

Chaudhri. M.B. did not meet Salman until after the

marriage was finalized in Pakistan in January 2002.

After the wedding, Salman told M.B. that “if his family,

especially his mom, [Aman] is happy with [M.B.], he’s

going to put [her] on a pedestal and our relationship will be

good.” J.A. 530.1 In this vein, he told M.B. that she “ha[s]

to make his family, especially his mom . . . happy.” Id.

About seven weeks after the marriage was finalized,

M.B. received a visa and flew to Virginia to live with

Salman and his family in their family home in Midlothian,

1. Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by

the parties in this appeal.

4a

Appendix A

Virginia. The first morning after M.B. arrived in Virginia,

Aman took her into the living room and said to her,

“[Y]ou are the daughter-in-law of a retired general colonel

and the wife of a doctor here in the United States, so you

need to put your standards up. And if you want to be happy

in your married life, the way to your husband’s heart is

through me. . . . And if you want [to make] him happy, you

have to make me happy.” J.A. 534.

Soon after M.B.’s arrival in the United States,

Appellants took away her notebook containing contact

information for her family and friends in Pakistan. They

also made her turn over her identification and immigration

documents for safekeeping in the family safe. But M.B. did

not have access to the safe. And even though M.B. received

a green card, 2 Appellants took it from her, saying it was

because her name was spelled incorrectly. They originally

told her they would have the green card corrected, but

she never saw it again. M.B. testified that Appellants, as

well as other members of the Chaudhri family, told her

repeatedly that she was in the country illegally, and they

would have her deported if she did not comply with their

demands.

Along with taking M.B.’s documents, Aman began

assigning M.B. a series of household chores she was

required to complete. M.B. testified that “[i]n the

2. A “green card” is a permanent residence card that allows

noncitizens “to live and work permanently in the United States.”

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Green Card, (Dec. 4,

2024), https://www.uscis.gov/green-card [https://perma.cc/65BZEJDW].

5a

Appendix A

beginning it was not much.” J.A. 535. She was required

to do things like clean the living room, kitchen, bathroom,

and laundry room before anyone else woke up. She was

also responsible for making meals at Aman’s request.

Eventually, however, the chores became full time labor.

M.B. was expected to work all day long – from morning

before others in the house awoke until bedtime. And as

time went on, each of the three Appellants, and other

uncharged family members, began assigning M.B. more

strenuous labor.

Notably, Salman did not live in the family home after

the first few years of the marriage. In fact, Salman did not

even live in the same state. He was away completing his

medical residency beginning in 2005. He then moved to

Pennsylvania in 2006, and to California in 2008. Although

he would return to Aman’s home for brief periods, he

remained in California for the duration of the marriage.

Thus, after 2005, M.B. was living in the family home with

Appellants, but not with her husband.

M.B. testified that the work she was required to do

escalated. She was required to paint the entire home

several times, including all inside rooms and the exterior

as far as she could reach. Additionally, she was made to

rip up and remove carpets from within the house; strip

and re-stain the deck at least twice a year; and tear up

and rebuild the cement pathway in the front of the home

at least twice. M.B. also testified that Aman and Nauman

once purchased a used car that was full of animal hair

from the previous owner. They made her clean the car

and remove all of the animal hairs using “[a] tweezer with

6a

Appendix A

a magnifying glass.” J.A. 571. She was also required to

mow the lawn using a push mower, even though the family

had a riding lawn mower. Similarly, M.B. was required to

do her and her children’s laundry by hand in a sink. She

was not allowed to use the washer and dryer that the rest

of the family used.

Appellants’ requirement that M.B. labor in their home

continued from 2002, when she arrived in Virginia, until

at least a couple years after the birth of M.B.’s fourth

child in 2008. M.B. was required to work through all of

her pregnancies, including even “mow[ing] the lawn [in

her] last week” of pregnancy. J.A. 604.

M.B. testified extensively at trial about the abuse

she suffered in Appellants’ home. She explained that

Appellants began with verbally abusing her in 2002

by telling her that she was a “whore, good for nothing,

bastard, [and] bitch” when they were displeased with her.

J.A. 546. In addition, Appellants forced M.B. to sleep on

the floor of her children’s rooms and restricted her access

to food.

Physical abuse soon followed beginning in 2003. The

first instance occurred after M.B. had stayed up late with

her first child who was sick, which caused her to be late

getting downstairs to start her morning work. Aman

was angry with M.B. for being late, so Aman cussed at

M.B. then slapped her and left a mark on her face. More

physical abuse followed from various family members.

M.B. testified that Rehan would slap her when he was mad

at her. M.B. also testified to one occasion where another

7a

Appendix A

member of the family held a knife to her throat either

because she did not complete a work task or because her

children were yelling. And she discussed another instance

where she was forced to mow the lawn then wait in the

laundry room without food or water until her sweat dried,

before she was permitted to enter the house to shower.

After showering, M.B. tried to get herself some food but

Aman and Rehan told her she was not allowed to eat until

she finished more work. While they were yelling at her,

Rehan put his phone down and M.B. tried to grab it to

call Salman. Rehan chased her, knocked her down, and

then kicked her in the stomach.

Weeks later, Rehan and his sister, Bushra, attacked

M.B. because Bushra believed M.B. needed to apologize

and seek forgiveness from Rehan for trying to use his

phone. The two tied M.B. up, wrapping the rope around

her neck and then pulling it tight, until she apologized.

They then dragged her out of the room so that her kids

could see her and told the children, “this is what happens

if you don’t listen to us or obey us.” J.A. 609–10.

M.B. explained at trial that Appellants also threatened

to have her deported on multiple occasions when they

were displeased with her. They also physically and

psychologically abused the children by forcing them to

slap M.B. when they talked to her, and by telling them

that M.B. was mentally ill and they should fear her. M.B.

explained that she continued to do the work she was

assigned and endure the abuse because she was terrified

Appellants were going to separate her from her kids if

she did not.

8a

Appendix A

Some years after the birth of her fourth child in 2008,

Appellants forced M.B. to move into the laundry room.

M.B. testified that she did not have a bed in the laundry

room. Rather, she would sleep on a mat on the floor. After

they moved M.B. into the laundry room, Appellants slowly

stopped assigning her work around the house. Aman

would ask M.B. to do things like “clean up the kitchen or

dining room. Small things.” J.A. 658. While she was living

in the laundry room, M.B. was only allowed to “watch”

her children but was not allowed to “interact” with them.

J.A. 665. Eventually Appellants stopped requiring M.B.

to perform any work.

But the physical abuse continued. M.B. testified to

one specific instance where Rehan hit her with a board

six times on the back and legs because she came back in

the house through the front door to get her prayer beads

and slippers after he had locked her in the garage so he

could watch television in the living room.

And two years after she was moved into the laundry

room, M.B. was exiled from the main house altogether

and forced to live in the “annex,” which was two rooms in

the garage. J.A. 667–68. M.B. was not able to access the

main house, and Appellants would supply her with one to

two weeks’ worth of “microwavable food” at a time. J.A.

668. At some point, Appellants took M.B.’s children to

California to see Salman. M.B. was left in the annex for

weeks, ran out of food, and was concerned that she would

never see her children again.

9a

Appendix A

In March 2016, M.B.’s brother visited Virginia from

Pakistan and went to Appellants’ house looking for M.B.

M.B. had not talked to her family in more than eight years

by that point. When M.B. first talked to her brother he did

not recognize her, partly due to significant weight loss and

hair loss over the 14+ years she had been in the United

States. M.B.’s brother tried to get her to leave with him,

but she refused because she did not want to leave her

children. M.B’s brother bought her a cell phone, and she

was able to reconnect with him and the rest of her family

in Pakistan.

M.B.’s brother returned to Virginia in May 2016 to

help M.B. leave Appellants’ home. When he arrived, he

witnessed Nauman slap M.B. in the face, and he called the

police for assistance. Nauman was arrested for domestic

assault, and M.B. was able to leave and obtain medical

treatment. The children were initially placed in foster

care, but M.B. obtained full custody of them in 2017.

Following an investigation, Appellants were charged

with conspiracy to commit forced labor, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 371; forced labor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589;

and document servitude, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1592.

The jury convicted all Appellants of the conspiracy

charge, Aman and Rehan of forced labor, and Aman of

document servitude. The district court denied Appellants’

motions for judgment of acquittal, and this timely appeal

followed.

10a

Appendix A

II.

A.

Appellants first argue on appeal that the district court

erred in denying their motions for judgment of acquittal

because they assert that the federal forced labor statute,

18 U.S.C. § 1589, does not apply to familial relationships

like the one here.

1.

We review the district court’s denial of a motion for

judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v. Robinson,

55 F. 4th 390, 401 (4th Cir. 2022). “We will uphold the

jury’s verdict if, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the government, the verdict is supported by

substantial evidence.” Id. (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). “Substantial evidence is that which a

reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and

sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Burfoot,

899 F.3d 326, 334 (4th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). We do not

“consider the credibility of witnesses and must assume

the jury resolved all contradictions in testimony in the

government’s favor.” Id. (citation omitted).

2.

Appellants argue that the district court was incorrect

to hold that the forced labor statute reaches “the domestic

labor of a family member obtained by another member of

11a

Appendix A

the family.” Appellants’ Opening Br. at 20. In their view,

the evidence was “of family domestic violence and abuse,

a matter of traditional state law concern,” and does not

fall within the ambit of § 1589. Id.

To determine the reach of a statute, we begin “with the

plain language of the statute because when the statute’s

language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least

where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—

is to enforce it according to its terms.” Lynch v. Jackson,

853 F.3d 116, 121 (4th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). “Only when

statutory text is ambiguous do we consider other indicia

of congressional intent such as the legislative history.”

Snyder’s-Lance, Inc. v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 991 F.3d

512, 516 (4th Cir. 2021) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). In interpreting the plain language of

the statute, we look to “the specific context in which the

language is used, and the broader context of the statute

as a whole.” Hurlburt v. Black, 925 F.3d 154, 158 (4th Cir.

2019).

The applicable version of the forced labor statute,

provides the following:

Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the

labor or services of a person by . . .

(1) threats of serious harm to, or physical

restraint against, that person or another

person;

12a

Appendix A

(2) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern

intended to cause the person to believe that,

if the person did not perform such labor or

services, that person or another person would

suffer serious harm or physical restraint; or

(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse

of law or the legal process, shall be fined under

the title or imprisoned not more than 20 years,

or both.

18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2000). The challenge here relates to the

first clause: “Whoever . . . obtains the labor or services of

a person.” In Appellants’ view, they are not “whoever” and

M.B. is not “a person” within the meaning of the statute

because there is a marital familial relationship between

them, such that their conduct should be excused as far as

federal law is concerned.

But the statutory language is broad. It makes no

exceptions for family relationships as Appellants suggest.

Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc., 951 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th

Cir. 2020) (explaining that the terms “[w]hoever” and

“person” are broad and “evince[] no intent on the part

of Congress to restrict the application of the statute to

particular actors or particular victims”). And there can be

no dispute that the work M.B. was required to perform in

this household was “labor or services.” “Labor” is defined

as the “expenditure of physical or mental effort especially

when fatiguing, difficult, or compulsory,” and “service” is

defined as “the performance of work commanded or paid

for by another.” United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 44

13a

Appendix A

n.10 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Labor, Merriam Webster’s

Third New International Dictionary Unabridged (2002)).

Attempting to avoid the obvious conclusion that the

plain language of the statute applies here, Appellants

urge us to consider that the forced labor statute is part

of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”), and

its legislative purpose was to “implement the Thirteenth

Amendment against slavery or involuntary servitude.”

Muchira v. Al-Rawaf, 850 F.3d 605, 617 (4th Cir. 2017).

In Appellants’ view, a statute meant to combat human

trafficking and involuntary servitude does not “suggest[]

Congress intended to reach” the circumstances present

in this case. Appellants further argue that the only crime

here was domestic abuse, which is a matter of state law.

In support of their arguments, Appellants point to

a Sixth Circuit case, United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d

623 (6th Cir. 2014). Toviave involved a defendant who

had brought four young relatives from Togo to live with

him in Michigan. Toviave had strict rules and made the

children perform chores such as cooking, cleaning, and

doing laundry, and he occasionally made them babysit

the children of his girlfriend and relatives. Toviave was

also abusive to the children and would beat them “if they

misbehaved or failed to follow one of [his] many rules.”

Toviave, 761 F.3d at 624. Toviave was convicted of forced

labor, but the Sixth Circuit vacated the conviction in a

narrow opinion that focused specifically on the facts of

that case.

The Sixth Circuit explained that “[a]n American

parent has always had the right to make his child perform

14a

Appendix A

household chores. That right is codified in Michigan.”

Toviave, 761 F.3d at 625. And that right applies equally to

one “standing in loco parentis.” Id. Thus, while the court

recognized that “the duties assigned by Toviave are ‘labor’

in the economic sense of the word” because “one could, and

people often do, pay employees to perform these types of

domestic tasks,” it held that they were not forced labor

under the statute because a parent has a separate right to

require those type of household chores. Id. at 625–26. And

the court held that the child abuse could not be punished

federally absent any cognizable forced labor because that

would be “federalization of state law.” Id. at 627.

