Opposition Brief — Katherine Novotny, et al., Petitioners v. Wes Moore, Governor of Maryland, et al.

Supreme Court briefAug 17, 2026

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No. 25-1324

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

————

KATHERINE NOVOTNY, et al.,

Petitioners,

WES MOORE, et al.,

Respondents.

————

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit

————

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

————

ANTHONY G. BROWN

Attorney General of Maryland

JULIA DOYLE

Solicitor General

RYAN R. DIETRICH*

Assistant Attorney General

200 Saint Paul Place

20th Floor

Baltimore, Maryland 21202

rdietrich@oag.maryland.gov

(410) 576-7648

Attorneys for Respondents

August 2026

*Counsel of Record

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002

QUESTION PRESENTED

Are Maryland’s laws prohibiting the carrying of

firearms in sensitive places consistent with the Second

Amendment, where they are grounded in this Nation’s

historical tradition of firearms regulation?

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED ..................................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................

INTRODUCTION ................................................

STATEMENT ......................................................

Statutory Background .....................................

Maryland’s Longstanding Restrictions on

Public Carry ...................................................

Locational Restrictions Enacted by the

Maryland General Assembly in 2023 ............

Proceedings Below ...........................................

The Fourth Circuit’s Decision .........................

REASONS FOR DENYING REVIEW ................

I. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION

IS CONSISTENT WITH THIS COURT’S

SECOND AMENDMENT PRECEDENTS.. .......................................................

A. Limiting

Firearms

Certain

Locations Has a Rich American

Tradition Derived from Our English

Forebears.. ...........................................

B. Maryland’s Laws Are Consistent with

the Principles Underlying This

Historical Tradition. ............................

II. PETITIONER’S SECURITY RATIONALE IS AHISTORICAL AND UNWORKABLE. ........................................................

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

III. COURTS ARE NOT DIVIDED ON THE

PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING A SENSITIVE PLACES ANALYSIS. .....................

IV. THIS COURT’S INTERVENTION IS

NOT WARRANTED AT THIS TIME. ......

CONCLUSION ....................................................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page(s)

Andrews v. State,

50 Tenn. 165 (1871) ..................................

Antonyuk v. James,

120 F.4th 941 (2d Cir. 2024)..................... 33, 34

Christian v. James,

176 F.4th 189 (2d Cir. 2026).....................

District of Columbia v. Heller,

554 U.S. 570 (2008) ............. 9, 15, 22, 25, 27, 33

English v. State,

35 Tex. 473 (1871) .....................................

Frey v. City of New York,

157 F.4th 118 (2d Cir. 2025)..................... 27, 34

Goldstein v. Hochul,

680 F. Supp. 3d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)........

Hill v. State,

53 Ga. 472 (1874) ...................................... 18, 19

Koons v. Attorney General New Jersey,

156 F.4th 210 (3d Cir.), reh’g en banc

granted and opinions vacated, 162 F.4th

100 (3d Cir. 2025)......................................

McDonald v. City of Chicago,

561 U.S. 742 (2010) ...................................

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen,

597 U.S. 1 (2022) ............. 1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 13-16, 18,

22, 24, 25, 27, 29-31, 33, 34

Owens v. State,

3 Tex. App. 404 (1878) ..............................

Schoenthal v. Raoul,

150 F.4th 889 (7th Cir. 2025) ....... 16, 17, 20-24,

27, 30, 33

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

State v. Shelby,

90 Mo. 302 (1886) ......................................

United States v. Allam,

140 F.4th 289 (5th Cir. 2025) ................... 33, 34

United States v. Rahimi,

602 U.S. 680 (2024) ........... 1, 2, 8, 15, 16, 21, 26

Wolford v. Lopez,

116 F.4th 959 (9th Cir. 2024) ............ 17, 21, 22,

27-30, 32, 33, 34

Wolford v. Lopez,

146 S. Ct. 2032 (2026) ... 6, 16, 17, 19, 20, 32, 33

CONSTITUTION

U.S. Const. amend. I .................................... 9, 10

U.S. Const. amend. II ............. 1, 6-8, 12-16, 18-21,

25, 30, 32, 33

STATUTES

2023 Md. Laws ch. 651 (House Bill 824) .....

2023 Md. Laws ch. 680

(Senate Bill 1) .......................................... 4-6, 31

Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (LexisNexis

2021 & Supp. 2023)

§ 4-102 .......................................................

§ 4-111(a)(2) ..............................................

§ 4-111(a)(4) ..............................................

§ 4-111(a)(9) ..............................................

§ 4-111(b) ...................................................

§ 4-111(b)(9) .............................................. 6, 31

§ 4-111(b)(11) ............................................

§ 4-111(d)(2) ..............................................

§ 4-208 .......................................................

§ 4-208(b)(2) ..............................................

§ 6-411 .......................................................

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Md. Code Ann., Ins.

§ 15-10B-01(g)(1)-(4) (LexisNexis 2017) ...

Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety

§ 5-307(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2023) ..........

Md. Code Ann., Transp.

§ 7-705(b)(6) (LexisNexis 2020) ................

Ala. Code § 13A-11-59(c) ..............................

1786 Va. Acts 35, 35, ch. 49 .........................

REGULATIONS

Md. Code Regs.

§ 04.05.01.01 .............................................

§ 04.05.01.03B ...........................................

§ 08.01.07.14 .............................................

§ 08.07.01.04 .............................................

§ 08.07.06.04 .............................................

§ 09.10.03.03A(10).....................................

§ 14.25.01.01 .............................................

§ 14.25.02.06 .............................................

§ 34.04.08.02 .............................................

§ 34.04.08.04 .............................................

§ 36.03.01.02B(6).......................................

§ 36.03.10.48 .............................................

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Act No. 702, reprinted in 7 Statutes at

Large of South Carolina (D.J. McCord ed.

1840) ..........................................................

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

An Act for the Better Security of the

Inhabitants, by Obliging the Male White

Persons to Carry Fire Arms to Places of

Public Worship (1770), reprinted in A

Digest of the Laws of the State of Georgia

(R. Aitken 1800) ........................................ 31-32

Cornelius Mills (c.1755-1823), Archives

of Md. .........................................................

Extracts from the Journal of Proceedings

of the Provincial Congress of New Jersey

(J. Sailer 1835) ..........................................

Laws of the State of Delaware (1797) ..........

Laws of the State of New Jersey

(J. Wilson 1811) ........................................

Raphael Semmes, Captains and Mariners

of Early Maryland (1937) .........................

Statute of Northampton 1328, 2 Edw. 3 c.3

(Eng.) ......................................................... 16, 22

Stephen Shapiro et al., Supreme Court

Practice (11 ed. 2019) ................................

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

INTRODUCTION

The Second Amendment right to carry firearms

publicly does not extend to “sensitive places.” New

York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 30

(2022). These include schools, government buildings,

and “new and analogous” sensitive places where

firearms regulation of those kinds of places is supported by the historical record. Id. This Court has

explained that the historical record will support

firearms regulation in “new and analogous” sensitive

places where regulation in those locations “is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory

tradition.” United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 692

(2024) (emphasis added).

Building on this Court’s assurance in McDonald v.

