Amicus Curiae Brief — Jonathan Granado, Petitioner v. Juanita Ramirez, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Estevan Ramirez

Supreme Court briefJun 30, 2026

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No. 25-1338

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

JONATHAN GRANADO,

Petitioner,

JUANITA RAMIREZ, INDIVIDUALLY

AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

OF THE ESTATE OF ESTEVAN RAMIREZ,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of A ppeals for the Fifth Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE TEXAS ASSOCIATION

OF COUNTIES, TEXAS ASSOCIATION OF

COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT POOL, NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION OF POLICE ORGANIZATIONS,

TEXAS CONFERENCE OF URBAN COUNTIES,

TEXAS MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, TEXAS CITY

ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, TEXAS MUNICIPAL

POLICE ASSOCIATION, TEXAS FRATERNAL

ORDER OF POLICE, AND TEXAS POLICE CHIEFS

ASSOCIATION, IN SUPPORT OF JONATHAN

GRANADO’S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Laura O’Leary

2717 State Street

Dallas, TX 75204

Francisco J. Valenzuela

Counsel of Record

Martin, Disiere, Jefferson &

Wisdom, LLP

9111 Cypress Waters Boulevard,

Suite 250

Dallas, TX 75019

(214) 420-5500

valenzuela@mdjwlaw.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

121134

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION . . . . . 6

A. The Ramirez Opinion Conf licts w ith

Multiple Decisions of this Court Concerning

Important Issues of Federal Law . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Qualified Immunity Provides Key

Protections to Officers Who Must

Make Split-Second Decisions to Use

Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

The Ramirez Decision Contravenes

This Court’s Qualified Immunity

Jurisprudence in Non-Trivial Ways . . . . . . . 8

This Court Regularly Reverses Lower

Courts’ Decisions that Improperly

Deny Qualified Immunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Table of Contents

Page

B. By Failing to Account for the Realities of

Policing, the Ramirez Decision Undermines

Core Functions of Qualified Immunity,

Increases Dangers to Officers and the

Public, and Threatens to Disrupt Law

Enforcement Recruitment, Training,

and Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Police Officers Face Significant Dangers . . . 13

The Ramirez Decision Disregards

Perceptua l Dist or tions Of f icers

Experience When Making Split-Second

Decisions to Use Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Legal Opinions Encouraging Timidity

in Police Responses Increase Dangers

to Officers and the Public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

C. The Cour t Should Grant Rev iew to

Address Serious Concerns that Multiple

Fifth Circuit Judges Have Repeatedly

Expressed About the Circuit’s Conflicting

Decisions in Use-of-Force Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

The Fifth Circuit’s Qualified Immunity

Decisions Are Inconsistent, Confusing, and

Deeply Indeterminate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

iii

Table of Contents

Page

The Fifth Circuit’s Irreconcilable

Holdings Give Off icers No Fai r

Wa r n i n g C o n c e r n i n g T h e i r

Potential Liability in Split-Second

Use-of-Force Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

D. Alternatively, the Court Should Grant the

Petition, Vacate the Ramirez Decision, and

Remand the Case for Reconsideration in

Light of Zorn v. Linton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Adams v. Williams,

407 U.S. 143 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Ambler v. Nissen,

132 F.4th 750 (5th Cir. 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Arizona v. Johnson,

555 U.S. 323 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Baker v. Coborn,

170 F.4th 988 (5th Cir. 2026) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Baker v. Coburn,

68 F.4th 240 (5th Cir. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Baker v. Putnal,

75 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Barnes v. Felix,

605 U.S. 73 (2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Boyd v. McNamara,

74 F.4th 662 (5th Cir. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 23

Brosseau v. Haugen,

543 U.S. 194 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 9, 11, 20, 22, 23

Chimel v. California,

395 U.S. 752 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Cited Authorities

Page

City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan,

575 U.S. 600 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

City of Escondido v. Emmons,

586 U.S. 38 (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Cole v. Carson,

935 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 21

Collins v. Bauer,

No. 3:11-CV-887-B, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10180

(N.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Crane v. City of Arlington, Tex.,

