Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Wisconsin Voter Alliance, et al., Petitioners v. Don M. Millis, Commissioner, Wisconsin Elections Commission, et al.

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APPENDIX A

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 25-1279

WISCONSIN VOTER ALLIANCE, et al.,

v.

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

DON M. MILLIS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 1:23-cv-01416-WCG

William C. Griesbach, Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 11, 2025 —

DECIDED FEBRUARY 10, 2026

Before BRENNAN, Chief Judge, and KIRSCH and

JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. As with every plaintiff who sues in

federal court, an issue-advocacy group must show it

has Article III standing. That can arise from concrete

injuries to its members or because the defendant

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“directly affected and interfered” with the group’s

“core business activities.” FDA v. All. for Hippocratic

Med., 602 U.S. 367, 395 (2024). And just like an

individual plaintiff, an organization must prove its

claimed injuries amount to more than a “bare

procedural violation” of federal law. Spokeo, Inc. v.

Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 342 (2016).

The Wisconsin Voter Alliance, an organization

dedicated to advancing election integrity, wants

Wisconsin to better ad-minister federal election law.

In the Alliance’s view, the Commissioners of the

Wisconsin Elections Commission need to enforce

certain voter-ID laws more strictly and alter the way

they manage voter registration lists. So the Alliance

filed a complaint with the Commission, asserting that

the Commissioners themselves failed to uphold

Congress’s commands. When the Commissioners

declined to review the complaint, the Alliance and two

of its members sued in federal court to compel a

response.

Before reaching the merits, the district court

dismissed this case for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, concluding that neither the Alliance nor

its members had Article III standing. Because the

district court properly applied the tests for identifying

intangible “injuries in fact” and organizational

standing, we affirm.

I

In 2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote

Act (HAVA or the Act) to “establish minimum election

administration standards for federal elections.”

United States v. Town of Thornapple, 143 F.4th 793,

796 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116

Stat. 1666) (citation modified). The Act required states

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to standardize voting systems, maintain computerized

voter registration lists, and more—all to minimize the

risk of repeating the controversies of the 2000

presidential election. Id. See also 52 U.S.C. §§ 21081–

21085.

HAVA includes two enforcement mechanisms.

First, the Attorney General can institute a civil action

against noncom-pliant states. 52 U.S.C. § 21111.

Second, each State that accepts federal funding under

the Act must “establish and maintain State-based

administrative complaint procedures.” 52 U.S.C. §

21112(a)(1). “Any person who believes that there is a

violation” of HAVA “may file a complaint” with an

authorized state agency. 52 U.S.C. § 21112(a)(2)(B)

(citation modified).

Wisconsin chose to take federal funds, so it

designated the Wisconsin Elections Commission to

hear HAVA complaints. Wis. Stat. § 5.05(1) (2025).

The Commission must abide by federal procedural

requirements. For example, the Act outlines a

timeline for resolving complaints and an option for

holding hearings on the record. 52 U.S.C. §§

21112(a)(2)(E), (H)–(I). It also explains how States

should adjudicate complaints on the merits. If “there

is a violation” of HAVA, the State “shall pro-vide the

appropriate remedy.” § 21112(a)(2)(F). But if “there is

no violation, the State shall dismiss the complaint.” §

21112(a)(2)(G). Wisconsin adopted many of these

provisions into its election code. Wis. Stat. §§

5.061(1)–(4).

The Wisconsin Voter Alliance knows these

procedures well. Since 2020, the Alliance has filed

more than ten HAVA complaints with the

Commission, several of which turned into state-court

lawsuits. When the Alliance’s President, Ron Heuer,

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describes the group’s “core organizational and

advocacy activities,” he highlights the importance of

HAVA complaints to their strategy. Without these

“governmental tools,” he contends the Alliance would

struggle to educate both its members and the public

on threats to their rights. The Alliance would also lack

the information needed to recommend new laws or

agency procedures to ensure election integrity.

Whenever “government officials, agencies, or

departments fail to cooperate in disclosing facts”

under laws like HAVA, Heuer declares, the Alliance’s

mission “is impeded,” which “require[s] the

organization to take action by available means.”

This case concerns two complaints the Alliance

filed against the Wisconsin Elections Commission. In

2022 and 2023, the Alliance, Heuer, and member

Kenneth Brown alleged that the Commissioners

themselves violated HAVA. In one complaint, they

faulted the Commissioners for sharing Wisconsin’s

statewide voter registration database with other state

actors; in another, they objected to a practice of

overseas voters bypassing voter-ID requirements.

Rather than answering these complaints, however,

the Commissioners announced their “ethical recusal.”

Following the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s lead, they

concluded “it would be nonsensical to have [the

Commission] adjudicate a claim against itself.” Teigen

v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 976 N.W.2d 519, 533 (Wis.

2022) (plurality opinion). Still, the Commissioners did

“not wish to leave” the Alliance “without a path

forward,” so they offered three alternatives. First, the

Commissioners authorized the Alliance to refer the

matter to a district attorney. See Wis. Stat. §

5.05(2m)(c)11. Next, the Alliance could “appeal the

decision of the commission” to a state trial court. Wis.

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Stat. § 5.06(8). Finally, the Commissioners noted that

ordinary administrative review may also be available.

See Wis. Stat. § 227.52.

The Alliance chose another path. Shortly after the

Commissioners denied their second complaint, the

Alliance, Heuer, and Brown sued the Commissioners

in federal court. In their view, HAVA’s procedural

requirements create private rights enforceable via 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Because the Alliance, Heuer, and

Brown offered only minimal allegations of harm,

though, the Commissioners moved to dismiss the

claim for lack of Article III standing. The district court

agreed and dismissed the case, but it gave the

plaintiffs leave to refile “be-cause of the strong public

interests in the integrity of elections.” After they

amended their complaint, the district court denied

their motion for summary judgment and dismissed

the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. FED.

R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) & 56(f)(1). Again, neither the

Alliance nor the individual plaintiffs offered enough

evidence of harm to establish standing. They timely

appeal.

II

This case hinges on whether the Alliance, Heuer,

and Brown have suffered an “injury in fact” sufficient

to confer Article III standing. They do not, however,

allege anything resembling a traditional tangible

injury, financial or physical. Instead, they claim to

have been injured by the Commissioners’ decision to

return their complaint without a decision on the

merits.

To allege injury in fact, the plaintiffs invoke two

distinct, evolving strands of the Supreme Court’s

standing jurisprudence: intangible injuries and

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organizational standing. Over the last five years, the

Supreme Court has revisited the tests for both

subjects. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S.

413, 424–30 (2021) (intangible injury); FDA v. All. for

Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 393–96 (2024)

(organizational standing). Though the federal courts

of appeals have debated the meaning of these cases,

the Supreme Court has yet to resolve any resulting

disputes.1 Accordingly, we first address the intangible

injury theories before turning to organizational

standing.

“We review a decision to dismiss for lack of

standing de novo.” In re Recalled Abbott Infant

Formula Prods. Liab. Litig., 97 F.4th 525, 528 (7th

Cir. 2024). A plaintiff’s “burden to demonstrate

standing changes as the procedural posture of the

litigation changes.” Persinger v. Sw. Credit Sys., L.P.,

20 F.4th 1184, 1189 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).

“Where, as here, the procedural posture is summary

judgment,” the plaintiff must provide “specific facts”

supporting standing—a higher burden than at the

pleading stage. Id. at 1189–90 (quoting Lujan v. Defs.

of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).

III

All three plaintiffs assert intangible injuries. They

argue that any time a state agency does not follow 52

U.S.C. § 21112(a) to the letter, they have an injury in

fact—without showing additional harm. In the

alternative, they characterize failures to abide by

these procedures as violations of the Petition Clause

See, e.g., Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer, 601 U.S. 1, 3–5 (2023)

(dismissing a case that would have addressed a circuit split on

certain forms of intangible injuries as moot).

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of the First Amendment.

A. Intangible Injury Framework

Article III standing is a “bedrock constitutional

requirement,” and we cannot reach the merits of a

case without it. Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 378

(quoting United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 675

(2023)). To establish Article III standing, plaintiffs

must show they suffered an “injury in fact” that was

“caused by the defendant and redressable by the

court.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 423. When seeking

prospective relief, like a declaratory judgment or an

injunction, plaintiffs also “must establish a sufficient

likelihood of future injury” to secure standing.

Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 381; Simic v. City of

Chicago, 851 F.3d 734, 738–39 (7th Cir. 2017).

An injury in fact must be “concrete, particularized,

and actual or imminent.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at

423. A “concrete” injury has a “close relationship to a

harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for

a lawsuit in American courts.” Pierre v. Midland

Credit Mgmt., Inc., 29 F.4th 934, 938 (7th Cir. 2022)

(quoting TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425) (citation

modified). Without such an injury, “there is no case or

controversy for the federal court to resolve.” Wood v.

Sec. Credit Servs., LLC, 126 F.4th 1303, 1308 (7th Cir.

2025) (quoting Casillas v. Madison Ave. Assocs., Inc.,

926 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 2019)).

Concrete injuries come in two varieties: tangible

and in-tangible. Tangible injuries, like monetary and

physical harms, “readily qualify as concrete injuries.”

Freeman v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 113 F.4th

701, 708 (7th Cir. 2024) (citation omit-ted). Intangible

harms can also be concrete if they have a “historical

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or common-law analog” that is “tortious.” Baysal v.

Midvale Indem. Co., 78 F.4th 976, 979 (7th Cir. 2023).

Examples include harms resembling defamation, false

light, disclosure of private information, intrusion

upon seclusion, and abuse of process. Freeman, 113

F.4th at 708; TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425. Violations

of some constitutional rights also qualify as intangible

injuries. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340.

A “bare procedural violation” of a federal statute,

however, does not count as an intangible injury. Id. at

342. That means Congress cannot “enact an injury

into existence” simply by creating a private right of

action. TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 426. “[D]eprivation of

a procedural right,” without showing “some concrete

interest that is affected by the deprivation,” does not

establish Article III standing. Summers v. Earth

Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009).

At the same time, “both history and the judgment

of Congress play important roles” for the standing

inquiry because “Congress is well positioned to identify

intangible harms that meet minimum Article III

requirements.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340. The Supreme

Court has long recognized that Congress can “elevat[e]

… concrete, de facto injuries that were previously

inadequate in law” to “the status of legally cognizable

injuries” by creating a private right of action. Lujan,

504 U.S. at 578. Intangible injury cases based on

violations of federal law, then, direct us to examine the

text of the underlying statute—even though standing

is a “threshold question that must be resolved … before

proceeding to the merits.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a

Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 88–89 (1998).

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B. Injuries for Procedural Violations under

HAVA

The Alliance, Heuer, and Brown cannot satisfy

TransUnion’s intangible injury test. If an asserted

injury has no common-law analog, raises no

constitutional concerns, and cannot be enforced

through an express right of action, a plaintiff does not

have standing. Neither of their theories clears this

bar.

1. Implied Rights Theory

To start, the plaintiffs have not shown that

violations of HAVA’s procedural requirements are

injuries per se. They do not point to any historic form

of action, in tort or otherwise, permitting citizens to sue

the government for failing to follow statutory

procedures without some additional concrete injury.

Indeed, they cannot: Spokeo and TransUnion identify

private injuries, like defamation or invasion of privacy,

as characteristic intangible injuries—not publicoriented grievances about government policies.

TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425.

To the extent the plaintiffs think the

Commissioners denied access to something tangible (a

“response” on the merits of their specific complaint),

they merely redefine procedural concerns as

substantive. The Supreme Court narrowly constrains

the tangible injury category to “physical or monetary”

harms. Id. Without proof of financial losses or bodily

harm, plaintiffs must allege intangible injuries that

pass muster un-der the Supreme Court’s historical

analog test.2

At best, this argument characterizes the relevant harm as an

“informational injury.” See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20–21

(1998). But there is no informational injury here, because there

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The plaintiffs believe, however, that they can

bypass the normal standing inquiry in this case. So

long as a federal statute creates a private right, they

contend, a plaintiff can establish standing just by

pointing to that statutory violation (if the relevant

agency action impacts them directly). This argument

follows from their merits theory: HAVA’s procedural

provisions create a private right to receive an

adjudication on the merits of their complaint,

enforceable via 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At oral argument

before us, they asserted, “Congress deter-mined the

harm was the state officials … violating HAVA,” and

that “harm” could establish standing without showing

anything more. Oral Arg. at 27:19–27:31.

TransUnion forecloses this argument. Congress

cannot use “its lawmaking power to transform

something that is not re-motely harmful into

something that is.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 426

(quoting Hagy v. Demers & Adams, 882 F.3d 616, 622

(6th Cir. 2018)). Of course, the judgment of Congress

matters for standing. But it cannot make a state

official’s failure to abide by the law “harmful” unless

that action maps onto a historical tort analog. The

Alliance, Heuer, and Brown, then, make an argument

that looks more like the TransUnion dissent than its

majority opinion.

Even if we adopted this theory, the Alliance, Heuer,

and Brown would lack standing. Congress has not

created a private right of action for individuals to

enforce HAVA in federal court. Bellitto v. Snipes, 935

has been no “denial of information subject to public disclosure”

under a sunshine law, like the Freedom of Information Act.