Importantly, however, the Sixth Circuit made clear

that “[t]he forced labor statute contains no exception

for parents or other close relatives,” and one “is not

immunized by that status.” Toviave, 761 F.3d at 626. But

on the facts of that case, the court held narrowly that

there was no cognizable forced labor because Toviave had

a legal parental right in Michigan to require the children

to perform chores. The addition of child abuse, which was

not specifically tied only to enforcement of the chores, did

not take away that right or transform child abuse into a

federal crime.

Appellants attempt to bootstrap Toviave and extend

its holding such that any case involving family members

and forced domestic work is not a federal crime. But that

is not only incorrect, it is absurd. To state what should

be obvious – women are not children. Appellants had no

parental role over M.B., nor did they have any legal right

to force her to do work against her will. And because she

15a

Appendix A

was forced to perform labor through the prohibited means

of force, coercion, physical restraint, and serious harm or

threats of serious harm, Appellants are guilty of violating

the statute.

3.

In a final attempt to challenge the applicability of

§ 1589, Appellants argue for the first time on appeal that

the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied because

it “fails to provide notice that a family member would

violate it by forcing another family member to perform

domestic chores.” Appellants’ Opening Br. at 23.

Because Appellants failed to make this argument

below, we review it only for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim.

P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights may

be considered even though it was not brought to the court’s

attention.”). To survive plain error review, Appellants

must demonstrate (1) an error (2) that is plain, “that is to

say, clear or obvious.” Molina-Martinez v. United States,

578 U.S. 189, 194, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 194 L. Ed. 2d 444 (2016)

(citation omitted). And (3) the error must have affected

Appellants’ substantial rights, “which in the ordinary case

means [they] must show a reasonable probability that,

but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would

have been different.” Id. (citation and quotation marks

omitted). Even then, we should only exercise our discretion

to recognize and correct the error if it seriously affects

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings. Id.

16a

Appendix A

“A statute is unconstitutionally vague . . . if it ‘fails

to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of

what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes

or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.’”

Martin v. Lloyd, 700 F.3d 132, 135 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting

United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304, 128 S. Ct.

1830, 170 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2008)). “One to whose conduct a

statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it

for vagueness.” Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756, 94 S.

Ct. 2547, 41 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1974).

Other than pointing out that the statute does not

define labor or services, Appellants do not explain how

the statute fails to put a person of ordinary intelligence

on notice of the proscribed conduct. But, because the

statute does not define “labor” or “services,” the district

court defined them, as we do, by their ordinary, dictionary

definitions. Appellants’ argument that the statute “fails

to provide notice that a family member would violate it

by forcing another family member to perform domestic

chores” defies common sense. Appellants’ Opening Br. at

23. The notice provided is straightforward – the statute

applies to “whoever” violates its terms and there are no

exceptions for family members. Period. And, as we have

explained, Appellants’ conduct is clearly proscribed by

the statute. Thus, they may not successfully challenge it

for vagueness.

Having concluded that § 1589 applies to the relationship

and conduct at issue here, we next consider Appellants’

arguments that various errors at trial require vacatur of

the convictions.

17a

Appendix A

B.

The first trial error Appellants allege is that the

Government improperly used its peremptory strikes

during jury selection on the basis of race, in violation of

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L.

Ed. 2d 69 (1986).

At the beginning of jury selection, the venire included

13 black jurors. Of those, six were struck for cause. When

the court turned to peremptory strikes, jury selection

proceeded in three stages. First, eight jurors were

selected from an initial panel. Next, four jurors were

selected from a second panel. This completed the twelve

member jury. Finally, four alternate jurors were selected

from a third panel.

The Government exercised a total of six peremptory

challenges for non-alternates – three on black prospective

jurors and three on white prospective jurors. Of the first

panel, the Government struck two black prospective jurors

who were under 30, unmarried, and childless, Jurors 9

and 26. The Government did not strike the third black

juror in the first panel, a 42 year old black female who was

married with three children. But that juror was struck by

Appellants, so she did not serve on the jury.

The second round of peremptory strikes for the nonalternate jury included a panel of four prospective jurors,

two of whom were black. The Government struck one of

those, Juror 42, who was also under 30, unmarried, and

18a

Appendix A

childless. 3 It did not strike Juror 49, a 31 year old black

female who was unmarried but had two children. When

the Government struck Juror 42, Appellants objected and

argued that the Government had improperly exercised its

peremptory strikes on the basis of race. The Government

explained that it had used its strikes to strike every

prospective juror who was very young, unmarried, and

childless, because it believed those characteristics would

make it difficult for those potential jurors to understand

why M.B. would stay at Appellants’ home. After hearing

this explanation, the court denied Appellants’ challenge

and continued on with jury selection. But, just a few

moments later, the Government accepted Juror 38 as a

member of the jury. Juror 38 was a white male who was

34 years old, unmarried, and childless. The court asked

how the Government distinguished that juror, who was

also young, unmarried, and childless, from Juror 42.

The Government responded, “Because, Your Honor, at

this point in time we have one strike left, and there are

jurors left on the panel and we want to reserve that.” J.A.

299. The Court responded, “All right. Okay. Playing with

fire.” Id.

The final round of peremptory strikes was for

alternate jurors, and each side had two strikes remaining.

The record does not reflect which party struck which juror,

but the record demonstrates that the parties collectively

struck four white males of varying ages and family status.

3. Although Appellants initially claimed in their opening brief

that Juror 42 was 31 years old, the record demonstrates that Juror

42 was born in 1993 and thus must have been under the age of 30 at

the time of jury selection.

19a

Appendix A

One of those males was the only other potential juror who

was under 30, unmarried, and childless.

At the conclusion of jury selection, one black juror,

Juror 49, a 31 year old female with two children, was

seated as a member of the jury. The two remaining black

jurors were seated as alternates. Sometime during the

trial, Juror 49 was excused from the jury with the consent

of both parties due to childcare issues and economic

hardship attributed to her service on the jury. Appellants

reminded the court of their earlier Batson challenge and

asked that one of the black alternate jurors be permitted

to deliberate in place of Juror 49, rather than the white

alternate who was first on the list. The district court

denied the motion, stating that it “may not have done

[jury selection] the way [the Government] did it myself,

but that doesn’t mean it is improper.” J.A. 1654. No black

jurors deliberated.

1.

Pursuant to Batson, prosecutors “may not discriminate

on the basis of race when exercising peremptory

challenges.” Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284, 287,

139 S. Ct. 2228, 204 L. Ed. 2d 638 (2019) (citing Batson,

479 U.S. at 79). A Batson challenge requires a threestep inquiry. First, the defendant makes “a prima facie

showing that a peremptory challenge was based on

racial considerations.” United States v. Dennis, 19 F.4th

656, 662 (4th Cir. 2021). Second, the burden shifts “to

the prosecution to offer a racially neutral reason for the

strike; [and] finally, the trial court determines whether a

20a

Appendix A

defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.” Id. “If a

prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist

applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack

[panelist] who is permitted to serve, that is evidence

tending to prove purposeful discrimination.” Miller-El

v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 162 L. Ed.

2d 196 (2005).

“On appeal, we sustain the trial court’s ruling unless

clearly erroneous.” Dennis, 19 F.4th at 662 (citing Snyder

v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 170 L.

Ed. 2d 175 (2008)). This is because a “trial court has a

pivotal role in evaluating Batson claims. Step three of the

Batson inquiry involves an evaluation of the prosecutor’s

credibility, and the best evidence of discriminatory intent

often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises

the challenge.” Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 (cleaned up).

A finding is “clearly erroneous” when “the reviewing

court . . . is left with the definite and firm conviction that

a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City of

Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 84 L. Ed.

2d 518 (1984) (citation omitted). But “[w]here there are two

permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice

between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Id. at 574.

2.

On appeal, Appellants argue that the district court

erred in denying their Batson challenge. Appellants

specifically take issue with the Government’s decision to

strike Juror 42, a black male who was under 30, unmarried,

21a

Appendix A

and childless, and its decision not to strike Juror 38, a

white male who was 34 years old, unmarried, and childless.

Appellants argue these decisions are inconsistent with the

Government’s proffered race neutral reasoning at trial;

namely, that it was striking jurors who were “very young,”

unmarried, and childless. J.A. 297. The Government

argues now that it was more specifically striking jurors

who were under the age of 30, unmarried, and childless.

But Appellants argue that is an impermissible post hoc

rationalization.

To be sure, the Government did not inform the district

court that it was defining “very young” as jurors under 30

years of age. Nevertheless, the district court evaluated

the Government’s explanation and the credibility of

the prosecutors. And while the court noted that it may

have disagreed with the trial strategy, the district

court found no Batson error. In fact, the district court

explicitly rejected Appellants’ Batson challenge at least

two separate times during the trial. We may not undo

that finding unless we are “left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson,

470 U.S. at 573. Upon review of the record, we are not left

with any such conviction.

While we take Appellants’ point that the Government

was not so precise in its explanation at trial, the record

bears out the truthfulness of its assertion that it struck

potential jurors who were “very young,” unmarried, and

childless, and that its definition of “very young” was jurors

under 30. At the conclusion of jury selection, there was not

22a

Appendix A

a single member of the panel who met all three criteria

the Government identified. Thus, we do not conclude that

the district court’s ruling was clearly erroneous.

C.

Appellants next argue that the district court erred

by admitting evidence of Appellants’ abuse of M.B. that

occurred after M.B. had admittedly stopped performing

labor and after the indictment alleged the conspiracy

ended in 2014.

Appellants moved in limine to exclude the evidence,

arguing that it was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. The

Government argued that the evidence was admissible as

intrinsic to the crime charged because it was necessary

to complete the story. And it argued alternatively that,

if the evidence was extrinsic, it was admissible pursuant

to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show Appellants’

knowledge of their crime, demonstrate consciousness of

guilt, and explain why M.B. stayed in the home even after

the forced labor ended. The Government also averred that

the probative value was not significantly outweighed by

the risk of unfair prejudice.

The district court found the evidence admissible as

intrinsic evidence and denied Appellants’ motion in limine

to exclude it.

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Appendix A

1.

We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.4

United States v. Freitekh, 114 F.4th 292, 315 (4th Cir. 2024).

“In so doing, we will identify an abuse of discretion if the

court’s decision was guided by erroneous legal principles

or rests upon a clearly erroneous factual finding.” United

States v. Bush, 944 F.3d 189, 195 (4th Cir. 2019) (cleaned

up). But, even a finding of error “does not end our inquiry.”

United States v. Brizuela, 962 F.3d 784, 798 (4th Cir. 2020).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a),

even if the district court erred in admitting evidence, “we

will not vacate the conviction if the error was harmless.”

Brizuela, 962 F.3d at 798. “An error is harmless if we can

say with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened

without stripping the erroneous action from the whole,

that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the

error.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

4. The Government argues that we should review this issue only

for plain error because Appellants failed to object to the evidence

when it was admitted during the trial. We disagree. “As a general

rule, motions in limine may serve to preserve issues that they raise

without any need for renewed objections at trial, just so long as the

movant has clearly identified the ruling sought and the trial court

has ruled upon it.” United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1321, 1325

(4th Cir. 1996). Appellants moved in limine to exclude this evidence,

and the district court explained that it was “denying the [relevant

portion of] the motion in limine.” J.A. 152. When Appellants sought

clarification about the specific testimony at issue here, the district

court made clear that “[n]one of it is excluded at this point.” Id. at

153. Thus, the motion in limine was sufficient to preserve this issue

for appeal.

24a

Appendix A

When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion

pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, “[w]e apply

a ‘highly deferential’ standard of review . . . and a trial

court’s “decision to admit evidence over a Rule 403

objection will not be overturned except under the most

extraordinary circumstances, where that discretion has

been plainly abused.” United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d

104, 132 (4th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up).

2.

“Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) prohibits evidence

of a crime, wrong, or other act from being used to prove

a person’s character in order to show that on a particular

occasion the person acted in accordance with the

character.” United States v. Webb, 965 F.3d 262, 266 (4th

Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). But Rule 404(b) is inapplicable

to “evidence that is intrinsic to the alleged crime.” Id.

(citation omitted) Uncharged conduct is intrinsic when

it “arose out of the same series of transactions as the

charged offense, or is necessary to complete the story of

the crime on trial.” Brizuela, 962 F.3d at 793–94 (cleaned

up) (quoting United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 886

(4th Cir. 1994)). Put differently, evidence is intrinsic when

it “is inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding

the charged offense [because] it forms an integral and

natural part of the witness’s accounts of the circumstances

surrounding the offenses for which the defendant was

indicted, or serves to complete the story of the crime

on trial.” United States v. Hoover, 95 F.4th 763, 770 (4th

Cir. 2024) (alteration in original) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).

25a

Appendix A

For evidence of uncharged conduct to be admissible to

complete the story of a charged offense, “the evidence must

be probative of an integral component of the crime on trial

or provide information without which the factfinder would

have an incomplete or inaccurate view of other evidence

or of the story of the crime itself.” Brizuela, 962 F.3d at

795. It must also be “necessary” to complete the story,

meaning there must be a “clear link or nexus between

the evidence and the story of the charged offense,” and

“the purpose for which the evidence is offered is actually

essential. Otherwise, the ‘complete the story’ doctrine

might be used to disguise the type of propensity evidence

that Rule 404(b) is meant to exclude.” Id.

On appeal, Appellants challenge all of the evidence of

their continued abuse of M.B. after she stopped performing

household labor. This includes evidence about Appellants

forcing M.B. to live in the laundry room and then the

garage annex, depriving her of food and money, cutting off

her relationship with her children, and evidence regarding

Appellants’ continued physical and psychological abuse.

