Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Bart Xavier Pestarino, Petitioner v. Danielle Tetrault Pestarino

Supreme Court briefJan 6, 2026

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FILED

JAN 0 6 2026

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT;ug

3n tfje Supreme (Court of tfje Wmteb States;

Bart Pestarino,

Petitioner

Danielle Pestarino

Respondent

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Washington State Supreme Court

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Bart Pestarino

Pro Se Petitioner

PO Box 1078

Carson CITY, NV, 89702

(360) 670-0741

RECEIVED

MAR 2 2026

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the Constitution permits a State to impose

severe and enduring consequences historically

associated with punishment—including loss of

parental rights, categorical firearm prohibitions,

subjection to no-warrant arrest, restrictions on

movement and association, reputational stigma, and

cascading federal disabilities—through civil “special

proceedings” stripped of criminal procedural

safeguards, devoid of due process, and governed by a

preponderance-of-the-evidence standard; and

whether Congress may constitutionally nationalize

and amplify those consequences through federal

statutes operating as bills of attainder by mandating

enforcement of such civil orders nationwide without

judicial adjudication or a minimum due process floor.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Tetrault Pestarino v. Pestarino, 5 Wash. 3d 1009,

576 P.3d 1186 (2025). Washington State Supreme

Court. Review denied October 8, 2025.

Pestarino v. Pestarino, No. 86578-IT, 2025 WL

1158428. Washington State Court of Appeals.

Judgment entered Apr. 21, 2025.

Pestarino v. Pestarino, No. 24-2-20111-29.

Skagit County Superior Court.

Judgment entered March 15, 2024.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinion Below

Jurisdiction

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ....1

Statement

................................................ 2

Reasons for Granting the Petition

I. A “Civil” Misnomer to Impose Punishment By

Circumventing Criminal Safeguards

II. RCW 7.105 Firearm Prohibitions Violate the

Second Amendment

III. RCW 7.105 Displaces Federal Immigration

Law, Defying Supremacy Clause

IV. The Challenged Statutes are Bills of Attainder

A. RCW 7.105

B. Federalization of Defective State Orders

i. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)

ii. 18 U.S.C. § 2265

iii. The VAWA Self-Petition Scheme^

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(51) and

8 U.S.C. § 1367

Conclusion

Appendix A — State supreme court denial of review

(Oct. 8, 2025)

Appendix B — Court of appeals opinion (Apr. 21,

2025)

Appendix C — Superior court order (March 15, 2024)

18a

Appendix D — Constitutional and statutory

provisions

35a

(iii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)

21-23

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)

Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277,

18 L. Ed. 356 (1866)

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006)

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)

Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973)

INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)

........................................... 18

Matter ofSingh, 211. & N. Dec. 598 (BIA 2019)

...................................................................................... 13

Muratoski v. Holder, 622 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2010)

(iv)

Cases—Continued^

Page

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen,

142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022)

17, 19-20

Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,

433 U.S. 425 (1977)

24-25, 28, 31-32, 34'35

Pestarino v. Pestarino, No. 3;25’CV-00082MMD-CLB, 2025 WL 1224718

(D. Nev. Apr. 27, 2025)

Pestarino v. Pestarino, No. 86670-2-1

(Wash. Ct. App. Div. 1 September 27, 2024)

(unpublished)

Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public

Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841 (1984) .... 33

United States v. Amankwaa SR,

No. i:24-cr-00549 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2024)

United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965)

...............................................................25, 34

United States v. Hussain,

2024 WL 5481339 (D. Vt. Oct. 23, 2024)

United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024)

Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971)...36

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)

U.S. Constitution:

Page

U.S. Const, art. I, § 9

4, 24-25, 29'37

U.S. Const, art. I, § 10

7, 24-28

U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2

7, 21-23

U.S. Const, amend. II...........................................7, 16'18

U.S. Const, amend. V

7, 10-11, 15, 17-19, 29-32, 35’37

U.S. Const, amend. VI

7, 16, 19, 30, 35

U.S. Const, amend. XIV

7, 17-19, 31, 35-37

Federal Statutes:

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(51)

3, 5, 10, 16, 33, 37

8 U.S.C. § 1367

3, 10, 14-16, 33, 37

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)

2-4, 16, 29-31

18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2)

................ 29

18 U.S.C. § 2265

2-3, 16, 31-32

42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Civil Rights Act of 1964)

7, 35-37

Federal Regulations:

......................................5

5, 21-22

8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(6)

8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2)(iv)

8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(f)(2)

(vi)

Washington State Statutes^

RCW 7.105 (generally)

RCW 7.105.010(4)(a)

RCW 7.105.010(17)

RCW 7.105.200(4)(a)

RCW 7.105.200(5)

RCW 7.105.200(7)

RCW 7.105.200(8)

RCW 7.105.225(l)(a)

RCW 7.105.405(4)(a)

RCW 7.105.450(2)

RCW 7.105.900(4)...

RCW 10.31.100(2)(a)

'RCW 18.47.010(2)

RCW 18.47.040(1)

Page

4-5, 8, 16-21, 23'24, 26-28

21-22

17, 27

19, 27

19, 26-27

27-28

(Vii)

“Coercive Control” Criminal Statutes—Other States:

Page

HRS § 586-1........................................................................ 6

HRS § 709-906(6).............................................................. 6

“Coercive Control” Statutes—Other States ■

10 DE Code § 1041(1) (2024)..........................................6

15 V.S.A. § 1101(l)(B), (2)...............................................6

Cal. Fam. Code § 6320......................................................6

C.R.S. § 13-14-101(2.1).................................................... 6

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-l(b)(4), 46b*15..........................6

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-1(b)(4)(D), 46b"15.................... 5

HRS § 586-1........................................................................ 6

HRS § 709-906(6).............................................................. 6

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209A, § 1.......................................6

Me. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 4102.............................................. 6

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2G25'29(a)(7).................................... 5

N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 821, 828, 842-a............................... 6

Washington State Evidence Rules:

ER 413(b)........................................................................... 19

(viii)

Other Federal Authorities^

Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 1999,

Hearing on H.R. 3083 Before the Subcomm, on

Immigration and Claims of the H. Comm, on

Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Dwayne

‘Duke’ Austin), p. 11

Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 1999,

Hearing on H.R. 3083 Before the Subcomm, on

Immigration and Claims of the H. Comm, on

Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Rep.

Lamar Smith), p. 11

Petition to Classify Alien as Immediate Relative of

a United States Citizen or as a Preference

Immigrant; Self-Petitioning for Certain Battered

or Abused Spouses and Children, 61 Fed. Reg.

13061, 13067 (Mar. 26, 1996), p. 12

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-19'676,

Immigration Benefits! Additional Actions Needed to

Address Fraud Risks in Program for Foreign

National Victims of Domestic Abuse (2019), at GAO

Highlights, p. 11

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-22-105328, U.S.

