Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Christina Casarez, Petitioner v. Irigoyen Farms, Inc., et al.
Supreme Court briefJun 12, 2026
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. __________
In the Supreme Court of the United States
________________________
CHRISTINA CASAREZ,
Petitioner,
v.
IRIGOYEN FARMS, INC., ET AL.,
Respondents.
___________________________________________
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
___________________________________________
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
___________________________________________
Kevin G. Little
Counsel of Record
LAW OFFICE OF KEVIN G. LITTLE
PO Box 8656
Fresno, CA 93747
(559) 342–5800
kevin@kevinglittle.com
Attorney for Petitioner
JUNE 2026
United States Commercial Printing Company • www.uscpc.us • (202) 866-8558
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the judgment below should be vacated
in light of Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC,
608 U. S. ___ (2026), where the California courts held
that the FAAAA’s safety exception does not apply unless the claim alleges the tractor-trailer itself was defective or otherwise unsafe, and that Miller v. C. H.
Robinson Worldwide, Inc. was wrongly decided, while
Montgomery unanimously held that common-law duties are part of a State’s safety regulatory authority
and that a claim is “with respect to motor vehicles” if
it concerns the vehicles used in transportation.
2. Whether 49 U. S. C. § 14501(c)(1) may be invoked by nonenumerated defendants such as shippers
and receivers to preempt state wrongful-death and
negligence claims arising from a fatal truck crash,
even though the statute expressly names only motor
carriers, motor private carriers, brokers, and freight
forwarders.
3. Whether the appropriate disposition is at minimum a grant, vacate, and remand order, and whether
summary reversal is warranted, where the state trial
court and the published state appellate decision rest
on reasoning that Montgomery has now squarely rejected.
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner, and plaintiff-appellant below, is Christina Casarez.
Respondents, and defendants-appellees below, are
Irigoyen Farms, Inc., and Walmart, Inc. Walmart, Inc.
is publicly listed, bearing stocker ticker symbol: WMT.
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
Superior Court of California (Fresno Cnty.):
Christina Casarez v. Irigoyen Farms, Inc., et al.,
No. 19CECG03758 (Sep. 11, 2023)
(judgment entered)
Court of Appeal of California (5th App. Dist.):
Christina Casarez v. Irigoyen Farms, Inc., et al.,
No. F086901 (Sept. 10, 2025) (opinion
affirm-ing superior court)
Christina Casarez v. Irigoyen Farms, Inc., et al.,
No. F086901 (Sept. 30, 2025) (certification
of Sept. 10, 2025 opinion for publication)
Christina Casarez v. Irigoyen Farms, Inc., et al.,
No. F086901 (Oct. 17, 2025) (rehearing
de-nied)
Supreme Court of California:
Christina Casarez v. Irigoyen Farms, Inc., et al.,
No. S293697 (Jan. 14, 2026) (discretionary
re-view denied)
Supreme Court of the United States:
Christina Casarez v. Irigoyen Farms, Inc., et al.,
No. 25A1102 (Apr. 7, 2026) (time to
petition for certiorari extended to June 13,
2026)
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Questions Presented ................................................... i
Parties to the Proceedings ......................................... ii
Related Proceedings ................................................... ii
Table of Authorities....................................................vi
Opinions Below ............................................................1
Jurisdiction ..................................................................1
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ....1
Statement of the Case .................................................2
A.
Factual Background .....................................2
B.
Procedural History........................................3
Reasons for Granting the Petition ..............................5
I.
A GVR is the minimum appropriate remedy
because Montgomery squarely rejects the
reasoning of both California courts ..............5
II.
Summary reversal is also warranted
because the conflict is not merely arguable;
it is direct and outcome-determinative ........7
III.
The separate question whether
nonenumerated shippers and receivers may
invoke § 14501(c)(1) reinforces the need for
plenary review if the Court declines
summary disposition ....................................9
IV.
This case is an unusually clean vehicle for
review. ......................................................... 10
Conclusion ................................................................. 11
iv
Appendix
Appendix A
Opinion [judgments of the superior court affirmed], Court of Appeal of California for the Fifth
Appellate District, Christina Casarez v. Irigoyen
Farms, Inc. et al.,
No. F086901 (Sep. 10, 2025) ........................... App-1
Appendix B
Order Granting Requests For Publication, Court
of Appeal of California for the Fifth Appellate District, Christina Casarez v. Irigoyen Farms, Inc. et
al.,
No. F086901 (Sep. 30, 2025) ......................... App-20
Appendix C
Order [petition for review denied], Supreme
Court of California, Christina Casarez v. Irigoyen
Farms, Inc. et al.,
No. S293697 (Jan. 14, 2026) ......................... App-21
Appendix D
Order [petition for rehearing denied], Court of
Appeal of California for the Fifth Appellate District, Christina Casarez v. Irigoyen Farms, Inc. et
al.,
No. F086901 (Oct. 17, 2025) ......................... App-22
v
Appendix E
Law And Motion Minute Order, Superior Court of
California for the County of Fresno, Christina
Casarez v. Andre Hill,
No. 19CECG03758 (Aug. 10, 2023) .............. App-23
Tentative Ruling ........................................ App-26
Clerk’s Certificate Of Mailing ................... App-30
Appendix F
49 U. S. C. § 14501(c) ..................................... App-33
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Landstar Ranger,
65 F. 4th 1261 (CA11 2023) ..................................4-7
Casarez v. Irigoyen Farms, Inc.,
114 Cal. App. 5th 873 (2025) ................................... 1
Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey,
569 U. S. 251 (2013) ..............................................8-9
Miller v. C. H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.,
976 F. 3d 1016 (CA9 2020) ...............................4, 6-7
Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC,
608 U. S. ___ (2026) .................................... 2, 4-8, 11
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
504 U. S. 374 (1992) ............................................9-10
Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc.,
74 F. 4th 453 (CA7 2023) ......................................4-7
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules
U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2 ............................................ 1
49 U. S. C. § 13102 ....................................................... 2
49 U. S. C. § 14501 .......................................... 1-6, 9, 11
49 C. F. R. § 390.6 ........................................................ 3
OPINIONS BELOW
The Fifth Appellate District’s opinion is reported at
114 Cal. App. 5th 873 and is reproduced in the Appendix at App. 1–19. The superior court’s summary-judgment order and tentative ruling are reproduced in the
Appendix at App. 23–29.
JURISDICTION
The Fifth Appellate District’s opinion was entered
on September 10, 2025. The Fifth Appellate District
denied rehearing on October 17, 2025. The Supreme
Court of California denied review on January 14, 2026.
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2, provides in relevant part:
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof … shall be
the supreme Law of the Land ….” U. S. Const., Art. VI,
cl. 2.
49 U. S. C. § 14501(c)(1) provides in relevant part:
“[A] State … may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of
law related to a price, route, or service of any motor
carrier … broker, or freight forwarder with respect to
the transportation of property.”
49 U. S. C. § 14501(c)(2)(A) provides in relevant part:
“Paragraph (1) shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor
vehicles, the authority of a State to impose highway route controls or limitations based on the size
2
or weight of the motor vehicle or the hazardous
nature of the cargo, or the authority of a State to
regulate motor carriers with regard to minimum
amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements and self-insurance authorization ….”
49 U. S. C. § 13102(16) provides in relevant part:
“The term ‘motor vehicle’ means a vehicle, machine,
tractor, trailer, or semitrailer propelled or drawn by
mechanical power and used on a highway in transportation ….”