We have little trouble concluding that what happened

between the end of M.B.’s forced labor and her finally

being freed from Appellants’ grasp “is inextricably

intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged

offense [because] it forms an integral and natural part of

the witness’s accounts of the circumstances surrounding

the offenses for which the defendant was indicted.” Hoover,

95 F.4th at 770. The evidence Appellants challenge comes

from M.B.’s own testimony about the crimes Appellants

perpetrated against her. It is a natural part of her account

26a

Appendix A

to tell the jury what happened from the beginning to the

end. Without this evidence, the jury could not have had

a complete picture, and the jurors would have been left

to wonder how they were hearing a case in 2020 over

crimes that occurred from 2002 to roughly 2010. The

challenged evidence completes the picture that what

happened here was not simply a daughter-in-law helping

out with household chores as Appellants would have the

jury believe, but, rather, involuntary servitude.

Because the district court’s decision was not “guided

by erroneous legal principles” and did not “rest[] upon a

clearly erroneous factual finding,” we conclude that it did

not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. Bush,

944 F.3d at 195 (citation omitted).

3.

Even still, Appellants argue the evidence of their

continued abuse should have been excluded as unduly

prejudicial pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Rule

403 is a rule of inclusion that allows courts to “exclude

relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:

unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the

jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting

cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.

Of course, “all evidence suggesting guilt is prejudicial

to a defendant.” United States v. Siegel, 536 F.3d 306, 319

(4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “That kind of general

prejudice, however, is not enough to warrant exclusion

27a

Appendix A

of otherwise relevant, admissible evidence.” Id. Rather,

to warrant exclusion, the prejudice must be unfair, and

“even then . . . the unfair prejudice [must] substantially

outweigh[] the probative value of the evidence.” Id.

(emphasis in original). “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial

and thus should be excluded under Rule 403 when there is

a genuine risk that the emotions of a jury will be excited

to irrational behavior, and this risk is disproportionate to

the probative value of the offered evidence.” United States

v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724, 730 (4th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up).

Where the evidence is substantially similar, or at least no

more sensational, than the crimes charged, there is no

unfair prejudice. See Siegel, 536 F.3d at 319–20; see also

United States v. Boyd, 53 F.3d 631, 637 (4th Cir. 1995).

Here, too, we readily conclude that the evidence

was not unfairly prejudicial. The evidence of Appellants’

continued abuse of M.B. was no more sensational than the

evidence related to their years-long conspiracy to obtain

her forced labor. And, in any event, we can say “with fair

assurance, after pondering all that happened without

stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the

judgment was not substantially swayed by” the admission

of this evidence. Brizuela, 962 F.3d at 798 (citation

omitted). As discussed above, the Government presented

sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Appellants forced

M.B. to labor in their home using threats of violence or a

scheme or plan intended to make her believe she or her

children would be hurt, or that she would be deported,

if she did not comply. And, notably, Appellants do not

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in this appeal

beyond arguing that the statute simply does not apply.

Therefore, any error on the district court’s part was

harmless.

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Appendix A

D.

Finally, Appellants argue that they are entitled to a

new trial because the district court improperly rejected

their proposed jury instruction as to the applicable mens

rea.

1.

“We review the district court’s decision to give or

refuse to give a jury instruction for abuse of discretion.”

United States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321, 366 (4th Cir.

2010) (citation omitted). Where a district court declines

to provide a proposed jury instruction, we will find

reversable error “only when the instruction (1) was

correct; (2) was not substantially covered by the court’s

charge to the jury; and (3) dealt with some point in the

trial so important, that failure to give the requested

instruction seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to

conduct his defense.” Id. (citation omitted). “[W]e do not

view a single instruction in isolation; rather we consider

whether taken as a whole and in the context of the entire

charge, the instructions accurately and fairly state the

controlling law.” Id. (citation omitted).

“[A]n error in instructing the jury harmless if it is

‘clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would

have found the defendant guilty absent the error.’” United

States v. Ramos-Cruz, 667 F.3d 487, 496 (4th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18, 119 S. Ct.

1827, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1999)).

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Appendix A

2.

The applicable version of 18 U.S.C. § 1589 prohibits

“knowingly provid[ing] or obtain[ing] the labor or

services of a person” by (1) “threats of serious harm to, or

physical restraint against, that person or another person”;

(2) “means of any scheme, plan or pattern intended to

cause the person to believe that, if the person did not

perform such labor or services, that person or another

person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint”;

or (3) “means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or

the legal process.”

During the charge conference, the parties each

proposed jury instructions related to the meaning of

“threats.” The Government proposed that the district

court explain that “a threat can be verbal or non verbal”

to clarify that the first prohibited means of obtaining labor

was not limited to verbal threats. J.A. 1555. Appellants

disagreed and proposed an instruction that “a ‘threat’ is a

serious statement expressing an intention to inflict harm”

and “the defendant(s) must have made the statement

intending it to be a threat, or with the knowledge that the

statement would be viewed as a threat.” J.A. 186.

The district court declined to give Appellants’

proposed instruction. Instead, it concluded that a threat

can be verbal or nonverbal, and so instructed the jury.

The court also did not include Appellants’ requested

instruction that they must have intended any statements

to be threats. But the court did instruct the jury that it

must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants

30a

Appendix A

(1) provided or obtained M.B.’s labor or services; (2) did so

by any one or combination of statutorily prohibited means;

and (3) acted knowingly. The court further instructed the

jury regarding the meaning of the terms “threat” and

“knowingly.” As to “threat,” the court explained,

A “threat” can be verbal or non-verbal. A

verbal threat is a serious statement expressing

an intention to inflict harm, at once or in the

future, as distinguished from idle or careless

talk, exaggeration, or something said in a joking

manner. For a statement to be a threat, the

statement must have been made under such

circumstances that a reasonable person who

heard or read the statement would understand

it as a serious expression of an intent to cause

harm.

J.A. 1690. And as to “knowingly”:

The term “know ingly,” as used in these

instructions to describe the alleged state of

mind of the defendant, means that he or she

was conscious and aware of his or her action,

realized what he or she was doing or what was

happening around him or her, and did not act

because of ignorance, mistake, or accident.

The intent of a person or the knowledge that

a person possesses at any given time may not

ordinarily be proven directly because there is

no way of directly scrutinizing the workings of

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Appendix A

the human mind. In determining what a person

knew or what a person intended at a particular

time, you may consider any statements made

or acts done by that person and all other facts

and circumstances received in evidence that

may aid in your determination of that person’s

knowledge or intent.

You may infer, but you are certainly not required

to infer, that a person intends the natural and

probable consequences of acts knowingly done

or knowingly omitted. It is entirely up to you,

however, to decide what facts to find from the

evidence received during the trial.

J.A. 1694.

3.

According to Appellants, the district court erred when

it declined to give their requested jury instruction that,

in order to convict, the jury had to find that Appellants

subjectively intended to threaten M.B. In support of their

argument, Appellants rely on Counterman v. Colorado,

600 U.S. 66, 143 S. Ct. 2106, 216 L. Ed. 2d 775 (2023).

In that case, the Supreme Court considered whether

the First Amendment requires proof, in a “true threat”

criminal case, of a defendant’s subjective intent to

threaten the victim. Importantly, per Counterman, a

“true threat” of violence is an “unprotected category

of communications” because true threats are “serious

32a

Appendix A

expressions conveying that a speaker means to commit

an act of unlawful violence.” Counterman, 600 U.S. at 74

(cleaned up). In other words, those charged in true threat

cases are prosecuted solely for their words. To address

the concern about a chilling effect on speech, the Court

determined that the First Amendment requires some

subjective mental state in true threat cases, but that “a

mental state of recklessness is sufficient.” Id. at 69. That

is, the Government need only prove that the defendant

“is aware that others could regard his statements as

threatening violence and delivers them anyway.” Id. at

79 (cleaned up).

In Appellants’ view, the district court’s instructions

were insufficient to inform the jury that Appellants must

have at least acted with reckless disregard for the fact

that their statements could be taken as threats. The

Government argues that Counterman is inapplicable

because this is not a true threat case, that the district

court’s instruction was correct even applying Counterman,

and that any error was harmless.

We disagree with the Government that Counterman

is inapplicable here. One theory of criminal liability the

Government pursued against Appellants was that they

forced M.B. to perform labor in their home by threatening

her with violence if she failed to comply. As in Counterman,

this case presents the question of whether Appellants’

statements could be considered criminal w ithout

running afoul of the free speech protections of the First

Amendment. See In re Rendelman, 129 F.4th 248, 252–54

(4th Cir. 2025). Counterman instructs that the answer

33a

Appendix A

to this question lies in whether Appellants possessed the

requisite mens rea, or state of mind, when they made the

threats. 600 U.S. at 72. The Government was required

to establish that Appellants were aware M.B. could have

regarded their statements as threatening violence. See id.

at 78–80. Appellants’ proposed jury instruction on threats

would have required the jury make such a finding. See J.A.

186 (requiring the jury to find that “the defendant(s) must

have made the statement intending it to be a threat, or

with the knowledge that the statement would be viewed

as a threat”). This proffered jury instruction correctly

reflects the mandate of Counterman, but the district court

declined to give the instruction.

Further, Appellants’ proposed instruction on

“threats” was not “substantially covered” by instructions

provided to the jury. See United States v. Spirito, 36 F.4th

191, 209 (4th Cir. 2022). Although the district court’s

instruction on forced labor required the jury to find that

the defendants acted “knowingly,” J.A. 186, the district

court’s instructions made no mention of Appellants’ state

of mind at the time they threatened M.B. Therefore, the

district court erred.

Nonetheless, the district court’s error was harmless

because the Government offered sufficient evidence

for the jury to convict based on the second prohibited

means: “any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause

the person to believe that, if the person did not perform

such labor or services, that person or another person

would suffer serious harm or physical restraint.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 1589 (2000). That portion of the statute independently

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Appendix A

requires that Appellants intended to cause M.B. to believe

she would be harmed, and it criminalizes only conduct.

Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Government, we conclude that the Government presented

sufficient evidence that Appellants created a climate of

fear and violence through repeated physical abuse and

threats of deportation when they were dissatisfied with

M.B.’s work or with her attitude, and that was a scheme,

plan, or pattern intended to make M.B. believe she would

be deported and/or separated from her children if she did

not continue making Appellants happy by completing the

assigned labor.

III.

Because we conclude that 18 U.S.C. § 1589 applies

here, and that the district court did not otherwise err at

trial, Appellants’ convictions are

AFFIRMED.

35a

Appendix A

BERNER, Circuit Judge, with whom Judge THACKER

joins, concurring:

Today we affirm that the domestic labor to which

Appellants subjected M.B. for years is properly considered

“forced labor” within the scope of the federal forced labor

statute. Our holding that the proper scope of the forced

labor statute includes domestic labor aligns fully with the

purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment, the promise of

which the forced labor statute was enacted to implement.

The Thirteenth Amendment provides that “[n]either

slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment

for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,

shall exist within the United States, or any place subject

to their jurisdiction.” U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1. One of

the primary purposes of the Amendment was to “abolish

the institution of African slavery as it had existed in the

United States at the time of the Civil War.” United States

v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942, 108 S. Ct. 2751, 101 L. Ed.

2d 788 (1988). The Thirteenth Amendment’s invocation of

“the term ‘involuntary servitude’ was intended to cover

those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery.”

Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332, 36 S. Ct. 258, 60 L.

Ed. 672 (1916).

The Thirteenth Amendment further authorizes

Congress to “pass all laws necessary and proper for

abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the

United States.” Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.

36a

Appendix A

409, 439, 88 S. Ct. 2186, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1189 (1968) (emphasis

and citation omitted). Congress enacted the Trafficking

Victim Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), which includes the

federal forced labor statute, pursuant to this authority.

See Muchira v. Al-Rawaf, 850 F.3d 605, 617 (4th Cir. 2017)

(describing congressional authority to “implement the

Thirteenth Amendment against slavery or involuntary

servitude” in passing the forced labor statute (quoting

United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 629 (6th Cir. 2014)).

The TVPA aimed to “combat trafficking in persons, a

contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are

predominantly women and children, to ensure just and

effective punishment of traffickers, and to protect their

victims.” TVPA, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102(a) (codified

at 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a)). It “address[es] the increasingly

subtle methods of traffickers who place their victims into

modern-day slavery.” H.R. Rep. No. 106-939, at 101 (2000)

(Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added). In passing the TVPA,

Congress specifically sought to empower prosecutors “to

bring more cases in which individuals have been trafficked

into domestic service.” Id. (emphasis added).

The Thirteenth Amendment promised to end the

subjugation of enslaved Black people. Enslavers forced

enslaved Black people to engage in physical labor against

their will and to toil in brutal conditions in fields. In

addition to labor outdoors, enslavers compelled Black

people, predominantly women, to endure “hard, steady,

often strenuous labor as [they] juggled the demands made

by [enslavers] and other members of the [enslavers’]

37a

Appendix A

family.” See Jacqueline Jones, Labor of Love, Labor of

Sorrow: Black Women, Work, and the Family from

Slavery to the Present 22–23, 27 (1985). Black women

were required to be constantly on call, to carry wood

and water, cook meals, clean, iron, and sew clothes, while

caring for enslavers’ children, livestock, gardens, and

yards. Id. at 23, 27; Jane E. Dabel, Domestic Workers,

Oxford African American Studies Ctr. 1 (May 19, 2005);

John W. Blassingame, The Slave Community: Plantation

Life in the Antebellum South 251 (rev. ed. 1979). Forced

domestic labor “rivaled cotton picking as back-breaking

labor.” Jones at 27. Enslavers tortured Black women with

harsh punishments, including physical attacks, while

they labored indoors. Id. at 25–26; Blassingame at 251.