Casillas, 926 F.3d at 338 (emphasis original). The Alliance,

Heuer, and Brown do not seek information at all; they want legal

remedies to resolve the concerns raised in their complaints.

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F.3d 1192, 1199 (11th Cir. 2019) (“HAVA creates no

private cause of action.”). “By its text, the HAVA only

allows enforcement via attorney general suits or

administrative complaint.” Am. C. R. Union v. Phila.

City Comm’rs, 872 F.3d 175, 184–85 (3d Cir. 2017). The

judgment of Congress, therefore, is not relevant to

analyzing standing in this case because Congress has

not weighed in on the matter.

Plaintiffs cannot escape these difficulties by

claiming HAVA creates implied rights enforceable

through § 1983. In almost every Supreme Court case

on intangible injuries arising under federal law (not

involving a constitutional violation), there has been an

express private right of action in the statute. See, e.g.,

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571–72 (“citizen-suit provision” of

the Endangered Species Act of 1973); Spokeo, 578 U.S.

at 335 (identifying an explicit cause of action to sue for

violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act);

TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 419 (same); Summers, 555

U.S. at 500 (Administrative Procedure Act); Akins, 524

U.S. at 19 (federal district court review of FEC

decisions under the Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971). Against such guidance, we should not leap to

include § 1983 implied rights cases.

More to the point, these HAVA procedural

provisions fail the Supreme Court’s test for

determining whether a Spending Clause statute

creates private rights. “To prove that a statute secures

an enforceable right, privilege, or immunity” under §

1983, “a plaintiff must show that the law in question

‘clear[ly] and unambiguous[ly]’ uses ‘rights-creating

terms.’” Medina v. Planned Parenthood S. Atl., 606

U.S. 357, 368 (2025)(quoting Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S.

273, 290 (2002)). The “rare statute” with rightscreating language can be enforced through private

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suits only if “Congress has [not] displaced § 1983’s

general cause of action with a more specific remedy.”

Id.; see also St. Anthony Hosp. v. Whitehorn, 132 F.4th

962, 971–72 (7th Cir. 2025) (en banc), cert. denied, 2025

WL 2949556.

This statute, by contrast, does not include rightscreating language. See 52 U.S.C. § 21112(a). It neither

describes these procedures as “rights” nor speaks about

a discrete class of protected individuals. See Health &

Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166,

183–86 (2023). And HAVA lays out a comprehensive,

two-pronged remedial scheme directing individuals to

air their grievances with state agencies, not federal

courts. See id. at 186–91. It is no wonder that the

Supreme Court, even before it restricted the implied

rights doctrine in Medina v. Planned Parenthood,

disfavored § 1983 claims de-signed to enforce HAVA.

See Brunner v. Ohio Republican Party, 555 U.S. 5, 6

(2008) (petitioners were unlikely to succeed on the

merits of their implied rights claim under 52 U.S.C. §

21083(a)(1)(A)). And pre-Medina cases finding private

rights for certain HAVA provisions never did so for §

21112. See, e.g., Colon-Marrero v. Velez, 813 F.3d 1, 9–

22 (1st Cir. 2016) (finding a private right in §

21083(a)(4)(A)); Sandusky Cnty. Democratic Party v.

Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 572–73 (6th Cir. 2004) (same

for § 21082(a)). When a plaintiff alleges an intangible

injury and implied rights at the same time, a weak

merits theory will counsel against finding standing.

Procedural injuries cannot survive Article III scrutiny

when Congress has not granted a procedural right. Cf.

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.3

The Supreme Court’s cases about implied rights under § 1983 do

not normally discuss standing. At first, the claims in these cases

may resemble procedural violations. Yet many involve tangible

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Whether or not this “‘history-and-judgment-ofCongress’ standard for assessing Article III ‘injury in

fact’ … has raised more questions than it answered” is

a question for the Supreme Court, not us. Laufer v.

Arpan LLC, 29 F.4th 1268, 1284 (11th Cir. 2022)

(Newsom, J., concurring) (citation omitted). But this

case is straightforward, even under TransUnion. Both

“history and the judgment of Congress” tell us not to

treat this alleged violation of HAVA as an intangible

harm. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340. Without further

evidence of concrete injury, the plaintiffs’ claim is not

cognizable in federal court.

2. Petition Clause Theory

The Alliance, Heuer, and Brown fare no better on

their claim of constitutional harm. They believe the

Commissioners violated their First Amendment rights

under the Petition Clause, which states, “Congress

shall make no law … abridging … the right of the

people … to petition the Government for a redress of

grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. Refusing to

adjudicate their dispute on the merits, they argue,

counts as a deprivation of their right to petition the

Government.

The Supreme Court has not analyzed whether

plaintiffs can show standing based on a violation of the

Petition Clause. But “traditional [intangible] harms

may also include harms specified by the Constitution

injuries in fact. See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 488 U.S. 1, 3 (1980)

(recovering welfare benefits promised by statute, a financial

harm); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Hal-derman, 451 U.S. 1,

15 (1981) (remedying deprivations of medical care, a physical

harm). And other cases involve intangible harms analogous to

common-law actions. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 277 (disclosure of

false sexual assault allegation in violation of FERPA, analogous

to defamation).

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itself.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425. First Amendment

violations

are

quintessential

examples

of

constitutional harms giving rise to intangible injuries.

Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340. Moreover, both the Supreme

Court and this court have suggested that the Petition

Clause should be treated the same as the Speech

Clause. See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482

(1985) (“The right to petition is cut from the same cloth

as the other guarantees of [the First] Amendment.”);

Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 412 (7th Cir. 1989) (we

“analyze an alleged violation of the [P]etition [C]lause

in the same manner as any other alleged violation of

the right to engage in free speech.”). So this court does

not treat the Petition Clause differently for standing

purposes. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs v. Daley, 983

F.3d 287, 297 (7th Cir. 2020) (upholding a dismissal for

lack of standing when plaintiffs “suffered no invasion”

of “First Amendment petition clause rights”).

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has foreclosed

this

argument.

As

then-Judge

Kavanaugh

summarized, “the Petition Clause does not provide a

right to a response or official consideration” when

people submit “petitions to state agencies.” We the

People Found., Inc. v. United States, 485 F.3d 140, 143

(D.C. Cir. 2007). He drew that conclusion from two

cases confirming that “the First Amendment does not

impose any affirmative obligation on the government to

listen, [or] to respond.” Smith v. Ark. State Highway

Emps., 441 U.S. 465 (1979); see also Minn. State Bd.

for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984). We

recently reaffirmed that holding. See Int’l Union of

Operating Eng’rs, 983 F.3d at 298 (quoting Smith and

Knight). The Petition Clause protects the “right of

access” to courts and government forums. Borough of

Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 387 (2011) (quoting

Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 896 (1984)). It

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does not go further.

The plaintiffs have not alleged a colorable Petition

Clause injury. The Commissioners responded to the

complaint and offered several pathways to petition the

government for redress of grievances.4 And even if they

had not suggested these alternatives, there would still

be no Petition Clause problem. The Commissioners did

not owe a response, so they could not create a

constitutional injury.

IV

Organizations, not just individuals, can establish

standing to sue in federal court. Sometimes,

organizations invoke “associational standing,” or the

ability to sue on behalf of their members. Hunt v.

Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343

(1977). But organizations can also “sue on their own

behalf for injuries they have sustained.” Havens Realty

Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 n.19 (1982). To

establish “organizational standing,” a plaintiff “must

satisfy the usual standards for injury in fact,

The plaintiffs understood Wisconsin state law to foreclose these

remedies. They argue Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m)(c)11 covers only

criminal prosecutions, not civil actions, while Wis. Stat. § 5.06(8)

and Wis. Stat. § 227.52(6) both preclude judicial review of an

agency “non-decision.”

But the plaintiffs do not point to any judicial opinions

interpreting those state laws, instead citing only federal

administrative law cases. We could find no state appellate cases

interpreting § 227.52(6), and just one considering § 5.05(2m)(c)11

in passing. See State v. Jensen, 782 N.W.2d 415, 425 (Wis. 2010).

The scope of judicial review under § 5.06(8) also appears to be

contested. See Brown v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 16 N.W.3d 619,

623–27 (Wis. 2025) (Kenneth Brown, from this case, was not

“aggrieved” by a merits order; no mention of non-decisions).

Plaintiffs cannot allege an injury under the Petition Clause if

these paths are viable.

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causation, and redressability that apply to

individuals.” Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 393–94. An

advocacy group cannot conjure up standing because of

the “intensity of the litigant’s interest.” Valley Forge

Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of

Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982). It must have

an actual injury.

The Alliance argues it has organizational and

associational standing. Both standing theories fail,

though, because any claim of such harm cannot survive

at the summary judgment stage.

A. Organizational Standing

The Alliance draws its organizational standing

theory from the Supreme Court’s recent decision in

Hippocratic Medicine. There, the Court stated that

organizations can establish standing when a

defendant’s actions “directly affected and interfered

with [the organization’s] core business activities.”

Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 395. Echoing this

language, the Alliance argues that the Commissioners

interfered with their “core political activities” by

declining to adjudicate their HAVA complaints. In

declarations submitted at the summary judgment

stage, it affirmed that all its core activities revolve

around using governmental processes “to investigate

or complain[] about governmental misdoings” and

educate its “membership” and “governmental officials”

on its findings. The Alliance believes these declarations

are enough to secure standing under the Supreme

Court’s test.

This approach misses the point of Hippocratic

Medicine. An organization does not have standing

when a government entity frustrates its “abstract

social interests” without a cognizable Article III

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injury. Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 394 (citation

omitted). The Commissioners’ decision to decline

reviewing this complaint was not an injury, and it

does not become one just because an advocacy group

asserts that HAVA complaints are important to its

mission. That approach would make organizational

standing more lenient than the bar for individuals. Cf.

id. at 393–94 (“[O]rganizations must satisfy the usual

standards for injury in fact, causation, and

redressability that apply to individuals.”). And it

would turn organizational standing into “nothing

more than a game of semantics,” in which advocacy

organizations can simply declare that disfavored

government conduct impedes their “core business

activities” without further evidence of harm. Tenn.

Conf. of the NAACP v. Lee, 139 F.4th 557, 566 (6th Cir.

2025). Organizations must point to more evidence of

concrete disruptions to mission-critical business

operations.

Even if it is assumed that filing HAVA complaints

counts as a “core” activity, moreover, this case does

not involve a “direct[] … interfere[nce].” Hippocratic

Med., 602 U.S. at 395. As the Alliance argued in its

summary judgment motion, it still can (and does) file

HAVA complaints against other parties. The

Commissioners declined to respond to two complaints

out of many, and they offered several alternative

channels for redressing the Alliance’s concerns.5

If the Alliance had incurred (or planned to incur) costs pursuing

the alternative remedies the Commissioners identified, it might

prove organizational standing. But such costs do not amount to

imminent injuries in this case. First, the Alliance has averred it

will not be pursuing any of these remedies, in part because it does

not believe they are available under Wisconsin state law. Supra

n.4. Second, assuming these pathways are viable, there is still one

option that does not incur additional costs—referring the matter

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Nothing prevents the Alliance from educating voters,

raising public concern about the Commission’s tactics,

or putting pressure on the legislature to reform the

law governing election disputes. There is no evidence

that the Commissioners’ actions threaten the

integrity of this group’s “advocacy business[],” so the

Alliance cannot establish organizational standing. Id.

B. Associational Standing

Just as the Alliance cannot establish standing for

its own injuries, it cannot do so in its representative

capacity either. For associational standing, an

organization must show “at least one of its members

would ‘have standing to sue in their own right,’” the

lawsuit protects interests “germane to the

organization’s purpose,” and the “participation of

individual members” is not necessary. Prairie Rivers

Network v. Dynegy Midwest Generation, LLC, 2 F.4th

1002, 1008 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Hunt, 432 U.S. at

343) (citation modified).

This claim fails at step one. Heuer and Brown do

not “have standing to sue in their own right” because

they have not suffered an injury in fact. As discussed

in Part III.B, they cannot claim an intangible injury

because the Commission’s decision not to adjudicate

the HAVA complaint on the merits fails the

TransUnion standing test. And they have not provided enough information to show an actual or

imminent financial injury cognizable under Article

III.

to a district attorney under Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m)(c)11. So long as

this cost-free alternative exists, any other potential costs are just

“allegations of possible future injury,” and not so pressing as to

be “certainly impending.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S.

398, 409 (2013) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158

(1990)) (citation modified).

19a

V

Cases involving advocacy groups and intangible

injuries are particularly prone to “manufacture[d]”

theories of Article III standing. Hippocratic Med., 602

U.S. at 395. The Supreme Court has cautioned us to

guard the courthouse gates against procedural

injuries masquerading as direct harm. TransUnion,

594 U.S. at 440. Permitting standing for these

plaintiffs would ignore this instruction.

