Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Christy Ann Martin, Petitioner v. John Fredrick Martin

No. ____________

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

------------------------------------------------------------------------CHRISTY ANN MARTIN,

Petitioner,

v.

JOHN FREDRICK MARTIN,

Respondent.

------------------------------------------------------------------------On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

Mississippi Court of Appeals

------------------------------------------------------------------------PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

------------------------------------------------------------------------JASON E. CAMPBELL

Counsel of Record

CAMPBELL LAW FIRM, P.A.

904 North Main Street

Water Valley, Mississippi 38965

(662) 537-4921

jason@campbelllawms.net

Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

A Mississippi chancery court held Petitioner in

civil contempt and sentenced her to six months’ incarceration, suspended on payment, for failing to satisfy

a $21,040.72 civil money judgment originating as a

property-damages suit in county court. The court

made no express finding as to Petitioner’s present

ability to pay, placed the burden on Petitioner to disprove ability, and delegated to opposing counsel the

authority to “automatically” trigger incarceration

upon any missed installment. Two Justices of the Mississippi Supreme Court voted to grant certiorari.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Due Process and Equal Protection

Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as applied

in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), and

Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011), forbid a

State from incarcerating an indigent judgment

debtor for nonpayment of a private civil money

judgment without a judicial inquiry into, and an

express on-the-record finding of, present ability to

pay.

2. Whether relabeling a civil money judgment as

“contempt”—thereby exposing the debtor to imprisonment otherwise foreclosed by the constitutional prohibition on debtors’ prisons—violates the

Fourteenth Amendment when ordinary civil-

collection remedies (execution, garnishment, and

enrollment of judgment) remain fully available.

3. Whether a state-court order that shifts the burden of proof on ability to pay to the debtor, and that

authorizes opposing counsel to obtain a warrant of

incarceration without a contemporaneous hearing,

satisfies the minimum procedural safeguards required by Turner.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner is Christy Ann Martin, defendant/counter-plaintiff below and appellant in the Mississippi Supreme Court.

Respondent is John Fredrick Martin, plaintiff/counter-defendant below and appellee in the Mississippi Supreme Court.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Martin v. Martin, No. 2018-272 (Warren Cnty.

Miss. Chancery Ct.) (Order for Contempt entered Feb.

5, 2024).

Martin v. Martin, No. 2024-CA-00222 (Miss. Ct.

App.) (affirmed June 24, 2025).

Martin v. Martin, No. 2024-CT-00222-SCT

(Miss.) (petition for writ of certiorari denied Feb. 3,

2026; JJ. Griffis and Branning voting to grant).

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED --------------------------------- i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ----------------------iii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS --------------------------------iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES -------------------------------- vi

INTRODUCTION ----------------------------------------------- 1

OPINIONS BELOW ------------------------------------------- 3

JURISDICTION ------------------------------------------------- 4

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED ----- 4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ------------------------------ 4

ARGUMENT ----------------------------------------------------- 7

I. The Decision Below Squarely Conflicts with This

Court’s Controlling Precedent on Jailing the Indigent

for Unpaid Debts ------------------------------------------------ 8

II. The Decision Below Deepens an Entrenched Conflict Among State High Courts and Federal Courts on

the Use of Civil Contempt to Enforce Money Judgments ------------------------------------------------------------- 11

III. The Question Is Exceptionally Important, Recurring, and Cleanly Presented -------------------------- 15

IV. This Case Is an Ideal Vehicle ----------------------- 16

CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------ 18

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX

Lower-Court Orders and Opinion

(Rule 14.1(i)(i)–(iii)) — Most recent decision first

APPENDIX A — Order of the Supreme Court of

Mississippi Denying Petition for Writ of Certiorari (Feb. 3, 2026) ................................................. 1a

APPENDIX B — Order of the Mississippi Court

of Appeals Denying Motion for Rehearing (Nov.

18, 2025) ................................................................. 3a

APPENDIX C — Opinion of the Mississippi

Court of Appeals Affirming Order of Contempt

(June 24, 2025) ....................................................... 5a

APPENDIX D — Order for Contempt, Chancery

Court of Warren County, Mississippi (Feb. 5,

2024) ..................................................................... 17a

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved

(Rule 14.1(f) & (i)(vi))

APPENDIX E — Constitutional and Statutory

Provisions Involved .............................................. 23a

Excerpts of Record Showing Federal Question Raised

(Rule 14.1(g) & (i)(v))

APPENDIX F — Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the Supreme Court of Mississippi (Filed Nov.

21, 2025) ............................................................... 25a

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Bearden v. Georgia,

461 U.S. 660 (1983) ------------2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 16

Bowen v. Bowen,

471 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1985) ---------------------------- 12

Cain v. White,

937 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 2019) -------------------------- 13

Carter v. Grace Whitney Props.,

939 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) ---------------- 12

Doss v. Doss,

949 So. 2d 71 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) ----------------- 12

Ex parte Hall,

854 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1993) --------------------------- 12

Ex parte Yates,

387 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1965) ----------------------- 12-13

Fuller v. Oregon,

417 U.S. 40 (1974) ---------------------------------------- 10

In re Nichols,

749 So. 2d 68 (Miss. 1999) ----------------- 2, 7, 12, 13

M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,

519 U.S. 102 (1996) -------------------------------------- 10

McDonald v. Chicago,

561 U.S. 742 (2010) -------------------------------------- 11

ODonnell v. Harris County,

892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018) -------------------------- 13

vi

Pugh v. Pugh,

472 N.E.2d 1085 (Ohio 1984) ------------------------- 14

Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc.,

155 F. Supp. 3d 758 (M.D. Tenn. 2015) ------------ 13

Tate v. Short,

401 U.S. 395 (1971) ------------------------------------ 2, 8

Timbs v. Indiana,

586 U.S. 146 (2019) -------------------------------------- 11

Turner v. Rogers,

564 U.S. 431 (2011) -------2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 16, 17

Williams v. Illinois,

399 U.S. 235 (1970) --------------------------------- 2, 7, 8

Wright v. Wright,

737 So. 2d 408 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998) --------------- 12

Constitutional Provisions and Statutes

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1-------- 1, 2, 4, 6, 11, 13, 14

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) --------------------------------------------- 4

Ind. Const. Art. I ---------------------------------------------- 12

Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 215, § 34A ------------------------- 14

Miss. Const. Art. 3, § 30 ----------------------------- 4, 6, 12

Ohio Rev. Code § 2705.02 ---------------------------------- 14

Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3502(e)(7) -------------------------------- 14

Sup. Ct. R. 10 -------------------------------------------------- 16

Sup. Ct. R. 13 ---------------------------------------------------- 4

Tex. Const. Art. I, § 18 -------------------------------------- 13

vii

Other Authorities

ACLU, In For A Penny: The Rise of America’s New

Debtors’ Prisons (2010) ------------------------------------ 3

Fees and Fines: The Criminalization of Poverty (Dec.

16, 2019) -------------------------------------------------------- 3

Fines & Fees Justice Ctr., A Debtor’s Prison: Fines

and Fees Create Debilitating Cycle of Incarceration (Feb. 20, 2018)------------------------------------------ 3

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Dear Colleague Letter on the Enforcement of Fines and

Fees (Mar. 14, 2016) -------------------------------------- 15

viii

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Christy Ann Martin respectfully petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the

judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi.