Enslavers forced Black women to work during pregnancy

up until giving birth and soon thereafter, with some even

giving birth in the fields between rows of cotton. Jones

at 19.

Appellants maintain that the labor M.B. was forced to

perform falls outside of the scope of the forced labor statute

because it was domestic in nature. Such an interpretation

would undermine the very purpose of the law. The history

of forced labor as it pertains to enslaved Black women

makes clear that the reach of the TVPA extends to forced

work beyond that which takes place outdoors or outside

of family homes. Just as the Thirteenth Amendment was

intended to prohibit all “forms of compulsory labor akin

to African slavery,” Butler, 240 U.S. at 332; see also Jones,

392 U.S. at 421–23, there can be no doubt that the forced

38a

Appendix A

labor statute criminalizes labor compelled by private

actors inside of private homes. The prohibition against

forced labor is neither limited to non-familial relationships

nor restricted in venue to the public sphere.

Forced labor is no less forced once it passes the

threshold of the home. The Thirteenth Amendment was

enacted to abolish the institution of slavery and to prohibit

compulsory labor akin to slavery. The forced labor statute

was enacted to make real this promise.

39a

Appendix

B

APPENDIX B — OPINION

OF THE

UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT

OF VIRGINIA, RICHMOND DIVISION,

FILED AUGUST 16, 2022

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA,

RICHMOND DIVISION

Criminal Action No. 3:19-cr-85

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ZAHIDA AMAN, et al.,

Defendants.

Filed August 16, 2022

OPINION

On May 13, 2022, after a two-week trial, a jury

convicted Zahida Aman of conspiracy, forced labor, and

document servitude; Mohammad Nauman Chaudhri

of conspiracy; and Mohammed Rehan Chaudhri of

conspiracy and forced labor. These convictions arise from

a three-count superseding indictment, which charged

the defendants—Aman and two of her sons, Nauman

Chaudhri and Rehan Chaudhri—with conspiring to

obtain and maintain the unpaid labor and services of M.B.

between March 2002 and August 2014, forced labor, and

document servitude.

40a

Appendix B

All three defendants now move for a judgment of

acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

29. (ECF Nos. 245, 246, 248.) The defendants argue that

(1) the forced labor statute—the Trafficking Victims

Protection Act—does not apply to a domestic relations

case such as this one and therefore any convictions for

forced labor or conspiring to force labor cannot stand; and

(2) sufficient evidence does not support their convictions.

ban and Nauman Chaudhri also move for a new trial

pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33,

arguing that M.B.’s trial testimony was incredible and

repeatedly impeached. (ECF Nos. 245, 248.)

The government asks the Court to deny the defendants’

motions because it properly prosecuted the defendants

under the forced labor statute; sufficient evidence supports

the convictions returned by the jury; and M.B. offered

credible testimony. The Court agrees that the forced labor

statute reaches the defendants’ conduct; that sufficient

evidence supports the defendants’ convictions; and that

M.B. testified credibly such that allowing the defendants’

convictions to stand does not result in manifest injustice.

The Court will, therefore, deny the defendants’ motions.

I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 7, 2019, a grand jury returned a threecount superseding indictment, charging the defendants

with conspiracy (Count One), forced labor (Count Two),

and document servitude (Count Three). (ECF No. 38.)

The government accused the defendants of conspiring

to obtain and maintain the unpaid labor and services of

41a

Appendix B

M.B. between March 2002 and August 2014. During this

time, M.B. was married to M.S. C., another son of Aman.

The government contended that in order to force M.B. to

do work for them at their home, the defendants physically

abused M.B. and her children and used threats related to

M.B.’s immigration papers.

After numerous delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic

and attorney conflict of interest, the defendants’ trial

commenced in May 2022 and lasted two weeks. A jury

found Aman guilty of Counts One through Three; Nauman

Chaudhri guilty of Co lint One and not guilty on Counts

Two and Three; and Rehan Chaudhri guilty of Counts One

and Two and not guilty on Count Three. (ECF No. 225.)

II. EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL1

In 2001, M.B.’s mother and Aman arranged for M.B. to

marry M.S.C., one of Aman’s sons. (Tr. 402, 405.) By 2001,

M.B. had reached an age where she, as a Pakistani woman,

felt pressure to marry. (Tr. 405.) M.B. also felt pressure

to make the marriage work because this arrangement

was the first major decision M.B.’s mother had made since

becoming a widow. (Tr. 402–03,410–11.)

In January 2002 in Pakistan, M.B. married M.S.C.

under Islamic law. (Tr. 412.) Contrary to common practice

in Pakistan, M.B. met M.S.C. for the first time on their

1. The Court construes this evidence in the light most

favorable to the government pursuant to the standard by which

a court reviews a Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal. See

infra Section III.A.1.

42a

Appendix B

wedding day. (Tr. 408–09.) During their first night

together as husband and wife, M.S.C. told M.B. that “if

his family, especially his mom, Zahida Aman, is happy

with [her], He’s going to put [her] on a pedestal and [their]

relationship w[ould] be good.” (Tr. 425.)

The day after the wedding, Aman and other members

of the Chaudhri family took M.B. to the embassy in

Pakistan for a marriage visa. (Tr. 416–17.) After receiving

the visa, M.B. boarded a plane for the first time ever and

flew to Washington, D.C., with M.S.C. (Tr. 426–27.) Rehan

Chaudhri and Nauman Chaudhri met M.B. and M.S.C. at

the airport in Washington and drove them to the family

home in Midlothian, Virginia, where M.B. and M.S.C.

would live. (Tr. 427–28.) The defendants (and Aman’s

elderly husband, S.C.) also lived at the same home.

The day after arriving, Aman sat M.B. down and told

her, “[Y]ou are the daughter-in-law of a retired general

colonel and the wife of a doctor here in the United States,

so you need to put your standards up. And if you want to

be happy in your married life, the way to your husband’s

heart is through me. . . . And if you want him happy, you

have to make me happy.” 2 (Tr. 429.) Shortly thereafter,

Aman began to regularly instruct M.B. to perform work

in the house. (Tr. 429–30.)

During the early years of M.B.’s time at the Chaudhri

house, her work included “clean[ing] the living room,

2. Aman’s husband served as a general colonel in Pakistan.

M.S.C. is a physician.

43a

Appendix B

the kitchen, the laundry room and the downstairs half

bathroom before [any other members of the family came]

downstairs” each morning, cleaning the deck if Aman

wanted to take her tea or breakfast outside, sometimes

preparing breakfast for the Chaudhri family, prepping for

lunch and dinner, and cleaning dirty dishes. (Tr. 429–30.)

M.B. “basically clean[ed] all day . . . until [she went] to

bed.” (Tr. 430.) M.B. was initially willing to perform this

work to make the Chaudhri family happy and, hopefully,

win the affection of Aman and in turn, her husband. (Tr.

431.)

M.B. lived at the Chaudhri house from 2002 to 2016

During this time, she had four children, born in 2003,

2004, 2006, and 2008, respectively. (Tr. 468–69.) Her

husband visited there periodically but spent the majority

of his time living elsewhere and working as a doctor—first

in Washington, D.C., then in Philadelphia, and then in

California. (Tr. 448–51.)

When M.B. traveled to the United States, she had

with her jewelry and paperwork, including immigration

documents, education documents, and a passport.

Immediately upon M.B.’s arrival, Aman took her jewelry.

(Tr. 431–32.) As for the paperwork, M.B. testified that

shortly after M.B. came to the Chaudhri house, Aman

asked, for her documents, including her immigration

documents and passport. (Tr. 433.) M.B. refused Aman’s

request. (Id.) Then Aman, S.C., and M.S.C. gathered

in Aman and S.C.’s bedroom and asked M.B. to enter.

(Tr. 433–34.) M.S.C. told M.B., “My father keeps all the

passports, and everything, in the safe. You cannot keep

44a

Appendix B

them. You have to give it to them.” (Tr. 434.) Again, M.B.

tried to refuse, but M.S.C. “enforced that [she] should”

agree, so according to M.B., “she had no choice except to

go and bring [the documents].” (Id.) Aman did not take

from M.B. the $200 or $300 that M.B.’s mother gave her

to take to the United States. (Tr. 426.) Aman did not

know about this money because after Aman denied M.B.

permission to bring the money to the United States, M.B.

hid the money in her bra during the trip. (Id.)

After M.B. handed over the documents, the defendants

placed M.B. under the impression that she remained in the

United States illegally. (Tr. 436.) Shortly after arriving

to the United States, M.B.’s green card came in the

mail, but it spelled her name incorrectly. (Tr. 435–36.)

Because M.B. never saw a corrected green card, as far

as she knew, she remained illegally in the United States.

(Tr. 436.) M.B., therefore, believed the defendants when

they told her she lacked legal immigration status in the

United States. Indeed, throughout the twelve years

that M.B. lived at the Chaudhri house in Midlothian,

the defendants repeatedly told M.B., “We can deport

you. Your paperwork is incomplete.” (Tr. 438.) M.B. also

testified that every time she would retaliate or refuse to

abide by any instructions from the defendants—about

twice a month—the defendants would tell her to “calm

[her]self down because [she could] be deported.” (Tr. 438.)

Each of the defendants made clear to M.B. that upon her

deportation, they would keep her children. (Tr. 439–40.)

M.B. caught a glimpse of her identification just one

time while there—during a trip with the Chaudhri family

45a

Appendix B

to California. (Tr. 496.) M.B. testified that Aman held

her identification during the trip, Aman handed M.B.’s

identification to airport security personnel, and Aman

intervened when airport security personnel attempted to

hand M.B.’s identification to M.B. (Tr. 495.)

The defendants used more than the confiscation of

M.B.’s immigration papers to isolate M.B. Shortly after

M.B. arrived in the United States, Aman took M.B.’s diary,

which contained the contact information for M.B.’s friends

and family. (Tr. 459–61.) Starting during M.B.’s first days

in the United States, Aman would stand by M.B. when

M.B. used the family’s phone. Around 2006, Aman forbade

M.B. from using the phone entirely. (Tr. 459–61, 774.)

Without a cell phone, private access to the family phone,

or a computer, M.B. did not have any means of private

communication with her family in Pakistan. During her

years at the Midlothian house, M.B. lost touch with her

family to such an extent that until her brother reunited

with M.B. in 2015, M.B.’s family did not know if she was

alive or dead. (Tr. 200–01.)

The only money M.B. had during her time with the

defendants was the money that M.B.’s mother encouraged

her to take to the United States in 2003, (Tr. 426, 574),

and money that M.B.’s brother gave to her in 2015, (Tr.

223). M.B. did not have a driver’s license. Indeed, at an

event at a local mosque, Rehan Chaudhri followed M.B.

and forced her to tell one of her children’s teacher’s, who

had just encouraged M.B. to get her driver’s license so she

could make friends, that she had no interest in learning

to drive. (Tr. 464–65.) The defendants also forbade M.B.

46a

Appendix B

from talking to her neighbors. (Tr. 461.) M.B. did manage

to leave the house on her own multiple times—for exercise

and for a long walk to stores, (Tr. 522, 1203)—but without

a car, money, phone, or, to her knowledge, legal status,

M.B. chose to remain there with her children.

Eventually, the defendants even restricted M.B.’s

access to food. (Tr. 508, 556–57.) The defendants kept

locked away the food that remained downstairs, (Tr. 554),

and moved much of the food to Aman’s room upstairs,

which Aman kept locked, (Tr. 5, 56). Aman gave M.B. food

to eat but did not allow her access to the family’s food.

M.B. would eat her meals after the rest of the family had

finished eating. (Tr. 556–57.)

M.B.’s living conditions also worsened through the

years. When M.B. first moved into the house, she shared

a bedroom with M.S.C. (Tr. 553.) After she began having

children, she moved into the children’s room; after the

birth of her fourth child in 2008, she began sleeping on the

floor of the children’s room. (Id.) Several years after the

birth of her fourth child, the defendants moved M.B. into

the laundry room; M.B. slept on a mat on the laundry room

floor. (Tr. 553–54; 558.) The defendants later converted

their garage into a finished annex, which included two

rooms, a kitchenette, and a bathroom. (Tr. 568; Def. Ex.

58-A.) After a couple years of living in the laundry room,

the defendants moved M.B. into this annex, which had a

door that opened onto the back deck and a door connected

to the main house. (Tr. 568–69.) The defendants kept the

door connecting the annex and the main house locked

and gave M.B. one or two weeks of microwavable food at

a time. (Tr. 569.)

47a

Appendix B

The defendants also caused M.B.’s children to fear

their mother by telling them that M.B. was “a crazy

woman” who would “sell them out for money.” (Tr. 519–20.)