50 F.4th 453 (5th Cir. 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Crane v. City of Arlington, Tex.,

60 F.4th 976 (5th Cir. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 20

Davis v. Scherer,

468 U.S. 183 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Dawes v. City of Dallas,

No. 22-10867, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 7980

(5th Cir. April 3, 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

District of Columbia v. Wesby,

583 U.S. 48 (2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10, 11

Filarsky v. Delia,

566 U.S. 377 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Cited Authorities

Page

Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Hunter v. Bryant,

502 U.S. 224 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Kisela v. Hughes,

584 U.S. 100 (2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Lytle v. Bexar County, Tex.,

560 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Maryland v. Wilson,

519 U.S. 408 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Mitchell v. Forsyth,

472 U.S. 511 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Mullenix v. Luna,

577 U.S. 7 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-10, 11, 21, 23

New York v. Belton,

453 U.S. 454 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 21, 22

Ornelas v. U.S.,

517 U.S. 690 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Pennsylvania v. Mimms,

434 U.S. 106 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

vii

Cited Authorities

Page

Plakas v. Drinski,

19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Ramirez v. Granado,

163 F.4th 204 (5th Cir. 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Ramirez v. Granado,

167 F.4th 807 (5th Cir. 2026) . . . . . 4-12, 14-16, 18, 19, 23-25

Reichle v. Howards,

566 U.S. 658 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 21, 22

Richardson v. McKnight,

521 U.S. 399 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna,

595 U.S. 1 (2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Ryburn v. Huff,

565 U.S. 469 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Scott v. Harris,

550 U.S. 372 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Smith v. Scott,

No. 24-1099, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 1686

(April 20, 2026) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Taylor v. Barkes,

575 U.S. 822 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

viii

Cited Authorities

Page

U.S. v. Arvizo,

534 U.S. 266 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

White v. Pauly,

580 U.S. 73 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 11

Wilson v. City of Bastrop,

26 F.4th 709 (5th Cir. 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Winzer v. Kaufman County,

916 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Winzer v. Kaufman County,

940 F.3d 900 (5th Cir. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 21

Wyatt v. Cole,

504 U.S. 158 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Zorn v. Linton,

U.S. , 146 S.Ct. 926 (2026) . . . . . . 5, 9, 11, 23-25

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. amend. IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5, 9, 17, 19

Statutes and Other Authorities

Sup. Ct. R. 37.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Cited Authorities

Page

Alexis Artwohl, Ph.D., Perceptual and Memory

Distortions During Officer Involved Shootings,

AELE Lethal & Less Lethal Force Workshop,

2008 Update, at 19-1 through 19-6, https://www.

aele.org/law/2008FPAUG/wb-19.pdf . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15

Elliott Averett, Note, An Unqualified Defense of

Qualified Immunity, 21 Geo. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y

241 (2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

FBI Releases 2021 Statistics on Law Enforcement

Officers Assaulted in the Line of Duty (Oct. 18,

2022), https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/

fbi-releases-2021-statistics-on-law-enforcementofficers-assaulted-in-the-line-of-duty . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

FBI Releases 2021 Statistics on Law Enforcement

Officers Killed in the Line of Duty (Oct. 17,

2022), https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/

fbi-releases-2021-statistics-on-law-enforcementofficers-killed-in-the-line-of-duty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, 2024 Recruitment &

Retention Survey Results, at 3, 5 (2025), https://

www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2025-06/

I ACP_ 2 0 2 4%2 0Rec r u it ment%2 0 %2 6%2 0

Retention%20Survey%20Results_2.pdf . . . . . . . . . . 16

Cited Authorities

Page

David A. Klinger, Rod K. Brunson, Police Officers’

Perceptual Distortions During Lethal Force

Situations, Criminology & Public Policy, Feb.

2009, 117-40 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-15

Officers Killed and Assaulted in the Line of

Duty, 2025, at 18 (2025), https://cde.ucr.cjis.

gov/LATEST/resources/reports/Officers%20

Killed%20and%20Assaulted%20in%20the%20

Line%20of%20Duty%2C%202025.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Reis Thebault, Police Vacancies Persist as

Departments Struggle with Hiring, Recruiting

and Reform, Wash. Post (May 27, 2023),

https://w w w.washingtonpost.com/nationalsecurity/2023/05/27/police-vacancies-hiringrecruiting-reform/ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-17

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Amici collectively represent thousands of local

governmental entities and law enforcement agencies,

hundreds-of-thousands of police officers, and tens-ofthousands of citizens. Amici and their members are

strongly interested in obtaining clear guidance from this

Court concerning potential liability when officers use

force in connection with their duties. Amici believe that

judicial decisions which recognize the realities of policing

in high-stress encounters involving the use of deadly force

will increase safety for law enforcement officers, suspects,

and citizens. Amici seek to assist this Court by providing

insight from the perspective of law enforcement officers

and their employing agencies.

Texas Association of Counties (“TAC”) is a non-profit

corporation with all of the 254 Texas counties as members.

The TAC Board of Directors represents the interests of

elected and appointed officials including associations of

County Judges and Commissioners, District and County

Attorneys, Sheriffs, Justices of the Peace, Constables,

District and County Clerks, and Auditors.1

1. Counsel of record for all parties received timely notice

under Supreme Court Rule 37.2 of amici’s intent to file this brief.

