Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Nicholas Roddy Ramlow, Petitioner v. Amanda Marie Mitchell

Supreme Court briefApr 26, 2025

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Appendix A—Idaho Supreme Court Order In Re:

Emergency Reduction In Court Services And

Limitation Of Access To Court Facilities (April 22,

2020)

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

In Re: Emergency Reduction)

In Court Services And

)

ORDER

Limitation Of Access To

)

April 22, 2020

Court Facilities

)

_____________________________ )

For public safety and to mitigate the spread of the

COVID-19 virus, and pursuant to Idaho Court

Administrative Rule 48, all State of Idaho court proceedings

and facilities shall operate as follows until further order of

this Court:

1. The minimum operating personnel for each court facility

shall include at least one front desk deputy clerk and one

courthouse security officer limiting access to court facilities.

If any non-court staff appears in-person for a hearing, at

least one additional court security officer in the courtroom is

required.

2. No jury trials shall commence, nor shall a juror be

required to appear, in a criminal case before August 3, 2020,

and in a civil case before October 5, 2020. This order

suspending jury trials shall be deemed good cause to deny a

motion to dismiss a criminal case based upon the time

requirements set forth in section 19-3501, Idaho code. See

Idaho criminal Rule 28. The postponement of criminal jury

trials required by this order shall be considered among the

other factors listed under Idaho Criminal Rule 46 in

determining the amount of bail and for purposes of

determining eligibility for pretrial release.

3. All trials on a petition to terminate parental rights and

felony sentencing hearings in which the possible penalty

includes a life sentence shall be held in person, subject to the

safety protocols identified in paragraph 7 of this order.

4. All other court proceedings are presumptively to be held

remotely, i.e. with all participants utilizing remote

technologies

including

teleconferencing

and

video

conferencing, and are subject to the following conditions and

requirements:

a. Court rules which prohibit hearing any case or

part thereof remotely are suspended during the

effective term of this order.

b. Any party intending to offer documentary

evidence

during a hearing held remotely will

provide the court and all parties a list of such exhibits and

copies thereof at least seventy- two (72) hours before

such hearing unless the assigned judge modifies the

time for good cause shown.

c. For all court proceedings, an audio recording

must be created in For The Record

(FTR) software or in

Zoom software. For all court proceedings in district

court, the official record must be kept by a court

reporter in addition to the audio recording. With the

permission of the assigned judge, a court reporter may

report proceedings remotely.

d. An assigned judge has the discretion to enter

other orders or impose other requirements to

promote the safety of participants, to promote

efficiency, and to protect the integrity of the remote

proceeding.

5. A presiding judge may, in the exercise of discretion and

after making findings on the record, determine that a

proceeding must be held in person because of the court’s

needs or to prevent undue prejudice to a party. In such a

case, the assigned judge may postpone the hearing of the

matter or allow an in-person hearing to the extent necessary

to enable the court to consider the matter.

6. Access by the public to court proceedings may be

requested, but will be permitted at the discretion of the

presiding judge.

7. while in a courthouse, any person attending or

participating in a court proceeding or doing court business

must:

a. wear a mask covering their nose and mouth;

b. maintain an appropriate social distance of at least

six (6) feet from all persons nor living in their

household;

c. comply with all court orders restricting the

number of persons that may gather together.

8. The Administrative District Judge is responsible for

ensuring adequate measures are in place so that while in a

courthouse all persons participating in a court proceeding or

doing court business:

a. have easy access to sanitation stations where

hand sanitizer, breach wipes, or handwashing is

available; and

b. can maintain appropriate social distance of at

least six (6) feet from any persons not living in their

household.

9. The Administrative District Judge has the discretion to

impose restrictions and limitations on the manner in which

courthouses and courtrooms are used, including restrictions

and limitations on in-person proceedings.

10. Existing grand jury panels may be extended at the

discretion of the court that summoned the grand jury.

11. The 21-day preliminary hearing requirement for out-ofcustody defendants under Idaho Criminal Rule 5.1 is waived

during the effective dates of this Order.

12. No judge shall be disqualified without cause from any

proceeding pursuant to Idaho criminal Rule 25(a), Idaho

Rule of civil procedure 40(a), and Idaho Rule of Family Law

Procedure 107 during the effective term of this order. When

this order is lifted, these disqualification rules will only

operate prospectively and may not be exercised

retrospectively in any existing case.

13. Signage shall be posted at all public entry points advising

individuals not to enter courtrooms or approach court

services offices if they:

a. have been asked to self-isolate by any doctor,

hospital, or health agency;

b. have been required to self-isolate because of

travel

outside the State of Idaho;

c. have been diagnosed with, but have not yet

recovered from, COVID-19; or

d. are experiencing any signs or symptoms of

illness including: fever, cough, shortness of breath

difficulty breathing, chills, repeated

shaking with

chills, muscle pain, headache, or new loss of taste or

smell;

e. are not wearing a mask covering their nose

and mouth.

14. Individuals who, in violation of these protocols, approach

a court services office or enter a courthouse or other venue

where court is being held in violation of these protocols shall

be denied access by anyone designated for courthouse

security by the Administrative District Judge. Any violation

of this order may be dealt with through contempt

proceedings set forth in Idaho Rule of civil procedure 75. Any

violation witnessed by a judge may be addressed through

summary contempt proceedings set forth in Rule 75(b).

15. Individuals with legitimate court business who are

prohibited from accessing court facilities for the reasons set

forth in paragraph 13 are advised to stay home and call the

local court clerk. Elected court clerks are urged to appoint

one (or more as necessary) point persons to process requests

for continuances, notify any presiding judge and involved

attorneys, and facilitate the filing of necessary documents

through e-firing or drop box processes.

This Order will take effect at 12:01 am on May 1, 2020 and,

at that time, supersede this Court's order of April 21,2020.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 22nd day of April, 2020.

Roger Burdick,

Chief Justice, Idaho Supreme Court

Appendix B—Temporary Ex Parte Protection Order

(October 22,2020); CV28-20-6569

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL

DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR

KOOTENAI COUNTY

Case No. CV28-20-6569

Amanda Mitchell,

Petitioner

Nicholas Ramlow,

Respondent.

PROTECTION ORDER

[X] Temporary Ex Parte Order and Notice of Hearing

[X] Stalking and/or Threats (I.C. § 18-7907)

Protected Person(s): [X] Petitioner; [X] Minor family

member(s): Cameron Mitchell

Respondent: Nicholas R. Ramlow

Respondent’s Address: 977 Foys Lake Rd. Kalispell, MT

59901.

Relationship to Protected Person(s): [X] child in

common; [X] have been in a dating relationship.

This order shall be effective until NOV 5, 2020 at

11:59 P.M./unless terminated earlier by another court

order. If the Respondent does not appear at the hearing

date listed on the last page of this order, a longer protection

order may be issued against the Respondent. If the

Petitioner fails to appear, the petition may be dismissed.

WARNINGS: This order meets all “full faith and credit”

requirements of the VAWA, 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994) upon

notice of the Respondent. This court has jurisdiction over

the parties and the subject matter; the Respondent has

been or will be afforded notice and a timely opportunity to

be heard as provided by the laws of this jurisdiction. This

order is valid and entitled to enforcement in each

jurisdiction throughout the 50 states of the United States,

the District of Columbia, all tribal lands, and all U.S.

territories, commonwealths, and possessions and shall be

enforced as if it were an order of that jurisdiction.

As a result of this order, it may be unlawful for the

Respondent to purchase or possess a firearm, including a

rifle, pistol, or revolver, or ammunition pursuant to federal

law under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). If you have any questions

whether these laws make it illegal for the Respondent to

possess or purchase a firearm, you should consult an

attorney.