The defendants told the children not to go near M.B. or

she would hurt them. (Tr. 519–20.) Nauman Chaudhri

and Aman yelled at M.B.’s youngest child and punished

him for talking to M.B. (Tr. 516–18.) M.B.’s second child,

K.S.C., testified that when the defendants told her these

things about her mother, she believed them; “I didn’t know

my mother. I didn’t know if she was actually crazy. All I

know is what the people I lived with were telling me, and

I believed them.” (Tr. 957.) K.S.C. explained that although

she never saw her mother do anything violent, K.S.C.

“ended up becoming very scared of her [mother], didn’t

want to talk to her, didn’t want to be near her because”

based on what the defendants told K.S.C., “it seemed like

[her mother] was someone capable of hurting [her].” (Id.)

The housework the defendants instructed her to

perform intensified from cooking, cleaning, and laundry.

Although Aman primarily instructed M.B.’s work,

everyone in the home, including Nauman Chaudhri and

Rehan Chaurdhi, instructed M.B. to perform housework

and other tasks like “painting the house” both inside

and outside as far as she could reach from the ground,

“rip[ping] apart carpets,” washing rugs, “clean[ing] cars,”

mowing the grass, moving furniture, trimming trees,

cleaning and staining the deck, and laying a concrete

walkway. (Tr. 496–505.) Although the Chaudhri household

had laundry machines, Aman forbade M.B. from using the

machines and required her to clean the laundry by hand in

the sink. (Tr. 498–99.) After moving M.B. into the laundry

48a

Appendix B

room several years after 2008, the defendants gradually

stopped asking M.B. to perform work.

When M.B. first arrived, she performed the housework

willingly to curry favor with her new in-laws. But in 2002,

the defendants began to verbally abuse M.B., calling her

“whore, good for nothing, bastard, bitch” if M.B. completed

“a chore, or anything in the house . . . not . . . according

to their liking.” (Tr. 441–42.) In 2003, the defendants

began to physically abuse M.B. The first violent episode

occurred after a sleepless night taking care of her oldest

daughter when she was an infant. (Tr. 453–54.) M.B. came

downstairs to start her morning chores later than Aman

had directed. (Tr. 453.) Aman was angry with M.B. and

“cussed [her] out.” (Id.) M.B. apologized for her tardiness

and explained that she would “finish everything that

[Aman had] asked [her to do].” (Id.) This made Aman

more upset, and Aman slapped M.B., leaving a mark on

M.B.’s face with her nail. (Id.) From this incident, M.B.

learned that she “had no say in [her work]. [She] had to

do it.” (Tr. 458.)

M.B. testified that each of the defendants slapped her

“[i]f [she hadn’t] listened to them, if their mom is angry,

. . . if [she] didn’t do a chore right. Like, anything that

could just make them upset with [her] when [she] would

tell them [she would] finish, it or something. Anything.”

(Tr. 456.) The defendants also involved the children in

their abuse of M.B., instructing the children to slap M.B.

(Tr. 513–14; 1086–88.) This physical abuse lasted for the

duration of M.B.’s years at the Chaudhri house. (See, e.g.,

Tr. 458.) Although the defendants regularly abused M.B.,

particular incidents stand out.

49a

Appendix B

A.

Washington, D.C. Incident

M.B. testified that during a trip within a couple years

after 2004, the year M.B.’s second child was born, the

family took a daytrip to Washington, D.C. (Tr. 482–83.)

During this visit, the defendants left M.B. on the side of

the road for misplacing her child’s shoe; after M.B. ran

after the car, which also held her children, the defendants

stopped the car and asked M.B. to get in. (Tr. 483–84.)

B. The Knife Incident

During another incident, Aman’s daughter, B.A.,

and Aman started verbally abusing M.B. “for not doing

a chore” or because “the kids were making noise.’’ (Tr.

506.) B.A., holding a knife, told M.B. that she would cut

her throat if she did not shut up. (Tr. 506.) B.A. then

held a knife to M.B.’s throat in front of Aman and M.B.’s

oldest child. (Tr. 506–07.) M.B.’s oldest child, born in

2003, testified that her “head was just a little bit over the

doorknob” when she witnessed B.A. hold a knife to M.B.’s

throat while Aman accused M.B. of lying. (Tr. 1083–84.)

C.

The Stairs Incident

One day after mowing the lawn—work M.B. stopped

performing several years after 2008—M.B. came into the

house and asked for a glass of water. (Tr. 507–08.) Aman

denied M.B.’s request. M.B. then opened the refrigerator

to find something to eat. Aman told M.B. “to close the

fridge door and start doing the other chores, there were

dishes to be washed and the kitchen to be cleaned.” (Tr.

50a

Appendix B

508.) Aman and M.B. started yelling at each other. M.B.

then grabbed Rehan Chaudhri’s phone and ran upstairs,

hoping to call M.S.C. (Tr. 509.) Rehan Chaudhri ran after

M.B., took his phone back, and kicked M.B. in the stomach.

(Tr. 509.)

Two weeks after this incident, Rehan Chaudhri and

B.A. approached M.B. to “deal[]” with what M.B. had done.

(Tr. 51 0.) B.A. and Rehan Chaudhri, joined by Aman, tied

M.B. up with a rope and dragged and pushed her down

the stairs. (Tr. 511, 966, 1085.)

D.

The Car Incident

After a fight at the house, M.B ran a couple blocks

away. (Tr. 544.) Nauman Chaudhri and Aman drove after

her. (Id.) After spotting M.B. in a bush, Nauman Chaudhri

and Aman tied her up in a scarf, “shoved” and “dragged”

M.B. into the car despite her protesting physically and

verbally, and drove M.B. back to the house. (Tr. 544–45.)

M.B. never tried to run away again. (Tr. 546.)

E. The 2x4 Incident

After the defendants moved M.B. into the laundry

room and before they moved her into the annex, Rehan

Chaudhri hit M.B. multiple times with a 2-inch by 4-inch

piece of wood (“2x4”). (Tr. 559.) M.B. testified that after

she defied Rehan Chaudhri’s instruction to step into the

garage while he watched TV downstairs, Rehan Chaudhri

hit her six times with a 2x4—on the legs, back, and

51a

Appendix B

shoulder3 —then put her in the garage, locking her out of

the house. While in the garage, M.B. she cried and “took

a deep breath.” (Tr. 562.)

From the garage, M.B. saw contractors doing yard

work. She waited for them to come near the door, at

which point she left the garage and asked to borrow the

contractor’s phone. (Tr. 562.) M.B. hoped to call M.S.C.

(Tr. 563.) But Rehan Chaudhri appeared and took the

phone from M.B., returned it to the contractor, and pushed

M.B. back to the garage. (Tr. 563-64.)

Later that same day, M.B. went to the home of the

Chaudhri’s neighbors, Mr. and Ms. Roarty. She asked

Ms. Roarty to borrow her phone. (Tr. 565.) With Ms.

Roarty’s phone, M.B. called M.S. C. and told him about

the incident. (Tr. 566.)

***

A lthough M.B.’s testimony was central to the

government’s case, the government also offered witnesses4

3. In her journal and in her 2017 interview with investigators,

M.B. recounted that the 2x4 struck her on the legs, back, and

arm. (Tr. 703–06.) During a November 29, 2016 deposition, M.B.

testified that that “the sixth time [Rehan Chaudhri] almost hit

[her] head, but [she] ducked enough so it hit [her] in the head but

not too much.” (Tr. 706.)

4. M.B.’s children, (see Tr. 954–58,959, 961–63, 966–67, 984–

87, 989–90, 1074–75, 1077, 1078–85, 1081–85, 1087–89), her brother,

(see Tr. 197–99, 200–01, 207, 214–215), Forensic Investigator

Melanie Griffiths, (see Tr. 324), Chesterfield County Detective

52a

Appendix B

who and non-testimonial evidence5 that corroborated much

of M.B.’s testimony.

III. DISCUSSION

All three defendants move for a judgment of acquittal

pursuant to Rule 29. (ECF Nos. 245, 246, 248.) The

defendants argue that (1) the forced labor statute does

not apply to a domestic relations case such as this one and

therefore any convictions for forced labor or conspiring to

force labor cannot stand; and (2) sufficient evidence does

not support their convictions. The government asks the

Court to deny the defendants’ motions for a judgment of

acquittal because it properly prosecuted the defendants

under the forced labor statute and because sufficient

evidence supports the convictions returned by the jury.

Because the Court finds that the forced labor statute

prohibits the defendants’ conduct and sufficient evidence

supports each of the defendants’ convictions, the Court will

deny the defendants’ motions for a judgment of acquittal.

Aman and Nauman Chaudhri also move for a new trial

pursuant to Rule 33, arguing that M.B.’s trial testimony

was incredible and repeatedly impeached. (ECF Nos.

245, 248.) The government asks that the Court deny the

motions for a new trial because M.B. offered credible

Laura Kay, (see Tr. 361–62), Chesterfield County Police Office

Matthew Wheeler, (see Tr. 295–96, 298), Dr. Christine Isaacs, (see

Tr. 793–97, 814), and Barbara Flinn, (see Tr. 825–28)

5. See, e.g., Gov’t Exhibits 3A, 3B, 8, 30, 31.

53a

Appendix B

testimony. Because the Court finds that M.B. testified

credibly such that allowing the defendants’ convictions

to stand does not result in manifest injustice, the Court

will deny Aman’s and Nauman Chaudhri’s motions for a

new trial.

A.

Tile Defendants’ Motions for Judgment of

Acquittal

1.

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c)(2) explains’

that “[i]f the jury has returned a guilty verdict, the

court may set aside the verdict and enter an acquittal.”

“Where . . . a motion for judgment of acquittal is based

on insufficiency of the evidence:, the conviction must be

sustained if the evidence, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the Government, is sufficient for any rational

trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Romer, 148

F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds

as recognized in United States v. Strassini, 59 F. App’x

550 (4th Cir. 2003). Courts “must consider circumstantial

as well as direct evidence, and allow the government

the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the facts

proven to those sought to be established.” United State v.

Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982). “Importantly,

the Court does not assess the credibility of witnesses

and resolves direct contradictions in testimony in the

government’s favor.” United States v. Jama, 217 F. Supp.

3d 882, 895 (E.D. Va. 2016).

54a

Appendix B

2.

Improper Application of the Forced Labor

Statute. 18 U.S. C. §§ 1581–94

The defendants argue that the government improperly

prosecuted this case under the forced labor statute. They

contend that the forced labor statute does not apply to

familial situations like this one and that domestic services

provided by a family member do not amount to “labor or

services” under the statute.

Congress passed the forced labor statute

“to implement the Thirteenth Amendment

against slavery or involuntary servitude.”

United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 629

(6th Cir. 2014). “Congress intended to reach

cases in which persons are held in a condition

of servitude through nonviolent coercion,” as

well as through “physical or legal coercion.”

United States v. Dann, 652 F.3d 1160, 1169 (9th

Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted);

see also United States v. Calimlim, 538 F.3d

706, 714 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Section 1589 is not

written in terms limited to overt physical

coercion, and we know that when Congress

amended the statute it expanded the: definition

of involuntary servitude to include nonphysical

forms of coercion.”).

Muchira v. Al-Rawaf, 850 F.3d 605, 617 (4th Cir. 2017), cert.

denied 138 S. Ct. 448, 199 L. Ed. 2d 329 (2017); see also

55a

Appendix B

Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102, 114 Stat. 1464, 1466–69 (2000).6

“Historically, criminal prosecutions for forced labor . . .

have nearly always involved employment situations and/or

sexual exploitation between unrelated parties.”7 (ECF No.

245, at 11.) The defendants argue that “[t]here is no federal

case where family members have been prosecuted under

18 U.S.C. § 1589 for their treatment of an in-law, or for

asking an in-law to contribute to household chores.” (Id.)

Regarding the defendants’ argument that the forced

labor statute does not permit the prosecution of family

members in the course of a shared living arrangement, the

forced labor statute contains no language that suggests

Congress did not intend for the statute to apply to familial

situations like this one. See 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2000) (barring

the use of a prohibited means to compel labor or services of

6. The forced labor statute creates the crime of forced labor

and offers trafficking victims an avenue to pursue civil remedies.

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1595.

7. See, e.g., Roe v. Howard, 917 F.3d 229 (4th Cir. 2019)

(affirming the district court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff,

who suffered sexual abuse as a housekeeper for the defendants);

United States v. Farrell, 563 F.3d 364 (8th Cir. 2009) (affirming

convictions under the forced labor statute for defendants who

recruited individuals from the Philippines to work for them in

the United States and then isolated these workers and compelled

their continued work by threatening physical force and arrest);

United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 2008) (affirming

conviction under the forced labor statute for defendant who

induced a fourteen-year old to move from Nigeria to the United

States based on the promise of education and money, but instead

compelled her work through physical, emotional, and sexual abuse).

56a

Appendix B

a “person”); United States v. Callahan, 801 F.3d 606, 617

(6th Cir. 2015) (noting that “Congress imposed limitations

on the . . . category of victims” in a sex trafficking statute,

but did not limit the forced labor statute’s “application

to immigrant victims or sex workers,” suggesting that

“the unqualified term ‘a person’ is purposefully broad”),

cert. denied Hunt v. United States, 577 U.S. 1227, 136

S. Ct. 1477, 194 L. Ed. 2d 571. “Absent ambiguity in the

statutory text, ‘[o]nly the most extraordinary showing of

contrary intentions in the legislative history will justify a

departure from [the statutory] language.’” United States

v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36,44 (2d Cir. 2010) (alterations in

original) (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S.