No counsel for any party in this matter and no party: (1) authored

this brief in whole or in part; or (2) contributed money that was

intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No

person, other than TAC, RMP, NAPO, CUC, TML, TCAA, TMPA,

Texas FOP, TPCA, and their members or counsel, contributed

money that was intended to fund the preparation or submission

of this brief. Amici submit this brief pursuant to Supreme Court

Rule 37.

TAC Risk Ma nagement Pool (“RM P ”) is a n

intergovernmental risk pool which provides risk coverages

to its 212 county members, 174 special district and other

local government entity members, and their officers,

employees, and volunteers.

National Association of Police Organizations (“NAPO”)

is a nationwide alliance of police units and organizations

committed to advancing the safety and working conditions

of law enforcement officers and their families, as well as

the organizations which represent them. Since NAPO’s

founding in 1978, it has become the strongest unified

voice supporting law enforcement in the United States.

The organization represents over 1,000 police units

and organizations, some 241,000 sworn officers, and

thousands of citizens concerned about fair and effective

law enforcement.

Texas Conference of Urban Counties (“CUC”), is a

non-profit association of 34 Texas counties, comprising

approximately 80% of the state’s population. CUC provides

advocacy and educational services to its members.

Texas Municipal League (“TML”) is a non-profit

association of over 1,170 incorporated cities that provides

legislative, legal, and educational services to its members.

Over 13,000 persons consisting of city mayors, council

members, city managers, city attorneys, and department

heads are member officials of TML by virtue of their

respective cities’ participation. The TML legal defense

program was established to monitor major litigation that

affects municipalities and to file amicus briefs on behalf

of its members in cases of special significance to cities

and city officials.

Texas City Attorneys Association (“TCAA”), an

affiliate of TML, is an organization of over 600 attorneys

who represent Texas cities and city officials in the

performance of their duties.

Founded in 1950, Texas Municipal Police Association

(“TMPA”) represents over 31,000 state, county, and local

police officers and public safety employees across Texas.

TMPA promotes professionalism in law enforcement

through training, education, and representation.

Texas Fraternal Order of Police (“Texas FOP”)

represents 14,000 active and retired officers and their

families. For more than 36 years, Texas FOP has

empowered Texas law enforcement professionals by

providing legal, legislative, labor, and educational services.

Founded in 1958, Texas Police Chiefs Association

(TPCA) promotes, encourages, and advances the

professional development and high ethical standards of

senior police management personnel throughout Texas.

TPCA’s membership of 1,550 includes the law enforcement

management personnel of over 330 cities and agencies

representing a population served of more than 15 million.

The hundreds-of-thousands of law enforcement

officers amici collectively represent face safety concerns

daily in connection w ith their duties. This Court

recognizes the dangers police officers routinely encounter

and understands that the Constitution permits them to use

lethal force when they reasonably believe that a suspect

poses a threat of serious harm to officers or others.

In Ramirez,2 a sharply divided panel of the Fifth

Circuit denied qualified immunity to an officer who made

a split-second decision to shoot a noncompliant suspect

who: was a few feet away; was part of a group described

as armed and dangerous; had resisted physical restraint

from another officer; and was holding a gun in his hand. 3

The panel decision contravenes multiple aspects of this

Court’s Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity

jurisprudence.

Ramirez is the latest in a long series of cases

demonstrating that the Fifth Circuit’s qualified immunity

analysis in use-of-force cases is broken in a way that the

Fifth Circuit itself cannot, or will not, repair.4 Uncertainty

in this area undermines a core function of qualified

immunity—fair notice of unconstitutional conduct—

constraining law enforcement officers and endangering

the public by encouraging timidity in response to suspects’

noncompliance.

Amici submit this brief to emphasize the exceptional

importance of the questions presented in the petition

for writ of certiorari, which broadly affect police safety,

public safety, police recruitment and training, and law

enforcement policies.

2. Ramirez v. Granado, 163 F.4th 204 (5th Cir. 2025); Pet.

App. 1a-35a.

3. ROA.932-935 [App. 430, 440, 441 (:01-:14), 431 (15:2815:37), 433 (15:54-16:24), 435 (14:35-17:00), 436 (15:15-15:40), 437

(15:15-15:40)].

4. The Fifth Circuit denied en banc review in Ramirez by

a 9 to 8 vote. Ramirez v. Granado, 167 F.4th 807, 808 (5th Cir.

2026); Pet. App. 45a.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Court should grant Officer Granado’s petition for

writ of certiorari because the Fifth Circuit has decided

an important federal question in a way that: (1) conflicts

with multiple decisions of this Court; (2) undermines

core functions of qualified immunity; and (3) disregards

the realities that law enforcement officers confront when

deciding whether to use force against noncompliant

suspects.