Citizenship and Immigration Services ■ Additional

(ix)

Actions Needed to Manage Fraud Risks (Sep. 19,

2022), at GAO Highlights, p. 11

USCIS Restores Integrity to the VAWA Domestic

Abuse Program After Finding Rampant Fraud, U.S.

Citizenship and Immigration Services (Dec. 22,

2025), https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/alerts/uscisrestores-integrity-to-the-vawa-domestic-abuseprogram-after-finding-rampant-fraud (last accessed

Dec. 30, 2025), p. 11

Washington State Bills:

Page

WA HB 1449 (2021)

(“coercive control” gross misdemeanor)........................ 6

WAHB 1426 (2025) (IDPO)...................................... 8-10

“Coercive Control” Crime Bills—Other States:

NYS5306 (2019).............

NY S05650 (2021)............................................................. 6

NY A2707 (2023)..............................................................6

NY S6695 (2023)..............................................................6

NY A679 (2025)................................................................. 6

NY S4079 (2025)..............................................................6

SC HB3621 (2021)............................................................ 6

SC S588 (2025).................

(x)

Other Authorities •

Aguilar, Julian. “Houston immigration advocates

warn of VAWA scam targeting undocumented

immigrants”, Houston Chronicle, July 24, 2025,

https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houstontexas/immigration/article/houston-vawaimmigration-scams-20783979.php (last accessed Dec.

31, 2025), p. 14

FIEL (Familias Inmigrantes y Estudiantes en la

Lucha), (Immigrant Families and Students in the

Fight). “PRESS ADVISORY: VAWA FRAUD IN

IMMIGRATION IS WIDESPREAD IN HOUSTON”,

July 24, 2025,

https://fielhouston.org/2025/07/24/press-advisory

vawa-fraud-in-immigration-is-widespread-inhouston-2/ (last accessed Dec. 30, 2025), p. 14

Mejia, Jonathan. “Houston attorney accused of

defrauding families with false domestic violence

relief applications”, FOX26Houston, July 24, 2025,

https://www.fox26houston.com/news/attorney

accused-defrauding-families-false-domestic-violencerelief-application (last accessed Dec. 31, 2025), p. 14

3n tfje Supreme Ourt of tfje Wmteti States

No.

BART PESTARINO, PETITIONER

DANIELLE PESTARINO, RESPONDENT

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT

Bart Pestarino, pro se Petitioner, respectfully

petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment

of the Washington State Supreme Court.

OPINION BELOW

The denial of review of the State Supreme Court

(Appendix) is Tetrault Pestarino v. Pestarino,

5 Wash. 3d 1009, 576 P.3d 1186 (2025)

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the State Supreme Court was

entered on October 8, 2025. The jurisdiction of this

Court is invoked under 28 U.S. Code § 1257

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

INVOLVED

Pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions are

reproduced in the appendix.

STATEMENT

This petition presents a single, recurring

constitutional question of national importance^

whether States and Congress may jointly reallocate

punishment from the criminal sphere to the civil

sphere in order to avoid the procedural safeguards

that historically constrained the State’s power to

deprive individuals of liberty.

Washington State’s civil protection order

statute, RCW 7.105, illustrates this structural defect.

Although denominated “civil,” the statute authorizes

courts to impose sweeping and durable restraints—

categorical firearm prohibitions, no-warrant arrest

exposure, loss of parental custody and visitation,

restrictions on movement and association, and

enduring reputational stigma—through proceedings

that dispense with the core protections of criminal

adjudication. Those proceedings rely on hearsay,

written submissions, and indeterminate standards,

employ a preponderance-of-the-evidence burden,

deny confrontation and discovery, and foreclose jury

determination.

Federal law then magnifies those

deprivations. By operation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)

and of 18 U.S.C. § 2265, an unconstitutional State

civil order becomes a nationwide firearms disability

enforceable by felony prosecution and mandatory

interstate recognition. Through the Violence Against

Women Act (VAWA) self-petition provisions, the

same unconstitutional State civil order generates

immigration consequences that impose stigma and

fracture family unity without notice or an

opportunity to be heard by the accused American

citizen.

This civil protection order (CPO) case comes

from the Washington State Supreme Court and

challenges 1) a State statutory regime enacted in

2022—RCW 7.105—that directly conflicts with the

Constitution and federal law; and 2) a federal regime

that violates the Constitution and acts as an

immigration fraud magnet: 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8); 18

U.S.C. § 2265; 8 U.S.C. § U01(a)(51); 8 U.S.C. §

1367. Petitioner—a 48 year-old Certified Public

Accountant (CPA) employed by the military—is a

U.S. citizen, Nevada state-citizen, and Nevada

resident. Petitioner has no criminal record, no

pending charges, no history of domestic violence, and

has paid child support in-full. Petitioner requests the

Court vacate the CPOs and dismiss the case with

prejudice. The Washington State Supreme Court

declined to hear the case. Since there has been no

trial yet, solely “special proceedings” at the superior

court and appellate court, Washington State is

betting that based on the odds of being granted

certiorari, Petitioner will never have a fair trial with

due process for an opportunity to be heard.

This case cleanly presents the constitutional

defect. The restrained party was never charged with

a crime and never waived due process, yet was

subjected to severe and enduring consequences solely

through civil “special proceedings” devoid of due

process. The courts below did not conduct a trial,

apply proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or permit

confrontation of witnesses. Yet the resulting civil

order triggered nationwide and federal disabilities

traditionally associated with punishment.

Petitioner’s challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)

materially differs from the Rahimi case1 this Court

recently heard because^ 1) Rahimi waived due

process, whereas Petitioner never waived due

process! 2) Rahimi did not challenge 18 U.S.C. §

922(g)(8) as a bill of attainder violating U.S. Const,

art. I, § 9, whereas Petitioner does; and 3) on one

hand, Rahimi is a convicted felon, while conversely,

Petitioner—who has no criminal record, no pending

charges, and no history of domestic violence—is

neither dangerous nor irresponsible.

The petition does not ask the Court to correct

a fact-bound error. It asks whether the Constitution

tolerates a system in which punishment may be

imposed in substance while avoided in name, and

whether Congress may rely on such State civil

processes to impose federal sanctions. That question

recurs nationwide and warrants this Court’s review.

Importation and Rapid Spread of “Coercive Control”

from the United Kingdom

“Coercive control” legislation is sweeping

through America—especially on the coasts—enacted

in Washington State as RCW 7.105 in 2022.

Emerging from sociological and psychological

academic literature and originating in a legal context

in the United Kingdom in about 2015, “coercive

control” attempts to draw parallels with kidnapping

1 United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024)

and hostage-taking to describe patterns within

intimate relationships. Unlike physical violence,

coercive control encompasses nonphysical behaviors

such as emotional manipulation, isolation, and

financial control. In Washington State2, New

Jersey3, and Connecticut4, contacting officials

regarding immigration status constitutes domestic

violence under new expanded definitions including

“coercive control”.

