Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Charles Bozzo, Petitioner v. Jennifer Nanasy, et al.

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS AND ORDERS

Amended Opinion, U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit (November 26, 2025)........ la

Amended Judgment, U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit (November 26, 2025)...... 16a

Order Recalling the Mandate, U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

(NGVWem bP 6.2025): esc esr seen sperepese reer ssn: 18a

Superseded Opinion Issued Prior to Recall of

Mandate, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit (October 17, 2025) 20... eee 19a

Opinion and Order, U.S. District Court for the

Western District of Michigan

(DéeOiib6r:27,, 2024) cece 34a

Judgment, U.S. District Court for the Western

District of Michigan (December 27, 2024)....... 57a

REHEARING ORDER

Order Denying Petition for Rehearing, U.S. Court

of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

(DeCEiHbEE 29) 2025) cncccccccseccnmesenmeennnauec 59a

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved .....61a

US. Corst.ametid. XIV ¢§ @: sscosssscvccsecsscesece 6la

A2Z U.S.C. § 1983 oo. eeeeeeeeeeceeteeeseeeteees 6la

MCL § 600.5805... eee ceceecceeeeceeeceeseeeeeeseeteeeees 62a

App.la

AMENDED OPINION, U.S. COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

(NOVEMBER 26, 2025)

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit 1.0.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 25a0324p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES BOZZO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JENNIFER NANASY, Discipline Coordinator,

Michigan Department of Corrections;

HEIDI E. WASHINGTON, Director,

Michigan Department of Corrections,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 25-1199

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.

No. 1:24-cv-00624—Jane M. Beckering, District Judge.

Before: THAPAR, READLER, and

HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judges.

App.2a

AMENDED OPINION

READLER, Circuit Judge.

Charles Bozzo was fired from his job as a

correctional officer with the Michigan Department of

Corrections after a coworker accused him of making

harassing comments. Years later, he sued two MDOC

employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the

pair violated Bozzo’s constitutional rights in terminating

him. The district court dismissed the action on statute

of limitations grounds and for failure to state a claim.

We affirm.

I.

We borrow the facts as alleged in the complaint.

Beginning in 2013, Bozzo worked on-and-off as a

correctional officer at the Michigan Department of

Corrections. But his employment ended for good due

to bad blood between him and Jane Doe, a fellow

MDOC employee. At one point in time, the two had

carpooled together to work. In 2017, however, Doe

reported Bozzo for lewd and obscene comments made

during their drives. Doe later reported Bozzo for other

instances of misconduct. Upon learning of these complaints, Bozzo seemingly directed some “obscenities” at

Doe when discussing her actions with fellow correctional officers. R.1, PageID 10-12. Once Bozzo’s words

made their way back to Doe, she reported him for that

conduct, too.

The situation came to a head on June 19, 2019,

when MDOC served Bozzo with a misconduct charge

regarding his carpool comments and his later remarks

about Doe in the workplace. The charge summarized

App.3a

the allegations against Bozzo as well as the MDOC

rules his purported misconduct implicated. Five days

later, MDOC held a disciplinary conference with Bozzo

and his union representative. According to Bozzo, the

conference was brief, amounting to little more than

his representative making a short statement about

Bozzo’s employment and the charges. MDOC informed

Bozzo of his termination on July 31, 2019.

Bozzo challenged that decision by invoking his

collectively bargained right to arbitration. A three-day

arbitration hearing was held ending on December 17,

2020. At the hearing, Jennifer Nanasy, MDOC’s

discipline coordinator, testified that MDOC applied its

recently updated employee policies to Bozzo, which took

a more stringent approach to harassment allegations.

A few months later, on March 1, 2021, the arbitrator

issued a ruling in favor of MDOC.

On December 18, 2023, Bozzo filed a complaint in

federal court. Named as defendants were Nanasy as

well as Heidi Washington, MDOC’s director. He sued

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations

spanning the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and

Fourteenth Amendments. In large part, Bozzo took

issue with his arbitration hearing (where he claims he

was “set up” using “surprise” testimony and “subjective”

new policies) and with the arbitrator (who he claims

relied on “falsehood[s]” and derived “significant income”

from MDOC arbitrations). Bozzo v. Nanasy, No. 23-cv-

1316, Dkt. No. 1, PageID 13-15, 23 (W.D. Mich. Dec.

18, 2023). After Bozzo failed to respond to defendants’

motion to dismiss, the district court dismissed the

action without prejudice for lack of prosecution. Bozzo

re-filed largely the same complaint on June 14, 2024.

Defendants again moved to dismiss, and the district

App.4a

court again granted their motion, this time on multiple grounds. One, that Bozzo’s claim was untimely

under the statute of limitations. And two, that Bozzo

had forfeited his constitutional arguments save for his

Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim,

which failed to state a claim in any event.

Bozzo appealed. As in district court, he advances

only his procedural due process claim. He asserts that

the district court erred in dismissing the action as

time-barred and that he stated a plausible claim for

relief under § 1983.