City of Chicago that “reasonable firearms regulation,”

including “solutions to social problems that suit local

needs and values,” could “continue under the Second

Amendment,” 561 U.S. 742, 785 (2010), state and local

governments have enacted regulations restricting the

public carrying of firearms in sensitive places. In

addressing the constitutionality of these laws, the

Fourth Circuit and other courts of appeals have employed the historical analysis established by this

Court’s precedents. Consistent with this Court’s

directive in Bruen to “reason[] by analogy,” these

courts have scoured the historical record and uncovered laws from this Nation’s past that are not only

analogous to, but in some cases are “dead ringer[s]”

for, the challenged modern regulations. 597 U.S. at

28, 30.

Similarly, consistent with this Court’s

directive in Rahimi to consider “whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that

underpin our regulatory tradition,” 602 U.S. at 692,

courts have derived from the robust historical record

several principles that animate both “how” and “why”

our Nation’s forebears restricted the public carrying of

firearms at locations similar to those covered by the

laws of today.

Ignoring these foundational principles, petitioners

present an unduly restrictive view that pushes aside

much of the historical record and applies the kind

of rigid history-and-tradition analysis rejected in

Rahimi. Petitioners advance their own “guiding principle,” one not found in any of this Court’s precedents:

for a place to qualify as “sensitive,” the place must be

protected by armed government security. Pet. 26-33.

As detailed below, the petitioner’s theory turns Bruen

on its head by eschewing a historical analysis for

a place-by-place, moment-by-moment determination

that ebbs and flows based on the shifting interests and

budgets of today’s governmental decision makers.

Petitioners’ novel comprehensive-security theory

has been uniformly rejected by the courts of appeals,

even by judges otherwise sympathetic to petitioners’

position, App. 1 49a; instead, the courts have remained

true to the historical analysis required by Bruen.

Although there may be minor disagreements among

the circuits relating to particular locational restrictions (or the underlying rationale supporting their

constitutionality), these minor disputes are overshadowed by the vast areas of shared consensus.

Given this harmony among the circuits, there is no

need for this Court’s intervention now, and this Court

should instead allow the percolation process to

continue.

All references to “App.” are to the appendix in the petition in

No. 25-1324.

STATEMENT

Statutory Background

Maryland’s Longstanding Restrictions on

Public Carry

In this case, petitioners challenge nearly all of

Maryland’s restrictions on where firearms may be

carried publicly. Some of these restrictions are longstanding, including the following restrictions set forth

in the Maryland Code:

•

Public school property. Md. Code Ann., Crim.

Law § 4-102 (LexisNexis 2021).

•

Public demonstration: An individual may not

possess a firearm at a demonstration in a public

place or have a firearm in their vehicle within

1,000 feet of the demonstration. This provision,

however, applies only after (1) the individual has

been advised by a law enforcement officer that a

demonstration is occurring; and (2) the individual has been ordered by the law enforcement

officer to leave the area. Id. § 4-208.

•

Public transit: An individual may not possess a

“concealed weapon[]” in any transit vehicle or

transit facility owned or controlled by the

Maryland Transit Administration. Md. Code

Ann., Transp. § 7-705(b)(6) (LexisNexis 2020).

Other longstanding restrictions are set forth in the

Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR):

•

Certain state buildings and grounds: An individual may not carry firearms on “state public

buildings, improvements, grounds, and multiservice centers under the jurisdiction of the

Department of General Services.”

COMAR

04.05.01.01, 04.05.01.03B.

•

State parks, state forests, and Chesapeake

Forest Lands. COMAR 08.01.07.14, 08.07.01.04,

08.07.06.04.

•

A horse-racing facility. COMAR 09.10.03.03A(10).

•

The Camden Yards Sports Complex (which

includes Oriole Park at Camden Yards, M&T

Bank Stadium, and the various surrounding

buildings). COMAR 14.25.01.01, 14.25.02.06.

•

A “State museum,” which is defined to include

“any property operated as a museum by the

Department [of Planning] or a unit within the

Department.” COMAR 34.04.08.02, 34.04.08.04.

•

Casinos. COMAR 36.03.01.02B(6), 36.03.10.48.

Locational Restrictions Enacted by the

Maryland General Assembly in 2023

In 2023, in the wake of this Court’s decision in

Bruen, the Maryland General Assembly enacted

Senate Bill 1, 2 which restricted the ability to carry a

firearm publicly at several additional locations, even if

an individual otherwise possesses a public-carry

permit. 3

Senate Bill 1 prohibits individuals from carrying

firearms in three categories of locations. The first

category, an “[a]rea for children and vulnerable individuals,” encompasses daycare facilities, private

That year the Maryland General Assembly also passed House

Bill 824, which changed Maryland’s public-carry permitting

process by, among other things, eliminating the “good and

substantial reason” standard. 2023 Md. Laws ch. 651.

Senate Bill 1 also provided that a person with a public-carry

permit generally must keep the handgun concealed. Md. Code

Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-307(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2023).

schools, and medical facilities. It is defined to mean

(1) “a preschool or prekindergarten facility or the

grounds of the facility”; (2) “a private primary or

secondary school or the grounds of the school”; and (3)

“a health care facility,” which means hospitals, ambulatory surgical centers, and facilities that are

“organized primarily to help in the rehabilitation of

disabled individuals.” Crim. Law § 4-111(a)(2); Md.

Code Ann., Ins. § 15-10B-01(g)(1)-(4) (LexisNexis

2017).

The second category, a “[g]overnment or public

infrastructure area,” covers “building[s] or any part of

a building owned or leased by a unit of State or local

government,” buildings on college and university campuses, polling places, and power plants. Crim. Law

§ 4-111(a)(4). With regard to government buildings,

the law requires “a clear and conspicuous sign at the

main entrance” stating that carrying firearms is

prohibited. Id. § 4-111(d)(2).

The third category, a “[s]pecial purpose area,” encompasses certain places where the public gathers for

entertainment, educational enrichment, or other

collective social pursuits. It is defined as “(i) a location

licensed to sell or dispense alcohol or cannabis for onsite consumption; (ii) a stadium; (iii) a museum; (iv) an

amusement park; (v) a racetrack; or (vi) a [casino].” Id.

§ 4-111(a)(9).

Senate Bill 1 also contains a provision that prohibits

individuals from entering buildings on private

property while carrying firearms without first obtaining permission to do so. Id. § 6-411. This

private property consent rule, which is not being

enforced as to property open to the public, is not at

issue in this case. 4

These prohibitions contain exemptions. One exemption is for active and retired law enforcement personnel. Id. § 4-111(b). Also exempted are the owner

or lessee of a (non-governmental) location and any

person expressly authorized to provide security at the

location. Id. § 4-111(b)(9). Finally, the law provides

an exemption for a firearm carried or transported in a

motor vehicle, so long as the firearm is either carried

by an individual with a valid public-carry permit or

locked in a container. Id. § 4-111(b)(11).