A State CPO makes a foreign national seeking

the CPO eligible for a green card under 8 U.S.C. §

1101(a)(51). Petitioner was accused of violating RCW

7.105 by contacting federal immigration officials to

terminate his application for spousal-based green

card5, which is a legally permissible act under

federal immigration law.6 In fact, Petitioner did not

terminate the application; petitioner terminated the

Affidavit of Support for the spousal-based green card,

also a legally permissible act under federal

immigration law.7 Washington State is a “sanctuary

state”. Skagit County is a “sanctuary jurisdiction”.

The Skagit County seat, Mount Vernon, WA, is a

“sanctuary city”. Washington State’s 2022 “coercive

control” laws are integral to Washington State’s

“sanctuary status” regime.

2 RCW 7.105.010(4)(a)

3 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-29(a)(7)

4 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-1(b)(4)(D), 46b-15

5 RCW 7.105.010(4)(a)(i)(E)(IV) “Contact local or federal

agencies based on actual or suspected immigration status”

6 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(6)

7 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(f)(2)

Hawaii8 became the first U.S. state to

explicitly incorporate coercive control into its

domestic abuse statutes in 2020. California9

followed. Colorado10, Maine11, New Jersey12,

Washington State13, Massachusetts14, Connecticut15,

Delaware16, New York17, and Vermont18 have

similarly amended their civil protection order

statutes to include coercive control or coercive

controlling behavior. Hawaii19 is the sole state so far

to criminalize “coercive control” as a misdemeanor,

although Washington State20 attempted to make

“coercive control” a gross misdemeanor, while New

York21 and South Carolina22 attempt to make

“coercive control” felonies. Other states have tried to

add “coercive control” language or interpretive

8 Haw. Rev. Stat. § 586’1

8 Cal. Fam. Code § 6320

io C.R.S. § 13-14-101(2.1)

u Me. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 4102

12 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-29(a)(7)

13 RCW 7.105.010(4)(a)

14 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209A, § 1

15 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-l(b)(4), 46b-15

io 10 DE Code § 1041(1) (2024)

17 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 821, 828, 842-a

18 15 V.S.A. § 1101(l)(B), (2)

19 HRS § 586-1; HRS § 709-906(6)

20WAHB 1449 (2021)

21 NY S5306 (2019); NY S05650 (2021); NY A2707 (2023); NY

S6695 (2023); NY S4079 (2025); NY A679 (2025)

22 SC HB3621 (2021); SC S588 (2025)

standards for civil protective orders, reflecting a

growing but uneven national trend.

Defects of coercive control statutes are

defiance of mandatory US Supreme Court precedents

and subversion of U.S. Const, art. I, § 10 Bill of

Attainder Clause prohibiting passage of a bill of

attainder; U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2, the Supremacy

Clause; 2nd Amendment; 5th Amendment void for

vagueness; 5th Amendment procedural due process;

violations of 6th Amendment Confrontation Clause;

and “sanctuary status” violations of the Equal

Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment by illegally

advancing interests of foreign nationals to qualify for

VAWA self-petition green cards to the detriment of

American citizens’ rights, contra to the Civil Rights

Act of 1964.23 State statute terms such as

“interference” or “control” lack objective boundaries.

Ordinary citizens cannot reasonably predict what

conduct crosses the line from relationship conflict

into legally cognizable abuse. Broadening the

definition of domestic violence to encompass

abstractions invites arbitrary enforcement and

inconsistent judicial application. Unlike traditional

domestic violence claims grounded in physical acts or

threats, coercive control allegations rely heavily on

subjective testimony and retrospective

interpretations of relational dynamics. This

undermines evidentiary reliability and shifts the

burden of proof, particularly in expedited CPO

proceedings without procedural safeguards. In short,

23 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86

(1973)

“coercive control” has no principled limiting

definition, becoming whatever an accuser or court

wishes it to be at the moment of decision. That

indeterminacy invites—and all but ensures—an

unlawful regime in which outcomes are effectively

preordained, accused persons are deprived of due

process, and adjudication devolves into theater. As

example, an RCW 7.105 “special proceeding” “full

hearing” serves not to test evidence or apply law, but

to demonstrate the State’s power to impose a

preferred moral narrative. History offers a familiar

analogue from illiberal and authoritarian regimes^

show trials and repression.

Washington State’s Attempt to Expand Civil

Punishment Through ‘Impaired Driving Protection

Orders”

The Washington State Legislature has made

explicit that the current RCW 7.105 is not an

endpoint, but a template. In 2025, Washington

sought to become the first State in the Nation to

enact an “Impaired Driving Protection Order”

(IDPO), a new civil restraint modeled on the same

structural features as its domestic violence

protection order regime. See H.B. 1426, 68th Leg.,

Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2025).

Under the proposed IDPO regime, a court

could impose severe and immediate restraints—

including loss of parental rights, firearm

prohibitions, mandatory vehicle ignition interlock

devices, alcohol monitoring, and functional bans on

driving—based solely on a civil petition and a

preponderance-of-the-evidence standard at a “special

proceeding”, without any prior interaction between

the respondent and law enforcement. The proposed

statute would authorize these consequences absent a

criminal charge, arrest, or conviction for impaired

driving.

Although framed as a public-safety measure,

the IDPO proposal operates as preemptive

punishment. It authorizes restraints traditionally

imposed only after criminal adjudication and

substitutes civil process stripped of criminal

safeguards. The proposed orders would impose

deprivation of liberty, property, and fundamental

rights through expedited proceedings lacking

adversarial testing, jury trial, and proof beyond a

reasonable doubt.

The IDPO proposal underscores the

constitutional stakes of this petition. If civil

protection orders may constitutionally be used to

impose punishment without criminal process, there

is no principled stopping point. The same mechanism

can be—and is being—extended beyond domestic

assault and domestic battery into wholly new

domains of regulation. Washington State’s effort to

enact IDPOs demonstrates how the civil-punishment

model is expanding outward, untethered from

traditional limits on the State’s punitive authority.

This Court’s intervention is warranted now,

before this model becomes entrenched across

additional areas of law. The Constitution does not

permit States to experiment with punitive civil

regimes in one domain and then replicate them

elsewhere, each time further eroding the procedural

safeguards that historically protected individual

liberty.

The VAWA Self-Petition Scheme

The Violence against Women Act (VAWA) self

petition green card provisions—8 U.S.C. §

1101(a)(51) and 8 U.S.C. § 1367—contain the same

structural due process defect. Petitioner has

standing to assert the VAWA self-petition provisions

are unconstitutional on their face because, “She

[Respondent, who is a Canadian national] stated

that her temporary relocation would allow her to

apply for a visa under VAWA while in Canada.”24

VAWA self-petition green cards invite immigration

fraud by operating to confer “sanctuary status” based

on unadjudicated civil allegations, unjustly

penalizing American citizens. The law mandates a

foreign national is eligible for a VAWA self-petition

green card simply by obtaining a CPO. Congress

created the VAWA self-petition scheme as an

immigration benefit that turns on untested

accusations, bars rebuttal by American citizens, and

knowingly tolerates fraud. The resulting stigma and

family separation constitute tangible legal harm

imposed without adjudication.