INTRODUCTION

This case is about whether a state court may

put an indigent woman in jail (i.e., a criminal punishment) for six months because she could not pay

$21,040.72 for carpet, storage fees, and other property

damages awarded in a civil suit by her ex-husband imposed as a civil judgment. Put another way, can a

chancery court wield its contempt power as a sword to

become a private collection agency for ordinary civil

money judgments? The Fourteenth Amendment, in its

plain terms and as applied by this Court, means that

no one in America may be incarcerated merely because she cannot pay.

Below, the Warren County Chancery Court in

Mississippi answered this question in the affirmative.

It ordered the Petitioner—an unemployed single

mother of a young child, with no assets to execute

against—to serve six months in the custody of the

Franklin County Sheriff unless she immediately delivered a $7,135.00 lump sum followed by monthly installments of $3,567.50. The court ordered her to

make these payments without any express finding of

her ability to pay, and, instead, shifted the burden of

disproving ability to her. Rather than recognizing her

1

sacrifice in staying home to care for her child, it

treated her stay-at-home-parenting as proof of willful

avoidance of the payments. Moreover, it delegated the

authority to “automatically” submit an order of incarceration upon any missed payment to her ex-husband’s counsel—with no requirement of a hearing, judicial review, or an ability-to-pay determination.

Quite simply, that is not civil contempt; it is a debtors’

prison by another name. See App. 17a–21a.

The Mississippi Supreme Court denied review

by a divided vote. Two Justices—Justices Griffis and

Branning—voted to grant. App. 1a-2a. That division

is telling, because the decision below cannot be

squared with this Court’s repeated holdings that the

Fourteenth Amendment forbids jailing the indigent

for unpaid money. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431,

131 S. Ct. 2501, 180 L. Ed. 2d 452 (2011); Bearden v.

Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S. Ct. 2064, 76 L. Ed. 2d

221 (1983); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S. Ct. 668,

28 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.

235, 90 S. Ct. 2018, 26 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1970). It also

cannot be squared with the Mississippi Supreme

Court’s own decision in In re Nichols, 749 So. 2d 68

(Miss. 1999), which vacated a nearly identical contempt order as “violat[ing]” Mississippi’s constitutional prohibition on imprisonment for debt. Id. at 72.

The question is not academic. Across the country, indigent litigants—overwhelmingly women, lowwage workers, and people of color—face incarceration

every day in state family, chancery, and civil courts

2

for unpaid money obligations. The Department of Justice, the American Bar Association, the ACLU, and

multiple federal district courts have documented the

problem. See, e.g., Fees and Fines: The Criminalization of Poverty (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/government_public/resources/public-lawyer/archive/fees-fines-criminalization-poverty

(last accessed April 25, 2026; Fines & Fees Justice

Ctr., A Debtor’s Prison: Fines and Fees Create Debilitating Cycle of Incarceration (Feb. 20, 2018)

https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/articles/debtorsprison-court-fees/ (last accessed April 25, 2026); In For

a Penny: The Rise of America's New Debtors' Prisons

(October 4, 2010),

https://www.aclu.org/publications/penny-rise-americas-new-debtors-prisons (last

accessed April 25, 2026). This Court’s intervention is

needed to restore the constitutional floor that Bearden

and Turner established.

The Petition should be granted.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Mississippi Supreme Court’s order denying

certiorari is unpublished, and is reproduced at App.

1a. The Mississippi Court of Appeals’ opinion affirming the chancery court is published opinion 2024-CA00228-COA and is reproduced at App. 3a. The Chancery Court of Warren County’s Order for Contempt is

published in Book 342, page 365 of the records of the

Chancey Court of Warren County, and in the Mississippi Electronic Case Management System as

3

Document No. 217 in Case Number 75CH1:18-cv00272, and is reproduced at App. 17a.

JURISDICTION

The Mississippi Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari on February 3, 2026. App.

1a. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1257(a). The petition is timely under Rule 13.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution provides, in relevant part: “No

State shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law; nor deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of

the laws.”

Article 3, Section 30 of the Mississippi Constitution provides: “There shall be no imprisonment for

debt.”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. The Underlying Civil Suit for Property Damages.

Respondent John Fredrick (“Rick”) Martin sued

Petitioner Christy Ann Martin (“Christy”) for divorce

in the Chancery Court of Warren County, Mississippi,

in November 2018. During the pendency of the

4

divorce, Rick also filed a separate civil action in the

County Court of Warren County seeking monetary

damages that he claimed resulted from Christy’s departure from the marital home—namely, storage fees,

carpet replacement costs, and similar items. That civil

suit (No. 19.0567) was later transferred and consolidated with the divorce proceeding.

On September 8, 2021, the chancery court entered a Final Judgment of Divorce and, on November

23, 2021, an Amended Final Judgment. The court

awarded Rick a $21,040.72 money judgment on his

property-damage claims, directing Christy to make

payment within twelve months. This money judgment

did not concern alimony, child support, or any order to

convey property; rather, it was a civil money judgment

of the kind ordinarily enforced by execution, garnishment, or enrollment of judgment under Mississippi

law.

B.

The Contempt Petition and Trial.

Twelve months passed, and Rick never enrolled

the judgment. Nor did he ever seek an execution, garnishment, or levy. Instead, on December 19, 2022, he

filed a Petition for Citation of Contempt explicitly

seeking to have Christy incarcerated “until she paid

the entirety of $21,040.72 plus legal interest thereon.”

Christy opposed the petition on constitutional

grounds. She testified that she lacked the funds to pay

the judgment, and that she had voluntarily foregone

full-time employment during the relevant period in

5

order to care for the parties’ young child at home. She

presented no concealed assets, no hidden income, and

no fraudulent conveyances. She argued that incarcerating her to collect a civil money judgment would violate the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 3, § 30 of

the Mississippi Constitution, and that Rick’s proper

remedy was ordinary civil execution.

C.

The Order for Contempt.

On February 5, 2024, the chancery court entered its Order for Contempt. App. 17a. The court:

a) held Christy in civil contempt for “failing to

pay the sum of $21,040.72”;

b) ordered her to pay an additional $7,500.00

in attorney’s fees;

c) sentenced her to six months in the custody

of the Franklin County Sheriff;

d) suspended the sentence on condition of a

$7,135.00 payment by March 1, 2024, with

monthly installments of $3,567.50 thereafter; and

e) authorized Rick’s counsel to “automatically

submit to the Court an order for incarceration” upon any missed payment. App. 21a.

The court made no express finding that Christy

possessed the present ability to pay the lump-sum

amount or the monthly installments. It did not inventory her assets, income, liabilities, or realistic earning

capacity. Instead, it dismissed her evidence as

6

“inconsistent with the law and the facts,” reasoned

that she “could” work because she had worked in the

past and was in “good health overall,” and placed the

burden of proving inability on her. App. 18a–19a.

D.

The Appeal.

Christy appealed, arguing that incarceration

for nonpayment of a civil money judgment contravenes the precedent set forth in Bearden, Turner, and

the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in In re

Nichols. The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed.