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
Factual Background
On the evening of September 27, 2019, Olivia Mendoza was driving westbound on Mountain View Avenue in Fresno County, California, when a tractortrailer heading northbound on Clovis Avenue ran a
stop sign and struck her vehicle. Olivia Mendoza was
pronounced dead at the scene. Law enforcement
deemed driver Andre Hill’s extreme fatigue a contributing factor in the crash, and Hill was later charged
with vehicular manslaughter. App. 2.
Before the crash, Hill had picked up a produce load
at Irigoyen Farms, a Selma-area grower-shipper, for
overnight delivery to Walmart’s distribution center in
McCarran, Nevada — approximately 350 miles away.
App. 2–3. The load was therefore an interstate trucking shipment from California to Nevada, placing this
case squarely within the interstate transportation setting that figured prominently in Montgomery’s analysis of § 14501(c). 608 U. S. at ___ (slip op., at 2–3, 6–7).
The logistics chain through which the load was
3
arranged proceeded as follows: Irigoyen contracted
with Royal Violet Logistics to arrange shipment;
Royal Violet subcontracted with SIO Logistics; SIO
contracted with Gold Coast Logistics Group as the motor carrier; and Gold Coast hired Hill as an independent contractor and furnished the tractor-trailer.
App. 2–3.
The record evidence bearing on the federal questions is treated as undisputed at the summary-judgment stage. Petitioner maintained that Walmart’s
“onerous contractual requirements incentivized reckless conduct by motor carriers” and that Irigoyen
loaded the truck and released Hill despite actual, contemporaneous knowledge that he had to travel a long
distance, had to arrive within a few hours, and was
“obviously already exhausted.” App. 4. Federal regulations independently prohibit coercion of drivers to
violate safety rules. See 49 C. F. R. § 390.6.
B. Procedural History
Petitioner Christina Casarez — individually and as
successor in interest to Olivia Mendoza’s estate —
filed suit against Irigoyen Farms and Walmart for motor-vehicle negligence, general negligence, and wrongful death. App. 3–4. On appeal, petitioner clarified
that the claims rested on respondents’ own direct conduct: Walmart for creating dangerous scheduling
pressure through its delivery requirements, and
Irigoyen for loading the truck and releasing Hill on a
350-mile overnight run despite actual, contemporaneous knowledge that he was obviously already exhausted. App. 4. Petitioner expressly disclaimed any
reliance on vicarious liability for the carrier’s or broker’s acts. Ibid.
4
In May 2023, Walmart and Irigoyen each moved for
summary judgment on the ground that petitioner’s
negligence claims were expressly preempted by the
FAAAA, 49 U. S. C. § 14501(c)(1). App. 4. The Fresno
County Superior Court (Hon. Jonathan M. Skiles)
granted both motions and entered judgments on September 11, 2023. App. 23–29. The trial court’s ruling
stated: “The FAAAA expressly preempts negligence
claims against a broker and its hirer. … Miller, however, is distinguishable because there the party asserting preemption was the broker that had specifically selected the transportation service. Here it is the
grower and retailer.” App. 27–29. The court also concluded that Miller’s application of the safety exception
“has recently been rejected in a case with near-identical facts.” Ibid. That reference was to the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises,
Inc., 74 F. 4th 453 (CA7 2023), the very line of authority this Court later rejected in Montgomery, 608 U. S.
at ___ (slip op., at 4, n. 1, 7); App. 28–29.
The Fifth Appellate District affirmed in a published
opinion filed September 10, 2025. App. 1–19. The
Fifth Appellate District held (1) that Walmart and
Irigoyen could invoke § 14501(c)(1) preemption even
though neither is an enumerated motor carrier, broker, or freight forwarder, App. 13–14; and (2) that the
safety exception of § 14501(c)(2)(A) did not apply because petitioner’s claims “do not purport the tractortrailer itself was defective or otherwise unsafe,”
App. 19. The court expressly found Miller’s rationale
“deficient,” App. 15–18, adopted the “direct connection”
rule of the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits — specifically Ye and Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Landstar Ranger, 65 F. 4th 1261 (CA11 2023) — App. 17–
5
18, and concluded that crash-based negligence claims
tied to driver fatigue and scheduling pressure lacked
the required nexus to motor vehicles under
§ 14501(c)(2)(A). App. 19. Montgomery later identified
Ye and Aspen as the contrary side of the circuit split
and rejected their approach. 608 U. S. at ___ (slip op.,
at 4, n. 1, 6–7).
Petitioner sought rehearing on October 15, 2025, arguing material legal error in the safety-exception
analysis. The Fifth Appellate District denied rehearing on October 17, 2025. App. 22. On November 10,
2025, petitioner sought review in the Supreme Court
of California. The Supreme Court of California denied
review on January 14, 2026. App. 21.
On May 14, 2026, this Court decided Montgomery v.
Caribe Transport II, LLC, 608 U. S. ___ (2026), unanimously holding that common-law duties are part of a
State’s safety regulatory authority and that a negligent-selection claim against a broker falls within the
FAAAA safety exception because such a claim “concerns motor vehicles — most obviously, the trucks
that will transport the goods.”
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I.
A GVR is the minimum appropriate remedy
because Montgomery squarely rejects the
reasoning of both California courts
This is a textbook candidate for a grant, vacate, and
remand order. The shipment here was an interstate
trucking load from California to Nevada, so the case
arises in the same interstate-transportation setting
that Montgomery treated as central to the structure of
§ 14501(c), including the contrast between interstate
preemption in subsection (c) and intrastate
6
preemption in subsection (b). 608 U. S. at ___ (slip op.,
2–3, 6–7; KAVANAUGH, J., concurring, slip op., 2–4).
This case is an especially clean candidate for summary disposition because the interstate nature of the
shipment is undisputed and both lower courts expressly relied on the now-rejected Ye/Aspen line of
reasoning. The trial court expressly distinguished
Miller because the defendants here were “the grower
and retailer” rather than the broker, and the Fifth Appellate District doubled down by holding that the
safety exception applies only when the truck itself is
alleged to be defective or otherwise unsafe. App. 27–
29, 19.
Montgomery rejects each premise on which the California courts relied. First, the Court unanimously
holds that common-law duties and standards of care
are part of a State’s authority to regulate safety. 608
U. S. at ___ (slip op., 4). Second, the Court holds that
a claim is “with respect to motor vehicles” if it concerns
the vehicles used in transportation — not only when
it targets a mechanical defect or the truck’s physical
condition. Id. at 5. Third, it applies that reasoning to
an upstream actor — a broker — because the negligent-selection claim concerns which trucks and drivers are put on the road. Ibid. Fourth, it rejects the
reasoning of the cases the California courts followed:
Montgomery expressly identified Ye and Aspen as the
contrary authorities and rejected their narrow approach. Id. at 4 n. 1, 6–7.
That is enough to require vacatur and remand. The
published California decision rested on a legal framework this Court has now repudiated, and the Supreme
Court of California denied review before Montgomery
issued. A GVR would allow the California courts to
7
reconsider preemption and the safety exception under
the governing standard.
II. Summary reversal is also warranted
because the conflict is not merely arguable;
it is direct and outcome-determinative
The decision below did not merely fail to anticipate
Montgomery in the abstract. It affirmatively rested
on authorities and reasoning that Montgomery later
disapproved. The Fifth Appellate District criticized
Miller for treating “with respect to motor vehicles”
broadly enough to encompass crash-based negligence
claims, insisted that such a reading would cause the
safety exception to swallow preemption, and held that
claims based on dangerous scheduling pressure and
knowingly releasing an exhausted driver were outside
the exception because the tractor-trailer itself was not
alleged to be defective. App. 15–19. In doing so, the
Court of Appeal relied on Aspen and Ye; the trial court
likewise relied on the then-recent Seventh Circuit line
rejecting Miller. App. 28–29, 15–19.