Under the law, the federal government

compiles a secret dossier about the accused person,

and the accused person has no right to know or

24 Commissioner’s Ruling Denying Discretionary Review,

Pestarino v. Pestarino, No. 86670-2-1 (Wash. Ct. App. Div. 1

September 27, 2024) (unpublished).

challenge the contents of the dossier, no right to

confront the accuser, and no due process rights for

any kind of hearing prior to green card issuance.

Want a green card, make fraudulent accusations—

members of Congress, GAO, and federal immigration

officials have repeatedly voiced grave concerns about

the VAWA self-petition green card program’s role in

immigration fraud since program inception.25

VAWA creates an irrational and one-sided

system that encourages fraud:

“From fiscal years 2020 to 2024, the overall

number of Form 1-360 VAWA self-petitions

increased by approximately 360% and male self

petitioners increased by 259%... In addition to

25 Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 1999, Hearing

on H.R. 3083 Before the Subcomm, on Immigration and Claims

of the H. Comm, on Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of

Dwayne ‘Duke’ Austin); Battered Immigrant Women Protection

Act of 1999, Hearing on H.R. 3083 Before the Subcomm, on

Immigration and Claims of the H. Comm, on Judiciary, 106th

Cong. (2000) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith); U.S. Gov’t

Accountability Off., GAO-19-676, Immigration Benefits!

Additional Actions Needed to Address Fraud Risks in Program

for Foreign National Victims of Domestic Abuse (2019), at GAO

Highlights; U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-22-105328, U.S.

Citizenship and Immigration Services: Additional Actions

Needed to Manage Fraud Risks (Sep. 19, 2022), at GAO

Highlights; USCIS Restores Integrity to the VAWA Domestic

Abuse Program After Finding Rampant Fraud, U.S. Citizenship

and Immigration Services (Dec. 22, 2025),

https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/alerts/uscis-restores-integrityto-the-vawa-domestic-abuse-progranrafter-finding-rampantfraud (last accessed Dec. 30, 2025).

the increase in male self-petitioners cited

above, we also saw a 2239% increase in parents

submitting VAWA self-petitions from fiscal year

2020 to 2024. These have not traditionally been

populations filing for VAWA.”26

VAWA’s evidentiary framework relies heavily

on self-authored affidavits, prohibits adversarial

testing, and shields allegations from contradiction^

“Persons who have obtained an order of

protection against the abuser or taken other

legal steps to end the abuse are strongly

encouraged to submit copies of the relating

legal documents.” 8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(2)(iv)

“Under this rule, primary evidence of good

moral character is the self-petitioner’s

affidavit.” Petition to Classify Alien as

Immediate Relative of a United States Citizen

or as a Preference Immigrant; Self-Petitioning

for Certain Battered or Abused Spouses and

Children, 61 Fed. Reg. 13061, 13067 (Mar. 26,

1996)

In Washington State, a CPO automatically makes

the recipient eligible for free housing in a domestic

violence shelter,27 so there is not only a welfare

26 https;//www.uscis.gov/newsroom/alerts/uscis-restoresintegrity-to-the-vawa-domestic-abuse-progranrafter-findingrampant-fraud (last accessed Dec. 31, 2025)

27 RCW 70.123.070(2)(a)

profit-motive but also a highly prejudicial, tug-atthe-heart-strings, circular argument of being a CPO

recipient living in a domestic violence shelter, when

they are one-in-the-same—exploiting a gap in the

VAWA self-petition green card program, effectively

doubling the indicia to USCIS in furtherance of

“sanctuary status” conferral:

“Evidence that the abuse victim sought safe

haven in a battered women’s shelter or similar

refuge may be relevant, as may a combination

of documents such as a photograph of the

visibly injured self-petitioner supported by

affidavits.” Petition to Classify Alien as

Immediate Relative of a United States Citizen

or as a Preference Immigrant; Self-Petitioning

for Certain Battered or Abused Spouses and

Children, 61 Fed. Reg. 13061, 13067 (Mar. 26,

1996)

Fabricated abuse claims and foreign nationals

fraudulently entering marriages highlight the

attraction to VAWA self-petition green cards. United

States v. Amankwaa SR, No. i:24-cr-00549,

(S.D.N.Y. Jan 18, 2024) [NY immigration attorney

convicted of fraud scheme using hundreds of VAWA

self-petitions to claim abuse by American-citizen

children of foreign national parents]; United States

v. Hussain, No. 23-CR-00056-03-JL, 2024 WL

5481339 (D. Vt. Oct. 23, 2024) [fraudulent marriage

with fraudulent VAWA self-petition abuse claims];

Matter of Singh, 27 I. & N. Dec. 598 (BIA 2019);

Muratoski v. Holder, 622 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2010).

The fact that a given law or procedure is efficient,

convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of

government, standing alone, will not save it if it is

contrary to the Constitution. INS v. Chadha, 462

U.S. 919, 944 (1983).

VAWA self-petition fraud has become so

widespread that a Houston, TX immigration

advocacy nonprofit, FIEL (Familias Inmigrantes y

Estudiantes en la Lucha) or (Immigrant Families

and Students in the Fight), issued a press advisory

entitled, “PRESS ADVISORY: VAWA FRAUD IN

IMMIGRATION IS WIDESPREAD IN HOUSTON”,

warning of fraud schemes by immigration attorneys

and deportation proceedings for those who

participate in the fraud schemes. One fraud

participant, Sabina Caxaj, stated, “They told us to

basically lie”28, and “It was for domestic violence that

never happened in my home. They just did a

fraudulent case and told us to lie to the law.”29

8 U.S.C. § 1367 is vague and requires

interpretations by the Executive Branch. Misreading

this statute further skews adjudications, excludes

vital evidence, and allows immigration benefits to be

weaponized against U.S. citizens. 8 U.S.C. §

1367(a)(1) prohibits immigration officials from

making an adverse determination of admissibility or

28 https;//www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houstontexas/immigration/article/houston-vawa-immigration-scams20783979.php (last accessed Dec. 31, 2025)

29 https7/www.fox26houston.com/news/attorney-accuseddefrauding-families-false-domestic-violence-relief-application

(last accessed Dec. 31, 2025)

deportability based solely on information provided by

an abuser—such as a spouse, parent, or trafficker—

in certain humanitarian contexts. An untested

accusation does not make someone an “abuser”.

US CIS policies treat any allegation of abuse as

sufficient to trigger 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(1), often

labeling the accused American citizen as a

“prohibited source” and preventing adjudicators from

considering even corroborated evidence provided by

the American citizen. This led to absurd results,

including but not limited to: 1) converting mere

allegations into automatic evidentiary shields; 2)

facilitating fraudulent or exaggerated claims in

VAWA, U’visa, T-visa, and 1'751 waiver cases! and 3)

undermining fairness and due process for U.S.

citizens by creating one-sided proceedings that

silence American citizens. Foreign nationals advance

and preserve immigration benefits without

meaningful examination at the expense of the rights

of U.S. citizens.