App. 5a. On February 3, 2026, the Mississippi Supreme Court denied certiorari by a divided vote; Justices Griffis and Branning voted to grant. App. 1a.

From this denial, Petitioner filed the instant Petition

for Certiorari.

ARGUMENT:

CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED

This Court should grant the instant petition for

four reasons. First, the decision below squarely conflicts with Bearden, Turner, Williams, and Tate, which

together prohibit the States from jailing the indigent

for unpaid money obligations absent a searching ability-to-pay inquiry. Second, the decision deepens an entrenched conflict among state and federal courts over

whether and how civil contempt may be used to collect

private money judgments. Third, the question is nationally important and recurring. Fourth, the case is

7

an ideal vehicle: the federal question was squarely

raised and preserved, the record is clean, and the state

grounds do not obscure the federal issue.

I. The Decision Below Squarely Conflicts with

This Court’s Controlling Precedent on Jailing

the Indigent for Unpaid Debts.

For more than a half-century, this Court has

held that the Due Process and Equal Protection

Clauses forbid the States from incarcerating persons

solely because they cannot afford to pay money. This

is true whether the money is a criminal fine (as in Williams and Tate), a probation condition (Bearden), or a

child-support obligation (Turner). The decision below

ignores this line of cases.

In Williams v. Illinois, this Court held that a

State may not “subject[] a prisoner to imprisonment

beyond the statutory maximum solely by reason of his

indigency.” 399 U.S. at 242. Tate v. Short extended the

rule to fine-only offenses, stating, “[T]he Constitution

prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence

and then automatically converting it into a jail term

solely because the defendant is indigent.” 401 U.S. at

398. These cases established the bedrock principle

that one’s economic status cannot transform a monetary obligation into a jailable one.

Bearden v. Georgia then crystallized the rule

for post-judgment enforcement, instructing that before a court may revoke probation and imprison a person for failure to pay, it “must inquire into the reasons

8

for the failure to pay.” 461 U.S. at 672 (emphasis

added). Furthermore, the court must determine

whether the failure was “willful” or merely was the

product of a genuine inability notwithstanding “bona

fide efforts.” Id. Where inability is shown, “it is fundamentally unfair to revoke probation automatically,”

and the court must “consider alternative measures of

punishment other than imprisonment.” Id. at 673.

Only if no alternative will serve the State’s legitimate

interests in “punishment and deterrence” may incarceration follow. Id. at 675-676.

Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, applied these

principles to civil contempt for failure to pay child support—an area where the State’s interest is at its zenith. Even there, Turner required, as a minimum constitutional floor: (1) notice that ability to pay is the

critical question; (2) a fair opportunity to present evidence on ability to pay; (3) use of forms or other devices to elicit financial information; and (4) an express

judicial finding regarding ability to pay. Id. at 447–48.

Anything less “create[s] an unacceptable risk of erroneous deprivation of … liberty.” Id. at 448-449.

Here, the Order below complied with none of

these requirements. It contains no express finding of

present ability to pay. In addition to failing to conduct

no inquiry whatsoever into her ability to pay, it reversed the burden, requiring Christy to prove her inability rather than Rick to prove willfulness of her failure to pay. Rather than reflecting any genuine inquiry, the Order merely cites Christy’s past work

9

history and current good health as surrogates for a

real ability-to-pay inquiry (and disregarding her work

as a stay-at-home caregiver for a minor child). The

chancery court did so even though Bearden rejected

that substitute. See 461 U.S. at 673-674. Furthermore,

it handed the sheriff’s warrant to opposing counsel,

who may unilaterally trigger incarceration upon any

missed payment without any hearing at all.

If Turner demands those procedures before the

State may jail a father for unpaid child support—an

obligation with a superior moral and legal claim—

then a fortiori those procedures are required before a

state court may jail an ex-wife for unpaid carpet replacement. The constitutional case is stronger, not

weaker, where the State’s asserted interest is the collection of an ordinary civil money judgment between

private parties.

This Court’s broader debtors’-prison jurisprudence reinforces the point. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S.

40, 54 S. Ct. 2116, 40 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1974), approved

recoupment only where safeguards against imprisonment for inability to pay were in place. Id. at 54. That

is, a State’s imposition of an obligation to pay may

only pass constitutional muster if it “impose[s] an obligation only upon those with a foreseeable ability to

meet it, and to enforce that obligation only against

those who actually become able to meet it without

hardship.” Id. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.

Ct. 555, 136 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1996), reaffirmed that

wealth-based deprivations of liberty trigger

10

heightened constitutional scrutiny. (Mississippi could

not deny M.L.B. appellate review of a decree terminating her parental rights due to her poverty, which made

her unable to pay the cost of obtaining the record on

appeal). More recently, in Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct.

682, 203 L. Ed. 2d 11 (2019), this Court emphasized

that the Excessive Fines Clause reflects a deep constitutional tradition against abuses by state actors who

weaponize monetary obligations against the indigent:

“In short, the historical and logical case for concluding

that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Excessive Fines Clause is overwhelming. Protection

against excessive punitive economic sanctions secured

by the Clause is, to repeat, both ‘fundamental to our

scheme of ordered liberty’ and ‘deeply rooted in this

Nation's history and tradition.’” Id. at 689 (quoting

McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767, 130 S. Ct.

3020, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894 (2010) (internal quotation

marks omitted; emphasis deleted). The decision below

offends each of those traditions.

II. The Decision Below Deepens an Entrenched

Conflict Among State High Courts and Federal

Courts on the Use of Civil Contempt to Enforce

Money Judgments.

State and federal courts are divided on the

proper constitutional limits of civil contempt to enforce private money judgments.

The Mississippi Supreme Court and several

other state high courts have held that civil contempt

11

cannot be used to imprison a debtor for a private

money judgment. In In re Nichols, 749 So. 2d 68, 72

(Miss. 1999), the Mississippi Supreme Court vacated

a contempt order imprisoning the defendant for failure to pay a private settlement, holding that “to imprison Nichols for the non-payment of this judgment

would violate Article 3, § 30 of the Mississippi Constitution.” The creditor, the court said, was “free to collect the judgment by execution, garnishment or any

other available lawful means so long as it does not include imprisonment.” Id. (emphasis added). The Mississippi Court of Appeals has taken the same view,

confining coercive contempt to specific performance,

support, and conveyance orders. See, e.g., Doss v. Doss,

949 So. 2d 71 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006); Wright v. Wright,

737 So. 2d 408, 411–12 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998). Other

state high courts have reached the same conclusion

under analogous state-constitutional bars on imprisonment for debt. See, e.g., Carter v. Grace Whitney

Props., 939 N.E.2d 630, 638 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010),

trans. denied (using contempt to enforce a civil money

judgment violates Ind. Const. Art. I, § 22 absent fraud

or family-support nexus); Ex parte Hall, 854 S.W.2d

656, 658 (Tex. 1993) (a divorce-decree money obligation is enforceable by contempt only where statutorily

authorized as support, lest the State imprison for

debt); Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So. 2d 1274, 1275 (Fla.