Il.

We review the complaint’s dismissal de nova

Operating Eng’rs’ Loc. 324 Fringe Benefit Funds v.

Rieth-Riley Constr. Co., 43 F Ath 617, 621 (6th Cir. 2022).

We take as true Bozzo’s well-pleaded factual allegations

as well as any reasonable inferences derived from those

allegations. Having done so, we then ask whether those

allegations moved Bozzo’s claims across the line from

possible to plausible, thereby surviving dismissal.

Forman v. TriHealth, Inc., 40 F.4th 448, 448 (6th Cir.

2022) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)).

A. Start with the threshold statute of limitations

question. Although the statute of limitations is an

affirmative defense, an action remains subject to

dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

if the complaint’s allegations “affirmatively show that

the claim is time-barred.” Cataldo v. US. Steel Corp.,

676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Jones v. Bock,

549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)). In that instance, a plaintiff

can survive dismissal only by showing that an exception

App.5a

to the statute of limitations applies. Lutz v. Chesapeake

Appalachia, LLC, 717 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2013).

Section 1983 claims borrow the limitations period

applicable to personal injury actions under the law of

the state in which they arose. Eidson v. State of Tenn.

Dep’t of Child’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir.

2007). The parties do not dispute that Michigan’s

three-year statute of limitations applies to this action.

See Rapp v. Putnam, 644 F. App’x 621, 625 (6th Cir.

2016) (citing Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th

Cir. 1986) (per curiam)); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.

§ 600.5805(2). But they do not agree on the date on

which that three-year clock started ticking.

A bit of background, then, on claim accrual for

§ 1983 claims. Although state law governs the duration

of the limitations period, federal law dictates when a

§ 1983 claim accrues. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,

388 (2007). On that front, the Supreme Court instructs

us that the statute of limitations begins to run when

the plaintiff has “a complete and present cause of

action.” Id. (quoting Bay Area Laundry & Thy Cleaning

Pension Tr. Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192,

201 (1997)). Said differently, the limitations period

commences “the first day that every element of a claim

has occurred such that the plaintiff may sue in court

over the claim.” Reguli v. Russ, 109 F.4th 874, 879

(6th Cir. 2024) (per curiam) (citing Wallace, 549 U.S.

at 338).

Despite Supreme Court precedent suggesting

otherwise, our Court’s cases have applied a “discovery

rule” to § 1983 claims. Under that framework, a claim

accrues when a “plaintiff knows or has reason to know

of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Johnson

v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., 777 F.3d 838, 843

App.6a

(6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Roberson v. Tennessee, 399 F.3d

792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005)). We have noted the apparent

contradiction between the Supreme Court’s occurrencebased rule and our discovery rule. See, e.g., Reguli,

109 F.4th at 885 (Murphy, J., concurring); Snyder-Hill

v. Ohio State Univ., 54 F.4th 963, 974 (6th Cir. 2022)

(Readler, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing

en banc). But we need not weigh in further on that

tension today. As both parties assume the discovery

rule applies notwithstanding Supreme Court precedent,

we take the case as presented to us. United States v.

Sineneng-Smith, 140 8. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020).

Turn, then, to the timing issues underlying Bozzo’s

claim. A “complete and present” “procedural due process

claim” has two elements. Reed v. Goertz, 143 S. Ct. 955,

961 (2023). First, there must be a “deprivation by state

action of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property.” Id. Second, there must be “inadequate state process.” Id. (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113,

125 (1990)). Taking these requirements together, a

procedural due process claim is “complete” only once

the “deprivation” and the State’s failure to “provide

due process” have both occurred. Jd (quoting Zinermon,

494 U.S. at 126).

When do we deem those events to have transpired

with respect to Bozzo? Beginning with the required

“deprivation,” Bozzo alleges a loss of property occurring

when his public employment was terminated. See

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,

542-43 (1985) (“pretermination hearing[s]” before

“deprivation”); Farhat v. Jopke, 370 F.3d 580, 597 (6th

Cir. 2004) (describing terminated employee’s “postdeprivation due process”). That date is often identifiable

from employment records or the like. See Damsel v.

App.7a

Fisher, 114 F.3d 1187, 1997 WL 328607, at *2 (6th Cir.

1997) (table) (per curiam). Here, MDOC formally

terminated Bozzo on July 31, 2019, “in a short correspondence.” R.1, PageID 16. So Bozzo’s “deprivation”

occurred on that date.

As for the requisite process, “a plaintiff's injury

accrues at the time that process was denied because

‘the allegedly infirm process is an injury in itself.” Am.

Premier Underwriters, Inc. v. Natl R.R. Passenger Corp.,

839 F.3d 458, 461 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Nasierowski

Bros. Inv. Co. v. City of Sterling Heights, 949 F.2d 890,

894 (6th Cir. 1991)). It follows that a plaintiff may

have a “complete and present cause of action” before

“the entity sued has... reached a ‘final decision’ on

the underlying substantive issues.” Jd. (citing Printup

v. Dir., Ohio Dep't of Job & Fam. Servs., 654 F. App’x

781, 784-88 (6th Cir. 2016)) (citation modified). Consider, for example, our decision in Printup. There, the

plaintiff lost her job after a social services agency

mistakenly labeled her a child abuser. Printup, 654 F.

