Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Eugene N. Bolin, Jr., Petitioner v. Keystone RV Company

No. ______

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

EUGENE N. BOLIN, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

KEYSTONE RV COMPANY,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Thomas Fitzgerald Ahearne

Counsel of Record

William Kenick

Graham Fulton

FOSTER GARVEY PC

1111 Third Avenue, Suite 3000

Seattle, WA 98101

206-447-8934

ahearne@foster.com

Counsel For Petitioner

LEGAL PRINTERS LLC ! Washington, DC ! 202-747-2400 ! legalprinters.com

i

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Does a person’s 14th Amendment right to

procedural due process include the right to see the

evidence that a court uses against them if the

opposing party who submitted that evidence claims

it is secret under the attorney-client privilege?

Different courts answer this constitutional

question differently. Some federal Circuits hold that

due process requires the person to see all that

evidence. Other Circuits hold the person can see

most of that evidence.

And in this case, the

Washington state courts held the person can see

none of that evidence – limiting the person to a

blacked-out version of the evidence upon which the

court based its ruling. (Image of the blacked-out

versions is in the body of this petition.)

To end the all, most, none split in our

nation’s courts, this Petition asks this Court to

establish a uniform due process right for all

Americans regardless of which Circuit or State they

live in.

ii

PARTIES

Petitioner: The party filing this Petition is

Eugene Bolin, Jr. (“Mr. Bolin”).

Respondent: The Respondent is Keystone

RV Company (“Keystone”).

Other parties in the lawsuit below:

Although this Petition’s procedural due process

question solely concerns Keystone’s attorney fees

motion against Mr. Bolin and trial judge’s

corresponding

$376,626.83

judgment

against

Mr. Bolin, that judgment was entered in a lawsuit to

which the following were also parties: defendants

Tacoma RV Center, Inc., Ladonna Meadows and

John Doe Meadows, American Guardian Warranty

Services, Inc., Contractors Bonding, Dexter Axle

Company, and Lippert Components Manufacturing,

Inc.; plaintiffs Aubrey N. Rinehart and Ryan M. Day;

and plaintiff’s counsel Law Offices of Eugene N.

Bolin Jr. PS. These parties are not participating in

the proceedings before this Court.

iii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Day v. Tacoma RV Center, Inc., No. 104774-6,

Washington State Supreme Court.

Day v. Tacoma RV Center, Inc., Nos. 59095-6–

II, 59788-8–II, Washington State Court of Appeals,

Division Two.

Rinehart v. Tacoma RV Center, Inc. et al., No.

21-2–06008-2, Superior Court for the State of

Washington in and for Pierce County.

Day v. Tacoma RV Center, Inc., No. 23-2–

05117-9, Superior Court for the State of Washington

in and for Pierce County.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ................i

PARTIES ................................................................... ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS .................................... iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... vi

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ............ 1

OPINIONS BELOW ................................................... 1

BASIS FOR JURISDICTION .................................... 2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED ....... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................... 2

1.

The Trial Court Ruling that Petitioner

Asserts Violated His Constitutionally

Protected Right to

Procedural Due Process ............................. 2

2.

The Washington Appellate Courts’ Ruling

on Petitioner’s Due Process Claim ............ 6

3.

The 14th Amendment Procedural Due

Process Question Presented in this

Petition ....................................................... 7

REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS PETITION ....... 8

1.

The 14th Amendment’s Due Process

Guaranty: Washington’s Courts Shall Not

Deprive Mr. Bolin of Property Without

Due Process of Law .................................... 9

v

2.

Money is “Property” Protected under the

14th Amendment’s Due Process Guaranty9

3.

The Procedural Due Process that the

14th Amendment Requires ...................... 10

4.

Employing Secret, Ex Parte Evidence

Does Not Provide the Procedural Due

Process that the 14th Amendment

Requires .................................................... 12

5.

Lack of Consistency Among the Circuits

When Attorney-Client Privilege is

Asserted .................................................... 13

6.