1985) (respondent was “improperly incarcerated for

civil contempt” where there was no showing of present

ability to pay child support in arrears); Ex parte Yates,

12

387 S.W.2d 377, 378 (Tex. 1965) (vacating as void the

portion of a divorce-decree contempt order remanding

the obligor to the sheriff’s custody until he “purges

himself by payment of all arrears,” under Tex. Const.

Art. I, § 18).

The decision below departs from In re Nichols

by recasting a consolidated county-court civil money

judgment as a divorce-decree obligation suitable for

coercive contempt. The Mississippi Court of Appeals

treated the label “Final Judgment of Divorce” as dispositive, even though the substance of the obligation

(damages for carpet and storage initially sought in a

separate civil action) was purely a civil tort-style

award. That labeling sleight-of-hand, if allowed to

stand, obliterates the rule In re Nichols established for

any plaintiff willing to consolidate his civil-damages

claim with a family case.

Federal courts have invalidated analogous

schemes under the Fourteenth Amendment. Rodriguez v. Providence Community Corrections, Inc., 155

F. Supp. 3d 758 (M.D. Tenn. 2015), concluded in the

context of a motion for a preliminary injunction that

plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their

claim that jailing them for probation violation without

an ability-to-pay inquiry violated the Fourteenth

Amendment. The Fifth Circuit in ODonnell v. Harris

County, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018), recognized the

Fourteenth Amendment infirmity of wealth-based detention regimes. More recently, in Cain v. White, 937

F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 2019), the Fifth Circuit affirmed

13

summary judgment against a parish scheme that

jailed indigent debtors for nonpayment of court-imposed financial obligations without any inquiry into

ability to pay, holding that the practice violated both

the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

At the same time, several other States authorize coercive incarceration for noncompliance with the

monetary terms of a divorce or property-settlement

decree, treating any breach of an equitable-distribution order as contemptable without regard to whether

the underlying obligation is, in substance, an ordinary

debt. See, e.g., 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3502(e)(7) (authorizing the chancery court to commit a noncompliant

party to county jail for up to six months for failure to

comply with an equitable-distribution order); Mass.

Gen. Laws Ch. 215, § 34A (broad civil-contempt power

to enforce noncompliance with divorce judgments, including monetary aspects); Pugh v. Pugh, 472 N.E.2d

1085, 1088-89 (Ohio 1984), and Ohio Rev. Code §

2705.02 (contempt sanction available for disobedience

of any court order, willful intent not required). The decision below aligns Mississippi with this latter group,

even though the Mississippi Constitution’s anti-imprisonment-for-debt clause and this Court’s decisions

in Bearden and Turner require otherwise. The conflict

is mature, important, and impossible to reconcile at

the State level. Only this Court can resolve it.

14

III. The Question Is Exceptionally Important,

Recurring, and Cleanly Presented.

The resurgence of modern debtors’ prisons is a

well-documented national problem. The Department

of Justice’s Mar. 14, 2016, 2016 Dear Colleague Letter

to state courts warned against entrenched practices

that

unconstitutionally

punish

the

poor.

https://southeuclidcourt.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Fines-and-Fees-Dear-Colleague-Letter3-14-16.pdf (last accessed April 25, 2026). The American Civil Liberties Union, the Brennan Center, and

the Fines & Fees Justice Center have each documented thousands of incarcerations each year for unpaid civil and criminal financial obligations. See, e.g.,

https://www.brennancenter.org/topics/criminal-justice/changing-incentives/fees-fines

and

https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/ (last accessed

April 25, 2026). Academic studies estimate that many

hundreds of thousands of Americans are subject to

warrants or incarceration for unpaid money at any

given time.

The issue is particularly acute in state chancery, family, and equity courts, which exercise broad

contempt powers with relatively little procedural formality and with limited appellate supervision. Civil

contempt orders of the kind at issue here are routinely

entered against indigent litigants—often pro se and

without any meaningful ability-to-pay inquiry. The

victims are disproportionately women, stay-at-home

15

caregivers, and low-income wage earners. The pattern

is not an isolated aberration, but, rather, a structural

feature of state practice that Bearden and Turner

were supposed to cure.

The constitutional question is outcome-determinative and cleanly presented. The chancery court

here expressly predicated its contempt order on the

$21,040.72 civil money judgment. The federal question was raised, argued, and decided below. No independent state-law ground obscures review. Two Justices of the Mississippi Supreme Court voted to grant

certiorari. This is precisely the vehicle this Court has

long said it prefers: a preserved, outcome-determinative federal question arising from a final state-court

judgment. Sup. Ct. R. 10(b)–(c).

IV.

This Case Is an Ideal Vehicle.

Several features make this case particularly attractive for review:

a) Clean federal question. Christy raised

the debtors’-prison argument before the

chancery court and on appeal. The Mississippi courts reached and decided the constitutional question on the merits. No procedural hurdle stands in the way of review.

b) No state-law off-ramp. The judgment below rests on a straightforward application of

state-court contempt power to a civil money

judgment. There is no alternative non-

16

federal ground on which this Court could decide the case.

c) Square conflict with this Court’s precedent. The Order makes no express finding

of ability to pay, places the burden on the

debtor, and authorizes warrantless incarceration on counsel’s unilateral motion.

Each of those features violates Turner.

d) Dissenting votes below. Two Justices of

the Mississippi Supreme Court voted to

grant certiorari, confirming that the question is substantial and divides the state’s

own high court. App. 1a.

e) Ongoing liberty interest. Petitioner remains under an active order of incarceration

suspended on payment. The constitutional

injury is live, ongoing, and capable of repetition absent this Court’s intervention.

17

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a

Writ of Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

JASON E. CAMPBELL

Counsel of Record

CAMPBELL LAW FIRM, P.A.

904 North Main Street

Water Valley, Mississippi 38965

Telephone: (662) 537-4921

jason@campbelllawms.net

Counsel for Petitioner

18

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX

Lower-Court Orders and Opinion

(Rule 14.1(i)(i)–(iii)) — Most recent decision first

APPENDIX A — Order of the Supreme Court of

Mississippi Denying Petition for Writ of

Certiorari (Feb. 3, 2026) ........................................ 1a

APPENDIX B — Order of the Mississippi Court

of Appeals Denying Motion for Rehearing (Nov.

18, 2025) ................................................................. 3a

APPENDIX C — Opinion of the Mississippi

Court of Appeals Affirming Order of Contempt

(June 24, 2025) ....................................................... 5a

APPENDIX D — Order for Contempt, Chancery

Court of Warren County, Mississippi (Feb. 5,

2024) ..................................................................... 17a

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved

(Rule 14.1(f) & (i)(vi))

APPENDIX E — Constitutional and Statutory

Provisions Involved .............................................. 23a

Excerpts of Record Showing Federal Question Raised

(Rule 14.1(g) & (i)(v))

APPENDIX F — Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the Supreme Court of Mississippi (Filed Nov.

21, 2025) ............................................................... 25a

APPENDIX A

Order of the Supreme Court of Mississippi

Denying Petition for Writ of Certiorari

Serial: 261243

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

No. 2024-CT-00222-SCT

CHRISTY ANN MARTIN Appellant/Petitioner

v.