Proceedings Below

On the same day that Senate Bill 1 was signed into

law, two sets of plaintiffs filed lawsuits challenging the

law’s constitutionality, primarily on Second Amendment grounds. Collectively, they challenged restrictions applying to (1) state parks and forests; (2) mass

transit facilities and vehicles; (3) school property (but

not the school buildings); (4) healthcare facilities, (5)

property under the jurisdiction of the Department of

General Services; (6) entertainment facilities, such as

stadiums, racetracks, amusement parks, and casinos;

As discussed below, petitioners challenged this law as part of

this case, and the district court enjoined enforcement of the law

as it applied to property open to the public. App. 124a. The

Fourth Circuit unanimously affirmed that aspect of the district

court’s decision. App. 43a. Maryland then filed a petition for writ

of certiorari. Moore v. Kipke, No. 25-1206 (U.S. docketed Apr. 22,

2026). But given this Court’s decision in Wolford v. Lopez, 146 S.

Ct. 2032 (2026), which held Hawaii’s nearly identical private

property consent rule unconstitutional, Maryland moved to

dismiss the petition, which this Court granted. Accordingly, the

injunction issued by the district court remains in place.

(7) property operated as a museum by the Department

of Planning; (8) buildings owned or leased by a unit of

state or local government (but not legislative assemblies, polling places, or courthouses); (9) locations

selling alcohol for on-site consumption; and (10) public

demonstrations (and areas within 1,000 feet). The

plaintiffs also challenged the private property consent

rule, but not for dwellings.

Both sets of plaintiffs moved for preliminary injunction and for summary judgment. The State also moved

for summary judgment as to all claims.

After consolidating the cases, the district court

denied injunctive relief as to the bulk of plaintiffs’

claims, including with regard to restrictions at museums, health care facilities, mass transit facilities

and vehicles, state parks, entertainment facilities,

school grounds, and government buildings. App. 144a174a. The district court, however, granted injunctive

relief as to the private property consent rule and the

restrictions at public demonstrations and locations

that sell alcohol for on-site consumption. App. 144a174a.

The court also denied all summary judgment

motions without prejudice. App. 173a. The parties

then renewed those motions, which the court granted

in part and denied in part consistent with its disposition of the preliminary injunction motions. App.

107a-125a. All parties timely appealed.

The Fourth Circuit’s Decision

The Fourth Circuit, in a partially divided decision,

affirmed in part and reversed in part. Judge Gregory,

joined by Chief Judge Diaz, concluded that Maryland’s

challenged location-based firearm restrictions are

consistent with the Second Amendment. In particular,

the court affirmed the district court’s judgment

upholding Maryland’s prohibitions on carrying firearms in government buildings, public transportation,

school grounds, healthcare facilities, museums, stadiums, racetracks, amusement parks, casinos, and

other specified places of amusement. App. 6a-8a. It

reversed the district court’s judgment invalidating

Maryland’s restrictions on carrying firearms within

1,000 feet of public demonstrations and at locations

licensed to sell alcohol for on-premises consumption.

App. 6a-8a.

The court began by acknowledging that it had not

yet “addressed the proper sensitive place analysis,”

and that this case therefore required it “to clarify the

sensitive place doctrine and its role within the broader

Bruen analysis.” App. 10a. To that end, the court

rejected the view that sensitive places fall outside the

Second Amendment’s textual coverage at Bruen’s first

step. App. 14a. Instead, the court held that restrictions on carrying firearms in sensitive places

regulate conduct protected by the Amendment’s text

and therefore must be justified through the historicaltradition analysis conducted at step two. App. 14a.

The court noted that, “[a]t Bruen step two, [courts]

must determine whether ‘a firearm regulation is

consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition.’”

App. 12a (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17). Drawing

from this Court’s decision in Rahimi, the court

emphasized that the historical inquiry focuses on

whether modern regulations are analogous to historical regulations in both their purposes and their

burdens (i.e, their “why” and “how”), not whether

historical and modern laws are identical. App. 12a.

The court explained that historical evidence relevant

to step two is not confined to 1791 but may extend

through the Reconstruction era and beyond, particularly when modern regulations address circumstances or locations that did not exist at the Founding.

App. 13a.

The court then addressed each of the challenged

locational restrictions. The court concluded unanimously that Maryland’s prohibition on carrying

firearms in government buildings was constitutional

because this Court had identified government buildings as paradigmatic sensitive places in which

firearms may be prohibited. App. 15a (citing Bruen,

597 U.S. at 31, and District of Columbia v. Heller, 554

U.S. 570, 626 (2008)). In the court’s view, this Court

had resolved the question, making further historical

analysis unnecessary. App. 15a.

The court likewise unanimously upheld Maryland’s

prohibition on firearms on school grounds. App. 23a24a. Relying on this Court’s pronouncement that

“schools” are sensitive places, the court concluded that

school grounds serve the same educational purposes

as school buildings, and that extending the firearms

restrictions to adjoining school property did not exceed

the historical understanding of sensitive places. App.

23a-24a.

The court also upheld Maryland’s prohibition on

firearms in mass-transit facilities and vehicles. Rather

than relying exclusively upon the sensitive-places

doctrine, the majority concluded that the restriction

was independently justified under the government’s

proprietary authority to manage property that it owns

or controls. App. 16a-19a.

Borrowing principles

developed in First Amendment jurisprudence, the

court reasoned that when the government acts as a

proprietor, it enjoys greater authority to regulate

conduct on its own property in order to preserve the

property’s intended use. App. 17a-19a. The court

concluded that Maryland’s prohibition independently

comported with the Nation’s historical tradition of

firearm regulation. App. 19a-21a. Recognizing that

no modern public transportation systems existed

at the Founding, the majority looked to nineteenthcentury railroad regulations governing privately operated passenger railroads, which frequently prohibited

passengers from carrying firearms while on board and

instead required them to be inspected or checked

before travel. App. 19a-21a. Although the court

acknowledged that Maryland’s public transit system

generally lacks checked-luggage facilities, the court

reasoned that prohibiting passengers from carrying

readily accessible firearms represented a comparable modern response to the same safety concerns addressed by historical railroad regulations.

App. 21a-23a.

The majority next concluded that Maryland’s

prohibition on carrying firearms at public demonstrations is consistent with the Nation’s historical

tradition under the First Amendment of promoting

peaceful public assemblies. App. 24a-29a. The court

surveyed English common law, colonial unlawfulassembly statutes, Founding-era riot laws, and

Reconstruction-era regulations restricting firearms at

public gatherings and concluded that these historical

sources demonstrated a longstanding tradition of

dispersing armed assemblies and treating the presence of weapons as increasing the threat to public

peace. App. 26a-29a. The court viewed Maryland’s

requirement that an armed individual first receive

notice from law enforcement and an opportunity to

leave the demonstration before committing any offense as analogous to historical dispersal orders issued

before unlawful assemblies could be punished. App.

28a-29a.

The court then upheld Maryland’s prohibitions on

carrying firearms in state parks and state forests as

consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of

firearm regulation. App. 29a-32a. The court explained that, because modern public parks did not exist at

the Founding, courts may examine regulations adopted when analogous institutions first emerged. App.

30a-31a. Here, the court found a robust tradition of

prohibiting firearms in public parks, beginning with

New York’s ban in Central Park in 1858 and followed

by similar restrictions in numerous States and major

municipalities. App. 30a-31a. The court further held

that Maryland’s regulations governing state forests

are supported by the same historical tradition. App.

31a-32a. Although forests differ from urban parks,

Maryland’s publicly owned forests serve recreational

and educational purposes sufficiently analogous to

parks. App. 31a-32a.