App’x at 783. She challenged that determination

through an administrative hearing with the agency,

which, if resolved in her favor, would have resulted in

her reinstatement. Jd. Although she was unsuccessful

at that hearing, a state court later vindicated her

claim on appeal. Jd The plaintiff then filed a procedural

due process claim arising from the agency's initial

mislabeling, asserting that her claim accrued when the

administrative hearing officer affirmed the agency’s

mistaken decision. Id. at 785. We disagreed. To our

minds, the plaintiffs claim accrued when the alleged

procedural mistakes resulted in her termination, before

the administrative hearing officer simply upheld those

mistakes. Id. at 787-88.

App.8a

As to Bozzo, he alleges a series of procedural

violations at different points in time. For instance, he

takes issue with MDOC’s handling of Doe’s complaints,

which date back to the June 24, 2019, pre-termination

conference. And he says those due process violations

continued all the way up to his post-termination arbitration hearing, which ended on December 17, 2020.

That latter date—December 17, 2020—was thus the

latest possible date when Bozzo allegedly was denied due

process. And as that date occurred after his termination

in 2019, it is the point at which both elements of his due

process claim had come to fruition, that is, the time at

which Bozzo had a “complete and present cause of

action.” Am. Premier Underwriters, 839 F.3d at 461

(quoting Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388).

This conclusion is problematic for Bozzo. Measured

from that date, Bozzo’s June 14, 2024, complaint did

not fall within the three-year statute of limitations.

True, Bozzo filed his first complaint on December 18,

2023, at the tail end of the limitations period. And

under Michigan law, Bozzo’s original lawsuit would

have tolled the limitations period while it was pending.

See Heard v. Strange, 127 F.4th 630, 633 (6th Cir. 2025)

(citing Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5856). But that

tolling wore off on May 8, 2024, when the district court

dismissed the case without prejudice, see id., and

Bozzo waited more than a month after that to re-file

his claims, rendering the present action untimely. See

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5805(2). As a result, his

claim is time-barred on its face. See Cataldo, 676 F.3d

at 547.

Bozzo disagrees. Invoking the discovery rule, he

contends that his claims could not have accrued until

he “fully realized” that he “was not afforded a fair

App.9a

grievance and constitutional process,” which, he says,

occurred on March 1, 2021, when the arbitrator issued

a decision in MDOC’s favor. Appellant Br. 7. Here, it

bears reminding that our focus under the discovery

rule is on when a “plaintiff knows or has reason to know

of [his] injury.” Johnson, 777 F.3d at 843 (emphasis

added). And, again, the “injury” in a procedural due

process claim is the “infirm process” that accompanies

a deprivation. Am. Premier Underwriters, 839 F.3d at

461 (citing Nasierowski, 949 F.2d at 894). Bozzo had

already been “deprived” of his job when he attended

his arbitration hearing. And he does not allege that he

was unaware of the supposed procedural problems at

his arbitration hearing as it unfolded (e.g., the “surprise”

witness, the arbitrator’s “significant income” from

MDOC arbitrations). R.1, PageID 17, 26. To the extent

Bozzo’s allegations could be construed as criticizing

the decision that followed, that amounts to “dissatisf[action] with the result,” not the process. Farhat, 370

F.3d at 597. Because knowledge of procedural defects

is what counts, the discovery rule does not change our

conclusion as to the accrual date of Bozzo’s claim. See

Printup, 654 F. App’x at 787-88.

With his claim facially time-barred, Bozzo turns

to various exceptions to the statute of limitations,

beginning with equitable tolling. Bozzo “carries the

burden of establishing [his] entitlement to equitable

tolling.” Jackson v. United States, 751 F.3d 712, 718-19

(6th Cir. 2014). But he confronts an immediate roadblock. We apply state tolling rules to § 1983 claims

unless they are inconsistent with federal law. Heard,

127 F.4th at 634. That turns our attention to Michigan

law, which does not permit common law equitable tolling

of express limitations periods, including the three-year

App.10a

period at issue here. See Trentadue v. Buckler Lawn

Sprinkler, 738 N.W.2d 664, 679-80 (Mich. 2007) (citing

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5805) (“[C]ourts are

[not] free to cast aside a plain statute in the name of

equity.”); Devillers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 702

N.W.2d 539, 556-57 (Mich. 2005); Secura Ins. Co. v.

Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 605 N.W.2d 308, 311 (Mich.

2000) (per curiam). Equitable tolling, it follows, is

unavailable under the Michigan limitations provision

at issue here. Nor does Michigan’s preference for statutory tolling mechanisms to the exclusion of common

law equitable tolling, standing alone, run afoul of federal

§ 1983 policy. See Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S.