675, 680, 105 S. Ct. 2897, 86 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1985)). The

defendants offer no evidence that Congress did not intend

the forced labor statute to apply to familial situations like

this one. The Court recognizes the novelty of this case,

but, in many ways, this situation is precisely what the

forced labor statute seeks to reach. See Toviave, 761 F.3d

at 629 (“Most [forced labor cases arising in the household

context] involve defendants that subjected their victims

to more extreme isolation. . . .”); Calimlim, 538 F.3d at

709 (affirming forced labor convictions of the defendant

who confiscated the victim’s travel documents and used

threats related to her immigration status to compel her

to continue); United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215,

225–28 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming forced labor conviction of

the defendant who physically abused the victim, prevented

her possession of her passport, and subjected her to

intolerable living conditions). The Court, therefore, finds

that the government properly prosecuted the defendants

pursuant to the forced labor statute.

57a

Appendix B

The Court also dismisses the defendants’ argument

that “labor or services” under the statute are limited to

work provided in an employment setting. The defendants

contend that household chores that family members

routinely perform in the home do ‘not amount to “labor

or services” under the forced labor statute. Not only has

Congress declined to exempt household chores from “labor

or services,” but courts have defined “labor or services”

under the forced labor statute broadly, just as this Court

did to the jury: “work or the performance of any particular

task of set of tasks, [including] any form of physical or

mental effort or ‘exertion to perform such work or tasks.”

(ECF No. 223, Jury Instruction No. 28, at 31); see, e.g.,

United States v. Kaufman, 546 F.3d 1242, 1260–63 (10th

Cir. 2008) (finding no plain error with a jury instruction

defining labor as “the expenditure of physical or mental

effort”). Indeed, the defendants in Callahan forced the

victim “to clean the apartment, do yard work, care for

their dogs, and run various errands for them.” 801 F.3d

at 614. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s

denial of the defendants’ motions to acquit and for a new

trial, thereby affirming the defendants’ conviction under

the forced labor statute based on the provision of these

household chores. Id. at 621. This Court, therefore, finds

that the “labor or services” under the forced labor statute

can include household chores.

The defendants also point to three cases that they

say most closely resemble this one: Muchira v. Al-Rawaf,

850 F.3d 605 (4th Cir. 2017) (affirming the district court’s

granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendants);

Headley v. Church of Scientology International, 687 F.3d

58a

Appendix B

1173 (9th Cir. 2012) (same); and United States v. Toviave,

761 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2014) (reversing the defendant’s

forced labor conviction due to insufficient evidence). In

each of these cases, the civil suit or criminal prosecutions

under the forced labor statute failed. For the reasons

set forth below, this Court finds these three cases

distinguishable from the case at bar.

In Muchira, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district

court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the

defendants, a family from Saudi Arabia who employed as a

housemaid the plaintiff, Winfred Muchira, a woman from

Kenya. 850 F.3d at 608–15. Muchira’s employers subjected

her to strict house rules, demanding hours, and verbal

reprimands; she suffered “depression, stress, and other

psychological maladies” as a result. Id. at 622. The Fourth

Circuit rejected Muchira’s claim under the forced labor

statute, finding that she “ha[d] failed to present sufficient

evidence that the Saudi family knowingly coerced her

into providing her labor and services ‘by means of the

abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process.’” Id. at

624 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(3)). The Fourth Circuit

reached this conclusion even though the defendants “kept

her passport, just as they had done in Saudi Arabia, in

accordance with the cultural practices of their country.”

Id. at 623. The Fourth Circuit noted that Muchira “never

asked to maintain possession of her passport and she was

never told that she could not.” Id. The Fourth Circuit

noted that “the forced labor provisions of the [Trafficking

Victims Protection Act] are not intended to . . . punish

immigrants for adhering to cultural rules and restrictions

that many in this country would refuse to abide by.” Id.

at 625.

59a

Appendix B

Although the situations M.B. and Muchira faced bear

some resemblance, the Court finds several key distinctions

between them. While Muchira received a small salary for

her work and had a bank account in her own name, M.B.

did not receive any payment during her time with the

defendants nor did she have access to a bank account in her

own name. Indeed, the only money M.B. had during her

time with the defendants was money that M.B.’s mother

encouraged M.B. to take with her to the United States in

2003 and money that M.B.’s brother gave to her in 2015.

In addition, unlike Muchira, who had her own cell phone

with Internet access by which she communicated with

family and friends in Kenya, M.B. did not have any means

of private communication with her family in Pakistan.

And unlike Muchira, who did not face abuse and lived

comfortably in her own bedroom, M.B. suffered verbal

and physical abuse from the defendants, had limited

access to food in the defendants’ home, and eventually

slept on the floor of the laundry room and lived alone in

the annex. Finally, unlike Muchira, who never tried to

keep her passport, M.B. tried to keep possession of her

immigration documents but the defendants did not allow

her to do so. Thus, although Muchira’s forced labor lawsuit

failed for lack of sufficient evidence, the government’s

prosecution of the defendants in this case does not suffer

the same frailty.

The defendants also cite Headley v. Church of

Scientology International to support their argument that

the forced labor statute does not apply in a case like this

one. 687 F.3d at 1178–81. In Headley, two former ministers

of the Sea Org within the Church of Scientology sued

60a

Appendix B

the Church under the forced labor statute. They claimed

that the Church “psychologically coerced them to provide

labor . . . . by causing them to believe that they could not

leave the ministry or that they would face serious harm

in doing so.” Id. at 1178. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the

district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to

the defendants on the forced labor claim because the

plaintiffs “joined and voluntarily worked for the Sea Org”;

because they had “innumerable opportunities to leave the

defendants” and “had access to vehicles, phones, and the

Internet”; and because the only adverse consequence the

plaintiffs “could have faced, had they taken any of their

many opportunities . . . to leave the Sea Org, was to have

been declared ‘suppressive persons’” by the Church and

“that consequence is not ‘serious harm’” under the forced

labor statute. Id. at 1180.

Just as the plaintiffs in Headley joined the Sea Org

voluntarily, M.B. chose to marry into the Chaudhri family

and travel to the United States. But unlike the plaintiffs in

Headley, M.B. lacked access to vehicles, phones, and the

Internet. Although she did manage to leave the Chaudhri

house multiple times, a sudden escape would have left

her in the United States without any friends and family,

without money, without legal status as far as she knew,

and without her children. And the one instance where M.B.

tried to run away, Aman and Nauman Chaudhri went after

her and forcibly brought her back to the house. Further,

although the plaintiffs in Headley suffered “isolated

instances of physical force” in the Church, M.B. endured

numerous incidents of physical and verbal abuse by the

defendants. Id. at 1178. Thus, the: defendants’ comparison

between Headley and this case falls short.

61a

Appendix B

Finally, the defendants cite United States v. Toviave,

in which the Sixth Circuit reversed the defendant’s

conviction for forced labor. 761 F.3d at 630. In Toviave,

the defendant brought four young relatives from Togo to

live with him in the United States. He made the children

complete household chores, like cooking, cleaning, and

doing: the laundry. He also abused the children, hitting

them as punishment for “minor oversights or: violations of

seemingly arbitrary rules.” Id. at 624. “Although Toviave’s

treatment of the children was reprehensible,” the Sixth

Circuit found it did not amount to forced labor in violation

of the forced labor statute because

First, forcing children to do household chores

cannot be forced labor without reading the

statute as making most responsible American

parents and guardians into federal criminals.

Second, requiring a child to perform those

same chores by means of child abuse does not

change the nature of the work. And third, if it

did, the forced labor statute would federalize

the traditionally state-regulated area of child

abuse.

Id. at 625. “[W]ithout a clear expression of Congressional

intent,” the Sixth Circuit explained that it should not

“transform a statute passed to implement the Thirteenth

Amendment against slavery or involuntary servitude into

one that generally makes it a crime for a person in loco

parentis to require household chores, or makes child abuse

a federal crime.” Id. at 629.

62a

Appendix B

The defendants here argue that like in Toviave, M.B.’s

labor amounted only to household chores, and just as a

parental figure may compel their children to perform

chores around the house, a family may expect one of its

members to contribute to the household in many of the

ways M.B. did. But the instant case does not place at issue

a parent’s right to make minor children perform chores as

did Toviave. Further, “[t]he line between required chores

and forced labor may be a fine one in some circumstances,”

and although the facts of Toviave fell “on the chores

side of the line,” the facts of the instant case fall on the

forced labor side of the line because of the sort of labor

the defendants told M.B. to perform, the frequency with

which they provided these instructions, and the manner

by which they compelled M.B.’s labor. Id. at 630.

For these reasons, the Court will deny the defendants’

judgment for acquittal based on improper application of

the forced labor statute.

3.

Insufficient Evidence

In the alternative, the defendants argue that the

evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to

the government, does not support their convictions. The

Court will consider this argument as to each count.

a.

Conspiracy (Count One)

As the Court explained to the jury, to establish a

criminal conspiracy to commit forced labor, the government

had to prove (1) that two or more people entered into an

63a

Appendix B

agreement or understanding to commit a crime—in

this case, forced labor;’ (2) that at some time during the

existence or life of the agreement or understanding,

the defendant knew the purpose of the agreement or

understanding; (3) that, knowing the purpose of the

agreement or understanding, the defendant entered or

deliberately joined the agreement or understanding;

and (4) that at some time during the existence or life of

the agreement or understanding, any one of its alleged

members knowingly performed an overt act to further or

advance the purpose of the agreement or understanding.

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1589, and 2; United States v. Singh,

518 F.3d 236, 252 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Nnaji,

447 F. App’x 558, 559–60 (5th Cir. 2011) (upholding

convictions for forced labor, conspiracy to commit forced

labor, and harboring an alien for financial gain). 8

The jury returned guilty verdicts for each of the

defendants as to the charge of conspiracy to commit forced

labor. The defendants contend that insufficient evidence

supports their convictions for conspiracy. Specifically,

the defendants argue that the jury’s only evidence of an

agreement or understanding to commit forced labor is the

familial relationship between them. Nauman Chaudhri

and Rehan Chaudhri also contend that the jury lacked

8. As the charged time period in this case ranges from 2000

to 2014, the government charged the defendants under the 2000

version of the forced labor statute, which did not include 18 U.S.C.

§ 1594 or any independent conspiracy charge for forced labor or

sex trafficking. See 18 U.S.C. § 1589. The government, therefore,

charged the defendants for conspiracy under § 371, which requires

proof of an overt act.

64a

Appendix B

evidence that either of them instructed M.B. to perform

housework.

i.

Agreement or Understanding to

Commit a Crime

The government presented evidence beyond the

defendants’ familial relationship to support the existence

of the conspiracy. Specifically, according to M.B.’s

testimony, each of the defendants threatened her with

deportation due to incomplete paperwork if she retaliated

or refused to do as they said. Each the defendants made

clear to M.B. that upon deportation, they would keep her

children. Although Aman primarily instructed M.B.’s

work, everyone in the home, including Nauman Chaudhri

and Rehan Chaurdhi, told M.B. to perform housework.

Each of the defendants verbally abused M.B., calling her

“whore, good for nothing, bastard, bitch” if M.B. completed

“a chore, or anything in the house . . . not . . . according to

their liking.” (Tr. 441–42.) Each of the defendants slapped

M.B. Each of the defendants participated in instances

of more acute abuse: the Washington, D.C. incident (all

defendants), the knife incident (Aman), the stairs incident

(Aman, Rehan Chaudhri), and the car incident (Aman,

Nauman Chaudhri). 9 Each of the defendants also told

9. Although Aman may have instigated this conspiracy,

this evidence showed Nauman Chaudhri’s and Rehan Chaudhi’s

participation. See United States v. Roberts, 881 F.2d 95, 101

(4th Cir. 1989) (affirming the district court’s jury instruction

that “one may become a member of the conspiracy without full

knowledge of all of its details, but if he joins the conspiracy with

an understanding of the unlawful nature thereof and willfully

65a

Appendix B

M.B.’s children that M.B. was “a crazy woman” who

would “sell them out for money.” (Tr. 519–20.) Each of the

defendants told the children not to go near M.B. or she

would hurt them.

The fact that the defendants lived in the same home

with M.B. during the twelve-year conspiracy also supports

the existence of an agreement or understanding. See

United States v. Collazo, 732 F.2d 1200, 1205 (4th Cir.

1984) (“To sustain the conspiracy conviction, there need

only be a showing that defendant knew of the conspiracy’s

purpose and some action indicating his participation.

These elements can be shown by circumstantial evidence

such as his relationship with other members of the

conspiracy, the length of this association, his attitude,

conduct, and the nature of the conspiracy.” (citation

omitted)). And to the extent the defendants argue that

the conspiracy charge must fail because the government

did not point to any explicit conversation between the

defendants discussing their agreement, evidence of such

an explicit agreement is not required for conviction. See

Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n.10, 95 S. Ct.

1284, 43 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1975) (“The agreement need not

be shown to have been explicit. It can instead be inferred

from the facts and circumstances of the case.”). The Court,

therefore, finds that the government presented sufficient

evidence that the defendants entered into an agreement

or understanding to force M.B. to perform labor through

abuse and threats of serious harm.

joins in the plan on one occasion, it is sufficient to convict him of

conspiracy”).

66a

Appendix B

ii.