The district court, then, correctly dismissed this

case for lack of standing. The Alliance, Heuer, and

Brown have not suffered an intangible injury based on

a violation of HAVA’s procedural requirements. And

the Alliance cannot establish organizational or

associational standing based on the record it has

developed in this case.6

AFFIRMED

BRENNAN, Chief Judge, concurring. I join the per

curiam opinion in full. I write separately to note that

this court’s organizational standing precedent has

been rendered largely obsolete. In FDA v. Alliance for

Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. 367 (2024), the

Supreme Court supplied a new reading of its

organizational standing holding from Havens Realty

Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982). Our court’s

caselaw expressly re-lies on a now-incorrect

understanding of Havens, seen most clearly in

Because the Alliance, Heuer, and Brown moved for summary

judgment, they had the burden of providing facts sufficient for

finding Article III standing at a post-discovery stage. Persinger,

20 F.4th 1189. They failed to do so here, even after the district

court had dismissed for lack of standing. Accordingly, we decline

to return this case to the district court for further factfinding. See

28 U.S.C. § 2106.

6

20a

Common Cause Indiana v. Lawson, 937 F.3d 944 (7th

Cir. 2019). Our precedent should be conformed to the

Supreme Court’s latest guidance.

The per curiam opinion correctly applies the “core

business activities” test outlined in Hippocratic

Medicine. Given the confusion these parties and

district courts have evinced about the governing

standard, though, we should clarify the law of Article

III standing for this circuit. To do this, I briefly outline

the evolution of the Supreme Court’s organizational

standing caselaw. Then, I examine how Common

Cause contradicts the new standard. Some questions

remain as to the scope of Hippocratic Medicine’s

holding on organizational standing, but Common

Cause and its progeny no longer control.

I

A. The Supreme Court Modifies the Test

For years, Havens Realty was the primary

Supreme Court precedent for organizational standing

claims. The Court concluded in Havens that a group

dedicated to housing advocacy activities (HOME) had

standing to sue a property management company that

engaged in racially discriminatory practices. 455 U.S.

at 378–79. HOME adequately alleged an injury in fact

to its own interests because it “devote[d] significant

resources to identify and counteract the defendant’s”

discrimination. Id. at 379. The Court found this

combination to be “far more than simply a setback to

the organization’s abstract social interests.” Id. (citing

Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972)).

“Such concrete and demonstrable injury to the

organization’s activities—with the consequent drain

on the organization’s resources—constitutes” an

injury in fact. Id.

21a

Recently, though, the Supreme Court tightened

the organizational standing test for public interest

groups. In Hippocratic Medicine, the Supreme Court

cabined Havens to its unique facts. 602 U.S. at 394–

96. When a group of advocacy organizations

challenged the FDA’s new rules on mifepristone (an

abortifacient pill), they claimed to have standing

because they were “incurring costs to oppose FDA’s

actions.” Id. at 394. Specifically, they spent money to

“conduct their own studies on mifepristone” so they

could “better inform their members and the public

about mifepristone’s risks.” Id. They also “expend[ed]

considerable time, energy, and resources drafting

citizen petitions to FDA, as well as engaging in public

advocacy and public education.” Id. (citation

modified).

The Court rejected these arguments. An

organization “cannot spend its way into standing

simply by expending money to gather information and

advocate against the defendant’s action.” Hippocratic

Med., 602 U.S. at 394. Rather, it must show how a

defendant “directly affected and interfered with [its]

core business activities.” Id. at 395.

To distance itself from the “drain on resources”

language in Havens, the Court redefined the injury in

that case as an in-formational, rather than a financial,

harm. It first emphasized that HOME engaged in

more than just issue advocacy—it “operated a housing

counseling service.” Id.7 The relevant harm arose

when “Havens gave HOME’s employees false inIn fact, Havens does not describe HOME as a traditional issueadvocacy organization at all: “Its activities included the operation

of a housing counseling service, and the investigation and referral

of complaints concerning housing discrimination.” 455 U.S. at

368.

7

22a

formation about apartment availability.” Id. Just like

a “re-tailer who sues a manufacturer for selling

defective goods to the retailer,” Havens Realty “sold”

the housing counseling organization defective

information, which incidentally incurred costs. Id.

Ultimately, HOME could not carry out its core

business activities under these conditions.

The Court, then, altered the Havens organizational

standing test in two ways. First, two kinds of spending

now qualify as “manufacture[d]” standing after

Hippocratic Medicine. 602 U.S. at 394. Costs incurred

through an organization’s “public advocacy” against

government action, like “drafting citizen petitions” to

an agency, cannot confer standing. Id. Nor does

standing exist when costs are incurred as part of

“public education” efforts, including collecting and

distributing in-formation “so that the associations can

better inform their members and the public about …

risks” of a challenged government action. Id. Second,

the paradigmatic Havens injury is now a direct, nonfinancial injury to the organization’s “core business

activities” (like lying to a plaintiff)—not a self-inflicted

harm caused by redirecting resources. Id. at 395.

Left unanswered in the Supreme Court’s opinion is

how to tell when a defendant “directly affect[s] and

interfere[s]” with an organization’s “core business

activities.” Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 395. As

appellate courts face this question, they should heed

the Supreme Court’s warning that “Havens was an

unusual case, and this Court has been careful not to

extend the Havens holding beyond its context.” Id. at

396.

B. This Court’s Precedent

Hippocratic Medicine does not fit with our

23a

precedent, so the law of this circuit should be clarified.

We have noted that this court’s decision in Common

Cause is “arguably in tension” with Hippocratic

Medicine. See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the

Press v. Rokita, 147 F.4th 720, 729 n.3 (7th Cir. 2025).

Common Cause explicitly relies on Havens, applying

it because “[n]othing in the Supreme Court’s …

standing

jurisprudence

…

undermined”

its

organizational standing holding at the time. 937 F.3d

at 950. Now that the Supreme Court has revised the

test from Havens, that conclusion should be

reconsidered.

1. The Common Cause Approach

Taken as a whole, Common Cause promotes the

“expansive theory of standing” that Hippocratic

Medicine curtailed. 602 U.S. at 395. In Common

Cause, this court concluded that several voting rights

organizations had standing to challenge an Indiana

law revamping that State’s procedures for cleaning up

its voter rolls. 937 F.3d at 948. In reaching that

conclusion, though, it accepted allegations of financial

“injuries” that Hippocratic Medicine now forecloses.

Most notably, the court credited claims of financial

injuries based on “public education” expenses. Each

organization said that it “expended resources

educating voters and community activists” about the

challenged law, including by “chang[ing] [their]

curriculum” and reaching out to voters directly. Id. at

951–52. One group “created a poster” that informed

members of the risk of de-registration. Id. at 952.

Even at the time, these alleged costs were “rather thin

gruel” for standing purposes. Id. at 964 (Brennan, J.,

concurring). The Supreme Court has now declared

them insufficient.

24a

Common Cause also relied on diversion of

resources language that no longer fits with

Hippocratic Medicine. The organizations in Common

Cause believed the Act would force them “to expend …

limited financial resources on rolling back the effects

of the bill.” 937 F.3d at 951. Sometimes, the “effects of

the bill” are presented as “concrete work” supporting

voters and poll workers; at other points, the opinion

shades over into public advocacy more broadly. But see

id. at 956 (“ruling out standing for lobbying efforts in

Indiana’s legislature”). Either way, more than once

the opinion entangles direct advocacy with voter

education. See id. at 952 (Common Cause Indiana

“devoted additional time and resources to

ameliorating the … effects of this law, including

conducting … training sessions aimed at educating

voters and community activists”).

Finally, Common Cause did not consider the

organizations’ “core business activities.” Hippocratic

Med., 602 U.S. at 395. In-stead, this court used a far

more elastic concept, “core mission,” which more

easily justified standing. Common Cause, 937 F.3d at

956. The “specific mission[s]” of the organizations

were described as multifaceted, including “educating

potential voters, helping them to fulfill whatever legal

requirements their state has legitimately imposed as

a condition of voting, and opposing any improper

voter-suppression measures that may exist.” Id. at

954. Moreover, Common Cause calls voter registration

“core” to the organizations, but it sup-plied no

evidence of how central these activities were to their

day-to-day operations. For example, this court states

that Common Cause Indiana’s “advocacy agenda …

extends far beyond voter registration.” Id. at 952. Yet

it conflates “voter registration,” “voter education,”

“voter programs,” and “voter advocacy,” calling them

25a

all part of the “core mission” of the organizations at

various points. Id. at 954. Hippocratic Medicine

requires more specificity than Common Cause provided. Cf. Fair Hous. Ctr. of Metro. Detroit v. Singh

Senior Living, LLC, 124 F.4th 990, 992–93 (6th Cir.

2025) (remanding for more evidence showing “that the

conduct challenged in the suit interfered with the

organization’s ‘core business activities.’”).

Reading Common Cause on its own terms, nearly

every large, well-funded advocacy organization could

establish standing in its own right. It would just have

to point to a portion of its operations and call them

“core.” That fully recognizes the fears in Hippocratic

Medicine of granting “all the organizations in America

… standing to challenge almost every … policy that

they dislike, provided they spend a single dollar

opposing those policies.” 602 U.S. at 395. As noted in

the per curiam, this approach would turn

organizational standing into “nothing more than a

game of semantics,” where organizations redefine

their “missions” at higher levels of generality to secure

standing. Tenn. Conf. of the NAACP v. Lee, 139 F.4th

557, 566 (6th Cir. 2025).

Hippocratic Medicine encourages courts to avoid

these games. Instead, they should employ a more

objective inquiry, looking to both the organization’s

actual “activities” and the way the defendant’s actions

impact them. Courts in this circuit, therefore, should

no longer follow Common Cause’s approach to

organizational standing in light of the Supreme

Court’s latest guidance.

2. Applying Hippocratic Medicine

The Supreme Court has not explicitly overruled

Havens. Nor did the Court explain what to do with the

26a

discussion of financial injury in that case. It may be

that all “diversion of resources” theories of

organizational standing are on their way out after

Hippocratic Medicine, but that is not yet clear. How,

then, should organizational standing disputes be

handled under this modified precedent?

After Hippocratic Medicine, it seems that courts

are to first look for instances in which the defendant

directly injured the plaintiff organization. Consonant

with Article III, these harms could be either tangible

or intangible. In Havens, the primary injury HOME

alleged was an intangible injury. The housing

corporation “provided … black employees false

information

about

apartment

availability.”

Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. at 395 (citing Havens,

455 U.S. at 366 and n.1, 368). Under the TransUnion

test, this kind of racial discrimination resembles

actions for fraud and tortious interference at common

law, both harmful to HOME’s “housing counseling”

business. Id. at 395. This falsehood, not any financial

harm, constitutes the paradigmatic Havens injury.

Accordingly, an organization would have standing to

sue for an intangible injury if an agency defrauded the

organization, violated its constitutional rights, or

committed something resembling a privacy tort

directly against the organization.

This inquiry may be more difficult when a plaintiff

asserts that the government caused financial harms.

Almost inevitably, a plaintiffs’ concerns will look more

like a taxpayer suit or “generalized grievance.” Carney

v. Adams, 592 U.S. 53, 58–59 (2020). But if a

government entity issued a fine or withheld grant

funding, the organization would likely have a direct

tangible financial injury. TransUnion, 594 U.S. at

27a

424–25.8

If the organization cannot show that a defendant’s

actions constitute direct concrete harm, whether

tangible or intangible, the “core business activities”

test takes center stage. Although not crystal clear,

Hippocratic Medicine does not expressly forbid all

financial organizational injury claims. Cf. Lee, 139

F.4th at 564–65 (highlighting conflict with normal

standing rules if financial harms were not injuries in

fact). So, courts would then have to ask whether a

defendant “directly affected and interfered with [the

plaintiff’s] core business activities,” causing the

plaintiff to incur a financial injury. Hippocratic Med.,

602 U.S. at 395. Of course, an advocacy organization

still “cannot spend its way into standing simply by

expending money to gather information and advocate

against the defendant’s action.” Id. at 394. Thus,

issue-advocacy groups would only satisfy Article III

scrutiny when they allege genuine financial harms

caused by the defendant, as the Supreme Court ruled

in Havens. Hippocratic Medicine tells us that these

situations will be exceedingly rare. 602 U.S. at 396.9

It is unclear whether the “core business activities” test should

be ap-plied to instances of direct, cognizable harm. Doing so

would risk violating the maxim that “organizations must satisfy

the usual standards” for standing because it may require

organizations to provide more proof of harm than individuals.

Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 393–94.

9

The language about financial injuries cannot be read out of

Havens so easily, even if that case is limited to “its context.”

Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 396. Havens involved a claim for

damages, not injunctive relief. 455 U.S. at 378. The Court made

clear that these tangible financial injuries (“the consequent drain

on the organization’s resources”) justified Article III standing. Id.

at 379. After all, the measure of HOME’s recovery would be based

on its administrative costs, not the falsity of the defendant’s

statements. This meant that there was a fit between the asserted

8

28a

Until the Supreme Court clarifies whether Havens

is still good law, though, this court must raise the bar

for alleging standing in these cases. Organizations

must provide more evidence of harm in their pleadings

and through discovery. They must point to facts

allowing a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the

defendant interfered with a core business activity, not

just a vaguely defined core mission. And they cannot

rely on any costs pertaining to educating the public or

issue advocacy. Without meaningful evidence of how

an organization spends its time and money,

organizations could redefine their purpose to plead

standing. And without showing that the financial

injuries are not advocacy costs, organizations could

spend their way into court as they wished.