478, 488 (1980).

Even under federal law, we apply equitable

tolling “sparingly,” meaning that absent “compelling

equitable considerations, a court should not extend

limitations by even a single day.” Graham-Humphreys

v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552,

560-61 (6th Cir. 2000). Though we have applied varying

approaches to assessing equitable tolling, the inquiry

“often” boils down to whether a litigant “fail[ed] to

meet a legally-mandated deadline due to unavoidable

circumstances beyond that litigant’s control.” Zappone

v. United States, 870 F.3d 551, 556-57 (6th Cir. 2017)

(quoting Graham-Humphrey’s, 209 F.3d at 560-61)

(citation modified). Here, neither Bozzo’s briefing nor his

complaint specify any “compelling equitable considerations” that support tolling. Graham-Humphrey’s, 209

F.3d at 561. And even if Bozzo’s waiting on the

arbitrator’s decision could count (it would not), Bozzo

still delayed nearly three years after that decision to

file suit. So his failure to exercise “reasonable diligence”

would foreclose equitable tolling in any event. Smith

App.lla

v. Davis, 953 F.3d 582, 599 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc)

(rejecting “stop-clock approach” to equitable tolling);

see Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 452

(7th Cir. 1990) (no “automatic extension ...by the

length of the tolling period”).

Bozzo also contends that by “exhausting [his]

administrative remedies,” he tolled the statute of

limitations period. Appellant Br. 12. Yet Bozzo does

not identify what administrative remedies he pursued.

In any event, “the settled rule is that exhaustion of

state remedies is not a prerequisite” to a § 1983 action.

Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 8. Ct. 2162, 2167 (2019)

(citation modified). Only prisoners—who are required

to exhaust—may receive tolling on that basis. See

Printup, 654 F. App’x at 787 n.5 (citing Patsy v. Bd. of

Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982)); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

All in all, Bozzo’s § 1983 claim is untimely on its

face. And as he cannot establish an exception to the

statute of limitations, his complaint was properly

dismissed on this basis.

B. Even had the claim been timely, we would

likewise agree with the district court that Bozzo failed

to state a procedural due process claim, the lone theory

from his complaint that he attempts to resurrect on

appeal. As already stated, that claim has two elements:

“deprivation by state action of a protected interest,”

and “inadequate state process.” Reed, 143 S. Ct. at

961. The parties agree that Bozzo had a protected

property interest in his employment. That leaves us

to resolve whether he plausibly alleged “inadequate

process.”

In this termination context, we evaluate the process

offered to Bozzo both before and after termination.

App.12a

Before termination, Bozzo must have had “some form

of... hearing.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542. Rather

than “a full evidentiary hearing,” all that was necessary

was an “initial check against mistaken decisions.” Id.

at 545. To clear that low bar, the hearing needed to

include, at the very least: (1) “oral or written notice of

the charges,” (2) “an explanation of the employer’s

evidence,” and (3) “an opportunity for the employee,”

here Bozzo, “to tell his side of the story.” Gilbert v.

Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 929 (1997) (citing Loudermill,

470 U.S. at 546). To take one example, in Buckner v.

City of Highland Park, the employer’s representative

visited the plaintiff in the hospital, showed him the

written allegations against him, and asked him to

comment in the presence of his union representative.

901 F.2d 491, 492, 495 (6th Cir. 1990). Despite the

lack of formality, we emphasized that the plaintiff

received a “chance to be heard.” Jd. at 495. That

“critical element” ensured adequate pre-deprivation

process. Id.

So too here. MDOC served Bozzo with a written

misconduct charge summarizing his allegedly harassing

comments and listing the MDOC rules he violated.

Shortly thereafter, Bozzo, accompanied by his union

representative, attended a disciplinary conference.

There, his representative addressed briefly Bozzo’s

future employment and dismissal of the charges.

MDOC terminated Bozzo one month later. But before

his termination took place, Bozzo received notice of

the allegations, MDOC’s basis for bringing them, and

a chance to speak up everything due process requires

before termination. Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 929.

Bozzo portrays the conference as little more than

a “brief discussion.” Appellant Br. 8. But, again, “a full

App.13a

evidentiary hearing” is not required at this stage.

Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545. An “opportunity to respond”

is sufficient. Buckner, 901 F.2d at 496. And nowhere

does Bozzo allege that MDOC limited his ability to

speak on the matter.

With pre-termination due process satisfied, we

turn our attention to whether MDOC followed through

with sufficient post-termination process. At this latter

stage, due process requires an “opportunity for a postdeprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.”

Farhat, 370 F.3d at 596 (emphasis omitted). “At a

minimum,” Bozzo had to “be permitted to attend the

hearing, to have the assistance of counsel, to call

witnesses and produce evidence on his own behalf,

and to know and have an opportunity to challenge the

evidence against him.” Rodgers v. 36th Dist. Ct., 529

F. App’x 642, 649 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Carter v. W.

Rsrv. Psychiatric Habilitation Ctr., 767 F.2d 270, 273

(6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)). Doing so through arbitration procedures set forth in an employee’s collective

bargaining agreement satisfies those criteria. Farhat,

370 F.3d at 596 (citing Bucker, 901 F.2d at 497).

That is what happened here. Following his

termination, Bozzo invoked his right to arbitration

per his collective bargaining agreement. He then

attended a three-day hearing before a neutral arbitrator.