Violation of any provision of this order by the

Respondent, after actual notice of its terms, is a

misdemeanor and may result in arrest and sentencing for

up to one year in jail and a $5,000 fine, even if the

Protected Person(s) consents to the violation. Only the

Court can change this order.

THE COURT ORDERS:

Personal Conduct Order. The Respondent shall

not contact or attempt to contact the protected person(s) in

any manner, including in person or through another

person, or in writing or through any electronic means,

including telephone, email, text, through social networking,

or facsimile. The Respondent shall not harass; stalk;

threaten; use, attempt to use or threaten use of physical

force; or engage in any other conduct that would place the

protected person(s) in reasonable fear of bodily injury.

However, the Respondent may participate in legal

proceedings involving the protected person(s) and may

communicate through attorneys about legal issues

involving the protected person(s).

PROTECTED PERSON(S) LISTED ON THE FIRST

PAGE OF THIS ORDER: [X] Petitioner; [X] Minor family

members.

[X] THERE ARE NO EXCEPTIONS TO THIS ORDER.

Stav-Awav Order. Respondent shall not, EVEN IF

INVITED BY THE PROTECTED PERSON(S),

knowingly remain within 1000 feet of the Protected

Person(s), or [X] go within 1000 feet of: [X] Protected

Person’s residence at 2163 W. John Loop 207 CDA 83814;

[X] Other: 3063 W. Augustin Dr. CDA ID.

Move-out Order and/or Law enforcement

assistance. [XI Does not Apply

Child custody. [X] Does not Apply (as to protected

child, however...); [X] Other: As to child covered by CV2016-2923, Protected person may use 3rd party for custody

exchanges and Respondent shall not deny exchanges based

on use of 3rd party.

Conflicting Orders. If any term of another civil or

criminal order conflicts with any term of this order you

must follow the more restrictive term. Dismissal of any

other order will not result in a dismissal of this order.

Other. Respondent SHALL NOT track, either

electronically or by device, the Petitioner in any way.

Order to clerk. It is further ordered that the clerk

of the court shall forward a copy of this order to the

Sheriff s Office in the county in which this order was

originally issued for immediate entry into record systems

and to facilitate service in the jurisdiction in which the

Respondent resides, if not previously served. The clerk

shall deliver or mail a copy of this order to the Petitioner.

NOTICE OF HEARING

A hearing to decide whether a longer Protection

Order will be issued will be held:

Date: November 4, 2020

Time: 9:00 a.m.

Before Judge Ross Pittman at the Kootenai County

Courthouse, 324 W. Garden Coeur d’Alene, Idaho.

WARNING: If the respondent does not appear at the

hearing, a longer protection order may be issued against

the respondent. If the petitioner fails to appear, the

petition may be dismissed

Date: 10/22/2020

Signed: Clark A. Peterson

Judge

NOTICE: It is a misdemeanor under Idaho Code § 39-6312

for the Respondent, after notice of this order, to violate the

provisions of this order. Further, it is a crime under Idaho

Code § 18-204 for any person to aid and abet a crime, or, not

being present, to advise and encourage a crime. In addition,

under Idaho Code § 18-304, any person who counsels, aids,

solicits or incites another to commit a misdemeanor is guilty

of a misdemeanor. Therefore, it may be a crime for any

person to encourage or invite contact between the

Respondent and the Petitioner, except such contact as is

expressly permitted by the above order.

I have received a copy of this order and agree to future

service be certified mail.

Signed: Amanda Mitchell

Petitioner

Date: 10/22/2020

ATTENTION: Keep a copy of this order in your possession

at all times in order to assist law enforcement. Immediately

report any violation of this order to law enforcement.

A10

Appendix C—Order Denying [Petitioner’s]

Participation At Protection Order Hearing

Without Wearing A Mask (November 17,2020); CV2820-6569

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL

DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE

COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

AMANDA MITCHELL,

Petitioner,

NICHOLAS RAMLOW,

Respondent,

ORDER ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO

PARTICIPATE AT PROTECTION ORDER HEARING

WITHOUT WEARING A MASK

DENIED: Mask requirement comes from order of the Idaho

Supreme Court

the Motion of Respondent, Nicholas Ramlow, for

an orderSdJQ^ing him personally to participate without

wearing a maskatth^hearing on November 18, 2020, or any

other date to which such>h^aring may be continued, and

review of the file herein^^his^ motion is hereby

GRANTED/DENIED.

11/17/2020

Clark A. Peterson, Magistrate

All

Appendix D-Protection Order (November 18,2020);

CV28-20-6569

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL

DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR

KOOTENAI COUNTY

Case No. CV28-20-6569

Amanda Mitchell,

Petitioner

Nicholas Ramlow,

Respondent.

PROTECTION ORDER

[X] Original

[X] Stalking and/or Threats (I.C. § 18-7907)

Protected Person(s): [X] Petitioner; [X] Minor family

member(s): Cameron Mitchell, Hudson [Ramlow]; [X]

Family, household member(s): Olivia Mitchell.

Respondent: Nicholas R. Ramlow

Respondent’s Address: 977 Foys Lake Rd. Kalispell, MT

59901-7469.

Relationship to Protected Person(s): [X] child in

common; [X] intimate partner; [X] have been in a dating

relationship.

This order shall be effective until NOV 18, 2021 at

11:59 P.M./unless terminated earlier by another court

order. If the Respondent does not appear at the hearing

date listed on the last page of this order, a longer protection

order may be issued against the Respondent. If the

Petitioner fails to appear, the petition may be dismissed.

A12

WARNINGS: This order meets all “full faith and credit”

requirements of the VAWA, 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994) upon

notice of the Respondent. This court has jurisdiction over

the parties and the subject matter; the Respondent has

been or will be afforded notice and a timely opportunity to

be heard as provided by the laws of this jurisdiction. This

order is valid and entitled to enforcement in each

jurisdiction throughout the 50 states of the United States,

the District of Columbia, all tribal lands, and all U.S.

territories, commonwealths, and possessions and shall be

enforced as if it were an order of that jurisdiction.

As a result of this order, it may be unlawful for the

Respondent to purchase or possess a firearm, including a

rifle, pistol, or revolver, or ammunition pursuant to federal

law under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). If you have any questions

whether these laws make it illegal for the Respondent to

possess or purchase a firearm, you should consult an

attorney.

Violation of any provision of this order by the

Respondent, after actual notice of its terms, is a

misdemeanor and may result in arrest and sentencing for

up to one year in jail and a $5,000 fine, even if the

Protected Person(s) consents to the violation. Only the

Court can change this order.

The Respondent was served and provided notice of hearing.

Petitioner Appeared: [X] Yes, Represented by: Samantha

Hammond.

Respondent Appeared: [X] No, Represented by: Kevin Waite

[X] The Court found, after a hearing, that a protection

order should be issued.

////

THE COURT ORDERS:

A13

Personal Conduct Order. The Respondent shall

not contact or attempt to contact the protected person(s) in

any manner, including in person or through another

person, or in writing or through any electronic means,

including telephone, email, text, through social networking,

or facsimile. The Respondent shall not harass; stalk;

threaten; use, attempt to use or threaten use of physical

force; or engage in any other conduct that would place the

protected person(s) in reasonable fear of bodily injury.

However, the Respondent may participate in legal

proceedings involving the protected person(s) and may

communicate through attorneys about legal issues

involving the protected person(s).

PROTECTED PERSON(S) LISTED ON THE FIRST

PAGE OF THIS ORDER: [X] Petitioner; [X] Minor family

members.

[X] THERE ARE NO EXCEPTIONS TO THIS ORDER.