JOHN FREDRICK MARTIN Appellee/Respondent

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Petition for

Writ of Certiorari filed by Christy Ann Martin. After

due consideration, the Court finds that the petition

should be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Petition for

Writ of Certiorari filed by Christy Ann Martin is

denied.

SO ORDERED, this the 2nd day of February, 2026.

/s/ Michael K. Randolph

_______________________________

1a

MICHAEL K. RANDOLPH, CHIEF JUSTICE

TO DENY: RANDOLPH, C.J., KING AND

COLEMAN, P.JJ., ISHEE AND SULLIVAN, JJ.

TO GRANT: GRIFFIS AND BRANNING, JJ.

Filed February 3, 2026 — Office of the Clerk,

Supreme Court / Court of Appeals.

2a

APPENDIX B

Order of the Mississippi Court of Appeals

Denying Motion for Rehearing

Electronic Document Nov-18-2025 13:31:00 2024-CA00222-COA Pages: 1

Supreme Court of Mississippi

Court of Appeals of the State of Mississippi

Office of the Clerk

D. Jeremy Whitmire, Clerk

Post Office Box 249

Jackson, Mississippi 39205-0249

Telephone: (601) 359-3694

Facsimile: (601) 359-2407

Street Address: 450 High Street, Jackson,

Mississippi 39201-1082

E-mail: sctclerk@courts.ms.gov

November 18, 2025

This is to advise you that the Mississippi Court of

Appeals rendered the following decision on the 18th

day of November, 2025.

Court of Appeals Case # 2024-CA-00222-COA

Trial Court Case # 75CH1:18-cv-00272-BLR

3a

Christy Ann Martin v. John Fredrick Martin

The motion for rehearing is denied.

NOTICE TO CHANCERY/CIRCUIT/COUNTY

COURT CLERKS: If an original of any exhibit

other than photos was sent to the Supreme

Court Clerk and should now be returned to you,

please advise this office in writing immediately.

Please note: Pursuant to MRAP 45(c), amended

effective July 1, 2010, copies of opinions will not

be mailed. Any opinion rendered may be found

by

visiting

the

https://courts.ms.gov

Court’s

and

website

at

selecting

the

appropriate date the opinion was rendered

under the category “Decisions.”

4a

APPENDIX C

Opinion of the Mississippi Court of Appeals

Affirming Order of Contempt

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE

OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-CA-00222-COA

CHRISTY ANN MARTIN APPELLANT

v.

JOHN FREDRICK MARTIN APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/05/2024

TRIAL JUDGE: HON. BENNIE L. RICHARD

COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: WARREN

COUNTY CHANCERY COURT

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JASON EDWARD

CAMPBELL

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: CALEB E. BROWN

NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL — DOMESTIC

RELATIONS

DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED — 06/24/2025

MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

5a

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., McDONALD AND

WEDDLE, JJ.

WEDDLE, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. The Warren County Chancery Court entered

an order finding that Christy Ann Martin (Christy)

willfully failed to pay her ex-husband, John Fredrick

Martin (Rick), $21,040.72 that had been awarded to

Rick in the parties’ final divorce judgment. After

holding Christy in contempt for failing to comply with

the divorce judgment, the chancellor ordered her to be

incarcerated for six months but suspended the

incarceration on the condition that Christy make

timely payments to Rick to satisfy the monetary

award.

¶2. On appeal, Christy argues that (1) the

chancellor erred by holding her in contempt for failing

to pay the monetary judgment; (2) the chancellor

erred by finding she had the financial ability to pay

the monetary judgment; and (3) incarceration was an

improper contempt sanction for the nonpayment of

the monetary judgment.

¶3. Upon review, we find no error in the

chancellor’s findings that Christy was in contempt of

6a

the divorce judgment and that she failed to prove her

inability to comply. We also find no error in the

chancellor’s use of the contempt powers available to

him to enforce Christy’s compliance with his prior

order. As a result, we affirm the chancellor’s order

holding Christy in contempt.

FACTS

¶4. The parties were married in March 2018 but

separated the following month. They reconciled in

August 2018 but again separated in November 2018,

with Rick filing a complaint for an irreconcilabledifferences divorce. Christy was pregnant at the time

of the parties’ November separation.

¶5. In February 2019, Rick filed his first amended

divorce complaint requesting a divorce on the ground

of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment or,

alternatively, irreconcilable differences. Rick also

requested DNA testing to confirm whether he was the

father of Christy’s unborn child.

¶6. Following confirmation of Rick’s paternity and

the birth of the parties’ minor child, Rick filed a second

amended divorce complaint in October 2019 asserting

7a

adultery as an additional fault-based ground for

divorce.

¶7. Rick provided the chancellor with the county

court’s order requiring that all the furnishings remain

in the storage facility until the chancellor “render[ed]

a final ruling on the equitable distribution and

disposition of said property.”

¶8. Rick asked that the chancellor order Christy to

reimburse him for the cost of moving his furnishings

back to the marital home and asserted over $15,000 in

damage to his personal property and the marital

home.

¶9. Following a hearing, the chancellor entered a

temporary order on January 24, 2020. The chancellor

awarded Christy temporary custody of the parties’

minor child, granted Rick visitation, and ordered Rick

to pay temporary child support.

¶10. On May 11, 2020, Rick filed a third amended

divorce complaint.

¶11. Rick provided information regarding the

$32,154.57 in expenses he had incurred to transport

8a

the household furnishings back to the marital home

and repair the damage caused.

¶12. In May 2020, the county court matter was

transferred to chancery court and consolidated with

the parties’ divorce proceedings. The chancellor

entered a final judgment on September 8, 2021. The

parties had withdrawn all fault-based grounds for

divorce and agreed to an irreconcilable-differences

divorce.

¶13. In reaching the custody determination, the

chancellor analyzed the relevant Albright factors.

Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss.

1983).

¶14. As to the parties’ employment, the chancellor

remarked on Christy’s lack of gainful employment for

the five years prior to the marriage and during the

marriage and that she had not worked consistently

since the parties’ separation.

¶15. The chancellor found both parties were in

good health, with that factor slightly favoring Christy

(38) over Rick (55) due to the age difference between

Rick and the parties’ one-year-old daughter.

9a

¶16. The chancellor next considered the stability of

each party’s home environment and employment.

After vacating the marital home, Christy and the

parties’ daughter had moved in with Christy’s mother,

stepfather,

niece,

and

son

from

a

previous

the

custody

relationship.

¶17.

The

chancellor

found

determination to be “a very close call[,]” but ultimately

awarded legal custody to both parties, primary

physical custody to Christy, and visitation to Rick.

Rick was ordered to pay $935 per month in child

support.

¶18. The chancellor also ordered alternation of the

income-tax credit. As to Rick’s claims for property

damage, the chancellor found that Rick had presented

sufficient

proof

“to

establish

that

Christy

intentionally and knowingly damaged Rick’s personal

property” and awarded Rick a total judgment of

$21,040.72, payable within twelve months.

¶19. Christy moved to alter or amend. The

chancellor entered an amended final judgment on

November 24, 2021 reflecting that the parties were to

alternate claiming their daughter for income-tax

10a

purposes; all other material provisions of the original

final judgment remained in effect.