This Court Can (and Should) Easily

Resolve the Lower Courts’ Inconsistent

Interpretation of 14th Amendment

Procedural Due Process Rights ............... 16

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 19

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Am. C.L. Union of Ga. v. Barnes,

168 F.3d 423 (11th Cir. 1999) .............................. 14

Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.

v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995) .. 12-14, 19-21

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965)............... 10

Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564 (1972) ................................................ 9

Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo,

174 F.3d 394 (4th Cir. 1999) ................................ 15

Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill,

470 U.S. 532 (1985) .............................................. 13

Garcia v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 770 F.3d 1300

(10th Cir. 2014)..................................................... 14

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) .............. 11, 17

Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474,

79 S. Ct. 1400, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1377 (1959) ......... 11, 17

Gross v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) .................. 11, 17

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) ................ 13

Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,

512 U.S. 415 (1994) ........................................ 10, 18

vii

Ideal Elec. Sec. Co., Inc. v. Int’l Fid. Ins. Co.,

120 F.3d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1997) .............................. 14

In re Nineteen Appeals Arising Out of San Juan

Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 982 F.2d 603

(1st Cir. 1992) ....................................................... 10

Lynn v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337

(9th Cir. 1981)....................................................... 12

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) ........ 10, 16

Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U.S. 128 (2017) ............. 9, 16

Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,

499 U.S. 1 (1991) .................................................. 18

Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank,

288 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 2002) .......................... 11, 17

Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) ....................... 10

TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 604 U.S. 56 (2025) ...... 11, 17

Yamada v. Nobel Biocare Holding AG,

825 F.3d 536 (9th Cir. 2016) ................................ 14

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, §1 ................................. 2, 9

Statutes

28 U.S.C. §1257(a)...................................................... 2

1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Eugene N. Bolin, Jr. respectfully

petitions for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme

Court of the State of Washington to review the the

Washington

courts’

holding

that

his

14th Amendment right to procedural due process

does not include the right to see attorney fee

evidence that the trial court used against him

because the opposing party who submitted that

evidence against Mr. Bolin asserted that that

evidence was privileged attorney-client information

that the opposing party wanted kept secret from

Mr. Bolin.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Washington Supreme Court’s March 4,

2026 Order denying Mr. Bolin’s Petition for Review

is at 584 P.3d 402 (Wash. 2026), 2026 WL 613166

(App. 121).

The Washington Court of Appeal’s October 14,

2025 Opinion is available at 2025 WL 2910726

(Wash. Ct. App. 2025) (App. 1). That Opinion’s

rejection of Mr. Bolin’s due process claim is at 2025

WL 2910726, at *27-29.

The trial court’s April 8, 2024 Order that

Mr. Bolin “pay restitution” to Respondent in the

amount of $376,626.83 of the attorney fees detailed

in the attorney fee bills Mr. Bolin was not allowed to

see is at App. 80-120 (App. 119, ORDER ¶¶ 1 & 3).

2

BASIS FOR JURISDICTION

The final judgment rendered by the highest

court of the State of Washington was entered

March 4, 2026. (App. 121).

The Petitioner (Mr. Bolin) claims a right to

procedural due process under the 14th Amendment

of the United States Constitution. He accordingly

invokes

this

Court’s

jurisdiction

under

28 U.S.C. §1257(a) (Final judgments or decrees

rendered by the highest court of a State in which a

decision could be had may be reviewed by the

Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where any right

is claimed under the Constitution of the United

States).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution provides in part: “...nor shall any

State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law....”

U.S. CONST.,

amend. XIV, §1.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1.

The Trial Court Ruling that Petitioner

Asserts Violated His Constitutionally

Protected Right to Procedural Due

Process

Respondent

Keystone

RV

Company

(“Keystone”) was one of five corporate defendants in

a product defect case where Petitioner Eugene Bolin

represented the plaintiff. (App. 3-4). After that case

3

was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice (App. 21),

one of those five corporate defendants (Respondent

Keystone RV Company) filed a Motion To Recover

Attorneys’ Fees And Costs against Mr. Bolin.

(App. 37-38).