II

As the per curiam opinion notes, the Wisconsin

Voter Alliance provided little evidence in support of its

“core business activities” argument. This is because

the Alliance changed its standing theory halfway

through the litigation. At first, the Alliance argued it

had standing because the Commissioners’ “nondecision” forced it “to divert resources to education

and other non-litigation methods to enjoin the HAVA

violations.” It also had to “pursue judicial remedies,”

which “diverts monetary resources away from its core

mission and objectives.” After Hippocratic Medicine,

injury and the claimed remedy—in other words, the harm was

redressable. But reading Hippocratic Medicine literally, we might

conclude that organizations have standing under Havens only

when they have an intangible injury, not a tangible financial

injury. That would invert the Supreme Court’s normal

presumptions about standing. Cf. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S.

330, 340 (2016) (tangible harms are presumed “synonymous” with

concreteness).

29a

though, the Alliance tried to re-frame its standing

argument in terms of its “core political activities.” On

appeal, it reiterates only the new arguments.

Federal appellate courts have an independent

obligation to assure themselves that standing exists.

Prairie Rivers Net-work v. Dynegy Midwest

Generation, LLC, 2 F.4th 1002, 1010 (7th Cir. 2021).

We should therefore carefully consider any arguments

for standing supported by the record—even those the

plaintiffs downplay before this court.

In its reply brief, the Alliance correctly recognized

that its reliance on a diversion of resources theory was

a “bad fact” in the record pointing against standing. It

saw that the old way of establishing standing—

pointing to de minimis costs incurred in response to

the defendant’s disfavored actions, as this court

permitted in Common Cause—no longer fit with the

Supreme Court’s modified approach. Rightly so. The

bare recitals of public education expenses offered in

the Alliance’s amended complaint run afoul of

Hippocratic

Medicine’s

prohibition

on

“manufacture[d]” standing. 602 U.S. at 394.

Other litigants have not picked up on this change

so quickly. In several recent district court opinions

from this circuit, the litigants expressly relied on a

diversion of resources theory to establish

organizational standing. Many of these courts have

applied Common Cause, even after Hippocratic

Medicine, because “[t]he Seventh Circuit has not yet

considered what effect Hippocratic Medicine has on

Havens and its precedents.” Kidd v. Pappas, No. 1:22cv-07061, 2025 WL 3507374, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8,

2025).10 Other cases have conflated the diversion of

See, e.g., Nat’l Fair Housing All. v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr., No.

1:18-cv-00839, 2025 WL 975967, at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2025);

10

30a

resources test with the “core business activities”

standard in ways that are not faithful to either

approach.11 This uncertainty about our circuit

precedent, not-withstanding the ruling in Hippocratic

Medicine, shows the need for clarity.

Though the Alliance tried to disregard its

erroneous “diversion of resources” theory on appeal, it

also misunderstood the “core business activities” test.

It thought the best way to satisfy Hippocratic

Medicine would be to strip out all references to

financial injuries from the record and its briefing. By

doing so, it assumed the new standard could be

satisfied without pointing to any injury at all, whether

direct harms cognizable under Article III or

downstream monetary consequences.

That is not correct. When an organization’s

intangible injury arguments fail, it does not escape

the strictures of Article III. Instead, Hippocratic

Medicine shows that these organizations must allege

a direct injury in fact or else risk dismissal for lack of

Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 1:24-cv-01867,

2025 WL 2712209, at *7 n.5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 2025). See also

Fair Hous. Ctr. of Cent. Ind., Inc. v. M&J Mgmt. Co., LLC, No.

1:11-cv-00612-TAB-JPH, 2024 WL 3859997, at *2–3 (S.D. Ind.

Aug. 19, 2024); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v.

Rokita, 751 F. Supp. 3d 931, 940–42 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 27, 2024);

Access Living of Metro. Chi., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 752 F. Supp.

3d 922, 928 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2024); Ill. Nurses Ass’n v.

Rosenblatt, No. 1:24-cv-12379, 2025 WL 2430571, at *3 (N.D. Ill.

Aug. 22, 2025).

One district court applied Common Cause with trepidation,

recognizing that Hippocratic Medicine may unsettle this court’s

precedent. See Legal Aid Chi. v. Hunter Props., No. 1:23-cv04809, 2024 WL 4346615, at *5–14 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2024)

(Seeger, J.).

See Chi. Headline Club v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-12173, 2025 WL

3240782, at *74–75 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2025).

11

31a

standing. Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 393–94. The

“core business activities” test does not stand apart

from the “usual standards for injury in fact, causation,

and redressability that apply to individuals.” Id. at

394. Rather, the test fits into the framework by

delineating the circumstances in which a defendant

does (and does not) cause a tangible financial in-jury

to an organization. Cf. Lee, 139 F.4th at 564–65

(discussing causation). Of course, the Alliance must

show a real injury to establish this kind of harm—not

just self-inflicted financial in-convenience. Without an

intangible injury, it must identify a financial harm to

even enter Article III’s ambit.

Because the district court dealt with the Alliance’s

diversion of resources theory and the defendant

litigated it before this court, this topic—including

resetting the applicable law—was properly presented

for our review and clarification of the law of this

circuit.

III

The Supreme Court has warned to be “careful not

to ex-tend the Havens holding” on organizational

standing “beyond its context.” Hippocratic Med., 602

U.S. at 395. The per curiam opinion correctly replaces

the old test with the new when it applies the “core

business activities” standard. Before Hippocratic

Medicine, parties and courts were not required to ask

about core activities, so the per curiam opinion takes

a step in the right direction. At some point the

Supreme Court may give further guidance about how

the “core business activities” standard fits with the

ordinary Article III analysis for tangible and

intangible injuries. Until then, parties and district

courts should acknowledge this change in the law and

adjust their approach to organizational standing.

32a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Everett McKinley Dirksen

United States Courthouse

Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Office of the Clerk

Phone: (312) 435-5850

www.ca7.uscourts.gov

FINAL JUDGMENT

February 10, 2026

Before

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge

CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge

No. 25-1279

WISCONSIN VOTER ALLIANCE, et al.,

Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

33a

DON M. MILLIS, et al.,

Defendants - Appellees

Originating Case Information:

District Court No.: 1:23-cv-01416-WCG

Eastern District of Wisconsin

District Judge William C. Griesbach

The judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED,

with costs, in accordance with the decision of this court

entered on this date.

s/

Clerk of Court

34a

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Everett McKinley Dirksen

United States Courthouse

Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Office of the Clerk

Phone: (312) 435-5850

www.ca7.uscourts.gov

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF MANDATE

March 4, 2026

To:

Linda M. Klemm

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Eastern District of Wisconsin

125 S. Jefferson Street

Green Bay, WI 54301-4541

No. 25-1279

WISCONSIN VOTER ALLIANCE, et al.,

Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

35a

DON M. MILLIS, et al.,

Defendants - Appellees

Herewith is the mandate of this court in this appeal,

along with the Bill of Costs, if any. A certified copy of

the opinion/order of the court and judgment, if any, and

any direction as to costs shall constitute the mandate.

RECORD ON APPEAL STATUS: No record to be

returned

36a

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

WISCONSIN VOTER ALLIANCE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. 23-C-1416

DON M. MILLIS, et al.,

Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

On October 25, 2023, Plaintiffs Wisconsin Voter

Alliance (WVA), Ron Heuer, and Kenneth Brown

brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the

members of the Wisconsin Elections Commission

(WEC), alleging violations of the Help America Vote

Act of 2002 (HAVA), 52 U.S.C. § 20901, et seq., and

seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On March

13, 2024, the court granted Defendants’ motion to

dismiss, finding Plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient

facts to show standing. But because there is a strong

public interest in election integrity, the court allowed

Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint. On April 12,

2024, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.

The matter is now before the court on Plaintiffs’

motion for summary judgment. Defendants oppose

37a

and ask the court to instead grant summary judgment

in their favor under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56(f)(1). Plaintiffs did not reply and the time to do so

has passed. So, Plaintiffs’ motion is ripe for the court’s

adjudication. While the parties devote most of their

briefing to merits issues, this case ends where the

court must begin—jurisdiction. For the following

reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion will be denied, and the case

will be dismissed.

BACKGROUND

A.

Statutory Scheme

HAVA was enacted in 2002 to “establish the

Election Assistance Commission to assist in the

administration of Federal elections and to otherwise

provide assistance with the administration of certain

Federal election laws and programs, to establish

minimum election administration standards for

States and units of local government with

responsibility for the administration of federal

elections,” and for other purposes. Pub. L. No. 107252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002). HAVA provides two

enforcement mechanisms. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 21111–12.

First, the “Attorney General may bring a civil action

against any State or jurisdiction in an appropriate

United States District Court” for declaratory and

injunctive relief “as may be necessary to carry out the

uniform and nondiscriminatory election technology

and administration requirements” under various

HAVA provisions. § 21111. Second, “any person who

believes that there is a violation of” HAVA’s uniform

and nondiscriminatory election technology and

administration requirements subchapter “may file a

complaint” under the “State-based administrative

complaint procedures.” § 21112(a). States that receive

38a

payment pursuant to a HAVA program must establish

and maintain State-based administrative complaint

procedures. § 21112(a)(1). HAVA’s requirements for

such complaint procedures include:

(A)

The procedures shall be uniform and

nondiscriminatory.

(B)

Under the procedures, any person who

believes that there is a violation of any

provision of subchapter III (including a

violation which has occurred, is

occurring, or is about to occur) may file

a complaint.

(C)

Any complaint filed under the

procedures shall be in writing and

notarized, and signed and sworn by the

person filing the complaint.

(D)

The State may consolidate complaints

filed under subparagraph (B).

(E)

At the request of the complainant,

there shall be a hearing on the record.

(F)

If, under the procedures, the State

determines that there is a violation of

any provision of subchapter III, the

State shall provide the appropriate

remedy.

(G)

If, under the procedures, the State

determines that there is no violation,

the State shall dismiss the complaint

and publish the results of the

procedures.

(H)

The

State

shall

make

a

final

39a

determination with respect to a

complaint prior to the expiration of the

90-day period which begins on the date

the complaint is filed, unless the

complainant consents to a longer

period

for

making

such

a

determination.

(I)

If the State fails to meet the deadline

applicable under subparagraph (H),

the complaint shall be resolved within

60 days under alternative dispute

resolution procedures established for

purposes of this section. The record and

other materials from any proceedings

conducted

under

the

complaint

procedures established under this

section shall be made available for use

under

the

alternative

dispute

resolution procedures.

§ 21112(a)(2)(A)–(I).

Wisconsin’s HAVA administrative complaint

procedure is set forth in Wis. Stat. § 5.061, entitled

“Compliance with federal Help America Vote Act.”

That section provides:

(1)

Whenever any person believes that a

violation of Title III of [HAVA] has

occurred, is occurring, or is proposed to

occur with respect to an election for

national office in this state, that person

may file a written, verified complaint

with the [WEC].

40a

(2)

If the [WEC] receives more than one

complaint under sub. (1) relating to the

same subject matter, the [WEC] may

consolidate the complaints for purposes of

this action.

(3)

A complainant under sub. (1) or any of the

complainants in a consolidated complaint

under sub. (2) may request a hearing and

the matter shall then be treated as a

contested case under ch. 227, except that

the [WEC] shall make a final

determination with respect to the merits

of the complaint and issue a decision

within 89 days of the time that the

complaint or the earliest of any

complaints was filed, unless the

complainant, or each of any complainants

whose complaints are consolidated,

consents to a specified longer period.

(4)

If the [WEC] finds the complaint to be

without merit, it shall issue a decision

dismissing the complaint. If the [WEC]

finds that the violation alleged in the

complaint has occurred, is occurring, or is

proposed to occur, the [WEC] shall order

appropriate relief, except that the [WEC]

shall not issue any order under this

subsection affecting the right of any

person to hold an elective office or

affecting the canvass of an election on or

after the date of that election.

Wis. Stat. § 5.061.

41a

B.

Factual Background

The material facts in this case are not copious,

nor are they in dispute. The WVA is an issue-advocacy

organization. Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Statement of

Material Facts (SOF) ¶ 2, Dkt. No. 41. Ron Heuer is

the president of the WVA, and Kenneth Brown is one

of its members. Id. ¶¶ 17, 24. The WVA’s core

activities include “working and serving in ways that

protect the rights of the organization, where

applicable, and its members, and those associated

with the WVA, whenever laws, statutes, rules,

regulations, or government actions (at whatever level,

federal, state, county, city or actions of their

respective officials) threaten or impede implied or

expressed rights or privileges afforded to them under

the federal or state constitutions, laws, or

regulations.” Id. ¶ 2. More specifically, the WVA and

its members file “administrative complaints with or

against the [WEC] for alleged [HAVA] violations.” Id.