The court unanimously upheld Maryland’s prohibition on carrying firearms in healthcare facilities.

App. 33a-34a. Recognizing that modern hospitals

have no direct Founding-era analogue, the court

looked to historical regulations governing comparable

institutions. App. 33a. It identified a historical

tradition of restricting firearms in places serving

vulnerable populations and in institutions devoted to

scientific and educational pursuits, and it concluded

that Maryland’s restrictions at healthcare facilities

are consistent with that tradition. App. 33a-34a.

The court upheld Maryland’s prohibitions on

carrying firearms in places of amusement, including

stadiums, amusement parks, racetracks, museums,

and casinos. App. 34a-36a. Because many of these

venues did not exist in their modern form at the

Founding, the court examined nineteenth-century

regulations governing analogous places as they

emerged and found a historical tradition of prohibiting

firearms in crowded places of amusement and public

gathering, such as ballrooms, public assemblies, and

educational events. App. 34a-36a. The court further

concluded that modern museums are analogous to

historically protected educational institutions, rendering that restriction consistent with the Second

Amendment. App. 35a.

With respect to Maryland’s prohibition on carrying

firearms in establishments licensed to sell alcohol for

on-premises consumption, the court concluded that

the restriction is supported by three overlapping

historical traditions. App. 36a-38a. First, the court

identified Founding-era and early American regulations addressing the dangers associated with combining firearms and alcohol, including laws restricting

alcohol sales to armed militia members, limiting the

discharge of firearms during drinking celebrations,

and prohibiting intoxicated persons from carrying

firearms. App. 36a-37a. Second, the court relied on

the historical tradition of regulating firearms at

crowded public gatherings, such as ballrooms and

public assemblies, where alcohol was often present

and governments sought to preserve public order.

App. 37a-38a. Third, the court identified nineteenthcentury laws specifically prohibiting firearms in “any

place where intoxicating liquors are sold.” App. 38a.

Finally, the court unanimously held that

Maryland’s private property consent rule for property

open to the public violates the Second Amendment.

App. 38a-42a. The court concluded that the historical

statutes that Maryland offered in support of its law did

“not support a broader tradition of excluding all

weapons for all purposes from the private property of

others without express permission.” App. 40a.

Judge Agee concurred in part and dissented in part.

As noted above, he agreed with the majority that

Maryland’s prohibitions on carrying firearms in

government buildings, school property, and healthcare

facilities are constitutional and that the State’s

default rule prohibiting firearms on private property

open to the public absent the owner’s affirmative

consent is not. App. 44a.

Judge Agee, however, would have held all the other

locational restrictions unconstitutional. App. 44a. In

doing so, he criticized the majority’s methodology for

applying Bruen. In his view, the majority adopted an

overly expansive conception of the sensitive-places

doctrine by identifying broad themes in the historical

record rather than requiring sufficiently analogous

historical regulations. App. 61a-62a. Judge Agee also

disagreed with the majority’s reliance on nineteenthcentury regulations as a source of historical evidence.

App. 61a-62a. Although acknowledging that later

history may sometimes illuminate constitutional

tradition, he emphasized that the Second Amendment’s meaning was fixed at the Founding and that

post-ratification enactments cannot establish new

limitations absent evidence that they reflect an

already existing constitutional tradition. App. 54a,

61a-62a.

REASONS FOR DENYING REVIEW

The Fourth Circuit correctly decided that

Maryland’s locational restrictions on firearm carrying

are consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of

firearm regulation and thus constitutional under the

Second Amendment. Contrary to petitioners’ claims,

the decision below reaffirms the widespread consensus

among the lower courts as to the broad principles to be

applied in analyzing whether a modern locational

restriction will properly be considered a “sensitive

place” where firearms may be altogether prohibited.

For these reasons, this Court’s intervention is not

warranted.

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IS

CONSISTENT WITH THIS COURT’S

SECOND AMENDMENT PRECEDENTS.

In 2022, this Court in Bruen held that, if “the Second

Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct,” then the government seeking to regulate that

conduct “must demonstrate that the regulation is

consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of

firearm regulation.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. Recognizing the need for such regulation, this Court

endorsed several types of restrictions. Addressing the

issue central to this litigation, the Court “assume[d] it

settled” that certain locations are ‘“sensitive places’

where arms carrying could be prohibited consistent

with the Second Amendment.” Id. at 30. This Court

endorsed such “longstanding” bans in schools, legislative assemblies, polling places, and courthouses,

while recognizing that this list was non-exhaustive

and “that modern regulations prohibiting the carry of

firearms in new and analogous sensitive places are

constitutionally permissible.” Id.

Bruen acknowledged that applying the restated

Second Amendment standard would require further

analysis by lower courts. Although the historical

inquiry “will often involve reasoning by analogy,” the

Court declined to “provide an exhaustive survey of the

features that render regulations relevantly similar,”

except to identify “at least two metrics: how and why

the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to

armed self-defense.” Id. at 28-29. As the Court

recognized, in some cases historical analogies will be

“relatively simple to draw,” while “other cases implicating unprecedented societal concerns or dramatic

technological changes may require a more nuanced

approach.” Id. at 27.

The Court cautioned that its standard was not

intended to be a “regulatory straightjacket,” and made

clear that governments were not required to identify

“historical twin[s]” or “dead ringer[s]” to support

modern regulations. Id. at 30. The Court recognized

that “[t]he regulatory challenges posed by firearms

today are not always the same as those that preoccupied the Founders in 1791 or the Reconstruction

generation in 1868,” and “the Constitution can, and

must, apply to circumstances beyond those the

Founders specifically anticipated.” Id. at 27-28.

Accordingly, when “[p]roperly interpreted, the Second

Amendment allows a ‘variety’ of gun regulations.” Id.

at 80 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (quoting Heller, 554

U.S. at 636).

In Rahimi, this Court reaffirmed that “the right

secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.”

602 U.S. at 690. In doing so, the Court expressed

concern that lower courts had been applying Bruen too

strictly. Id. at 691. Thus, it clarified that “the appropriate analysis involves considering whether the

challenged regulation is consistent with the principles

that underpin our regulatory tradition.” Id. at 692

(emphasis added). And most recently, in Wolford v.

Lopez, this Court explained that the historical inquiry

is not “mechanical,” and instead asks whether the

record is “close enough to enable a court to say:

‘Because this historical law was understood to be

compatible with the right codified by the Second

Amendment, we can infer that the restriction imposed

by the modern law is likewise consistent with that

right.’” 146 S. Ct. 2032, 2044 (2026). The proper test

allows the court to “identify the range of permissible

regulatory goals and how far States may go to achieve

them,” to ensure “end[s] pursued and means deployed”

cohere with those principles. Id. at 2055 (Barrett, J.,

concurring).

A. Limiting Firearms in Certain Locations

Has a Rich American Tradition Derived

from Our English Forebears.

This Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation supports the constitutionality of Maryland’s

locational restrictions. “The beginning of the relevant

tradition . . . is 1328’s Statute of Northampton, a

British statute forbidding going or riding ‘armed by

night []or by day, in fairs [or] markets.’” Schoenthal v.