Amici share the frustration of the six Fifth Circuit

judges who forcefully disagree with the Ramirez panel’s

qualified immunity analysis and bemoan the uncertainty

that has long marked the Fifth Circuit’s decisions in

use-of-force cases. 5 The Court should heed the concerns

of multiple sitting Fifth Circuit judges and grant review,

reverse the panel decision, and repair the confusion the

Fifth Circuit has created through its incorrect application

of Fourth Amendment standards and its conflicting

decisions about qualified immunity in cases involving

officers’ split-second decisions to use force.

Alternatively, the Court should grant the petition,

vacate the panel decision, and remand for reconsideration

in light of this Court’s recent decision in Zorn v. Linton 6

because the Ramirez panel decision makes the same

serious error this Court addressed in Zorn.

5. Pet. App. 46a-47a (Ho, J., and Oldham, J., dissenting from

the denial of en banc review, joined by Jones, Smith, Duncan, and

Engelhardt, JJ.) (Richman and Wilson, JJ. also voted for rehearing

en banc. Pet. App. 45a.).

6. Zorn v. Linton,

U.S. , 146 S.Ct. 926 (2026) (per curiam).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

A. The Ramirez Opinion Conflicts with Multiple

Decisions of this Court Concerning Important

Issues of Federal Law.

The petition presents important issues affecting

officer safety and public safety. This Court characterizes

the government’s interest in officer and public safety

as “legitimate and weighty” 7 and recognizes that police

officers may use lethal force when they reasonably

believe that a suspect poses a threat of serious physical

harm to officers or others. 8 This Court understands

that officers approaching individuals seated in an

automobile face significant danger 9 and that officer

safety is imperiled if weapons are within drivers’ or

passengers’ reach during an arrest.10 How much more

legitimate and weighty is the safety concern when, as in

Ramirez, a passenger bursts out of an automobile after

7. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 331 (2009) (citation

omitted).

8. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197-98 (2004) (per

curiam).

9. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148, n.3 (1972)

(“According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings

occurred when a police officer approached a suspect seated in an

automobile.”); see also, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,

413 (1997) (“the fact that there is more than one occupant of the

vehicle increases the possible sources of harm to the officer”).

10. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981);

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).

a high-speed chase at 2:30 a.m. while actually holding a

gun in his hand? Supra, n.3.

Qualified Immunity Provides Key Protections

to Officers Who Must Make Split-Second

Decisions to Use Force.

One i mpor t a nt — a nd necessa r y— pu r pose of

qualified immunity is to enable law enforcement officers

to protect one another and the public without fear of

exposure to crippling damages claims. 11 The Fifth

Circuit’s flawed qualified immunity analysis in this case

threatens to upset the “balance between vindication of

constitutional rights and government officials’ effective

performance of their duties” that qualified immunity is

designed to protect.12

11. E.g., Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167-68 (1992) (qualified

immunity protects government’s ability to perform its traditional

functions and, by safeguarding government, protects the public at

large); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-26 (1985) (the public

interest is served when officials act with independence and without

fear of consequences, such as distraction from governmental duties,

inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people

from public service). Qualified immunity provides officers immunity

from civil suit but not from other consequences of their conduct, like

criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Collins v. Bauer, No. 3:11-CV-887-B,

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10180 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2012).

12. Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012).

The Ramirez Decision Contravenes This

Court’s Qualified Immunity Jurisprudence in

Non-Trivial Ways.

As Petitioner explains,13 the Ramirez decision conflicts

with this Court’s decisions in Barnes v. Felix,14 Scott v.

Harris,15 and Mullenix v. Luna.16

Additionally, the Ramirez opinion violates this

Court’s longstanding precedent and imposes unrealistic

and dangerous expectations on police officers by secondguessing an officer’s on-scene assessment of danger.

This Court has characterized as a “wise admonition” the

proposition that “judges should be cautious about secondguessing a police officer’s assessment, made on the scene,

of the danger presented by a particular situation.”17 This

is sensible in part because officers’ specialized training

and experience enables them to make inferences and

deductions that “might well elude an untrained person.”18

13. Pet. at 18-25.

14. Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 80-83 (2025) (courts must

consider events prior to the use of force as part of the totality of

the circumstances analysis).

15. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (courts must not

credit versions of events that video evidence blatantly contradicts).

16. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12-13 (2015) (per curiam)

(plaintiffs must demonstrate a violation of clearly established law

defined with specificity).

17. Ryburn v. Huff, 565 U.S. 469, 477 (2012) (per curiam).

18. U.S. v. Arvizo, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (citation omitted);

see also, e.g., Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (“a police

officer views the facts through the lens of his police experience

and expertise”); see also infra, §§B1-B2.

Courts “recognize that the decision to shoot can

only be made after the briefest reflection, so brief that

‘reflection’ is the wrong word” and note that there is too

little time for the officer to consider alternatives “and too

much opportunity to second guess that officer.”19 This is

certainly true in the case at bar, in which Officer Granado

had but seconds to react when Ramirez and three other

men burst out of a car after a dangerous high-speed chase,

and Ramirez—gun in hand—tussled with an officer and

attempted to evade arrest. Supra, n.3.