¶ 6; see also id. ¶¶ 7–10.

This case centers on two HAVA complaints that

Plaintiffs filed. On September 8, 2022, the WVA and

Heuer filed an administrative complaint under Wis.

Stat. § 5.061 against the WEC, alleging that the WEC

violated HAVA’s requirements to maintain its

statewide voter registration database through the

state’s participation in the Electronic Registration

Information Center (ERIC) and requesting an

evidentiary hearing on the matter. Id. ¶¶ 27–29; see

also 2022 WEC Complaint, Dkt. No. 1-1. On October

19, 2022, the WEC sent the WVA a letter explaining

that the verified complaint was “being returned

without consideration or dismissal” by the WEC

because a complaint brought against the WEC itself

warranted “ethical recusal” by the WEC. Defs.’ Resp.

42a

to Pls.’ SOF ¶ 30; see also WEC Return Letter, Dkt.

No. 1-2.

On October 2, 2023, Plaintiffs collectively filed

another complaint under Wis. Stat. § 5.061 against

the WEC, alleging that the WEC violated HAVA by

issuing unlawful guidance that allows overseas

absentee votes to be received through the Uniformed

and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 52 U.S.C.

§ 20301, et seq., without HAVA-required voter identity

and eligibility verification and requesting an

evidentiary hearing on the matter. Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’

SOF ¶ 34; see also 2023 WEC Complaint, Dkt. No. 13. On October 4, 2023, the WEC sent Plaintiffs a letter

functionally identical to that the WEC sent Plaintiffs

on October 19, 2022. Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ SOF ¶ 36. The

letter explained that the verified complaint was “being

returned without consideration or dismissal” by the

WEC because a complaint brought against the WEC

itself warranted “ethical recusal” by the WEC. Id. ¶¶

36–37; see also WEC Return Letter, Dkt. No. 1-4.

Plaintiffs generally contend that they are

entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief because

the WEC’s 2022 and 2023 “non-decision” response

letters violated their federally protected rights.

Defendants counter that they are entitled to summary

judgment because, undisputed facts aside, neither

HAVA nor § 1983 provide a private cause of action on

which Plaintiffs can assert their claims in federal

court. The court will not reach the cause of action

question as this case is resolved at the antecedent

question of standing.

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is appropriate when the

movant shows there is no genuine issue of material

fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

43a

matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see generally

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).

The court may grant summary judgment to the

nonmovant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56(f). Haley v. Kolbe & Kolbe Millwork Co., 863 F.3d

600, 613 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing other sources).

As this court has already said, federal courts do

not have jurisdiction to decide every legal question

that may arise. Instead, Article III of the United

States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal

courts to actual “cases” or “controversies” brought by

litigants who demonstrate standing. U.S. Const. art.

III, § 2, cl. 1. The doctrine of standing is not an esoteric

doctrine that courts use to avoid difficult decisions; it

“serves to prevent the judicial process from being used

to usurp the powers of the political branches.” Clapper

v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013); see

also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S.

83, 94–95 (1998) (“The requirement that jurisdiction

be established as a threshold matter ‘springs from the

nature and limits of the judicial power of the United

States’ and is ‘inflexible and without exception.’”

(alterations omitted) (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M.R.

Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884))). It is because

of “this overriding and time-honored concern about

keeping the Judiciary’s power within its proper

constitutional sphere” that the court “must put aside

the natural urge to proceed directly to the merits of an

important dispute and to settle it for the sake of

convenience and efficiency.” Hollingsworth v. Perry,

570 U.S. 693, 704–05 (2013) (alterations and internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521

U.S. 811, 820 (1997)). So, “[t]he court is bound to ask

and answer for itself” the standing question, “even

when not otherwise suggested, and without respect to

the relation of the parties to it.” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at

44a

94 (quoting Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v.

Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 453 (1900)).

“The familiar ‘triad of injury in fact, causation,

and redressability constitutes the core of Article III’s

case-or-controversy

requirement.’”

Gracia

v.

SigmaTron Int’l Inc., 986 F.3d 1058, 1064 (7th Cir.

2021) (quoting Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 103–04). “The

party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of

establishing these elements” and must prove them “in

the same way as any other matter on which [the party]

bears the burden of proof.” Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Injury in fact is at

issue here. “To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must

show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally

protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’

and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or

hypothetical.’” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330,

339 (2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). Plaintiffs

have shown their claimed injury is particularized and

actual—each was privy to a WEC proceeding that

resulted in the WEC issuing a “no decision” response

letter. But Plaintiffs have not shown that their

claimed injury is concrete.

“A concrete injury is a real injury—that is, one

that actually exists, though intangible harms as well

as tangible harms may qualify.” Nettles v. Midland

Funding LLC, 983 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2020)

(citation omitted). Where a purported harm is

intangible, “both history and the judgment of

Congress play important roles.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at

340. As to the former, “it is instructive to consider

whether an alleged intangible harm has a close

relationship to a harm that has traditionally been

regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English

or American courts.” Id. (citing another source). As to

the latter, “Congress may ‘elevate to the status of

45a

legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries

that were previously inadequate in law.’” Id. at 341

(alterations omitted) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578).

But the Court went on to caution that

Congress’ role in identifying and

elevating intangible harms does not

mean that a plaintiff automatically

satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement

whenever a statute grants a person a

statutory right and purports to authorize

that person to sue to vindicate that right.

Article III standing requires a concrete

injury even in the context of a statutory

violation. For that reason, [a plaintiff]

could not, for example, allege a bare

procedural violation, divorced from any

concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-infact requirement of Article III.

Id.; see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S.

488, 497 (2009) (“Unlike redressability, however, the

requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor of Article

III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute.”).

More specifically and as relevant here, “[a] citizen

may not sue based only on an ‘asserted right to have

the Government act in accordance with law.’” Food &

Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S.

367, 381 (2024) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,

754 (1984)). And yet, that is the thrust of Plaintiffs’

argument.

As to Heuer and Brown, Plaintiffs argue that

the two have not had their HAVA complaints against

the WEC adjudicated and intend to file HAVA

complaints in the future; therefore, they have suffered

a harm that is “real” and “immediate.” Pls.’ Br. in

46a

Supp. at 38, Dkt. No. 32 (citing Pls.’ SOF ¶ 25, Dkt.

No. 35 (“[Brown] had expectations, as understood

under the law, rules, or regulations, that the

Commission would render an adjudication—a

decision. It was [Brown]’s understanding the

Commission had to make a decision, but he did not get

a decision, which concerns him because he will file

HAVA complaints in the future.”)); see also Defs.’

Resp. to Pls.’ SOF ¶ 22. In essence, Heuer and Brown

argue they were harmed because the WEC has not

followed 52 U.S.C. § 21112(a). That is not enough.

Plaintiffs also contend that the WVA has

organizational standing. Organizations can establish

standing “to sue on their own behalf for injuries they

have sustained.” All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at

393 (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455

U.S. 363, 379 n.19 (1982)). To do so, an organization

“must satisfy the usual standards for injury in fact,

causation, and redressability.” Id. at 394. But as with

an individual, “an organization may not establish

standing simply based on the ‘intensity of the

litigant’s interest’ or because of strong opposition to

the government’s conduct, ‘no matter how

longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified

the organization.’” Id. (internal citation omitted) (first

quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United

for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,

486 (1982); and then quoting Sierra Club v. Morton,

405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972)).

Plaintiffs have not shown that the WVA has

suffered an injury in fact. In an attempt to do so, they

reassert that the WVA has been harmed by the WEC’s

failure to adjudicate its HAVA complaints. Plaintiffs

further argue that “the WEC’s actions have directly

affected and interfered with the WVA’s core political

activities” because the WVA has been forced to divert

47a

resources from other initiatives to litigating in federal

court. Pls.’ Br. in Supp. at 36; Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ SOF

¶ 12. But the Supreme Court has shut the door on that

argument:

[A]n organization that has not suffered a

concrete injury caused by a defendant’s

action cannot spend its way into

standing simply by expending money to

gather information and advocate against

the defendant’s action. An organization

cannot manufacture its own standing in

that way.

Indeed, that theory would

mean that all the organizations in

America would have standing to

challenge almost every federal policy

that they dislike, provided they spend a

single dollar opposing those policies.

All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 394–95. Thus,

the WVA comes up short like Heuer and Brown; it

does not have organizational standing.

One final point. There may be concern that if

Heuer, Brown, and the WVA do not have standing,

then who does? The Court also answered this question

in Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine. There, the Court

observed that it “has long rejected that kind of ‘if not

us, who?’ argument as a basis for standing.” 602 U.S.

at 396 (citing other sources). For “[t]he Framers of the

Constitution did not ‘set up something in the nature

of an Athenian democracy or a New England town

meeting to oversee the conduct of the . . . Government

by means of lawsuits in federal courts.’” Id. (quoting

United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179

(1974)). Thus, it may be that some issues are

necessarily “left to the political and democratic

48a

processes.” Id. In this case, Defendants note that

HAVA contains a remedy for allegedly deficient

administrative complaint procedures—a federal

audit. Plaintiffs may wish to consider pursuing that

remedy for the relief they seek.

In sum, Plaintiffs have not shown that Heuer,

Brown, or the WVA have suffered an injury in fact.

Accordingly, they do not have standing to proceed in

federal court, so the court must deny their motion for

summary judgment and dismiss this action.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No.

31) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is

dismissed for lack of standing. The Clerk is directed to

enter judgment accordingly.

Dated at Green Bay, Wisconsin this 31st day of

January, 2025.

s/

William C. Griesbach

United States District Judge

49a

APPENDIX E

MOHRMAN, KAARDAL & ERICKSON, P.A.

Attorneys and Counselors at Law

150 South Fifth Street

Suite 3100

Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402

Erick G. Kaardal

Telephone: 612/465-0927

Telephone: 612/465-0927

Facsimile: 612/341-1076

Writer’s E-Mail: Kaardal@mklaw.com

Via ECF

January 19, 2026

Office of the Clerk

United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

Everett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse

219 S. Dearborn Street, Room 2722

Chicago, IL 60604

Re: Wisconsin Voter Alliance, et al. v. Don M. Mills,

et al.

Case No. 25-1279

Dear Clerk of Court:

The Appellants Wisconsin Voter Alliance,

Ronald Heuer, and Kenneth Brown (WVA) submit

this letter under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

28(j). The U.S. Supreme Court recently issued a

decision in Bost v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, No.

24-568, 2026 WL 96707 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2026) that

50a

sheds additional light upon Article III standing

issues before this Court.

The Bost Court held that candidates have a

personal interest in rules governing counting of votes

to support Article III standing to challenge votecounting statutes. Id. at *3. Candidates, unlike a

common competitor in the economic marketplace,

have an interest in a “fair process” as they “seek to

represent the people.” Id. This parallels WVA’s

argument that the state agency’s rules only affect

complainants who filed a HAVA complaint, here, the

WVA, not the general public. WVA Princ. Br. at 9,

27, 36. WVA’s interest is in a “fair process” seeking

administrative adjudicative relief as statutory law

requires. Id.

Bost also found candidates not only “have a

concrete and particularized interest in the rules that

govern the counting of votes in their elections”

regardless of cost to their campaigns but, “[t]heir

interest extends to the integrity of the election….”

Bost, 2026 WL 96707, at *5. This too parallels WVA’s

arguments regarding the purpose of HAVA state

processes to adjudicate complaints about

irregularities in the election process; it relates to the

integrity of elections and outcomes. E.g., WVA Princ.

Br. at 23. Irregularities in the election process

undermines the confidence of the election results for

which a HAVA complaint’s purpose. HAVA and state

statutory processes invite complaint to identify

alleged election process issue or issues. And, a

decision represents WVA’s resolution of its

complaint, a prize that cannot be severed from

WVA’s interest in the HAVA adjudicative process.

Bost, 2026 WL 96707, at *3. (Candidates interest in

“prize” to represent the people cannot be severed

51a

from interest in electoral process).

WVA filed in federal court because of the

WEC’s non-decision violating state statutory law

expending moneys to mitigate or avoid substantial

risk of this harm” sufficient standing under Bost. Id.,

at 5.

Sincerely,

/s/Erick G. Kaardal

EGK/mg

cc:

Counsel of Record (via ECF)

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH FED.

R. APP. P. 32 (g)

The

undersigned

certifies

that

the

Supplemental Authority Letter submitted herein

contains 349 words and complies with the type/volume

limitations of the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure 32(g). This Supplemental Authority Letter

was prepared using a proportionally spaced typeface

of 14-point. The word count is stated in reliance on

Microsoft 365, the word processing system used to

prepare this Supplemental Authority Letter.

/s/Erick G. Kaardal

Erick G. Kaardal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on January 19, 2026, I

electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the

Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the

52a

Seventh Circuit by using the CM/ECF system. I

certify that all participants in the case are registered

CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished

by the CM/ECF system.

/s/Erick G. Kaardal

Erick G. Kaardal

53a

APPENDIX F

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

Wisconsin Voter Alliance, Ron Heuer, and Kenneth

Brown,

v.