Montgomery rejected each of those propositions step
by step, and in doing so specifically disavowed the
very contrary authorities on which the California
courts relied.
On the “swallowing preemption” argument, the
Court explained that the safety exception “saves only
a subset of preempted claims — those involving regulations concerning motor vehicle safety,” so that
“[s]tate laws related to motor carrier prices, routes,
and services that have no relationship to safety remain preempted.” 608 U. S. at ___ (slip op., 6). A
broader reading of the safety exception therefore does
not swallow the preemption clause.
8
On the meaning of “with respect to motor vehicles,”
this Court held the phrase means “concerns” the vehicles used in transportation, following the same interpretation applied in Dans City Used Cars, Inc. v.
Pelkey, 569 U. S. 251, 261 (2013). 608 U. S. at ___ (slip
op., 5). This Court rejected the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuit “direct connection” rule that the Fifth Appellate District adopted here. Ibid.
On upstream actors, this Court applied its holding
to C. H. Robinson — a broker that did not own the
truck or employ the driver — because “[r]equiring
C. H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a
carrier therefore concerns motor vehicles — most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods.” Ibid.
If negligent selection of an unsafe carrier concerns
motor vehicles, then knowingly releasing an obviously
exhausted driver on a 350-mile overnight run under
time pressure necessarily concerns motor vehicles as
well. The lower courts’ equipment-defect rule cannot
be reconciled with Montgomery’s reasoning or result.
Summary reversal is especially appropriate because the error is purely legal, the material facts are
fixed by the summary-judgment posture, and the
judgment rests entirely on preemption. The lower
courts did not identify any adequate and independent
state ground for affirmance. To the contrary, the Fifth
Appellate District expressly stated, “In light of our
disposition, we need not address other arguments
raised by the parties.” App. 19. The judgment therefore stands on one basis only: a federal preemption
ruling that Montgomery has now foreclosed.
The case below is analytically stronger than Montgomery in one critical respect: the claims here go beyond negligent selection of a carrier. The defendants
9
are alleged to have had contemporaneous, first-hand
knowledge of the very safety hazard that caused the
crash — observing Hill’s visible exhaustion at the
loading dock — yet released a loaded tractor-trailer
for an overnight 350-mile run under delivery-deadline
pressure. If a broker’s failure to vet a carrier’s safety
record concerns motor vehicles, the direct physical observation of an impaired driver and the creation of
pressure that foreseeably contributes to fatigue-related highway fatalities concerns motor vehicles a fortiori.
III. The separate question whether
nonenumerated shippers and receivers
may invoke § 14501(c)(1) reinforces the
need for plenary review if the Court
declines summary disposition
Beyond the safety-exception error, the Fifth Appellate District held that Walmart and Irigoyen could invoke § 14501(c)(1) preemption even though that statute expressly names only motor carriers, motor private carriers, brokers, and freight forwarders. It reasoned that “[n]othing in the language suggests a beneficiary of the preemption clause must itself be a motor carrier, broker, or freight forwarder.” App. 13–14.
That holding extends a federal preemption defense
to categories of actors Congress chose not to enumerate. Congress carefully named the covered entities in
§ 14501(c)(1) and omitted shippers and consignees
while separately preserving States’ safety authority in
§ 14501(c)(2)(A). The Fifth Appellate District’s extension by implication contravenes the canon that courts
should not expand statutory lists beyond their textual
terms. See Dans City, 569 U. S. at 260–262; Morales v.
10
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 383–384
(1992).
The practical stakes are substantial. Modern
freight supply chains routinely involve retailers, manufacturers, and agricultural shippers who dictate delivery schedules and operational conditions without
being enumerated entities under § 14501(c)(1). The
decision below creates a broad federal immunity for
those actors in any negligence case arising from a
truck crash. That ruling warrants independent plenary review if the Court concludes the safety-exception error can be corrected only by remand rather than
summary reversal.
IV. This case is an unusually clean vehicle for
review.
The petition arises from a published appellate decision that was denied review by the state’s highest
court. App. 20–21. The federal questions were preserved, pressed at every level, and expressly decided.
App. 13–19, 26–29. The summary-judgment posture
fixes the material facts and no vehicle problems tied
to factual development exist. The judgments rest
solely on FAAAA preemption; duty, breach, and causation were not reached. App. 19.
Respondents Walmart and Irigoyen themselves
conceded below that they were not acting as brokers
— Walmart acknowledged its role as a purchaser-consignee, and Irigoyen acknowledged it used an independent broker to arrange shipment. That concession
sharpens both federal questions: the defendants are
unambiguously nonenumerated entities who invoked
preemption on behalf of broker and carrier services
they did not provide, and they did so in connection
11
with an interstate California-to-Nevada load while
their employees were directly observing the safety
hazard that would cause the fatal crash.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of
certiorari should be granted. At minimum, this Court
should grant the petition, vacate the judgment below,
and remand for further consideration in light of Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, 608 U. S. ___
(2026). Because the reasoning of both the trial court
and the Fifth Appellate District is squarely incompatible with Montgomery, summary reversal is also warranted.
CONCLUSION
This Court should grant certiorari.
Kevin G. Little
Counsel of Record
LAW OFFICE OF KEVIN G. LITTLE
PO Box 8656
Fresno, CA 93747
(559) 342–5800
kevin@kevinglittle.com
JUNE 2026
Attorney for Petitioner
App-1
Appendix A
[Filed: Sep. 10, 2025]
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
CHRISTINA CASAREZ,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
IRIGOYEN FARMS, INC. et al.,
F086901
(Super. Ct. No.
19CECG03758)
OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Fresno County. Jonathan M. Skiles, Judge.
Law Office of Kevin G. Little and Kevin Gerard Little for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Hugo Parker, Edward R. Hugo, Bina Ghanaat, and
Alex G. Taheri for Defendant and Respondent
Irigoyen Farms, Inc.
Frost Brown Todd, Kevin C. Schiferl, Stephanie V.
McGowan; Murchison & Cumming, Kasey C. Townsend and Gina E. Och for Defendant and Respondent
Walmart Inc.
-ooOooPlaintiff Christina Casarez appeals from September 11, 2023 judgments of the Fresno County Superior
Court entered after orders granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Irigoyen Farms, Inc.
(Irigoyen Farms) and Walmart Inc. (Walmart). The
App-2
superior court concluded Casarez’s negligence claims
were preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (Pub.L. No. 103-305
(Aug. 23, 1994) 108 Stat. 1569) (FAAAA). We agree
and affirm the judgments.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.
Undisputed facts 1
a.
Accident
On the evening of September 27, 2019, Olivia Mendoza was driving westbound on Mountain View Avenue when a tractor trailer heading northbound on Clovis Avenue ran a stop sign and collided with her vehicle. Olivia 2 was pronounced dead at the scene. Before the accident, Andre Hill—the driver of the tractor
trailer—picked up a load of produce from Irigoyen
Farms for delivery to Walmart’s distribution center in
McCarran, Nevada.
His “extreme fatigue” was
deemed by law enforcement to have been a factor in
the crash. Hill was subsequently charged with vehicular manslaughter.