There, Bozzo had a representative acting as counsel,

and he nowhere disputes that he had a chance to

present witnesses and evidence as well as the ability

to challenge the evidence presented against him. That

is, Bozzo enjoyed the minimal procedures needed for a

post-termination hearing. Bozzo does claim that a

“surprise” witness testified at the hearing, but he gives

App.14a

no indication as to whether or how that testimony

breached procedure. R.1, PageID 17.

Rather than identifying precise aspects of the

post-deprivation process with which he takes issue,

Bozzo instead attacks the decisionmaker. Emphasizing

what he sees as the lack of “neutrality and competence”

displayed by the arbitrator, Appellant Br. 9, Bozzo

alleges that the arbitrator earned “significant income”

from handling other MDOC arbitrations. R.1, PageID

26. But that bare allegation does not plausibly suggest

bias. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 683 (2009);

cf. Nationwide Mut Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d

640, 648 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding no “reasonable

person” would conclude that arbitrator was “partial”

simply because he arbitrated prior disputes involving

the opposing parties). In a similar vein, he alleges that

the arbitrator “relied on disproven falsehood[s].”

Appellant Br. 9. Further, he adds, the arbitrator

embraced “unwritten, ephemeral ‘evolving standards,”

id., a seeming reference to the new agency disciplinary

policy applied to Bozzo’s case. These claimed errors

alone do not plausibly show that the arbitrator was

biased against Bozzo, let alone some other procedural

defect. Rather, Bozzo’s insistence that the arbitrator

misapprehended the law and facts suggests that he is

simply “dissatisfied with the result.” Farhat, 370 F.3d

at 597. In other words, his gripes go to substance, not

procedure. That does not suffice to plead a procedural

due process claim.

Bozzo’s other arguments are even less availing.

We see no evidence that the district court imposed a

higher pleading standard than that required by Rule

12(b)(6). See R.12, PageID 110 (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555). And we see no merit in his remaining

App.15a

points, many of which were raised for the first time in

his reply brief, and all of which are meritless. See

Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov't, 305

F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation modified). In

sum, we agree with the district court that Bozzo failed

to state a viable § 1983 claim.

eeES

We affirm.

App.16a

AMENDED JUDGMENT, U.S. COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

(NOVEMBER 26, 2025)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES BOZZO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JENNIFER NANASY, Discipline Coordinator,

Michigan Department of Corrections;

HEIDI E. WASHINGTON, Director,

Michigan Department of Corrections,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 25-1199

On Appeal from the United States District Court for

the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.

Before: THAPAR, READLER, and

HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judges.

AMENDED JUDGMENT

THIS CAUSE was heard on the record from the

district court and was submitted on the briefs without

oral argument.

App.17a

IN CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is ORDERED

that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

/s/ Kelly L. Stephens

Clerk

App.18a

ORDER RECALLING THE MANDATE, U.S.

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

(NOVEMBER 6, 2025)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES BOZZO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Ms

JENNIFER NANASY, Discipline Coordinator,

Michigan Department of Corrections;

HEIDI E. WASHINGTON, Director,

Michigan Department of Corrections,

Defendants-Appellees.

Case No. 25-1199

ORDER

Upon sua sponte consideration, it is ORDERED

that the mandate in this appeal is hereby recalled.

ENTERED PURSUANT TO RULE 45 (a),

RULES OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

/s/ Kelly L. Stephens

Clerk

Issued: November 06, 2025

App.19a

SUPERSEDED OPINION ISSUED PRIOR TO

RECALL OF MANDATE, U.S. COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

(OCTOBER 17, 2025)

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit 1.0.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 25a0324p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES BOZZO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JENNIFER NANASY, Discipline Coordinator,

Michigan Department of Corrections;

HEIDI E. WASHINGTON, Director,

Michigan Department of Corrections,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 25-1199

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.

No. 1:24-cv-00624—Jane M. Beckering, District Judge.

Before: THAPAR, READLER, and

HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judges.

App.20a

OPINION

READLER, Circuit Judge.

Charles Bozzo was fired from his job as a

correctional officer with the Michigan Department of

Corrections after a coworker accused him of making

harassing comments. Years later, he sued two MDOC

employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the pair

violated Bozzo’s constitutional rights in terminating

him. The district court dismissed the action on statute

of limitations grounds and for failure to state a claim.

We affirm.

I.

We borrow the facts as alleged in the complaint.