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 23-cv-1416 WCG

Don M. Millis, in his official capacity as a member of

the Wisconsin Elections Commission, or his

successor, Robert F. Spindell, Jr., in his official

capacity as a member of the Wisconsin Elections

Commission, or his successor, Marge Bostelmann, in

her official capacity as a member of the Wisconsin

Elections Commission, or her successor, Ann S.

Jacobs, in her official capacity as a member of the

Wisconsin Elections Commission, or her successor,

Mark L. Thomsen, in his official capacity as a

member of the Wisconsin Elections Commission, or

his successor, Megan Wolfe, in her official capacity as

Administrator of the Wisconsin Elections

Commission, or her successor,

Defendants.

DECLARATION II OF RON HEUER

I, Ron Heuer, declare as follows:

I am President of Wisconsin Voter Alliance

and make this declaration in support of Plaintiffs’

Motion for Summary Judgment for the organization

54a

and for myself. In addition, this declaration also

represents my personal knowledge as a plaintiff

before this Court regarding the underlying

allegations of the Amended Complaint. I have

personal knowledge of the attached documents and

the present status of the proceedings before this

Court. In addition, the references to the record is a

result of consultation with counsel. His office

prepared the appendix, the index, and gathering of

documents. Finally, counsel assisted me with any

reference to the record that is included in this

declaration.

The Wisconsin Voter Alliance is an issueadvocacy organization with core missions that

includes providing services to others through

multiple ways.

1. I am President of Wisconsin Voter Alliance

and make this declaration in support for the

organization and for myself. This declaration also

reflects my personal knowledge of the facts stated to

the best of my recollection. Plaintiff Wisconsin Voter

Alliance is a Wisconsin non-profit corporation located

in Kewaunee County, E3530 Townline Road,

Kewaunee, Wisconsin, 54216. The Wisconsin Voter

Alliance is a statewide issue-advocacy organization

with members who seek to ensure, as part of their

association objectives, public confidence in the

integrity of Wisconsin’s elections, in election results

and election systems, processes, procedures, and

enforcement, and that public officials act in

accordance with the law in exercising their

obligations to the people of the State of Wisconsin.

The WVA further seeks to educate and report to its

members and the public about available methods to

55a

meet the stated objectives.

2. Moreover, the Wisconsin Voter Alliance

core organizational and advocacy activities to

support objectives that include findings to inform

members or others who consider themselves

associated with the WVA, whenever laws, statutes,

rules, regulations, or government actions (at

whatever level, federal, state, county, city or actions

of their respective officials) threaten or impede

implied or expressed rights or privileges afforded to

them under the federal or state constitutions, laws,

or regulations or all. Core activities include

educating its members and the public to meet the

organization’s objectives, and public officials of, for

example, revealing possible misconduct of public

officials (such as when acting contrary to the law or

regulations), or the need to correct administratively

or recommending new laws or amending laws via

legislative action. The methodology used includes

drafting of reports, testifying before governmental

officials or units of government, legislative

committees, public events, or events organized by the

Wisconsin Voters Alliance or other parties. See e.g.,

attached Exhibit 4, APP. 303–306.

3. The Wisconsin Voter Alliance also works

and provides services to its members, including the

protection of the rights of itself as an organization, to

investigate or obtain information, documents, data,

or other materials from the government entity,

government officials, or others similarly situated. See

e.g., id.

4. Indeed, whenever government officials,

agencies, or departments fail to cooperate in

disclosing facts, date, or material for example,

abiding by existing law such as the Freedom of

Information Act or Public Records Act or other laws,

56a

under such circumstances, when a violation of a rule,

law, or other illegality occurs, the organization is

impeded to service or inform its members, the public,

the legislature, or other governmental officials. And

the impediments require the organization to take

action by available means. Id.

5. Usually, using available governmental

tools, such as the Freedom of Information Act, the

Public Records Act, or other laws that provide

procedures to obtain available governmental

documents or data, it involves using governmental

administrative processes (filing requests, complaints,

or other methods of petitioning the governmental

unit or body). Id.

6. In addition, the Wisconsin Voter Alliance

will use the judiciary, both, state or federal, as a tool

of last resort, in most cases, to ensure it can meet

core advocacy activities to serve its members or

public as previously stated. Id.

7. The Wisconsin Voter Alliance will use the

laws or regulations that provide for the petitioning of

the government, its’ departments, agencies, or

officials, as “tools” to file petitions (complaints)

against the government or governmental officials.

Notably, while laws or regulations are available to

the general public to use, not everyone will do so.

Those who do are sometimes referred to as

“complainants” such as in administrative

proceedings. The term is interchangeable with such

other specific type of complainants, such as

“plaintiff,” “appellant,” “respondent,” “appellee,”

“petitioner,” and the like. Id.

8. The Wisconsin Voter Alliance will file

administrative complaints, or other actions, against

the Wisconsin Elections Commission or its members

or both, when alleged violations of the Help America

57a

Vote Act occur or when the WVA learns of HAVA

related violations. In addition, the WVA will assist

other WVA members or individuals associated with

the WVA in complaints filed administratively with or

against the WEC for alleged HAVA violations. The

WVA will do so, when such complaints align with the

WVA core activities and mission, and assistance

would include, but not limited to, educating the

public and government officials about the underlying

complaint, general assistance in the administrative

process, and other related assistance as is called for.

Id.

9. When the Wisconsin Voter Alliance filed a

complaint with the Wisconsin Elections Commission,

as petitioning a grievance regarding an alleged Help

America Vote Act violation, as a complainant, the

WVA had expectations, as it understood the law,

rules, or regulations, that the Commission would

render an adjudication—a decision. The

understanding of the governing law led the WVA to

believe the Commission had to make a decision, but

it did not get a decision.

10. While the processes and procedures to file a

HAVA complaint are made for the ease of the

complainant, without cost, the Wisconsin Elections

Commission non-decision to the Wisconsin Voter

Alliance complaint required the diversion of

resources from the relatively simply administrative

filing to seeking a remedy in federal court and

interfering with the Alliance’s core activities in these

types of administrative proceedings.

11. Even without the diversion of resources

devoted to the core mission of the Wisconsin Voters

Alliance, it had an expectation to obtain a Wisconsin

Elections Commission decision in the relatively

simple an inexpensive administrative HAVA

58a

proceeding.

12. The Wisconsin Voter Alliance is unaware of

any prohibition against the filing of a Help America

Vote Act complaint against an agency such as the

Wisconsin Elections Commission or its members as

election officials.

13. If in the future, the Wisconsin Voter

Alliance, as an organization and as an organizational

decision, believes that the Wisconsin Elections

Commission or any of its members violated

provisions of the Help America Vote Act, the WVA

will file an administrative complaint against the

WEC or its members. With the WVA’s filing, as an

organization, it would also expect the WEC to render

a decision or ensure its’ matter would be fully

adjudicated in a way that the expected right to

petition the government for the redress of grievances

had been heard, regardless of the final outcome.

14. Based upon the past actions of the

Wisconsin Elections Commission, when the

Wisconsin Voter Alliance files a Help America Vote

Act complaint against the WEC, again, based upon

past actions—which have not changed—the WEC

will neither consider the WEC’s complaint nor make

a decision on the HAVA allegations asserted.

15. The Wisconsin Voter Alliance believes it

has an institutional stake in the administrative

complaints filed with the Wisconsin Elections

Commission under HAVA to determine whether or

not a violation of the federal law occurred. Without a

WEC adjudication of the WVA’s HAVA complaint, it

is the WVA’s belief that the alleged violation is ongoing.

16. Without a Wisconsin Elections

Commission decision of the Wisconsin Voter Alliance

HAVA complaint, corrective action by the agency,

59a

election official or others, cannot be taken. This

would interfere with the WVA’s core objectives that

include, but is not limited to, recommending,

reporting, amending or developing legislation, rules,

regulations, or guidelines to ensure the violation

ceases, or does not occur again in the future in a

similar form.

17. The Wisconsin Voter Alliance has an

institutional stake in the administrative complaints

filed with the Wisconsin Elections Commission under

HAVA to determine whether or not a violation of the

federal law occurred. Without that adjudication, it is

the WVA’s belief that the alleged violation is on-going.

Without a decision, corrective action by the agency,

election official, the WVA, or others, cannot be taken.

This would include, but is not limited to,

recommending, reporting, or developing legislation,

rules, regulations, or guidelines to ensure the

violation ceases, or does not occur again in the future.

Ronald Heuer as President of the Wisconsin

Voter Alliance and individual complainant.

18. I am the President of the Wisconsin Voter

Alliance. As the President of the organization, I

provide a number of responsibilities and services to

the membership. Not a total explanation of what I do,

but my work includes for example, communicating to

members and the general public regarding the

organization’s work, as I also assist in determining

the petitioning actions necessary to take, what events

to participate, directing investigations, the reporting

of the organization findings and work to others,

provide testimony to public officials or to

governmental bodies (such as legislative or

Congressional committees); meeting with public

officials and others regarding improving laws,

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regulations, or proposed legislative in alignment with

the organization’s goals or objectives as previously

described.

19. I will direct the Wisconsin Voter Alliance to

assist or support or both, WVA members or others

associated with the WVA or the organization’s core

activities with the filing of administrative

complaints. This includes complaints with or against

the Wisconsin Elections Commission for alleged

HAVA violations. Recent examples include the

WVA’s assistance with my own HAVA complaint and

that of Kenneth Brown.

20. At times, the Wisconsin Voter Alliance will

be directed to assist or support or both, WVA

members or others associated with the WVA or its

core activities in litigation. Recent examples include

the WVA’s assistance with the instance federal court

action. See also, Exhibit 4, APP. 303–306.

21. Moreover, I know that certain laws, rules,

and regulations, allow me, personally, to petition the

government for the redress of grievances. In other

words, processes or procedures allow me to be a

“petitioner,” “complainant,” “plaintiff,” and the like to

either obtain information from the government,

departments, agencies, or officials, or to file

complaints or other similar documents to convey and

adjudicate my grievance(s) to the same. In other

words, I also have a personal interest in acting as an

“activist” to gather information, documents, data, or

other materials and the like, to inform others such as

legislators or governmental officials (as just two

examples), about the need or how to improve our

processes and procedures regarding elections and

related topics.

22. Personally, I reside in Wisconsin and a

Wisconsin registered voter.

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23. I have a personal stake in the

administrative complaints I filed with the Wisconsin

Elections Commission under HAVA to determine

whether or not a violation of the federal law occurred.

Without that adjudication, it is my belief that the

alleged violation is on-going. Without a decision,

corrective action by the agency, election official,

myself, or others, cannot be taken. This would

include, but is not limited to, recommending,

reporting, or developing legislation, rules, regulations,

or guidelines to ensure the violation ceases, or does

not occur again in the future.

24. When I personally filed a complaint with

the Wisconsin Elections Commission, as petitioning a

grievance regarding an alleged Help America Vote

Act violation, as a complainant, I had expectations as

I understood the law, rules, or regulations, that the

Commission would render an adjudication—a

decision. It was my understanding the Commission

had to make a decision, but I did not get a decision.

25. If in the future I believed that the

Wisconsin Elections Commission or any of its

members violated provisions of the Help America

Vote Act, I will file an administrative complaint

against the WEC or its members or both. With my

filing, I would also expect the WEC to render a

decision or ensure my matter would be fully

adjudicated in a way that I can feel as though my

right to petition the government for the redress of my

grievances has been heard, as a complainant,

regardless of the final outcome.

26. I am unaware of any prohibition against

the filing of a Help America Vote Act complaint

against an agency such as the Wisconsin Elections

Commission or its members as election officials.

27. Based upon the past actions of the

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Wisconsin Elections Commission, when I file a Help

America Vote Act complaint against the WEC, again,

based upon past actions—which have not changed—

the WEC will neither consider my complaint nor

make a decision on the HAVA allegations asserted.

28. While the processes and procedures to file

a HAVA complaint are made for the ease of the

complainant, without or with minimal cost, the

Wisconsin Elections Commission non-decision to my

HAVA complaint required me to seek relief from the

federal court and to whatever extent of the outcome,

I could be personally liable for costs associated with

the federal court action. The Commission’s nondecision gave me little choice but to seek a remedy in

court.

Details of Filing of HAVA complaints with the

WEC and the WEC’s responses in September

2022 and October 2023.

29. On September 8, 2022, with the assistance

of counsel, the Wisconsin Voters Alliance and I filed

a verified HAVA violation complaint against the

Wisconsin Elections Commission and the WEC’s

Commissioners, individually. In addition, a hearing

on the complaint was requested. Am. Compl. Ex. A,

APP. 29–39.

30. Essentially, the September 2022, WVAHeuer HAVA complaint alleged that the WEC and

its commissioners were transferring voter

registration information to a third-party, Electronic

Registration Information Center, Inc., alleging the

actions as legally unauthorized under HAVA. Id.

31. The September 2022 WVA-Heuer HAVA

complaint was filed under Wisc. Stat. § 5.06.