¶20. On April 21, 2023, the chancellor found

Christy had committed parental alienation and held

her in contempt, ordering her to pay $6,000 in

attorney’s fees.

¶21. On May 11, 2023, Rick filed another contempt

petition. After a hearing, the chancellor denied

modification of custody but warned Christy of

consequences.

¶22. On February 5, 2024, the chancellor held a

hearing on Rick’s newest contempt petition. Christy

paid the $6,000 attorney-fee sanction the morning of

the hearing. As to the $21,040.72 award, Christy had

been aware of it for years but had still failed to make

any payments.

¶23. After holding Christy in contempt, the

chancellor awarded Rick $7,500 in attorney’s fees and

ordered Christy incarcerated for six months —

suspended on the condition that Christy pay $7,135 by

March 1, 2024 and continue regular payments until

the balance was satisfied. Christy appeals.

11a

DISCUSSION

¶24. On appeal, Christy asserts that her monetary

obligation to Rick constitutes an ordinary civil

judgment, that contempt is not the proper remedy for

an ordinary money judgment, and that incarceration

was an improper contempt sanction.

¶25. Our caselaw holds “that contempt is not a

proper mechanism for execution upon [an ordinary]

money judgment pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil

Procedure 69(a)” Pierce v. Sorrells, 376 So. 3d 1257,

1262 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024). “[T]he primary

purpose of a civil-contempt order is to enforce

compliance with a court order.” Bozant v. Nguyen, 296

So. 3d 254, 261 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). Upon

review, we disagree with Christy’s contention that the

chancellor held her in contempt for failing to pay a

mere ordinary civil judgment.

¶26. Although Rick initially filed in county court,

the chancellor consolidated the matter with the

divorce proceedings and considered Rick’s proof of

damage to the marital home and personal property,

awarding $21,040.72 in damages.

12a

¶27. The chancellor incorporated Rick’s award into

the divorce judgment and placed conditions on

Christy’s duty to satisfy the obligation.

¶28. We conclude that her financial obligation to

Rick is distinguishable from a mere ordinary civil

judgment. The chancellor vested the provision with

the full force of a lawful court order subject to

enforcement through his coercive contempt powers.

Cf. Bozant, 296 So. 3d at 261-62 (¶13); Allred v. Allred,

735 So. 2d 1064, 1069 (¶¶18-20) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).

¶29.

Although

our

caselaw

authorizes

the

chancellor to compel compliance with a divorce

judgment through contempt, we still must determine

if sufficient evidence supported the willfulness

finding.

¶30. Christy raises no dispute that she failed to

pay. The record demonstrates by “substantial credible

evidence” that Christy failed to comply with a prior

court order. The burden then shifted to Christy to

prove “an inability to pay, that the default was not

willful, that the provision violated was ambiguous, or

that performance was impossible.” Siders v. Zickler,

312 So. 3d 1224, 1230 (¶¶18-19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021).

13a

¶31. Christy testified she had worked from home

only a little as an insurance agent and elected to spend

the majority of her time as a stay-at-home mother.

¶32. Christy testified she relied mainly on child

support, residual insurance income, and money from

her mother and stepfather, with whom she lived.

¶33. The chancellor concluded Christy’s claims of

financial inability lacked credibility, citing her

repeated prior contemptuous conduct.

¶34. “The chancellor, by his presence in the

courtroom, is best equipped to ... determine the

credibility of the witnesses.” Morland v. Morland, 396

So. 3d 501, 507 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024). We find

sufficient credible evidence supported the chancellor’s

determination that Christy possessed present ability

to pay but voluntarily, and willfully, chose not to.

¶35. Contempt sanctions available to a chancellor

include “fine, imprisonment, both, or neither.”

Gebetsberger v. East, 627 So. 2d 823, 826 (Miss. 1993).

“[W]hat sanction to impose for contempt belongs to the

chancery court’s sound discretion.” McPhail v.

McPhail, 357 So. 3d 602, 614 (¶66) (Miss. 2023).

14a

¶36. Similar circumstances were addressed in

Paxton v. Paxton (Paxton I), 222 So. 2d 834, 835 (Miss.

1969).

¶37-40. Upon review, the supreme court agreed the

chancellor had not erred in finding contempt and

ultimately did not disturb the use of incarceration as

a remedy. Paxton v. Paxton (Paxton II), 305 So. 2d

106, 107 (Miss. 1974).

¶41. Mississippi caselaw clearly demonstrates that

incarceration is among the available sanctions in civil

contempt actions. Gebetsberger, 627 So. 2d at 826. We

affirm the chancellor’s use of incarceration to compel

compliance.

¶42. The supreme court has emphasized that an

“[i]nability to pay to avoid incarceration is a

continuing defense.” Riser v. Peterson, 566 So. 2d 210,

211 (Miss. 1990). “[A] LITIGANT IS ALWAYS

ENTITLED TO OFFER EVIDENCE OF INABILITY

TO

PAY

AS

A

DEFENSE,

NOT

TO

THE

CONTEMPT, but to the incarceration.” Id. at 212

(emphasis in original).

CONCLUSION

15a

¶43.

Finding

no

error

in

the

chancellor’s

determination that Christy was in willful contempt of

the divorce judgment’s requirement to pay Rick

$21,040.72, we affirm the chancellor’s order of

contempt.

¶44. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ.,

WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE,

McCARTY, EMFINGER AND ST. PÉ, JJ.,

CONCUR.

16a

APPENDIX D

Order for Contempt — Chancery Court of

Warren County, Mississippi

FILED — February 5, 2024 — Beverly Johnson,

Chancery Clerk

IN THE CHANCERY COURT OF WARREN

COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI

JOHN FREDRICK MARTIN

PLAINTIFF/COUNTER-DEFENDANT

VS.

CAUSE NO: 2018-272

CHRISTY ANN MARTIN

DEFENDANT/COUNTER-PLAINTIFF

ORDER FOR CONTEMPT

THIS DAY this cause came for hearing on the Petition

for

Contempt

filed

by

the

Plaintiff/Counter-

Defendant, John Fredrick Martin (“Rick”) against the

Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff, Christy Ann Martin

(“Christy”) alleging that Christy failed to pay sums

owed to Rick pursuant to the Final Judgment for

Divorce and separate Order for Contempt entered

herein and the Court having heard oral testimony

from each of the respective parties and other

17a

witnesses is of the opinion that the following relief

being the same should be granted. It is therefore,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

1. That the Court issued a bench ruling on December

10, 2020, resulting in a written order being filed

September 8, 2021, which was subsequently amended

on November 24, 2021, ordering Christy to pay

$21,040.72 to Rick as a part of the Final Judgment for

Divorce within one year. The Court also entered an

Order of Contempt against Christy on April 21, 2023,

ordering Christy to pay $6,000.00 to Rick as attorney

fees based on her prior contemptuous conduct. The

Court notes that Christy has known about the initial

Final Judgment for Divorce for more than three years.