[X] THERE ARE EXCEPTIONS ORDERED AS

FOLLOWS: [X] to participate in court ordered mediation

Stav-Awav Order. Respondent shall not, EVEN IF

INVITED BY THE PROTECTED PERSON(S),

knowingly remain within 1000 feet of the Protected

Person(s), or [X] go within 1000 feet of: [X] Protected

Person’s residence at 2163 W. John Loop 207 CDA 83814;

[X] Other: 3063 W. Augustin Dr. CDA ID.

Move-out Order and/or Law enforcement

assistance. [XI Does not Apply.

Child custody. [X] Does not Apply.

Conflicting Orders. If any term of another civil or

criminal order conflicts with any term of this order you

must follow the more restrictive term. Dismissal of any

other order will not result in a dismissal of this order.

A14

Order on Renewal. [X] IT IS FURTHER

ORDERED that if Respondent wants a hearing to object to

the renewal of this order Respondent must file a request for

such a hearing with the Court within 14 days.

Treatment/Counseling. [X] Attend an approved

Domestic Violence Offender Intervention Program and

attend review hearings

Change in Address and Future Service. The

parties shall, at all times, keep the Court informed of their

current mailing/email addresses.

Other.

10.

Order to clerk. It is further ordered that the clerk

of the court shall forward a copy of this order to the

Sheriffs Office in the county in which this order was

originally issued for immediate entry into record systems

and to facilitate service in the jurisdiction in which the

Respondent resides, if not previously served. The clerk

shall deliver or mail a copy of this order to the Petitioner.

Date: 11/18/2020

Signed: Clark A. Peterson

Judge

NOTICE: It is a misdemeanor under Idaho Code § 39-6312

for the Respondent, after notice of this order, to violate the

provisions of this order. Further, it is a crime under Idaho

Code § 18-204 for any person to aid and abet a crime, or, not

being present, to advise and encourage a crime. In addition,

under Idaho Code § 18-304, any person who counsels, aids,

solicits or incites another to commit a misdemeanor is guilty

of a misdemeanor. Therefore, it may be a crime for any

person to encourage or invite contact between the

Respondent and the Petitioner, except such contact as is

expressly permitted by the above order.

I have received a copy of this order, advisory

notice and warning.

A15

Signed: Amanda Mitchell

Petitioner

Date: 11/18/2020

Signed: Nicholas Roddy Ramlow by Kevin Waite, Attorney

Date: 11/18/2020

ATTENTION: Keep a copy of this order in your possession

at all times in order to assist law enforcement. Immediately

report any violation of this order to law enforcement.

A16

Appendix E—Letter To Administrative

Richard S. Christensen (November 16,2021)

Judge

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL

DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR

KOOTENAI COUNTY

Case No. CV28-20-6569

AMANDA MARIE MITCHELL,

Petitioner,

NICHOLAS RODDY RAMLOW,

Respondent,

LETTER TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE RICHARD S.

CHRISTENSEN

Judge Richard S. Christensen,

COMES NOW, the Respondent, Nicholas Ramlow In

Pro Per, with this Letter requesting that you modify the

current terms and conditions under which parties may have

access to the Courts; parties must have access to the

Courts. While the most current Administrative Order for

the First Judicial District listed on the Supreme Court’s

website is Order H21-DW.25, Respondent has reason to

believe that there is a more current Order and that this

Order is compliant with the Supreme Court Order “In Re:

Emergency Order Regarding Court Services, dated

September 22, 2021.” Guidelines prohibiting litigants from

accessing the courts for refusing to wear masks should be

reconsidered and reversed for the following reasons:

Mask wearing as a means of mitigating the

spread of SARS-COV-2, lacking objective and substantial

evidence of its effectiveness, is a political question, a priori.

As a political matter, a government requirement to wear a

mask falls under the unlawful umbrella of compelled speech

and, by requiring them within the Court, the Courts become

its most fervent campaigner; engaged in judicial activism.

A17

As the revered Thomas Sowell puts so well in

his book, Intellectuals and Society, judicial activism is

distinguished by “...whether the basis of a judge’s decision is

the law created by others...or whether judges base their

decisions on their own conceptions of ‘the needs of the times’

or of ‘social justice’ or of other considerations beyond the

written law or legal precedents.” Further, Sowell warns that

“[i]f the principle of free-wheeling judicial law-making

becomes established and accepted across the ideological

spectrum, then swings of the ideological pendulum over time

can unleash a judicial war of each against all, in which the

fundamental concept of law itself is undermined, along with

the willingness of the people to be bound by the arbitrary

dictates of judges.” Declaration of Nicholas Ramlow (Nov.

17, 2020). Sowell. P. 254, 258.

Judicial Activism comes with it great dangers

and costs to the public interest. In a paper attached hereto

as “Exhibit A”,9 Kuran argues the paper “illuminates not

only why a policy that few people support privately may

command an overwhelming public endorsement, but also

why, once this policy is in place, the degree of private

opposition will diminish.” For the purposes of this paper, the

Respondent urges consideration of the following:

in an environment consisting of

“activists... split into two pressure groups”, one that

advocates for not wearing a mask (Respondent/p=0) and

another who advocates for wearing masks (Judge/p=l) and

“non-activist[s], far greater in number, [who] are not precommitted to any particular policy...”, the reader can follow

the logic of this proposition from Exhibit A.

The great danger here (and why history

and experience has taught us to severely limit rule making

powers of courts in general) is that, while society may consist

9 Said exhibit provides the mathematical framework for preference

falsification and is in the record on appeal but omitted from this petition

due to its length.

A18

of many “private preferences” and “public preferences” for

the policy choices of p=0, the power of p^l to produce a public

environment (the courts) that prohibits p=0 means that,

regardless of number of p=0 in society, the public

environment will consist of only p=l and non-activists.

This public environment thus constrains

all “public preference” to p=l.

To achieve societal

equilibrium “private preferences” must be consistent with

“public preferences”, see bold line in Figure 2. Revolutions

are more likely to occur when there is a deviation between

“private preferences” and “public preferences” or, put

differently, when society, as a whole has aggregated a large

degree of “preference falsifications”.

“The activists advocating p=l are major

beneficiaries of the described capture of the non-activists’

minds.. .the key role in this capture is played not by them but

by the mass of non-activists, who, by withholding their

personal convictions from one another, distort the climate of

opinion...[this] manipulation is possible precisely because

the non-activists’ cognitive limitations make their minds

capturable.”

4. As indicated by Affidavit, attached hereto as

“Exhibit B”, you were served “NOTICE OF VIOLATIONS,

PURSUANT 18 U.S.C. 242, PRAYER FOR RELIEF, AND

NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE-FAIR NOTICE AS A

DISPOSITIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE ‘CLEARLY

ESTABLISHED LAW’ STANDARD AND INJURY CLAIM

PURSUANT 42 U.S.C.[1983]” on May 19, 2021. Respondent

hereby gives further notice of intent to file a lawful challenge

to “absolute judicial immunity” in the same suit.

The aforementioned Notice gives further

reasons as to why the current order is unlawful. Among

these are:

principles

violates

separations

powers

A19

It violates limitations on general rule

making powers of Idaho Courts, e.g. I.C. § 1-213 “[s]aid rules

shall neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive

rights of any litigant.” (Procedural protections of substantive

interests were created before the U.S. Supreme Court

adopted the term “substantive”, ergo the more antiquated a

procedural rule, the more likely it is inexorably tied to a

substantive interest).

I.C.A.R. 48 grants discretionary power to

the lower courts during an emergency—away from the

Supreme Court, “...the Administrative Judge..,may order

the closure of a district court...”