To evidence the amount, reasonableness, and

necessity of the attorney fees it sought to recover

from Mr. Bolin, Keystone gave the judge the detailed

attorney fee billing statements that it said it had

paid. (App. 38).

But Keystone gave the judge those detailed

attorney fee billing statements ex parte for the judge

to review in camera (App. 38-39) – thereby

preventing Mr. Bolin from being able to see,

confront, question, challenge, or dispute the

reasonableness, necessity, (or even applicability) of

the hundreds of thousands of dollars of attorney fees

Keystone’s motion asked the judge to order Mr. Bolin

to reimburse.

4

Keystone meanwhile provided Mr. Bolin a

heavily redacted copy of the detailed billing

statements it had given to the judge ex parte

(App. 123-131). For example, 88 pages of billing

statements like the following:

(App. 124-125 [above is the actual image of one of the

redacted billing statements in the court file, but

Appendix printing rules prohibited the actual image

being reproduced in this Petition’s Appendix]).

5

Mr. Bolin objected to his being denied access

to the unredacted billing statement evidence that

Keystone had submitted to the judge ex parte for use

against him. (App. 39, 70-73).

Mr. Bolin objected that unlike the unredacted

attorney fee evidence that Keystone had given to the

judge ex parte, approximately 75% of the attorney fee

evidence Keystone provided to him did not even

show what the $502,169.11 Keystone claimed it had

paid was for. (App. 70). 1

Mr. Bolin objected that the redacted invoices

deprived him of due process and were fundamentally

unfair. (App. 39).

The judge rejected Mr. Bolin’s objections, and

ruled that Keystone “has provided unredacted fee

and costs statements in camera substantiating all of

their costs of defense in this case....

Having

reviewed these detailed invoice statements, the

Court finds that all of these expenses were incurred

in defense of the above-captioned lawsuit, and all

were reasonable, and unfortunately necessary

expenditures”. (App. 106).

Based on that in camera review of the ex parte

billing statements that Mr. Bolin was not allowed to

see, the judge ordered Mr. Bolin to “pay restitution”

to Keystone in the amount of $376,626.83 of the

attorney fees detailed in the evidence Mr. Bolin was

not allowed to see (App. 119, ORDER ¶¶ 1 & 3).

The following equation is the math for that approximately

75% calculation: ($502,169.11 - $130,688.50) ÷ $502,169.11 =

0.73975, or 74%.

1

6

The unredacted billing statements upon which

the judge based that $376,626.83 attorney fee

restitution order, however, are not in the court

record because Keystone gave its attorney fee

evidence to the judge ex parte. Only the redacted

billing statements are in the court record for appeal.

(App. 70).

2.

The Washington Appellate Courts’ Ruling

on Petitioner’s Due Process Claim

The Washington Court of Appeals rejected

Mr. Bolin’s claim that ordering him to reimburse

$376,626.83 of the attorney fees detailed in evidence

Mr. Bolin was not allowed to see, confront, question,

challenge, or dispute the reasonableness, necessity,

and applicability of violated his constitutional right

to due process.

2025 WL 2910726, at *27-29

(App. 70-75).

The Washington Court of Appeals did so by

ruling that Mr. Bolin had no 14th Amendment due

process right to see the evidence that the judge used

against him to find that $376,626.83 was the

restitution amount he had to pay to Keystone –

explaining that Keystone asserted the evidence it

had submitted to the judge ex parte for use as a

sword against Mr. Bolin was shielded by the

attorney-client privilege, and that “there is no due

process right for an opposing party to see materials

protected by attorney-client privilege.” 2025 WL

2910726, at *27 (App. 71).

The Washington Supreme Court denied

Mr. Bolin’s Petition for Review of that Court of

7

Appeals decision. 584 P.3d 402 (Wash. 2026), 2026

WL 613166 (App. 121-122).

3.

The 14th Amendment Procedural Due

Process Question Presented in this

Petition

Keystone’s Motion To Recover Attorneys’ Fees

And Costs presented two issues:

Step 1.