Knowledge of the Conspiracy’s

Purpose & Willful Entry into the

Conspiracy

The evidence also allowed any rational trier of fact to

find that the defendants knew the conspiracy’s purpose

and willfully joined. Not only did each of the defendants

instruct M.B. to perform work and abuse her, but each of

the defendants took steps to isolate M.B. and keep M.B.

in the home. Aman took M.B.’s diary and forbade M.B.

from speaking with her family. Rehan Chaudhri made

M.B. explain to a congregant at their mosque that she had

no interest in getting her driver’s license; this incident

could have led a reasonable juror to conclude that Rehan

Chaudhri participated in the decision to not allow M.B.

to drive and intended to dispel any suspicion held by this

congregant that the family did not permit M.B. to drive.

Nauman Chaudhri helped his mother drag M.B. back to

the house after M.B. ran away. This evidence allows any

rational trier of fact to find that each of the defendants

willfully joined the conspiracy to compel M.B.’s labor with

knowledge of the conspiracy’s purpose.

iii. Overt Act

Finally, the government presented sufficient evidence

for a rational jury to find that at some point during the

conspiracy, one of its members knowingly performed

an overt act to further or advance the purpose of the

conspiracy. As set forth above, M.B. testified that each

of the defendants physically and verbally abused her,

instructed her to perform services in their home, and

67a

Appendix B

took steps to conceal their crimes. “[B]ecause only one

member of a conspiracy must commit an overt act,” any

one of these overt acts satisfies this element for each of

the defendants. United States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d 659,

669 (4th Cir. 2001).

For these reasons, the Court finds that the evidence,

viewed in the light most favorable to the government,

allowed any rational trier of fact to find the essential

elements of the conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt as

to each of the defendants.

b.

Forced Labor (Count Two)

To establish forced labor, the government had to show

(1) that the defendant provided or obtained the labor or

services of a person, here, M.B.; (2) that the defendant did

so by (A) threats of serious harm to, or physical restraint

against, that person or another person; (B) means of a

scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause that person

to believe that, if the person did not perform such labor

or services, that person or another person would suffer

serious harm or physical restraint; or (C) means of the

abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process; and (3)

that the defendant acted knowingly. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589,

and 2; United States v. Calimlin, 2:04cr248, ECF No.

188, Jury Instructions, at 33–34, 44 (E.D. Wis. May 25,

2006). The Court instructed the jury that a defendant acts

knowingly if “he or she was conscious and aware of his

or her action, realized what he or she was doing or what

was happening around him or her, and did not act because

of ignorance, mistake, or accident.” (ECF No. 223, Jury

68a

Appendix B

Instruction 33, at 36.) The government also charged the

defendants in Count Two with attempting to commit forced

labor. (Id., Jury Instruction 35, at 38.) The government

could prove attempted forced labor by showing that (1) the

defendant intended to commit the crime of forced labor

as already defined; and (2) that the defendant did an act

constituting a substantial step towards the commission of

that crime. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, and 2; United States v.

Neal, 78 F.3d 901, 906 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[A] defendant can

be convicted of an attempt only if the United States proves

beyond a reasonable doubt (1) culpable intent to commit

the crime charged and (2) a substantial step towards the

completion of the crime that strongly corroborates that

intent.”).

The jury returned guilty verdicts for defendants

Aman and Rehan Chaudhri as to the forced labor charge.

Aman and Rehan Chaudhri urge the Court to acquit

them of the forced labor conviction based on insufficient

evidence.

i.

Obtained MB.’s Labor or Services

The government offered sufficient evidence that both

Aman and Rehan Chaudhri instructed M.B. to perform

work. Although much of the work M.B. performed amounts

to housework, that does not preclude Aman’s and Rehan

Chaudhri’s convictions’ for forced labor under the forced

labor statute. See supra Section III.A.2; Callahan, 801

F.3d at 614 (affirming the convictions for forced labor of

defendants who forced the victim “to clean the apartment,

do yardwork, care for their dogs, and run various errands

69a

Appendix B

for them”). Thus, the Court finds that the government

presented sufficient evidence that Aman and Rehan

Chaudhri obtained M.B.’s labor.

ii.

Through a Prohibited Means

The government also offered sufficient evidence

that Aman and Rehan Chaudhri compelled M.B.’s work

through a prohibited means. M.B. testified that Aman

and Rehan Chaudhri verbally and physically abused

M.B., threatened her with deportation, and isolated M.B.

from her family, her children, and the world outside of

the Chaudhri house. By abusing and manipulating M.B.

in this way, Aman and Rehan Chaudhri compelled M.B.’s

work around the house.

The defendants argue that the abuse M.B. endured

did not relate to the labor or services she performed in

the house. Although not every instance of abuse about

which M.B. testified related directly to labor or services

M.B. performed, certain instances did. For example, M.B.

testified about the incident when Aman slapped her when

M.B. she began her work late because she was tending to

her sick infant daughter. In addition, the government asked

M.B., “How frequently did Rehan strike you? . . . Was it

once a week, once a month?” (Tr. 456.) M.B. replied, “It

depended on whatever their mood is. If I haven’t listened’

to them, if their mom is angry, if [Aman] is angry for me,

if didn’t do the chore right.” (Tr. 456 (emphasis added).)

M.B. explained that this abuse happened regularly. In

these two instances, M.B.’s testimony made explicit the

connection between the labor or services she provided

70a

Appendix B

Aman and Rehan Chaudhri and the abuse she endured

from them.

As for the instances in which the abuse M.B. endured

did not immediately relate to the labor she provided,

these instances contributed to the climate of fear created

by the defendants to coerce M.B. to remain working in

the home. The Fourth Circuit has permitted such a line

of reasoning. See United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562,

566 (4th Cir. 1981) (affirming the defendants’ convictions

under 18 U.S.C. § 1584, the predecessor to 18 U.S.C.

§ 1589, and finding that “the record in this case readily

establishes the climate of fear pervading [the defendants’

agricultural] camp created by the beatings and assaults

on the workers and threats of like treatment”); United

States v. Harris, 701 F.2d 1095, 1100 (4th Cir. 1983)

(affirming the defendant’s conviction under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1584, the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 1589, based on

the “reign of physical terror” created by the defendant

and despite the lack of “evidence that [the defendant]

personally ever assaulted [the victim] or threatened the

victim] with harm”); Udeozor, 515 F.3d at 266 (affirming

the defendant’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1584, the

predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 1589, and explaining that “it

was not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to allow

the jury to hear evidence that sexual abuse was used to

make the victim believe she had no choice but to comply

with the [defendants’] demands”). Thus, although the

government did not offer evidence connecting certain

instances of abuse M.B. endured with labor she performed,

such instances of abuse offer additional evidence of the

prohibited means by which Aman and Rehan Chaudhri

compelled M.B.’s labor.

71a

Appendix B

Next, Aman and Rehan Chaudhri contend that three

of the worst acts of violence M.B. described occurred

after 2014, when the charged conspiracy ended. But, when

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

government, two of the instances occurred before 2014.

(See Tr. 507–12 (M.B. explaining that Aman and Rehan

Chaudhri tied M.B. with rope and dragged and pushed

her down the stairs after M.B. came inside after mowing

the lawn, a chore M.B. says she stopped performing

several years after the birth of her last child in 2008); Tr.

1083–84 (M.B.’s daughter, born in 2003, testified that her

“head was just a little bit over the doorknob” when she

witnessed Aman’s daughter hold a knife to M.B.’s throat

while Aman accused M.B. of lying).) But the timing of

these instances notwithstanding, M.B. offered ample

testimony—detailing years of abuse beginning after the

birth of her first child in 2003—that allowed a reasonable

jury to find that Aman and Rehan Chaudhri compelled

M.B.’s labor through prohibited means.

Finally, the defendants argue that M.B. provided her

labor willingly. Although M.B. may have volunteered her

work at the beginning her time at the Chaudhri house, her

initial consent does not excuse subsequent forced labor.

See Dann, 652 F.3d at 1164–65 (affirming the defendant’s

conviction for forced labor even through the victim agreed

to enter the United States and work for the defendants);

United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165, 1167 (5th Cir. 1997)

(affirming the defendants’ convictions for forced labor

even though the victims initially agreed to work for the

defendants).

72a

Appendix B

iii. Knowingly

Based on the evidenced outlined in Section III.A.3.a.ii,

a reasonable jury could have found that Aman and Rehan

Chaudhri acted knowingly when compelling M.B.’s labor.

***

For these reasons, the Court finds that the evidence,

viewed in the light most favorable to the government,

allowed any rational trier of fact to find the essential

elements of forced labor beyond a reasonable doubt as to

Aman and Rehan Chaudhri.

c.

Document Servitude (Count Three)

Finally, to establish document ser vitude, the

government had to prove (1) that the defendant concealed,

removed, confiscated, or possessed an actual or purported

passport or other immigration document, or any other

actual or purported government identification document,

of the person, here M.B.; (2) that the defendant did so

either (A) in connection with violating the forced labor

statute; or (B) with the intent to violate the forced labor

statute; and (3) that the defendant acted knowingly. See 18

U.S.C. §§ 1592 and 2; Dann, 652 F.3d at 1173; Sabhnani,

599 F.3d at 245.

Aman, the only defendant who stands convicted of

document servitude, argues that the Court should acquit

her of document servitude because M.B. “provided her

[immigration] documents to [the defendants] to make

73a

Appendix B

her husband happy, [and] because her father-in-law kept

all travel documents for the family.” (ECF No. 248, at

17–18.) But the evidence at trial belies these arguments.

M.B. testified that she initially refused to hand over

her immigration documents to Aman. Only after M.S.

C., S.C., and Aman confronted her and insisted did she

capitulate; M.B. felt that she “had no choice except to go

and bring [the documents].” (Tr. 434.)10 After handing over

her documents, M.B. testified that every time she would

retaliate or refuse to abide by any instructions—about

twice a month—the defendants would tell her to “calm

[her]self down because [she could] be deported.” (Tr.

438.) The defendants placed M.B. under the impression

that she remained in the United States illegally. The

only time M.B. ever saw her identification while living

at the Midlothian house came when the family travelled

to California: Aman presented M.B.’s identification to

airport security and intervened when the security official

attempted to return the card to M.B. herself. Thus, the

jury heard sufficient evidence to conclude that Aman

possessed M.B.’s immigration papers and did so to keep

M.B. in the home performing work.

10. Even if M.B. did consensually hand over her passport and

immigration documents, such consent does not preclude Aman’s

guilt as to document servitude. See Dann, 652 F.3d at 1173–74

(affirming the defendant’s conviction for document servitude

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1592 even though the victim gave the

documents to the defendant for safekeeping, the victim never

asked for the documents back, nor did she look for them herself).

74a

Appendix B

B. Aman’s and Rehan Chaudhri’s Motions for a

New Trial

1.

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) provides:

“Upon the defendant’s motion, the court may vacate any

judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice

so requires.” “The ultimate test on a Rule 33 motion is

whether letting a guilty verdict stand would be a manifest

injustice.” United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129, 134

(2d Cir. 2001).

“In deciding a motion for a new trial, the district court

is not constrained by the requirement that it view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the government.”

United States v. Arrington, 757 F.2d 1484, 1485 (4th Cir.

1985). But “[u]nder the applicable legal principles, a trial

court ‘should exercise its discretion to award a new trial

sparingly,’ and a jury verdict is not to be overturned

except in the rare circumstance when the evidence ‘weighs

heavily’ against it.” United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209,

216–17 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Perry,

335 F.3d 316, 320 (4th Cir. 2003)), cert. denied by Smith v.

United States, 549 U.S. 892, 127 S. Ct. 197, 166 L. Ed. 2d

161 (2006); see also Arrington, 757 F.2d at 1485 (“When

the evidence weighs so heavily against the verdict that it

would be unjust to enter judgment, the court should grant

a new trial.”).

75a

Appendix B

When a Rule 33 motion asks the Court to “evaluate

for ‘itself the credibility of witnesses,” courts “should

not lightly substitute its judgment for that of the jury.”

United States v. Chin, 181 F.3d 92 (Table) [published in

full-text format at 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 10859], 1991 WL

333137, at *1 (4th Cir. May 26, 1999), cert. denied Chin v.

United States, 528 U.S. 919, 120 S. Ct. 278, 145 L. Ed. 2d

233 (1999). Indeed, a district court judge could find that

“based upon the evidence presented” he or she “would

not have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt because [he or she] had some problems with the

credibility of witnesses.” 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 10859,

[WL] at *2 (quoting the district court during the post-trial

hearing). But if the jury “didn’t have those same problems”

and the judge does not “have an abiding conviction that

. . . a miscarriage of justice would occur,” then the district

court properly denies a motion for new trial. Id. (quoting

the district court during the post-trial hearing).

“Because the courts generally must defer to the jury’s

resolution of conflicting evidence and assessment of witness

credibility, ‘[i]t is only where exceptional circumstances

can be demonstrated that the trial judge may intrude upon

the jury function of credibility assessment.’” Ferguson,

246 F.3d at 133–34 (alteration in original) (quoting United

States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1414 (2d Cir. 1992)).

Such exceptional circumstances arise “where testimony

is ‘patently incredible or defies physical realities.’” Id. at

134 (quoting Sanchez, 969 F.2d at 1414).

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Appendix B

2.