1 This part is based on the separate statements in the record.
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1), (3); see also North Coast
Business Park v. Nielsen Construction Co. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th
22, 30–31 [“ ‘[A]ll material facts must be set forth in the separate
statement. “This is the Golden Rule of Summary Adjudication:
if it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” ’
“].) We also consider as part of the record evidence to which objections were made but overruled. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (c).)
2 To avoid confusion, we identify individuals who share the
same surname by their first names. No disrespect is intended.
App-3
b.
Additional background
Irigoyen Farms, a family farm based in Selma, produces over 30 varieties of fresh vegetables and supplies fresh produce to its customers. One such purchaser is Walmart.
Irigoyen Farms typically contracts with a freight
broker to ship its produce. Prior to the aforementioned
accident: (1) Irigoyen Farms contracted with Royal
Violet Logistics, LLC (Royal Violet) to “arrange for the
delivery of the subject load”; (2) Royal Violet contracted with SIO Logistics LLC (SIO) to “hire a motor
carrier for the subject load”; (3) SIO contracted with
Gold Coast Logistics Group (Gold Coast) “to act as the
motor carrier of the subject load”; and (4) Gold Coast
hired Hill as an independent contractor and provided
him with the tractor trailer involved in the collision.
II. Operative complaint
Casarez—individually and on behalf of her daughter Olivia’s estate—filed a lawsuit against Irigoyen
Farms and Walmart, among others. 3 In her complaint, she raised three causes of action: (1) motor
vehicle negligence; (2) general negligence; and (3)
wrongful death. Casarez alleged Irigoyen Farms
and/or Walmart owned or otherwise controlled the
Casarez joined Jaime Mendoza—Olivia’s father—as a defendant under Code of Civil Procedure section 382. “A party
who is joined in a wrongful death action as a defendant under
[Code of Civil Procedure] section 382 is only nominally a defendant. In reality, he is a plaintiff [citations].” (Estate of Kuebler v.
Superior Court (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 500, 503–504.) Jaime filed
a cross-complaint and opposed defendants’ summary judgment
motions, which likely explains why the record sometimes refers
to multiple plaintiffs. Jaime is not a party to this appeal.
3
App-4
tractor trailer; employed and entrusted the tractor
trailer to Hill; negligently failed to train and supervise
Hill; and negligently failed to maintain and repair the
tractor trailer.
Later, in appellant’s opening brief, Casarez clarified
she was suing Irigoyen Farms and Walmart “for their
actions and their failures to comply with the industry
standards applicable specifically to them, not vicariously for the acts of the motor carrier or broker, or for
the broker’s negligent hiring of the motor carrier.”
Specifically, she “sued Walmart because its onerous
contractual requirements incentivized reckless conduct by motor carriers” and “sued Irigoyen Farms because, through its employees, it loaded its product on
the truck driven by . . . Hill and sent him on his way
despite actual, contemporaneous knowledge he had a
long distance to travel, had to be there within just a
few hours, yet was obviously already exhausted.”
III. Summary judgment motions
In May 2023, Irigoyen Farms and Walmart each
filed a motion for summary judgment. Both argued—among other things—the FAAAA preempted
Casarez’s claims. In her opposition to these motions,
Casarez asserted the FAAAA did not apply because (1)
“the FAAAA only preempts state laws that relate to
motor carriers, brokers, and freight forwarders” and
“neither Walmart nor Irigoyen Farms is a motor carrier or a transportation broker”; and (2) “the FAAAA
does not preempt state law personal injury claims”
that are subject to its “safety regulation exception.”
In support of the latter, Casarez cited Miller v. C.H.
Robinson Worldwide, Inc. (9th Cir. 2020) 976 F.3d
1016 (Miller).
App-5
IV. Ruling
Following an August 9, 2023 hearing, the superior
court adopted its tentative ruling, which granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The ruling read in part:
“The [FAAAA] expressly preempts negligence claims against a broker and its hirer.
[Citation.] [¶] It is undisputed that the products onboard the truck were being shipped
from the grower (Irigoyen Farms . . .) to the
retailer (Walmart . . .). [Citation.] It is also
undisputed that such a shipment is typically
arranged through a freight broker. [Citation.] Therefore, the burden shifts to plaintiffs to show that preemption does not apply.
[Citation.]
“Plaintiffs rely on Miller[, supra,] 976 F.3d
1016 for the proposition that the FAAAA does
not preempt state law personal injury claims
under the safety regulation exception. [Citation.] Miller, however, is distinguishable
because there the party asserting preemption
was the broker that had specifically selected
the transportation service.
[Citation.]
Here it is the grower and retailer. Furthermore, the entity [in Miller] in the analogous
remote role of the moving parties here was
dismissed from the proceeding altogether.
[Citation.] In addition, Miller’s application
of the safety [regulation] exception has recently been rejected in a case with near-identical facts.
[Citation.]
Consequently,
plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to
App-6
show their claim is not preempted under federal law as to moving defendants Walmart
and Irigoyen [Farms].”
DISCUSSION
I.
Overview of legal principles
a.
Summary judgment law
“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has
no merit or that there is no defense to the action or
proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., 4 § 437c, subd. (a)(1).)
Summary judgment “provide[s] courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to
determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is
in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843
(Aguilar); see Lee v. Marchetti (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 97,
99 [“ ‘The salient philosophy behind this procedural
device is to provide a method for the prompt disposition of actions and proceedings which have no merit
and in which there is no triable material issue of
fact . . . .’ ” (italics omitted)].)
A motion for summary judgment “shall be granted
if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In
determining if the papers show that there is no triable
issue as to any material fact, the court shall consider
all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except the
evidence to which objections have been made and
Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent statutory citations
refer to the Code of Civil Procedure.
4
App-7
sustained by the court, and all inferences reasonably
deducible from the evidence, except summary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a
triable issue as to any material fact.” (§ 437c, subd.
(c).)
A defendant seeking summary judgment bears an
initial burden to produce evidence demonstrating either one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or there is a complete defense to
that cause of action. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 849–850, 854–855.) “The
burden on a defendant moving for summary judgment
based upon the assertion of an affirmative defense is
heavier than the burden to show one or more elements
of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established.”
(Anderson v. Metalclad Insulation Corp. (1999) 72
Cal.App.4th 284, 289.) “Instead of merely submitting evidence to negate a single element of the plaintiff’s cause of action, . . . ‘the defendant has the initial
burden to show that undisputed facts support each element of the affirmative defense’ [citations].” (Ibid.,
italics omitted; see Kids’ Universe v. In2Labs (2002)
95 Cal.App.4th 870, 878–879 [preponderance of the
evidence standard of proof].)
If the defendant makes a prima facie showing, then
the burden of production “shifts to the plaintiff . . . to
show that a triable issue of one or more material facts
exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”
(§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Specifically, where the defendant raises an affirmative defense, “the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to show there is one or more triable issues of material fact regarding the defense after the
App-8
defendant meets the burden of establishing all the elements of the affirmative defense.” (Jessen v. Mentor
Corp. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1484; see Vahle v.
Barwick (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1328 [“The
plaintiff need not produce any evidence until the defendant has established every element of his or her
defense.”].) “The plaintiff . . . shall not rely upon the
allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a
triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall
set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue
of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a
defense thereto.” (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); accord, Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849.) “There is a triable
issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence
would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion
in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”
(Aguilar, supra, at p. 850, fn. omitted.)
“[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party
moving for summary judgment bears the burden of
persuasion[5] that there is no triable issue of material
fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850, fn. omitted.)
b.