VAWA inflicts constitutional injury on

American citizens. Although framed as an

immigration benefit, VAWA necessarily adjudicates

the conduct of U.S. citizens. Those citizens are

labeled abusers in federal records, deprived of family

unity, and exposed to collateral legal consequences.

VAWA’s self-petition provisions abandon due

process, encourage fraud, and injure American

citizens by-design. The Constitution does not permit

purported immigration benefits to be conferred

through secret accusations immune from challenge

that impose punishment on American citizens.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. A “Civil” Misnomer to Impose Punishment By

Circumventing Criminal Safeguards

The Framers added the Bill of Rights to the

Constitution to protect certain individual rights

against government infringement. The Constitution

does not permit the Government to impose

punishment while evading the safeguards that

historically constrained it. From the Founding

onward, deprivations of liberty, arms, and property

required heightened procedural protections.

RCW 7.105 authorizes restraints that are

punitive in both history and effect, yet dispenses

with confrontation, trial, proof beyond a reasonable

doubt, meaningful adversarial testing, and a jury. 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(8); 18 U.S.C. § 2265; 8 U.S.C. §

1101(a)(51); and 8 U.S.C. § 1367 then federalize the

punishment. That combination is constitutionally

intolerable.

The State and the Federal Government meted

out unconstitutional punishment here under a “civil”

label. In a series of unconstitutional actions

involving the current case, the State forcibly

expatriated Petitioner’s native-born American-citizen

Child; the State permanently separated Petitioner

from his Child; the State and Federal Government

took Petitioner’s Second Amendment rights

throughout America; the State conferred sanctuary

status to a foreign national at the expense of

Petitioner and Petitioner’s Child; the State and

Federal Government restricted Petitioner’s freedom

of movement; the Federal Government forced

Petitioner into military administrative processes to

defend his security clearance, job, and pension! and

the existence of CPOs compels Petitioner to disclose

CPOs on any future employment applications for the

rest of Petitioner’s employable years as if Petitioner

was a felon. Petitioner would have had more due

process rights in a business contracts lawsuit or a

torts lawsuit than in this CPO case.

II. RCW 7.105 Firearm Prohibitions Violate the

Second Amendment

RCW 7.105: 1) pre-dates the New York State

Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022)

decision! 2) expressly employs illegal interest

balancing gun-control measures foreclosed by Bruen!

and 3) declares in its statutory text that

constitutional rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights

are abridged.30

Petitioner is a person with Second

Amendment rights per District of Columbia v.

Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). RCW 7.105 categorically

prohibits firearm possession, thereby burdening

conduct protected by the Second Amendment. Under

30 RCW 7.105.200(4)(a), “The extent to which a defendant's

Fifth Amendment rights are or are not implicated, given the

special nature of protection order proceedings, which burden a

defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege substantially less than

do other civil proceedings”

this Court’s precedents, once the Second

Amendment’s plain text covers the regulated

conduct, the burden shifts to the State to

demonstrate consistency with the Nation’s historical

tradition of firearm regulation.

Washington State cannot meet that burden.

Although some historical regulations addressed

dangerousness, there is no historical analogue to

Washington State’s imposition of firearm

prohibitions through non-adversarial civil

proceedings devoid of due process safeguards.

History matters not only as to whether firearms were

regulated, but how. RCW 7.105’s procedures are

unknown to the Founding tradition and therefore fail

constitutional scrutiny.

Policy arguments and interest balancing are

irrelevant. With proclamations such as “[v]ictims are

in the best position to know what their safety needs

are and should be able to seek these crucial

protections without having to rely on the criminal

legal system process”, Washington State’s “public

health” gun-control approach31 would be anathema

to Framers who focused on preserving individual

rights. History controls, and Washington State

cannot meet that burden.

In defiance of McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill,

561 U.S. 742, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 177 L. Ed. 2D 894

(2010), RCW 7.105 disarms by prohibiting due

process. Washington State courts issue and renew

orders for firearm prohibitions based on written

allegations, affidavits, and hearsay—without live

31 RCW 7.105.900(4)

testimony, without cross-examination, without

discovery32, without the rules of evidence33, and

without meaningful credibility testing. Per Bruen,

courts are required to consult history to determine

the scope of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation

Clause. Where credibility is decisive, the statute

permits findings to be made on paper alone.34 There

is no Founding Era analogue for that regime.

At America’s Founding, firearm restrictions—

rare as they were—required due process. Historical

mechanisms sometimes invoked by States, such as

surety laws, do not resemble RCW 7.105. With no

criminal record and no pending charges, Petitioner

could not have been found an affrayer, rioter,

disturber, or breaker of the peace, so violation of

surety laws would not involve firearm disarmament

as RCW 7.105 does. Moreover, Petitioner could not

have been found to be disaffected, since as a member

of the Armed Forces and as a current federal

employee of the military, Petitioner took the Oaths of

32 Per RCW 7.105.200(7), the rules of discovery do not apply,

and discovery can only occur if specifically authorized by the

court.

33 Per RCW 7.105.200(8), “The rules of evidence need not be

applied, other than with respect to privileges, the requirements

of the rape shield statute under RCW 9A.44.020, and evidence

rules 412 and 413.” ER 413 renders evidence of the immigration

status of criminal defendants, civil plaintiffs, and witnesses

presumptively inadmissible at trial. So Respondent can accuse

Petitioner of immigration “coercive control”, but Petitioner’s

testimony is apparently inadmissible per the ER 413

mechanism.

34 RCW 7.105.200(5)

Enlistment and of Office to bear true faith and

allegiance to the Constitution.

RCW 7.105 departs from the Nation’s

traditions in two constitutionally fatal ways. First, it

replaces adversarial testing with judicial discretion

exercised on hearsay and written submissions

without a trial. Second, it rests on indeterminate,

foreign concepts imported from modern-day United

Kingdom—such as “coercive control”—that have no

American historical pedigree and no fixed

evidentiary elements. Together, those features

permit firearm deprivation without the procedural

safeguards historically required for comparable

restraints. Importing indeterminate, foreign concepts

from modern-day United Kingdom highlights the

differences between America’s constitutional system

versus British common law system. Over the last 250

years since America’s independence, British common

law changed. Modern-day UK “coercive control”

changes cannot be adopted in America due to our

Constitution’s prohibitions. That mismatch is

decisive under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v.

Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022). States must identify a

historical tradition that not only permitted

disarmament but did so through comparable

procedures, yet Washington State refused to even

attempt to address traditions as required by New

York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct.

2111 (2022).

The absence of adversarial testing is not a

minor procedural flaw. It is central to constitutional

analysis. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v.

Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) looks to how firearm

regulations were imposed, not merely to whether

some restriction existed in the abstract. A statute

that authorizes disarmament through procedures

unknown to the Founding Generation cannot be

justified by history. RCW 7.105 is unconstitutional.