Raoul, 150 F.4th 889, 911 (7th Cir. 2025), cert. denied,

146 S. Ct. 2158 (2026) (citations and some quotation

marks omitted).

“This firearm restriction in

traditionally crowded public spaces persisted into

American law, including in Virginia and North

Carolina.” Id. at 911-12 (citations omitted); see also

Bruen, 597 U.S. at 35 (noting that “[a] long, unbroken

line of common-law precedent stretching from Bracton

to Blackstone” will demonstrate a relevant historical

tradition).

At the beginning of the nineteenth century,

jurisdictions began to enact express, location-specific

restrictions that prohibited firearm carry in “confined

and crowded spaces.” Schoenthal, 150 F.4th at 912

(citing an 1817 New Orleans ordinance prohibiting

firearms in public ballrooms); see also Wolford v.

Lopez, 116 F.4th 959, 986 (9th Cir. 2024), rev’d on

other grounds, 146 S. Ct. 2032 (2026) (describing an

1853 New Mexico law restricting weapons at

ballrooms). As Professor Saul Cornell has explained,

these “laws did not represent a new constitutional

principle different than the common law restrictions

that existed for centuries, but an application of the

same legal principles to new circumstances brought

about by changes in firearms technology, consumer

behavior, and the demographic changes associated

with greater urbanization.” (4th Cir. J.A. 169.) One

exemplar is an 1870 Texas law that prohibited going

armed “into any church or religious assembly, any

school room or other place where persons are assembled for educational, literary or scientific purposes,

or into a ball room, social party or other social

gathering composed of ladies and gentlemen, or to any

election precinct on the day or days of any election,” or

into “any other place where people may be assembled

to muster or perform any other public duty, or any

other public assembly.” (4th Cir. J.A. 403.) Around

this same time, at least seven other States and

territories enacted specific locational restrictions on

firearms. (See 4th Cir. J.A. 393-421 (chronicling laws

from Tennessee (1869), Georgia (1870), Missouri

(1874), Arizona (1889), Oklahoma (1890), Idaho

(1901), and Montana (1903).)

In addition to these state laws, many local

ordinances restricted the carrying of firearms in

specific locations.

As historian Patrick Charles

explained, the historical tradition is marked by the

concept of “firearms localism,” a “preference among

state and local lawmakers to regulate firearms and

deadly weapons more strictly at the local rather than

the state level.” (4th Cir. J.A. 209-211.) Similar to the

state statutes set forth above, these ordinances, such

as ones enacted in Stockton, Kansas (1887) and

Columbia, Missouri (1890), restricted the carrying of

firearms in places such as those “where people have

assembled for educational, literary or social purposes”

and, more generally, at “any other public assemblage

of persons met for any lawful purpose.” (4th Cir. J.A.

261, 423-424.) Moreover, consistent with firearms

localism, many local jurisdictions enacted ordinances

that restricted the carrying of firearms in “corporate”

or “incorporate” areas. These ordinances, which restricted the carrying of firearms in entire municipalities,

rendered more specific restrictions unnecessary. (See

4th Cir. J.A. 213-215 (setting forth ordinances from

local jurisdictions in North Carolina (1882), Louisiana

(1874), Pennsylvania (1873), Utah (1893), Nebraska

(1889), and modern-day South Dakota (1882).)

There is no evidence that any of these sensitiveplace restrictions were ever found to be unconstitutional. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 36 (noting that an

important factor in whether a historical regulation

supports an analogous modern restriction is whether

it faced contemporaneous challenges to its constitutionality). Indeed, the opposite is true. See, e.g., Hill

v. State, 53 Ga. 472 (1874); State v. Shelby, 90 Mo. 302

(1886); Owens v. State, 3 Tex. App. 404 (1878). Not

only do these cases show that these restrictions passed

legal muster, but they reveal the prevailing attitudes

of the very people who decided to subordinate their

States’ police powers to the limitations of the Second

Amendment:

We confess it appears to us little short of

ridiculous, that any one should claim the

right to carry upon his person any of the

mischievous devices inhibited by the statute,

into a peaceable public assembly, as, for

instance into a church, a lecture room, a ball

room, or any other place where ladies and

gentlemen are congregated together.

English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 478-79 (1871); see also

Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 182 (1871); Hill, 53

Ga. at 476 (“[T]he bearing of arms of any sort [at

concerts] is an eye-sore to good citizens, offensive to

peaceable people, an indication of a want of a proper

respect for the majesty of the laws, and a marked

breach of good manners.”). In the words of this Court,

these cases demonstrate unequivocally that these

“historical law[s were] understood to be compatible

with the right codified by the Second Amendment.”

Wolford, 146 S. Ct. at 2044.

B. Maryland’s Laws Are Consistent with

the Principles Underlying This Historical Tradition.

As the Fourth Circuit’s comprehensive opinion

demonstrates, Maryland’s sensitive places laws are

consistent with the historical laws referenced above

and the underlying principles of firearm regulation

that they embody. Some of Maryland’s restrictions

draw directly from these historical laws to prohibit the

carrying of firearms at crowded locations (i.e., bars,

mass transit, and places of amusement), while others

implicate places where vulnerable populations may be

found (i.e., healthcare facilities and museums). In

some cases, these and other laws draw from a more

specific tradition of regulation, including such “dead

ringers” as Reconstruction-era laws that prohibited

firearms in parks or laws that prohibited firearms in

places where alcohol was served. But in all cases,

Maryland’s laws are linked with a widespread

tradition of prohibiting firearms in locations where

firearms are incompatible with the nature and

purpose of the location, even when used in legitimate

self-defense. See Schoenthal, 150 F.4th at 910 (noting

that the “unifying principle” among historical regulations of public carry is that “[t]hey are all discrete

places with unavoidable characteristics that potentially render it ill-advised to allow firearms”). That

feature ensures that courts “can infer that the restriction[s] imposed by the modern law[s are] consistent

with” the Second Amendment right. Wolford, 146 S.

Ct. at 2044.

Maryland’s laws do not “amount[] to an effective ban

on carrying in any public place,” Pet. 17, as petitioners

argue. Instead, Maryland’s laws prohibit public carrying of firearms at only those discrete locations where

restricting the carrying of firearms is consistent with

history and tradition and their underlying principles.

To illustrate the impact of Maryland’s laws “in

practice,” consider the “ordinary day” referenced in

this Court’s decision in Wolford. 146 S. Ct. at 2048-49.

There, this Court described a “hypothetical young

woman” who wished to legally carry a firearm as she

goes to a gas station, her workplace, a fast-food

restaurant at lunchtime, and then runs errands after

work at a large drug store, a dry cleaner, and a grocery

store. Id. Although this Court found that Hawaii’s

private property consent rule burdened the woman’s

journey at every step, id., Maryland’s sensitive places

laws do not stand as an obstacle at any of those

locations. That Maryland’s law does not affect firearm

carriage during such an “ordinary day” speaks to its

targeted approach.

II. PETITIONER’S SECURITY RATIONALE

IS AHISTORICAL AND UNWORKABLE.

Boxed in by this Court’s pronouncement that the

history and tradition embodied in the Second

Amendment establish that there are sensitive places

where firearms may be prohibited, petitioners advance

their own theory about the relevant principles

underlying this tradition. But this theory—upon

which their whole case rises and falls—underscores

the unsoundness of their position.