The Ramirez decision also conflicts with this Court’s

precedent addressing the clearly established law prong of

the qualified immunity analysis, which requires plaintiffs

to identify a rule specifically prohibiting the officer’s

conduct in the particular circumstances the officer faced. 20

Thus, this Court has “stressed the need to ‘identify a case

where an officer acting under similar circumstances . . .

was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment’” 21 and

summarily reversed a Fifth Circuit decision which denied

qualified immunity after defining the clearly established

law too broadly. 22

19. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1994)

(relying, in part, on Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97

(1989)).

20. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018);

see also, e.g., Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198; Pet. App. 31a (Oldham,

J., dissenting).

21. Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64 (quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S.

73, 79 (2017) (per curiam)); see also, e.g., Zorn, 146 S.Ct. at 930.

22. Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12-15, 19.

The panel majority in Ramirez contravened this

Court’s precedent by relying on Lytle to find a violation

of clearly established law, explaining that “‘[i]t has long

been clearly established that, absent any other justification

for the use of force, it is unreasonable for a police officer

to use deadly force against a fleeing felon who does not

pose a sufficient threat of harm to the officer or others.’”23

Lytle is incapable of serving as the basis for a violation of

clearly established law because: (1) in Mullenix, this Court

abrogated the formulation on which the Ramirez panel

majority relied;24 and (2) as two of the Ramirez panel judges

have acknowledged, Lytle did not find a constitutional

violation, so it could not clearly establish law. 25

23. Pet. App. 13a (quoting Lytle v. Bexar County, Tex., 560

F.3d 404, 417 (5th Cir. 2009)).

24. Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (rejecting the formulation “that

a police officer may not use deadly force against a fleeing felon

who does not pose a sufficient threat of harm to the officer or

others”) (citation omitted); see also Baker v. Coborn, 170 F.4th

988, 994 (5th Cir. 2026) (“To the extent that courts continue to

cite Lytle for the very formulation of clearly established law in

the context of officer-involved shootings that Mullenix overruled,

that is error.”).

25. Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64; Dawes v. City of Dallas, No. 2210867, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 7980 at *8-9, *19 (5th Cir. April

3, 2024) (unreported, per curiam) (Oldham and Dennis, JJ.,

acknowledging that Lytle did not find a constitutional violation).

In its clearly established law analysis, the Ramirez panel majority

also made passing reference to Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 198

(5th Cir. 1996). Pet. App. 13a. This is unavailing, as the Baker

decision also did not find a constitutional violation.

As in Mullenix, this Court should summarily reverse

the Fifth Circuit’s unjustified denial of qualified immunity

in the case at bar. 26

This Court Regularly Reverses Lower Courts’

Decisions that Improperly Deny Qualified

Immunity.

This Court has “issued a number of opinions reversing

federal courts in qualified immunity cases,” because

“qualified immunity is important to society as a whole” and

because “as an immunity from suit, qualified immunity

is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go

to trial.” 27 Indeed, this Court has not hesitated to correct

circuit courts that improperly deny immunity. 28 The Court

should do so again in the instant case.

26. Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12-15, 19; Pet. App. 34a-35a

(Oldham, J., opining that the Ramirez panel decision warrants

summary reversal as did Mullenix).

27. White, 580 U.S. at 79 (citations omitted).

28. E.g., Zorn, 146 S.Ct. 926; Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna,

595 U.S. 1 (2021) (per curiam); Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100

(2018) (per curiam); Wesby, 583 U.S. 48; City of Escondido v.

Emmons, 586 U.S. 38 (2019) (per curiam); Mullenix, 577 U.S.

at 16-19; Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 826-27 (2015); City and

County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 611, n.3 (2015)

(“the Court often corrects lower courts when they wrongly subject

individual officers to liability”) (collecting cases); Brosseau, 543

U.S. at 201.

B. By Failing to Account for the Realities of Policing,

the Ramirez Decision Undermines Core Functions

of Qualified Immunity, Increases Dangers to

Officers and the Public, and Threatens to Disrupt

Law Enforcement Recruitment, Training, and

Operations.

By denying qualified immunity to an officer who made

a split-second decision to shoot an armed suspect who

was attempting to evade arrest, the Ramirez decision

undermines core functions of qualified immunity, including:

1) providing fair notice to officers of unconstitutional

conduct; and 2) enabling officers to act without fear of

negative consequences such as distraction from their

duties, inhibition of their responses, and deterrence of able

people from seeking employment in government service. 29

The panel opinion disregards the realities of policing,

including the dangers officers face and the perceptual

and memory distortions they experience during rapidly

developing, high-stress encounters. Instead, the Ramirez

opinion encourages timidity in police responses, which

increases dangers to officers and the public.