III. RCW 7.105 Displaces Federal Immigration Law,

Defying Supremacy Clause

The superior court issued the CPO with the

finding that Petitioner violated RCW 7.105 by

contacting federal immigration officials to terminate

his 1-864 Affidavit of Support for his spousal’based

green card application regarding Respondent35, a

legally permissible act under federal immigration

law.36

The Supremacy Clause states that federal law

“shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the

Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any

Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the

Contrary notwithstanding.”37 Under this principle,

Congress has the power to pre-empt state law.38

State law must also yield to federal law if Congress

exclusively regulates the field, or when state laws

conflict with federal law.39 This includes cases where

“compliance with both federal and state regulations

35 RCW 7.105.010(4)(a)(i)(E)(IV) “Contact local or federal

agencies based on actual or suspected immigration status”

36 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(f)(2)

37 U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2

38 Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372

(2000)

39 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012)

is a physical impossibility,”40 and those instances

where the challenged state law “stands as an

obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the

full purposes and objectives of Congress”.41 As this

Court has stated, the Supremacy Clause “prohibit[s]

States from interfering with or controlling the

operations of the Federal Government.”42

8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(f)(2) expressly vested

Petitioner with the right to withdraw his F864

Affidavit of Support at any time prior to the

adjudication of Respondent’s adjustment application.

The regulation states, “In an adjustment of status

case, once the sponsor, substitute sponsor, joint

sponsor, household member, or intending immigrant

has presented a signed affidavit of support and any

required attachments to an immigration officer or

immigration judge, the sponsor...may disavow his or

her agreement to act as sponsor...if he or she does so

in writing and submits the document to the

immigration officer or immigration judge before the

decision on the adjustment application.”

The superior court issued the CPO due to

Petitioner correctly following 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(f)(2)

in violation of RCW 7.105. On appeal, Respondent

conceded that no immigration “coercive control”

violation of RCW 7.105.010(4)(a)(i)(E)(IV) occurred,

yet the appellate court omits the opposition’s case40 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,

142-143 (1963)

41 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)

42 United States v. Washington, 142 S. Ct. 1976, 1984 (2022);

see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 400

(1819); Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398-400 (2012).

ending admission in their opinion.43 On appeal, the

Washington State Court of Appeals affirmed while

relying on untested hearsay44 and altering the

asserted basis for the order to preserve RCW 7.105 at

all costs by side-stepping Supremacy Clause

unconstitutionality. The appellate court switched the

basis of the CPO to domestic violence, yet the

appellate court’s own order states that law

enforcement determined no domestic violence

occurred. No objective evidence exists to support the

conclusion of domestic violence. There was not even a

purported eyewitness. Petitioner has never been

charged with domestic violence, yet the Washington

State Supreme Court denied review. The Federal

Government is supreme in the field of immigration,

per Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399

(2012); the Washington State Legislature passed

RCW 7.105 in defiance of the Supremacy Clause! and

RCW 7.105 is unconstitutional.

43 Respondent's Appellate Brief, Page 22, “But let’s assume that

the trial court erred by finding there was coercive control.

Fine.”

44 Doula not present at the purported date/time/location of an

alleged event; doula submitted a hearsay affidavit parroting

Respondent’s text message to doula. Appellate court treated

doula as a new source. A doula is a person employed to provide

guidance and support to a pregnant woman during labor. A

doula is not a medical provider, per RCW 18.47.010(2). In

Washington State, a doula is a non-medical support person for

which no license is required, per RCW 18.47.040(1). The doula

never did a doula’s job due to Child’s birth taking place in a

hospital in an emergency surgery.

IV. The Challenged Statutes are Bills of Attainder

RCW 7.105 and the federal CPO regime are

illegal bills of attainder, illegal instruments for

nationwide gun control measures, illegal

contrivances for fraudulent changes to immigration

status, and illegal prohibitions on freedom of

movement—through an asserted expansion of Full

Faith and Credit. Those consequences fall not on

convicted criminals, but on citizens who have never

been charged with—much less found guilty of—any

crime.

The Bill of Attainder Clauses (U.S. Const, art.

I, § 9 and U.S. Const, art. I, § 10) were adopted

against the backdrop of British parliamentary

practice, where acts were often justified as necessary

for public safety or administrative efficiency, yet they

dispensed with adjudication and foreclosed defense.

Bills of attainder in early American history often

inflicted civil disabilities, reputational

condemnation, or loss of rights without formal

criminal conviction. The Framers viewed that

practice as fundamentally incompatible with liberty.

By prohibiting bills of attainder, they barred

Congress (in U.S. Const, art. I, § 9) and States (in

U.S. Const, art. I, § 10) from legislatively

determining guilt, imposing stigma, or disabling

rights, even when punishment took noncriminal

forms. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,

468-69 (1977).

The Bill of Attainder Clauses were intended

not as a narrow technical prohibition, but rather as

implementation of separation of powers, a general

safeguard against legislative exercise of judicial

function or, more simply, trial by legislature. United

States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 85 S. Ct. 1707, 14 L.

Ed. 2d 484 (1965); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433

U.S. 425, 468 (1977). The Bill of Attainder Clauses

admit of no balancing and no exceptions. They are an

absolute structural limit on legislative power.

Separation of powers was not instituted with the

idea that it would promote governmental efficiency,

but was looked to as bulwark against tyranny.

United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 85 S. Ct. 1707,

14 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1965).

A bill of attainder is a legislative act that

targets an identifiable class, inflicts punishment, and

does so without a judicial trial. The challenged

statues identify a defined class—persons subject to

civil protection orders—imposes severe and lasting

disabilities; and do so through proceedings that

withhold the safeguards of a judicial trial. By

converting State CPOs into federal disabilities,

Congress has nationalized a regime of status-based

punishment without judicial adjudication.

A. RCW 7.105

The Washington State Legislature defied, this

Court by passing RCW 7.105 after this Court already

twice found unconstitutional Washington State’s use

of hearsay, where one case was specifically regarding

Washington State CPOs.45 Crawford v. Washington,

541 U.S. 36 (2004); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S.

813 (2006)

An RCW 7.105 “special proceeding” is not a

trial, and a "’[f]ull hearing’ means a hearing where

45 RCW 7.105.200(8) “The rules of evidence need not be applied”

of which Washington State ER Title 8 is Hearsay

the court determines whether to issue a full

protection order.’”46 The statute itself states that

accused persons’ 5th Amendment rights are

abridged47 in the interest of speed so the accuser can

get satisfaction.48 A jury is not allowed; a “special

proceeding” is conducted by a commissioner or judge.

There are no rights to confront an accuser, to call

witnesses, to cross-examination,49 to discovery.50

Hearsay is expressly allowed, and a defense of

violation of the rules of evidence is disallowed.51 The

judicial standard is preponderance of the evidence.52

Accused persons are subject to no-warrant arrest

provisions of RCW 7.105.450(2) and RCW

10.31.100(2)(a). CPO renewals are automatic, as it is

accused persons’ burden to prove innocence.53 Among

multiple Constitutional violations, RCW 7.105

violates U.S. Const, art. I, § 10 Bill of Attainder

Clause since it imposes punishment targeting

46 RCW 7.105.010(17)

47 RCW 7.105.200(4)(a), “The extent to which a defendant's

Fifth Amendment rights are or are not implicated, given the

special nature of protection order proceedings, which burden a

defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege substantially less than

do other civil proceedings”

48 RCW 7.105.200(5) “the purpose of this chapter to provide

victims quick and effective relief.”