The legal liability issue: should

Mr. Bolin be held liable to reimburse any

attorney fees and costs? (App. 80-120).

Step 2.

The factual amount issue: if

Mr. Bolin should be held liable to reimburse

any attorney fees and costs, which of the fees

and costs claimed by Keystone were

reasonable, necessary, and applicable to that

liability? (App. 80-120).

For the reasons explained in the Washington

state court proceedings below, Mr. Bolin believes the

state court erred in the Step 1 liability part of its

ruling on Keystone’s Motion To Recover Attorneys’

Fees And Costs. (App. 78, 119).

But since the state court’s Step 1 legal

liability ruling is governed by Washington state law

instead of federal law, Mr. Bolin’s Petition to this

Court cannot (and thus does not) concern the Step 1

legal question of whether Mr. Bolin should be liable

to reimburse any attorney fees and costs.

On the other hand, the state court’s Step 2

factual determination of which fees and costs

claimed by Keystone are in fact reasonable,

8

necessary, and applicable to Mr. Bolin’s liability

triggers federal law – specifically, Mr. Bolin’s

federally protected 14th Amendment right to

procedural due process when the state court made

its $376,626.83 factual determination.

Put bluntly, the question presented by

Mr. Bolin’s Petition to this Court is straightforward

and simple: Does a person’s 14th Amendment right

to procedural due process include the right to see the

evidence used against that person when the

opposing party submitting that evidence to the court

claims that that evidence is a secret under the

attorney-client privilege? The Washington State

courts’ answer is “no”.

Mr. Bolin respectfully

submits that the United States Constitution’s

answer is “yes”.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS PETITION

The facts material to the constitutional

question presented by this Petition are not

complicated.

This Petition concerns solely the Washington

courts’

Step 2

factual

determination

that

$376,626.83 is the amount of attorney fees and costs

that Mr. Bolin must pay as restitution to reimburse

attorney fees and costs detailed in the billing

statements that Mr. Bolin was not allowed to see. (It

is important to remember that while the findings

concerning the Washington courts’ Step 1 legal

determination that Mr. Bolin’s conduct created legal

liability to Keystone can be long and contentious,

this Petition only concerns the Washington courts’

Step 2 factual determination that $376,626.83 is the

9

dollar amount of reasonable, necessary, and

applicable attorney fees and costs that Mr. Bolin

must pay as restitution to reimburse the Keystone

attorney fees and costs detailed in the billing

statements that Mr. Bolin was not allowed to see.)

1.

The 14th Amendment’s Due Process

Guaranty: Washington’s Courts

Shall Not Deprive Mr. Bolin of Property

Without Due Process of Law

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution mandates that no state shall

“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law.” U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV.

2.

Money is “Property” Protected under the

14th Amendment’s Due Process Guaranty

Money is “property” protected under the

14th Amendment’s due process guaranty. See Nelson

v. Colorado, 581 U.S. 128, 135 (2017) (analyzing the

withholding of petitioner’s money paid to the court

as fees, court costs, and restitution as property in

procedural due process claim); Bd. of Regents of

State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571–72 (1972)

(“This Court has also made clear that the property

interests protected by procedural due process extend

well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels,

or money”).

This Court has accordingly made it clear that

“The action of state courts in imposing penalties ...

without providing adequate notice and opportunity

10

to defend, has, of course, long been regarded as a

denial of due process of the law guaranteed by the

Fourteenth Amendment.” Shelly v. Kraemer, 334

U.S. 1, 16 (1948); accord, Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,

512 U.S. 415, 434–35 (1994) (“A decision to punish a

tortfeasor by means of an exaction of exemplary

damages is an exercise of state power that must

comply with the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment”); In re Nineteen Appeals

Arising Out of San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire

Litig., 982 F.2d 603, 614 (1st Cir. 1992) (“when a

judge constructs a process for setting fees, the

process must contain at least the procedural minima

that the Due Process Clause requires”).

3.

The Procedural Due Process that the

14th Amendment Requires

“The fundamental requirement of due process

is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful

time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (bold italics

added) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,

552 (1965)).