Analysis11

Only Nauman Chaudhri and Aman move for a new

trial pursuant to Rule 33. Nauman Chaudhri does not

make his Rule 33 arguments separately from his Rule

29 arguments; instead, he contends that the improper

application of the forced labor statute and the lack of

sufficient evidence support both his Rule 29 arguments

and his Rule 33 arguments. As explained in Sections

III.A.2 and III.A.3.a, the Court finds that the forced

labor statute properly applied to the instant case such

that allowing Nauman Chaudhri’s conviction to stand does

not result in a manifest injustice and sufficient evidence

supports Nauman Chaudhri’s conspiracy conviction. The

Court will, therefore, deny Nauman Chaudhri’s motion

for a new trial.

Aman asserts a separate argument to urge the Court

to grant a new trial: that M.B.’s testimony “was incredible

11. In conducting this analysis, the Court considers evidence

presented by both the government and the defendants during trial.

The defendants offered witnesses who testified that they never

witnessed abuse at the defendants’ home, (see, e.g., Tr. 1480 (Jim

Webb, a neighbor), that M.B. was a valued member of the Chaudhri

family, (see, e.g., Tr. 1318–20 (B.A.)), and that M.B.’s children were

happy and healthy, (see, e.g., Tr. 1433–34:(Melissa Larry, the

former teacher of M.B.’s second child, K.S.C.)). The defendants

also presented many pictures showing M.B. with the Chaudhri

family and M.B.’s children appearing happy and healthy. (See, e.g.,

Def. Exs. 66-C, 76A, 768, 77A.) The defendants challenged M.B.’s

testimony by drawing attention to inconsistencies between her

retellings of the same incidents and to M.B.’s difficulty providing

dates for certain incidents of abuse.

77a

Appendix B

and impeached repeatedly.” (ECF No. 248, at 18.) In

support, Aman points to eight statements that M.B. made

during trial and evidence that challenges the veracity of

each statement. The Court will consider each statement

in turn.

a.

House Painting

M.B. testified that the defendants made her paint the

exterior of the house. Aman explains that no witnesses

supported this claim; indeed, neighbors “Mr. Webb and

Mr. Bowling . . . said they never saw any female painting

the exterior of the house.” (ECF No. 248, at 18.) “Mr. Webb

testified that when he moved out of his house in 2010, [the

Chaudhri house] still had the original paint on it as when

he moved into his home in 2000.” (Id. at 18–19.)

Although Mr. Webb lived across the street, he worked

away from the home, (Tr. 1475), and Ms. Bissett, who was

formerly married to Mr. Webb, testified that she “lived on

the back side of [her] house” so she only looked towards the

defendants’ home when she was coming or going from her

own home, (Tr. 1205). As for Mr. Bowling, he could not see

the Chaudhri house from his home, and he worked away

from the home. (Tr. 1453–54, 1469.) Thus, the conflicting

testimony of Mr. Webb and Mr. Bowling does not render

unbelievable M.B.’s testimony about painting the exterior

of the house.

b.

Concrete Walkway

M.B. testified that she replaced the concrete walkway

twice. Aman explains that Mr. Webb’s and Mr. Bowling’s

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Appendix B

testimony contradicted this testimony; neither ever saw

M.B. working on the walkway. (Tr. 1468, 1479.) In addition,

Mr. Vega, a contractor who Aman hired to fix the walkway,

testified that the walkway was very deteriorated when

he began his work. (Tr. 894.) But as explained above, Mr.

Webb and Mr. Bowling did not watch the house at all times;

their not having observed M.B. work on the walkway does

not compel the conclusion that the work did not occur. As

for Mr. Vega’s testimony, a jury could reasonably conclude

that the work of someone inexperienced in constructing

walkways could quickly deteriorate.

c.

Neighbor Interaction

Aman next cites M.B.’s testimony that the defendants

forbade her from interacting with neighbors. Aman claims

that the following testimony contradicts M.B.’s statement:

Ms. Bissett’s testimony that she interacted with M.B. on

one occasion, Ms. Roarty’s testimony that M.B. asked to

borrow her phone, and Mr. Bowling’s testimony about

M.B. stopping on the street to talk to his child. (Tr. 564–65,

938, 1194, 1466–67.)

A ju r y cou ld rea sonably have bel ieved t h i s

“contradictory” testimony and still have concluded that the

defendants forbade M.B. from interacting with neighbors.

Indeed, Ms. Roarty testified that M.B. appeared hesitant

and nervous when borrowing the phone, suggesting that

the defendants would not have approved of M.B.’s visit

to Ms. Roarty. (Tr. 932.) Ms. Bissett testified that M.B.

“always seemed to be alone,” (Tr. 1193), and Ms. Bowling

explained that M.B. would not interact with her on London

79a

Appendix B

Park Drive when the two would pass, (Tr. 1455). Thus,

although M.B. interacted with some neighbors, a jury

could reasonably have found credible M.B.’s testimony

that the defendants forbade such interaction.

d.

Immigration Status

Aman contends that M.B.’s “claim concerning lack

of knowledge about her immigration status is also

unbelievable.” (ECF No. 248, at 19.) In support of this

position, Aman points to evidence that M.B., who has a

college degree in English literature and participated in

one year of a master’s program in English Literature,

(Tr. 609–10), “saw her green card” “[w]ithin ten days of

arriving in the United States,” “signed four individual

letters addressed to the immigration office concerning

her immigration status and green card,” “travelled to

the immigration office in Norfolk on two occasions and

travelled to the CVS to obtain a passport photo,” and

“used her green card to travel to California.” (ECF No.

248, at 19.)

M.B. explained, however, that her name was not

spelled correctly on the green card she saw after arriving

to the United States; she believed this inaccuracy

rendered the green card invalid unless the spelling of her

name was corrected. (Tr. 645.) As for her signature on

the letters, M.B. testified that she was not allowed to see

the documents; the defendants would cover the substance

of the documents when M.B. signed them. (Tr. 527–28.)

On one occasion, M.B. asked Aman about the document

she was asked to sign, and Aman explained, “It’s nothing

80a

Appendix B

that you should be concerned about.” (Tr. 528.) M.B.

also testified that she knew the immigration office was a

government building, but the defendants never told her

the purpose of the visits. M.B. suspected the purpose of

one such visit was to renew her passport. (Tr. 530.) During

another visit, she provided fingerprints, but she did not

know why; she “wasn’t allowed to question” and if she

did, the defendants would punish her. (Tr. 530–31.) As

for the trip to California, M.B. testified that Aman held

her identification during the trip, Aman handed M.B’s

identification to airport security personnel, and Aman

intervened when airport security personnel attempted to

hand M.B.’s identification to M.B. Although M.B. caught a

glimpse of her identification this day, this was the only time

she saw her identification. Based on this evidence, a jury

could reasonably have found credible M.B.’s statement

that she did not know her immigration status while she

lived with the defendants.

e.

M.S.C.’s Occupation

Aman also cites M.B.’s testimony that she did not

know what her husband was doing for work outside the

home as evidence of her unreliability. But review of this

testimony shows that when M.B. said she did not know

what her husband was doing for work, she may have meant

that she did not know what type of medicine he practiced

and in what sort of setting he worked. A jury interpreting

this testimony could have reasonably concluded that M.B.

knew her husband practiced medicine, but she just lacked

the specifics; thus, M.B.’s testimony that she had “no idea”

what her husband did for work does not undermine M.B.’s

credibility as the defendants suggest. (Tr. 449.)

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Appendix B

f.

Incidents of Abuse

Finally, Aman argues that M.B.’s testimony regarding

three separate incidents of violence is “simply unbelievable.”

(ECF No. 248, at 20.) First, M.B. testified that Aman’s

daughter, B.A., “threatened to cut [M.B.’s] throat with

a knife.” (Id.) Although B.A. denied ever perpetrating

violence against M.B., M.B.’s eldest child, F.S.C., testified

to having witnessed this incident when she stood about

the height of a doorknob. (Tr. 1083–84.) Although F.S.C.

did not mention this memory to investigators until she

had lived with M.B. for several years, the jury evaluated

the credibility of the witnesses and to the extent to jury

believed that M.B.’s and F.S.C.’s testimony about the

incident, such a belief was reasonable.

The second incident of violence A man deems

unbelievable is M.B.’s testimony that Aman, B.A., and

Rehan Chaudhri tied M.B. up with a rope and dragged and

pushed her down the stairs. M.B. did not tell investigators

about this incident until 2021 and the details of the

incident—whether she fell down the stairs at all, whether

the rope was tied around her hands, whether she was

“pushed” or “dragged” down the stairs—varies between

M.B.’s retellings (in her journal, to investigators in 2021,

and in court). (Tr. 695–97.) Although B.A. denied this

incident, F.S.C. also testified about an incident involving a

rope and her mother falling down the stairs. (Tr. 1085–86.)

As with the first incident, F.S.C. did not mention this

memory to investigators until she had lived with M.B.

for several years. Despite this conflicting evidence, a

reasonable jury could have believed M.B.’s testimony in

whole or in part.

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Appendix B

Aman also challenged M.B.’s testimony about Rehan

Chaudhri hitting her with a 2x4. Aman finds this testimony

incredible because neither Mr. Vega nor Ms. Roarty

noticed that M.B. had any injuries when she asked to

borrow their phones. Although observations of injury

would have bolstered M.B.’s credibility, her testimony is

not patently incredible without those observations. M.B.

says that the 2x4 mostly hit her in areas that her clothing

would have concealed. Although M.B.’s retellings of this

event—to investigators, in her journal, in court—are not

entirely consistent,12 the bulk of her testimony remains the

same: Rehan Chaudhri hit her six times with a 2x4 after

he grew angry with her for not staying in the garage. A

reasonable jury could, therefore, have deemed credible

M.B.’s testimony in whole or in part.

***

Having reviewed the evidence presented in this case,

the Court does not find any exceptional circumstance that

compels the Court to intrude upon the jury’s credibility

determinations. The Court, therefore, finds that allowing

Aman’s convictions to stand does not result in manifest

injustice; because “‘competent, satisfactory and sufficient

evidence’ in the record supports the jury verdict,” the

Court will deny Aman’s motion for a new trial. Ferguson,

246 F.3d at 134 (quoting Sanchez, 969 F.2d at 1414).

12. These inconsistencies include whether Rehan Chaudhri

pushed her into the laundry room, what item M.B. sought to

retrieve from the laundry room—her scarf or her prayer rug

and Quran, what M.B.’s interaction with Rehan Chaudhri was

like before the strikes, and where exactly the 2x4 hit M.B. (See

Tr. 700–07.)

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Appendix B

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny the

defendants’ motions for a judgment of acquittal pursuant

to Rule 29 and Aman’s and Rehan Chaudhri’s motions for

a new trial pursuant to Rule 33. (ECF Nos. 245, 246, 248.)

The Court will issue an appropriate Order.

Let the Clerk send a copy of this Opinion to all counsel

of record.

Date: 16 August 2022 /s/ John A. Gibney, Jr.

Richmond, VA

John A. Gibney, Jr.

Senior United States

District Judge

84a

Appendix

C UNITED STATES

APPENDIX C — ORDER

OF THE

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT,

FILED MAY 6, 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4054 (L)

(3:19-cr-00085-JAG-2)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MOHAMMAD NAUMAN CHAUDHRI,

a/k/a NAUMAN CHAUDHRI,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 23-4077

(3:19-cr-00085-JAG-3)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MOHAMMAD NAUMAN CHAUDHRI,

a/k/a NAUMAN CHAUDHRI,

Defendant–Appellant.

85a

Appendix C

No. 23-4078

(3:19-cr-00085-JAG-1)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ZAHIDA AMAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER

The court denies the petition for rehearing and

rehearing en banc. No judge requested a poll under Fed.

R. App. P. 40 on the petition for rehearing en banc.

Entered at the direction of the panel: Judge Gregory,

Judge Thacker, and Judge Berner.

For the Court

/s/ Nwamaka Anowi, Clerk

86a

Appendix

D

APPENDIX

D — RELEVANT

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

18 U.S.C.A. § 1589. Forced labor

(a) Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or

services of a person by any one of, or by any combination

of, the following means –

(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical

restraint, or threats of physical restraint to that

person or another person;

(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious

harm to that person or another person;

(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of

law or legal process; or

(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern

intended to cause the person to believe that, if that

person did not perform such labor or services, that

person or another person would suffer serious harm

or physical restraint,

shall be punished as provided under subsection (d).

(b) Whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by

receiving anything of value, from participation in a

venture which has engaged in the providing or obtaining

of labor or services by any of the means described in

subsection (a), knowing or in reckless disregard of the

fact that the venture has engaged in the providing or

obtaining of labor or services by any of such means, shall

be punished as provided in subsection (d).

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Appendix D

(c)

In this section:

(1) The term “abuse or threatened abuse of law or

legal process” means the use or threatened use of a

law or legal process, whether administrative, civil, or

criminal, in any manner or for any purpose for which

the law was not designed, in order to exert pressure

on another person to cause that person to take some

action or refrain from taking some action.

(2) The term “serious harm” means any harm,

whether physica l or nonphysica l, i nclud i ng

psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that

is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding

circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the

same background and in the same circumstances to

perform or to continue performing labor or services

in order to avoid incurring that harm.

(d) Whoever violates this section shall be fined under this

title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If death

results from a violation of this section, or if the violation

includes kidnaping, an attempt to kidnap, aggravated

sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, the defendant shall be

fined under this title, imprisoned for any term of years

or life, or both.