Despite her knowledge of these court orders, Christy

failed to make any payments to comply with the order

of this Court. While the Court is sensitive to a person’s

hardship and inability to pay, the Court is not

convinced that Christy could not have shown some

good faith basis to pay. Christy’s argument that she

does not have the ability to pay is inconsistent with

the law and the facts of this case. Specifically, there is

no inability to pay when Christy voluntarily chose to

18a

be unemployed since the divorce was entered on

December 20, 2020. Christy stated that she has no

money and no job due to her desire to keep the minor

child at home until the child reaches the age of five.

However, this still does not rise to the level of inability

to pay given that Christy has a work history, has

indicated that she can work when she chooses to work

and is in good health overall. Nothing has been

presented to this Court which shows that Christy is

prohibited or unable to work.

2. That based on Christy’s repeated contemptuous

conduct in the past, the Court admonished Christy

that if she intentionally failed to comply with this

Court’s order, she would be incarcerated and that any

such incarceration could lead to more serious

consequences up to a modification of custody. The

Court acknowledges that since the inception of the

divorce proceedings and in other orders herein, there

have been consistent findings that Christy’s conduct

has been willful, contemptuous, contumacious and

deliberate. The conduct in this case is not much

different. The Court is not deceived by Christy’s

19a

sophisticated testimony or her calm demeanor but

focuses more on her conduct.

3. That Christy is hereby found to be in contempt for

failing to pay the sum of $21,040.72 within one year

in accordance with this Court’s Final Judgment for

Divorce. The Court finds that Christy’s conduct was

willful, contumacious and deliberate and therefore,

grants Rick’s request for attorney’s fees in the amount

of $7,500.00. The Court finds that the attorney fees

are reasonable considering the aggravated expenses of

repeated continuances, evading service of process and

gamesmanship exhibited by Christy.

4. The Court further recognizes that Christy

presented a check in the amount of $6,000.00 to Rick

on the morning of trial. This payment was made to

satisfy Christy’s prior obligation to pay Rick for

attorney’s fees from a prior contempt entered on April

21, 2023.

5. Based on this finding of contempt, the Court orders

that Christy be incarcerated for a period of six

months. However, the Court hereby suspends this

order of incarceration on the condition that Christy

makes a payment of $7,135.00 no later than March 1,

20a

2024. The balance of $21,405.72 owed by Christy shall

be paid on the first day of each month in the amount

of $3,567.50 until paid in full. All payments shall be

submitted to Rick’s attorney, Tonya Franklin, in the

form of a money order dated for the first day of each

month. If Christy fails to make any payment as

ordered herein, Counsel for Rick shall automatically

submit to the Court an order for incarceration

directing the Franklin County Sheriff’s Department

or other law enforcement agency to immediately take

Christy Ann Martin into custody until such time as

Christy complies with this Court’s order. This period

of incarceration shall not exceed six months.

6. The Court again admonishes Christy that the

suspension of the order of incarceration herein is

conditional upon her timely compliance with the

payment schedule set forth above.

SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED,

this the 5th day of February, 2024.

/s/ Bennie L. Richard

_______________________________

HON. BENNIE L. RICHARD, CHANCELLOR

21a

Agreed as to form by:

TRAVIS T. VANCE, JR., MSB #6045

914 Grove Street

Vicksburg, Mississippi 39183

Telephone: 601-638-0046

22a

APPENDIX E

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

Involved

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, §

1 (in relevant part):

“No State shall ... deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law;

nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction

the equal protection of the laws.”

Mississippi Constitution, Article 3, § 30:

“There shall be no imprisonment for debt.”

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a):

“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the

highest court of a State in which a decision

could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme

Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of

a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn

in question or where the validity of a statute of

any State is drawn in question on the ground of

its being repugnant to the Constitution,

treaties, or laws of the United States, or where

any title, right, privilege, or immunity is

specially

set

up

or

23a

claimed

under

the

Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or

any commission held or authority exercised

under, the United States.”

24a

APPENDIX F

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme

Court of Mississippi (Filed November 21, 2025)

E-Filed Document Nov 21 2025 14:53:42 2024-CA00222-COA Pages: 8

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

MISSISSIPPI

CHRISTY ANN MARTIN

VS.

APPELLANT

CAUSE NO. 2024-CA-00222

JOHN FREDRICK MARTIN

APPELLEE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

COMES NOW the Appellant, Christy Ann Martin, by

and through counsel of record, and pursuant to

Mississippi

Rule

of

Appellate

Procedure

17,

respectfully petitions this Honorable Court to issue a

Writ of Certiorari to review the decision of the

Mississippi Court of Appeals rendered on November

18, 2025, and in support would show the following:

I. DECISION FOR WHICH REVIEW IS SOUGHT

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Warren County

Chancery

Court’s

finding

25a

of

contempt

and

incarceration of Appellant for failure to pay a civil

money judgment in the amount of $21,040.72, which

originated

from

a

tort-based

damages

action

consolidated into the divorce cause. The Court of

Appeals further affirmed the contempt finding despite

undisputed evidence of Appellant’s inability to pay.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. That the opinion of the Court of Appeals of

the State of Mississippi is contrary to the

United States Constitution and the Mississippi

Constitution.

2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred by

affirming incarceration for failure to pay a civil

money judgment, in direct conflict with Article

3, Section 30 of the Mississippi Constitution

and controlling Mississippi Supreme Court

precedent distinguishing ordinary debt from

support-based

obligations

enforceable

by

contempt.

3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred by

affirming incarceration for contempt while

26a

disregarding undisputed proof of inability to

pay, contrary to Mississippi Law.

III. UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL

HISTORY

Christy Ann Martin (“Christy”) and John Fredrick

“Rick” Martin married in March 2018 and separated

just one month later. After a brief reconciliation, they

again separated in November 2018. Christy was

pregnant at the time. Rick filed for divorce, later

amending his complaint to include paternity, custody,

and property-related issues. DNA testing confirmed

Rick’s biological relationship to the child. During

litigation, Rick alleged damage to the marital home

and personal property, asserting over $15,000 in

losses. A county court action addressing those claims

was consolidated into the divorce case.

A temporary order entered January 24, 2020, awarded

Christy temporary physical custody and required each

party to gather their property from storage. On

September 8, 2021, the chancery court entered a final

judgment granting an irreconcilable differences

divorce. Christy was awarded primary physical

custody. Rick was granted visitation and ordered to

27a

pay child support. The chancellor denied alimony and

found Christy willfully caused property damage. As a

result, Rick was awarded $21,040.72, payable by

Christy within twelve (12) months. Christy moved to

alter or amend. The Court only corrected a tax

exemption

provision.

The

monetary

judgment

remained unchanged.

Over the next several years, the parties returned to

court repeatedly. Christy was held in contempt for

interference with visitation, with attorney fee awards

entered against her in 2023. On February 5, 2024, the

chancellor conducted a further review of compliance

with the prior orders. Christy paid the $6,000

attorney-fee sanction the morning of the hearing but

had paid nothing toward the $21,040.72 propertydamage judgment that had been outstanding since

2021. The chancellor found Christy in willful

contempt, concluding she had chosen not to work

despite having the ability to do so. The Chancellor

then imposed six months’ incarceration, suspended on

the condition that she make payments, including

$7,135 by March 1, 2024. Christy appealed.