This Court recognizes that “it would be unreasonable

to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in

the performance of their duties.” 30 This is precisely what

the Ramirez opinion requires. This Court should grant

review to correct the panel’s serious errors.

29. Infra, §C2; supra, n.11; infra, n.44.

30. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) (per

curiam) (citation omitted).

Police Officers Face Significant Dangers.

Law enforcement officers are aware that they face

significant dangers in the line of duty. Indeed, the

FBI annually publishes data collections entitled Law

Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (“LEOKA”)

“to aid the law enforcement community by providing

information to positively impact their training and keep

them safe on the job.” 31

The FBI’s LEOKA reports show that, in 2021, when

Ramirez defied police commands and attempted to evade

arrest while holding a gun, 73 officers were feloniously

killed in the line of duty. 32 Suspects used firearms to kill

61 of these officers, and 44 of these killings happened in

the South. 33 The FBI reports that, in 2021, more than

43,000 officers were assaulted while performing their

duties and nearly 80,000 assaults against law enforcement

officers involved weapons. 34 In 2021, 11.7% of officers

were assaulted while on the job. This rate has increased

31. Officers Killed and Assaulted in the Line of Duty, 2025,

at 18 (2025), https://cde.ucr.cjis.gov/LATEST/resources/reports/

Off icers%20K illed%20and%20A ssaulted%20in%20the%20

Line%20of%20Duty%2C%202025.pdf.

32. FBI Releases 2021 Statistics on Law Enforcement

Officers Killed in the Line of Duty (Oct. 17, 2022), https://www.

fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-releases-2021-statistics-on-lawenforcement-officers-killed-in-the-line-of-duty.

33. Id.

34. FBI Releases 2021 Statistics on Law Enforcement

Officers Assaulted in the Line of Duty (Oct. 18, 2022), https://www.

fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-releases-2021-statistics-on-lawenforcement-officers-assaulted-in-the-line-of-duty.

steadily, and in 2025, 13.8% of officers were assaulted in

the line of duty. 35

Officer Granado rightly understood that Ramirez’s

actions created serious danger for all officers present.

Supra, n.3. The Ramirez panel majority disregarded this

danger. Pet. App. 1a-13a.

The Ramirez Decision Disregards Perceptual

Distortions Officers Experience When Making

Split-Second Decisions to Use Force.

This Court’s concerns about judges second-guessing

an off icer’s on-scene assessment of danger 3 6 are

particularly valid considering the mental processes in

effect during rapidly developing, high-stress encounters,

such as incidents involving lethal force.

Many studies demonstrate that police officers

overwhelmingly experience perceptual and memory

distortions when faced with situations that led to the use

of deadly force. 37 Officers faced with lethal force situations

35. Supra, n.31 at 11.

36. Supra, §A2.

37. E.g., Alexis Artwohl, Ph.D., Perceptual and Memory

Distortions During Officer Involved Shootings, AELE Lethal &

Less Lethal Force Workshop, 2008 Update, at 19-1 through 19-6,

https://www.aele.org/law/2008FPAUG/wb-19.pdf; id. at 19-4 (in a

group of 157 police officers involved in shootings, 84% experienced

diminished sound, 79% experienced time distortions during the

events, and 52% experienced memory loss for part of the event);

David A. Klinger, Rod K. Brunson, Police Officers’ Perceptual

Distortions During Lethal Force Situations, Criminology &

unconsciously switch to an “experiential thinking” mode,

which: (1) facilitates automatic, rapid responses; (2) is

oriented toward immediate action rather than reflection

and delayed action; and (3) is marked by fragmented

and distorted memory of the event. 38 Indeed, “[t]here is

virtually no factor in a shooting that can’t be subject to

perceptual or memory distortion.”39 One researcher noted

that “independent studies using different methodologies

have found that memory and perceptual distortions do in

fact occur to some degree in officer involved shootings

and must be taken into account when second-guessing

the actions and the statements of officers involved in

shootings.”40

Courts must recognize that, during deadly force

encounters, reasonable officers are highly likely to

experience perceptual and memory distortions and

“experiential thinking” oriented toward rapid, automatic

responses. The Ramirez panel majority disregarded these

realities of policing, denying Officer Granado qualified

immunity merely because, immediately after shooting

the armed suspect, while in an emotionally excited

state—marked by breathing heavily, pacing, repeating

himself, and swearing—Granado asked another officer for

Public Policy, Feb. 2009, 117-40 (in a group of 80 police officers

involved in shootings, 82% experienced diminished sound, 51%

experienced tunnel vision, and 79% experienced time distortions

during the events).