Federal preemption
“The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution establishes that federal law ‘shall be the supreme law of the land . . . , any thing in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
Whereas a burden of production entails only the presentation of evidence, a burden of persuasion entails the establishment of a requisite degree of belief by way of such evidence.
(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)
5
App-9
notwithstanding.’
[Citation.]
Consequently, the
supremacy clause vests Congress with the power to
preempt state laws. ‘Congress may exercise that
power by enacting an express preemption provision,
or courts may infer preemption under one or more of
three implied preemption doctrines: conflict, obstacle, or field preemption.’
[Citations.]
Express
preemption occurs when Congress defines the extent
to which its enactments preempt state law. [Citation.] Conflict preemption is found when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law simultaneously. [Citation.] Obstacle preemption occurs
when state law stands as an obstacle to the full accomplishment and execution of congressional objectives.
[Citation.] Field preemption applies when federal
regulation is comprehensive and leaves no room for
state regulation. [Citation.]” (People ex rel. Harris
v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th
772, 777–778.)
Where a plaintiff’s claims are federally preempted,
summary judgment is appropriate. (Jessen v. Mentor Corp., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1485; Armstrong v. Optical Radiation Corp. (1996) 50
Cal.App.4th 580, 584–585; Scott v. CIBA Vision Corp.
(1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 307, 313.)
c.
FAAAA
Under the FAAAA, a state “may not enact or enforce
a law, regulation, or other provision having the force
and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of
any motor carrier . . . , broker, or freight forwarder
with respect to the transportation of property.” (49
U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1); see Scott v. CIBA Vision Corp.,
supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 314 [“When Congress has
App-10
considered the issue of preemption and has included
in the enacted legislation a provision expressly addressing that issue, there is no need to engage in an
analysis of implied preemption principles.”].) The
following words are explicitly defined by statute:
“The term ‘motor carrier’ means a person providing
motor vehicle transportation for compensation.” (49
U.S.C. § 13102(14).)
“The term ‘broker’ means a person, other than a motor carrier or an employee or agent of a motor carrier,
that as a principal or agent sells, offers for sale, negotiates for, or holds itself out by solicitation, advertisement, or otherwise as selling, providing, or arranging
for, transportation by motor carrier for compensation.”
(49 U.S.C. § 13102(2).)
“The term ‘freight forwarder’ means a person holding itself out to the general public (other than as a
pipeline, rail, motor, or water carrier) to provide
transportation of property for compensation and in
the ordinary course of its business— [¶] (A) assembles
and consolidates, or provides for assembling or consolidating, shipments and performs or provides for
break-bulk and distribution operations of the shipments; [¶] (B) assumes responsibility for the transportation from the place of receipt to the place of destination; and [¶] (C) uses for any part of the transportation
a carrier subject to jurisdiction under this subtitle.”
(49 U.S.C. § 13102(8).)
“The term ‘transportation’ includes— [¶] (A) a motor vehicle, vessel, warehouse, wharf, pier, dock, yard,
property, facility, instrumentality, or equipment of
any kind related to the movement of passengers or
property, or both, regardless of ownership or an agreement concerning use; and [¶] (B) services related to
App-11
that movement, including arranging for, receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, refrigeration, icing, ventilation, storage, handling, packing, unpacking, and interchange of passengers and property.”
(49 U.S.C. § 13102(23).)
On the other hand, the meanings of certain phrases
have been established by the United States Supreme
Court:
The phrase “law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law” “comfortably” includes
“state common-law rules.” (Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg (2014) 572 U.S. 273, 281–282, citing 49 U.S.C. §
41713(b)(1).)
The phrase “related to” “embraces state laws ‘having a connection with or reference to’ carrier ‘ “rates,
routes, or services,” ’ whether directly or indirectly.
[Citation.]” (Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey
(2013) 569 U.S. 251, 260 (Pelkey); see Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc. (1992) 504 U.S. 374, 383 [“The ordinary meaning of [‘relating to’] is a broad one . . . and
the words thus express a broad pre-emptive purpose.”].)
The phrase “with respect to” “ ‘massively limits the
scope of preemption’ ordered by the FAAAA. [Citation.]” (Pelkey, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 261, fn. omitted.)
“[F]or purposes of FAAAA preemption, it is not sufficient that a state law relates to the ‘price, route, or
service’ of a motor carrier in any capacity; the law
must also concern a motor carrier’s ‘transportation of
property.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
The FAAAA “exempts certain measures from its
preemptive scope . . . .” (Pelkey, supra, 569 U.S. at p.
256.) For instance, 49 United States Code section
14501(c)(2)(A) reads in part:
App-12
“[Paragraph (1)] shall not restrict the safety
regulatory authority of a State with respect to
motor vehicles, the authority of a State to impose highway route controls or limitations
based on the size or weight of the motor vehicle or the hazardous nature of the cargo, or
the authority of a State to regulate motor carriers with regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance
requirements and self-insurance authorization . . . .” (Italics added.)
“The term ‘motor vehicle’ means a vehicle, machine,
tractor, trailer, or semitrailer propelled or drawn by
mechanical power and used on a highway in transportation . . . .” (49 U.S.C. § 13102(16).)
II. Standard of review
We review de novo “the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on purely legal issues such as federal
preemption” (Valencia v. SCIS Air Security Corp.
(2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 377, 383) as well as “ ‘[q]uestions of statutory interpretation . . . and the applicability of a statutory standard to undisputed facts’ ”
(California State University, Fresno Assn., Inc. v.
County of Fresno (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 250, 265 (Cal.
State Fresno)).
III. Analysis
a. The FAAAA preempts plaintiff’s negligence
claims against defendants
In granting the summary judgment motions, the superior court concluded Casarez’s negligence claims
were preempted by the FAAAA. On appeal, Casarez
App-13
contends the FAAAA does not apply for two reasons.
First, the preemption clause identifies “motor carrier[s], “broker[s], and “freight forwarder[s]” (49 U.S.C.
§ 14501(c)(1)), not “shippers” and “receivers” like
Irigoyen Farms and Walmart, respectively. Second,
Irigoyen Farms and Walmart “are [being] sued for direct negligence rather than the negligence of others.”
(Boldface & capitalization omitted.) Neither contention is persuasive.
“ ‘In ascertaining the meaning of a statute, we look
to the [legislative] intent . . . as expressed by the actual words of the statute’ [citation], ‘giving them a
plain and commonsense meaning’ [citation].” (Cal.
State Fresno, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 266.) “ ‘If
there is no ambiguity in the language, we presume the
Legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning
of the statute governs.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Here,
the express language of the FAAAA is unequivocal: a
state “may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or
other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . , broker, or freight forwarder with respect to
the transportation of property.”
(49 U.S.C. §
14501(c)(1).) Nothing in the language suggests a
beneficiary of the preemption clause must itself be a
motor carrier, broker, or freight forwarder. (See, e.g.,
Creagan v. Wal-Mart Transportation, LLC (N.D. Ohio
2018) 354 F.Supp.3d 808, 813, fn. 6 [FAAAA
preempted claim against shipper].) Nothing in the
language suggests preemption is limited to claims of
vicarious liability. Instead, the FAAAA applies so
long as the claim “(1) derives from the enactment or
enforcement of state law and (2) relates to [the] prices,
routes, or services [of a motor carrier, broker, or
App-14
freight forwarder] with respect to the transportation
of property.” (People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor
Transportation, Inc., supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 782.)
“ ‘When statutory language is clear and unambiguous
there is no need for construction, and we will not indulge in it.’ [Citations.]” (Cal. State Fresno, supra,
at p. 266.) “ ‘We will not speculate that [Congress]
meant something other than what it said. Nor will we
rewrite a statute to posit an unexpressed intent.’