Petitioners argue that the “guiding principle” underlying the sensitive places doctrine is “the presence of

security”: “Where the government takes upon itself

the burden to prevent unlawful entry with arms into a

place frequented by the general public, then, and only

then, may the individual right to armed self-defense

be subject to a temporary restriction.” Pet. 2-3, 27.

But this theory—which the courts of appeal, and even

the dissenting judge in this case, have uniformly

rejected—is impossible to square with precedent,

history, or “common sense.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 698;

App. 49a n.2 (“While this argument rests on

questionable factual support, it more fundamentally

lacks foundation in the Supreme Court’s cases.” (Agee,

J., concurring and dissenting)); Schoenthal, 150 F.4th

at 910 (noting that the “core principles unifying” the

sensitive places doctrine “[s]urely” do not include the

presence of “government provided security”); Wolford,

116 F.4th at 981.

To begin, petitioners’ argument “flatly contradicts”

this Court’s precedents. Wolford, 116 F.4th at 981.

Indeed, petitioners do not even attempt to show that

their theory accounts for schools, which both Bruen

and Heller expressly identified as sensitive places.

Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30; Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. Nor

could they, given that there is no history of comprehensive security in schools. Wolford, 116 F.4th at

981.

Further, petitioners’ historical evidence is lacking

even with respect to the locations they do attempt to

address—courthouses, legislative assemblies, and

polling places. First, with respect to courthouses, petitioners rely on an assortment of statutes assigning

sheriffs and constables various roles in court proceedings. But these laws did not require those officers

to provide security for the public, but instead gave

them “administrative responsibilities,” such as executing judgments, managing juries, and serving

process or writs. 5 Schoenthal, 150 F.4th at 909 & n.17.

Nor do the Statute of Northampton or the early state

laws modeled on it support petitioners’ view. Contra

Pet. 31-32. Those laws excepted royal or judicial

officers from general prohibitions on carry near the

king or in court but, again, did not provide any security

for the public. 6

Similarly, for legislative assemblies, petitioners cite

inapposite statutes appointing or setting daily pay for

doorkeepers or sergeants-at-arms for legislative

bodies. Pet. 27-29. Those statutes—which often contemplated irregular attendance—did not specify how

See, e.g., Laws of the State of New Jersey 50 (J. Wilson 1811)

(1798 New Jersey statute making constables “ministerial officers

of the . . . court” responsible for “execut[ing] and return[ing] all

precepts, summons, warrants, writs and other process”), https://

tinyurl.com/3hv2spnu.

See Statute of Northampton 1328, 2 Edw. 3 c.3 (Eng.); 1786

Va. Acts 35, 35, ch. 49.

often those individuals would attend legislative

sessions, identify their duties, require them to be

armed, or even mention security. 7 Schoenthal, 150

F.4th at 909 & n.16. Other historical evidence demonstrates that these roles did not focus on security: for

example, the duties of one doorkeeper for Maryland’s

House of Delegates, Cornelius Mills, “included supplying wood for the use of the [legislature] and

maintaining the furniture.” 8 And, while petitioners

purport to identify a single incident in the late 1600s

in which the doorkeeper of the Maryland General

Assembly turned away armed visitors, Pet. 29, their

own source states that “the Burgesses”—that is, the

legislators themselves—denied the individuals entry

because it was “contrary to the Antient rules &

Custume of this house.” 9 As the Seventh Circuit

observed, the measures petitioners identify “would be

less-than-adequate to stave off violence.” Schoenthal,

150 F.4th at 909.

The historical laws petitioners cite concerning

polling places, Pet. 30, also do not demonstrate a

tradition of comprehensive security. Rather, these

laws show that the role of officers “was largely to

help run elections rather than provide security.”

See, e.g., Extracts from the Journal of Proceedings of the

Provincial Congress of New Jersey 240 (J. Sailer 1835) (1775 New

Jersey ordinance setting doorkeeper’s pay “for each day that he

hath or shall attend”), https://tinyurl.com/22za9db7.

Cornelius Mills (c.1755-1823), Archives of Md., https://tiny

url.com/5878zf59. While serving as doorkeeper and, later, as

sergeant-at-arms, Mr. Mills also worked “as a carpenter/joiner,

ran a boardinghouse, and advertised his experience as an

auctioneer,” id.— roles not requiring any security expertise.

Raphael Semmes, Captains and Mariners of Early Maryland

286 (1937), https://tinyurl.com/5hcv2d2f.

Schoenthal, 150 F.4th at 909-10. In other words,

States traditionally required sheriffs to staff the polls

and announce results—not screen visitors for firearms. 10

Thus, petitioners’ claim that there is a tradition of

meaningful security at courthouses, legislative assemblies, or polling places is unsupported by the historical record. At most, it shows that some of these

places sometimes had a law enforcement officer

present, almost always for non-security reasons. This

history of “lax and irregular security practices,” id. at

909, does not provide a unifying principle for sensitive

places.

Moreover, this Court effectively foreclosed petitioners’ narrow view when, in Bruen, it identified

characteristics of locations it might recognize as sensitive places. In rejecting New York’s assertion that

firearms could be prohibited in all “places where

people typically congregate and where law-enforcement and other public safety professionals are presumptively available,” this Court stated, “It is true

that people sometimes congregate in ‘sensitive places,’

and it is likewise true that law enforcement professsionals are usually presumptively available in those

locations.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30-31. The Court’s

observation that law enforcement officials are “usually

presumptively available” in sensitive places thus

refutes petitioners’ theory that government-provided

security must always be present.

See, e.g., 2 Laws of the State of Delaware 984-86 (1797) (1790

statute requiring sheriffs to announce elections; “attend, conduct,

and regulate” polling; and deliver results), https://tinyurl

.com/2vcn3f8b.

Ironically, petitioners’ theory could even expand the

concept of sensitive places beyond what this Court had

in mind. Petitioners claim that States may transform

a location into a sensitive place wherever the government “takes steps to ensure it is providing for [its

citizens’] protection.” Pet. 33. In doing so, however,

petitioners concede that any public place in Maryland

may potentially be a sensitive place where public

carrying of a firearm may be prohibited, regardless of

historical tradition. For example, under petitioners’

theory, Maryland may decide to impose governmentprovided security on a grocery store, and—simply by

virtue of that decision—individuals may be prohibited

from carrying firearms in that grocery store, even if

there is no historical tradition supporting such a

restriction.

On the flip side, petitioners’ security theory fails to

account for places that this Court has already

recognized are sensitive. Under petitioners’ theory,

because Maryland does not currently provide comprehensive security at any of its more than 1,500 polling

places, its prohibition on firearm carriage there would

violate the Second Amendment—despite Heller and

Bruen’s express approval of such a prohibition.

Petitioners have seemingly replaced history and

tradition with “flexibility.” Pet. 32.

Moreover, although petitioners tout their security

theory as a “robust principle,” Pet. 32, it is unworkable

even on its own terms. They do not answer critical

questions about how such a theory would work in

practice, such as how much security is in fact needed

for a weapons restriction to cross the invisible line

from unconstitutional to valid. And is the notion of

the requisite security transitory, such that the ability

to carry a firearm might spring into existence if the

security guard momentarily steps away?