I.C.A.R. 48 is a 4th tier rule (low effect of

law) and subsequent dictates are 5th tier rendering them

weak and infantile to constitutional provisions (high effect of

law).

jury protections.

It violates speedy and impartial trial by

right to be heard.

It violates due process protections to the

It violates speech protections under the

1st Amendment and is therefore subject to strict scrutiny.

The risk associated with SARS-COV-2 has,

thus far, been cast by subjective review and no objective

standard has been identified for longer than a 30 day media

cycle (political indicator). Further, the ‘remedy’ may be

worse than the ‘emergency’. As Thomas Sowell liked to say,

“’A’ always exceeds ‘B’—if you exaggerate ‘A’ and leave out

enough of ‘B’.”

In conclusion, Respondent hereby DEMANDS access

to the Court and that you remove the constitutional

violations from your procedure and for the “immediate

resumption of court business by the most expeditious and

practical means possible”, pursuant I.C.A.R. 48(a). I PRAY

A20

for the resumption of court business and the proper station

of its jurisdiction; constrained to the laws written by others.

Dated this 16th day of November, 2021

By:

Nicholas Ramlow, In Pro Per

A21

Appendix F-Kootenai County District Court Order

On Appeal (October 7,2022); CV28-20-6569

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL

DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE

COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

AMANDA MITCHELL,

Petitioner-Appellee,

NICHOLAS RAMLOW,

Respondent-Appellant.

Case No. CV28-20-6569

ORDER ON APPEAL

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURE

Appellee, Amanda Mitchell, and Appellant, Nicholas

Ramlow, were previously in a dating relationship which

ended in 2019. See Petition for Protection Order p.6. They

have one minor child in common, Hudson Ramlow. See

Petition for Protection Order p.3. Appellee also has two other

children from other relationships. See Petition for Protection

Order p.6 Appellee filed a Sworn Petition for Protection

Order on October 21, 2020 alleging that Appellant had been

stalking her. Appellee outlined eight (8) separate occasions

that demonstrated Appellant had placed tracking devices on

her vehicles, drained oil from her boyfriend's truck, showed

up at her house unannounced and was tracking her through

their son with a watch that has tracking capabilities. The

trial court entered an ex parte temporary protection order

based on the petition and set the matter for hearing on

November 4, 2020.

Appellant was served the petition and notice of

hearing on November 26, 2020, as evidenced by the Sheriffs

Return of Service on record in the case herein. The initial

A22

temporary protection order stated, "If the Respondent does

not appear at the hearing date listed on the last page of this

order, a longer protection order may be issued against the

Respondent. If the Petitioner fails to appear, the petition

may be dismissed." See Temporary Ex Parte Protection

Order and Notice of hearing dated October 22, 2020 on file

in the case herein.

The initial hearing on the Temporary Ex Parte Order

was scheduled for November 4, 2020. The transcript of that

hearing reveals that Appellant was represented by counsel,

however, Appellant was outside the courthouse as he refused

to wear a mask and was not allowed to enter. T. p.4, LI. fl14. Appellee was not represented by counsel and since

Appellant was unwilling to enter the courtroom, the court

continued the hearing for an additional two (2) weeks. T. p.5,

LI. 9-12. The court entered a Reissuance of Temporary

Protection Order and Notice of hearing which contained the

same language informing Appellant that a longer protection

order may be entered if he fails to appear at the hearing.

The presiding judge also informed Appellant through

his counsel that Appellant would be required to attend the

subsequent hearing in person, as is everyone in civil

protection cases. T. p.ll, LI. 6-9. The judge did state that

Appellant could request whatever he felt is appropriate, but

at that time, the presiding judge was requiring Appellant to

be present in court with a mask on. T.p. 11, LI. 11-14. The

judge again stated at the conclusion of the hearing, "Mr.

Ramlow will be expected to be here in person with a mask on

subject to any decisions otherwise that Judge Peterson

makes." T. p. 12, LI. 5-7. The next hearing was scheduled for

November 18, 2020.

Counsel for Appellant filed a Notice of Appearance on

November 16, 2020, two days prior to the hearing. Appellant

also filed a Motion to Allow Respondent to Participate at

Protection Order hearing without Wearing a Mask on the

same date. That Motion was denied by the Court on either

November 17 or 18, 2020. Appellant did not request that in

A23

the alternative to being allowed to appear personally in court

without a mask, that the court enter a lesser alternative

such as appearing via Zoom. Appellant's motion stated,

"Respondent is not requesting to participate in the hearing

of this matter by Zoom, but would do so under objection if the

court orders it." See Motion to Allow Respondent to

Participate at Protection Order hearing without Wearing a

Mask dated November 16, 2020, page 2.

At the hearing on November 18, 2020, the presiding

judge stated that he had addressed the request to attend the

hearing without a mask and that Appellant was required to

"come in. He's required to wear a mask." T. p. 14, LI. 17-19.

Further, the judge stated, "So I ask the bailiffs to escort him

inside. If he is unwilling to wear a mask, the bailiffs were

also advised that there's a warrant for his arrest and he's to

be taken into custody." T. p. 14, LI. 20-23.

The bailiffs were unable to locate Appellant outside of

the courthouse and counsel for Appellee informed the court

that there was a possibility that Appellant had already been

arrested on his outstanding warrant because of the presence

of police officers outside. T. p. 15, LI. 17-19. The court then

addressed the underlying petition and stated, "let's go ahead

and address that here, because he is not present, either

because he's been taken into custody or because he himself

on his own apparently departed." T. p. 17, LL 8-11.

The court then addressed the petition and informed

Appellee that she was entitled to entry of an order as

Appellant failed to appear. T. p. 17, LL 4-7. The court

inquired as to whether Appellee wished to have an order of

protection entered and counsel responded in the affirmative.

T. p. 18. LL 7-9. Counsel for Appellant then made a record

related to the constitutionality of the stalking in the seconddegree statute, Idaho Code 18-7906, stating that it was void

for vagueness as it relates to the victim suffering emotional

distress. T. p. 18, LI. 11-23. The court interrupted counsel

and stated that he was not going to allow counsel to make a

A24

record as his client was not present. T. p. 18 LI. 24-25; p. 19,

LI. 1-16.

The court then inquired into the terms requested by

the original petition not entered in the temporary protection

order. The court asked if including all minor children in the

protection order was sufficient to which counsel stated it

was. T. p. 21-22. The court entered the protection order for

one year and required Appellant to attend the batterer's

intervention course and informed the present parties that it

would set it for subsequent review hearings. T. p. 24, LI. 1521, p. 25, LL 1-15.

Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration on

December 2, 2020. The motion for reconsideration addressed

the same issues that are presented by Appellant on appeal.

That motion was heard before the trial court on February 2,

2021 and an extensive record was made. That record is

contained within the transcripts prepared by the court. The

motion for reconsideration was denied and an order was

entered reflecting such.

A subsequent review hearing was scheduled for

January 5, 2021 to review Appellant's progress with the

batterer's intervention course. That hearing was conducted

via Zoom. Appellant failed to appear at that hearing and a

warrant was issued for his arrest. Appellant was arrested on

his warrant on or about May 20, 2021. At his arraignment

on the following date, the presiding judge quashed the

court's warrant and allowed Appellant to participate in the

batterer's intervention course in his hometown. Appellant

has not had any review hearings with the court since and he

has not provided any proof of participation in or completion

of said course. No further warrant or motions for contempt

have been pursued for Appellant's failure to abide by the

court's order.

Appellant appealed the lower court's order for

protection entered November 18, 2020 and also the decision

of the court on his Motion for Reconsideration.

A25

This matter came on for oral argument on June 13,

2022 on Appellant's Brief and Appellee's Responsive Brief.