[Citations.]” (Ibid.)
Undisputed facts demonstrate Casarez’s negligence
claims against Irigoyen Farms and Walmart are derived from “law[s], regulation[s], or other provision[s]
having the force and effect of law” (see Northwest, Inc.
v. Ginsberg, supra, 572 U.S. at p. 282 [“It is routine to
call common-law rules ‘provisions.’ ”]) and ultimately
deal with Hill’s driving while en route to Walmart’s
distribution center to deliver Irigoyen’s produce (see
Pelkey, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 261 [claim must “concern
a motor carrier’s ‘transportation of property’ ”]).
Therefore, the FAAAA preempts these claims.
b. The FAAAA’s safety exception does not apply in
the instant case
On appeal, Casarez reiterates the FAAAA’s safety
exception under 49 United States Code section
14501(c)(2)(A) exempts state law personal injury
claims from preemption. She primarily relies on Miller, supra, 976 F.3d 1016 for this proposition. In that
case, the plaintiff was seriously injured in a collision
with a tractor trailer that was transporting goods for
a warehouse club. (Miller, supra, at p. 1020.) He
sued the freight broker that arranged for the transportation, alleging the broker “negligently selected an
App-15
unsafe motor carrier.” (Ibid.) The federal district
court found the plaintiff’s claim was preempted by the
FAAAA and did not “fall within the exception for ‘the
safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to
motor vehicles.’ ” (Miller, at p. 1020.) While the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed the claim was
sufficiently “related to” broker services, which is
within the ambit of the preemption clause (see id. at
pp. 1021–1025), it concluded the district court “erred
in holding that the safety exception does not apply” (id.
at p. 1020). Examining the phrase “with respect to
motor vehicles” (49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A)), the circuit court understood “ ‘with respect to’ ” as being synonymous with “ ‘relat[ed] to.’ ” (Miller, supra, at p.
1030.) Hence, to successfully invoke the safety exception, a claim need only “ ‘ “hav[e] a connection with”
motor vehicles,’ whether directly or indirectly. [Citation.]” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) The Ninth Circuit held
“negligence claims against brokers, to the extent that
they arise out of motor vehicle accidents, have the requisite ‘connection with’ motor vehicles” and are covered by the safety exception. (Id. at p. 1031.)
At the outset, we point out “[f]ederal decisions may
be persuasive, but California courts are not bound by
the decisions of the lower federal courts.” (Santa
Ynez Band of Chumash Mission Indians v. Lexington
Ins. Co. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1064, 1071, citing People v. Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80, 86; accord, Raven v.
Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 352.) We have no
obligation to follow Miller. Moreover, we find Miller’s rationale deficient. First, the Ninth Circuit apparently believed the preemptive scope of the FAAAA
was first “tempered by ‘the presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law,’
App-16
particularly in areas of traditional state regulation.”
(Miller, supra, 976 F.3d at p. 1021.) However, “[i]f a
statute ‘contains an express pre-emption clause, our
“task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which
necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’
pre-emptive intent.” ’
[Citations.]”
(Brown v.
Mortensen (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1052, 1060; accord,
Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust (2016)
579 U.S. 115, 125.)
“The presumption against
preemption does not apply when there is an express
preemption clause . . . .” (Assur. Wireless USA, L.P.
v. Reynolds (9th Cir. 2024) 100 F.4th 1024, 1032, fn. 4;
see R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. County of Los Angeles
(9th Cir. 2022) 29 F.4th 542, 553, fn. 6 [Miller mistakenly relied on presumption against preemption when
evaluating express preemption clause].)
Second, by finding “with respect to” and “related to”
interchangeable, the Ninth Circuit ignored relevant
United States Supreme Court precedent that clearly
distinguished between these phrases in the FAAAA
context. As noted, with respect to 49 United States
Code section 14501(c)(1), the high court construed “related to” more broadly and “with respect to” more restrictively. (See ante, at p. 9.) Tellingly, “with respect to” is utilized in the safety exception (49 U.S.C.
§ 14501(c)(2)), which immediately follows the preemption clause. “[I]t is a well-established rule of construction that when a word or phrase has been given
a particular scope or meaning in one part or portion of
a law it shall be given the same scope and meaning in
other parts or portions of the law.” (Stillwell v. State
Bar (1946) 29 Cal.2d 119, 123; see IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez
(2005) 546 U.S.21, 34 [“[I]dentical words used in
App-17
different parts of the same statute are generally presumed to have the same meaning.”].) “It would be
odd if, in two consecutive subsections of the Code,
which use materially identical language, the same
words were read to mean one thing in the first subsection but another in the second. All else being equal,
we prefer a reading of the second that coheres with
binding precedent as to the first.” (Hylton v. U.S.
Atty. Gen. (11th Cir. 2021) 992 F.3d 1154, 1159; accord,
Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Landstar Ranger
(11th Cir. 2023) 65 F.4th 1261, 1271 (Aspen).) Thus,
“[j]ust as the phrase ‘with respect to the transportation of property’ ‘massively limits’ the preemption provision, we read the phrase ‘with respect to motor vehicles’ to impose a meaningful limit on the [safety] exception to the preemption provision.” (Aspen, supra,
65 F.4th at p. 1271.)6
Miller’s expansive interpretation of “with respect to
motor vehicles” encompasses both direct and indirect
connections with motor vehicles (see Miller, supra,
976 F.3d at p. 1030), which—far from imposing a
meaningful limit on the safety exception—enables the
safety exception to swallow the preemption clause. As
noted, the preemption clause applies to claims that
derive from the enactment or enforcement of state law
6 For this reason, we find unpersuasive Cox v. Total Quality
Logistics, Inc. (6th Cir. 2025) 142 F.4th 847, a case Casarez’s
counsel highlighted at oral argument. In an opinion filed July 8,
2025, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held the plaintiff’s negligence claim was covered by the FAAAA’s safety exception.
(Cox, at p. 858.) In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit—
akin to the Ninth Circuit in Miller—“read the ordinary meaning
of ‘with respect to’ as synonymous with . . . ‘relating to.’ ” (Id. at
p. 857.)
App-18
and relates to the prices, routes, or services of a motor
carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to
the transportation of property. (See ante, at p. 11.)
“Of course, every state law that relates to the prices,
routes, or services of a motor carrier, broker who contracts with a motor carrier, or freight forwarder who
‘uses . . . a [motor] carrier’ [citation], will have at least
an indirect relationship to motor vehicles—motor vehicles are how motor carriers move property from one
place to another. [Citation.] Accordingly, if an indirect connection between a state law and a motor vehicle satisfied the safety exception, then the phrase
‘with respect to motor vehicles’ would have no meaningful operative effect.” (Aspen, supra, 65 F.4th at p.
1271.) Furthermore, “[i]f an indirect connection to
motor vehicles made a state law ‘with respect to motor
vehicles’ for the purposes of the safety exception, then
Congress’s inclusion of a separate exception to allow
states to impose highway route controls and cargo limits would almost certainly be redundant because such
controls and limits are indirectly related to motor vehicle safety, too.” (Id. at p. 1272, italics omitted; see
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A).) “ ‘An interpretation that
renders related provisions nugatory must be avoided
[citation] . . . .’ ” (Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 659; see In re J. W. (2002)
29 Cal.4th 200, 209 [“One principle assumes that
every part of a statute serves a purpose and that nothing is superfluous.”].) To “ensure that the phrase
‘with respect to motor vehicles’ has an operative effect”
(Aspen, supra, at p. 1271) that comports with “[t]he
canon against surplusage” (Whitehead v. City of Oakland (2025) 17 Cal.5th 735, 747, fn. 1), it must be construed as “requiring a direct connection between the
App-19
state law and motor vehicles” (Aspen, supra, at p.