49 RCW 7.105.200(5)

50 RCW 7.105.200(7)

51 RCW 7.105.200(8) “The rules of evidence need not be applied”

of which Washington State ER Title 8 is Hearsay

52 RCW 7.105.225(l)(a)

53 RCW 7.105.405(4)(a)

specific individuals and identifiable groups in a

manner that bypasses judicial protections.54

In Petitioner’s renewal “special proceeding”

“full hearing”, Petitioner contested jurisdiction and

inquired directly twice for the superior court to

articulate the basis for jurisdiction. The superior

court twice refused to articulate the basis for

jurisdiction. The superior court ruled that Petitioner

had not fulfilled his requirement to prove his

innocence under RCW 7.105.405(4)(a), and the

superior court issued a 5-year CPO renewal to the

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in

Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada—where

Respondent and Child reside as result of superior

court’s April 2024 forcible expatriation order of

Child—for enforcement upon Petitioner in Nevada.

There is no way to mount an effective defense under

RCW 7.105, the result of a “special proceeding” “full

hearing” is a forgone conclusion, RCW 7.105 exceeds

the limits of Washington State’s actual jurisdiction—

resulting in issuance of a renewal CPO to a foreign

country for enforcement back in America through

cross-border agreements. Petitioner is precluded

from entering Canada due to the CPO, Petitioner

must keep a distance from Child due to CPO, and

therefore, Petitioner is permanently separated from

Child until the CPOs are vacated as

unconstitutional.

54 Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425

(1977)

B. Federalization of Defective State Orders

i. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)

18 U.S.C. § Section 922(g)(8) criminalizes

firearm possession based solely on the existence of a

qualifying civil protection order. It requires no

federal finding of guilt, no adjudication of

dangerousness, and no independent procedural

safeguards. Instead, it presumes the validity of state

civil orders regardless of the procedures by which

they were issued.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) targets a discrete,

identifiable class. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) applies only

to persons subject to a qualifying domestic-violence

restraining order. That class is defined with

precision: individuals restrained by civil orders

entered upon a showing far short of criminal guilt,

often issued ex parte, under varying state standards,

and without any requirement for due process

safeguards. This is not a general law regulating

conduct. It singles out a closed class defined by a

status and imposes a federal disability based solely

on that status. That is the paradigmatic structure of

an attainder.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) imposes punishment

within the meaning of Article I. 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(2)

states those who violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) shall

be fined as provided in Title 18, imprisoned not more

than 10 years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) foregoes due process. A

bill of attainder substitutes legislative judgment for

due process, and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) does exactly

that. 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8)(A) does not care whether

CPOs were issued with due process and provides no

recourse. Petitioner is prime example that there is no

recourse. Petitioner requested federal injunction in

US District Court in Nevada where Petitioner is

state-citizen to stop the unconstitutional renewal

CPO, yet the judge ruled that domestic violence is a

State issue.55 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) authorizes

Congress to predetermine that all persons subject to

certain civil orders are categorically unfit to exercise

a fundamental constitutional right—and criminally

punishable for doing so—without any federal

adjudication of guilt, mens rea, or individualized

finding of dangerousness, while prohibiting any due

process for the mechanical dispensation of

punishment.

Although CPOs are entered by courts, they are

not criminal trials. In Washington state, CPO

“special proceedings” lack the Sixth Amendment’s

guarantees of confrontation, compulsory process, jury

trial, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(8) leverages these procedurally deficient

civil proceedings to impose a federal criminal

disability, thereby accomplishing legislatively what

the Constitution forbids Congress from doing

directly. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) converts untested civil

allegations into automatic federal punishment.

The 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) mechanism reports

all CPOs, including CPOs that were never envisioned

when 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) became law in 1994, to

55 Pestarino v. Pestarino, No. 3:25-CV-00082-MMD-CLB, 2025

WL 1224718 (D. Nev. Apr. 27, 2025)

the National Crime Information Center (NCIC)

administered by the FBI. NCIC information is used

adversely in federal personnel actions. Due to the

NCIC mechanism, military servicemembers are

being involuntarily discharged because they cannot

possess or control firearms, and law enforcement

officers lose their jobs. Due to the NCIC mechanism,

there are people like Petitioner who have security

clearances at risk, which if revoked, involves job loss

and loss of pension.

In sum, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) identifies a

discrete class, imposes felony criminal liability as

punishment, and does so without any due process.

Per Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433

U.S. 425 (1977) and U.S. Const, art. I, § 9, it is an

unconstitutional bill of attainder.

ii. 18 U.S.C. § 2265

18 U.S.C. § 2265 compels nationwide

enforcement of protection orders, transforming the

least protective State procedures into the national

baseline. Functionally, the statute does not merely

facilitate interstate comity. States are required to

enforce foreign orders even when those orders were

issued without the safeguards required locally,

thereby exporting constitutional defects across

jurisdictions.

18 U.S.C. § 2265 applies only to persons

subject to a qualifying domestic-violence restraining

order—a discrete, identifiable class. Legislative

purpose confirms punishment. 18 U.S.C. § 2265 was

enacted as part of a broader effort to punish

individuals accused—but not convicted—of domestic

violence. The law’s structure reflects a judgment that

members of the covered class are presumptively

dangerous and must be subjected to continuing

restraint, regardless of subversion by States, such as

Washington State’s “coercive control”, IDPO

expansion, and issue-CPO-to-confer-sanctuarystatus

regime. That is punitive.

18 U.S.C. § 2265 requires States to give full

faith and credit to protection orders issued by other

jurisdictions—even when those orders were entered

under laws and procedures that violate the

Constitution. 18 U.S.C. § 2265 dispenses with

longstanding affirmative defenses to enforcement of

foreign orders—fraud, lack of jurisdiction, and lack of

due process. 18 U.S.C. § 2265 nevertheless mandates

enforcement of ex parte orders, orders lacking

jurisdiction, and orders entered without notice or

meaningful hearing, even when enforcement results

in criminal liability. Constitutional rights cannot

depend on the least protective procedures among the

Fifty States and the Territories. Yet, 18 U.S.C. §

2265 proscribes due process and mandatorily

nationalizes the consequences of the most

procedurally deficient protection orders. Per Nixon v.

Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425

(1977) and U.S. Const, art. I, § 9, it is an

unconstitutional bill of attainder.

iii. The VAWA Self-Petition Scheme: 8 U.S.C. §

1101(a)(51) and 8 U.S.C. § 1367

VAWA’s self-petition provisions further

illustrate the same structural defects as bills of

attainder. The statutes confer immigration benefits

based on unadjudicated allegations of abuse, while

simultaneously denying the accused U.S. citizen

notice, participation, or opportunity to contest the

accusations. The result is the legislative imposition

of reputational stigma based solely on executive

acceptance of allegations rather than judicial

determination of wrongdoing.