At the time of the hearing on oral argument, the underlying

civil protection order had expired, and the District Court

asked for additional briefing on the issue of whether the

expiration of the protection order rendered the appeal moot.

II. STANDARD

The appellate court exercises free review over

conclusions of law. "Appellate courts ... are not permitted to

substitute their own view of the evidence for that of the trial

court, or to make credibility determinations;" Nelson v.

Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 713 (2007). The standard of review is

an abuse of discretion. The relevant inquiry in determining

an abuse of discretion "is whether the trial court (1) correctly

perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the

outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the

legal standards applicable to the choices before it; and (3)

reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Hopper v.

Hopper, 144 Idaho 624, 626 (2007).

The magistrate's findings of fact will be upheld if they

are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Smith

v. Smith, 124 Idaho 431, 436 (1993). Further, the findings of

fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and such

are not clearly erroneous if supported by substantial and

competent evidence. Baker v. Ore-Idaho Foods, Inc., 95 Idaho

575, 578 (1973). "Substantial and competent evidence is

relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to

support a conclusion." Kelly v. Wagner, 161 Idaho 906,910

(2017).

III. ANALYSIS

"Justiciability issues, such as mootness, are :freely

reviewed." Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep't of Admin.,

159 Idaho 813, 826, 367 P.3d 208, 221 (2016) (quoting State

v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8,232 P.3d 327,329 (2010) ). "An

issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and

substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded

A26

through judicial decree of specific relief." Nampa Educ. Ass 'n

v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 158 Idaho 87, 90, 343 P.3d

1094, 1097 (2015) (quoting Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater

Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849, 851, 119 P.3d 624,

626 (2005) ). Stated differently, mootness "applies when a

favorable judicial decision would not result in any relief. This

Court may only review cases in which a judicial

determination will have a practical effect on the outcome."

Houpt v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass'n, 160 Idaho 181, 189,

370 P.3d 384, 392 (2016) (quoting Fenn v. Noah, 142 Idaho

775, 779, 133 P.3d 1240, 1244 (2006) ). "This Court must

raise issues of mootness sua sponte because it is a

jurisdictional issue." Suter v. Biggers, 157 Idaho 542,550,337

P.3d 1271, 1279 (2014).

In the present case, the protection order expired on

April 17, 2022. Appellee has not filed enforcement

proceedings, nor would she be able to as the civil protection

order is expired and is not a valid or enforceable judgment at

this time. The appeal is moot as Appellant lacks a legally

cognizable interest in the outcome, there is no justiciable

controversy, and a judicial determination will have no

practical effect upon the outcome. Further, Appellant has

failed to demonstrate that an exception to the mootness

doctrine exists and therefore, the appeal is moot.

Due to the protection order from which Appellant

appeals has expired, this Court finds that the appeal is moot

and will not engage in the analysis of the issues on appeal.

It should be noted that Appellant is required to attend

the domestic violence program as a result of the terms of his

stipulated Judgment of Modification in his custody case,

Kootenai County Case Number CV-2016-2923, which is a

separate judgment and separate case.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing,

Appellant's appeal as moot.

this

Court

dismisses

□

A27

DATED this 7th day of October, 2022.

Scott Wayman, District Judge

A28

Appendix G—Idaho Supreme Court Opinion

(November 27,2024): Mitchell v. Ramlow, 559 P.3d

1210 (Idaho, 2024)

559 P.3d 1210

SUPREME COURT OF IDAHO,

Coeur d’Alene, September 2024 Term.

AMANDA MARIE MITCHELL,

Petitioner-Respondent,

NICHOLAS RODDY RAMLOW

Respondent-Appellant

Docket No. 50287-2022

Opinion Filed: November 27, 2024

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District

of the State of Idaho, Kootenai

County. Scott L. Wayman, Senior District Judge. The

decision of the district court is affirmed.

Kevin J. Waite, P.C., Coeur d’Alene, for Appellant, Nicholas

Roddy Ramlow. Kevin J. Waite argued.

Palmer, George, PLLC, Coeur d’Alene, for Respondent

Amanda Marie Mitchell. Samantha R. Hammond argued.

MEYER, Justice.

This is an appeal from the district court’s dismissal of

Nicholas Roddy Ramlow’s appeal of a civil protection order.

The district court determined that the expiration of the

underlying protection order rendered Ramlow’s appeal moot.

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Ramlow’s appeal

as moot and decline to award attorney fees on appeal.

////

A29

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In October 2020, Amanda Mitchell filed for a civil

protection order against Ramlow based on allegations that

he was stalking her. Mitchell and Ramlow were in an onagain-off-again relationship for several years and shared a

son in common. At the time Mitchell requested the protection

order, she was separated from Ramlow and engaged to

another man. She maintained that Ramlow was tracking her

movements by, among other things, placing a tracking device

on her car and giving their son a smart watch with tracking

capabilities. The magistrate court issued a temporary ex

parte protection order based on Mitchell’s application and

set the matter foi' a hearing on November 4, 2020.

During this time, mask mandates were in place due to

the COVID-19 pandemic. The Kootenai County Courthouse

required parties to wear a mask to enter the courthouse. On

the day of the hearing, Ramlow appeared at the courthouse

but was refused entry because he refused to wear a mask as

required by the order then in effect. The hearing was

rescheduled to November 18, 2020. Ramlow was not

physically present at the rescheduled hearing; he again

refused to wear a mask, and at the hearing it was unclear

whether he left the courthouse of his own accord or if he had

been taken into custody on an outstanding warrant.

Nevertheless, the magistrate court held the hearing without

Ramlow, and it did not permit Ramlow’s attorney to argue

against the protection order. The magistrate court issued the

protection order for one year. The terms of the protection

order required Ramlow to attend a 52-week domestic

violence course and attend review hearings.

Ramlow filed a motion for reconsideration of the

protection order in December 2020. Mitchell opposed the

motion for reconsideration, which was denied following a

hearing in March 2021. The motion for reconsideration and

the magistrate court’s decision are not part of the record on

appeal. On April 14, 2021, Ramlow agreed to complete a 52week domestic violence course and to attend all review

A30

hearings as part of his child custody agreement in a separate

case. On April 23, 2021, Ramlow appealed the denial of his

motion for reconsideration and the issuance of the protection

order to the district court. The magistrate court extended the

protection order through April 17, 2022, but it had expired

by the time Ramlow’s appeal was set for oral argument

before the district court. As a result, the district court

requested supplemental briefing from the parties on

whether Ramlow’s appeal was moot. After hearing oral

argument on the merits of the appeal and reviewing the

parties’ supplemental briefing, the district court dismissed

Ramlow’s appeal as moot. On October 7, 2022, the district

court issued its Order on Appeal, which held that the

expiration of the underlying protection order mooted the

appeal and that Ramlow failed to show that an exception to

the mootness doctrine applied to preserve his appeal.

Ramlow timely appealed the district court’s order. On

appeal, Ramlow asks this Court to reverse the district court’s

ruling that his intermediate appeal was moot and to vacate

the magistrate court’s underlying protection order. He

argues that the district court erred when it dismissed his

appeal because he contends his appeal still presents

justiciable issues and, in the alternative, he claims his

appeal satisfies all three exceptions to the mootness

doctrine. Ramlow also seeks an award of attorney fees on

appeal under Idaho Code section 12-121, and costs under

Idaho Appellate Rule 41. Mitchell argues that the district

court did not err in dismissing Ramlow’s appeal as moot and

seeks attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code section 12121, as well as costs on appeal under Idaho Code section 12107.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When this Court reviews the decision of the district

court acting in its appellate capacity, we do not review the

magistrate court’s decision but are “procedurally bound to

affirm or reverse” the district court. Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154

A31

Idaho 855, 859, 303 P.3d 214, 218 (2013) (quoting Bailey v.

Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012)).

A district court’s mootness determination is reviewed

de novo. State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329

(2010).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Ramlow’s appeal is moot.

A case is considered moot when “the issues presented

are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable

interest in the outcome.” Frantz v. Osborn, 167 Idaho 176,

180, 468 P.3d 306, 310 (2020) (quoting Farrell v. Whiteman,

146 Idaho 604, 610, 200 P.3d 1153, 1159 (2009)). A case is

also considered moot when a judicial determination “would

have no effect either directly or collaterally on the plaintiff,

the plaintiff would be unable to obtain further relief based

on the judgment and no other relief is sought in the action.”

Idaho Schools for Equal Educ. Opportunity ex rel. Eikurn v.

Idaho State Bd. of Educ. ex rel. Mossman, 128 Idaho 276,

282, 912 P.2d 644, 650 (1996) (citation omitted). This Court

may dismiss an appeal if it determines the appeal “involves

only a moot question.” State u. Long, 153 Idaho 168, 170, 280

P.3d 195, 197 (Ct. App. 2012) (quoting State v. Manzanares,

152 Idaho 410, 419, 272 P.3d 382, 391 (2012)).

However, an appeal may survive even if it is moot so

long as it falls within one of three recognized exceptions to

the mootness doctrine: “(1) when there is the possibility of

collateral legal consequences imposed on the person raising

the issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is likely to evade

judicial review and thus is capable of repetition; and (3)

when an otherwise moot issue raises concerns of substantial

public interest.” Koch v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 163,

177 P.3d 372, 377 (2008) (quoting AmeriTel Inns, Inc. v.

Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849, 851—52, 119

P.3d 624, 626-27 (2005)).

We agree with the district court that Ramlow’s appeal

is moot. The protection order was the sole basis of Ramlow’s

A32

intermediate appeal, and when it expired, Ramlow lost any

legally cognizable interest in the outcome. Any judicial

determination concerning the validity of the protection order

would not affect Ramlow because the order was no longer

enforceable, and Ramlow was no longer subject to its terms.

Nevertheless, because Ramlow contends that his

appeal falls within all three exceptions to the mootness

doctrine, we must determine whether his case satisfies one

or more of those exceptions. For the reasons explained below,

we conclude that Ramlow’s appeal does not satisfy any

exception to the mootness doctrine.

B. Ramlow’s appeal does not fall within the

recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine.

Ramlow maintains that his appeal falls within all

three exceptions to the mootness doctrine. In a one-sentence

analysis, the district court concluded that Ramlow failed to

establish that his appeal fell within an exception to the

mootness doctrine. We will analyze each exception in turn.

We note at the outset that there is some overlap between the

capable of repetition yet evading review exception and the

public interest exception.

1. The Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review

exception does not apply in this case.

The capable of repetition yet evading review exception

to the mootness doctrine requires that the issue on appeal is

both capable of repetition and likely to evade judicial review.

Ellibee v. Ellibee, 121 Idaho 501, 503, 826 P.2d 462, 464

(1992) (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court

has noted that the doctrine “applies only in exceptional

situations,” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109

(1983) (citing DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319

(1974)), and is ‘limited to the situation where ... (1) the

challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully

litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was

a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party

would be subjected to that same action again[.]” Murphy v.

A33

Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (per curiam) (quoting

Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam)

(remaining citations omitted).

We have considered otherwise moot appeals in the

past “due to the abbreviated length of protection orders”

when “the time period in which a person is affected may

expire prior to judicial review,” and “the controversy is

susceptible to repetition yet avoiding review.” Ellibee, 121

Idaho at 503, 826 P.2d at 464 (citations omitted). However,

in Ellibee, the issues presented on appeal were also “quite

likely to arise on future occasions” as they involved “the

scope of the Domestic Violence Act’s application, and its

requisite standard of proof.” Id. In addition, the issues

presented were “issues of substantial public interest” given

that, at that time, the Domestic Violence Act was recently

enacted and had not been interpreted by an Idaho appellate

court. Id.

Ramlow raises two arguments to support his

contention that his appeal falls under the capable of

repetition yet evading review exception to the mootness

doctrine. First, he argues that the short duration of

protection orders makes challenges to their validity likely to

evade review. He notes that protection orders “are typically

issued for either 90 days or one year” and may or may not be

renewed or extended beyond that timeframe. He is not wrong

in this regard. Protection orders are of relatively short

duration and can evade review when they expire before an

appeal is complete. Ramlow emphasizes that the protected

party can allow a protection order to expire during the

pendency of an appeal by failing to request that the order be

renewed. By emphasizing this, Ramlow implies that Mitchell

harbored some kind of nefarious intent or ulterior motive by

strategically declining to seek a second renewal or an

extension of the civil protection order in this case, thereby

rendering his appeal moot. There is no evidence in the record

to support the view that Mitchell’s failure to seek a second

A34

extension of the civil protection order was done with the

intent to sabotage Ramlow’s appeal.

As part of this argument, Ramlow references

“challenged conduct” that is “capable of depriving a party of

his visitation rights.” He has not identified exactly what he

claims is the “challenged conduct.” The protection order was

issued by the magistrate court based on allegations from

Mitchell that Ramlow placed tracking devices on her car and

on their son’s smart watch, and that he was engaged in

stalking behavior. Ramlow has suggested that the protection

order that issued in this case was questionable; however, he

did not provide this Court with a complete record of what

occurred before the magistrate court. Because this Court

received an incomplete record on appeal, we must assume

that the record below supports the magistrate’s decision to

issue the civil protection order. La Bella Vita, LLC v. Shuler,

158 Idaho 799, 805, 353 P.3d 420, 426 (2015) (“When a party

appealing an issue presents an incomplete record, this Court

will presume that the absent portion supports the findings

of the district court. We will not presume error from a silent

record or from the lack of a record.” (quoting Gibson v. Ada

County, 138 Idaho 787, 790, 69 P.3d 1048, 1051 (2003)).

Even if the short duration of civil protection orders

makes an appeal of the underlying order capable of evading

judicial review, Ramlow has failed to show that the issues in

his appeal are capable of repetition because they are too fact

specific. The facts underlying each civil protection order case

are different, as is the corresponding evaluation of the

magistrate court’s decision whether to issue a civil protection

order in a particular case. The discrete issues that Ramlow

complains of are not likely to be raised in a similar way in

future cases.

Other courts have followed this same line of reasoning

when dealing with fact-specific appeals under this exception

to the mootness doctrine. See N.F. v. G.F., 316 P.3d 944, 947

(Utah Ct. App. 2013). Utah’s version of the public interest

exception to the mootness doctrine includes the capable of

A35

repetition yet evading review exception. See id. at 946. In

N.F., a grandmother appealed from a child protective order

involving her minor grandchild. Id. at 945. The mother of the

child argued that the grandmother’s appeal was moot. Id. at

946. The Utah Court of Appeals determined the appeal was

moot because the order had expired. Id. at 947. The

grandmother attempted to challenge the expired order under

the public interest exception, arguing that the district court

had applied an overly broad interpretation of the statute

when it issued the challenged order. Id. at 946-47. The Utah

Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the district court

narrowly construed the statute and based its findings on the

unique facts of the case. Id. It explained that the

grandmother’s appeal did not fall within the exception

because it was not “likely to recur in a similar manner’ in

future cases.” Id. at 947. Specifically, it explained that

“[b]ecause the factual underpinnings of each child abuse case

are different and because such facts are necessarily the basis

of the trial court’s determination of whether a child is in

imminent danger of being abused, the issues of which

Grandmother complains are not likely to be raised in a

similar manner in other future cases.” Id. The Utah Court of

Appeals cited cases from other jurisdictions that followed a

similar analysis:

Cf. Putman v. Kennedy, 297 Conn. 162, 900 A.2d

1256, 1265 n. 14 (2006) (“[A]lthough the defendant

claims numerous due process and statutory

violations, his pro se brief filed before the Appellate

Court indicates that they all are rooted in the trial

court’s exercise of its discretion with respect to the

facts of these particular cases, and his brief to this

court, filed by counsel, does not indicate otherwise.