1271).
According to Casarez herself, she “sued Walmart
because its onerous contractual requirements incentivized reckless conduct by motor carriers” and “sued
Irigoyen Farms because, through its employees, it
loaded its product on the truck driven by . . . Hill and
sent him on his way despite actual, contemporaneous
knowledge he had a long distance to travel, had to be
there within just a few hours, yet was obviously already exhausted.” These claims do not purport the
tractor trailer itself was defective or other otherwise
unsafe. Therefore, the FAAAA’s safety exception
does not apply here. 7
DISPOSITION
The September 11, 2023 judgments of the superior
court are affirmed. Costs are awarded to defendants
and respondents Irigoyen Farms, Inc. and Walmart
Inc.
WE CONCUR:
/s/ Detjen
DETJEN, Acting P. J.
/s/ Peña
PEÑA, J.
/s/ De Santos
DE SANTOS, J.
In light of our disposition, we need not address other arguments raised by the parties.
7
App-20
Appendix B
[Filed: Sep. 30, 2025]
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
In The Court of Appeal of the State of California
Fifth Appellate District
CHRISTINA CASAREZ,
F086901
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No.
19CECG03758)
v.
ORDER
GRANTING
REQUESTS
FOR PUBLICATION
IRIGOYEN FARMS, INC. et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
As the nonpublished opinion filed on September 10,
2025, in the above entitled matter hereby meets the
standards for publication specified in the California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c), it is ordered that the
opinion be certified for publication in the Official Reports.
/s/ Detjen
DETJEN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
/s/ Peña
PEÑA, J.
/s/ De Santos
DE SANTOS, J
App-21
Appendix C
[Filed: Jan. 14, 2026]
Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District –
No. F086901
S293697
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
En Banc
_________________________________________________
CHRISTINA CASAREZ,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
IRIGOYEN FARMS, INC. et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
_________________________________________________
The applications to appear as counsel pro hac vice
are granted. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.40(a).)
The petition for review is denied.
The request for an order directing depublication of
the opinion is denied.
GUERRERO
Chief Justice
.
App-22
Appendix D
. [Filed: Oct. 17, 2025]
IN THE
Court of Appeal of the State of California
IN AND FOR THE
Fifth Appellate District
CHRISTINA CASAREZ,
F086901
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No.
19CECG03758)
v.
IRIGOYEN FARMS, INC. et al.,
ORDER
Defendants and Respondents.
Appellant’s petition for rehearing filed October 15,
2025, in the above referenced case is hereby denied.
Appellant’s “MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE,”
filed October 15, 2025, is denied. The materials as to
which judicial notice is requested are not necessary or
helpful to our analysis. (See Jordache Enterprises,
Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th
739, 748, fn. 6; Appel v. Superior Court (2013) 214
Cal.App.4th 329, 342, fn. 6.)
/s/ Detjen
DETJEN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
/s/ Peña
PEÑA, J.
/s/ De Santos
DE SANTOS, J
App-23
Appendix E
(Filed: Aug. 10, 2023)
SUPERIOR COURT OF
CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF FRESNO
Civil Department - Non-Limited
Entered by:
TITLE OF CASE:
Christina Casarez vs. Andre Hill
LAW AND MOTION MINUTE
ORDER
Hearing Date:
Hearing Type:
Department:
Judge:
Court Clerk:
Reporter:
Appearing Parties:
Plaintiff:
Christina Casarez
Counsel: K. Little
[ ] Off Calendar
Case Number:
19CECG03758
August 9, 2023
Summary Judgment (X2)
403
Jon M Skiles
J. Xiong
Not Reported
Defendant:
Counsel: E. Ruiz;
Z. Batkhand (Zoom);
E. Hugo (Zoom);
G. Gutierrez (Zoom);
M. D’Amico (Zoom)
App-24
[ ] Continued to [ ] Set for __ at __ Dept. for __
[ ] Submitted on points and authorities with/without
argument.
[X] Matter is argued and submitted.
[ ] Upon filing of points and authorities.
[ ] Motion is granted [ ] in part and denied in part.
[ ] Motion is denied [ ] with/without prejudice.
[ ] Taken under advisement
[ ] Demurrer [ ] overruled [ ] sustained with __ days
to [ ] answer [ ] amend
[X] Tentative ruling becomes the order of the
court. No further order is necessary.
[X] Pursuant to CRC 3.1312(a) and CCP section
1019.5(a), no further order is necessary. The
minute order adopting the tentative ruling
serves as the order of the court.
[X] Service by the clerk will constitute notice of
the order.
[X] See attached copy of the Tentative Ruling.
[ ] Judgment debtor __ sworn and examined.
[ ] Judgment debtor __ failed to appear.
Bench warrant issued in the amount of $ __
JUDGMENT:
[ ] Money damages [ ] Default
in the amount of:
Principal $__
Interest $__
ney fees $__ Total $__
[ ] Other __ entered
Costs $__
Attor-
App-25
[ ] Claim of exemption [ ] granted [ ] denied.
Court orders withholdings modified to $ __ per __
FURTHER, COURT ORDERS:
[ ] Monies held by levying officer to be [ ] released to
judgment creditor.
[ ] returned to judgment
debtor.
[ ] $ __ to be released to judgment creditor and balance returned to judgment debtor.
[ ] Levying Officer, County of __ , notified.
issue
[ ] Notice to be filed within 15 days.
of Premises
[ ] Other: __
[ ] Writ to
[ ] Restitution
App-26
Tentative Ruling
Re:
Christina Casarez v. Andre Hill
Superior
Court
Case
No.
19CECG03758
Hearing Date:
August 9, 2023 (Dept. 403)
Motion:
(1) By Defendant Walmart, Inc. for
Summary Judgment
(2) By Defendant Irigoyen Farms,
Inc. for Summary Judgment
Tentative Ruling:
To overrule all objections and grant defendants
Walmart, Inc.’s and Irigoyen Farms, Inc.’s, motions
for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437C,
subds. (p) and (q).) Moving defendants are directed
to submit to the court proposed judgment consistent
with the summary judgment rulings within ten (10)
days from the date of this order.
Explanation:
A trial court shall grant summary judgment where
there are no triable issues of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. (Code Civ. Proc., §437c, subd. (c); Schacter v.
Citigroup (2009) 47 Cal.4th 610, 618.) “A motion for
summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.”
(Code of Civ. Proc., § 437C subd. (f)(1); see also Catalano v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 91, 97
[piecemeal adjudication prohibited.].)
App-27
In determining motion for summary judgment or
adjudication, “‘we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to plaintiffs’” and “‘liberally construe plaintiffs’ evidentiary submissions and strictly scrutinize
defendant[’s] own evidence, in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiffs’ favor.”’
(McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist.
(2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 96-97, citations omitted.) The
court does not weigh evidence or inferences (Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 856), nevertheless, “‘[w]hen opposition to a motion for summary judgment is based on inferences, those inferences must be reasonably deducible from the evidence,
and not such as are derived from speculation, conjecture, imagination, or guesswork.” (Waschek v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 640,
647, citation omitted; Code Civ. Proc., § 437C, subd.
(c).)