The first element of a bill of attainder—

specification of the affected persons—is satisfied

because the statutory scheme targets a clearly

identifiable class of individuals. Under 8 U.S.C.

§1101(a)(51), a “self-petitioner” is defined as an alien

who claims to have been subjected to battery or

extreme cruelty by a U.S. citizen or lawful

permanent resident spouse, parent, or child. This

definition inherently identifies another party: the

alleged abuser. When past activity serves as point of

reference for ascertainment of particular persons

ineluctably designated by legislature for

punishment, a legislative act may be a bill of

attainder. Selective Serv. Sys. V. Minnesota Pub. Int.

Rsch. Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 104 S. Ct. 3348, 82 L. Ed.

2d 632 (1984). VAWA meets that standard. Here, the

class is plainly defined: U.S. citizens or lawful

permanent residents accused by self-petitioners of

battery or extreme cruelty.

The second element—punishment under the

bill of attainder doctrine—is not limited to

imprisonment or fines; it can include legislative

actions that impose stigmatizing consequences,

deprivation of rights, or other burdens historically

associated with punitive legislative acts. United

States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 85 S. Ct. 1707, 14 L.

Ed. 2d 484 (1965); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S.

277, 18 L. Ed. 356 (1866). This Court has recognized

that punishment may consist of the infliction of

stigma, the deprivation of legal protections, or the

imposition of disabilities based on legislative findings

of wrongdoing. Nixon v. Administrator of General

Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977).

Under the VAWA self-petition framework,

immigration benefits are granted to the self

petitioner once immigration authorities accept the

abuse allegations as credible. The U.S. citizen,

however, is never given notice that the allegations

have been made, never informed that the

government has relied on them, and never provided

any opportunity to challenge them. 8 U.S.C. §1367

provides this secrecy, prohibiting disclosure of

information relating to VAWA self-petitions. While

intended to protect self-petitioners, the provision also

ensures that the accused U.S. citizen remains

unaware of the allegations being used as the basis

for immigration benefits. The consequences for the

accused U.S. citizen are substantial. The statutory

framework allows the federal government to formally

recognize a relationship as abusive and to grant

immigration benefits based on that determination.

This classification carries a significant reputational

stigma, effectively branding the U.S. citizen as a

perpetrator of domestic abuse in the context of an

official self-petition green card decision, exposing the

U.S. citizen to collateral legal consequences. The U.S.

citizen’s familial interests—traditionally recognized

as among the most fundamental rights protected by

constitutional law—may therefore be impaired

through a process in which the citizen had no voice.

Nor can the government deny the punitive

character of the VAWA self-petition scheme by

labeling it a “benefit” to the self-petitioner. This

Court has rejected formalism in bill-of-attainder

analysis. What matters is effect, not label. Nixon v.

Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977). When

the conferral of a benefit to one party necessarily

depends on a legislative determination of misconduct

by another — and when that determination inflicts

stigma and legal harm — the statute functions as

punishment.

The third element—absence of due process—

is central to the constitutional problem. In the

VAWA self-petition process, the determination of

abuse occurs entirely within the executive

immigration system. Immigration officers assess the

credibility of the self-petitioner’s allegations and

supporting evidence, but the accused U.S. citizen is

not a party to the proceeding and has no procedural

rights within it. The process therefore lacks the core

due process safeguards that characterize judicial

adjudication^ notice, confrontation of evidence, the

opportunity to present a defense, and a neutral

adjudicator hearing both sides of the dispute. The

secrecy provisions of 8 U.S.C. §1367 further entrench

this defect. By preventing disclosure of the existence

or contents of the petition, the statute forecloses any

meaningful opportunity for the accused U.S. citizen

to challenge the allegations in any forum. Even if the

citizen later becomes aware of the allegations

through collateral means, the immigration

determination has already been made without the

U.S. citizen’s participation. In effect, Congress has

created a mechanism through which the Federal

Government may adopt and rely upon abuse

allegations while systematically excluding the

accused party from the adjudicative process. Even in

immigration, due process applies when government

action inflicts concrete injury. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533

U.S. 678, 695 (2001). When the government

combines stigma with tangible legal harm, due

process is required. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400

U.S. 433, 437 (1971). Even the plenary power over

immigration does not authorize Congress to punish

U.S. citizens by legislative fiat.

The substitution of legislative or

administrative condemnation for judicial

determination of guilt and the imposition of punitive

consequences based on unilateral accusations

undermine the separation of powers and threaten

individual liberty. While the statutes are framed as

protective measures for self-petitioners, their

structural operation places the accused U.S. citizens

outside of any due process safeguards. Just as

Respondent has argued that the existence of

fraudulently-obtained, sanctuary-status CPOs are

undisputable evidence of abuse, Respondent can

leverage a VAWA self-petition green card to further

fraudulently advance her interests, claiming

validation by the Federal Government when, in-fact

Respondent’s fraudulent claims would remain

untested. The Constitution’s prohibition on bills of

attainder exists precisely to prevent such legislative

determinations of wrongdoing, and the VAWA self

petition scheme of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(51) and 8

U.S.C. § 1367 is unconstitutional.

CONCLUSION

The Constitution does not permit States to

impose punishment while evading due process

safeguards, nor does it permit Congress to

nationalize such defective State processes through

bills of attainder. This case presents the

constitutional questions cleanly. The restrained

party was never charged with a crime, never waived

due process, and was subjected to severe and

enduring consequences solely through civil “special

proceedings” devoid of due process. The issue recurs

nationwide, the issue is a growing challenge, and

lower courts are divided or silent on its resolution.

This Court’s intervention is necessary.

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted.

BART PESTARINO

PRO SE PETITIONER

MARCH 2026

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Appendix A — State supreme court

denial of review (Oct. 8, 2025)................................... la

Appendix B — Court of appeals opinion

(Apr. 21, 2025).............................................................. 3a

Appendix C — Superior court order

(March 15, 2024).......................................................... 18a

Appendix D — Constitutional and statutory

provisions....................................................................... 35a

U.S. Const, amend. II................................................... 35a

U.S. Const, amend. V................................................... 35a

U.S. Const, amend. VI..................................................35a

U.S. Const, amend. XIV............................................... 36a

U.S. Const, art. I, § 9.................................................... 37a

U.S. Const, art. I, § 10..................................................38a

U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2............................................... 38a

8U.S.C. § 1101(a)(51)..................................................38a

8U.S.C. § 1367..........................................

39a

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)................................................... 44a

18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2)................................................... 45a

8 U.S.C. § 2265............................................................... 45a

42 U.S.C. § 2000d.......................................................... 46a

8 CFR 103.2(b)(6)......................................................... 47a

8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(2)(iv)................................................ 47a

8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(f)(2)..................................................48a

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.