32. On October 19, 2022, the Wisconsin

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Elections Commission and its commissioners, through

the WEC’s staff attorney Jim Witecha, sent a letter to

the Wisconsin Voters Alliance stating that our

complaint was being returned “without consideration

or dismissal by the Wisconsin Elections Commission.”

See, Am. Compl. Ex. B, APP. 40–42.

33. With the Wisconsin Elections

Commission’s failure to consider and make a decision

regarding the Wisconsin Voter Alliance-Heuer HAVA

complaint, the non-decision and non-adjudication of

the issue directly affected the core activities and

objectives of the WVA as previously outlined and our

right as complainants to a decision or remedy or both

regarding the HAVA issues presented to the WEC.

34. Moreover, the Wisconsin Elections

Commission did not refer the Wisconsin Voter

Alliance and Heuer September 2022 HAVA complaint

to an administrative law judge in its letter of October

19, 2022 to adjudicate the allegations asserted. See,

Am. Compl. Ex. B, APP. 40–42.

35. I, personally, and for the Wisconsin Voter

Alliance, considered the letter as a non-decision of

the underlying September 8, 2022 HAVA complaint

because the letter stated the Wisconsin Elections

Commission did not consider and did not make a

decision regarding the complaint. The WEC said the

complaint, against the WEC and its Commissioners

warranted an ethical recusal. Id.

36. The same October 2022 Wisconsin

Elections Commission letter also suggested two

“paths” to take as a method to adjudicate the

September HAVA complaint.

37. I believe that neither of the two paths the

Wisconsin Elections Commission suggested to be

applicable. One was to refer the HAVA complaint to

the county attorney under Wisc. Stat. §

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5.05(2m)(c)(11), and the other under Wisc. Stat. §

5.06(8), suggesting appealing a decision of the

commission to the state circuit court.

38. On October 2, 2023, the Wisconsin Voters

Alliance, Kenneth Brown, and I filed with the

assistance of counsel, filed a verified HAVA violation

complaint against the Wisconsin Elections

Commission and the WEC’s Commissioners,

individually. Am. Compl. Ex. C, APP. 42–57. The

HAVA complaint had a number of exhibits attached

to it to substantiate the allegations. Id., APP. 58–265.

In addition, a hearing was requested. Id.

39. Two days later, on October 4, 2023, the

WEC and its commissioners, through the WEC’s staff

attorney Angela O’Brien, sent a letter to the

Wisconsin Voters Alliance (for Kenneth Brown and

myself), stating that our complaint was being

returned “without consideration or dismissal by the

Commission.” Am. Compl. Ex. D, APP. 266–267.

40. With the Wisconsin Elections

Commission’s failure to consider and make a decision

regarding the Wisconsin Voter Alliance-Heuer-Brown

HAVA complaint, the non-decision and nonadjudication of the issue directly affected the core

activities and objectives of the WVA as previously

outlined and our right as complainants to a decision

or remedy or both regarding the HAVA issues

presented to the WEC.

41. The Wisconsin Elections Commission did

not refer the October 2023 HAVA complaint to an

administrative law judge in its letter of October 4,

2023 to adjudicate the allegations asserted.

42. I, personally, and for the Wisconsin Voter

Alliance, considered the letter as a non-decision of

the underlying October 2, 2023 HAVA complaint.

The Wisconsin Elections Commission said the

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complaint, against the WEC and its Commissioners

warranted an ethical recusal.

43. The same October 4, 2023 Wisconsin

Elections Commission letter also suggested two

“paths” to take as a method to adjudicate the

September HAVA complaint. Neither of the paths

suggested were believed to be applicable. One was to

refer the HAVA complaint to the county attorney

under Wisc. Stat. § 5.05(2m)(c)(11), and the other

under Wisc. Stat. § 5.06(8), suggesting appealing a

decision of the commission to the state circuit court.

But, the Wisconsin Voter Alliance and I believe that

under Wis. Stat. § 5.06(9), the circuit court’s authority

is strictly limited and unavailing.

44. The belief is based upon my reading of

Wisconsin Statutes § 5.06(9) which is accurately

quoted as follows: “The court may not conduct a de

novo proceeding with respect to any findings of fact

or factual matters upon which the commission has

made a determination, or could have made a

determination if the parties had properly presented

the disputed matters to the commission for its

consideration. The court shall summarily hear and

determine all contested issues of law and shall

affirm, reverse or modify the determination of the

commission, according due weight to the experience,

technical competence and specialized knowledge of

the commission, pursuant to the applicable

standards for review of agency decisions under s.

227.57.” This appears limiting and inapplicable,

since there is no record—findings of fact or factual

matters determined.

45. The Wisconsin Voter Alliance and I have

not contended that the provision seeking criminal

prosecutions, Wisc. Stat. § 5.05(2m)(c)11, is a “path”

available to them for a civil HAVA complaint

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adjudication—since the WVA and Heuer recognize

that in the end, it is within the discretion of the

prosecutor whether to prosecute.

46. In addition, the Wisconsin Voter Alliance

and I believe the Wisconsin Election Commission’s

recommendation as inapplicable because the HAVA

complaints allege violations of federal law (Wis. Stat.

§ 5.05(2m)(c)2.a (“Any person may file a complaint

with the commission alleging a violation of chs. 5 to

10 or 12”)), and county attorneys are believed not to

have the authority to criminally prosecute violations

of federal law meaning that the violations sought

arise from a federal law (HAVA), not state law,

thereby, I believe it is not for the “state” to criminally

prosecute, but an U.S. Attorney.

47. I know that neither the Wisconsin Voter

Alliance nor I sought suggested the Wisconsin

Elections Commission consider their respective

HAVA complaints as seeking criminal prosecution.

48. In addition, the Wisconsin Voter Alliance

and I found it astounding that the Wisconsin

Election Commission, believed its suggested “path” to

appeal to the circuit court under Wisc. Stat. § 5.06(8)

applied. It gave no basis for its “belief.” With a nodecision from the WEC, we believe there is nothing

to “appeal.” Thus, it appears the WEC expected the

WVA to expend its resources to have the courts

decide the applicability of § 5.06(8), to the

predicament of the WEC’s non-decision.

49. I know that neither of the HAVA

administrative complaints filed in September 2022

nor October 2023 were referred to the Wisconsin’s

Division of Hearings and Appeals. But, the

Wisconsin Elections Commission has referred

HAVA complaints to the administrative law judges,

through the Wisconsin Division of Hearings and

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Appeals.

50. In December of 2023, with the assistance

of counsel, the Wisconsin Voters Alliance and I filed

a verified HAVA complaint with the WEC against

the University of Wisconsin–Parkside. The

allegations asserted that the University violated

HAVA by engaging in university sponsored student

get-out-the-vote and voter registration drives. Am.

Compl., Ex. E, APP. 268–288.

51. In March of 2024, after the filing of the

December 2023 HAVA complaint against WisconsinParkside, our legal counsel received an email from

the Wisconsin Division of Hearings and Appeals.

The email communication stated that the Division of

Hearings and Appeals received a referral from the

WEC on February 29, 2024, seeking a contested case

hearing “to resolve the complaint and a proposed

decision.” Am. Comp., Ex. F, Doc. No. 15–6; APP.

290. See also, Notice of Prehearing Conference, Id.,

R. Heuer Decl. Ex. 2, APP. 292–293.

52. For example, on February 29, 2024, the

Wisconsin Elections Commission referred the

Wisconsin Voter Alliance and my HAVA complaint

against Wisconsin-Parkside to Wisconsin’s Division

of Hearings and Appeals. The administrative process

has included discovery between the parties and will

include a contested case hearing, if necessary, under

applicable Wisconsin administrative law, and

ultimately a decision. See, Am. Compl. Exhibit F,

APP. 289–291.

53. Neither of the HAVA administrative

complaints filed by either the Wisconsin Voter

Alliance, Ronald Heuer, or Kenneth Brown were

referred to the Wisconsin’s Division of Hearings and

Appeals.

54. I believe, as does the Wisconsin Voter

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Alliance, that because the WEC, by failing to make a

decision, offered no administrative relief—neither via

a hearing nor an appropriate remedy if a violation

were to be found.

55. I believe that the Wisconsin Voter Alliance

and I have a right to petition the government for the

redress of grievances, and that the HAVA procedures

provide for that petitioning process for those

individuals or organizations that use the process as

complainants or petitioners.

56. I believe the Wisconsin Voter Alliance and

I, that, generally, petitioning the government for the

redress of grievances is a constitutionally protected

under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

57. I believe the Wisconsin Voter Alliance and

I that Wis. Stat. § 5.061 provides for a petitioning

process for the redress of grievances regarding

alleged HAVA violations for those individuals or

organizations or both who use the process as

complainants or petitioners.

58. I believe the Wisconsin Voter Alliance and

I that petitioning the government for the redress of

grievances as a constitutionally protected right is

embodied and further embraced under HAVA, 52

U.S.C. § 21112.

The Wisconsin Elections Commission missed

deadlines regarding the decision-making

process and not providing alternative dispute

resolution processes for the complainants in

this case.

59. As President of the Wisconsin Voter

Alliance, and personally, I am familiar with the

process, procedures, and status of the Help America

Vote Act complaints filed with the Wisconsin

Elections Commission by the WVA, myself, and

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Kenneth Brown that are subject to these

proceedings. In this regard, I do know that the WEC

has not held a hearing, nor made a decision,

regarding the 2022 and 2023 HAVA complaints

referenced here as Amended Complaint Exhibits A

and C within the 89 day requirement from the

respective filings as I believe is required under 52

U.S. Code § 21112 (a)(2)(h).

60. In addition, I also know, regarding the

2022 and 2023 HAVA complaints referenced here as

Amended Complaint Exhibits A and C, that

Wisconsin Elections Commission has not conducted

dispute resolution proceedings within 60 days of

failing to hold a hearing and make a decision (as I

believe, violates 52 U.S. Code § 21112 (a)(2)(H)) and

as I believe is required under 52 U.S. Code § 21112

(a)(2)(I).

61. As “complainants,” I and the Wisconsin

Voter Alliance believe that using the processes and

procedures provided to file HAVA complaints or

petitions with the Wisconsin Elections Commission is

unique from those individuals or organizations or

both, who do not participate in that process or

procedure.

62. I believe that the Wisconsin Voter Alliance

and I as complainants or petitioners, having engaged

in the HAVA petitioning process before the

Wisconsin Elections Commission and are denied a

decision or a hearing or both, that we are denied the

right to an adequate remedy, unique and distinct

from other individuals or organizations that do not

partake in the HAVA complaint petitioning process.

63. The Wisconsin Voter Alliance and I believe

that a person or organization who has not filed an

actual HAVA complaint with the Wisconsin Elections

Commission, in which the WEC has returned the

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complaint with no consideration, dismissal, or

decision has no harm to complain of.

Wisconsin receives federal HAVA funding.

64. I do know that Wisconsin obtains federal

HAVA funding. I did research on HAVA funding for

Wisconsin on the internet and found it to be

true: https://www.oversight.gov/report/EAC/AuditHAVA-Grants-Awarded-State-Wisconsin (last visited

June 26, 2024).

Documents relevant to the proceedings.

65. I am familiar with documents that have

been filed with the district court and believe the

documents as relevant to the proceedings before this

Court. Attached are copies of the following:

Exh Amended Complaint for Declaratory APP. 1

ibit and Injunctive Relief

APP. 29

1 Am. Comp. Ex. A – 2022 WEC

Complaint (Sept. 8, 2022)

APP. 40

Am. Comp. Ex. B – 2022 WEC

Letter (Oct. 19, 2022)

Am. Comp. Ex. C – 2023 WEC

APP. 42

Complaint (Oct. 2, 2023)

Am. Comp. Ex. D – 2023 WEC

APP. 266

Letter (Oct. 4, 2023)

APP. 268

Am. Comp. Ex. E – 2023 WEC

Complaint v. Parkside

APP. 289

Am. Comp. Ex. F – Emails Re:

Administrative Law Judge and

contested case hearings

Exhi Wisc. Div. of Appeals Or.; Re: WEC APP. 292

bit 2 referring complaint to Div. of App.

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Exh WEC letter recusing itself (May 3,

ibit 2021)

3

Exh List of Wisconsin Voter Alliance

ibit Activities, 2022-2024

4

APP. 294

APP. 296

APP. 303

66. With the assistance of counsel, the

documents are organized in an appendix for the ease

of the Court in finding the documents referred to or

relied upon in the summary judgment memorandum

of law and statement of the facts.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the

laws of the United States of America such as 28

U.S.C. § 1746 that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated: August 29, 2024.

Electronically Signed by Ron Heuer

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APPENDIX G

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

Wisconsin Voter Alliance, Ron Heuer, and Kenneth

Brown,

v.

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 23-cv-1416 WCG

Don M. Millis, in his official capacity as a member of

the Wisconsin Elections Commission, or his

successor, Robert F. Spindell, Jr., in his official

capacity as a member of the Wisconsin Elections

Commission, or his successor, Marge Bostelmann, in

her official capacity as a member of the Wisconsin

Elections Commission, or her successor, Ann S.