28a

On June 24, 2025, the Court of Appeals affirmed the

contempt finding and incarceration sanction of the

Warren County Chancery Court. Subsequently,

Christy timely filed for rehearing and the Court of

Appeals denied

the Motion for re-hearing on

November 18, 2025.

IV. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

(M.R.A.P. 17)

That the Supreme Court of Mississippi should grant

the writ requested herein. This Court has long

distinguished nonpayment of alimony/child support,

which is enforceable by contempt, from nonpayment

of ordinary civil debt, which is not punishable by

incarceration. The Court of Appeals failed to conduct

that required distinction and instead affirmed

incarceration for nonpayment of a money judgment

arising from a civil damages action, not a supportbased obligation. This conflict with binding precedent

alone warrants certiorari under Rule 17.

The decision undermines constitutional protections

against imprisonment for debt. Article 3, Section 30 of

the Mississippi Constitution expressly prohibits

imprisonment for debt. The Court of Appeals affirmed

29a

incarceration despite: the judgment consisting solely

of money damages, not support; and no finding that

the debt arose from a category to which the

constitutional bar does not apply. The decision

expands contempt power to ordinary debt collection

and,

if

left

unreviewed,

creates

statewide

consequences in domestic litigation where tort-based

claims may be consolidated with divorces. Review is

warranted under Rule 17 due to the significant

constitutional issue.

Even assuming contempt authority existed, the

decision

conflicts

with

established

precedent

regarding inability to pay. A contempt judgment

cannot stand when the contemnor proves inability to

comply. This Court has consistently held that inability

to pay is a complete defense. The record reflects:

Appellant had no income sufficient to file tax returns;

lacked savings, credit, or accounts of her own; lived

with her parents and relied on borrowed funds; and

her only source of funds was intermittent back-childsupport payments.

The Court of Appeals affirmed incarceration while

ignoring undisputed evidence of inability to pay, in

30a

direct conflict with controlling precedent, warranting

review under Rule 17.

V. ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE WRIT

In a most unconstitutional manner, the Warren

Chancery Court was affirmed in entering an order for

incarceration against Christy for not paying an

amount of money damages by the Court of Appeals.

The decision effectively permits a Chancery Court to

convert an ordinary civil damages award into a

contempt-enforceable “support-like” obligation, and

incarcerate a party despite a proven inability to pay.

Further, the Court of Appeals’ opinion fails to analyze

the origin and nature of the debt. The Court of

Appeals treats consolidated civil-tort damages as

equivalent to support obligations — child support and

alimony. Finally, the opinion expands contempt power

beyond the limits recognized by this Court, making it

unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeals cites McPhail v. McPhail, 357

So. 3d 602, 614 (¶66) (Miss. 2023) for the proposition

that a chancellor has discretion in selecting contempt

sanctions. However, the Court of Appeals failed to

apply the controlling limitation found in McPhail —

31a

that incarceration in civil contempt is permissible

only when the contemnor has the present ability to

purge the contempt, meaning the sanction must

remain coercive and never punitive. In McPhail, the

Supreme Court emphasized that contempt sanctions

must compel compliance, not punish, and that the

chancellor must ensure the contemnor has the actual

ability to comply before imposing incarceration. Lack

of present ability prevents incarceration as a lawful

remedy. Yet here, the Court of Appeals assumed

ability to pay based merely on general capability for

employment, rather than evidence of actual present

financial capacity, and approved incarceration where

the purge path was financially speculative and not

supported by specific findings of ability to pay. This

contradicts McPhail’s requirement that incarceration

must cease the moment coercion becomes impossible,

a principle embedded in McPhail and recognized

through Riser. Riser v. Peterson, 566 So. 2d 210, 211

(Miss. 1990).

Under the instant ruling of the Court of Appeals, any

parent who is unemployed, even for legitimate

reasons, becomes jailable for not paying a property

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judgment, even if they have no current ability to

produce funds, and that is precisely the constitutional

danger McPhail prohibits. Where the Court of Appeals

treated discretion as unbounded, McPhail makes clear

it is strictly conditioned on the contemnor’s present

purge ability. The failure to enforce this safeguard

creates

significant

constitutional

error

and

a

statewide rule allowing punitive imprisonment under

civil contempt.

That the Court of Appeals has misapplied, and/or

attempted to modify the applicability of Riser v.

Peterson, 566 So. 2d 210, 211 (Miss. 1990). In the

opinion in the instant case, the Court of Appeals found

that:

“The supreme court previously has emphasized

that an ‘[i]nability to pay to avoid incarceration

is a continuing defense as imprisonment does

not accomplish the [remedial] purpose of the

civil contempt decree.’ Riser v. Peterson, 566

So. 2d 210, 211 (Miss. 1990). Although ‘a

litigant may be incarcerated for civil contempt

for

failure

to

pay

LITIGANT

IS

ALWAYS

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a

judgment[,]

THAT

ENTITLED

TO

OFFER EVIDENCE OF INABILITY TO PAY

AS A DEFENSE, NOT TO THE CONTEMPT,

but to the incarceration.’ Id. at 212 (emphasis

in original). Thus, as the Riser court explained,

‘even if [a party] was already committed to jail,

she would still be entitled to be discharged on

proof of inability to pay’ should she present

sufficient evidence of her present financial

inability to pay at a future hearing on the

issue.” (¶19 Ct. App. Opinion).

The opinion minimizes this protection by suggesting

continued

litigation

alone

justifies

keeping

incarceration as an enforceable threat. Such erosion of

Riser’s safeguard invites unconstitutional results,

including, but not limited to, incarceration becoming

punitive rather than coercive, individuals remaining

jailed

despite

proven

inability,

and

other

unconstitutional inequities. This is precisely the

concern the Supreme Court highlighted in Paxton I

and II, yet the Court of Appeals bypassed that caution

and

affirmed

incarceration

without

requiring

contemporaneous evidence of present ability. Paxton

v. Paxton (Paxton II), 305 So. 2d 106, 107 (Miss. 1974);

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Paxton v. Paxton (Paxton I), 222 So. 2d 834, 835 (Miss.

1969). Only this Court can resolve the contradiction

between Riser’s constitutional limits and the broader

contempt authority upheld here.

VI. CONCLUSION

If left undisturbed, the opinion authorizes the use of

incarceration

as

a

debt-collection

mechanism

whenever a civil damages judgment happens to arise

in a domestic setting. This invites instability and

unpredictability in chancery practice and is precisely

the type of important legal question contemplated by

Rule 17. Therefore, the Appellant respectfully

requests that this Honorable Court grant certiorari,

review the Court of Appeals’ decision, and reverse the

contempt judgment of the Chancery court.

Respectfully submitted this 21st day of November,

2025.

/s/ Jason E. Campbell

Jason E. Campbell (MSB #103792)

CAMPBELL LAW FIRM, P.A.

904 N. Main St.

35a

Water Valley, MS 38965

Telephone: (662) 537-4921

Email: jason@campbelllawms.net

Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Jason E. Campbell, certify that I have this day

served a copy of the foregoing Petition for Writ of

Certiorari on all counsel of record via the Court’s

electronic filing system, which automatically notifies

all registered CM/ECF participants.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this the 21st day of

November, 2025.

BY: /s/ Jason E. Campbell

Jason E. Campbell, MSB No. 103792

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