Beginning in 2013, Bozzo worked on and-off as a

correctional officer at the Michigan Department of

Corrections. But his employment ended for good due

to bad blood between him and Jane Doe, a fellow MDOC

employee. At one point in time, the two had carpooled

together to work. In 2017, however, Doe reported Bozzo

for lewd and obscene comments made during their

drives. Doe later reported Bozzo for other instances of

misconduct. Upon learning of these complaints, Bozzo

seemingly directed some “obscenities” at Doe when

discussing her actions with fellow correctional officers.

R.1, PageID 10-12. Once Bozzo’s words made their

way back to Doe, she reported him for that conduct,

too.

The situation came to a head on June 19, 2019,

when MDOC served Bozzo with a misconduct charge

regarding his carpool comments and his later remarks

about Doe in the workplace. The charge summarized

App.21la

the allegations against Bozzo as well as the MDOC

rules his purported misconduct implicated. Five days

later, MDOC held a disciplinary conference with Bozzo

and his union representative. According to Bozzo, the

conference was brief, amounting to little more than

his representative making a short statement about

Bozzo’s employment and the charges. MDOC informed

Bozzo of his termination on July 31, 2019.

Bozzo challenged that decision by invoking his

collectively bargained right to arbitration. A three-day

arbitration hearing was held ending on December 17,

2020. At the hearing, Jennifer Nanasy, MDOC’s

discipline coordinator, testified that MDOC applied

its recently updated employee policies to Bozzo, which

took a more stringent approach to harassment

allegations. A few months later, on March 1, 2021, the

arbitrator issued a ruling in favor of MDOC.

On December 18, 2023, Bozzo filed a complaint in

federal court. Named as defendants were Nanasy as

well as Heidi Washington, MDOC’s director. He sued

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations

spanning the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and

Fourteenth Amendments. In large part, Bozzo took

issue with his arbitration hearing (where he claims he

was “set up” using “surprise” testimony and “subjective”

new policies) and with the arbitrator (who he claims

relied on “falsehood[s]” and derived “significant income”

from MDOC arbitrations). Bozzo v. Nanasy, No. 23-cv-

1316, Dkt. No. 1, PageID 13-15, 23 (W.D. Mich. Dec.

18, 2023). After Bozzo failed to respond to defendants’

motion to dismiss, the district court dismissed the

action without prejudice for lack of prosecution. Bozzo

re-filed largely the same complaint on June 14, 2024.

Defendants again moved to dismiss, and the district

App.22a

court again granted their motion, this time on multiple

grounds. One, that Bozzo’s claim was untimely under

the statute of limitations. And two, that Bozzo had

forfeited his constitutional arguments save for his

Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim,

which failed to state a claim in any event.

Bozzo appealed. As in district court, he advances

only his procedural due process claim. He asserts that

the district court erred in dismissing the action as

time-barred and that he stated a plausible claim for

relief under § 1983.

Il.

We review the complaint’s dismissal de nova

Operating Eng’rs’ Loc. 324 Fringe Benefit Funds v.

Rieth-Riley Constr. Co., 43 F.4th 617, 621 (6th Cir.

2022). We take as true Bozzo’s well-pleaded factual

allegations as well as any reasonable inferences

derived from those allegations. Having done so, we then

ask whether those allegations moved Bozzo’s claims

across the line from possible to plausible, thereby

surviving dismissal. Forman v. TriHealth, Inc., 40

F.4th 448, 448 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

A. Start with the threshold statute of limitations

question. Although the statute of limitations is an

affirmative defense, an action remains subject to

dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) if the complaint’s allegations “affirmatively

show that the claim is time-barred.” Cataldo v. US.

Steel Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)). In that instance,

a plaintiff can survive dismissal only by showing that

App.23a

an exception to the statute of limitations applies. Lutz

v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 717 F.3d 459, 464

(6th Cir. 2013).

Section 1983 claims borrow the limitations period

applicable to personal injury actions under the law of

the state in which they arose. Eidson v. State of Tenn.

Dep’t of Child’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir.

2007). The parties do not dispute that Michigan’s threeyear statute of limitations applies to this action. See

Rapp v. Putnam, 644 F. App’x 621, 625 (6th Cir. 2016)

(citing Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir.

1986) (per curiam)); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.

5805(2). But they do not agree on the date on which

that three-year clock started ticking.

A bit of background, then, on claim accrual for

§ 1983 claims. Although state law governs the duration

of the limitations period, federal law dictates when a

§ 1983 claim accrues. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,

388 (2007). On that front, the Supreme Court instructs

us that the statute of limitations begins to run when

the plaintiff has “a complete and present cause of

action.” Id. (quoting Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning

Pension Tr. Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192,

201 (1997)). Said differently, the limitations period

commences “the first day that every element of a claim

has occurred such that the plaintiff may sue in court

over the claim.” Reguli v. Russ, 109 F.4th 874, 879

(6th Cir. 2024) (per curiam) (citing Wallace, 549 U.S.

at 338).