Finally, petitioners’ security theory creates a fatal

flaw in their argument. Petitioners seek to invalidate

the challenged restrictions on their face. But as this

Court recently explained, a facial challenge “is the

‘most difficult challenge to mount successfully,’

because it requires a defendant to ‘establish that no

set of circumstances exists under which the Act would

be valid.’” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 693 (citation omitted).

Under petitioners’ theory, however, whether a

particular location is a “sensitive place” depends on

the level of security being provided at that time.

Plainly, if any location could be transformed into a

sensitive place within moments merely by implementing government security, then a “set of circumstances” always “exists under which [Maryland’s

sensitive places laws] would be valid.” Id. This type

of fact-dependent inquiry would thus preclude the

broad facial relief that petitioners are seeking in this

case.

III. COURTS ARE NOT DIVIDED ON THE

PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING A SENSITIVE PLACES ANALYSIS.

Petitioners argue that “[t]he courts of appeals are

divided over how to assess locational restrictions on

the right to bear arms.” Pet. 17. This claim is vastly

overstated.

Of the more than 12 broad categories of places

addressed by the courts of appeals, petitioners have

identified only three locations over which there is any

disagreement: public transit, healthcare facilities,

and public assemblies. A closer look, however, reveals

that any disagreement within these categories is more

circumscribed than petitioners let on.

First, every court of appeals to have considered the

issue has determined that there is a historical

tradition of restricting the public carry of firearms on

public transit. App. 19a-21a; Frey v. City of New York,

157 F.4th 118, 135 (2d Cir. 2025); Schoenthal, 150

F.4th at 920-22; Wolford, 116 F.4th at 1000-01. To the

extent there is potential disagreement, it is over

whether such a restriction must contain an exception

for an inoperable or securely stored firearm. Compare

App. 21a-22a with Wolford, 116 F.4th at 1001-02. But

those courts that have found such an exception to be

unnecessary either did not address the issue or did so

on the premise that the plaintiffs had brought a facial

challenge against restrictions on all public transit,

which included transportation systems intended only

for short-distance travel where checking luggage

would be impractical. See, e.g., App. 21a-22a. Those

courts left open the possibility that, applied to largerscale public transit, a firearms prohibition that did not

contain any exception might be inconsistent with

historical tradition. See, e.g., App. 21a-22a.

Of the three courts of appeals to have considered

bans at healthcare facilities, only one—the Ninth

Circuit—concluded that the restriction was unconstitutional. Wolford, 116 F.4th at 999-1000. But this is

an outlier: even Judge Agee, who dissented below as

to every other locational restriction not expressly

referenced in Heller and Bruen, concluded that

healthcare facilities, as a category, fell within the

sensitive places doctrine. App. 65a-66a. Moreover,

the Ninth Circuit’s decision was based on its

conclusion, at the preliminary injunction stage, that

the government had failed to support its argument

with historical laws. Wolford, 116 F.4th at 1000.

With respect to public assemblies, again the Ninth

Circuit stands as the sole outlier. Id. at 997-98.

Moreover, even if this Court were inclined to consider

this issue, this case would be a poor vehicle for doing

so. Rather than banning firearms at a permitted

public gathering outright, as other jurisdictions (both

past and present) have, Maryland’s law prohibits the

public carry of a firearm at a “demonstration in a

public place” only after (1) the person is “advised by a

law enforcement officer that a demonstration is

occurring at the public place” and (2) the officer orders

the person “to leave the area of the demonstration

until the person disposes of the firearm.” Crim. Law §

4-208(b)(2). As the Fourth Circuit concluded, these

attributes align Maryland’s law with historical

“unlawful assembly” laws from the Founding “that

ordered dispersal of assemblies, particularly where

individuals were armed with weapons.” App. 27a-28a.

Moreover, addressing Maryland’s law would have

little impact: no other State—except Alabama 11—has

a comparable statute.

Petitioners’ attempt to conjure up a split among the

circuits regarding the general principles that animate

the underlying historical tradition also falls flat. Pet.

19-20. Again relying solely on the Ninth Circuit in

Wolford, petitioners assert that the courts of appeals

are split as to whether a firearms ban “may be

sustained ‘in places that serve vulnerable populations.’” Pet. 19 (citing App. 33a). But nothing in the

Fourth Circuit’s decision (or any other circuit’s

Ala. Code § 13A-11-59(c).

decision) stands for the proposition that, as petitioners

claim, a place may be deemed “sensitive” solely on the

basis that vulnerable populations can be found there.

Instead, as Wolford concedes, the presence of vulnerable populations is a principle that should be

considered as one factor when distilling the scope of

the relevant historical tradition. 116 F.4th at 981.

Similarly, the Fourth Circuit concluded that healthcare facilities were sensitive places because they

“serve vulnerable populations” and because “[t]here is

also a historical tradition of banning guns in places

used for scientific purposes.” App. 33a-34a. Likewise,

the Fourth Circuit concluded that museums were

sensitive places not only because they “serve children,”

but also because “locations that serve an educational

purpose . . . are historically protected.” App. 35a.

Petitioners’ claim that the lower courts are using the

protection of “vulnerable populations” as a freestanding, independent principle misrepresents those cases.

Petitioners’ complaint that lower courts have

improperly relied on a “well-established tradition of

prohibiting firearms at crowded places” suffers from

the same flaw. Pet. 21 (quoting App. 36a-37a).

Indeed, their claim that this Court in Bruen “expressly

rejected” “crowded” places as a historical justification,

Pet. 22, is especially misplaced. All that Bruen

explained was that the relatively crowded nature of

Manhattan could not be used as a stand-alone

justification for banning firearms throughout the

entire island, because to do so would “define[] the

category of ‘sensitive places’ far too broadly.” 597 U.S.

at 31.

But, in doing so, this Court implicitly

acknowledged that more targeted regulations would

pass constitutional muster—so long as they were

supported by historical tradition. See id. (noting that

this Court did “not undertake an exhaustive historical

analysis . . . of the full scope of the Second Amendment”). Yet that is what Maryland and other States

have done, enacting their locational restrictions in

discrete locations that do not eviscerate the right to

public carry.

Petitioners’ focus on disagreements as to the viability of the government proprietary doctrine is also

inapt. Pet. 19. Although the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have adopted a more robust version of this

principle, App. 16a-19a, Wolford, 116 F.4th at 970-71,

no court of appeals has concluded that government

ownership is irrelevant. See Schoenthal, 150 F.4th at

918 (“We consider government ownership at Bruen’s

second step as a guidepost for locating the public

transit restriction within our nation’s tradition.”).

And no court has relied exclusively on the government

proprietary doctrine to uphold a firearms prohibition.

See App. 19a-21a. (concluding that Maryland’s

restriction on public transit is also supported by an

analogous historical tradition). Similarly, to the

extent that the Ninth Circuit articulated the principle

in Wolford, it was as dicta, unmoored to any concrete

claim before the court. See Wolford, 116 F.4th at 970

(noting that, although the government may not

restrict firearms at banks generally, the government

may do so “if [it] operates a bank” (emphasis added)).