“Never” is not a meaningful time to be

shown the evidence used against you.

And allowing you to be heard on the content of

evidence that you are not allowed to see does not

provide a meaningful manner to respond to that

evidence’s hidden content.

Mr. Bolin’s constitutional right to procedural

due process accordingly required disclosure of the

evidence that the judge used to make the

11

previously-noted factual finding against him that

$376,626.83 of the expenses detailed in the attorney

fee bills Keystone gave the judge ex parte were all

reasonable and necessary. See Greene v. McElroy,

360 U.S. 474, 496, 79 S. Ct. 1400, 1413, 3 L. Ed. 2d

1377 (1959) (when reasonableness depends of factual

findings, the evidence used must be disclosed to the

individual so that he has an opportunity to show

that it is untrue); TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 604 U.S.

56, 82 (2025) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Greene

and stating that “Efforts to inject secret evidence

into

judicial

proceedings

present

obvious

constitutional concerns”); Gross v. Lopez, 419 U.S.

565, 580 (1975) (“Fairness can rarely be obtained by

secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of

rights.”); Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v.

Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); cf.,

Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 286

(7th Cir. 2002) (Posner J.) (disapproving of

permitting the submission of class action fee

applications in camera because it “paralyzes

objectors”).

Federal case law accordingly makes it clear

that when important decisions turn on questions of

fact, due process requires the court to provide the

opponent an opportunity to confront and crossexamine with respect to the evidence being used

against that opponent. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.

254, 269 (1970) (adverse witnesses); Greene v.

McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959) (documents as

well as witnesses because disclosure of both witness

testimony and documentary evidence are important

to protect one’s Due Process rights); see also Am.Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d

12

1045, 1069 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that procedural

due process’s notice and hearing requirements have

ancient roots in the rights to confrontation and

cross-examination).

4.

Employing Secret, Ex Parte Evidence

Does Not Provide the Procedural Due

Process that the 14th Amendment

Requires

Federal courts have accordingly recognized

that the use of secret evidence, reviewed in camera,

is a violation of due process.

For example, Lynn v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,

656 F.2d 1337, (9th Cir. 1981) involved a university

assistant professor who was denied merit salary

increases based on content in the professor’s tenure

review file. 656 F.2d at 1339–1340. The university

refused to disclose the professor’s tenure file to the

professor – but submitted the file to the trial court

where the judge reviewed it in camera. Id. at 1345.

The Ninth Circuit held that that violated due

process – explaining that our adversarial system

“functions properly and leads to fair and accurate

resolutions, only when vigorous and informed

argument is possible. Such argument is not possible,

however, without disclosure to the parties of the

evidence submitted to the court.” Id. at 1346.

Another

example

is

Am.-Arab

AntiDiscrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th

Cir. 1995). Applying the Matthews balancing test,

the Ninth Circuit held that when secret evidence is

used, “One would be hard pressed to design a

procedure more likely to result in erroneous

13

deprivations” – explaining that “the very foundation

of the adversary process assumes that the use of

undisclosed information will violate due process

because of the risk of error.” 70 F.3d at 1069.

The 14th Amendment’s procedural due

process guaranty requires disclosure even in highly

sensitive national security contexts. See, e.g., Hamdi

v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (citizen

detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an

enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual

basis for his classification and a fair opportunity to

rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a

neutral decisionmaker, because “An essential

principle of due process is that a deprivation of life,

liberty, or property ‘be preceded by notice and

opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of

the case.’”) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v.

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985)).

In short, federal case law makes it clear that

employing secret, ex parte evidence against a person

does not provide the procedural due process that the

14th Amendment requires.

5.

Lack of Consistency Among the Circuits

When Attorney-Client Privilege is

Asserted

The

same

14th Amendment

right

to

procedural due process should apply in every

American courtroom. But when it comes to one’s

right to see the evidence a judge is using against you

if your opponent asserts that that evidence is

privileged

attorney-client

information,

your

14th Amendment constitutional right turns not on

14

our Constitution but on that courtroom’s federal

Circuit or state.