Despite Supreme Court precedent suggesting

otherwise, our Court’s cases have applied a “discovery

rule” to § 1983 claims. Under that framework, a claim

accrues when a “plaintiff knows or has reason to know

of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Johnson

App.24a

v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., 777 F.3d 838, 843

(6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Roberson v. Tennessee, 399

F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005)). We have noted the

apparent contradiction between the Supreme Court’s

occurrence-based rule and our discovery rule. See, e.g.,

Reguli, 109 F.4th at 885 (Murphy, J., concurring);

Snyder-Hill v. Ohio State Univ., 54 F.4th 963, 974 (6th

Cir. 2022) (Readler, J., dissenting from the denial of

rehearing en banc). But we need not weigh in further

on that tension today. As both parties assume the

discovery rule applies notwithstanding Supreme Court

precedent, we take the case as presented to us. United

States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 8. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020).

Turn, then, to the timing issues underlying Bozzo’s

claim. A “complete and present” “procedural due process

claim” has two elements. Reed v. Goertz, 143 S. Ct.

955, 961 (2023). First, there must be a “deprivation by

state action of a protected interest in life, liberty, or

property.” Id. Second, there must be “inadequate state

process.” Id. (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113,

125 (1990)). Taking these requirements together, a

procedural due process claim is “complete” only once

the “deprivation” and the State’s failure to “provide

due process” have both occurred. Jd (quoting Zinermon,

494 US. at 126).

When do we deem those events to have transpired

with respect to Bozzo? Beginning with the required

“deprivation,” Bozzo alleges a loss of property occurring

when his public employment was terminated. See

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,

542-43 (1985) (“pretermination hearing[s]” before

“deprivation”); Farhat v. Jopke, 370 F.3d 580, 597 (6th

Cir. 2004) (describing terminated employee’s “postdeprivation due process”). That date is often identifiable

App.25a

from employment records or the like. See Damsel v.

Fisher, 114 F.3d 1187, 1997 WL 328607, at *2 (6th Cir.

1997) (table) (per curiam). Here, MDOC formally

terminated Bozzo on July 31, 2019, “in a short correspondence.” R.1, PageID 16. So Bozzo’s “deprivation”

occurred on that date.

As for the requisite process, “a plaintiff's injury

accrues at the time that process was denied because

‘the allegedly infirm process is an injury in itself.” Am.

Premier Underwriters, Inc. v. Nat? R.R. Passenger Corp.,

839 F.3d 458, 461 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Nasierowski

Bros. Inv. Co. v. City of Sterling Heights, 949 F.2d 890,

894 (6th Cir. 1991)). It follows that a plaintiff may

have a “complete and present cause of action” before

“the entity sued has... reached a ‘final decision’ on

the underlying substantive issues.” Jd. (citing Printup

v. Dir., Ohio Dep't of Job & Fam. Servs., 654 F. App’x

781, 784-88 (6th Cir. 2016)) (citation modified).

Consider, for example, our decision in Printup. There,

the plaintiff lost her job after a social services agency

mistakenly labeled her a child abuser. Printup, 654 F.

App’x at 783. She challenged that determination

through an administrative hearing with the agency,

which, if resolved in her favor, would have resulted in

her reinstatement. Jd. Although she was unsuccessful

at that hearing, a state court later vindicated her

claim on appeal. Id. The plaintiff then filed a procedural

due process claim arising from the agency’s initial

mislabeling, asserting that her claim accrued when the

administrative hearing officer affirmed the agency’s

mistaken decision. Id. at 785. We disagreed. To our

minds, the plaintiffs claim accrued when the alleged

procedural mistakes resulted in her termination, before

App.26a

the administrative hearing officer simply upheld those

mistakes. Id. at 787-88.

As to Bozzo, he alleges a series of procedural

violations at different points in time. For instance, he

takes issue with MDOC’s handling of Doe’s complaints,

which date back to the June 24, 2019, pre-termination

conference. And he says those due process violations

continued all the way up to his post-termination

arbitration hearing, which ended on December 17,

2020. That latter date—December 17, 2020—was thus

the latest possible date when Bozzo allegedly was

denied due process. And as that date occurred after

his termination in 2019, it is the point at which both

elements of his due process claim had come to fruition,

that is, the time at which Bozzo had a “complete and

present cause of action.” Am. Premier Underwriters,

839 F.3d at 461 (quoting Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388).

This conclusion is problematic for Bozzo. Measured

from that date, Bozzo’s June 14, 2024, complaint did

not fall within the three-year statute of limitations.

True, under Michigan law, Bozzo’s original lawsuit

would have tolled the limitations period during the six

months before it was dismissed without prejudice. See

Heard v. Strange, 127 F.4th 630, 633 (6th Cir. 2025)

(citing Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5856). But Bozzo

filed that first complaint on December 18, 2023—one

day after the three-year limitations period expired on

December 17, 2023, meaning the first lawsuit did

nothing to alter the limitations period. See Mich.

Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5805(2). As a result, his claim

is time-barred on its face. See Cataldo, 676 F.3d at

547.