38. Artwohl, supra, n.37 at 19-1 through 19-6.

39. Id. at 19-6.

40. Id.

confirmation of his perception, immediately prior to the

shooting, that Ramirez had a gun in his hand. Supra, n.3.

Nobody disputes that Granado repeatedly shouted

“he’s got a gun” immediately before discharging his

weapon, or that Ramirez was, in fact, holding a gun and

attempting to evade arrest throughout the 8-second

encounter. Denying qualified immunity under these

circumstances ref lects a troubling and dangerous

misunderstanding of officers’ experiences when making

split-second decisions to use lethal force.

Legal Opinions Encouraging Timidity in

Police Responses Increase Dangers to Officers

and the Public.

The panel decision in Ramirez, with its vigorous

dissents, and the Fifth Circuit’s narrow denial of en banc

review, demonstrate the unpredictability of the Circuit’s

qualified immunity jurisprudence.41 Uncertainty in the law

increases the significant dangers law enforcement officers

regularly face, encourages timid responses to crime, and

interferes with the increasingly difficult task of hiring and

retaining skilled peace officers. 42

41. Infra, §§C1-2.

42. See, e.g., Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, 2024 Recruitment

& Retention Survey Results, at 3, 5 (2025), https://www.theiacp.

org/sites/default/files/2025-06/IACP_2024%20Recruitment%20

%26%20Retention%20Survey%20Results_2.pdf (more than 70%

of the law enforcement agencies responding to the IACP’s 2024

survey reported that officer recruitment had become more difficult

than it was five year ago); Reis Thebault, Police Vacancies Persist

as Departments Struggle with Hiring, Recruiting and Reform,

Wash. Post (May 27, 2023), https://www.washingtonpost.com/

This Court has recognized that avoiding unwarranted

timidity on the part of government officials is an important

government interest 43 and has noted that

police officers . . . routinely make close decisions

in the exercise of the broad authority that

necessarily is delegated to them. . . . In these

circumstances, officials should not err always on

the side of caution. Officials with a broad range

of duties and authority must often act swiftly

and firmly at the risk that action deferred will

be futile or constitute virtual abdication of

office.44

Officers should not be encouraged to err on the side

of caution because, in the increasingly risky profession

of law enforcement, officers’ hesitation can be deadly to

officers and civilians. Many judges have recognized the

importance of interpreting the Fourth Amendment in a

manner that discourages hesitation when an officer’s use

national-security/2023/05/27/police-vacancies-hiring-recruitingreform/ (law enforcement agencies throughout the country are

experiencing unprecedented difficulty hiring and retaining

qualified officers); see also, e.g., Elliott Averett, Note, An

Unqualified Defense of Qualified Immunity, 21 Geo. J. L. & Pub.

Pol’y 241, 273-77 (2023) (exploring the disproportionate increase

in crime and reduction in law enforcement staffing after Colorado

repealed qualified immunity).

43. Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 389-90 (2012); Richardson

v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 408-09 (1997).

44. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 196 (1984) (citation

omitted, cleaned up); see also Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224,

229 (1991) (per curiam).

of deadly force is geared toward protecting officers and

members of the public.45

The Ramirez decision conflicts with this Court’s

decisions counseling against unwarranted timidity and

with eight Fifth Circuit judges’ concerns about the

dangers of rulings that encourage hesitation in officers’

responses. Pet. App. 1a-35a.

C. The Court Should Grant Review to Address Serious

Concerns that Multiple Fifth Circuit Judges

Have Repeatedly Expressed About the Circuit’s

Conflicting Decisions in Use-of-Force Cases.

The Fifth Circuit’s Qualified Immunity

Decisions Are Inconsistent, Confusing, and

Deeply Indeterminate.

Ramirez is the latest in a growing list of cases in which

the Fifth Circuit narrowly denied en banc review of panel

45. E.g., Pet. App. 46a (“I’m troubled by the decision to put

police officers on trial for using reasonable force in a good faith

effort to keep innocent people safe.”) (Ho, J., joined by Jones and

Smith, JJ., dissenting from the denial of en banc review); Winzer

v. Kaufman County, 916 F.3d 464, 482 (5th Cir. 2019) (Clement, J.,

dissenting in part) (objecting to a holding that instructs officers to

delay their responses, explaining that “when a split second is all

you have, waiting itself is a decision—one that may bring disastrous

consequences”); accord Winzer v. Kaufman County, 940 F.3d 900,

901 (5th Cir. 2019) (Ho, J., joined by Smith, Clement, Engelhardt, JJ.,

dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (citing with approval

Judge Clement’s prior dissent and reasoning); Cole v. Carson, 935

F.3d 444, 457 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Jones, J., joined by Smith,

Owen, Ho, Duncan, and Oldham, JJ., dissenting) (noting that in the

“increasingly risky profession of law enforcement,” “action beats

reaction every time”) (citation omitted).

decisions that rejected officers’ assertions of qualified

immunity in use-of-force cases.46 Nine sitting Fifth Circuit

judges have expressed dissatisfaction with the Circuit’s

inconsistent holdings in this area. This Court should heed

these judges’ concerns and grant review in Ramirez to

repair the confusion the Fifth Circuit has created through

its conflicting and uncertain decisions interpreting the

Fourth Amendment and analyzing qualified immunity in

cases involving officers’ split-second decisions to use force.