Finally, in addition to the lower courts’ unanimous

rejection of petitioners’ security theory, there is no

disagreement among the circuits in rejecting one of

petitioner’s other central principles: a purported

“tradition of permitting—and sometimes requiring—

firearm carrying in crowded places of public assembly

where people would otherwise be vulnerable to armed

violence.” Pet. 21; see Wolford, 116 F.4th at 997. Most

of these laws date from the early colonial era, and all

of them served distinct purposes that are no longer

relevant today. Although Bruen instructs courts to

consider both “how” and “why” a regulation “burden[s]

a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense,”

597 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added), these laws do not

burden that right at all; rather, much like militia laws

generally, they related only to the community’s

collective defense. 12 Specifically, the express purpose

of these laws was to protect citizens from external

threats such as slave insurrections and Native

American attacks along the colonial frontier, not

interpersonal violence among American citizens. 13

However existential those threats may have been at

the time, they do not exist anymore. Moreover, the

racist origins of these laws—which often applied on

their face only to “white male inhabitants” 14—

If, as petitioners claim, there was a robust tradition of

carrying firearms in public, one must wonder why these colonial

legislatures felt the need to compel their citizens to comply with

such a tradition.

To the extent that these laws demonstrate a tradition of

armed protection of premises where people gather, Maryland’s

sensitive places laws honor that tradition. With regard to nongovernmental locations referenced in Senate Bill 1, the prohibitions on the carrying of firearms do not apply to “a person who is

authorized by the owner or lessee of the location to wear, carry,

or transport a firearm at the location for the purpose of . . .

employment as a [licensed] security guard [or] protecting any

individual or property at the location with an express agreement

between the parties.” Crim. Law § 4-111(b)(9). Thus, instead of

the government conscripting its own citizens into the collective

defense of the community, property owners are now free to

determine whether, and to what extent, to provide armed security

at the places they control.

See An Act for the Better Security of the Inhabitants, by

Obliging the Male White Persons to Carry Fire Arms to Places of

undermines any reliance on these laws as a source of

enduring principles. See Goldstein v. Hochul, 680

F. Supp. 3d 370, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (observing that

“these statutes are rooted in racism[,] not the Second

Amendment”). For example, the 1743 South Carolina

statute cited by petitioners (Pet. 21), which required

colonists to bring their guns to church, also laid bare

its purpose: so that “inhabitants of this Province may

be the better secured and provided against the

insurrections and other wicked attempts of negroes

and other slaves.” 15 “Unless we put history entirely

out of our minds, [petitioners’] claim that this tainted

artifact illuminates the original understanding of the

right to keep and bear arms cannot be taken

seriously.” Wolford, 146 S. Ct. at 2053.

IV. THIS COURT’S INTERVENTION IS NOT

WARRANTED AT THIS TIME.

As set forth above, this Court should decline to hear

this case because Maryland’s locational restrictions

are consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of

firearm regulation. But this Court should also decline

to exercise certiorari review for additional reasons.

First, contrary to petitioners’ assertion that “the

lower courts have expressed deep frustration with

their own analyses,” Pet. 2, this is not because those

courts are struggling with applying this Court’s

precedents. It is true that, at the close of its opinion,

the Ninth Circuit in Wolford remarked that its

Public Worship (1770), reprinted in A Digest of the Laws of the

State of Georgia, 157–58 (R. Aitken 1800), https://tinyurl

.com/3umyvry2.

Act No. 702, reprinted in 7 Statutes at Large of South

Carolina 417-19 (D.J. McCord ed. 1840), https://tinyurl.com

/38cpkmbj.

decision, which upheld some locational restrictions but

not others, might “appear arbitrary.” 116 F.4th at

1003. But, as this Court has acknowledged, “the

history-based analysis [Heller] prescribed would not

be easy,” and that nonetheless this “mode of analysis

[would be] necessary to prevent judges from balancing

away the” Second Amendment right. Wolford, 146 S.

Ct. at 2042. Thus, the Ninth Circuit was simply

making this same point, noting that, after “taking a

step back from the historical analysis,” its decision

was the result demanded by fidelity to this Court’s

history and tradition test as articulated in Bruen. See

Wolford, 116 F.4th at 1003 (noting that, although “the

lack of an apparent logical connection among the

sensitive places is hard to explain in ordinary terms,”

“[t]he deep historical analysis required by the

Supreme Court provides the missing link”).

With the lower courts faithfully applying this “deep

historical analysis,” it is thus not a reason for concern

that those courts may be grappling with emerging

Second Amendment questions. Indeed, that is how

the process should work. And, as detailed above, the

courts of appeal have coalesced around a robust

historical record that identifies several foundational

principles, as well as specific locations, that—following this Court’s directives—inform a modern-day

analysis.

The lack of any meaningful circuit split thus

counsels in favor of allowing further percolation in the

lower courts. Only five courts of appeals, the Second,

Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth, have issued nonvacated merits decisions in challenges to sensitiveplace laws since Bruen. See App. 6a-8a; Schoenthal,

150 F.4th at 899; United States v. Allam, 140 F.4th

289, 295-299 (5th Cir. 2025); Antonyuk v. James, 120

F.4th 941, 955 (2d Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct.

1900 (2025); Wolford, 116 F.4th at 970. Two of those

circuits addressing broad challenges to several

locations have done so only in appeals from orders

granting or denying preliminary injunctions, such that

their conclusions were tentative. 16 See Antonyuk, 120

F.4th at 1048 n.126; Wolford, 116 F.4th at 1002-03.

And the Fifth Circuit, like the Seventh (whose decision

involved only mass transit), decided only a very

narrow issue, rejecting an as-applied challenge to a

statute prohibiting firearms in a school zone brought

by an individual who “behav[ed] erratically and menacingly,” while “offer[ing] no opinion regarding the

[statute’s] constitutionality . . . in any other context.”

Allam, 140 F.4th at 299-300. In addition, the stakes

in a constitutional challenge are unusually high: any

decision the Court issues “cannot be overruled by statutory amendments.” Stephen Shapiro et al., Supreme

Court Practice § 6.37(i)(1) (11 ed. 2019). Having

declined to preemptively “comprehensively define

‘sensitive places’” in Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30, this Court

should not deny itself the benefit of percolation now.

Indeed, that percolation is still continuing. Currently pending before the en banc Third Circuit is a

challenge to a slate of locational restrictions in New

Jersey that essentially mirrors the restrictions being

challenged in this case. Koons v. Attorney General

New Jersey, 156 F.4th 210, 270-71 (3d Cir.), reh’g en

banc granted and opinions vacated, 162 F.4th 100 (3d

Cir. 2025). Allowing the full Third Circuit to address

Although the Second Circuit addressed a challenge to

firearms restrictions in mass transit and in Times Square at the

preliminary injunction stage in Frey, the Second Circuit entered

a final judgment rejecting a challenge to restrictions in parks in

Christian v. James, 176 F.4th 189, 203-06 (2d Cir. 2026).

this challenge will provide further insight into

whether this Court’s intervention is in fact needed on

this issue.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

ANTHONY G. BROWN

Attorney General of Maryland

JULIA DOYLE

Solicitor General

RYAN R. DIETRICH*

Assistant Attorney General

200 Saint Paul Place

20th Floor

Baltimore, Maryland 21202

rdietrich@oag.maryland.gov

(410) 576-7648

Attorneys for Respondents

August 2026

*Counsel of Record

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.