“A defendant bears the burden of persuasion that
‘one or more elements of’ the ‘cause of action’ in question ‘cannot be established,’ or that ‘there is complete
defense’ thereto.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) In particular, for purposes of summary judgment, “[a] defendant or crossdefendant has met his or her burden of showing that
a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown
that one or more elements of the cause of action, even
if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or
that there is complete defense to the cause of action.”
(Code Civ. Proc., §437c, subd. (p)(1).)
Preemption
The Federal Aviation Authorization Administration
Act (“FAAA”) expressly preempts negligence claims
App-28
against a broker and its hirer. (Creagan v. Wal-Mart
Transportation, LLC (2018) 354 F.Supp.3d 808, 814
[holding that personal injury plaintiffs could proceed
against a motor carrier, but not a broker and hirer].)
It is undisputed that the products onboard the truck
were being shipped from the grower (Irigoyen Farms,
Inc. [“Irigoyen”]) to the retailer (Walmart, Inc.
[“Walmart”]). (SUMF, nos, 3-5.) It is also undisputed that such shipment is typically arranged
through freight broker. (SUMF, no. 5.) Therefore,
the burden shifts to plaintiffs to show that preemption
does not apply. (See Code Civ. Proc., §437c, subd.
(p)(1).)
Plaintiffs rely on Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide,
Inc. (9th Cir. 2020) 976 F.3d 1016 for the proposition
that the FAAAA does not preempt state law personal
injury claims under the safety regulation exception.
(Id. at p. 1030-1031, (Miller).) Miller, however, is
distinguishable because there the party asserting
preemption was the broker that had specifically selected the transportation service (Id. at p. 1020).
Here it is the grower and retailer. Furthermore, the
entity (Costco) in the analogous remote role of the
moving parties here, was dismissed from the proceeding altogether. (Ibid, fn. 1.) In addition, Miller’s
application of the safety exception has recently been
rejected in a case with near-identical facts. (See Ye
v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc. (7th Cir. 2023) 2023
WL 4567097, at pp. 9-10 [holding that the safety exception would not save from preemption under 49
U.S.C.§ 14501 negligent hiring claim against a freight
broker.].) Consequently, plaintiffs have failed to
meet their burden to show their claim is not
App-29
preempted under federal law as to moving defendants
Walmart and Irigoyen.
Because the motions are disposed of on express
preemption grounds, the court need not reach the
other asserted grounds of implied preemption and
duty.
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule
3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5,
subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary.
The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will
serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk
will constitute notice of the order.
Tentative Ruling
Issued By:
JS
on
(Judge’s initials)
8/7/2023
(Date)
App-30
SUPERIOR COURT OF
CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF FRESNO
Civil Department,
Central Division
1130 “O” Street
Fresno, California 93724-0002
(559) 457-2000
TITLE OF CASE:
Christina Casarez vs. Andre Hill
FOR COURT
USE ONLY
CLERK’S CERTIFICATE OF
Case Number:
MAILING
19CECG03758
I certify that I am not a party to this cause and that a
true copy of the:
Minute Order and Tentative Ruling
was placed in a sealed envelope and placed for collection and mailing on the date and at the place shown
below following our ordinary business practice. I am
readily familiar with this court’s practice for collecting
and processing correspondence for mailing. On the
same day that correspondence is placed for collection
and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of
business with the United States Postal Service with
postage fully prepaid.
Place of mailing: Fresno, California 93724-0002
On Date: 08/10/2023 Clerk, by /s/ J. Xiong , Deputy
J. Xiong
App-31
Kevin G. Little
Law Office of Kevin G.
Little
P.O. Box 8656
Fresno, CA 93747
Eddie Ruiz
Attorney at Law
2341 East Ashlan Ave
Fresno, CA 93726
Barry D. Brown
Cholakian & Associates
400 Oyster Point Blvd.,
Suite. 415
San Francisco, CA
94080
John P. Cotter
Diepenbrock & Cotter
LLP
1435 River Park
Drive, Suite 400
Sacramento, CA 95815
James D Weakley
Weakley & Arendt,
APC
5200 N. Palm Ave.,
Suite 211
Fresno, CA 93704
Patrick S. Schoenburg
Wood, Smith, Henning
Berman LLP
7108 N. Fresno St,
Suite 250
Fresno, CA 93720
Tina M. Glezakos
HUGO PARKER, LLP
240 Stockton Street,
8th Floor
San Francisco, CA
94108
Shelley O’Connor
Cholakian & Associates
400 Oyster Point
Blvd., Ste. 415
South San Francisco,
CA 94080
App-32
Marisa L. D’Amico
Murchison & Cumming, LLP
2175 N. California
Blvd., Suite 900
Walnut Creek, CA
94596
Sumair S Sandhu
Sandhu Law Group
APC
2535 Capitol Oaks
Drive, Suite 450
Sacramento, CA 95833
App-33
Appendix F
Statutory Provisions Involved
49 U. S. C. § 14501(c)
(c) MOTOR CARRIERS OF PROPERTY.—
(1) GENERAL RULE.—Except as provided in
paragraphs (2) and (3), a State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority of 2 or more
States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation,
or other provision having the force and effect of
law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier (other than a carrier affiliated with a
direct air carrier covered by section 41713(b)(4))
or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight
forwarder with respect to the transportation of
property.
(2) MATTERS NOT COVERED.—Paragraph
(1)—
(A) shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles,
the authority of a State to impose highway
route controls or limitations based on the size
or weight of the motor vehicle or the hazardous
nature of the cargo, or the authority of a State
to regulate motor carriers with regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements and self-insurance authorization;
(B) does not apply to the intrastate transportation of household goods; and
(C) does not apply to the authority of a State or
a political subdivision of a State to enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision relating to the regulation of tow truck operations
App-34
performed without the prior consent or authorization of the owner or operator of the motor vehicle.
(3) STATE STANDARD TRANSPORTATION
PRACTICES.—
(A) CONTINUATION.—Paragraph (1) shall
not affect any authority of a State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority of 2 or
more States to enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision, with respect to the intrastate transportation of property by motor
carriers, related to—
(i) uniform cargo liability rules,
(ii) uniform bills of lading or receipts for
property being transported,
(iii) uniform cargo credit rules,
(iv) antitrust immunity for joint line rates or
routes, classifications, mileage guides, and
pooling, or
(v) antitrust immunity for agent-van line operations (as set forth in section 13907), if
such law, regulation, or provision meets the
requirements of subparagraph (B).
(B) REQUIREMENTS.—A law, regulation, or
provision of a State, political subdivision, or political authority meets the requirements of this
subparagraph if—
(i) the law, regulation, or provision covers the
same subject matter as, and compliance with
such law, regulation, or provision is no more
burdensome than compliance with, a provision of this part or a regulation issued by the
Secretary or the Board under this part; and
App-35
(ii) the law, regulation, or provision only applies to a carrier upon request of such carrier.
(C) ELECTION.—Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, a carrier affiliated with a direct air carrier through common controlling
ownership may elect to be subject to a law, regulation, or provision of a State, political subdivision, or political authority under this paragraph.
(4) NONAPPLICABILITY TO HAWAII.—This
subsection shall not apply with respect to the
State of Hawaii.
(5) LIMITATION ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall be
construed to prevent a State from requiring that,
in the case of a motor vehicle to be towed from
private property without the consent of the owner
or operator of the vehicle, the person towing the
vehicle have prior written authorization from the
property owner or lessee (or an employee or agent
thereof) or that such owner or lessee (or an employee or agent thereof) be present at the time the
vehicle is towed from the property, or both.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.