In dissenting from the denial of en banc rehearing in

Ramirez, Judge Ho, joined by Judges Jones and Smith,

stated “[i]nstability remains the state of the law in our

circuit when it comes to excessive force. This instability

is not just regrettable as a matter of law—it’s dangerous

for the police officers and civilians of our circuit.” Pet.

App. 46a.

In Boyd v. McNamara, Judge Oldham characterized

the Fifth Circuit’s excessive force precedent as “deeply

indeterminate” and stated, “when we are bound only by

conflicting circuit precedent, it is unclear to me if and how

we are bound at all.”47 Judge Oldham worried about the

46. Pet. App. 45a (denying en banc review by a 9-8 vote in

Ramirez); Ambler v. Nissen, 132 F.4th 750 (5th Cir. 2025) (per

curiam) (denying en banc review by a 9-8 vote when an officer

was denied qualified immunity for briefly using force to handcuff

a noncompliant suspect after a lengthy high-speed car chase);

Crane v. City of Arlington, Tex., 60 F.4th 976, 977-79 (5th Cir. 2023)

(per curiam) (denying en banc review by a 10-6 vote, when a panel

denied qualified immunity to an officer who shot a noncompliant

suspect who twice ran over another officer with his car).

47. Boyd v. McNamara, 74 F.4th 662, 673 (5th Cir. 2023)

(Oldham, J., concurring).

Fifth Circuit’s “predictably unpredictable interpretations

of the ‘hazy border between excessive and acceptable

force.’”48

In Crane, six Fifth Circuit judges disagreed with

the panel’s qualified immunity analysis and expressed

frustration about the Circuit’s unwillingness, as a body,

to issue consistent opinions in split-second use-of-force

cases.49 Judge Oldham and his co-dissenters described

the Fifth Circuit’s refusal to review the Crane opinion

en banc as “revelatory of a general reluctance (at best)

or refusal (at worst) to devote the full court’s resources

to qualified-immunity cases,” which the dissenters found

“imprudent.”50 Judge Ho characterized the Circuit’s splitsecond excessive force opinions as “confusing to citizens

and police officers,” and he saw no hope of advancing the

rule of law within the Circuit.51 According to the dissenting

judges and Judge Ho, “we sow the seeds of uncertainty

in our [use-of-force] precedents—which grow into a briar

patch of conflicting rules, ensnaring district courts and

litigants alike.”52

Dissenting from the denial of en banc review in

Winzer, Judge Ho, joined by Judges Smith, Clement,

48. Id. (quoting Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 201).

49. Crane, 60 F.4th at 977-79.

50. Id. at 978 (Oldham, J., joined by Jones, Smith, Duncan,

and Wilson, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

51. Id. at 978 (Ho, J. concurring in denial of rehearing en banc,

but agreeing with the dissenting judges that the panel should have

granted qualified immunity).

52. Id. at 978-79.

and Engelhardt, expressed “deep concerns” that the

Fifth Circuit’s split-second use-of-force opinions send

a dangerous message to law enforcement officers—

“[s]ee something, do nothing.”53 This troubling message

contravenes this Court’s guidance, 54 and that of multiple

Fifth Circuit judges, concerning how officers should

respond to emergent situations to protect the public. 55

The Fifth Circuit’s Irreconcilable Holdings

Give Officers No Fair Warning Concerning

Their Potential Liability in Split-Second Useof-Force Cases.

This Court recognizes the importance of “ensuring

that officials can reasonably anticipate when their conduct

may give rise to liability for damages.”56 “[T]he crux of

the qualified immunity test is whether officers have fair

notice that they are acting unconstitutionally.”57 If the law

at the time of the incident “did not clearly establish that

the officer’s conduct would violate the Constitution, the

53. Winzer, 940 F.3d at 902-03.

54. Supra, §B3.

55. “In the wide gap between acceptable and excessive

uses of force, however, immunity serves its important purpose

of encouraging officers to enforce the law, in ‘tense, uncertain

and rapidly evolving’ split-second situations, rather than stand

down and jeopardize community safety.” Cole, 935 F.3d at 465

(Jones, J., dissenting, joined by Smith, Ho, Duncan, Oldham, and

Richman, JJ.).

56. Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664 (cleaned up, citation omitted);