For example, in some Circuits your

14th Amendment right to procedural due process

allows you to see all of that evidence being used

against you with no redactions. See, e.g., Ideal Elec.

Sec. Co., Inc. v. Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., 120 F.3d 143, 151

(D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding party against whom fees

were sought was “entitled to discover the

information

it

requires

to

appraise

the

reasonableness of the amount of fees requested,”

including the “nature and extent of the work done”

so it would “present to the court any legitimate

challenges” to the fees sought); Am. C.L. Union of

Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 428 (11th Cir. 1999)

(holding fee opponents have an obligation to make

“specific and reasonably precise” objections to fee

petitions that indicate “a lack of proper billing

judgment” and defendants carried their burden by

“carefully analyz[ing] the billing records . . . to

calculate the number of hours billed for completing

each of various litigation tasks”).

In other Circuits your 14th Amendment right

to procedural due process allows you to see most of

that evidence being used against you, with limited

redactions or through summaries of the work

performed. See, e.g., Yamada v. Nobel Biocare

Holding AG, 825 F.3d 536, 546 (9th Cir. 2016) (“On

remand, the district court must allow Defendants

access to the timesheets, appropriately redacted to

remove privileged information, so they can inspect

them and present whatever objections they might

have concerning the fairness and reasonableness of

15

Plaintiffs’ fee request.”); Garcia v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,

770 F.3d 1300, 1308 (10th Cir. 2014) (affirming trial

court’s decision to deny a motion to compel itemized

time records, reviewing records in camera, allowing

each side to depose someone familiar with

adversary’s billing, and ordering disclosure of billing

rates and time incurred); Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo,

174 F.3d 394, 403 (holding legal bills were protected

from disclosure to the extent the bills revealed the

identity of the federal statutes researched

implicating opinion work product not subject to

disclosure).

But

in

Washington

state,

your

14th Amendment right to procedural due process

allows you to see none of that evidence being used

against you. Washington allows total reductions in

that evidence being used against you. As explained

earlier, the Washington court ruled that Mr. Bolin

had no 14th Amendment due process right to see the

evidence that the judge used against him to find that

he had to pay restitution to Keystone in the amount

of $376,626.83, because Keystone asserted that the

evidence it had submitted to the judge ex parte for

use as a sword against Mr. Bolin was shielded by the

attorney-client privilege – and “there is no due

process right for an opposing party to see materials

protected by attorney-client privilege.” 2025 WL

2910726, at *27 (App. 71).

16

6.

This Court Can (and Should) Easily

Resolve the Lower Courts’ Inconsistent

Interpretation of 14th Amendment

Procedural Due Process Rights

This Court can (and should) easily end the

current inconsistency among the Circuits and states

as to whether employing secret, ex parte evidence

against a person provides the procedural due process

required by the 14th Amendment when the party

submitting that evidence against their opponent to

prove the reasonableness and necessity of their fees

simultaneously refuses to disclose that evidence to

their opponent.

This Court’s Matthews balancing test

evaluates (A) the private interest affected; (B) the

risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through

the procedures used; and (C) the governmental

interest at stake. Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U.S. 128

(2017) (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,

335 (1976)).

(A) Private Interest Affected. With respect to

the private interest, the private interest affected in

fee requests is the amount of money the court orders

to be paid – with, as noted earlier, money being

“property” protected under the 14th Amendment’s

due process guaranty.

(C) Governmental Interest at Stake. With

respect to the government interest in private fee

requests like this, the government interest at stake

is de minimis at best – because requiring the fee

applicant to disclose its evidence to the opposing

17

party imposes little (if any) burden on the court

system or government.

(B) Risk of Erroneous Deprivation through the

Procedures Used.