Thus, although the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading

review’ exception might well be applicable in a

domestic violence restraining order case raising

broader issues than those presented here, the

Appellate Court properly concluded that the

exception did not apply to this appeal.”); In re Jeffrey

A36

C., 64 Conn. App. 55, 779 A.2d 765, 772 (2001)

(determining that an issue was “not capable of

repetition” where the issue was limited “to the case

at hand and preclude[d] any far reaching impact in

future Juvenile Court proceedings”), rev’d on other

grounds, 261 Conn. 189, 802 A.2d 772 (2002).

Id. (alteration in original). Similar fact-specific issues are at

play in this case. Ramlow’s appeal of the expired protection

order does not raise the type of broad issues that are likely

to recur in future cases.

Second, Ramlow argues that his exclusion from the

courthouse, resulting from his refusal to comply with the

mask-mandates in place during the COVID-19 pandemic,

bring his appeal within the capable of repetition yet evading

review exception. He asserts that the mask mandates were

the result of judicial activism. He appears to claim that

compliance with such mandates may give an “undue

advantage” to individuals that comply with the mandates

over individuals that seek to challenge the mandates, which

he contends is a scenario that could arise again in the future.

We are not persuaded by this line of argument. In this case,

Ramlow is correct that he was unable to challenge the

issuance of the protection order at the hearing before the

magistrate below; however, his own choices led to that

outcome. He decided not to wear a mask. He either left the

courthouse of his own accord or was arrested on an

outstanding warrant in another case. It is unreasonable to

expect that the exact same mask mandates will be imposed

in the event of a future pandemic. The mask mandates at

issue in Ramlow’s underlying case have long since expired,

and the advent of treatment options has largely eliminated

the need for the strict mandates employed in the early days

of the pandemic. Circumstances on the ground have

changed. While it is not outside the realm of possibility for

another pandemic to occur, it is the first of its kind in the

modern era and is unlikely to recur in the near future.

A37

Other courts have taken a similar view when it comes

to whether challenges to orders issued during the pandemic

fall within the capable of repetition yet evading review

exception to the mootness doctrine. In Brach v. Newsom, 38

F.4th 6, 11, 12 (9th Cir. 2022), the Ninth Circuit determined

that a challenge to school closure orders issued during the

pandemic was moot and did not fall under the capable of

repetition yet evading review exception to the mootness

doctrine. The Ninth Circuit looked to the fact that the

challenged school closure statutes “included a sunset

provision so [the] law would automatically expire” on a

certain date, as well as a “self-repeal” clause, and noted

“[b]oth of these dates have come and gone and there have

been no efforts to reenact the emergency legislation.” Id. at

13. The Ninth Circuit noted that the schools “maintained inperson instruction throughout the surge of the Omicron

COVID-19 variant, even while the State’s case count soared

well past numbers reached early in the pandemic.” Id. at 14.

It explained that measures to combat the virus have led to a

significant change in the circumstances. Id. (first citing

Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, 20 F.4th 157,

162—64 (4th Cir. 2021); then citing County of Butler v.

Governor of Pennsylvania, 8 F.4th 226, 231 (3d Cir. 2021)).

The appellants in Brach acknowledged "that circumstances

have changed since July 2020, when they filed their

complaint, but suggest that an unexpected reversal in the

public health situation could lead the Governor to once again

close schools.” Id. The Ninth Circuit determined that the

appellants’ “fears are too ‘remote and speculative.’” Id. It

explained that “[reasonable expectation means something

more than ‘a mere physical or theoretical possibility,”’ and

the capable of repetition yet evading review exception did not

apply because there was no “reasonable expectation” that

schools would again be closed. Id. The Ninth Circuit noted

the changed circumstances since the beginning of the

pandemic led it to conclude that the capable of repetition yet

evading review exception did not apply. Id. at 15.

A38

We hold that Ramlow’s appeal does not satisfy the

capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to the

mootness doctrine, as his case is too fact-specific to fall

within this exception.

2. The Collateral Consequences exception does not

apply in this case.

This exception to the mootness doctrine applies “when

there is the possibility of collateral legal consequences

imposed on the person raising the issue.” Snap! Mobile, Inc.

v. Vertical Raise, LLC, Idaho , , 544 P.3d 714, 742-43

(2024) (alteration omitted) (quoting Koch v. Canyon County,

145 Idaho 158, 163, 177 P.3d 372, 377 (2008)). In Snap!

Mobile, we concluded that the collateral consequences

exception applied because the permanent injunction at issue

in that case “may form the basis for further contempt

proceedings.” Id. at , 544 P.3d at 743.

Ramlow maintains that the collateral consequences

exception applies to his appeal because he was ordered to

attend a 52-week domestic violence course and subsequent

review hearings as a term of the civil protection order. He

contends that the requirement continues beyond the

expiration of the protection order and is a collateral

consequence of the order. Ramlow also argues that firearm

restrictions under Title 18 of the United States Code in

sections 922(g)(8) and 924(a)(2) stemming from the civil

protection order are a collateral consequence, although he

concedes that he was only subject to those restrictions while

the civil protection order was in effect. Finally, Ramlow

maintains that his parenting time and child custody order

are affected by the terms of the civil protection order despite

its expiration.

Mitchell counters that Ramlow is no longer subject to

the terms of the civil protection order because it has expired.

She points out that Ramlow was never subject to civil

contempt proceedings for his failure to complete the 52-week

domestic violence course, that he cannot be subject to

contempt proceedings because the civil protection order has

A39

expired, that he never attended review hearings, and that he

is no longer subject to the firearms restrictions stemming

from the protection order. Mitchell also notes that Ramlow

entered into a stipulated child custody agreement in a

separate case in which he agreed to attend a 52-week

domestic violence course and the review hearings. She

argues that, as a result, the collateral consequences

exception does not apply to Ramlow’s appeal.

We agree with Mitchell and the district court that

Ramlow has not shown the possibility of collateral legal

consequences affecting him due to the expired civil

protection order. Ramlow is no longer subject to the firearms

restrictions that were in place when the protection order was

active. No contempt proceedings were ever initiated against

Ramlow for his failure to complete the 52 week-domestic

violence course. Ramlow has failed to show that the

existence of an expired civil protection order will prejudice

him in other proceedings. He has already entered into a

stipulated child custody agreement with Mitchell, and he has

not identified any other legal proceedings where the expired

protection order could have collateral legal consequences.

His contention that his parenting time is a collateral

consequence of the civil protection order is unavailing.

Ramlow entered into a separate child custody agreement.

That agreement contained provisions related to parenting

time, which would increase in phases. He agreed to complete

the 52-week domestic violence course and attend review

hearings as part of Phase 1. Even though Ramlow argued

that he would not have agreed to complete the domestic

violence course or attend review hearings if it was not

already court-ordered, there is no evidence to support that

contention in the record on appeal. We note that the civil

protection order has now expired, and its requirements that

Ramlow complete the domestic violence course and attend

review hearings are no longer enforceable in this case. Any

impact on Ramlow’s parenting time at this point is due to his

past failure to comply with the terms of the stipulated child

custody agreement and is not attributable to the expired

A40

protection order in this case. As a result, we hold that the

collateral consequences exception does not apply in this case.