Bozzo disagrees. Invoking the discovery rule, he

contends that his claims could not have accrued until

App.27a

he “fully realized” that he “was not afforded a fair

grievance and constitutional process,” which, he says,

occurred on March 1, 2021, when the arbitrator issued

a decision in MDOC’s favor. Appellant Br. 7. Here, it

bears reminding that our focus under the discovery rule

is on when a “plaintiff knows or has reason to know of

[his] injury.” Johnson, 777 F.3d at 843 (emphasis

added). And, again, the “injury” in a procedural due

process claim is the “infirm process” that accompanies

a deprivation. Am. Premier Underwriters, 839 F.3d at

461 (citing Nasierowski, 949 F.2d at 894). Bozzo had

already been “deprived” of his job when he attended

his arbitration hearing. And he does not allege that he

was unaware of the supposed procedural problems at

his arbitration hearing as it unfolded (e.g., the “surprise”

witness, the arbitrator’s “significant income” from

MDOC arbitrations). R.1, PageID 17, 26. To the extent

Bozzo’s allegations could be construed as criticizing the

decision that followed, that amounts to “dissatisf[action]

with the result,” not the process. Farhat, 370 F.3d at

597. Because knowledge of procedural defects is what

counts, the discovery rule does not change our conclusion

as to the accrual date of Bozzo’s claim. See Printup,

654 F. App’x at 787-88.

With his claim facially time-barred, Bozzo turns

to various exceptions to the statute of limitations,

beginning with equitable tolling. Bozzo “carries the

burden of establishing [his] entitlement to equitable

tolling.” Jackson v. United States, 751 F.3d 712, 718-19

(6th Cir. 2014). But he confronts an immediate

roadblock. We apply state tolling rules to § 1983 claims

unless they are inconsistent with federal law. Heard,

127 F.4th at 634. That turns our attention to Michigan

law, which does not permit common law equitable

App.28a

tolling of express limitations periods, including the

three-year period at issue here. See Trentadue v.

Buckler Lawn Sprinkler, 738 N.W.2d 664, 679-80

(Mich. 2007) (citing Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5805)

(“[C]ourts are [not] free to cast aside a plain statute in

the name of equity.”); Devillers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n,

702 N.W.2d 539, 556-57 (Mich. 2005); Secwra Ins. Co.

v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 605 N.W.2d 308, 311 (Mich.

2000) (per curiam). Equitable tolling, it follows, is

unavailable under the Michigan limitations provision

at issue here. Nor does Michigan’s preference for statutory tolling mechanisms to the exclusion of common

law equitable tolling, standing alone, run afoul of federal

§ 1983 policy. See Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S.

478, 488 (1980).

Even under federal law, we apply equitable tolling

“sparingly,” meaning that absent “compelling equitable

considerations, a court should not extend limitations

by even a single day.” Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis

Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 560-61 (6th

Cir. 2000). Though we have applied varying approaches

to assessing equitable tolling, the inquiry “often” boils

down to whether a litigant “fail[ed] to meet a legallymandated deadline due to unavoidable circumstances

beyond that litigant’s control.” Zappone v. United States,

870 F.3d 551, 556-57 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Graham-

Humphrey’s, 209 F.3d at 560-61) (citation modified).

Here, neither Bozzo’s briefing nor his complaint

specify any “compelling equitable considerations” that

support tolling. Graham-Humphrey’s, 209 F.3d at

561. And even if Bozzo’s waiting on the arbitrator's

decision could count (it would not), Bozzo still delayed

nearly three years after that decision to file suit. So

his failure to exercise “reasonable diligence” would

App.29a

foreclose equitable tolling in any event. Smith v.

Davis, 953 F.3d 582, 599 (9th Cir. 2020) (en bane)

(rejecting “stop-clock approach” to equitable tolling);

see Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446,

452 (7th Cir. 1990) (no “automatic extension . . . by

the length of the tolling period”).

Bozzo also contends that by “exhausting [his]

administrative remedies,” he tolled the statute of

limitations period. Appellant Br. 12. Yet Bozzo does

not identify what administrative remedies he pursued.

In any event, “the settled rule is that exhaustion of

state remedies is not a prerequisite” to a § 1983 action.

Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 8. Ct. 2162, 2167 (2019)

(citation modified). Only prisoners—who are required

to exhaust—may receive tolling on that basis. See

Printup, 654 F. App’x at 787 n.5 (citing Patsy v. Bd. of

Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982)); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

All in all, Bozzo’s § 1983 claim is untimely on its

face. And as he cannot establish an exception to the

statute of limitations, his complaint was properly

dismissed on this basis.

B. Even had the claim been timely, we would

likewise agree with the district court that Bozzo failed

to state a procedural due process claim, the lone

theory from his complaint that he attempts to resurrect

on appeal. As already stated, that claim has two

elements: “deprivation by state action of a protected

interest,” and “inadequate state process.” Reed, 143 S.

Ct. at 961. The parties agree that Bozzo had a protected

property interest in his employment. That leaves us

to resolve whether he plausibly alleged “inadequate

process.”

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