With respect to the risk of

erroneous deprivation, the discussion in the above

Sections 3 and 4 of this Petition confirms this

Court’s own recognition that the risk of erroneous

deprivation is high when the fee applicant is allowed

to use secret, ex parte evidence to “prove” to the court

the value and reasonableness of the applicant’s fee

request – for as Justice Gorsuch accurately

explained last year in his TikTok Inc. v. Garland

concurrence, “Efforts to inject secret evidence into

judicial proceedings present obvious constitutional

concerns”. 604 U.S. at 82 (2025); accord, Greene v.

McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496, 79 S. Ct. 1400, 1413, 3

L. Ed. 2d 1377 (1959) (when reasonableness depends

of factual findings, the evidence used must be

disclosed to the individual so that he has an

opportunity to show that it is untrue); Gross v.

Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975) (“Fairness can rarely

be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of

facts decisive of rights.”); Am.-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069

(9th Cir. 1995) (same); cf., Reynolds v. Beneficial

Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 286 (7th Cir. 2002)

(Posner J.) (disapproving of permitting the

submission of class action fee applications in camera

because it “paralyzes objectors”).

This serious risk of erroneous deprivation is

why, as noted earlier, federal case law makes it clear

that when important decisions turn on questions of

fact, due process requires the court to provide the

18

opponent an opportunity to confront and crossexamine with respect to the evidence being used

against that opponent. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.

254, 269 (1970) (adverse witnesses); Greene v.

McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959) (documents as

well as witnesses); see also Am.-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069

(9th Cir. 1995) (noting that the notice and hearing

requirements of procedural due process have ancient

roots in the rights of confrontation and crossexamination, and that “One would be hard pressed

to design a procedure more likely to result in

erroneous deprivations” – explaining that “the very

foundation of the adversary process assumes that

the use of undisclosed information will violate due

process because of the risk of error.”).

Employing secret, ex parte evidence in the

trial court then further exacerbates this well

recognized risk of erroneous deprivation by

preventing appellate review of the evidence upon

which the trial court based its decision. Cf., Honda

Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 420 (1994)

(procedural due process requires “the availability of

both ‘meaningful and adequate review by the trial

court’ and subsequent appellate review.”) (quoting

Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20

(1991)).

But since the attorney fee evidence used

against Mr. Bolin was given by Keystone to the trial

judge ex parte, that evidence is not in the court

record for any appellate court to review. Instead, the

appellate courts – like Mr. Bolin himself – have to

determine if $376,626.83 of fees were reasonable,

19

necessary, and applicable by reviewing the redacted

evidence Keystone and the trial judge let Mr. Bolin

see. E.g.,

(App. 124-125 [above is the actual image of one of the

redacted billing statements in the court file, but

Appendix printing rules prohibited the actual image

being reproduced in this Petition’s Appendix]).

The resulting impossibility of appellate review

further confirms the risk of unchecked and

erroneous deprivation.

CONCLUSION

The state trial judge, state Court of Appeals,

and state Supreme Court in this case read this

Court’s procedural due process decisions to say

something that the Petitioner believes this Court’s

20

decisions did not say. The Washington courts read

this Court’s decisions to hold that a person’s

14th Amendment right to procedural due process

does not include the right to see, confront, or

question evidence used against that person if the

opposing party submitting that evidence as a sword

to be used against that person claims that that

evidence is shielded from disclosure to that person

under the attorney-client privilege.

If the Petitioner is correct in believing that

that is not what this Court’s decisions said, then this

Court should grant this Petition to resolve the

current lack of consistency among our nation’s courts

with respect to evidence that can Constitutionally be

given to the judge ex parte but hidden from the

person who will be penalized by that evidence.

To end the previously noted all, most, none

split in our nation’s courts, Petitioner respectfully

asks this Court to grant this Petition so it can

establish a uniform due process right for Americans

regardless of which Circuit or State they live in, and

under that uniform due process right, review and

reverse the Washington courts’ decision below.

21

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

Thomas Fitzgerald Ahearne

Counsel of Record

for Eugene N. Bolin, Jr.

William Kenick

Graham Fulton

June 1, 2026

FOSTER GARVEY PC

1111 Third Avenue, Suite 3000

Seattle, WA 98101

206-447-8934

ahearne@foster.com