Jacobs, in her official capacity as a member of the

Wisconsin Elections Commission, or her successor,

Mark L. Thomsen, in his official capacity as a

member of the Wisconsin Elections Commission, or

his successor, Megan Wolfe, in her official capacity as

Administrator of the Wisconsin Elections

Commission, or her successor,

Defendants.

DECLARATION OF KENNETH BROWN

I, Kenneth Brown, declare as follows:

I make this declaration in support of the

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. This

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declaration represents my personal knowledge, to the

best of recollection or beliefs, as a plaintiff before this

Court regarding the underlying allegations of the

Amended Complaint and its allegations.

1. I reside in Racine County and am a member

and associated with the Wisconsin Voter

Alliance. I have assisted the organization

reach its goals and objectives by actively

petitioning the government, such as filing the

administrative complaint with the Wisconsin

Elections Commission dated, I believe, on

October 2, 2023.

2. From time to time I will keep the organization

informed about activities in Racine and Racine

County, Wisconsin that would be of interest to

the organization or its members or both.

3. I am a complainant that petitioned the

Wisconsin Elections Commission regarding a

Help America Vote Act alleged violation in

October of 2023.

4. I joined as a complainant with the Wisconsin

Voter Alliance and Ronald Heuer, because I

believe that a Help America Vote Act violation

occurred in my County. The administrative

complaint against the Wisconsin Voter

Alliance and its members was filed with the

assistance of the Wisconsin Voter Alliance and

its President, Ronald Heuer. Ron and I

discussed the filing as he explained to me need

for the complaint, the rules, regulations, or

law allowing for the complaint and possible

outcome. I fully supported the filing,

understood the allegations, and expected an

adjudication from the WEC.

5. I understood the administrative complaint

used the laws of Wisconsin. With the help of

74a

6.

7.

the Wisconsin Voter Alliance and Ron Heuer I

have come to recognize and aware of certain

laws, rules, and regulations, that allow me to

personally petition the government for the

redress of grievances. In other words,

processes or procedures allow me to be a

“petitioner,” “complainant,” “plaintiff,” or

however the term is used in a complaint or

petitioner, to either obtain information from

the government, departments, agencies, or

officials, or to file complaints or other similar

documents to convey and adjudicate my

grievance(s) to the same. In addition, I have a

personal interest in acting as an “activist” to

gather information, documents, data, or other

materials and the like, to inform others such

as legislators or governmental officials (as just

two examples), about the need or how to

improve our processes and procedures

regarding elections and related topics. I also

would share my efforts with Ron as the key

representative of the WVA to allow the

organization to reach its core goals and

activities as I understand them.

When I filed the Help America Vote Act

complaint with and against the Wisconsin

Elections Commission, in October 2023, I had

expectations, as I understood the law, rules, or

regulations, that the Commission would

provide a decision. But, as a complainant, I did

not get a decision—the complaint wasn’t even

considered by the WEC.

Ron Heuer explained to me that the Wisconsin

Elections Commission returned our complaint

without consideration and without a decision.

As I recall, Ron explained that the WEC letter

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contained so-called “options” which were not

true alternatives to obtain a decision

regarding the merits of the HAVA complaint.

8. For example, before filing the administrative

complaint, neither Ron nor I contemplated,

suggested, or even considered the matter as

warranting a criminal prosecution. This was

an administrative process to petition the

government for the redress of grievances, or so

I thought. The Wisconsin Elections

Commission suggesting criminal prosecution

made little sense, especially when, as

explained to me, that type of referral under

the law or rules was the WEC’s.

9. In addition, I know, after speaking with Ron,

that none of us as complainants, including the

Wisconsin Voter Alliance, received any word

from the Wisconsin Elections Commission that

it would refer the matter to the Wisconsin’s

Division of Hearings and Appeals.

10. The Wisconsin Elections Commission’s

suggestion to file an action, after returning my

complaint without consideration or decision,

with the Wisconsin circuit court. That made no

sense to me. The HAVA complaint process, as

I understand it, provided for an administrative

means at no cost to me as a complainant to

obtain a decision about the alleged violation.

11. The Wisconsin Elections Commission, I

believe, returning my complaint without

consideration or decision, is a non-decision. I

believe that under the law I was entitled to a

decision. The alternatives given for the WEC’s

non-decision were not viable alternatives

considering the WEC is obligated to make a

decision. The WEC did not even consider nor

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provide me an alternative administrative

process such as going before an Administrative

Law Judge.

12. I believe the Wisconsin Elections Commission

denied me of and failed me by not providing

for a process regarding my grievance against

the government granted to me under the

existing law or rules or regulations guiding

HAVA complaint processes and procedures.

13. While the processes and procedures to file a

HAVA complaint are made for the ease of the

complainant, without cost, the Wisconsin

Elections Commission non-decision to my

complaint required me to seek relief in federal

court. I did so in support of the Wisconsin

Voter Alliance and Ron Heuer, that together,

we would be able to get a decision on the

merits of the underlying HAVA allegations.

But, more importantly to me is my belief that

the WEC denied me the right to petition the

government for the redress of grievances as

the WEC is obligated to do so under HAVA.

However, I do know, that as a party in a court

action I could be personally liable for costs

associated with the federal court action. I

shouldn’t have to be exposed to that

possibility. Regardless, the Commission’s nondecision gave me little choice but to seek a

remedy in court.

14. I believe that I have a right to petition the

government for the redress of grievances, and

that the HAVA procedures provide for that

petitioning process for those individuals or

organizations that use the process as

complainants or petitioners.

15. I believe my right to petition the government

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for the redress of grievances is a

constitutionally protected under the First

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and that

right is derived from HAVA to and through the

Wisconsin Elections Commission obligations,

duties, or mandates provided under HAVA.

The failure to so, is an injury to me.

16. Finally, as an self-described activist, as

associated with the Wisconsin Voter Alliance,

and as a person willing and able to help the

WVA reach its core activities and objectives, I

will in the future file HAVA complaints

against the Wisconsin Elections Commission

and its members as necessary, or other HAVA

complaints with the expectation of the

complaint being considered and adjudicated as

required under governing laws, rules, or

regulations.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the

laws of the United States of America such as 28

U.S.C. § 1746 that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated: August 29, 2024.

Electronically Signed by Kenneth Brown

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EXHIBIT H

Exhibit D

Wisconsin Elections Commission

201 West Washington Avenue | Second Floor |

P.O. Box 7984 | Madison, WI 53707-7984

(608) 266-8005 | elections@wi.gov | elections.wi.gov

October 4, 2023

Wisconsin Voter Alliance

C/O Ron Heuer & Kenneth Brown

E 3530 Townline Road

Kewaunee, WI 54216

Sent via email to kaardal@mklaw.com

gynild@mklaw.com

Re: Complaint Filed with Wisconsin Elections

Commission

Wisconsin Voter Alliance et al v. Wisconsin

Elections Commission et al (EL 23-51)

Dear Mr. Heur, Mr. Brown, and Wisconsin Voters

Alliance,

This communication is to inform you that the verified

complaint submitted against the Wisconsin Elections

Commission (“the Commission”) is being returned

without consideration or dismissal by the Commission.

It is the position of the Commission and its staff that a

complaint

against

the

Commission,

against

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Commissioners in their official capacities, or against

Commission staff, warrants an ethical recusal by the

body. The Commission’s position reflects the need to

avoid conflicts associated with an adjudicative body

deciding a matter brought against itself, similar to the

provisions of law and ethics precluding a judge from

presiding over a case filed against herself, or someone

with personal or professional ties to her. It is my

sincere hope that you can appreciate our efforts to

maintain the integrity of the Wis. Stats. §§ 5.05, 5.06,

and 5.061 complaint processes.

Additionally, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Teigen

et al v. Wisconsin Elections Commission et al, stated

that “…it would be nonsensical to have WEC a

adjudicate a claim against itself under § 5.06(1).” 2022

WI 64, 33, 403 Wis. 2d 607, 976 N.W.2d 519.

Despite this stance, the Commission does not wish to

leave you without a path forward. Wisconsin Statutes

provide the following:

Wisconsin Statute § 5.05(2m)I11: If the

commission finds that there is probable cause to

believe that a violation under subd. 2. has

occurred or is occurring, the commission may, in

lieu of civil prosecution of any matter by the

commission, refer the matter to the district

attorney for the county in which the alleged

violator resides, or if the alleged violator is a

nonresident, to the district attorney for the

county where the matter arises, or if par. (i)

applies, to the attorney general or a special

prosecutor. For purposes of this subdivision, a

person other than a natural person resides

within a county if the person’s principal place of

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operation is located within that county.

Wisconsin Statute § 5.06(8): Any election

official or complainant who is aggrieved by an

order issued under sub. (6) may appeal the

decision of the commission to circuit court for the

county where the official conducts business or the

complainant resides no later than 30 days after

issuance of the order. Pendency of an appeal

does not stay the effect of an order unless the

court so orders. (Emphasis Added)

Though it is your right regardless, the Commission

formally gives you leave to submit this complaint to the

respective district attorney for the jurisdiction in which

the alleged violator resides for alleged criminal

violations under Wis. Stat. § 5.05 or appeal this

decision directly to the circuit court in accordance with

Wis. Stat. § 5.06(8) for alleged administrative

violations. It is also the Commission’s belief that Wis.

Stat. § 5.06(8) appellate rights may be applied to Wis.

Stat. § 5.06(1) “HAVA Complaints.”

You may also wish to consider any other maintained or

available legal rights, including but not limited to, Wis.

Stat. Chapter 227 appeal/hearing rights, the filing of a

civil complaint in the courts, or similar remedies.

Please feel free to contact me if you have any additional

questions regarding this complaint.

Sincerely,

s/

Angela O’Brien

Staff Attorney

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APPENDIX I

Exhibit B

Wisconsin Elections Commission

201 West Washington Avenue | Second Floor |

P.O. Box 7984 | Madison, WI 53707-7984

(608) 266-8005 | elections@wi.gov | elections.wi.gov

October 19, 2022

Wisconsin Voter Alliance

E 3530 Townline Road

Kewaunee, WI 54216

Sent via email: kaardal@mklaw.com

Re: Complaint Filed with Wisconsin Elections

Commission

Wisconsin Voter Alliance et al. v. Wisconsin

Elections Commission et al. (EL 22-69)

Dear Mr. Heuer and Wisconsin Voters Alliance,

This communication is to inform you that the verified

complaint submitted against the Wisconsin Elections

Commission (“Commission”) is being returned

without consideration or dismissal by the Wisconsin

Elections Commission. It is the position of the

Commission and its staff that a complaint against

the Commission warrants an ethical recusal by the

body. The Commission’s position reflects the need to

avoid the conflicts associated with an adjudicative

body deciding a matter brought against itself, similar

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to the provisions of law and ethics precluding a judge

from presiding over a case filed against herself, or

someone with personal or professional ties to her. It

is my sincere hope that you can appreciate our efforts

to maintain the integrity of the Wis. Stats. §§ 5.05,

5.06, and 5.061 complaint processes.

Additionally, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Teigen

et al. v. Wisconsin Elections Commission et al., 403

Wis.2d 607, 633, stated that “…it would be

nonsensical to have WEC adjudicate a claim against

itself…”

Despite this stance, the Commission does not wish to

leave you without a path forward. Wisconsin

Statutes provide the following:

Wisconsin Statute § 5.05(2m)(c)11: If the

commission finds that there is probable cause

to believe that a violation under subd. 2. has

occurred or is occurring, the commission may,

in lieu of civil prosecution of any matter by the

commission, refer the matter to the district

attorney for the county in which the alleged

violator resides, or if the alleged violator is a

nonresident, to the district attorney for the

county where the matter arises, or if par. (i)

applies, to the attorney general or a special

prosecutor. For purposes of this subdivision, a

person other than a natural person resides

within a county if the person's principal place

of operation is located within that county.

Wisconsin Statute § 5.06(8): Any election

official or complainant who is aggrieved by an

order issued under sub. (6) may appeal the

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decision of the commission to circuit court for

the county where the official conducts business

or the complainant resides no later than 30

days after issuance of the order. Pendency of

an appeal does not stay the effect of an order

unless the court so orders. (Emphasis Added)

Though it is your right regardless, the Commission

formally gives you leave to submit this complaint to

the respective district attorney for the jurisdiction in

which the alleged violator resides for alleged

criminal violations under Wis. Stat. § 5.05 or appeal

this decision directly to the circuit court in

accordance with Wis. Stat. § 5.06(8) for alleged

administrative violations. It is also the Commission’s

belief that Wis. Stat. § 5.06(8) appellate rights may

also be applied to Wis. Stat. § 5.061 “HAVA

Complaints.”

You may also wish to consider any other maintained

or available legal rights, including but not limited to,

Wis. Stat. Chapter 227 appeal/hearing rights, the

filing of a civil complaint in the courts, or similar

remedies.

Please feel free to contact me if you have additional

questions regarding this complaint. Sincerely,

s/

Jim Witecha

Staff Attorney

WISCONSIN ELECTIONS COMMISSION

cc:

Commission Members

Meagan Wolfe, Commission Administrator