3. The Substantial Public Interest exception does not

apply in this case.

This exception to the mootness doctrine applies when

an issue “of substantial public interest” is involved.

Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429, 432, 816 P.2d 986, 989

(1991). This Court has held the substantial public interest

exception applies to the following situations: (1) reviewing

involuntary commitments, id., (2) interpreting the scope of a

recently enacted statute and the standard of proof related to

claims under that statute, Ellibee, 121 Idaho at 503, 826 P.2d

at 464 (interpreting the scope of the then-recently enacted

Domestic Violence Act and the standard of proof required to

obtain a domestic violence restraining order), and (3)

determining whether a public entity can use public funds to

campaign in an election, AmeriTel Inns, Inc. v Greater Boise

Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849, 852, 119 P.3d 624, 627

(2005). We have long held that “the possibility of the

reoccurrence of a similar lawsuit” or the “theoretical

possibility that an issue may resurface will not suffice” to

bring an appeal within the public interest exception to the

mootness doctrine. Great Beginnings Child Care, Inc. v. Off.

of Governor of State of Idaho, 128 Idaho 158, 160, 911 P.2d

751, 753 (1996).

In this case, Ramlow posits that his appeal falls

within the substantial public interest exception because of

“the simple fairness of procedure.” He contends that “[t]o

declare this appeal moot would vest substantial control in

the 'protected person’ [to determine] whether issues raised

on appeal can be resolved.” Ramlow maintains that the

protected party’s ability to decide “whether to apply for the

extension of a protection order or just let it expire . . . can

ultimately insulate a questionable protection order from

appellate review and decision^]” He also contends that

because his civil protection order hearing occurred during

the COVID-19 pandemic, and he was denied entry to the

A41

courthouse for refusing to wear a mask, this appeal presents

issues of substantial public interest.

Ramlow’s arguments under the substantial public

interest exception have some overlap with his arguments

related to the capable of repetition yet evading review

exception. As we explained in that section, Ramlow focuses

on the protected party’s failure to seek an extension of a

challenged civil protection order during the pendency of an

appeal as being indicative of some kind of nefarious intent or

ulterior motive on the part of the protected party to thwart

the appeal or gain some other kind of advantage in the

litigation. Again, there is no evidence in the record that

indicates Mitchell’s failure to seek a second extension of the

civil protection order was done with the intent to sabotage

Ramlow’s appeal. Ramlow argues that “(t]he ability of one

party to pull the rug out from under the other party’s appeal”

facilitates “evasion of review” and promotes a “dubious policy

of giving that party unilateral control over the appeal

process and any other litigation . . . that may be influenced

by the challenged judgment.” His argument that the ability

to decide not to seek an extension of a protection order grants

the protected party control over the entire appeal process

and any other related claims is too speculative. His

contention that the protection order process grants the

protected party unilateral control over any other future

litigation that may be influenced by the challenged

protection order relies on the “possibility of reoccurrence of a

similar lawsuit,” which is not sufficient to raise broader

issues of substantial public interest.

The same can be said of his argument with respect to

the COVID-19 mask mandates. Ramlow’s second argument

that the substantial public interest exception applies

because, “[w]hile a failure to wear a mask does not currently

bar entry to the courthouse, it is possible that we are not

done with this pandemic or that there will be another one

and that the measures and restrictions that bedeviled

[Ramlow] may be put back in place” is a “theoretical

\ />

A42

possibility that an issue may resurface,” which this Court

has held is insufficient to fall within the substantial public

interest exception, Great Beginnings Child Care, Inc., 128

Idaho at 160, 911 P.2d at 753. For these reasons, we hold

that Ramlow’s appeal does not fall within this exception to

the mootness doctrine.

4. Vacatur of the underlying order is not appropriate

in this case.

Finally, Ramlow seeks to vacate the underlying

expired protection order if we affirm the district court’s

determination that his appeal is moot. In Moon v. Investment

Board of State of Idaho, 102 Idaho 131, 627 P.2d 310 (1981),

we vacated the underlying judgment when a constitutional

challenge of a statute became moot on appeal because the

statute was repealed during the pendency of the appeal. We

held that vacatur of the judgment, in that case, was

appropriate because it “clears the path for future relitigation

of the issues between the parties,” and vacatur ensured that

none of the parties was prejudiced by a “decision which in

the statutory scheme was only preliminary.” Id. (quoting

United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 40 (1950)).

In State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 9, 232 P.3d 327, 330 (2010),

we held that vacatur of the decision from the Court of

Appeals was appropriate when the defendant had served his

entire sentence while the intermediate appeal was pending,

and we dismissed the appeal as moot. In that case, however,

we did not vacate the underlying sentence, nor did we vacate

the district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction. Id.

These cases stand for the proposition that an issue may be

moot because of a change in circumstances, and, in the

interest of fairness, those changed circumstances may or

may not justify vacatur of an underlying order or judgment.

This case does not present a situation where vacatur

of the underlying order is appropriate. Ramlow’s appeal is

moot because the civil protection order has long since

expired, not because of a changed circumstance that would

indicate that, in the interest of fairness, the underlying order

A43

should be vacated. Therefore, we decline to vacate the

expired civil protection order in this case. Ramlow is no

longer subject to the order. Even if he shares a child with

Mitchell, he has failed to demonstrate that the possibility of

relitigating the same issues that arose in connection with the

expired protection order is likely. With respect to potential

prejudice stemming from the expired civil protection order,

Ramlow entered into a stipulated child custody agreement in

a different case that places a separate requirement on him

to complete the domestic violence class and attend review

hearings. Ramlow has failed to show that the existence of an

expired civil protection order will prejudice Ramlow in other

proceedings.

C. Neither party is entitled to an award of attorney

fees on appeal.

Ramlow seeks attorney fees on appeal under Idaho

Code section 12-121. Idaho Code section 12-121 provides for

an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party if the appeal

was pursued or defended “frivolously, unreasonably or

without foundation.” I.C. § 12-121. As Ramlow was not the

prevailing party on appeal, he is not entitled to an award of

attorney fees under this section.

Mitchell also seeks an award of attorney fees on

appeal under Idaho Code section 12-121. She contends that

Ramlow “does not develop any of his arguments on appeal

and cites very little authority for his position.” Mitchell

maintains that Ramlow is simply inviting this Court to

second- guess the district court with respect to its mootness

determination. Although Mitchell is the prevailing party on

appeal, we decline to award her attorney fees under Idaho

Code section 12-121 because Ramlow’s appeal was not

pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.

Ramlow raised valid arguments related to the difficulties in

appealing the issuance of a protection order when that order

is not renewed.

Mitchell seeks an award of attorney fees under Idaho

Code section 12-107. Idaho Code section 12-107 does not

A44

provide for an award of attorney fees on appeal—it provides

for costs on appeal when “a new trial is ordered” or “when a

judgment is modified” within the trial court’s discretion.

Section 12-107 states, “[i]n all other cases the prevailing

party shall recover costs, including his costs below when the

appeal is to the district court.” I.C. § 12-107(2). We decline to

award attorney fees or costs to Mitchell under this section.

Mitchell also seeks costs on appeal under Idaho

Appellate Rule 40(b). As the prevailing party, she is entitled

to costs on appeal.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the district court’s

decision is affirmed. Mitchell is awarded costs under Idaho

Appellate Rule 40(b).

Chief Justice BEVAN, and

MOELLER, and ZAHN CONCUR.

Justices

BRODY,

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Appendix H—Photo Of State Actors Obstructing

Court Access (November 17,2021)

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.